

AUTHORITARIANISM, MODERNIZATION, AND DEMOCRACY IN CHILE

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- RETHINKING THE CENTER: PARTY POLITICS IN NINETEENTH- AND TWENTIETH-CENTURY CHILE.* By Timothy R. Scully. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992. Pp. 287. \$42.50.)
- DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE CHILEAN COUNTRYSIDE: FROM THE PRE-LAND REFORM PERIOD TO THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION.* Edited by Cristóbal Kay and Patricio Silva. (Amsterdam: Centro de Estudios y Documentación Latinoamericanos, 1992. Pp. 326. \$33.75.)
- PINOCHET: THE POLITICS OF POWER.* By Genaro Arriagada. Translated by Nancy Morris. (Boston, Mass.: Unwin Hyman, 1988. Pp. 196. \$34.95 cloth, \$12.95 paper.)
- DEINDUSTRIALIZATION IN CHILE.* By Jaime Gatica Barros. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989. Pp. 170. \$28.50.)
- POLITICAS HACIA LA EXTREMA POBREZA EN CHILE, 1973-1988.* By Pilar Vergara. (Santiago: FLACSO, 1990. Pp. 354.)
- CHILE'S MIDDLE CLASS: A STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL IN THE FACE OF NEO-LIBERALISM.* By Larissa Lomnitz and Ana Melnick. (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1991. Pp. 160. \$28.50.)
- CHILE: TRANSFORMACIONES CULTURALES Y MODERNIDAD.* By José Joaquín Brunner, Alicia Barrios, and Carlos Catalán. (Santiago: FLACSO, 1989. Pp. 228.)
- AUTORITARISMO, MODERNIZACION Y MARGINALIDAD: EL CASO DE CHILE, 1973-1989.* By Eugenio Tironi. (Santiago: SUR, 1990. Pp. 280.)
- FROM DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY: REBUILDING POLITICAL CONSENSUS IN CHILE.* Edited by Joseph S. Tulchin and Augusto Varas. (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1991. Pp. 90. \$9.95.)
- HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGREEMENT: CHILE DURING PRESIDENT AYLWIN'S FIRST YEAR.* By Americas Watch. (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1991. Pp. 100. \$10.00.)

When Patricio Aylwin acceded to the presidency of Chile in March 1990, one of the longest and most brutal dictatorships in the region ended. Since then, the concern with organizing an opposition geared toward

removing General Augusto Pinochet from power has been replaced by the new challenge of consolidating an emerging democracy. This changing political agenda has raised a whole series of new issues for Chileans and also calls for fresh thinking by social scientists. Yet as this new phase of work begins, it is crucial to attain a sharpened historical perspective. Because the current challenges were shaped historically, making sense of the Pinochet years is a necessary starting point for any inquiry into the future development of Chilean democracy. The task of recovering the past should never be too far from scholarly inquiries regarding the present and the future, but because Chile stands at a crossroads in its political development, the need for historical perspective is particularly pressing.

This review essay will therefore focus on an array of recent writings that seek to provide answers to some of the most pressing questions being asked about the past. Why did democracy break down in 1973? What type of authoritarian regime emerged? What changes were brought about during the period from 1973 to 1990? How did the transition from authoritarian rule take place? And what are the prospects for democratic consolidation? In an effort to arrive at fairly comprehensive answers, this review considers a variety of viewpoints. Although the majority of the authors are Chilean, U.S. and European perspectives are also included. Most of these authors are political scientists and sociologists, but economics, history, and anthropology are also represented.

The Breakdown of Democracy: Changes in the Political Party System and Social Classes in the Countryside

It would be hard to find a better entrée for considering the origins of the authoritarian regime led by Pinochet than the historically grounded overview of the evolution of the Chilean political party system provided by Timothy Scully, a political scientist at the University of Notre Dame and the Kellogg Institute. Although *Rethinking the Center: Party Politics in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Chile* barely touches on the Pinochet years, this book is extremely relevant to the present moment. Scully's in-depth analysis of the background to Pinochet's accession to power provides an essential benchmark for assessing the changes needed to avoid a new breakdown. This work has much to recommend it. Stylistically, it is beautifully crafted and well written. Substantively, it offers an intriguing interpretation of Chilean history achieved through a subtle balancing of broad theoretical concerns and rich empirical information. If my reaction is any indication, anyone interested in Chile will not want to put the book down once he or she opens it.

Scully employs the critical juncture model to study the evolution of the Chilean party system in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Originally developed by Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan in the West-

ern European context and recently elaborated and extended to Latin America by Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, this model revolves around a simple yet powerful idea.¹ To explain briefly, the way in which social cleavages are “resolved” politically is viewed as defining a set of institutional arrangements that become “frozen” in place, thus shaping the nature of political conflict for some time to come. According to this perspective, social change results in new institutional arrangements, which Scully defines in terms of new political parties and their relation to the existing parties. The periods in which social cleavages are translated into new party systems are called *critical junctures*.

In analyzing Chile, Scully identifies three critical junctures that developed at distinct times in response to three basic social cleavages. The first was the religious or clerical-anticlerical cleavage in the nineteenth century, the second the urban class cleavage in the first decades of the twentieth century, and the third the rural class cleavage in the 1950s. What is peculiar to the Chilean case is that all three social cleavages led to the shaping of a tripartite party system. This history makes Chile a fruitful case for Scully to pursue in exploring the formation and impact of center parties. Contradicting Maurice Duverger’s argument, Scully seeks to show that the center is *the* force for moderation and compromise within a party system. Indeed, *Rethinking the Center* seeks to transcend Chilean history to drive home a point of broad relevance. Even if we accept as a given the reality that social life is marked by divisions, Scully argues, we can seek in politics a means of overcoming rather than accentuating them. As recent Chilean history illustrates, politics can also become a polarizing force, something that Scully seeks to explain.

Within this general framework, Scully seeks to add to the literature on parties and democracy in Chile.² The impact of the earlier religious and urban-class cleavages on the Chilean party system have been discussed extensively by Arturo Valenzuela, Samuel Valenzuela, and Paul Drake. Scully draws on this well-developed literature, but he also stresses the need to look beyond the incorporation of urban labor and the formation of the labor-based Socialist and Communist parties in the 1930s. He therefore places special emphasis on the importance of the rural-class cleavage in the 1950s and the formation of the Christian Democratic party

1. See Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction,” in *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*, edited by Lipset and Rokkan (New York: Free Press, 1967); and Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, *Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and the Regime Dynamics in Latin America* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991).

2. Some of the key previous works include Arturo Valenzuela, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978); Paul W. Drake, *Socialism and Populism in Chile, 1932–1953* (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1978); and J. Samuel Valenzuela, *Democratización vía reforma: la expansión del sufragio en Chile* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones del IDES, 1985).

