JOHN LOCKE AND THE TOLERATION OF CATHOLICS: A NEW MANUSCRIPT

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ABSTRACT. The following Communication presents a newly discovered manuscript by John Locke. The manuscript dates from 1667–8 and it deserves notice as the most significant example of Locke’s thought on the toleration of Catholics prior to the Epistola de tolerantia (1689). The manuscript, entitled Reasons for tolerating Papists equally with others, reveals Locke’s engagement with Sir Charles Wolseley’s Liberty of conscience, the magistrates interest (1668) and significantly informs the compositional history of Locke’s Essay concerning toleration (1667–8).

The following Communication presents a newly discovered manuscript by John Locke. The manuscript dates from 1667–8 and it deserves notice as the most significant example of Locke’s thought on the toleration of Catholics prior to the Epistola de tolerantia (1689). In recent decades, scholarly work on Locke’s intellectual development has devoted particular attention to his stance on the...
toleration of Catholics.¹ Locke’s response to Henry Stubbe’s *Essay in defence of the good old cause* (1659) is often described as the earliest evidence of his attitude on the issue, before his ‘Discourse on infallibility’ (1661), his enlightening visit to Cleves (1665–6), and his *Essay concerning toleration* (1667–8).² According to this narrative, Locke’s position would evolve to tolerate every religious sect on the basis of their speculative beliefs and worship, but consistently except Catholics for their seditious articles of faith: the pope’s power to dissolve oaths, to legislate infallibly, and to depose foreign rulers as excommunicates or heretics. The manuscript below reveals that Locke reached this position only after he had addressed a number of arguments in favour of Catholic toleration. In the first two sections of the article, we describe the provenance, content, and context of the manuscript, and examine how it influenced, and possibly inspired, the *Essay concerning toleration*. In the third section, we transcribe the manuscript itself.

I

In May 1667, Locke entered the household of Anthony Ashley Cooper (1621–83), Lord Ashley, against a backdrop of political turmoil.³ Within a month, the Dutch Raid on the Medway (19–24 June) would corrode popular support for Charles II, prompting the fall of Edward Hyde (1609–74), the first earl of Clarendon, and emboldening nonconformists and their allies to push for a new church settlement. Persecutions conducted under the Act of Uniformity (1662), the Conventicle Act (1664), and the Five Mile Act (1665) had, since the Restoration, alienated nonconformists, whose support was now required to buttress the crown. The final months of 1667 and the first of 1668 witnessed an outpouring of works on the question of the ‘comprehension’ or ‘indulgence’ of nonconformity: the issue of whether the Church of England would ‘comprehend’ Protestant dissenters within its ranks or ‘indulge’ their worship outside of the church. Between August 1667 and 9 May 1668, when parliament was adjourned, at least twenty-three pamphlets appeared on the question.⁴ It was


⁴ For a summary of the debate, see John Coffey, *Persecution and toleration in Protestant England, 1558–1689* (Harlow, 2000), pp. 166–79; and John Locke, *An essay concerning toleration and other
during this time that Locke wrote, but did not publish, the earliest versions of his *Essay concerning toleration*. The *Essay* was an extended defence of religious toleration which remained in manuscript until 1829, when Locke’s biographer and relative Peter King (1776–1833) printed extracts from one of its versions; it later appeared, at greater length, in H. R. Fox Bourne’s *Life of John Locke* (1876), but no serious attempt to edit the *Essay* or examine its context was made until J. R. and Philip Milton’s Clarendon edition of 2006. In the Introduction to their edition of the *Essay*, the Miltons provided a comprehensive overview of the debate entrained by the fall of Clarendon, but could find no direct connection between its publications and Locke’s work. They did, however, note the similarity between Locke’s arguments and those presented in two anonymously published pamphlets, attributable to Sir Charles Wolseley (1629/30–1714): *Liberty of conscience...asserted & vindicated* (1668) and *Liberty of conscience, the magistrates interest* (1668). Wolseley, the Miltons maintained, was an author ‘who probably came closest to Locke in his general outlook’ on toleration, yet they could find no evidence of Locke’s knowledge of Wolseley’s publications. The manuscript which we present below confirms the Miltons’ suspicions. Roughly 3,000 words in length and entitled *Reasons for tolerating Papists equally with others*, the manuscript draws directly upon Wolseley’s *Liberty of conscience, the magistrates interest*, and constitutes the earliest extant draft of passages in the *Essay concerning toleration*.

The manuscript is conserved in the Greenfield Library of St John’s College, Annapolis. It is a gathering of two folded half-sheets (212 mm × 159 mm), making four leaves or eight pages in total: fos. 1r, 3v, and 4r are blank; fos. 1r, 2r, 2v, and 3r bear text in Locke’s hand; and 4v bears his endorsement ‘Toleration. 67’. The manuscript is wrapped in another folded half-sheet, addressed ‘For Edward Clark of Chipley Esqr’ – Locke’s friend, Edward Clarke (1650–1710), the MP for Taunton (1690–1710) – with an additional endorsement (‘Mr. Locke | of Toleration’) in an unidentified hand, and tearing around the remainder of a wax seal. In 1922, the manuscript was enclosed in a half sheet of wrapping paper, whose folded paper was adorned with a rather distinctive and ornate watermark, which could be seen as an anagram of the name ‘Locke’. The manuscript is slung between the folios with a piece of string, while the final folio is held together with a metal staple. The paper is thin and moderately well-preserved; the ink is black and of a moderately high quality.

The manuscript is written in a neat hand, and there is no evidence of Locke’s biographer and relative Peter King (1776–1833) printing extracts from one of its versions; it later appeared, at greater length, in H. R. Fox Bourne’s *Life of John Locke* (1876), but no serious attempt to edit the *Essay* or examine its context was made until J. R. and Philip Milton’s Clarendon edition of 2006. In the Introduction to their edition of the *Essay*, the Miltons provided a comprehensive overview of the debate entrained by the fall of Clarendon, but could find no direct connection between its publications and Locke’s work. They did, however, note the similarity between Locke’s arguments and those presented in two anonymously published pamphlets, attributable to Sir Charles Wolseley (1629/30–1714): *Liberty of conscience...asserted & vindicated* (1668) and *Liberty of conscience, the magistrates interest* (1668). Wolseley, the Miltons maintained, was an author ‘who probably came closest to Locke in his general outlook’ on toleration, yet they could find no evidence of Locke’s knowledge of Wolseley’s publications. The manuscript which we present below confirms the Miltons’ suspicions. Roughly 3,000 words in length and entitled *Reasons for tolerating Papists equally with others*, the manuscript draws directly upon Wolseley’s *Liberty of conscience, the magistrates interest*, and constitutes the earliest extant draft of passages in the *Essay concerning toleration*.

