

only in Chile and Cuba, in the 1930s, and in Bolivia. The country-by-country analyses which make up the bulk of this work are based in large part on the author's interviews and correspondence dating back to 1946 with leaders and former leaders of Trotskyist groups in the hemisphere and reflect Alexander's unexcelled familiarity with the Marxist-Leninist left in Latin America.

Two background chapters—on the rise and development of international Trotskyism and on the Fourth International and its factions in Latin America—place the later chapters in international historical perspective, though they fail to deal adequately with the relation between Trotsky's own ideas and those of his disputatious followers. (Trotsky's activities in Mexico during the late 1930s are discussed.) Generalizations are usually instructive, though on occasion, as in several comments on Trotskyists and guerrilla warfare (pp. 36, 43), they are potentially misleading or unnecessarily imprecise.

Though other studies will increase our knowledge of individual Trotskyist movements in Latin America, such as John W. F. Dulles's *Anarchists and Communists in Brazil* (1973) has already done, Alexander's book is certain to remain an essential research tool in this field for years to come.

WILLIAM E. RATLIFF
The Hoover Institution

THE UNITED STATES AND THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR. 1941–1947. By *John Lewis Gaddis*. Contemporary American History Series. New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1972. xiii, 396 pp. \$12.50, cloth. \$3.95, paper.

John Lewis Gaddis has provided us with one of the most interesting scholarly works on the origins of the cold war. The strength of the book, for which he was awarded the Bancroft Prize, lies in the careful research, superb organization, and the uniformly good writing. The book offers both student and layman a wealth of clearly presented information. Furthermore, Gaddis has refrained from the prevalent self-righteousness which we have so far witnessed in the heated debate over this period.

This strong commendation would seem to indicate that at last detachment has brought us to the point of balanced scholarship. However, a closer examination of Gaddis's assumptions and claims is necessary, for the book attempts to go beyond "revisionist" historiography. Although Gaddis acknowledges the revisionist contribution to this crucial historical period, he criticizes this same contribution for overemphasizing the economic motivations of American policy-makers. He purports to differ by asserting that economics played only a minimal role in American-Soviet relations, and he virtually ignores economic factors in his own analysis.

The forces on which Gaddis concentrates are domestic politics, bureaucratic inertia, quirks of personality, and perceptions—accurate or inaccurate—of Soviet intentions as the major influences on Washington officialdom. Gaddis claims that American public opinion was the key determinant in American policy toward the Soviets. He uses public opinion polls as a barometer of *the* national sentiment, but fails to consider that public opinion may have been a direct consequence of the pressures exerted by the Truman administration, and previous government policy, on American thought through the mass media.

The real issue in the clash between revisionist and orthodox historians has been an attempt to establish blame: who caused the cold war? On this issue Gaddis has a dual position. He leads his readers to believe that he has gone beyond this quarrel: "The Cold War is too complicated an event to be discussed in terms of either national guilt or the determinism of inevitability" (p. 360). He tells his audience, "If one must assign responsibility for the Cold War, the most meaningful way to proceed is to ask which side had the greater opportunity to accommodate itself, at least in part, to the other's position given the range of alternatives as they appeared at the time" (p. 360). It was the Soviets, according to Gaddis, who had the greater range of alternatives. Consequently, Stalin, because of the very nature of the Soviet system, had *more* options available than the United States did. Gaddis finds the "Russian dictator" immune to the domestic pressures that American policy-makers faced. He concludes that this narrowness in options for American leaders left the United States with little choice, and little responsibility. Furthermore, although Gaddis's argument takes into account the impact of Soviet actions on U.S. policy, it does not examine in the same light or with any thoroughness the impact of American actions on Soviet foreign policy.

Hence, it appears to me that ultimately this logic is successful only as a restatement of the orthodox argument. As an attempt "to go beyond revisionism" it has not succeeded. The reader finds no new facts or interpretations. The work is not a synthesis, and it reinforces the argument that the United States was less responsible than the Soviet Union in initiating the cold war. Although it is a fine and integrated coverage of the period, the book offers no new conceptual framework, and once again we have not been taken beyond either orthodoxy or revisionism.

DIANE SHAVER CLEMENS
University of California, Berkeley

THE SINO-SOVIET TERRITORIAL DISPUTE. By *Tai Sung An*. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1973. 254 pp. \$8.95.

REALIGNMENT OF WORLD POWER: THE RUSSO-CHINESE SCHISM UNDER THE IMPACT OF MAO TSE-TUNG'S LAST REVOLUTION. 2 vols. By *Oton Ambroz*. New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1972. Vol. 1: xxx, 338 pp. Vol. 2: 406 pp. \$25.00.

Both of these books combine carefully documented history with responsible speculation about the troubled relationship between Moscow and Peking. *The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute* examines the background of the border problem, its exacerbation since the fighting along the Ussuri River in 1969, and the possibility that it will lead to war. An appendix containing English translations of Russo-Chinese treaties and protocols from 1689 through 1915 is of sufficient interest by itself to warrant buying the book, despite occasional inconsistencies in transliteration.

The author contends, "The Sino-Soviet conflict, which began as an ideological dispute in 1960, has degenerated into a nationalistic clash based on territorial issues." He comments that some Soviet "hawks" might like to launch a preventive attack against China, before Peking acquires a large arsenal of ICBMs. Even so, "In large measure, the future prospect of war or peace at the Sino-Soviet border