(the Partido Demócrata Cristiano, or PDC), perceiving its rise as an essential landmark in the evolution of the party system and a crucial factor affecting the stability of the democratic regime.³

Scully's rethinking of the center targets in particular the well-known interpretation advanced by Arturo Valenzuela. Scully criticizes this explanation for essentially adopting Giovanni Sartori's account, in which the center is viewed as both lacking the capacity for political initiative and encouraging greater political polarization in multiparty systems (pp. 6–11, 180–86). Like Arturo Valenzuela, Scully views the role of the PDC as a prominent factor that cannot be overlooked in explaining fully the breakdown of democracy in 1973. But in a more complex fashion, Scully perceives the 1973 coup less as the result of the weakness of the political center than as the result of the success of the PDC's strategy of electoral mobilization. Moreover, the center's impact on the stability of the democratic regime was mediated by the reactions on both the right and the left (pp. 169–70). In other words, political instability resulted from the type of centrist party the PDC was rather than from the simple presence of a centrist party. In what Scully emphasizes as a crucial difference, the PDC simply did not play the role of mediator between the extremes, as did the case of the nineteenth-century Liberals and the twentieth-century Radicals. In Scully's terms, the "programmatic" nature of the PDC, in contrast with the "positional" type of center party in Chile before the 1950s, underlay the breakdown of democracy in Chile in 1973.

A very different perspective on the Chilean countryside emerges from *Development and Social Change in the Chilean Countryside*, edited by Cristóbal Kay and Patricio Silva. This volume presents contributions by British, U.S., and Chilean scholars on three periods: the "hacienda period" (1850–1964), the "land reform period" (1964–1973), and the "neoliberal period" (1973–1990). Although slightly more than half the contributions were published previously in longer versions, the collection's merit resides in its judicious assemblage of writings by some of the outstanding students of "the agrarian question," including Kay, Silva, David Lehmann, Brian Loveman, and Maurice Zeitlin. These essays are simply the best empirical research on agricultural developments from 1850 to 1990 and the shifting political roles of landlords and peasants. The task of assessing major shifts and important continuities over this long period is facilitated by the editors' introductory and concluding essays.

Various essays in *Development and Social Change in the Chilean Countryside* support one of Scully's central arguments about the countryside:

3. This reading of the evolution of the Chilean party system also modifies the views presented by Ruth Collier and David Collier. Scully goes beyond their focus in *Shaping the Political Arena* in assessing the urban labor cleavage, and he presents a more nuanced view of how new cleavages intersect with the old ones (pp. 172, 182–84).

that political stability through the late 1950s depended on the exclusion of the peasantry (see the essays by Loveman and Lehmann). This finding is no surprise, given that Scully draws on Loveman's work to a large extent. Several of the other contributors, however, disagree with Loveman. Kay in particular contrasts his class analysis with Loveman's views, characterizing them as similar to Michael Lipton's "neopopulist version of 'urban bias'" (pp. 9, 106–7). According to Kay, "the process of capital accumulation in Chile rest[ed] above all on the economic exploitation (in a Marxist sense) of the urban working class" (p. 150). Bluntly, then, while Kay views peasant mobilization as contributing to the instability of the government of Eduardo Frei, he does not see it as a central factor in the fall of Salvador Allende. Thus the debate over the impact of the role of peasants and changes in rural social relations on political stability remains inconclusive.

One reason for this impasse is that *Development and Social Change in the Chilean Countryside* focuses primarily on the development of capitalism. The contributors continue their ongoing debate over the various paths to capitalism followed in Chilean agriculture and whether any of them offered serious possibilities for resolving the agrarian question (pp. 6–7, 10, 93ff). Chile is viewed as having followed the landlord path until 1964, shifting to a state-farm path under Allende, and then turning to a dominant capitalist-farmers path and a subordinate peasant-farmers path under Pinochet. The problem with this conceptualization of the agrarian question is that it remains trapped in the Marxist metaphor of base and superstructure, unable to escape the hold of economic determinism. According to Kay's analysis, the state simply "mediates" the main contradiction in society, the one between classes (pp. 106–7). If so, then it is unnecessary to supplement class analysis with a theory of the state and political institutions that grants autonomy to political will. But despite the declared superiority of class analysis (p. 11), in the end, the collection's stress on class and economic categories leads to an impoverished discussion of politics. Readers are left with Kay's references to "formal bourgeois democracy," which do little to illuminate the political dynamics of the period leading up to 1973 (p. 150).

In sum, the lack of analysis focusing on institutions, which need not come at the expense of attention to class issues, is a problem affecting many contributions in Kay and Silva's *Development and Social Change in the Chilean Countryside*. As Scully's "political-institutional" analysis shows, one can study the reality of classes in a society without disregarding institutions and political choice. A full account of the causes of the 1973 breakdown of democracy cannot dissociate class conflict from political forms because, as Scully skillfully demonstrates, the dynamics of a party system are crucial in determining whether compromise over conflictive issues is possible or not. In other words, a valid explanation of the 1973

breakdown of democracy in Chile must stress the eroding capacity of the party system to regulate conflict.⁴

The Authoritarian Regime: Consolidation of Pinochet's Power

While comprehending the causes of the breakdown of democracy in Chile is important for a general understanding of democracy and authoritarianism, it is also relevant to the present situation in Chile. Because Chile is effectively a case of redemocratization, the current prospects for democratic consolidation are connected with the overcoming of those elements of the party system that led to political instability in the period before 1973. But whatever the links between the present and the pre-1973 period, it is also crucial to stress that the Chile of the early 1990s differs greatly from the Chile of the early 1970s. The Pinochet regime, with its fearsome brutality and effective use of state power, reshaped the very contours of Chilean society. Indeed, notwithstanding all the talk at the time, the election of Allende in 1970 was a less critical turning point in Chilean history than the coup in 1973. Recognizing implicitly the coup's overriding significance, most of the books under review focus on the changes introduced by the military regime.

Although in hindsight the significance of the 1973 coup as a watershed in Chilean history stands out, at the time of the overthrow it was unclear just what type of military rule would ensue in Chile. Unlike their peers in Argentina, the Chilean armed forces had no history of intervention. Indeed, in only two instances in Chilean history after 1830 did the military intervene in politics to produce a break in constitutional rule. Only with the passage of time did the new power structure take shape. Pinochet's gradual consolidation of power and the emerging institutional outlines of the new regime are the subjects addressed by Chilean political scientist Genaro Arriagada in *Pinochet: The Politics of Power*. A translation of a 1985 Spanish edition updated through late 1987, this book is written in language and style that are extremely accessible. Its interest goes beyond the subject matter and Arriagada's acuity as one of the keenest observers of military affairs to his roles as head of the national campaigns opposing the 1980 and 1988 plebiscites and as vice president of the Christian Democratic party.