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The watermark on fos. 2 and 3 is a horn, resembling Edward Heawood, *Watermarks, mainly of the 17th and 18th centuries* (Hilversum, 1950), no. 2686, although the top central flourish is more rounded and pronounced, and the base of the shield is flatter and squarer; fos. 2 and 4 have a countermark (‘PC’), with the letter P drawn in two thin lines and the letter C drawn in the shape of a stenciled outline. For Clarke, see H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison, eds., *Oxford dictionary of national biography* (Oxford, 2004) (ODNB), xi, p. 862. The hand endorsing the manuscript (‘Mr. Locke | of Toleration’) differs in orthography and style from Clarke’s endorsements in Bodleian Library,
consigned to Sotheby’s by Edward Clarke’s relative E. C. A. Sanford (1859–1923), together with two manuscripts of the *Essay concerning toleration*.¹⁰ Maggs Bros. purchased the manuscript for £4 10s and subsequently advertised it in three catalogues between 1925 and 1928 for £52 10s.¹¹ Sometime after its third advertisement, the manuscript was sold to Paul Hyde Bonner (1893–1968), the American novelist,¹² whose own collection was auctioned in 1934 by Anderson Galleries in Manhattan.¹³ From there, the manuscript entered the possession of a ‘Mr Henry MacDonald of New York’, who presented it at a time we cannot determine to the Greenfield Library, where it has remained since.

Edward Clarke had acted as the custodian of several of Locke’s manuscripts between 1683 and 1689, when Locke was an exile in the Netherlands. Yet the precise manner in which Clarke acquired the *Reasons* (as we will call it) remains a mystery. Clarke’s age and situation in 1667 decisively rules him out as the intended reader of the *Reasons*; however, he would later collaborate with Locke in politics,¹⁴ and he may have taken an interest in Locke’s unpublished writings on the toleration of Catholics, possibly after reconciling himself to James II (1687) or in some attempt to justify William III’s alliance with Catholic Austria (1689).¹⁵ A plausible explanation is that the *Reasons* was one of the ‘many papers’ which Locke sent to Clarke in August 1683, giving him

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¹¹ Maggs Bros., *Catalogue 439* (1925), item 425 and plate xvi; Maggs Bros., *Catalogue 492* (1927), item 956 and plate xv; Maggs Bros., *Catalogue 500* (1928), item 106 and illustration.


¹³ The manuscript was first offered by Duttons, Inc., for $175 in 1931 (*Sale catalogue of the private library of Paul Hyde Bonner* (1931), item 602) and later by Anderson Galleries, Inc., for $100 in 1934 (*Collection of Paul Hyde Bonner: first editions and manuscripts of outstanding importance* (15–16 Feb. 1934), item 201).


the power to burn whatever he ‘disliked’; Clarke must have retained the cache of papers after Locke’s return to England in February 1689.¹⁶

The *Reasons* comprises two sets of notes. At the start of each set is the marginal heading ‘Page’ / ‘Pag.’, followed by two series of numbers (‘7, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20; 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13’), each presenting Locke’s response to another, unidentified work (see Figure 1). A comparison of these passages with printed books on toleration from 1667–8 reveals their source to be the first edition of Wolseley’s *Liberty of conscience, the magistrates interest*.¹⁷ Locke has copied out the page number from Wolseley’s work and variously enlarged upon, recast or responded to its arguments, in what amounts to the only surviving evidence of Locke’s interest in Wolseley’s publications.

Wolseley was a former MP (1653–60) and Cromwellian turned Royalist conspirator who had published nothing prior to 1667, and had apparently retired from public life in 1662.¹⁸ He had served with Ashley in Barebone’s Parliament and Cromwell’s council of state, and he has been described as Ashley’s ‘intellectual protégé’; however, the evidence of their connection after 1660 is limited.¹⁹ In 1671–2, Ashley would dine on numerous occasions with one of Wolseley’s close friends, Arthur Annesley (1614–86), the earl of Anglesey, but it is not known whether these meetings involved Wolseley.²⁰ Similarly, there is no evidence that Locke and Wolseley ever met. Wolseley does not feature in Locke’s correspondence or manuscripts, and he is nowhere described by Locke’s friends as a mutual acquaintance. Indeed, it is possible that Locke might not have identified Wolseley as the author of the *Liberty of conscience... asserted & vindicated* or *Liberty of conscience, the magistrates interest* at all, since


¹⁷ Wolseley’s *Liberty of conscience... asserted & vindicated* (W3310) appeared before his *Liberty of conscience, the magistrates interest* (W3309), and promised its appearance (p. 54). A ‘second’ edition combined both texts (W3311) and described *Liberty of conscience, the magistrates interest* as the ‘second part’ of *Liberty of conscience... asserted & vindicated*. Locke’s page references in the *Reasons* correspond only to W3309, the first edition of *Liberty of conscience, the magistrates interest*.


²⁰ For Wolseley’s friendship with Anglesey, see Worden, ‘Toleration’, p. 230 n. 148; D. R. Lacey, *Dissent and parliamentary politics in England, 1661–1689: a study in the perpetuation and tempering of parliamentarianism* (New Brunswick, NJ, 1969), p. 462 n. 3; Bodleian Library, 8° C 345 Linc., Anglesey to Thomas Barlow, 16 Nov. 1676.
their ascription to Wolseley was not made, in print, until 1738,\textsuperscript{21} and the absence of his name from the title pages of both works confounded several seventeenth-century readers. A contemporary manuscript criticism of \textit{Liberty}

of conscience...asserted & vindicated, for example, despaired of identifying the author (‘whoever he is’) in its very first line, and a search of every extant copy of both Liberty of conscience pamphlets reveals a consistent perplexity. In the ninety-six copies of these works which we have located, eleven bear seventeenth-century attributions to Wolseley, but five variously ascribe the works to William Penn (1644–1718), John Owen (1616–83), and a ‘Mr Goddard’. The remainder either bear authorial ascriptions to Wolseley dating from the eighteenth century onwards, or bear no ascription whatsoever.

