Changing Political Opportunity: The Anti-Rape Movement and Public Policy

Both the legal definition of rape and the social responses to it have changed dramatically over the last twenty-five years. The sorts of assaults classified as criminal, the willingness of women who have been raped to turn to the criminal justice system, the rules of prosecution, and the penalties imposed on those found guilty have all been the explicit subjects of public debates initiated in the early 1970s by activists who broke the silence of earlier decades. Activists’ engagement with the policy process throughout the 1970s altered institutions and policy at the local, state, and federal levels, and also affected the development and claims of the broader women’s movement.

Starting in 1970, feminist activists employed a wide range of tactics, from public education and local protests to lobbying legislators at the state and federal level, seeking to change social norms as well as policy and institutions at multiple levels of government. By directing public attention to the issue of rape, activists also raised awareness of other aspects of women’s status in the United States. Movement organizations recruited, trained, and politicized new activists, and created the rape crisis center, a feminist organization that provided services according to a set of principles and engaged in social change work. By declaring war on rape, the movement turned a social condition into a political opportunity for mobilization. Activists quickly won serious and substantial victories in policy and institutional reform. Yet by 1980 the feminist anti-rape movement was in sharp decline. The political component of the movement had largely faded, sponsoring organizations turned their attention elsewhere, and services once provided by movement organizations were located in other institutions.

The story of the anti-rape movement of the 1970s exemplifies a common pattern in United States politics: a social movement emerges to address a
neglected issue or constituency, succeeds in mobilizing support, and attempts to address a wide range of issues; mainstream political institutions take up and respond to some portion of the movement’s demands, and the movement disappears. As social movements work to change the world around them, they also change the terrain on which they function. In this context, victories are often double-edged.

We look at the anti-rape movement here to extend our understanding of the relationship between movements and public policy. Although public policy is a component in the political opportunity structure movements face, and movements can shape public policy, the social movement and policy literatures are insufficiently integrated. In this article we mean to refine political opportunity theory by examining this particularly dramatic case—one in which some of the movement’s demands were quickly met with concrete policy reforms. The anti-rape movement altered the world that produced it, and changed itself in the process. As it won a variety of victories—including service development, institutional and statutory reform, and measurable changes in public perceptions and involvement—it also altered the possibilities and claims available for political action.

We use this case to refine and extend political opportunity theory in response to three distinct, but interrelated, gaps in the literature. First, although scholars acknowledge that activists’ efforts can alter political opportunity, they have rarely examined how. Second, social movements organize around claims that potential supporters find viable. State responses alter the viability of particular claims, such that hard-won gains may be an obstacle to subsequent mobilization. We therefore need a conception of social movement outcomes that incorporates changes in public policy more explicitly. Third, because movements can change the opportunity structure they face, political opportunities that allow social protest to emerge need to be conceptualized apart from those that contribute to movement decline.

In this article we use political opportunity theory to examine the rise, influence, and decline of the anti-rape movement in the United States in the 1970s. We begin by reviewing the literature on political opportunity, focusing on factors that contribute to the rise and to the decline of social protest. We then recount the shifts in political opportunity that allowed the movement to emerge and grow. We trace the development of the movement and its engagement with the state, considering its influence on policy at multiple levels of government, and the movement’s subsequent decline. In the conclusion, we address the interactive relationships among movements, public policy, and political opportunity more generally, suggesting ways in which policy successes affect the prospects for subsequent mobilization, and calling for a broader and more nuanced way of thinking about success, such
that both changes in policy and changes in the prospects for continued mobilization are considered.

Politics, Opportunities, and Public Policies

Political Opportunity Theory

In order to understand the process of a movement's decline and institutionalization, we need to begin by understanding its origins. Protest and dissent do not occur in a political vacuum. Rather, social movements draw from mainstream politics and culture in their efforts to transform the world that creates them. The same environment that creates grievances for dissidents also provides the mix of resources and obstacles that activists use to try to redress them. Scholars refer to this world outside the social movement as the "structure of political opportunities," but they differ on how to define and measure the critical concept.1 Tarrow provides a usable shorthand definition of political opportunity as "consistent—but not necessarily formal or permanent—dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure."2

Given this broad conceptualization of opportunities, it is understandable that within the literature on political opportunity, analysts choose sets of variables that bear most obviously on their areas of concern.3 The major insight underlying most of this literature is that opportunity for launching and sustaining a protest movement is essentially curvilinear: when authorities are open to dissident claims, dissidents will find more direct and less risky ways of pursuing their interests, through more conventional political action, such as lobbying or electoral campaigns—a protest movement is not needed. When authorities are completely intransigent, dissidents are unable to launch social movements—protest appears futile or dangerous. Thus, protest movements emerge when there is the possibility of some responsiveness from government. People are unlikely to engage in social protest unless they believe that such efforts are both necessary and potentially effective. Organizers choose issues that seem most urgent or most promising to their constituencies, targets that seem most vulnerable or provocative, and constituencies most likely to mobilize. The responses they get are a product of both their choices, and the changing circumstances they face.

Before considering feminist organizing against rape, we want to emphasize three critical points about political opportunity that shape the logic of this study. First, by changing political alignments, public policy, and mainstream culture, activists can alter the opportunities they and other challeng-
ers face. Scholars concerned with social movement theory have recognized this, and numerous case studies trace the influence and decline of movements, but theoretical arguments and case analyses are rarely integrated on this point. Second, opportunities vary across issues and over time. The study of particular movements over time emphasizes the dynamic nature of opportunity, such that government policy or political alignments can enable particular challengers, and legitimate and advantage certain claims at different times.\textsuperscript{4} Claims can lose viability for mobilizing following success as well as failure. Third, although opportunity analyses are generally used to explain movement origins, they are less frequently invoked to explain movement decline. Treatments of movements generally employ more rigorous and comprehensive political opportunity frameworks at the outset of case studies, then retreat to offering political contingencies in explaining movement decline. This is unfortunate, because when the conditions that made mobilization possible, and an attractive strategy for activists, change, we would expect the prospects and incentives for continued political mobilization to change as well. Naturally, the opportunities that sustain mobilization are likely to be quite different from those that initially stoke mobilization. Failing to distinguish these different sets of opportunities is a serious oversight in the literature.