Pinochet: The Politics of Power provides an overview of the evolution

4. In referring to the causes of the 1973 coup, Tironi's book strongly emphasizes economic tensions in a manner that closely follows O'Donnell's 1973 argument. See Guillermo O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1973). Tironi does not cite this classic work, drawing instead on the work of the French regulation school (pp. 126–29). While he does refer to Valenzuela's *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile*, his invocation of the importance of institutions seems tacked on to the economic reasoning somewhat as an afterthought.

of the Pinochet regime through 1987 and an in-depth look at the peculiarities of Chile's authoritarian "power structure" (p. 8). But it is the latter emphasis on the internal workings of the regime and the lengthy detailing of how Pinochet moved to consolidate his position at the head of the government that give rise to Arriagada's most significant contributions. As he explains, Pinochet's genius lay in drawing on the military institution's tradition of professionalism and manipulating it to distance the military from political power. This course of action led to what Arriagada describes as "distorted professionalism" (pp. 38, 107). Having thus avoided politicizing the military, Pinochet successfully pushed through a new constitution, which was approved in a 1980 plebiscite that Arriagada does not hesitate to call "a fraud." Designed to extend Pinochet's hold on power until 1997, the new constitution effectively institutionalized his power over the military junta and the military institution (see pp. 45, 33–34, and Chapter 5). In comparative terms, this approach produced a unique situation.

The peculiarity of Chile's authoritarian power structure raises interesting questions for comparative analysis. The influence of Guillermo O'Donnell's work led to the labeling of post-1973 Chile, along with the military regimes in Brazil (1964–1985), Argentina (1976–1983), and Uruguay (1973–1985), as "bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes."⁵ The virtue of this label was that it pinpointed certain central features of the Chilean regime. As O'Donnell defined them, bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes resulted from military interventions that were not conceived as transitional. Instead of being geared toward playing a caretaker role, the military in bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes sought to bring about broad changes in what they saw as the root causes of instability in the democratic system. In this regard, the Pinochet regime undoubtedly shared a family resemblance with the other cases labeled as bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes.

The problematic side to applying the bureaucratic-authoritarian label to Chile was the tendency to overlook institutional differences across cases. This blurring is no small matter because as students of authoritarianism and transitions from authoritarian rule have stressed, sensitivity to institutional variations is necessary both for social scientists seeking to construct more precise comparative categories and for opposition groups devising strategies to oppose military rulers. It is in this regard that Arriagada makes an important contribution to scholarly understanding of regime dynamics. Moving beyond the early emphasis on the economic dimension of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes, he highlights the uniqueness of the Chilean power structure and points out significant institutional variations between Chile and the other bureau-

5. *Ibid.*

cratic-authoritarian cases (see Chapter 11). Thus his analysis restores an often ignored analytical dimension that is central to studying bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes.

The Neoliberal Model I: Economic Restructuring in Industry and Agriculture

Significant as it was, the change in political regime in 1973 was only part of a broader process of change. With the consolidation of power well advanced by 1975, the way was open for the military rulers to start pushing a radical and sweeping agenda of change. At the heart of their "neoliberal program" lay the attempt to restructure the Chilean economy by breaking with the policies of import-substitution industrialization implemented since the 1930s. Under the leadership of the so-called Chicago Boys and Finance Minister Sergio de Castro, Chile became one of the earliest, purest, and most dogmatic instances of applying a neoliberal economic agenda.

The impact of the new economic policies on industry is the central focus of *Deindustrialization in Chile*, by Jaime Gatica Barros, an economist working in Santiago for PREALC (Programa Regional del Empleo para América Latina y el Caribe). He identifies the crucial factors affecting Chilean economic performance as the tight monetary policy, the rapid opening to international trade, domestic liberalization of capital markets, and the system of incentives biased against productive investment (Chapter 1). These factors yielded high levels of unemployment, a soaring per capita foreign debt, and deindustrialization. Industrial output decreased by 10 percent between 1970 and 1982, while industrial employment in 1982 reached only 70 percent of the 1970–71 level. Moreover, as a percentage of total gross domestic product, industry fell from 24.7 percent in 1970 to 19.3 percent in 1982, while industrial employment fell from 21.5 percent to 12.7 percent over the same period (pp. 21–22).

Gatica Barros focuses primarily on the years between 1974 and 1982, although he goes beyond the 1981–1983 crisis to consider the subsequent recovery in 1984–1986 in order to show that deindustrialization was not simply the result of a cyclical downturn (p. 154). Even after the recovery, the effects of deindustrialization lingered on as a consequence of plant closings and eroded capital equipment, which in turn resulted from the drop in investment rates between 1976 and 1981. In short, reduction of productive capacity, along with supply bottlenecks, presented a structural obstacle to expanding output and employment until after the mid-1980s.

Gatica Barros supports his argument with detailed and clearly presented evidence, but *Deindustrialization in Chile* never escapes the narrow constraints of economic discourse. This is a problem when the issues to be explained escape economic categories and demand an interdisciplinary perspective. To begin with, one finds no mention of industrial

relations, workers' rights, or changes in trade union laws, even though these aspects obviously affect developments in industry. Similarly, no attention is given to the social and political forces underlying economic policy-making. For example, one learns nothing about the links connecting the state, the Chicago Boys, the *grupos económicos* (large business conglomerates), and other business sectors. Yet it is hard to make sense of deindustrialization in Chile without learning why those business groups born out of industrial policies dating back to the 1930s were seduced by the Chicago Boys despite the negative effects of their policies on these groups. As Peter Evans and others have shown, these political economic relations appear to have crucial effects on structural adjustment programs.⁶ The failure to address these relations is probably the biggest gap in Gatica Barros's book.

The narrowness of the conceptual framework of *Deindustrialization in Chile* becomes even more evident when it is compared with the discussions of changes in agriculture provided in several contributions to the Kay and Silva collection. Reflecting the difference between the usual concerns of economists and sociologists, these contributions address the social and political dimensions of change head on. Transformations in the Chilean countryside are broadly perceived as part of the regime's neo-liberal agenda. Rather than seeking to revive the pre-1964 hacienda system, the government aimed instead at facilitating through incentives the development of a new class of enterprising and technologically innovative capitalist farmers. But in order to open the way for this new agricultural class, the advances made by the peasants under the Frei and Allende governments had to be undone. This goal was achieved through strong state initiatives such as the privatization of the "reformed sector" (the one created out of the expropriated farms during the land reform between 1964 and 1970). As Silva argues, "The privatization of the reformed sector led to the elimination of the *asentamientos* [agrarian reform settlements] that formed the basis of the old rural unions" (p. 228). The state's liberal use of repression against rural unions, new labor laws, and deteriorating working conditions for most of the peasants also helped weaken the basis of peasant solidarity (pp. 13, 215ff, 223). In other words, the simple elimination of most peasant organizations was part of the changes in the Chilean countryside that led to the emergence of a capital-intensive agriculture, especially in the "dynamic categories" of production such as fruits, forestry, and certain leguminous plants (p. 229).