A reader’s identification of the publisher of both pamphlets might have assisted in unmasking Wolseley as their author, but the association would only have been discernible from 1675, six years after Nathaniel Ponder (1640–99) published Wolseley’s The unreasonablenesse of atheism. Ponder had issued the Liberty of conscience pamphlets anonymously (his name is absent from the title page and the text), but he would later announce his role as their publisher in a catalogue subjoined to an edition of William Okeley’s A small monument of great mercy (1675), and a reprint of John Owen’s Of the mortification of sin in

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23 Cambridge University Library, Syn.7,68,70, no. 4; Trinity College, Cambridge, K.16.16 (12); Congregational Library, London, 18.2.1 (10/11), 81.2.104; Ushaw College Library, Durham University, XIX.F.2.7D; Harris Manchester College, Oxford, T:12/12 and T:12/13; Bodleian Library, C.9.2 (11) Linc.; Folger Shakespeare Library, 139-739q and 149-447q. A copy belonging to Thomas Barlow (1608/9–91), the bishop of Lincoln, reports that ‘The Author (as I am informed by those who may know) is Sr. Charles Wolseley’ (Bodleian Library, C.9.2 (11) Linc.). This copy provided the basis for the ascription in Fysher et al., eds., Catalogus (n. 21 above).
25 Trinity College, Cambridge, I.15.61 (7) and X.37.33 (9); Regent’s Park College, Oxford, 2.g.27; Exeter College, Oxford, P6 17 (8) and P6 17 (9); Queen’s College, Oxford, UUb.1213 (6); Christ Church, Oxford, E.293 (2); Bodleian Library, B 18.5 (3) Linc.; New College Library, Edinburgh, Ba.b.18/8, Bc.6.11/2, Bc.2.7/12; Columbia University Library, Pamphlet 208 Z4 v.3; Union Theological Seminary, McAlpin 1668 W867 L and 1668 W86; University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign, X 261.7 W83.L2; Northwestern University Library, 261.7 W867J; Wilson Library, University of Minnesota, Stuart Tracts v, pp. 1609–756, 47; Beinecke Library, Yale University, Mhc8 1668 W83; Watkinson Library, Trinity College, BX 520.5-3.67 1644; Boston Athenaeum Library, Tract B1., 18; Newberry Library, Case C.726.986.
belongings (c. 1678). Ponder subsequently stocked numerous copies of both Liberty of conscience pamphlets, and he appears not to have taken many precautions in their sale or conservation, possibly because the works had not attracted adverse attention in 1667–8. Soon after their appearance, the licensor Roger L’Estrange (1616–1704) had conceded that they were ‘rather to be answered than punished, except as an unlicensed pamphlet’. The printer of the pamphlets, whom we can identify as John Darby (d. 1704), did little to conceal his handiwork, in apparent sympathy with Ponder’s indifference or in expectation of L’Estrange’s response: seven ornaments used in the Liberty of conscience pamphlets recur in numerous publications from the period bearing Darby’s name. Locke, however, appears never to have met Darby or Ponder, and his manuscripts, publications, and correspondence do not mention them in

30 The catalogue, which includes a work first published in 1673 (C5064A) and sold by Ponder in 1678 (C5065), is present in three copies of John Owen, Of the mortification of sin in believers (London, 1668): Bodleian Library, Vet. A3 f.852, Congregational Library, London, 23.1.35, and University of California, Davis, BV4925.O8 1668.


34 The ornaments are (1) an initial A (W3310, p. 5, W3311, p. 3); (2) an initial T (W3309, p. 3), printed in Hetet, ‘A literary underground’, p. 208; (3) a fleur-de-lis (W3310, p. 5, W3311, p. 3); (4) a crowned Celtic harp (W3309, p. 3); (5) a five-part fleuron (W3310, title page); (6) a heart-shaped urn (W3309, p. 12, W3310, pp. 5, 54, W3311, pp. 3, 51); (7) a goblet (W3309, p. 12, W3310, pp. 5, 54, W3311, pp. 3, 51). Among those used by Ponder’s known printers, ornaments matching the aforementioned in size and appearance recur nonpareil in Darby’s publications, and in the stock used by Simon Dover (d. 1664?) and his widow Joan (d. 1706/7), whose ornaments Darby acquired c. 1664–6, and which are marked with an asterisk in the following list: ornament (1) appears in G134A (p. 1), S5955 (p. 3); ornament (2) appears in B5535* (sig. A2r), M1508A* (p. 1), H3763A (sig. A2r), A1061 (sig. A2r); ornament (3) appears in B5629* (sig. G2v), D2117* (p. 24), B5535* (sig. A2r), M1508A* (p. 21), A1435A (sig. A2r), H2828 (p. 1), M1371A (sig. A8v), S2481 (sig. Br), S5956 (p. 1); ornament (4) appears in M1508A* (pp. 13, 31), P3403A (second title page), S2481 (sig. [r3v]), S5956 (p. 1); ornament (5) appears in KB24 (sig. A2r), S2472 (p. 97); ornament (6) appears in B5629* (sig. G2v), D2117* (p. 24), S5955 (title page), A1061 (sig. A8v); ornament (7) appears in B5629* (sig. G2v), D2117* (p. 24), A1061 (sig. A8v). For the use of printers’ ornaments to incriminate Dover in 1664, see Hetet, ‘A literary underground’, pp. 164–5; for their use to identify Darby in a different context, see Noel Malcolm, ‘The making of the Ornaments: further thoughts on the printing of the third edition of Leviathan’, Hobbes Studies, 21 (2008), pp. 3–37.
any form.\textsuperscript{35} It is not inconceivable that Locke suspected Wolseley’s connection to the pair, or that he might have viewed the \textit{Liberty of conscience} pamphlets as the product of a conjunction of printers and writers surrounding the earl of Anglesey, Ponder’s close associate,\textsuperscript{36} or John Owen, the dean of Christ Church, Oxford (1651–60), during Locke’s initial residence in the college (1652–67). But the case for Locke’s familiarity with such a connection would be entirely circumstantial.\textsuperscript{37}

In contrast, no difficulty surrounds our knowledge of the arguments which Locke would have encountered in \textit{Liberty of conscience, the magistrates interest}. In that tract, Wolseley presented a defence of toleration which, in the words of Gary S. De Krey, ‘emphasized that relief for dissenters was in the political interest of the king and the kingdom, in the religious interest of domestic and international Protestantism, and in the economic interest of the country’;\textsuperscript{38} he exalted a ‘ballance’ between ‘divided Interests and Parties in Religion’ as a solvent of religious factionalism, and he pressed his case far enough to contemplate disestablishment. The argument was partly epistemic: coercing the conscience was a form of ‘spiritual rape’, which wrongly presupposed our ability to choose or discard religious beliefs; a state religion was ‘not always infallibly true’, and its restraint on consciences could inhibit a collective, national striving towards an enlarged knowledge of religious ‘Truth’.\textsuperscript{39} But the argument was also practical, and studded with rejoinders to the persecuting tendencies of any established religion: persecution breeds resentment and factious violence, it discourages talented office-holders ‘only because they cannot comply with some Ceremonies’, and it hinders the security of Protestantism against ‘a relapse to Popery’.\textsuperscript{40} This final point underlay much of Wolseley’s reasoning, and notionally prevented Catholics from appropriating his arguments for their cause.

