Patterns of Civilian Control of the Military in East Asia’s New Democracies

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Successful institutionalization of civilian control of the military is a necessary condition for the consolidation of democracy. This is particularly relevant for East Asia, where the military used to be a key player in the previous authoritarian regimes. This article analyzes the changes, advances, and setbacks in achieving civilian control in five countries that have made the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule: Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. The empirical analysis is built on a conception of civilian control that distinguishes three areas of political decisionmaking: political recruitment and overall public policymaking, national defense, and internal security. The study shows that only in Taiwan and South Korea have civilians succeeded in curtailing military influence in politics. In contrast, in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, the military has shown itself more or less resilient in guarding its prerogatives in the postauthoritarian era. This seriously impedes the democratically elected authorities’ effective power to govern in these countries and has led to democratic deterioration in Thailand and the Philippines. The article highlights three arguments to account for the profound difference between the cases: historical legacies of authoritarian rule and the path of democratic transition, the internal security role of the military, and the relationship between development and democratic consolidation.

Keywords: civil-military relations, democratization, East Asia, Indonesia, military, Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, transition

The past quarter century has seen a global trend of democratic transition going hand in hand with the decline of military regimes and open military intervention. In spite of this development, asserting civilian control of the armed forces remains high on the political agenda in many emerging democracies. This is the case in East
Asia, where democratic transitions have taken place in the Philippines (1986), South Korea (1987), Taiwan (1987), Thailand (1992), and Indonesia (1999). In these countries, the military was a key player in the previous authoritarian regimes. Even today, after two decades of democratic development in East Asia, civilian control is still not an uncontested norm in the region.

However, there are significant differences between the cases. Taiwan and South Korea have seemingly managed to push and keep the military out of politics. In the Southeast Asian democracies, by contrast, political intervention by the military remains a common phenomenon. In these countries, military officers continue to exercise political influence and jeopardize the democratic process. Most drastically, in recent years, public discontent with cynical elites, chaotic politics, and controversies surrounding electoral outcomes have motivated disgruntled officers to stage coup attempts in the Philippines and in Thailand.

It is our goal in this article to contribute to the research on democratization in East Asia by analyzing the development of civil-military relations in Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand from the beginning of the respective transition processes until 2007. We believe that our study enhances the understanding of democratization and civil-military relations in the region in several ways. Our treatment presents a systematic and theory-driven comparative examination of civilian control in five new democracies in East Asia that goes beyond simple dichotomous evaluations and allows for a differentiated comparative assessment of civilian control in each respective country. The comparative perspective yields important insights into characteristic patterns of civilian control attempts and their outcomes. Further, it permits some tentative conclusions regarding the relationship between civil-military relations and democratic consolidation as well as background factors that influence civilians’ abilities to expand their control over the military.

The study finds that East Asian democracies do not converge on a single pattern of civilian control of the armed forces. These five countries were confronted with highly diverse historical preconditions regarding the military’s inclusion into the ruling elite during the authoritarian regimes, and, the degree to which civilians have been able to extend their political power and to reduce military influence over politics has also varied. While Taiwan and South Korea have seen a considerable decline in their militaries’ political clout, military establishments in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand have been able to shield their prerogatives to a large extent and have become or remained
political veto powers in the process. Our analysis further shows that this lack of civilian control over the military has led to a significant weakening of the general “quality” (Diamond and Morlino 2005) of the institutions and processes that are supposed to guarantee people’s sovereignty in the three Southeast Asian countries.

The article proceeds as follows. We first outline the conceptual framework for our analysis. We then compare the development of civil-military relations in the five new democracies in the region along three major areas of civil-military relations: political recruitment and overall public policy, external defense, and internal security. Finally, we discuss the relationship between civilian control and the consolidation of democracy in East Asia.

Making Sense of Civilian Control

Civilian control of the military is a conditio sine qua non for democratic consolidation. The very idea of democratic rule, understood as political participation and control by the governed,1 presupposes that democratically elected governments and parliaments have the ability to decide policies without undue influence by nondemocratic veto powers such as the military. Without sound civilian control, democratic transition and consolidation remain fragile and subject to potential reversal by nondemocratic forces. Civilian control of the military has therefore been described as one of the core components of democracy that needs to be institutionalized if a newly democratized polity is to be considered consolidated (Schmitter 1995; Diamond and Plattner 1996; Linz and Stepan 1996; Merkel 2004).