Due to the capital-intensive nature of this new agriculture, further changes resulted in the social structure of the countryside. Fewer peas-

6. Peter Evans, "The State as Problem and Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy, and Structural Change," in *The Politics of Economic Adjustment: International Constraints, Distributive Conflicts, and the State*, edited by Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, 139-81 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992).

ants owned land, as even those peasants who benefited from privatization of the “reformed sector” surrendered to the high prices being offered for their land (see Lovell Jarvis’s essay in the Kay and Silva volume). Meanwhile, the nature of the work force changed, as more permanent rural workers (*inquilinos*) on farms were replaced by an army of seasonal or temporary workers (*temporeros*), the new dominant category in the rural labor market (p. 229). In sum, the traditional agricultural structure based on the hacienda and *inquilinaje* became a thing of the past, swept away by the process of capitalist modernization. Replacing it was a system based on a class of capitalist farmers who resembled business owners and the *temporeros*, the two new social categories on the rural scene.

From the government’s perspective, these changes heralded a great success. During the Pinochet era, total agricultural production grew at an average yearly rate of 5.6 percent. Chilean agriculture also became more closely integrated into the world economy, as evidenced by the twentyfold increase in agricultural exports over the same period (p. 293). In surveying the economy as a whole, furthermore, after the 1981–1983 economic crisis and the move toward a more “pragmatic” version of neoliberal policies, things started to look up for the military rulers. Growth in gross national product resumed, approaching the 10 percent mark toward the end of the 1980s.⁷ Other encouraging indicators included inflation that was modest by Latin American standards and reduction of the foreign debt. Not all was rosy, as indicated by the high level of unemployment, but if there was a “bottom line,” it was that the Pinochet regime had succeeded in bringing about structural change, reorienting the economy from inward- to outward-looking, and achieving macroeconomic stability. Unlike the other military regimes in the region, Pinochet could claim to have aided the process of capitalist modernization.

Chile’s economic performance in the late 1980s made it fashionable to consider its experience with economic restructuring as something of a model for other Latin American countries to follow. On closer inspection, however, the praise bestowed on the Pinochet regime for its economic performance is somewhat misguided. If it is undeniable that achieving basic macroeconomic stability is a desirable goal, then there is also no denying that the economic policies implemented during the Pinochet years created a huge “social debt.” Chile’s economic accomplishments under Pinochet indeed have to be measured against trends like the growth of urban and rural *poblaciones* (squatter settlements) and the fact that some 45 percent of the Chilean population was living in poverty by the end of the Pinochet era.

7. Taking into account the drastic reductions in gross national product during the crises in 1975 and 1981–1983, however, the growth rate over the entire seventeen years that Pinochet held power averaged only 3 percent per year.

Given the social costs entailed in pursuing the neoliberal economic program and the single-minded determination with which economic reform was initially pushed, it may seem ironic to speak of a social policy during the Pinochet years. But the military government did carry out a variety of antipoverty programs. The goal of the regime's social policy, however, was to target only the poorest groups in society. In line with the principle of subsidiarity of the state, social services were privatized and the overall level of social spending was roughly halved between 1973 and 1979. The aim of "eradicating extreme poverty" implied therefore that other sectors that had benefited from the social policies of previous governments would be left to fend for themselves. Consistent with the regime's neoliberal inspiration, a minimalist social policy replaced the previous conception of the welfare state.

Sociologist and FLACSO researcher Pilar Vergara has studied the social policy of the Pinochet regime extensively by analyzing its anti-poverty programs. In *Políticas hacia la extrema pobreza en Chile, 1973–1988*, she outlines ten programs implemented primarily in urban areas related to nutrition, elementary education, housing, health, and social security (pp. 30–31). As Vergara acknowledges, the extreme difficulty of gaining access to data redirected much of her effort to merely describing systematically how each program operated and its impact on the poor. Her meticulous approach will thus provide other researchers with an important data base for future work. Notwithstanding this concern with detailed description, the picture that emerges is quite clear. Vergara finds that the social policies she studied were failures because they did not address the root causes of poverty. In her estimation, an adequate approach would have called for a more comprehensive strategy than that attempted by Pinochet.

Yet although Vergara finds inherent limits in the regime's approach to poverty, she believes that studying the design and implementation of these programs can provide useful lessons for future governments seeking to target the extremely poor. She points out several shortcomings in the design and execution of the authoritarian regime's anti-poverty programs. First, the government did not operationalize its definition of poverty: it never clearly assessed the size of the "target group" nor the level required to raise the target group above the poverty line (pp. 57–58, 284–85). Using independent measures, Vergara concludes that the resources committed by the state fell far short of what was necessary for the number of people covered and the extent of their needs. Other drawbacks reflected the technocratic conception of state policy, which gave no role to those affected by the programs. This technocratic bent led to erratic implementation of programs and made it

hard to identify those affected by a particular problem and respond to their needs.

The general thrust of the regime's social policy, in sum, is evident. By ignoring those above the level of extreme poverty and lowering the overall amount of expenditures, social policy under Pinochet selectively targeted those who fit the rigid indicators used to identify beneficiaries, leaving the rest—a sizable number—to fend for themselves and meet their needs through “the market.” If certain achievements can be cited in the areas of nutrition and infant mortality, there were more poor at the end of military rule than in 1973 (p. 300). The social costs of the market reforms were exacerbated rather than ameliorated by the new minimalist social policy.

Among those left to fend for themselves must be counted the middle class, one of the big losers under Pinochet. While one sector of the middle class (professionals, small business owners, and merchants) ascended to enjoy higher standards of life, another sector (known as the “traditional middle class”) fared poorly. This sector, which is to say those whose positions were linked to the state, had participated in the process of modernization since the 1930s. But as state functions that formerly had provided their means of social mobility were cut back and as state employment was reduced by about a fifth between 1973 and 1979, this sector declined. Anthropologists Larissa Lomnitz and Ana Melnick studied responses to this new situation by a group of primary and secondary teachers, who were prototypical of public-sector employees. The findings are presented in *Chile's Middle Class: A Struggle for Survival in the Face of Neoliberalism*.

Lomnitz and Melnick found that the new post-1973 reality, which turned teachers into “isolated individual[s] in the marketplace,” forcibly triggered a transformation in typical middle-class social networks (p. 149). In contrast to patterns in the 1960s, the loss of stability in the 1970s and 1980s obliged teachers to turn to immediate family members for favors in order to sustain their own physical survival, including loans, food, and access to shared housing (pp. 64–69, 148). In terms of survival strategies, the prevailing middle-class social networks in the 1960s had extended beyond close family members, allowing the middle class to participate in the fruits of modernization. Then in a dramatic reversal, middle-class survival strategies in the 1980s came to resemble those typical of the marginal poor in Mexican shantytowns. Thus in addition to adversely affecting the industrial proletariat, the urban popular sector, and the rural working class, the economic policies pursued during the Pinochet years reversed the gains of a sizable portion of the middle class.