\textsuperscript{35} Locke owned three works published by Ponder: David Clarkson’s \textit{Primitive episcopacy} (1689) and the first and second parts of Andrew Marvell’s \textit{The rehearsal transpros’d} (1672–3); John Harrison and Peter Laslett, eds., \textit{The library of John Locke} (Oxford, 1971), pp. 109 (735), 185–6 (1931–3).

\textsuperscript{36} For this connection, see Andrew Marvell, \textit{The prose works of Andrew Marvell}, ed. Martin Dzelzains and Annabel Patterson (2 vols., London, 2003), i, p. 27.

\textsuperscript{37} For Owen, Ashley, and Locke, see Richard Ashcraft, \textit{Revolutionary politics and Locke’s ‘Two treatsies of government’} (Princeton, NJ, 1986), p. 112; Marshall, \textit{John Locke}, pp. 5–6. Wolseley also had a demonstrable connection with Robert Ferguson (d. 1714), the conspirator, whose link to the Ashley circle before 1679 is controverted (F. H. Blackburne Daniell, ed., \textit{Calendar of state papers, domestic series, 1673–1675} (London, 1904), p. 327 (1697), and Rober[t] F[erguson], \textit{A sober enquiry into the nature...of moral virtue} (London, 1673), sigs. A3r–5r; Marshall, \textit{John Locke}, p. 79 n. 8).


\textsuperscript{39} [Wolseley], \textit{Liberty of conscience} (W3309), pp. 8, 19, and [Wolseley], \textit{Liberty of conscience...asserted & vindicated} (W3310), p. 29.

\textsuperscript{40} [Wolseley], \textit{Liberty of conscience} (W3309), pp. 3, 9, 11.
In the *Reasons*, Locke would use the arguments presented in Wolseley’s *Liberty of conscience, the magistrates interest* as a basis to consider precisely this question, in a manner which far exceeded Wolseley’s emphasis. In the first set of notes, Locke excerpts phrases from the first twenty pages of Wolseley’s twenty-two-page work, and builds a case for the toleration of Catholics. In the second set, Locke returns to the work’s first page and builds a case *against* the toleration of Catholics. In both, Locke examines three principal subjects: how Catholicism could be defended on the basis of Wolseley’s positions; whether the indulgence of nonconformity would inadvertently strengthen Catholicism; and why Catholics should not be tolerated, but actively persecuted. The connection between each of these subjects and Wolseley’s stimulus was close, but not imitative. Unlike Locke in the *Reasons*, Wolseley was adamant that the indulgence of nonconformity would in no way potentially extend to the toleration of Catholics, since a ‘Liberty for the Gospel’ could only guide believers to the intolerant detestation of papist principles. Locke’s response to this claim in the first part of the *Reasons* typified his interpretative mode, using Wolseley’s argument as the bridge to an unexpected conclusion. ‘If liberty of conscience make...men dayly more & more to abhor popery’, Locke observes, ‘Papists may be tolerated as well as others.’ This was the tendency of other notes in the first part of the *Reasons*, and it revealed an understandable hesitation to embrace an unqualified indulgence for Catholics, tempered by a striking impartiality. Locke’s other remarks, for example, were unusually generous to Catholics: ‘If abilities alone ought to prefer men to employment & the King ought not to lose the use of any part of his subjects’, Locke writes, ‘Papists are to be tolerated.’ ‘If Papists can be supposd to be as good subjects as others’, Locke concedes again, ‘they may be equally tolerated.’ The tone is emollient, and nowhere replicated in Locke’s works.41

In the second part of the *Reasons*, however, Locke was clear that Catholics were intolerable, so long as their allegiance was in question:

I doubt whether upon Protestant principles we can justify punishing of Papists for their speculative opinions as Purgatory transubstantiation &c if they stopd there. But possibly noe reason nor religion obleiges us to tolerate those whose practicall principles necessarily lead them to the eager persecution of all opinions, & the utter destruction of all societys but their owne. see that it is not the difference of their opinion in religion, or of their ceremonys in worship; but their dangerous & factious tenents in reference to the state.

Exactly when Locke first consulted a copy of the *Liberty of conscience, the magistrates interest* is difficult to establish. The dated endorsement of the *Reasons* (‘Toleration, 67’) suggests that Locke had encountered Wolseley’s arguments

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41 For an overview of how the question of Catholic toleration was treated in these debates, see John Miller, *Popery and politics in England, 1660–1668* (Cambridge, 1973), pp. 91–120.
prior to 25 March 1667[/8],\(^\text{42}\) but his consultation of the work might have occurred as early as the autumn of 1667.\(^\text{43}\) As noted above, J. R. and Philip Milton identified a close parallel between Wolseley’s arguments and those advanced by Locke, but they could not establish whether the resemblance was anything more than an accident. The Reasons demonstrates Locke’s interest in Wolseley’s work irrefragably – and it provides a crucial piece of new evidence for the compositional history of Locke’s Essay concerning toleration.

II

The Essay presented by the Miltons was a collation of four manuscripts, each of which they assigned a siglum: H (Huntington Library, San Marino, HM 584), A (‘Adversaria 1661’, Bodleian Library, MS Film 77, pp. 106–25), O (Bodleian Library, MS Locke c. 28, fos. 21r–32v), and P (The National Archives, Kew, PRO 30/24/47/1). The relationship of the manuscripts is complex, but the following facts about their composition are significant for our purposes. H is in Locke’s hand and it is the urtext of A, O, and P, which differ from it in several respects. H is a set of twenty-one folded half-sheets gathered into five quires signed A to E; quires B–C present Locke’s views of the fundamental principles of toleration, and they are heavily revised; quire A presents a fair copy of part of the text of quire B; and quires D–E discuss what the magistrate ought to do in practice; significantly, the text on quire D begins afresh at the top of a page, which may indicate a discontinuity in composition with quire C. H ends with the phrase ‘Sic cogitavit Atticus 1667’, and it is endorsed ‘Toleration. 67’; when sold in 1922, it was accompanied by a single half-sheet (F) containing a 1,600-word ‘first draft’ of some of its passages.\(^\text{44}\) The Miltons assert that the composition of the Essay’s earliest versions (F and H) was most probably completed in late 1667 or early 1668.\(^\text{45}\)

There are a number of circumstances which directly connect the Reasons with F and H. First, the Reasons, F, and H were all owned by Edward Clarke’s relative and consigned for sale as a batch in 1922, as we have noted.\(^\text{46}\) Second, the watermarks of the Reasons closely match those of F, and those of quire D of

\(^\text{42}\) For an example of Locke dating the new year from 25 March, see (inter alia) De Beer, ed., The correspondence of John Locke, i, pp. 263–4 (187), 332–7 (241).

