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THE CONTRIBUTORS

JOHN HUBER is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan. His current research focuses on the impact of formal rules and procedures on interparty bargaining processes in advanced industrial democracies.

G. BINGHAM POWELL, JR., is Professor of Political Science at the University of Rochester. He is the author of Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence (1982), coauthor and coeditor of Comparative Politics Today (1992), and currently serving as managing editor of the American Political Science Review.

GEORGINA WAYLEN is Lecturer in Politics and Contemporary History at the University of Salford, England. She is currently writing a book on gender and Third World politics.

STUART J. KAUFMAN is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Kentucky. He is currently working on a study of the causes of ethnic violence in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

MARK I. LICHBACH is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Colorado. A theorist interested in European politics, Lichbach explores the connections between collective action theories and political conflict, as well as the connections between collective choice theories and democratic institutions. He is the author of Regime Change and the Coherence of European Governments (1984) and of articles in political science, economics, and sociology. His two most recent books are The Rebel's Dilemma and The Cooperator's Dilemma (both forthcoming).

JEFFREY A. WINTERS is Associate Professor of Politics at Northwestern University. He works on the comparative and international political economy of contemporary capitalism and is the author of Power in Motion: Capital Mobility and the Indonesian State (forthcoming).

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ABSTRACTS

CONGRUENCE BETWEEN CITIZENS AND POLICYMAKERS IN TWO VISIONS OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
By JOHN D. HUBER and G. BINGHAM POWELL, JR.

This paper explores two quite different visions of the democratic processes that can create congruence between citizen preferences and public policies. In the Majority Control vision, electoral competition and citizen choices result in the direct election of governments committed to policies corresponding to the preferences of the median voter. In the Proportionate Influence vision, election outcomes result in legislatures that reflect the preferences of all citizens; legislative bargaining results in policies linked to the position of the median voter. The authors give more explicit theoretical form to these visions and link them empirically to specific types of modern democracies. They then attempt to test the success of each vision in bringing about congruence between citizen self-placements and the estimated positions of governments and policymaker coalitions on the left-right scale in twelve nations in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Although the analysis reveals weaknesses in each approach, it suggests a consistent advantage for the Proportionate Influence vision.

WOMEN AND DEMOCRATIZATION: CONCEPTUALIZING GENDER RELATIONS IN TRANSITION POLITICS
By GEORGINA WAYLEN

This article examines the impact of gender relations on democratization. It considers a number of key questions: what role do women's movements play in the transition to democratic rule and what impact does a return to competitive electoral politics have on women and women's movements. The starting point is a critique of the existing literature on democratization. That literature cannot provide a satisfactory analysis of the role of women in transition politics because of the narrow definitions of democracy used and the top-down focus of much of it. The article then develops a gendered analysis through a comparison of the different processes of transition in Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe. It highlights the significance of the relationship between civil society and the state and the existence of “political space.”

ORGANIZATIONAL POLITICS AND CHANGE IN SOVIET MILITARY POLICY
By STUART J. KAUFMAN

This article uses two puzzles from the Brezhnev period to test competing models of Soviet military policy and of innovation in military “doctrine.” An organizational model of Soviet military policy offers the best explanation of both cases: why the Soviet Union’s Brezhnev-era military strategy contradicted the Politburo’s priorities (to prevent any war from escalating to nuclear use) and why the Soviet Union agreed to the ABM treaty. The ABM case shows that civilian leaders can force change in military “doctrine” when they have a policy handle—a way of redefining the issue to remove it from the military’s exclusive area of competence. When civilians lack a policy handle, as in the military strategy case, they are unable to force innovation if the military is unwilling.

The Russian government now faces the task of finding effective policy handles that will institutionalize civilian control of military policy. The fate of Russia’s reforms may depend on it.
What Makes Rational Peasants Revolutionary?
Dilemma, Paradox, and Irony in Peasant Collective Action

By Mark I. Lichbach

Peasant upheavals are studied from the perspective offered by the selective incentives solution to Olson’s collective action problem. This article presents much evidence from three different forms of peasant struggles—everyday forms of peasant resistance, unorganized rural movements, and organized peasant rebellions—that demonstrates the widespread existence of selective incentives. Questions about the causes and consequences of selective incentives are then examined. First, what are the conditions under which peasant struggles emphasize material selective incentives rather than nonmaterial altruistic appeals? The level of selective incentives in any peasant upheaval is a function of demand and supply considerations. Peasants demand selective incentives. The suppliers include one or more dissident peasant organizations, the authorities, and the allies of both. A political struggle ensues as the suppliers compete and attempt to monopolize the market. Second, what are the conditions under which the pursuit of material self-interest hurts rather than helps the peasantry’s collective cause? Selective incentives supplemented by ideology can be effective; selective incentives alone are counterproductive.

These questions and answers lead to the conclusion that the selective incentives solution reveals much more about peasant upheavals than simply that peasants will often be concerned with their own material self-interest. It is therefore important to study the following three aspects of peasant collective action: the dilemma peasants face, or how peasant resistance is in the interest of all peasants but in the self-interest of none; the paradox peasants face, or that rational peasants do solve their dilemma (for example, with selective incentives) and participate in collective action; and the irony peasants face, or that self-interest is both at the root of their dilemma and at the foundation of a solution to their paradox.

Power and the Control of Capital

By Jeffrey A. Winters

This essay reviews three recent books on the political economy of finance in postcolonial Asia and Latin America and suggests a framework for examining the relationship between political power and varying patterns of control over investment resources. The stress is on the constraints different controllers of capital can impose on state leaders, the conditions under which policymakers can subvert these constraints, and how conflicts within the state over the trajectory of policy are mediated by who (or what) supplies critical investment resources and the institutional channels through which the resources flow.