What is special about Lomnitz and Melnick's study is that it goes beyond addressing the government's policies to consider societal responses. In the most valuable part of their study, the coauthors buttress

their findings on changing middle-class survival strategies by presenting the personal stories of five teachers. This anthropological focus, which accounts for about half the book, adds a human dimension to the repeated and now well-known statistics on poverty in Chile. Moving in the same direction is *Chile: transformaciones culturales y modernidad* by José Joaquín Brunner, Alicia Barrios, and Carlos Catalán. Brunner, a FLACSO researcher, is probably Chile's premier cultural analyst. This work analyzes how the military regime affected Chilean culture directly but also via the transformations it introduced into society.

Chile: transformaciones culturales provides a cultural analysis of the years from 1973 to 1988 by studying fairly general trends (Chapter 2) and then marshaling detailed quantitative information on the various "cultural fields" of education, the mass media (television, radio, newspapers, and music), the arts, and religion. The authors also scrutinize what they call conflicts within "quotidian culture" (pp. 26, 21, 184–94, Chapter 3). As they make clear, their analysis is based on the premise that culture is a potentially autonomous field of action, an idea running counter to the ubiquitous tendency toward economic reductionism (p. 26).

At the most general level, what is interesting about *Chile: transformaciones culturales* is its periodization of the years 1973–1988 into three phases. Brunner, Barrios, and Catalán focus first on a detectable shift around 1980, when the control exercised through "atomization" during the first years after the coup was gradually replaced by the less intrusive spread of "passive conformism." Around this time, the "authoritarian culture" characterizing the years from 1973 to 1980 gave way to a "consumerist culture" (pp. 47, 54, 81–84, 72). The next shift, which opened a third phase, was signaled by the first protests against the government in May 1983. These protests ended a decade characterized by little effective contestation of the government's cultural policy. The break was not complete, however, because the cultural changes brought about since 1980 lingered on (pp. 94–96, 189–94). This overlap between the second and third phase was significant.

The authoritarian rulers astutely realized that if the changes they wanted to bring about in the Chilean economic structure were to have a lasting impact, they would have to be accompanied by cultural change. Hence the government's cultural policies (like its social policies) were geared toward reinforcing the economic policies central to the neoliberal agenda. While the regime's social policy sought to end the welfare state concept of public responsibility in the area of social services, its cultural policy tried to install a model of social relations based exclusively on the laws of market competition. For ten years, the Pinochet regime moved unhindered in this direction. Although the protests in 1983 signaled the emergence of opposition, the regime's previous gains were not erased. Elements of continuity survived in the phase after 1983 and even after

democracy was finally achieved. Most crucial was the fact that the vision of a consumerist society was not entirely rejected. The model of a market society had taken root.

Authoritarian Modernization: A Global Interpretation of the Pinochet Revolution

As the works by Arriagada, Gatica Barros, Vergara, Lomnitz and Melnick, and Brunner et al. consistently suggest, the changes introduced during the Pinochet years were sweeping in scope. But each of these studies focuses on a single dimension of the Chilean experience under Pinochet and provides only a partial analysis at best. This is certainly not the case with the work of sociologist Eugenio Tironi, a senior researcher at the Centro de Estudios Sociales y Educación (SUR). *Autoritarismo, modernización y marginalidad: el caso de Chile, 1973–1989*, which grew out of a dissertation written under Alain Touraine, is an ambitious attempt to pull together various strands of analysis to provide an overarching interpretation of the Pinochet revolution. As such, it stands out among the works published thus far on this period.

Tironi's opus is no doubt a major contribution. The broad scope, sustained argumentation, and attempt to encompass the entire Pinochet period make *Autoritarismo, modernización y marginalidad* provocative as well as informative. There is a problem, however, in the way the book's framework is presented. Tironi dedicates three introductory chapters to laying out a formal theoretical framework built around the work of Emile Durkheim and the problem of social integration. This framework is put forth in a verbosely abstract manner that reads more like an exegesis of Durkheim's work than like a theoretical discussion preceding the body of a book. Basically, Tironi presents some general propositions about tendencies toward integration and disintegration that are supposed to be valid for all societies at all times.

The gaps left by this framework are readily apparent. First, concepts more comparative in nature, which would allow one to distinguish how different societies tackle these common tasks, are not introduced. Even more important, many of the notions discussed at length—such as collective representations—practically do not reappear throughout the body of the book. And other concepts that seem crucial to the book's argument—such as accumulation regime, mode of regulation, type of society, social movement, and logic of collective action—are never clarified. As it stands, the Durkheimian framework remains rather detached from the rest of the text.

Despite this shortcoming, *Autoritarismo, modernización y marginalidad* reveals strong aspects. In the first empirical section of the book, Tironi pulls together and interprets trends in the fields of politics, economics,

culture, and society. He assesses these changes, asking whether Chile has become a more modern "type of society." His illuminating answer is to reject views that one-sidedly stress the regressive aspects of the regime's policies. Rather, Tironi views the changes introduced under Pinochet as part of a modernizing project. In short, the "Pinochet revolution" produced an "authoritarian modernization" along the lines of the model associated with Otto von Bismarck in Germany (pp. 32–34, 153–56, Chapters 5 and 6).

This broad argument invites comparing Tironi's work with that of writers who have emphasized the economic prerequisites of democracy. If Seymour Lipset's "optimistic equation," which holds that more socio-economic development would lead to more political democracy, was clearly refuted by O'Donnell's work on bureaucratic authoritarianism, more recent modifications in the original argument have created a more credible argument. For example, as Lipset himself has recently argued, if countries experience certain tensions that may be conducive to authoritarianism when they start to develop economically, the link between economic development and democratization becomes firmly established at a middle level of economic development.⁸ This interpretation is not far from Tironi's view of recent Chilean history.

Much like O'Donnell, Tironi argues that the 1973 coup was the political response to economic necessities. Exhaustion of the "easy phase" of import-substitution industrialization and the difficulties of entering the "hard phase" combined with the global crisis of "Fordism" (a regime of accumulation centering on mass consumption) "led to the social and political upheavals that ended in 1973 with the democratic regime" (p. 128). But once Pinochet came to power, over time "modernization by an authoritarian path became more and more incompatible with modernity" (p. 39). That is, "the modernity of society . . . progressively . . . entered into conflict with the authoritarianism of the political regime" (p. 44).

Beyond the contradiction between authoritarianism and modernization, Tironi stresses that one of the legacies of Chile's authoritarian modernization is the tension it produces due to its meager capacity for integration. He discusses key structural changes brought about by the Pinochet revolution, including the decline of the traditional middle class, the weakening of trade unionism, and the increased number of *marginalizados* who engage in non-wage work or jobs in the informal sector (Chapter 6). Thus on a national scale, authoritarian modernization was accompanied by an increased "dualism" that was most evident in the growth of poblaciones (pp. 169, 172).