\(^\text{43}\) Bodleian Library, B 18.5 Linc., includes a flyleaf inscription, recording the date of items bound with W3309 as ‘Mich: Terme 1667’. Wolseley’s Liberty of conscience, the magistrates interest and Liberty of conscience...asserted & vindicated are not listed in Edward Arber, ed., The term catalogues, 1668–1709 (London, 1903–6), but the works indisputably appeared before April 1668. [Abraham Wright], Anarchie reviving (London, 1668), attacks Wolseley’s first edition at length; Wright’s work is dated 15 April 1668 on its final page (p. 74), and it identifies W3309 and W3310 on sig. A1r and pp. 7, 13.

\(^\text{44}\) Locke, ECT, pp. 162–91, which describes F as a ‘first draft’ of the Essay.

\(^\text{45}\) Ibid., p. 172.

\(^\text{46}\) The identification of the 1922 Sanford sale (n. 10 above) supersedes the provenance of F and H in ibid., p. 190.
H, indicating that they might have derived from the same source of paper. Third, two passages which appear in the Reasons also appear, in a somewhat modified form, in quire D of H. In the first passage, Locke anticipates the claim that Catholicism in England would benefit from persecution, since people could inquire into condemned principles out of sympathy or mental instability (bold here highlights the differences between the texts):

**Reasons for tolerating Papists**

\[fo. 2r\]

zdly: The principles & doctrines of that religion seem\(\text{e}\) lesse apt to take inquisitive heads or unstable mindes, men commonly in their voluntary changes doe rather persue liberty & enthusiasme, wherein they seem\(\text{e}\) their owne disposers, rather then give themselves up to the authority & imposition of others.

**Essay concerning toleration (H)**

\[fo. 21r\]

besides the principles & doctrines of that religion are lesse apt to take inquisitive heads & unstable minds, men commonly in their voluntary changes doe rather persue liberty & enthusiasme, wherein they are still free & at their owne disposall rather then give them selves up to the authority & impositions of others.

\(...\)

adde to this that popery haveing beene brought in & continued in the world upon the ignorant & zealous world by the art & industry of the world their clergy, & kept up & kept up by the same artifice backd by power & force,

it is the most likely of any religion \[fo. 2v\] to decay, where the secular power handles them severely or at least takes from them those encouragements & supports they receive from their owne Clergy.  

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47 The watermarks in the manuscript of the Reasons, in sheet F, and in quire D resemble Heawood, *Watermarks*, no. 2686; the countermark is present in the manuscript of the Reasons and quire D, but absent from F, owing to a truncation of the sheet. For the watermarks in quires A, B, C, and E, see Locke, *ECT*, p. 163.

48 For the full set of editorial conventions adopted for the presentation of texts in this article see Section III below.

In the second passage, Locke anticipates the objection that the persecution of Catholics may violate a defence of toleration in matters of speculative belief:

*Reasons for tolerating Papists*

[fo. 2v]

**Besides he cannot be**
thought to be punished merely for
**conscience who owns**
himself at the same time
**the subject and adherent of an**
enemy prince.

*Essay concerning toleration* (H)

[Insertion on fo. 20v, facing fo. 21r]

**Nor indeed (re) can they be**
thought to be punished merely for
**their consciences who own**
them selves at the same time
**subjects of a foraigne &**
enemy Prince.50

While there are numerous differences between the passages as presented in the *Reasons* and *H*, one change strongly indicates which manuscript preceded which. In the *Reasons*, Locke writes that ‘men commonly in their voluntary changes doe rather persue liberty & enthusiasm’. In *H*, Locke first wrote the same phrase, but then deleted the word ‘rather’. It is improbable that Locke wrote out the phrase in *H* and deleted the word ‘rather’, but when copying the phrase into the *Reasons*, reinstated the deletion. It is much more plausible to suppose that Locke first wrote out the phrase in the *Reasons*, but when copying it into *H*, decided to delete the word ‘rather’; the texts presented in A, O, and P all appear to derive from the wording of this passage as it is presented in *H*. If Locke wrote the *Reasons* after writing *H*, and was copying this passage from *H* to the *Reasons*, why did he alter it, when he made no such alterations when copying it into A, O, and P? These considerations make it virtually certain that the *Reasons* was a source for the passage which reappears in quire D of *H*.

A consideration of the content and composition of F – the ‘first draft’ of the *Essay* – also suggests that the *Reasons* preceded not only those parts of quire D in which its phrases are recycled, but any earlier draft of the *Essay* as a whole. Locke began F with the general intention ‘To state the question of toleration right’. He subsequently listed two ‘sorts of things’ that have a ‘right to toleration’:

the first is all puerly speculative opinions, as the beleife of a trinity, fall, antipodes atoms &c which have noe reference at all to society 2 the place time & manner of worshiping my god. To both these papists & all mankinde seeme to have a title(.).51

Locke underlined the last phrase focusing on Catholics (‘To both these papists & all mankinde seeme to have a title’), possibly in order to indicate a deletion (see Figure 2). This phrase, however, suggests that Locke began F with the toleration of Catholics at the forefront of his mind. The remainder of F sets the tone for much of Locke’s later writing on toleration (‘I ought to have liberty

50 Compare ibid.
51 Ibid., p. 303.
in my religious worship, because it is a thing betweene god and me, & is of an eternall concernment wheras the magistrate is umpire between man & man’), but the conclusion returns again to the question of whether Catholics should be tolerated (see Figure 3). Indeed, when first written, the conclusion of F terminated with a list of four policy proposals focused particularly on the toleration of Catholics; Locke wrote that while ‘Papists & all other men have a right to toleration of their religious worship & speculative opinions’, having ‘adopted into their religion as fundamentall truths, severall opinions, that are oposite & destructive to any government but the popes, [they] have noe title to toleration’. The opening and closing of F, as it was originally conceived, were thus focused on the toleration of Catholics, in a manner which suggests that this was the original subject of the manuscript. In what was evidently a later addition, Locke noted that his conclusions might have wider applications than the toleration of Catholics alone, and conceded that ‘these perhaps may be rules for other partys as well as papists’. Later still, Locke deleted this phrase and added a fifth policy proposal concerning ‘all other dissenters’, lengthening the paper by roughly 160 words, and broadening its scope beyond Catholics tout court.