In spite of this consensus, the voluminous literature on transitions to democracy still lacks a universally accepted definition and conceptualization of civilian control. Building on recent theoretical work by Kenneth Kemp and Charles Hudlin (1992), Felipe Agüero (1995), and Peter Feaver (2003), we propose to define civilian control as a particular state in the relations between the civilian political authorities and the military leadership in which the civilians alone have the power to decide on national policies. While the civilians may choose to delegate the implementation of certain policies to the military, they alone determine which particular policies the military implements. Civilians alone define the boundaries between policymaking and policy implementation. Furthermore, civilian authorities are entitled and have the capacity to effectively control the implementation of their decisions. They
possess sanctioning power vis-à-vis the military, and they can revise their decisions at any time. In this sense, civilian control is a relative condition—that is, it is possible to distinguish different degrees of civilian control (e.g., strong or weak, encompassing or limited).

To be able to differentiate degrees of civilian control, we distinguish three decisionmaking areas: elite recruitment and overall public policy, national defense, and internal security (Colton 1979; Alagappa 2001; Trinkunas 2005). In order to evaluate the degree of civilian control in a country, the distribution of decisionmaking power in each of these areas must be analyzed. Full-fledged democratic civilian control requires that elected civilians enjoy institutionalized and uncontested decisionmaking power in all three areas. In an outright military regime, the armed forces dominate all areas.

Civilian dominance of *elite recruitment and overall public policymaking* is the sine qua non for democratic rule. Only if free and fair elections are the only channel for choosing the political elites and the elected officials have the effective power to make political decisions (and have them implemented) in all political affairs, can democracy persist. Breaches of civilian dominance in this area include constitutionally reserved representation for military officers in cabinets and parliaments, military veto power regarding the appointment of government or public administration personnel, control of aspects of the electoral process by the military, autonomous military policymaking, or the existence of military structures, which parallel, supersede, or control the civilian administration.

Second, *national defense* is the core function of any military. Even in established democracies, officers are involved in the formulation of defense policies, provide expertise to civilian decisionmakers, and exercise authority over the military’s internal organizational structure. Since a certain degree of “institutional autonomy” (Pion-Berlin 1992) is functional for the military to fulfill its mission, militaries usually enjoy some autonomous decisionmaking powers concerning internal affairs. Civilian control over national defense is at stake, however, if the civilian authorities do not possess final decisionmaking power, cannot control the defense policy agenda, and are not able to define the boundaries of the military’s institutional autonomy—or if civilian institutions are unable to monitor and sanction the military’s defense activities.

*Internal security* constitutes a third area of particular importance for gauging civil-military relations. Both established and new democracies deploy their armed forces to provide disaster relief, to support the civilian police force and border control troops, or to fight insurgen-
cies and terrorism. These activities, however, are compatible with civilian control only if civilians decide the range, duration, and frequency of these missions and if civilian institutions are able to monitor the military’s internal security operations.

Disaggregating civilian control into these three areas allows for nuance in analysis, permits differentiated assessments of the overall patterns of civilian control, and avoids untenable dichotomies. Furthermore, it also provides a framework for the systematic cross-national comparison of the specific forms, patterns, and dynamics of civil-military relations in new democracies. In the next section, we analyze the development of civil-military relations in five East Asian new democracies based on this conceptual framework.

Mapping Civilian Control in East Asia

Before turning to the changing patterns of civil-military relations in East Asia, we must understand the initial conditions for civilian control in the region. In all five countries, the military had been a strong political actor. In South Korea, Indonesia, and Thailand, the military had historically been the single most powerful institution, and even in the civilian-led authoritarian regimes of Taiwan and the Philippines, it had been integrated into the ruling power bloc. Thus, in all five countries the armed forces exercised significant influence on genuinely political issues and performed multifunctional roles with respect to national security, police work, development activities, and nation building. Authoritarian rulers in East Asia have time and again relied on their military’s coercive capabilities to guarantee regime security and maintain law and order. Furthermore, according to military folklore in Indonesia and Thailand, the armed forces were not merely part of the nation—they created the nation. Even in South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines, where the military’s role as an agent of nation building had been less accentuated, the armed forces imagined themselves as the warrantors of national survival and defenders against communist subversion.