8. Seymour Lipset, Kyoung Ryung Seong, and John Carlos Torre, "A Comparative Analysis of the Social Requisites of Democracy," *International Social Science Journal*, no. 136 (May 1993):155–75.

Opposition to Military Rule: Pobladores, Political Parties, and the Transition to Democracy

Following the emergence of the *pobladores* (urban shantytown dwellers), the potential for political action of this new social actor became a key topic of debate. As is well known, the *pobladores* were protagonists in the protests between 1983 and 1986. But what interests Tironi is the theoretical question of whether the *pobladores* constituted a social movement. This question organizes the second empirical section of *Autotarismo, modernización y marginalidad*, in which Tironi draws on his important research to present a meticulous analysis of the *pobladores*. He begins by warning against viewing the *pobladores* as inhabitants of a “marginal world” isolated from the rest of society and internally homogeneous (pp. 172–73). On the basis of attitude surveys, Tironi argues against the view associating the *pobladores* with violence and radical action (Chapter 7). In contrast, his sober assessment of the phenomenon depicts *pobladores* as seeking integration and state assistance while relying on political and reformist methods to advance their goals (p. 181). These findings dispel the alarmist and revolutionary depictions of the *pobladores* by stressing resignation as a more common response than rebellion. Only a minority—consisting of the educated, the young, students, and the unemployed—was found to have turned to violence (p. 202).

The limited political potential of the *pobladores* thus becomes evident. They are mainly inwardly oriented and apathetic, although tending at times toward explosive action, as in the 1983–1986 cycle of protests. But even this form of collective action is interpreted by Tironi as more expressive than instrumental (p. 168). Therein lies a significant handicap, which Tironi uses to justify not labeling what is usually termed “the *pobladores*’ movement” as a social movement (pp. 210, 220–22).⁹ Undeniably, the resurgence of contestation in 1983 after a ten-year lull represented an important departure. Although the protests failed to trigger the desired transition from authoritarian rule, the “loss of fear” they brought about facilitated the gradual emergence of a concerted opposition to Pinochet.¹⁰ As a collective actor at the center of the protests, the *pobladores*

9. Tironi draws on Touraine’s definition, in which social movements are actors linked to the functioning of a society but not to its change (pp. 21, 32, 18, 20). Most readers would ask for some “unpacking” of this definition.

10. Countering economic explanations that locate the root of this cultural change in the direct impact of the 1981–1983 economic crisis, Brunner et al. view the protests themselves as bringing about the “reintroduction of the principle of politics in civil society,” that is, as “a principle affecting everyday mass culture” (p. 94). Thus if the economic crisis is perceived as partly enabling this change, the emergence of social actors organized in opposition to the government is conceptualized in terms more like those emphasizing the loss of fear than like those who consider economic hard times as the primary explanation. Likewise, Tironi advances a critique of economic explanations of the protests and the subsequent transition. He states flatly that research links violent protest to “factors associated

made a significant contribution in this regard. But the push for democratization called for moving from expressive to strategic action. In this process, unsurprisingly, the pobladores ceded the leading role to political parties (p. 41).

Tironi touches on the transition to democracy, but this phase is more explicitly addressed in the collection of essays edited by Joseph Tulchin and Augusto Varas, *From Dictatorship to Democracy: Rebuilding Political Consensus in Chile*. This slim volume is the fruit of a conference held at the Wilson Center in Washington, D.C., in December 1989. Rather than being an effort to present research findings, this volume appears to be more political than academic in its aims, seeking in particular to raise the level of awareness regarding Chile in the U.S. capital.¹¹ Given the posts that many of the contributors hold in the Aylwin government, the essays can be read as position papers on “where Chile should go from here.” The volume includes essays by Minister of Economy Carlos Ominami, Secretary General of the Socialist party and Minister of Education Jorge Arrate, Minister of the Chilean General Presidential Staff Edgardo Boeninger, and Deputy Foreign Minister for Political Affairs Carlos Portales, along with a contribution by former Minister of Finance and Economy Rolf Lüders. While there is certainly value in this forward-looking exercise, the volume also contains good discussions of the transition.

Echoing common themes in the literature on the transition, various contributions to *From Dictatorship to Democracy* point out the importance of the decision by opposition leaders to contest the 1988 plebiscite (originally called for in the Constitution of 1980) and to form the broad coalition known as the Concertación de Partidos por el No (see the contributions of Boeninger and Arrate). Another theme is the learning process during the Pinochet years, which led politicians to reappraise the value of “formal political democracy.” As Portales emphasizes, these factors were crucial in shaping a particular mode of transition. Given the moderation of the opposition and the fact that it “implicitly operated within the formal framework of the regime,” the transition from authori-

with the instability of the political system” and not with “socioeconomic variables” (pp. 206–7, 225–27). At other points, however, Tironi stresses the importance of economic factors, much as he does in his argument concerning the 1973 coup, viewing the economic crisis as leading more or less to the political opening and the protests (pp. 145–46, 27, 22). This confusion arises from Tironi’s lack of explicit discussion of the economic theories that he draws on as well as from the need for clarification of the links between economic and social categories.

11. Some of the main academic sources on the transition process include Manuel Antonio Garretón, *Reconstruir la política: transición y consolidación en Chile* (Santiago: Andante, 1987); *The Struggle for Democracy in Chile, 1982–1990*, edited by Paul Drake and Iván Jaksic (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1991); and Guillermo Campero and René Cortázar, “Actores sociales y la transición a la democracia en Chile,” *Colección Estudios CIEPLAN*, no. 25 (1988):115–58.

tarian rule was a “gradual, nonviolent” process that did not break with the institutional framework of the authoritarian regime (p. 61). The result, in comparative terms, was one of the most controlled transitions to democracy ever witnessed in Latin America.

Thus despite the opposition’s success in ending military rule, the mode of transition from authoritarian rule, which entailed no break with the regime’s institutional framework, meant that the move toward democracy would be a highly conditioned process. Tironi, for example, sees the transition directly in terms of conditionality: what made the transition possible in the first place was the opposition’s adaptation to the new reality brought about by the Pinochet revolution (pp. 41, 153–55). Consequently, when Christian Democrat Patricio Aylwin assumed power as the head of the *Concertación de Partidos para la Democracia* in March 1990, following a plebiscite in 1988 and general elections in 1989, the transition remained incomplete. Given the reformist nature of the transition, the new leaders inherited a series of restrictive legacies from the previous authoritarian era.¹²

Democratic Consolidation: Challenges and Prospects

When Aylwin took over, Chile put its experience with military rule behind and embarked on a new path. In this new phase, the main political challenges were to finish the incomplete transition and to begin the process of democratic consolidation. With regard to the latter task, Chile is an atypical case in the South American context. Only Chile and possibly Uruguay can be considered instances of redemocratization. But Chile is unique in another respect: although the last of the South American countries that succumbed to military rule in the 1960s and 1970s to move toward democracy, Chile was the first to undertake democratic consolidation following a thoroughgoing economic restructuring. Given this historical path, as various contributors argue, democratic consolidation depends on maintaining a delicate balance between continuity and change.