This raises the possibility that the Reasons antedated not just quire D of H, but F itself, the first draft of the Essay concerning toleration. It is possible that after Locke wrote F he wished to analyse the question of Catholic toleration in more detail, and wrote the Reasons as a product of this desideratum. Yet this seems less probable than a scenario in which Locke wrote the Reasons first and F subsequently: why would Locke seek Reasons for tolerating Papists equally with others, and entertain the possibility that Catholics could be tolerated, when he had already concluded at the end of F that ‘Papists…have noe title to toleration’? Instead, F, prior to revision, reads like a more systematic treatment of the questions first addressed in the Reasons. In such a scenario, having constructed some initial arguments for and against the toleration of Catholics in the Reasons, Locke then chose to present a more elaborate treatment of this topic in the unrevised form of F; further consideration led Locke to broaden

59 Ibid.
53 Ibid., p. 306.
the scope of F to encompass nonconformists, pressing him to commence the Essay proper with a broadened focus on toleration in general. Such a situation, in which Locke’s interest in a specific topic transformed into a more expansive work, has a direct parallel elsewhere in his writings; the Essay concerning human understanding began in c. 1671 as a consideration of ‘morality and reveal’d religion’, but quickly expanded from the ‘one sheet of Paper’ Locke initially anticipated, into a sprawling project which continued for the remainder of his life.54

If we suppose a similar development in this instance, the Reasons would explain why the conclusions in the initial version of F were so focused on ‘Papists’; the question of Catholic toleration was that which Locke originally set out to answer. Locke then revised F to compass Protestant dissenters within the scope of his arguments, adopted a broader perspective, and comprehensively formulated his mature views on toleration for the first time. In such a scenario, the Reasons would be the immediate antecedent of the Essay, presenting aspects of Locke’s later thinking on toleration in an embryonic form.

In the same manner, the Reasons would also raise questions about the order of composition of the Essay. The similarity in watermarks between the Reasons, F, and quire D of H could plausibly bracket their composition into a distinctive phase. In such a phase, Locke procured a sheaf of paper and wrote the Reasons; using the same paper, he consecutively completed F and quire D. In

a subsequent phase, Locke changed his paper stock and completed quires E and A–C. This sequence (quires D–E, B–C, A) is not an essential part of our argument, but it would incidentally align with the disparate focus of the quires’ concerns: A–C include text which is concerned with the fundamental principles of toleration; D–E include text which is concerned with what a magistrate ought to do in practice. It would be reasonable to assume that the composition of H occurred in these phases, mirroring the disparity of its quires’ content and paper. As noted above, the text at the beginning of quire D is discontinuous with that at the end of quire C. It would be perfectly possible for Locke to have completed his revisions of F, dealing with the principles of toleration in general, only subsequently to consider the practicalities of the magistrate’s actions in quire D, without having first completed quires A–C.

This hypothesis aside, the Reasons highlights two important – but previously indemonstrable – features of Locke’s Essay concerning toleration: a focus on Catholicism and a dependence upon contemporary debate. In reference to the former, the Reasons reveals how the spectre of Catholicism animated Locke’s earliest theory of toleration, and helped shape its first expression. In this connection, it is important to re-emphasize that Locke’s stance on the indulgence of Catholics, prior to 1667–8, had been intransigently hostile. His response to Stubbe of 1659 had refused to allow that a ‘liberty’ to Catholics could ‘consist with the security of the Nation’: ‘since I cannot see how they can at the same time obey two different authoritiest carrying on contrary intrest especially where that which is destructive to ours ith [sic] backd with an opinion of infalibility and holinesse supposd by them to be immediatly derivd from god’. Within eight years, however, Locke was prepared to admit that Catholics could benefit from a form of toleration which denied the possibility of coercing beliefs, to the extent that F described this principle as the basis of a ‘right to toleration’: ‘Papists & all other men have a right to toleration of their religious worship & speculative opinions’. Yet Locke was evidently dissatisfied with this concession, and he did not include a ‘right to toleration’ of any kind for Catholics in H, A, O, or P. Instead, the Essay insisted on the magistrate being assured that ‘doctrines absolutely destructive’ to society could be ‘separated’ from Catholic religious worship before the indulgence of Catholics could be countenanced — the position which Locke would hold throughout the Epistola de tolerantia and his Letters (1690–2) on toleration:

These [sc. Roman Catholics] therefor blending such opinions with their religion, reverencing them as fundamentall truths, & submitting to them as articles of their

55 The signatures of the quires in the Essay were only added after the work as a whole was completed. Quires B and C were evidently written before the fair copy in quire A was made; that quire D was designated later in this sequence has no bearing on the relative priority of its composition.

56 De Beer, ed., The correspondence of John Locke, i, pp. 109–12 (75).

faith, ought not to be tolerated by the magistrate in the exercise of their religion unless he can be secured, that he can allow one part, without the spreading of the other, & that the propagation of these dangerous opinions may be separated from their religious worship.\textsuperscript{58}

Locke would consistently associate Catholicism with a fixed belief in the pope’s temporal supremacy; the \textit{Epistola} appeared to describe it as an ‘\textit{ipso facto}’ component of Catholic worship.\textsuperscript{59} Yet Locke would also suppose that this fixed belief could be renounced, and he later evinced an apparent interest in an ‘Oath of Allegiance’ for English Catholics, in which the creedal rudiments of Catholicism would be emptied of ‘dangerous opinions’.\textsuperscript{60} The \textit{Reasons} was not a prelude to this doctrine per se, but a sign that Locke was prepared to reconsider its governing presumption: the idea that Catholics could not be tolerated by the magistrate in the exercise of their religion unlesse he can be securd, that he can allow one part, without the spreading of the faith, ought not to be tolerated by the magistrate in the exercise of their religion unless he can be secured, that he can allow one part, without the spreading of the other, & that the propagation of these dangerous opinions may be separated from their religious worship.\textsuperscript{58}

In the context of the religious politics of the Ashley circle, the implications of Locke’s stance in the \textit{Reasons} are significant for their ambiguity. The option of according or denying Catholics a ‘right to toleration’ might have proceeded from Ashley’s inclinations, but it is difficult to know what these were between the aborted Declaration of Indulgence of 1662 and the Treaty of Dover of 1670.\textsuperscript{62} Ashley’s relationship with a Catholic bloc at court, represented principally by Queen Henrietta Maria, Queen Catherine, Henry Bennet (1618–85), the earl of Arlington, and Thomas Clifford (1630–73),\textsuperscript{63} is insusceptible of reconstruction; any sense that the \textit{Essay} was written at Ashley’s request is questionable in itself, but it is particularly difficult to imagine that he might have
instructed Locke to accept the bloc’s designs for Catholic relief, assuming that these were known or meaningfully formulated before 1670. It is entirely possible that Ashley and Locke had expected that Charles II would issue an indulgence for Catholics in 1668, packaged with a salve to nonconforming consciences: Locke foresaw that a justification would be required to defend the policy and he wrote the *Reasons* in *politique* obedience to this prediction, or in anticipation of Ashley’s purposes.