Elite Recruitment and Overall Public Policy

Given this mingling of military and politics during the authoritarian era, it is unsurprising that curtailing military influence over the political center has been a top priority of the new democratic governments. In South Korea and Taiwan, civilians had mostly eliminated military
participation in elite recruitment and public policy decisionmaking by the mid-1990s. In Taiwan’s authoritarian regime, political power ultimately rested in the dominance of the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT), and its leaders Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo. In spite of a strong representation of senior military officers in all major government and party structures, the armed forces had not constituted an alternative channel for political ascension nor was the military able to control political decisionmaking. Therefore, civilian dominance over the political core areas had already been firmly established when democratization started in 1987.

During the early years of democratization, however, it seemed as if the armed forces’ political influence was increasing. Confronted with opposition from the conservative mainlander faction in the KMT Central Committee, President Lee Teng-hui (1988–2000) decided to appease and co-opt the military, naming former army general and long-term chief of general staff Hau Pei-tsun prime minister in 1990. Making Hau head of government did not lead to any significant or lasting increase of military influence, though; to the contrary, Lee was still able to do away with many of the military’s institutional means of influencing policy, for instance, by reforming the National Security Council, a formerly military-dominated quasi-governmental agency that had the power to veto the budget bill, into a mere presidential advisory body (Lo 2001, 152–156; Swaine 1999, 15). Furthermore, Hau Pei-tsun retired in 1993, marking the end of even the last remnants of direct military influence on elite recruitment and public policy decisionmaking (Fravel 2002, 63–67). Both Lee and his successor, Chen Shui-bian (2000–2008), strengthened the government’s position vis-à-vis the military by promoting professional soldiers and increasing the share of native Taiwanese in the military leadership. This proved to be an important asset in counterbalancing conservative elements in the officer corps, gradually reducing the military’s potential to oppose changes in public policy (Shambaugh 1996, 1292; Lee 2007, 210–221). Even with regard to foreign policy and the highly sensitive topic of relations with Mainland China, there is no empirical evidence whatsoever to suggest undue political involvement of or confrontation with the military. The litmus test for civilian supremacy came in 2000, when Chen Shui-bian, a stout proponent of Taiwan independence and critic of the military, was elected president. Following Chen’s election, then chief of general staff Tang Yao-ming publicly pledged loyalty to the new president, emphasizing that the military respected the core principles of democracy (Hsueh 2003).
In South Korea, democratic leaders had been similarly successful in guarding and expanding their decisionmaking powers in elite recruitment and public policy. Under the authoritarian regime of former general Chun Doo-hwan (1980–1988), government and military alike had been dominated by members of the hanahoe, a faction of military officers consisting mainly of graduates of the Korean Military Academy’s eleventh class of 1955. Democratically elected president Roh Tae-woo (1988–1993), himself a former general and member of hanahoe, began to promote loyal officers to high command posts, while at the same time refraining from seriously reforming civil-military relations (Kim, Liddle, and Said 2006, 252–254). While this approach consolidated his personal authority over the military and shielded him from possible military adventurism, it did nothing to strengthen civilian control.

Only after Kim Young-sam (1993–1998) was elected the first civilian president in thirty years were substantial reforms initiated. Relying on a network of loyal military supporters who mainly came from his native Pusan and South Kyongsang region, Kim capitalized on existing regional sentiments in the armed forces to neutralize military opposition and strengthen his own position (Jun 2001, 131). In addition, hanahoe was further weakened when Kim’s administration purged more than 1,000 of its members from the officer corps. The once powerful faction was ultimately marginalized when former presidents Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, together with thirteen other generals, were put on trial in 1996 (Kim, Liddle, and Said 2006, 151). Accompanying these moves of depoliticization, military participation in government was significantly reduced. While in the Roh administration 19.6 percent of all cabinet members had a military background, this number went down to 8.0 percent during the Kim Young-sam administration (Croissant 2008, 303). Similarly, the share of former officers in the National Assembly went down from about 7 percent during Roh’s incumbency to little more than 2 percent in the 1996–2000 period (Croissant 2004, 366).