One area where democratic consolidation appears tightly bound to

12. The key legacies included Pinochet’s right to remain commander in chief of the army for eight more years and thereafter as senator for life, the presence of nine appointed senators, a national security council with strong powers and military representation, and a packed supreme court. A series of other preemptive and confining measures were taken by the Pinochet government in the year after defeat in the 1988 plebiscite, including laws affecting the central bank, elections, and television as well as appointments within the armed forces and military budgets. Some of the more restrictive aspects of the Constitution of 1980 were softened through a series of amendments approved in a July 1989 plebiscite. The constitutional reforms flexibilized the mechanisms for reforming the constitution, reduced the mandate of the first president to four years, diminished the importance of the designated senators, changed the composition and powers of the national security council to diminish the tutelary role of the military, and rescinded the proscription of the Communist party.

change is in civil-military relations. Here one finds important similarities between Chile and other countries moving away from military regimes. If democracy is about civilian leaders being elected and having the power to make policy, then one of the shared tasks facing new democratic governments is to assert their control over the military. In this regard, a common pattern seems to be that one of the first manifestations of “the military problem” is the issue of how to deal with the past—more precisely, how to respond to the record of human rights violations by the former power holders.

As stressed in the Americas Watch report, *Human Rights and the Politics of Agreement*, this undertaking has not been an easy affair for the Aylwin government. This short book, written in accessible language and style, discusses various aspects of the subject: the gradual revelation of human rights abuses; the workings of the Rettig Commission (the Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación), appointed by President Aylwin in April 1990; the substance of the Rettig report released in February 1991 and reactions to it;¹³ and the intricacies of the judicial responses to the human rights question. After reading this detailed account of events through mid-1991, two observations can be made. On the negative side, certain pieces of legislation bequeathed by the outgoing regime, such as the 1978 amnesty law and the December 1989 law forbidding future congresses and governments from investigating the military’s wrongdoings, have imposed serious constraints on the Aylwin government’s ability to confront the human rights question fully. On the positive side, President Aylwin has skillfully pursued a policy stressing the need to deal with the past even within these inherited constraints.

In the assessment of the Americas Watch report, however, Aylwin’s “politics of agreement” made it hard for the government to achieve its stated goal of balancing truth and justice, ending up with more truth than justice (p. 50). The report concludes that “because of the role of military courts and legislation decreed by the Pinochet regime, there is little prospect that the human rights violations of the military regime will be completely investigated or that those responsible will be prosecuted” (p. 38).¹⁴ Standing back, however, one can see the result of the government’s human rights policy as somewhat more ambiguous. Certainly, full justice has not been done. But the delicate balancing act carried out by Aylwin has enabled the government to avoid the kind of instability experienced in Argentina between 1987 and 1989. Thus if we consider the Chilean government’s human rights policy in the larger context of the

13. For the full report, see the *Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation*, 2 vols. (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993).

14. In the most important human rights prosecution to date, retired General Manuel Contreras, former head of the secret police (the Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional, or DINA), was put on trial in late 1992.

problem of civil-military relations (with which it is inextricably linked at this stage of Chile's political development), it is probably safe to say that Aylwin's policies have had a positive effect.

Beyond the area of civil-military relations, where the process of democratic consolidation admittedly depends on key changes,¹⁵ democratic consolidation in other areas is bound to hinge on a more complex balance between change and continuity, especially with regard to the economy. When the democratic authorities came to power in 1990, they inherited an economy that was in relatively better shape than those of Brazil and Argentina during their respective transitions. It is therefore understandable that the new economic policymakers decided not to tinker with the model they had inherited from Pinochet. This decision reflected acceptance of the need for economic restructuring and a more general reevaluation of the market (see Angel Flisfisch's contribution to Tulchin and Varas's *From Dictatorship to Democracy*, p. 14). The Aylwin government therefore assured domestic and foreign business interests that it would respect property and investment laws and would not return to pre-1973 economic policies. The changes envisioned were actually relatively minor. A tax reform was passed to obtain new funds for anti-poverty programs in health, education, and housing, and a few reforms in the labor laws were pushed through. The degree of continuity is evident in Kay and Silva's characterization of the new government's economic policies as "neoliberalism with a human face" (pp. 6, 293).

The implications of the new government's economic policies for democratic consolidation are significant. Post-1990 economic policies are probably linked positively to Chile's prospects for economic growth. But as Tironi argues most persuasively, a key social consequence of the economic model introduced during the Pinochet period was that Chile became a dual society in which a large portion of the population was marginalized from the process of modernization (pp. 157, 247, 255–58). This dualism represents a problem for democratic consolidation because

15. The need for change is also pressing regarding a series of undemocratic features of the Constitution of 1980, some of which pertain to civil-military relations. One important step was taken in early 1992, when a municipal and regional reform passed by the congress led to the municipal elections in June 1992, the first in twenty years. That same month, the government introduced a reform package to reestablish democratic control over the armed forces, eliminate the non-elected senators, loosen military control of the national security council, and make the electoral system more representative and proportional. Passage of these constitutional reforms will require the support of the right-wing parties, given their control of the senate. But because of the results of the municipal elections (the government parties received 53.5 percent of the vote compared with less than 30 percent for the right-wing parties, the Unión Democrática Independiente and Renovación Nacional), the right now appears determined to block the reforms. If they succeed, then the vestiges of the authoritarian constitution will have to be tackled by the winners of the presidential and parliamentary elections in December 1993. On the proposed constitutional reforms, see Ignacio Walker, "La reforma constitucional," *Mensaje* (Santiago), no. 410 (July 1992):213–15.

even under a minimal or procedural definition of democracy, as Francisco Weffort argues, "the minimal procedural working of a political democracy implies certain minimal social conditions."¹⁶ These conditions seem far from attainable in Chile, causing a large segment of society to feel no sense of belonging to a national community and excluded from participating in the political process. It thus appears that although the contradiction between a closed polity and an open economy eventually caught up with Chile's authoritarian rulers, the increased dualism engendered by their authoritarian modernization is likely to hamper democratic consolidation for a long time to come. In this regard, the fate of democracy appears closely tied to change favoring social cohesion.

What is necessary from the democratic perspective is that the issue of redistribution be placed on the political agenda along with that of growth. Such an agenda will be hard to implement. As indicated by Peter Evans's work, certain conditions seem to be related to progress on this front. In Evans's view, a response to distributional issues requires a state characterized by a broader "embedded autonomy" than that needed to tackle structural adjustment and economic growth.¹⁷ What this process entails is, on the one hand, a state structure closely in touch with societal interests but not captured by any single group (a description that the current Chilean government has begun to approximate). On the other hand, what is also needed is the formation of autonomous popular-sector actors and political parties capable of projecting broad societal interests.