Public Policy and Political Opportunity

In order to understand the interactive relationship between movements and opportunities in relatively open polities like the United States, we need to look closely at public policy. Although movement activists generally make policy demands on the state, and policy scholars acknowledge the potential influence of movements on policy, scholars of social movements and of public policy formation generally talk past one another. For example, policy analysts Baumgartner and Jones devote considerable attention to the “waves of enthusiasm” that can shape the public agenda and resultant policies, pointing to public attention and the mass media, but they do not mention the movements that can generate these “waves.”\textsuperscript{5} Similarly, while Jones considers the effects of public opinion and citizens’ attentiveness on public policy formation more generally, he does not address the effects on policy of demands made by activist movements.\textsuperscript{6} Conversely, Costain, among the most policy-oriented of the social movement analysts, emphasizes the importance of particular congressional statutes in opening political opportunities for activists, yet she does not examine the content of policy in detail.\textsuperscript{7} In a similar way, Piven and Cloward address the relationship between protest and policy but not with the detail and specificity needed to interpret a case such as this one.\textsuperscript{8} In discussing the conditions that create opportunities for
challengers to mobilize effectively, Piven and Cloward write only of vaguely defined "large scale changes" that undermine political stability. In assessing how movements can affect policy, Piven and Cloward argue that in times of electoral instability, elites may offer concessions, but they do not specify the mechanisms by which movements influence policy. For the most part, the distance between policy analysts and students of social movements reflects differences in focus. Scholars of the politics of policy formation generally address the inside of the political arena, while studies of social movements address those operating outside mainstream political institutions. The relationship between the inside of the political arena and the larger context in which it operates, however, suggests the necessity of integrating the two literatures.

The issues addressed by public actors making policy, the urgency with which they consider reform, and the alternative possibilities they consider are all shaped by the political universe outside those institutions. Kingdon's metaphor of the "policy window" provides a convenient framework for the policy process on which to graft an understanding of movements. Kingdon argues that the confluence of three streams—problems, policies, and politics—affords institutional actors the chance to affect policy reforms. Movement activists can affect the policy process through each stream: by identifying social conditions as problems worthy of attention; amplifying the urgency of government action; and suggesting (or foreclosing) possible solutions. Politically, movements can provide cover for institutional actors to pursue reform and/or increase the risks of action (or inaction). Integrating the insights from political opportunity theory, we would expect movements to be much more influential on policy at times when policymakers are themselves divided on important issues. To use Baumgartner and Jones's terms, we would expect challengers' definitions of problems and alternatives to exercise more sway when a "policy monopoly" is fragmenting. Political mobilization can then exploit fissures within policy monopolies and lead to innovation in policy. Changes in policy, however, can create new monopolies that dampen the prospects of successful mobilization by challengers.

Looking from the outside, that is, from the perspective of movement actors, public policy provides both the grievances and the rewards that can spur (or dampen) political mobilization. Changes in public policy can alter political alliances in government so that actors normally comfortable within institutional politics seek to mobilize extra-institutional protest to support their claims. Further, government action can provide venues for political action, legitimate certain kinds of claims, as well as provide resources, both material and symbolic, to challengers to use in pursuing their claims within government, often making some sorts of claims, tactics, or groups, stronger than others in the process.
Moments ripe for political action or policy reform pass, sometimes without either action or reform. Movements emerge in response to particular constellations of policy and political alignments but the presence of political movements changes the structure of political opportunities that they, their opponents, and subsequent challengers face. Institutional actors respond to protest movement claims, through combinations of reform, repression, and incorporation. This pattern is endemic to dissident politics in American politics, and can be seen in a variety of case studies of particular movements. Those responses change the urgency and possibilities that challengers consider. As example, Mansbridge’s chronicle of the campaign to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) in the United States notes that progress in fighting discrimination against women through the courts and through state legislatures led some activists to proclaim that the ERA would do even more, while reducing other activists’ sense that social mobilization and ERA ratification were needed to ensure equality. \(^\text{17}\) Mansbridge’s story demonstrates that social protest movements are comprised of coalitions, united for a period of time on a limited set of issues. When policy or political opportunity more generally changes, the nature of these coalitions also changes, as political mobilization can become less necessary for some groups, and less promising for others. \(^\text{18}\) Cycles of protest or reform, then, are inherently political. \(^\text{19}\)

The analysis that follows advances this political process approach, in which fluctuations in public attention and mobilization are explained with reference to fluctuations in political opportunities, and in opposition to theories that explain fluctuations in mobilization with reference to some constant, such as the intractability of social problems \(^\text{20}\) or the inherent tendency in human beings to disappointment. \(^\text{21}\) Our approach suggests that the content of public policy is a critical factor in the structure of political opportunity that makes dissident mobilization possible and potentially efficacious. In a wide range of cases, such as toxic waste, drunk driving, and gay and lesbian rights, we have seen the consistent importance of the content of policy in determining movement trajectories. Generally, when movements affect changes in policy, they alter the circumstances that allowed them to mobilize in the first place, thus changing the prospects for subsequent mobilization. In our analysis of anti-rape activism, we will focus particularly on the interaction between activists and the policy environment. We contend that organizers successfully exploited a political opportunity to address a poorly managed social problem. The generally and partially favorable responses of public institutions strained political alliances within the movement and made it more difficult for activists to continue to mobilize in the same way. Because a social movement’s trajectory is dependent upon its interaction with authorities, life cycle approaches that explain movement demise in terms of
exhaustion” or “disappointment” are, at best, incomplete. Similarly, an explanation of demise that views the end of mobilization as “co-optation” or “selling out” neglects both the real achievements that such bargains can entail, and the actual difficulties of mobilizing in the wake of success. Rather, we understand movement demise by looking at activist efforts to mobilize in the face of state responses.

Changing Opportunities: Mobilizing Against Rape

In retrospect, we can see several shifts in political opportunity that made rape a more urgent and viable issue around which activists could mobilize in the 1970s. Following Kingdon, we can categorize these changes into three distinct streams: problems, politics, and policy. First, in the problem stream, rape appeared as a growing social problem before it began to receive widespread public attention in the early 1970s. Data gathered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and disseminated regularly in government documents, indicated that the rate of reported rape began to increase dramatically in the early 1960s (see Fig. 1), as women entered the workforce in increased numbers, nearly a decade before rape became politicized. In the early 1970s, these FBI data indicated that rape was the fastest growing violent crime in the United States. It is important to note here that the escalation of a problem does not necessarily cause people to perceive that the problem requires political attention. As Stone notes, in order for a condition to be transformed into a social problem appropriate for political mobilization and amenable to changes in public policy, advocates for change need to explain that condition as part of a larger narrative that assigns responsibility to some addressable cause. They did that in this case by countering prevailing narratives about rape (i.e., women “ask for it”) with one that allowed for the possibility of meaningful action. In this case, although the social condition was worsening, and of concern to increasing numbers of women, the rising rate of rape was not, in itself, sufficient to generate a political movement.

Second, in the politics stream, the decade of the 1960s was rife with political activism from the left, the largest shares focused on civil rights and on the efforts to stop the war in Vietnam, but there was also activism against poverty, on behalf of the environment, for free speech, for a number of student concerns and, of course, for women’s equality more generally. This political activism trained activists who would later work for women’s rights and against violence against women. Further, the movements of the 1960s demonstrated the efficacy of protest as a tactic and the social movement as a form, such that the political movements of the 1960s “spilled over” to
Figure 1.

other movements in the 1970s. And the responsiveness of government, at least rhetorically, to the claims of these movements encouraged other dissidents to take up social protest as a means of seeking reform.