Yet an alternative possibility runs in a different direction. From Locke’s perspective, Catholicism served as the crux of a consistent theory of toleration, in which the difficulty was double-sided: how could a theorist argue for Catholic persecution without vitiating a case for the indulgence of nonconformity? A resurgence of Catholicism had evidently suggested itself as the effect of a forthcoming indulgence; a note dating from early 1667 in one of Locke’s memorandum books reveals that he feared Catholic intentions for England: ‘Papist | for carrying on the designe of the Papists in Englan(d) | V(ide) | Campanella | Adam Contzen | Hieron’.64 Locke also cited these individuals in a booklist from around this time under the heading ‘Politici’, noting: ‘In these three last authors you have the ways & methods describd of the Papists carrying on their designe in England.’65 The question of Catholic loyalty was clearly a matter of some on-going interest before Locke’s move to London to take up his position in Ashley’s household, and it would be reasonable to assume that this fear persisted during the composition of the *Reasons*.

Wolseley’s *Liberty of conscience, the magistrates interest* opened a new front in this debate, in that it elaborated a pragmatic case for the indulgence of nonconformity, dependent on civil ‘interest’, which required safeguards against Catholic misuse. This could explain the negative conclusion which the *Reasons* appears to endorse. Locke might have nominally sought ‘reasons’ for tolerating Catholics, but he was insistent – in the first and later drafts of the *Essay concerning toleration*, and every later iteration of his theory – that Catholics were intolerable, insofar as their allegiance remained in doubt. What distinguished the *Reasons*, on this reading, was the charity of its assumptions: Locke was willing to contemplate the toleration of Catholics in a fashion which others would never countenance, and he did so with startling impartiality. This interpretation does not rely on any specific claim about the precedence of the *Reasons* or the *Essay*, it is possible that Locke wrote the *Reasons* alongside or after the *Essay*, in order to clarify his positions or satisfy

64 National Library of Israel, Ms. Var. 294, p. 3, possibly in reference to the works identified in Bodleian Library, MS Locke f. 14, pp. 9, 19, 22, 24, and J. R. Milton, ‘The date and significance of two of Locke’s early manuscripts’, *Locke Newsletter*, 19 (1988), pp. 47–89, at pp. 72, 86 n. 38. This manuscript was previously in private hands (Bodleian Library, MS Film 79); its new location was identified in 2016 by J. C. Walmsley.

65 The National Archives, Kew, PRO 30/24/47/30, fo. 43r.
his curiosity. But this alternative would issue in the same observation: in 1667–8, Catholicism and allegiance preoccupied Locke in a manner which we have so far failed to appreciate.

The Reasons has a second, but equally novel, significance. Nothing in Locke’s correspondence or manuscripts had previously shed light on the relationship of the Essay with Locke’s interest in contemporary debates. Yet it is clear from the Reasons that Locke held some measure of interest in another living theorist of toleration. If it is true that the arguments which Locke employed in the Essay ‘were his own’, as the Miltons have contended, the extent to which these arguments were produced in the company of pamphleteers – instead of abstracted contemplation – must now be recognized, and further explored.

III

Editorial conventions. Our transcription retains the manuscript’s original spelling, capitalization, and punctuation, with the following exceptions. Manuscript forms for words such as ‘y’c’, ‘y’h’, ‘w’ch’ have been replaced by the usual printed forms, as have suffixes such as ‘-m’t’ [ment]. Contractions and abbreviations such as ‘K’ [King], and ‘nālı’ [natural] have been silently expanded. Italics are used for scribal interlineations, strikethroughs for scribal deletions, and double strikethroughs for scribal cancellation by superimposition. Angle brackets ⟨ ⟩ are used for editorial insertion or substitution in a text, and a raised dot · for an editorial stop.

Transcription. Greenfield Library, St John’s College, Annapolis, BR1610.L8232 [fo. 1r]

Page Reasons for tolerating Papists equally with others.

7 Persecution disobeiges the best sort amongst the Papist as well as amongst others.

12 If liberty of conscience make all men dayly more & more to abhor popery Papists may be tolerated as well as others.


67 For a comparison, see Locke’s fragmentary notes on Samuel Parker’s A discourse of ecclesiastical polite (London, 1669), in Locke, ECT, pp. 322–6.

68 [Wolseley], Liberty of conscience (W339q), p. 7: ‘It disoblige the best sort of men in every party, whom the State should most cherish and engage.’

69 Ibid., p. 12: ‘Christendom cannot...afford an instance that ever any State or People, where Divine-Knowledge, by Liberty of Conscience, and a Liberty for the Gospel was once spread, were in the least danger of turning Apostates to Popery, but have grown daily more and more into a detestation of it.’
If liberty of conscience breed men up in an irreconcileable dislike to all imposition in religion. Papists may be safely tolerated.

If liberty of conscience unite the Protestants against the Papists. Papists may safely be tolerated.\(^2\)

If toleration be the way to convert Papists as well as others, they may equally to be tolerated.\(^3\)

If Papists can be supposd to be as good subjects as others they may be equally tolerated.\(^4\)

If all subjects should be equally countenanced, & imployd by the Prince. the Papist have an equall title.\(^5\)

If abilitys alone ought to prefer men to imployment & the King ought not to lose the use of any part of his subjects. Papists are to be tolerated.\(^6\)

If liberty of conscience obleige all partys to the prince & make them wholly depend upon him, then the Papists may be tolerated.\(^7\)

If to force dissenters to ones opinion, be contrary to the rule of religion\(^8\) & to noe purpose.\(^9\) Papists should be tolerated.

If suffering for it will promote any opinion. Papists are to be tolerated.\(^10\)

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\(^1\) Ibid., p. 13: ‘Liberty of Conscience will breed men up with an irreconcileable dislike to all imposition in Religion and Conscience, and so unite them in a general abhorrence of Popery.’

\(^2\) Ibid., pp. 16–17: ‘Those that are of his Opinion, he may think them, in his private judgment, better Christians than others; but there is no Policy so to distinguish them, as if they were thereby better Subjects than others.’

\(^3\) Ibid., p. 17: ‘A Prince should seat himself in his Throne, with an equal Political Aspect to all his Subjects, and employ them, as their fitness for his Service qualifies them.’

\(^4\) Ibid., p. 17: ‘Let a Prince but choose men to serve him, whose Ability and Fitness carries the evidence of his choice, and other Exceptions will soon vanish.’