Significantly, as a result of deliberate policies of the Pinochet regime (and of unintended consequences in some cases), a few signs pointing to the emergence of autonomous popular-sector actors can be detected. Tironi correctly points out that the military rulers sought to weaken the link between unions and parties directly by prohibiting union officials from serving as party officials and vice versa (pp. 30, 153–55, 165–67). Paul Drake, however, has argued that "organized workers had to develop more autonomous skills because the military so thoroughly dismembered their political allies."¹⁸ Kay and Silva find similar evidence of "more autonomous rural unionism which is less manipulated by political parties" and less susceptible to state paternalism (pp. 297–98, 232). Yet these developments must be put into perspective.

From several sources, assessments skeptical of the role of autonomous social actors can be heard. Drake himself stresses that "Although unions operated much more autonomously after the coup, they still

16. Weffort, "Novas Democracias, Qué Democracias? *Lua Nova*, no. 27 (1992):5–30, 23.

17. Evans, "The State as Problem and Solution," 176–81.

18. Paul Drake, "Urban Labour Movements under Authoritarian Capitalism in the Southern Cone and Brazil, 1964–1983," in *The Urbanization of the Third World*, edited by Josef Gugler, 366–98 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 388.

heeded party cues.”¹⁹ Brunner, Barrios, and Catalán insist similarly that one of the cultural legacies of the Pinochet years is conformism of the masses. The new consumerist ideology is also perceived as scarcely conducive to developing a culture that fosters active participation by individuals and groups in solving their own problems (pp. 193–94, 209–10). Even more explicitly, both Tironi and Flisfisch consider social actors as simply too weak to represent broad societal interests at the political level. Hence they consider it likely that political parties will have to play a crucial role in managing the tensions arising from the simultaneous challenges of democratization and the effects of structural adjustment (Tironi, pp. 46–47, 66–67, 257–58; Flisfisch in Tulchin and Varas, pp. 16–17).

If political parties are to represent broad societal interests and foster social cohesion without destabilizing the new democracy, a party system will have to develop that differs considerably from the one existing in Chile in 1973. Although it is still hard to discern long-term trends, Scully’s *Rethinking the Center* does provide the historical perspective needed to address this question by examining what came before Pinochet. Scully argues that important changes have taken place in parties across the political spectrum, particularly evident in the secularization or de-ideologization of the Christian Democratic party (PDC) in response to authoritarian rule. The PDC appears to have turned away from its previous hegemonic aspirations in placing greater emphasis on coalition building. The PDC has thus become what Scully terms a “positional” type of center party as opposed to the “programmatic” party it was from the late 1950s until the early 1970s. This unusual development, along with the renewal process within the Socialist party, allowed formation of the *Coalición de Partidos para la Democracia* (CPD) and is central to Chilean prospects for democratic consolidation. As Scully and Tironi note, Chile has already evolved from a party system characterized by “polarized pluralism” in the early 1970s to one closer to Giovanni Sartori’s “moderate pluralism” (see Scully, pp. 199–201; Tironi, pp. 155, 44–45). If this trend holds, Chile is undoubtedly well on the way to becoming a consolidated democracy.

Conclusion: A Comparative Research Agenda

One question of interest arising from all this discussion is whether the recent changes in Chile represent a new critical juncture. The country has certainly experienced significant changes in its social structure and notable alterations in its party system. Scully is nevertheless skeptical of interpreting these political changes as a critical juncture. Such an assessment can only be preliminary, because as he acknowledges, it may be too

19. Ibid.

early to make any definitive pronouncement on the question (pp. 190–93). Complicating the matter is the danger of looking only for signs of features that defined previous critical junctures, such as the incorporation of a new social group or the emergence of a new party. This kind of approach would be problematic if, now that no formal political exclusions remain to be resolved by expanding voting rights, a new critical juncture emerged with different characteristics. Various authors including Juan Linz and Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos have argued that the very nature of political parties and political participation may be changing in comparison with the era of mass parties.²⁰ In sum, it seems likely that a final assessment of whether recent changes in Chile represent a new critical juncture will depend on further research—along with that seemingly inescapable aid of the social sciences, the passing of time.

Another question raised by the scholarship on Chile concerns the connection between various paths of democratization and long-term prospects for democratic consolidation. As has been pointed out, Chile appears to have been one of the first countries to move toward democracy after having restructured its economy successfully. The question that comes up is whether “only the neo-liberal strategy” of democratization “offers the possibility of eventually arriving at a stable, viable liberal regime,” as Laurence Whitehead has suggested.²¹ If so, then whatever the shortcomings of a situation like Chile’s in 1990–1992 in terms of participation, political choice, and citizens rights, the long-term prospects for arriving at a liberal democratic regime would be much greater than in countries like Brazil and Argentina, which have shown no sustained tendency toward liberal democracy and are currently characterized by a type of unconsolidated democracy that O’Donnell has labeled “delegative democracy.”²²

Answering this question calls for an explicitly comparative research agenda to clarify the differences between the Chilean transition (similar in many ways to the one followed by South Korea, Taiwan, and possibly Mexico) and that followed in other paradigmatic cases like Brazil, where structural adjustment followed rather than preceded political democra-

20. Juan Linz, “Change and Continuity in the Nature of Contemporary Democracies,” in *Reexamining Democracy*, edited by Gary Marks and Larry Diamond, 182–207 (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage, 1992), esp. 182–87; and Wanderley Guilherme dos Santos, “El siglo de Michels: competencia oligopólica, lógica autoritaria y transición en América Latina,” in *Muerte y resurrección: los partidos políticos en el autoritarismo y las transiciones en el Cono Sur*, edited by Marcelo Cavarozzi and Manuel Antonio Garretón, 469–522 (Santiago: FLACSO, 1989).

21. Laurence Whitehead, “The Alternatives to Liberal Democracy: A Latin American Perspective,” in *Prospects for Democracy*, edited by David Held, a special issue of *Political Studies* 40 (1992):146–59, 154.

22. O’Donnell, *Delegative Democracy?* Kellogg Working Paper no. 172 (Notre Dame, Ind.: Kellogg Institute for International Studies, University of Notre Dame, 1992). See also Whitehead, “Alternatives to Liberal Democracy,” 151.

tization.²³ A second and related point is that more work needs to be addressed to comparing the trade-offs between a scenario where structural adjustment was not attempted (or was attempted but failed during the period of authoritarian rule) and thus was left for the new democratic authorities to complete as opposed to the scenario that Chile fits, in which structural adjustment was accomplished under authoritarian rule, leaving the new democracy to face the consequences of economic adjustment. These questions, which can only be answered comparatively, touch the core of developments in Chile and a broad set of cases and should therefore be placed at the center of future research.

23. For a useful discussion, see Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, "Economic Adjustment and the Prospects of Democracy," in *Politics of Economic Adjustment*, edited by Haggard and Kaufman, 319–50.