There were also changes in attitudes and discourse that allowed activists to speak publicly about rape as a political problem. In addition to political unrest, the 1960s witnessed more candid public attention to previously private matters related to sex and sexuality, such that it was less difficult to discuss rape publicly. Among the first references to rape in the media in the early 1970s were discussions about the treatment of rape within abortion law and politics. Furthermore, the recognition of child abuse, in particular, legitimated activist and government concern with rape. The civil rights movement also drew national attention to abuses of judicial process in sentencing black men convicted of rape to death in the South. The “victims,” in these cases, were not women who had been raped, but men who had been abused by racist legal systems; nonetheless, national attention was drawn to rape cases, and this shined an inadvertent light on the “other” victims of rape.

Finally, in the policy stream, there was an elite-driven pressure to reform rape laws, many of which had been unchanged since colonial times, in the context of larger reforms and calls for the standardization of criminal law. In an effort to promote equity by standardizing and streamlining criminal law in the United States, the American Law Institute, a professional organization comprising judges, lawyers, and law professors, began calling for a national Model Penal Code (MPC) in 1952. In 1962, after thirteen rounds of drafts and commentaries, the American Law Institute approved and published an MPC, and called for states to reform their criminal laws in accordance with it. State lawmakers’ decisions to respond to the MPC provided an open window that the anti-rape movement would later exploit.

The Origins and Growth of the Anti-Rape Movement

Organizing Against Rape

The feminist anti-rape movement grew out of the women’s movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Although rape was appropriately the concern of many women, it was more radical feminist activists who first devoted sustained energy to it. This radical wing of the women’s movement, which exhibited an explicit local community orientation, developed in response to discrimination within male-led organizations directed to social change. Personal experiences of sexist treatment by men in the civil rights and New Left movements led women veterans of those movements to want to address sexism directly, and to develop nonexist nonhierarchical organizations. This
background, rather than efforts aimed at law in particular, produced an attention to grievances drawn from lived experiences; the central premise was that discrimination against women was visible in all aspects of social and economic life, and was part of a larger oppressive structure.

Women’s experiences generated the impetus for organizing around rape. Local feminist organizations initially devoted a good deal of attention to building consciousness and community at the grassroots level. Much of this work entailed bringing women together to talk about their own experiences, at first in relatively small consciousness-raising groups. In the safety of these groups, many women revealed that they had been raped, and the frequency of these revelations led to a recognition among activists that, as Csida and Csida wrote, “Rape was not an isolated act of violence—that it really was the ultimate sexist act—the definitive ripoff of female by male—and that it occurred far more frequently than any one realized.”

Activists began to fight back with direct-action tactics at the local level. In 1970, radical feminists on the West Coast, outraged by the tale of a topless dancer raped at a bachelor party, picketed the wedding with placards declaring the groom a rapist. The New York Radical Feminists (NYRF), after learning that one of their members had been raped while hitchhiking, sponsored a “Speak-Out on Rape” on 24 January 1971, which was modeled on a tactic used by the abortion rights movement. The first Speak-Out, which drew an overflow crowd of more than three hundred and considerable press attention, was later recognized as the emergence of a war against rape. The Speak-Outs spread, and activists distributed reports of them widely, effectively putting the issue at the top of the political agenda for many feminists.

From the time that women began speaking about rape in public events, activists realized that violence against women generally, and rape in particular, demanded a set of immediate and concrete responses. Feminist activists in the early 1970s emphasized that rape, particularly rape of adult women by adult men, was extremely common and that social and institutional responses were inadequate. Women were often reluctant to tell others they had been raped and, even more so, to seek help from public institutions; most rapes went unreported. Activists concluded that the high levels of social stigma associated with revealing the experience of rape, illuminated in the Speak-Outs, both perpetuated rape and worsened post-rape trauma for women.

Furthermore, women who had been raped described the poor treatment that they received from a range of public institutions. In the immediate aftermath of rape, hospital personnel and police were generally unprepared and often insensitive. In order for cases of rape to advance through the criminal justice system, especially to the trial stage, women had to confront a system that made harsh demands upon them. Prosecutors and judges re-
quired them to substantiate their claims with kinds of evidence not required for other crimes, and their personal lives were subject to public scrutiny, such that many women felt they were interrogated more aggressively by police and prosecutors, and with more suspicion, than were the alleged rapists. Finally, conviction rates for rape were very low. The notoriously poor response of the criminal justice system ill-served women who reported rape and discouraged other women from turning to authorities.

Setting Goals

Feminist anti-rape activists proffered multiple goals, some directly addressing problems faced by individual women: (1) to provide direct services to women who had been raped and (in most communities) to advocate for them as they negotiated local health and criminal justice institutions; (2) to teach women how to avoid and resist rape, and to assist them in doing so; and (3) to encourage (or to force) local institutions—hospitals, police departments, and prosecutors’ offices—to be more responsive to women who have been raped in their home communities. In addition, nearly all anti-rape organizations and rape crisis centers had broader social, political, and policy goals. Organizations that were primarily liberal feminist in their orientation chose to focus on reforming rape laws at the state level in order to increase conviction rates and to protect women from additional post-rape trauma. More radical groups called for far-reaching social change and, ultimately, the end of sexual violence aimed systematically at women; some of the more radical groups also joined with their liberal counterparts in the legal reform efforts. In all cases, their demands were more ambitious than the proposed Model Penal Code reforms mentioned above.

The New York Radical Feminists, who organized one of the first feminist conferences on rape, held in New York City on 17 April 1971, published a set of goals drafted at that conference. The NYRF document began with a statement of the long-term goal “to eliminate rape.” Other long-term goals included the elimination of sex roles, the eradication of women’s subservient position in the family and in the labor market, and broad cultural change. The NYRF explained that “our culture—advertising, major novels, pornography—is based on male consciousness and the objectification of women.” The long-range goals were followed by a list of shorter-term goals, which included improving the handling of rape by health and criminal justice professionals, altering living conditions so women could live more safely, and establishing self-defense training. In this way, making public policy demands and providing services to women who had been raped were a means to mobilize activists and develop a broader critique of society. To find a way to draw the connections between the personal and political, and between advocacy and service, feminist activists created a new institution, the rape crisis...
Inventing the Rape Crisis Center

Radical feminists opened the first rape crisis centers almost simultaneously in the spring of 1972 in a handful of cities, including Berkeley, Chicago, Detroit, the District of Columbia, Philadelphia, and Seattle. The model quickly proliferated across the United States, as activists established centers not only in large metropolitan areas and college towns, but in communities of all sizes and composition; anti-rape activists had established nearly twenty-five rape crisis centers by 1973. Founders disseminated their goals and programs through informal channels within the feminist movement, including newsletters and conferences, such that the earliest centers were remarkably uniform in structure and activities.