\(^5\) Ibid., p. 17: ‘Let a Prince once give Liberty of Conscience, and he obliges all Parties to him, and makes them wholly depend upon him.’

\(^6\) Ibid., p. 18: ‘let him not lay violent hands upon mens persons, because he cannot satisfie their understandings; that is Zeal without Knowledge, and Religion without a Rule’.

\(^7\) Ibid., p. 18: ‘To say a Magistrate is lukewarm in Religion, because he will not force men to his Opinion, is to say, He is lukewarm, because he will not do a thing, that Christ hath no where required of him; and do a thing, that is to no purpose to do, for that very end for which it is done.’

\(^8\) Ibid., p. 20: ‘Nay, there is nothing under the Sun to promote an Opinion in Religion, like making men suffer for it.’
Persecution of them alone can as little make them unite with the rest other partys, as toleration can make them divide amongst themselves. Both which effects follow a generall tolleration or persecution of other dissenters.78

In punishing papists for their religion, you are not soe liable to mistake you cannot by prosecuteing that as faction which is indeed conscience. For those who are guided as in persecuting other dissenters79 For those who are absolutely disposd of by an authority supposd infallible, whose interest is directly opposite to yours, must necessarily be all factious however some of them may be sincerely conscientious.

Though persecution usually makes other opinions be sought after & admir’d;80 yet perhaps it is lesse apt to recommend popery then any other religion. 1st Because persecution is its owne practice & soe begets lesse pitty. 2dly: The principles & doctrines of that religion seeme lesse apt to take inquisitive heads or unstable mindes, men commonly in their voluntary changes doe rather persue liberty & enthusiasme, then wherein they seeme their owne disposers, rather then give themselves up to the authority & imposition of others. Besides Popery, haveing beene brought in & continued by power & force joynd with the art & industry of the clergy, it is the most likely of any religion to decay, where the secular power handles them severely or at least takes from them those encouragements & supports they receive from their owne Clergy.

Quære Whether the Papists or Protestants gaind most proselyts by the persecutions they sufferd in those changes at the begining of the reformation

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78 Ibid., pp. 3–4: ‘Those who in their Principles largely differ from each other, when they come to be all bound up together in one common volumn, and linked in the same chain of Persecution and Suffering, will be sure to twist themselves into an united Opposition, to such an undistinguishing severity: Whereas the thing in it self rightly considered, So many divided Interests and Parties in Religion, are much less dangerous than any, and may be prudently managed to ballance each other, and to become generally more safe, and useful to a State, than any united party or interest whatever.’

79 Ibid., pp. 4–5: ‘Tis marvellous prudence to separate between Conscience and Faction, which can never be, but by a liberty for the one, that so they may distinctly punish the other.’

80 Ibid., p. 5: ‘For the errors you may suppose men possessed withal, as an eager Persecution is apt to make the Professors of them, think them more than ordinary Truths, and themselves some great men in maintaining them; so it makes others seek after that, when driven into a Corner, which were it in the open streets, no man would regard.’
Standers-by will be lesse dissatisfied with severity usd to papist then to others because it is lex talionis. Besides he cannot be thought to be punishd meerly for conscience who ownes himself at the same time the subject and adherent of an enemy prince.  

That a Prince ought to encourage knowledg, from whence springs variety of opinions in religion, makes not at all for papists who owne an implicit faith, & acquiesce in ignorance & who may as well submitt to the impositions of their owne lawfull prince, as those of a foraigner. the infallibility on both sides being equall. 

All the rest that is said p. 8. favours the toleration of Papists lesse then others.  
'Twill be lesse dangerous to discontent the Papist when the other partys are pleased then now. Especialy when indulgence will lesse secure you of their fidelity to the government then that of others. Every subject has an interest in his naturall prince, whilst he does not owne subjection to an other power. 

Liberty will lesse destroy the hopes & pretensions of papists that desire publrick mischief, then of others. Because they are backd by a forraign power, & are obleigd to propagate their religion by force 

A small part of the trade of England is (I thinke) managed by Papists. & if imposition in religion will lessen their trade it is perhaps a reason why they should not be tolerated

If it be the King’s interest to be head of the protestants this bespeaks noe indulgence for Papists. Unlesse the persecuteing of them here will draw the same usage or worse upon the protestants beyond sea. And how far even that may be advantageous to us in the present posture of of affairs, can only be determind by those who can judg whether the Hugonots in France or Papists in England are likelyest to make head, & disturb the respective governments

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81 Ibid., p. 7: ‘All standers-by, the generality of a Nation looking on, must needs be dissatisfied, to see a plain honest man, upright and punctual in all his dealings amongst men, punish’d meerly for his Conscience to God.’
82 Ibid., pp. 7–8: ‘If we look into that which naturally occasioneth several Opinions in Religion, ‘tis that which a Prince should for his own Interest highly encourage, and that is Knowledge.’
83 Wolseley here argues against imposition in religion as a means to secure the assistance of the most serious-minded and industrious.
84 Ibid., p. 9: ‘A Subject that gives the same testimony of his Fidelity to his Prince, that others do, and behaves himself in all Civil Concerns, as a faithful and pro

85 Ibid., p. 9: ‘As every Subject hath an Interest in his Natural Prince.’
86 Ibid., p. 9: ‘Let Liberty of Conscience be once fitly given, and the root of all mens hopes and pretensions, that desire publick mischief, is pulled up.’
87 Ibid., p. 9: ‘We shall never have a flourishing Trade without it.’
88 Ibid., p. 10: ‘‘Tis the King of Englands true Interest to become Head of all the Protestant party in the World.’
I doubt whether upon Protestant principles we can justifie
punishing of Papists for their speculative opinions as Purgatory
transubstantiation &c if they stopd there. But possibly noe
reason nor religion obleiges us to tolerate those whose practicall
principles necessarily lead them to the eager persecution of all
opinions, & the utter destruction of all societys but their owne.
soe that it is not the difference of their opinion in religion, or of
their ceremonys in worship; but their dangerous & factious
tenents in reference to the state. *which are blended with & make a
part of their religion* that excludes them from the benefit of toler-
ation· who would thinke it fit to tolerate either presbiterian or
Independant, if they made it a part of their religion to pay an
implicit subjection to a forraigne infallible power?

Severity to Papists only, cannot make them unite with any other
party. nor toleration disunite them among them selves.

In this section, the handwriting is somewhat looser.

Ibid., p. 11: ‘How can we otherwise justifie forcing men, where such Principles are
avowed, but by a flat denial of them, and recurring to those Popish Weapons of the absolute
Power of the Church.’

Wolseley notes that persecution had driven some Protestants to make common cause with
Catholics.

The underlining of ‘Toleration’ is in a darker ink, suggesting that it was added later.