The rape crisis centers adopted the short-term goals described earlier and set about providing services neglected by other institutions. In the egalitarian rape crisis center, activists tried to create a microcosm of the better world they imagined, and early rape crisis centers shared three elements: (1) they were organized as collectives, with nonhierarchical decision-making and minimal formalized divisions of labor; (2) they provided services directly, mainly telephone hotline services, face-to-face counseling, and victim advocacy vis-à-vis mainstream health and criminal justice institutions; and (3) they engaged in a variety of tasks aimed at changing the world around them—including public education programs, lobbying efforts aimed at institutional change and statutory reform, and mass demonstrations and protests.

The centers were joined, between 1973 and 1976, by more than three hundred local task forces and state coalitions formed under the umbrella of the National Rape Task Force, established by the National Organization for Women (NOW). Together, the centers and the NOW Task Force activists engaged in extensive public education programs, organized demands for the reform of local health and criminal justice institutions, called for rape-law reform across the states, lobbied for financial support from the federal government, and, crucially, demanded widespread social change.

Mobilizing Activists

In addition to addressing the immediate needs of women who had been raped, the early anti-rape activists also understood that rape was a viable issue for mobilizing new feminist activists. As women were delaying marriage and entering the workforce in greater numbers, their perceived (and real) vulnerability to violence outside the home increased. Because rape was an issue that concerned many women, the early rape crisis centers provided a vehicle for bringing together women of diverse backgrounds and political perspectives, many of whom had been raped, including women without ex-
plicitly feminist politics.\textsuperscript{44} Rape seemed an especially promising issue to mobilize around, in part, because there was little organized opposition—at least not to improving medical services and criminal justice responses for adult women raped by adult men other than their husbands, the dominant image of rape at the time. Activists could win institutional and policy reform victories on these issues.

In addition, because mainstream service and legal institutions had been inadequate in responding to rape, anti-rape organizers could fill a service gap, thus enabling organizations to give new recruits useful work to do, and this kind of activity can solidify political support. Many of the earliest rape crisis centers were run entirely by volunteers; even those which incorporated paid staffs relied on large groups of non-professional volunteers to staff the hotlines and fulfill public speaking commitments. The salience of rape as an issue, emphasized by the movement, allowed the movement to grow quickly.

Remaking the World, Engaging the State

Winning Public Attention

The anti-rape movement fully engaged much of the women's movement of the 1970s, and worked to change the ways in which the state and society dealt with rape. Activists sought to raise the profile of rape as an issue and to alter public perceptions of its incidence, circumstances, and effects. Individual authors, most notably Susan Brownmiller, opened public discussion of rape, and provided an analysis of the crime that tied violence against women to a larger structure of oppression.\textsuperscript{45} Activists also made collective efforts to bring increased visibility to the issue, staging "Take Back the Night Marches," along with other similar demonstrations. The early, women-only demonstrations, held at night, were public marches in which women would radically proclaim their right to be safe on the streets. Characterized by high volumes and bright lights, they served to educate both participants and bystanders about violence against women and public safety, and to symbolize the potential for real change in the way women lived their lives.\textsuperscript{46} The widespread and enduring slogan, "rape is violence, not sex," popularized a central claim. Most ambitiously, activists wanted to connect rape publicly to broader social inequities, and thus, remake the world.

In order to gauge the level of public attention to rape, we developed a rough coding scheme for relevant articles reported in the \textit{New York Times Index}.\textsuperscript{47} In Figure 2, we see the rapid increase in public attention from the origins of the anti-rape movement in 1970. Between 1970 and 1974, the number of stories about rape rose more than sixfold, from eight (1970) to fifty-three (1974). These early stories reflected the progress of statutory re-
forms in the state legislatures, changes in local criminal justice institutions, and extensive coverage of new feminist anti-rape organizations and demonstrations as well as the assumption of rape-related activities by other women's movement organizations.

We also see widespread coverage of certain key cultural events, such as the NBC television movie, "A Case of Rape." Broadcast in February 1974, the Nielsen Company reported that the movie led all network programs in national ratings for the week. It also served as a "news peg" upon which columnists opined and interest groups offered comments. Television executives, seeking an audience, produced this dramatic vehicle to respond to and exploit new public interest in the topic.48

In addition to relatively indirect effects of the movement on public attention and culture, activists directly engaged public institutions, beginning with grassroots efforts aimed at local government and quasi-public institutions that dealt with women who had been raped. This was followed by organized efforts aimed at statutory reform across the fifty states, and attempts to enlist financial support from the federal government.

Improving Local Institutions

From the start activists criticized the way local hospitals, police, and prosecutors treated women who had been raped. Institutional and procedural reforms came relatively quickly, and most scholars of the period49 attribute the reforms to the influence of feminist activism.50 Initially, the rape crisis centers took on some of the jobs that they believed these institutions neglected. The centers themselves provided telephone hotlines, face-to-face counseling, self-defense classes, and victim advocacy. At the same time they recognized that some tasks were beyond their capabilities: they could not provide medical care; and they also could not arrest or prosecute rapists. Many anti-rape activists concluded that the movement needed to engage local public agencies to elicit permission for their volunteers to accompany women through the post-rape process, to coordinate referrals, and to demand institutional and procedural reforms.

Relations between the early centers and mainstream institutions were inherently problematic in the wake of often aggressive protests; anti-rape activists had branded treatment by criminal justice professionals as "the second rape."51 Furthermore, the early centers were particularly hesitant to trust police or prosecutors. As one activist recalls:

The founders of the early centers were predominantly among the more militant feminists. They did not believe, for example, that institutional practices would, or even could, change. They reasoned that rape is the
NYT Coverage of "Sex Crimes" Issues
1960-1980

Number of Entries


Figure 2.

logical extension of sexual, political and economic exploitation of women by men. Therefore, since men control the institutions, the treatment of victims was not likely to change. In keeping with that belief, those centers chose not to establish cooperative relations with any public agencies except hospitals. 52

Some of the more radical centers experimented with developing autonomous feminist proxies for arrest and prosecution, in the form of highly organized group confrontations of men known to be offenders. Women, usually including the woman who had been assaulted, confronted offenders publicly, announcing their crimes, and trying to hold them accountable in some way. 53 Some of the more radical centers maintained their opposition to working with public criminal justice institutions, but most moved to establish cooperative relationships with police departments and prosecutors’ offices. Among the earliest centers, the question of working with criminal justice institutions was always difficult; deliberations about strategy on this question, especially in collectively-run organizations, were often long and painful. By 1973, however, the cooperative strategy dominated, a reflection of shifting movement strategies and of more responsive public institutions. 54

As a result of activist efforts, local institutions improved their treatment of women who had been raped. In the final report of a 1974 federally-sponsored study of the response of hospitals to women who had been raped, Brodyaga et al. found substantial improvements in the immediacy with which women were seen, the preparedness and sensitivity of personnel, and the institution of treatment protocols, including evidence collection and patient care. 55 The study’s final report also issued extensive guidelines for further improvements in pre-examination procedures, procedures for medical examinations, followup treatment, training, and interagency coordination. Subsequently, a 1978 federally-sponsored study reported further nationwide gains in hospitals’ responses to rape such that flagrantly inadequate treatment was now unusual. 56

Local police departments and prosecutors’ offices were also among the early targets of anti-rape activists; tales of unprepared criminal justice agencies and insensitive personnel were legendary. The poor treatment was attributed to several factors common to both institutions, including the general lack of training related to sexual assault, the absence of both designated victim-witness advocates and specialized rape units, and limited coordination with other agencies.

Again, a series of federally-sponsored studies found that institutional and procedural reforms—instigated largely by rape-related activism and local lobbying efforts—were instituted rapidly in both police departments and pros-
ecutors’ offices across the country. A comprehensive survey of 208 police departments found that, between 1973 and 1976, 52 percent of departments instituted changes in their procedures for dealing with rape, and 31 percent reported that they had specific plans for changing their procedures in the near future. Battelle simultaneously surveyed 150 prosecutors’ offices and found substantial, although more modest, levels of change; in the prior three years, 26 percent of offices reported initiating changes in dealing with rape offenses. In both institutions, core changes included the establishment of special rape units, rape-specific training programs, and the increased use of women personnel.

Reforming State Rape Laws

Both liberal and radical feminists were frustrated by often-archaic state penal codes that made it difficult for the state to prosecute and convict rapists. By encouraging women to speak about their experiences in the criminal justice system, feminists drew attention to the inadequacy of state laws. In their reform efforts they focused on the need for four basic legal changes: (1) broadening the definition of rape to include a range of hostile sexual behavior; (2) limiting the need for victims to demonstrate vigorous physical resistance in order to secure convictions; (3) eliminating corroboration requirements that formerly required the testimony of witnesses; and (4) adding “shield” laws that restricted the defendant’s use of the victim’s past sexual conduct as evidence.

From Leigh Bienen’s inventory of state rape laws, we have traced the incidence of reform of rape laws from 1960 to 1979. Figure 3 notes the number of states reforming aspects of their rape laws in each year. Throughout the 1960s, a few states would effect minor reforms each year, often in response to the Model Penal Code. Starting in the early 1970s, however, rape law was on legislative agendas across the United States. Between 1970 and 1979, forty-nine of fifty states reformed their rape laws; thirty states reformed their laws in 1975 alone.

Across the country, feminist anti-rape activists, often in coordination with the NOW Task Forces and more mainstream women’s organizations such as the League of Women Voters, actively lobbied state legislatures to press for statutory reform. A diverse set of observers—including federal government researchers and legal analysts—attribute the wave of reform largely to the demands of local feminist activists. Largen noted that although rape reform would eventually bring together a varied group of advocates, “both the basic rape-law reform goals and the rape-law reform process were established by the women activists who had initiated the reform drive.” Legal analysts Horney and Spohn concur, noting that concerns about archaic rape laws “sparked a nationwide, grass-roots movement in which women’s groups lob-
bied for rape law reforms. Their efforts resulted in changes in the rape laws of all fifty states. ”

The case of Michigan, which effected the first comprehensive reform, underscores the role that activists played. In Michigan, statutory change took place remarkably quickly; legislation was passed only five months after introduction. Activists from the Women’s Crisis Center in Ann Arbor enlisted the help of an instructor at the University of Michigan Law School, forged alliances with conservative “law and order” legislators, and lobbied the governor and the legislature’s Judiciary Committee—boosted by the first showing of “A Case of Rape.”

Gaining a Federal Response

Although most anti-rape activism focused on the state and local level, many activists were eager to get funds for their anti-rape and rape crisis work and lobbied the federal government for support. Pressed by an activist lobbying campaign, Senator Charles Mathias (R-Md.) introduced a bill in Congress in September 1973 to establish a National Center for the Prevention and Control of Rape (NCPCR) within the National Institutes of Mental Health (NIMH). Mathias credited the bill’s passage in the legislature to NOW’s efforts; the bill was vetoed once and then signed by President Ford and NCPCR opened its doors in 1976. The Mathias legislation, however, constituted a limited victory for the anti-rape movement, as NCPCR’s legal mandate included “knowledge building and knowledge transfer.” The absence of any funding for services surprised and disappointed many of the anti-rape activists who had lobbied for the bill.

The federal government, however, offered localities support for services through another source, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), in the Department of Justice. Congress created LEAA as part of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, following widespread concern about rising crime rates during the 1960s. From 1969, LEAA awarded federal money to the states in the form of block grants, to be spent on varied criminal justice and crime-related programs. Starting in 1974, rape crisis centers began to compete for, and to secure, some of the LEAA block-grant funds, mostly in the form of “seed money”—assistance designed to support centers while they developed local funding alternatives. Figure 4 indicates LEAA spending levels on the block grants—including “action grants” and discretionary grants—for which rape crisis centers competed. Although data on LEAA spending on rape-related programs are not available, LEAA funds reached a large share of centers in the middle and late 1970s; NCPCR reported that nine of thirty-one centers surveyed cited LEAA grants as among their “primary sources” of funding.
Figure 3.

grants provide the best indicator of explicit federal commitment to combating rape.

Although anti-rape activists provoked a federal response to rape, they were frustrated by the way the federal government allocated funds. Many center workers expressed bitterness that substantial federal funds went to research, and that the limited monies for services available through LEAA were allocated almost exclusively to professional agencies and not to rape crisis centers. As activists Myhre and Capps argued:

The availability of [federal] funds and the ways in which they have been disbursed has meant emphasis on the following approaches to rape: (1) law enforcement; (2) mental health centers; and (3) academic research. These funding priorities come at the expense of grassroots women’s efforts, and at the expense of recognizing, understanding and dealing with the societal roots of rape. 73

At the same time, the massive amount of federally-sponsored rape-related research funded in the 1970s through both NCPCR and LEAA clearly played an important role in bringing further public attention to the problem of rape, and activists, while critical, recognized the value of the federal effort. 74

Changing Opportunities: Movement Decline

The Decline of the Anti-Rape Movement

The early 1970s clearly brought the anti-rape movement a series of remarkable victories, including a revolution in public awareness, the mobilization of thousands of activists, widespread policy and institutional reform at the local level, the initiation of rapid legal reform at the state level, which would diffuse across the states for the rest of the decade, and the achievement of a significant federal response. By the mid-1970s, the anti-rape movement lived in a world quite different from the one in which the Speak-Outs had taken place in 1971. By the end of the decade, however, partly a result of its successes, the movement had stalled and declined sharply. The movement was less able to recruit and mobilize activists to engage in political advocacy at the state and local level, to command public attention, and to create events.

The movement’s decline took place on several fronts. First, the original-model feminist rape crisis center turned out to have a short lifespan. While the number of rape crisis centers operating in the United States increased from approximately twenty-five in 1973 to nearly four hundred by late 1976, the original model was quickly diluted as centers abandoned some of the characteristic practices—including most of their social change work—
Figure 4.

that tied them to the feminist movement. The face of the rape crisis center changed in large part because centers pursued newly available public monies—which required more conventional organizational structures and highly developed service delivery systems. Centers formed after the end of 1973 rarely adopted the feminist collective organizational structure and, importantly, devoted a greater share, sometimes even all, of their resources to direct service rather than to social-change work. The later centers relied more on paid, professionalized staffs and less on volunteers, and often established affiliations with larger, not explicitly feminist, institutions (e.g., YWCAs, community mental health centers); they operated at a distance from the original centers and from the larger women’s movement. By the end of the decade, approximately half of the original centers folded; many of the surviving centers redesigned their structure and activities, often as their founders departed. In a 1980 report to the National Institute of Justice, Carrow observed that “rape crisis centers have matured over the last several years. [They] are no longer viewed as a ‘radical alternative,’ but as an essential part of the response to rape.” Gornick, Burt, and Pittman report that by the early 1980s “the nationwide pool of rape crisis centers had changed from the small homogeneous core to a large, fluid, and enormously diverse group of programs . . . approximately a decade after the anti-rape movement began, the original ‘model’ of the rape crisis center [was] virtually extinct.”

Second, the mobilization of activists proved to be as short-lived as the feminist rape crisis center. After about 1975, the anti-rape movement mobilized fewer and fewer women, largely because the role of the rape-crisis-center volunteer had shifted to services and no longer served as a means to recruit activists. Professional staff gave volunteers more limited, service-oriented, work to do, which neither politicized volunteers nor attracted women with political concerns. As Largen observes:

The influx of non-activist women into center volunteer roles has changed centers’ goals. The founding centers were run by small groups of women who devoted themselves almost exclusively to the cause. They operated as collectives with every woman sharing the decision-making, as well as the tasks. Most volunteers now have less time to offer and see themselves more as victim helpers than as agents for social change. While this new type of volunteer makes it easier for centers to survive the high volunteer turnover rate, it also means a lower level of motivation and activism.

Mobilization declined further when NOW abolished its National Rape Task Forces in 1976 in order to respond to “the state of emergency on the Equal
Third, as rape crisis centers engaged less in social-change work, they also found themselves providing rape-related services alongside other local providers. Largely goaded into action by the movement’s activism, a range of social service agencies quickly initiated rape-specific service programs. Brodyaga et al. report that in 1974 organizations such as the YWCA, Planned Parenthood, health clinics, schools, churches, and neighborhood service groups began instituting rape-specific service programs. The rise of rape services in mainstream institutions—social service agencies, as well as the hospitals, police departments, and prosecutors’ offices that the movement had worked so hard to change—meant that the rape crisis centers in many localities now competed with a range of other providers for rape service monies. And, as other institutions developed their own rape programs, they no longer needed the centers’ volunteers on-site, and often pushed them out. Thus, the sense that rape was an issue neglected by mainstream institutions (reasonably) diminished, as did the apparent necessity for political mobilization.

Fourth, as the movement’s message that rape was an enormous problem became widely accepted, many of the anti-rape movement’s original claims—for example, that rape was linked to rigid sex-role stereotyping and to women’s subservient position in society—were soon overwhelmed by less comprehensive interpretations of the causes of rape and by a focus on traditional models of crime prevention. In other words, many mainstream political institutions embraced some of the political concerns of the anti-rape activists while jettisoning the movement’s original radical claims. In a striking example, feminist organizations sponsored a night march against rape in New York City that attracted three hundred marchers on 4 August 1976. This was followed, less than three weeks later, by a rally sponsored by the Mayor’s Task Force on Rape; the second march, which included members of the city government and the police force, made no explicit claims against patriarchy. The point is that feminist activists no longer enjoyed a monopoly on the issue of combating rape, and other institutions fighting against rape did not share feminist concerns apart from acting against rapists.

Fifth, the availability of federal monies through the LEAA block grants to the states turned out to be more problematic for the anti-rape movement than activists had envisioned—and less stable. Anti-rape activists were divided from the start about the blessings of federal (and other public) funds. On the one hand, federal money afforded activists with paid employment and operating funds to continue their work, along with a certain kind of legitimacy. At the same time, federal money reached the local centers with strings attached, so that anti-rape workers had to spend their time collecting statis-
tics, keeping records, and adhering to certain bureaucratic norms. Activists questioned whether the commitment to fundable activities was actually a good use of their time, and whether records of clients’ experiences might be abused.

In addition, rape crisis centers were required to establish boards and hire paid professional staff in order to qualify for public money. This generally meant relinquishing a core element of the founders’ vision of the centers as collectively-run and nonhierarchical, thus breaking down the ideal of equal access to information and decision-making. Within local rape crisis centers, activists engaged in long and difficult debates about the advisability of accepting public funds altogether. Many centers that refused public monies folded, as they were unable to sustain a volunteer effort when the first wave of activists “burned out.” Others that accepted outside funding found their efforts directed increasingly to victim service activities, rather than to political advocacy and social-change work. The demise of political work in rape crisis centers after the mid-1970s, is widely attributed to the influx of public financing.90 Many centers abandoned political work in order to meet the stated demands of external funders, and others toned down or ceased their activist work as a pre-emptive measure to ensure their prospects for winning public grants and contracts.91

Furthermore, acceptance of federal funding led to a dependence that made rape crisis centers exceptionally vulnerable to shifts in the political winds. LEAA money was first won by rape crisis centers in 1974 and, as shown in Figure 4, the LEAA funds for which the centers competed peaked two years later and then were sharply cut. The block grant programs that funded the centers in the 1970s were phased out by fiscal year 1980.92 Further cuts initiated during the first Reagan administration eliminated other sources of funding that had supported some rape crisis centers, including the Comprehensive Employment Training Act (CETA) program; the National Center for the Control and Prevention of Rape was also closed.93

Finally, by the end of the 1970s the high levels of public attention to rape that the activists had fought for began to fall. As shown in Figure 2, by 1980 the number of relevant stories about rape had dropped to twenty-seven, above the levels of the 1960s, but substantially below the 1974 peak. The decline—due at least in part to the essential completion of nationwide state rape-law reform by the end of the decade, as well as to the decline in high-visibility feminist events—both reflected and furthered the anti-rape movement’s demise.94 The movement diminished because organizers were no longer able to mobilize large numbers of issues to combat an issue that was no longer so egregiously managed or neglected—a function of their previous mobilization.
The origins of social protest movements have received much more scholarly attention than their decline. Partly, this is because one needs to understand origins in order to understand decline—and the reverse is not the case. The opportunities that allowed anti-rape activism to grow and reach mainstream institutions did not simply reverse. In fact, the changes in opportunities that promote movement decline are not simply the opposite of those that allow emergence. Rather, in this case we saw that protest mobilization declined when dissident concerns, or some portion of dissident concerns, were addressed in a routinized fashion by government. The original issues that promoted mobilization were no longer so clear to a broad movement coalition, as extra-institutional action seemed neither so necessary nor so promising. As this story demonstrates, it was not that activists ran out of steam, that leaders disappeared, or that government repressed activism. Instead, the story of this movement underscores the inadequacy of explanations that emphasize natural life cycles of movements. This movement's history was intimately tied up with government policy and mainstream politics.

By the end of the 1970s, the opportunities for social mobilization had changed dramatically. When mainstream institutions responded more sympathetically and effectively to women who had been raped, the crime of rape no longer seemed to indict those mainstream institutions. Activism against rape was thus separated from the larger feminist agenda, and incorporated into institutional policies to fight crime. It was also separated from victim services, as feminist activists could not credibly claim to provide counseling or victim advocacy more effectively than, for example, credentialed and better-funded professionals.

Anti-rape activists changed public policy and culture and, in the process, made their own organizing work more difficult. Importantly, central to the activists' appeal in mobilizing recruits was the perception that if they did not take the responsibility for combating rape, no one else, certainly not the state, would. Their success in getting state and local government to take up some of this work lessened the sense of urgency needed to staff the movement. Also significantly, the transfer of in-service training to personnel in local hospitals, police forces, and prosecutors' offices, and the assumption of victim advocacy services by public institutions, eliminated a niche that the rape crisis centers formerly filled. Essentially, in getting other established institutions to take up jobs that they had designed and filled, the centers undermined their own service roles, and made the necessity of their advocacy less obvious to new recruits.

Paradoxically, the rape crisis centers were ill-positioned to survive their own successes. Even as they turned to emphasize service rather than political advocacy in pursuit of securing a stable flow of finance (and recruits), those
services were increasingly provided by other institutions. Although public institutions had committed to providing counseling and victim advocacy, not all of the work that the centers had done continued. In particular, in emphasizing responding to individual cases of rape, rather than the larger structural oppression of women by a patriarchal state and society, mainstream institutions not only ignored the larger analysis of the anti-rape movement, they undermined it. As Matthews put it, the goal shifted from stopping rape to “managing its consequences.” The collectively-run egalitarian rape crisis center as an organizational form virtually disappeared. The larger movement lost a visible face, a source of recruiting and service, and an institutional presence in the process.

Conclusion

In this article we examined the case of the anti-rape movement of the 1970s to trace the emergence, growth, influence, and subsequent decline of a dissident challenge in a liberal polity. We have focused on this dramatic and short-lived movement’s interactions with the state over time, emphasizing public policy formation and institutional reform. This builds on earlier work about the process of political institutionalization, and gives a clear sense of the very real victories and concessions that political movements must make. Importantly, we have emphasized that movement politics, rather than constituting a complete break from more mainstream and institutional politics, are closely related to conventional political events.

Through a close examination of this case, we have demonstrated the ways in which activist efforts can alter the political opportunities they and subsequent activists face. In this case, by changing state laws and local government and quasi-governmental procedures, anti-rape activists reduced the apparent necessity of their own efforts. On the one hand, the movement’s successful efforts at changing popular attitudes about rape and official responses to rape may have made it possible to raise other issues of sexual violence. On the other hand, their efforts allowed official institutions to define the terms of the response to rape and to subsequent issues. By engaging official institutions to help women who had been raped and to combat rape more generally, the movement effectively factored a radical analysis and its own role out of the political equation.

Social protest movements organize around claims that activists and potential supporters find viable. Viability means that a dissident claim is urgent enough to warrant mobilization, yet apparently moderate enough that protest could effect meaningful change. The issues that fit these criteria change over time, determined largely by the ongoing conflicts between states and
activists. Governmental response alters the viability of various issues by making some claims seem more urgent or more promising. When government leaves unattended a mobilizable constituency or neglects a substantial issue, activists can find the political opportunity to create a movement. Organizers face the job of finding mobilizable constituencies, and creating public recognition of the importance of particular issues. When they succeed, at least in liberal polities, government reduces the scope of potential movement coalitions by filling the gaps in policy and services that activists demonstrate. Government’s success in doing this makes it harder to mobilize on the same issues because concerns and constituencies are no longer so clearly neglected. As a result, activists are frequently not able to claim their own victories.

The process of social movement decline is thus very different from that of initial mobilization. Activists rapping at the doors of governmental institutions demanding access and influence are not always turned away. Rather, responsive governments co-opt the concerns and constituencies by offering recognition and often substantive reforms at the same time. Dissidents are not always forced back out into the political netherworld. In the case of activism against rape, within a few short years the rape crisis centers no longer provided the only viable location for activists to help women who had been raped, and to combat rape. Hospitals, police forces, prosecutors’ offices, and state legislatures offered new locations and new means of fighting rape, accommodating some portion of activists’ concerns. This makes any simple evaluation of movement influences extremely difficult. Anti-rape activists won important changes in politics and policy, but sacrificed the opportunity to lodge comprehensive criticisms of patriarchy in the process.

Much work remains to be done, both on this case and on the question of its generalizability within liberal polities. It remains to be seen whether other dissident claims can be so quickly and easily accommodated, and whether other sorts of movements can find ways to accept substantial victories gracefully and continue to advance a broader political agenda. Subsequent research should also trace the implementation of rape-related policy at the state and local level after the movement is no longer visible in monitoring government actions, for it is far from clear that movement victories, once won, are irreversible. We also need to examine the development of individuals and organizations within the movement as they took on new political issues. In seeking to mobilize support and find new ways to maintain their organizations, feminist activists who had addressed rape as a critical issue subsequently turned to new and related issues; activists attempted to reshape the public image of rape by addressing other kinds of sexual violence against women. The way new issues alter dissident politics and coalitions remains a largely unexplored, and absolutely critical, issue in understanding the politics of dissent. The rapid rise and decline of the anti-rape movement, espe-
cially the short life of the feminist rape crisis center, raises crucial questions about evaluating movement successes and their consequences. Movements can undermine their bases of mobilization as the salience of their grievances diminishes in the wake of policy reforms. The cost of policy victories to political mobilization presents an analytic puzzle for scholars and a strategic challenge to activists.

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Notes

2. Tarrow, Power in Movement, 85.
7. Costain, Inviting Women’s Rebellion.
9. Ibid., 28.
22. Our approach extends Kingdon's *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies* metaphor about policy formation and applies it to political mobilization.
24. Deborah Carrow, *Rape: Guidelines for a Community Response: An Executive Summary* (Washington, D.C., 1980), 1–2. It is not clear that the reported rape rate is an accurate or consistent measure of the prevalence of the crime. It is difficult to determine, for example, whether the increased reported rate reflected more rapes or the increased willingness of women to report rape. See, for example, Jeanne C. Marsh, Alison Geist, and Nathan Caplan, *Rape and the Limits of Law Reform* (Boston, 1982); Jim Galvin, "Rape: A Decade of Reform," *Crime and Delinquency* 31 (1985): 163–68; Gary F. Jensen and Mary Altani Karpos, "Managing Rape: Exploratory Research on the Behavior of Rape Statistics," *Criminology* 31 (1993): 363–85.
29. Feminist reformers criticized aspects of the MPC's proposed rape laws. The MPC automatically downgraded the crime when there was a prior relationship between a woman and the rapist and required a "fresh complaint" of rape to be made within three months of the incident in order to prosecute. See Susan Estrich, *Real Rape* (Cambridge, Mass., 1987): 49–54.
32. June Bundy Csida and Joseph Csida, *Rape: How to Avoid It and What to Do About It If You Can't* (Chatsworth, Calif., 1974), 133–34.
Avoid It, 134; New York Radical Feminists, Rape: The First Sourcebook for Women (New York, 1974).

35. Estrich, Real Rape; Linda A. Fairstein, Sexual Violence: Our War Against Rape (New York, 1993); Marsh, Geist, and Caplan, Rape and the Limits of Law Reform; Cassia Spohn and Julie Horney, Rape Law Reform: A Grassroots Revolution and Its Impact (New York, 1992).

36. NYRF, Rape, appendix IV.


42. Largen, “Grassroots Centers,” 46–51.


44. Largen, “Anti-Rape Movement.”


47. The New York Times Index (New York, 1960–80), for all its problems, provides a reasonable measure of mainstream attention to a broad range of issues, and as such is used by scholars of social movements and public policy, e.g., Baumgartner and Jones, Agendas and Instability; Costain, Inviting Women’s Rebellion; Jenkins and Eckert, “Channeling”; McAdam, Political Process; David S. Meyer, A Winter of Discontent: The Nuclear Freeze and American Politics (New York, 1990); Nelson, Making an Issue. We counted all of the abstracts under the heading “sex crimes” (there is no category for “rape”), omitting those entries that referred specifically to individual crimes such as reports of attacks, arrests, or the progress of specific trials. What remains, aggregated and presented in Figure 2, includes reports of: (1) legal and policy events (discussions of legislation and administrative policy developments); (2) activist events (including protests, campaigns, and organizational news); (3) relevant research; and (4) cultural events (reviews of books, films, and television movies, and subsequent discussions of those products).


49. Ian Blair, Investigating Rape: A New Approach for Police (Dover, N.H., 1985); Brodyaga et al., Rape and Its Victims; Carrow, Rape: Guidelines, 1–2; Largen, “Grassroots Centers,” 46–51; Marsh, Geist, and Caplan, Rape and the Limits of Law Reform; Spohn and Horney, Rape Law Reform.

50. There is a broad consensus that the reforms initiated in localities across the country—in hospitals, police departments, and prosecutors’ offices—were brought about largely by the efforts of anti-rape activists. For example, two national studies commissioned by the U.S. Department of Justice reached this conclusion. In a study of local responses to rape, com-
completed for the LEAA, Brodyaga et al., *Rape and Its Victims*, xi, found that:

Much of the recent attention has been stimulated by citizens concerned with equalizing the status of women. The women’s movement has often focused on the inequities inflicted upon victims of rape. . . . Citizens’ activities to increase public awareness of these problems have brought about efforts to . . . improve medical treatment for rape victims, and to encourage police departments and prosecutors’ offices to examine their procedures in the investigation and prosecution of rape cases.

Similarly, at the end of the decade, Carrow (*Rape: Guidelines*, 1-2) reported to the National Institute of Justice that:

The early 1970s marked the beginning of a change in the treatment of rape incidents. . . . At the forefront of this changing perspective was the rape crisis center. As the offspring of the feminist movement, these centers . . . have provided the impetus for improved hospital procedures. . . . Police and prosecutors . . . have instituted procedural and policy reforms reflecting this emphasis.

51. Matthews, *Confronting Rape*.
54. Largen, “Anti-Rape Movement.”
55. Brodyaga et al., *Rape and Its Victims*, 55.
56. Carrow, *Rape: Guidelines*.
60. Fairstein, *Sexual Violence*.
63. Leigh Bienen, “Rape III: National Developments in Rape Reform Legislation,” *Women’s Rights Law Reporter* 6 (1980): 171-212. We coded a state as having reformed its law in a given year if its legislature passed one or more changes to the state’s rape law during that year.
67. Estrich, Real Rape; Marsh, Geist, and Caplan, Rape and the Limits of Law Reform.
72. NCPCR, Federal Funding Resources, 2.
73. Myhre and Capps, “Conferences,” 35.
76. Steven Rathgeb Smith and Michael Lipsky, Non-Profits for Hire: The Welfare State in the Age of Contracting (Cambridge, Mass., 1993), in a careful study of nonprofit organizations, document the transforming effects that public monies have on the organizational structure, and ultimately missions, of nonprofits.
77. Brodyaga et al., Rape and Its Victims; Gornick, Burt, and Pittman, “Structure and Activities of Rape Crisis Centers.”
78. Matthews, Confronting Rape.
79. Largen, “Anti-Rape Movement.”
81. Carrow, Rape: Guidelines, 7.
84. Ibid.
85. Brodyaga et al., Rape and Its Victims, 137.
86. Matthews, Confronting Rape.
89. Matthews, Confronting Rape.
90. Largen, “Grassroots Centers,” 46–51; Matthews, Confronting Rape.
91. Gornick, Burt, and Pittman, “Structure and Activities of Rape Crisis Centers.”
94. Notable in Figure 2 is a second peak near the end of the 1970s, reflecting the emergence of a new issue in the “sex crimes” category, marital rape. The 1978 Rideout case marked the emergence of marital rape in the public debate on rape; see also Lisa M. Cuklanz, Rape on Trial: How the Mass Media Construct Legal Reform and Social Change (Philadelphia, 1995). More important, the emergence of marital rape as a public issue signaled a shift in public attention toward domestic violence, and away from violence against women occurring outside the home, including rape. Activists reframed their claims about rape in response to these changes.
95. Matthews, Confronting Rape.