However, even after the neutralization of hanahoe and the significant reduction of military influence over the political center, concerns remained regarding the conditional loyalty of the officer corps to the democratically elected government. Thus, as with Taiwan, the election of former dissident and long-term opponent of military rule Kim Dae-jung as president (1998–2002) was widely seen as the event marking the consolidation of civilian dominance over the political center. Not only did the military abstain from interfering with Kim’s election, they
also acquiesced to the new president’s “Sunshine Policy” of taking a more conciliatory stance toward North Korea (Saxer 2004, 386).

The Southeast Asian nations present a radically different picture. In Indonesia, the politicization of the military remains a key problem of political reform to this day. In Suharto’s New Order, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI) had been the main pillar of regime stability, dominating the security sector and enjoying privileged access to the political center. As a result of its integration into the regime power structure, the military had wielded enormous influence in elite recruitment, policymaking, and public administration at every level of the state (Honna 2003).

After democratization started in 1999, some progress was made in diminishing the military’s political predominance. In 1999, the ABRI officially abolished the doctrine of *dwifungsi* (dual function), according to which the armed forces were not only responsible for defending the country but were also a sociopolitical force with the right to participate in government (Said 2006). The old military leitmotif was replaced by a “New Paradigm,” which stipulated the formal separation of the police from the military, the suspension of *kekaryaan* (the practice of promoting active-duty military personnel to nonmilitary jobs), a reduction (and, in the end, abolition) of reserved representation of the armed forces in the national legislature, and the promise that soldiers would honor the principle of political neutrality (Rabasa and Haseman 2002, 25–31). Today, active-duty officers no longer hold political positions or staff the central government’s bureaucracy. Furthermore, in a highly symbolic act, ABRI was renamed Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Armed Forces of Indonesia, TNI), which had been the name given to the Indonesian armed forces during the war for independence from Dutch colonialism.

However, this progress did not lead to a comprehensive and lasting strengthening of civilian control over the core political decisionmaking areas. For one, the military accepted reforms only because interim president Habibie (1998–1999) had cultivated strong personal relations with controversial senior military leaders such as General Wiranto (Kim, Liddle, and Said 2006, 257–261). Second, the military itself decided on the scope and contents of depoliticization and the redefinition of its political role. The New Paradigm, for example, was conceived and implemented by so-called intellectual generals (including the current president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, 2004–) with civilians playing hardly any role in the process (Honna 2003, 164–167). Furthermore, Habibie’s successors did not follow up on his first steps, so that
under Presidents Wahid (1999–2001) and Megawati (2001–2004), little progress in strengthening civilian control was made. Rather, Megawati’s policy of relying on personal connections to the military leadership and promoting trusted officers to government positions contributed to a return of military influence in policymaking and policy implementation (Kingsbury 2003, 240). As a result, civil-military reform ground to a halt. For example, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, a former four-star general, was elected president in 2004, and in October 2005, TNI commander in chief Sutarto reactivated the Territorial Command (Burford 2006, 1). As an expression of the TNI’s doctrine of Total People’s Defense, the Territorial Command consists of intricately branched territorial structures that politically, socially, and economically interweave the armed forces with the civilian institutions at the grassroots level. This, in essence, subjects the local governmental and administrative agencies of the state to military authority and oversight (Wandelt 2007, 292).

Contrary to Indonesia, the Philippines had had an unbroken tradition of civilian control until martial law was imposed in 1972 and President Marcos began co-opting senior officers into his regime coalition. Although presidents before Marcos had used the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for fighting insurgents, controlling resettlement programs, and even electioneering (Berlin 2008), it was Marcos’s use of military rule to buttress a regime of plunder and abuse that eroded the traditions of professionalism within the AFP and promoted military factionalism based on clientelistic loyalties, military academy class ties, and linguistic as well as generational differences (Casper 1995, 87–115). Under the lead of the vice chief of staff, Fidel Ramos, and the secretary of defense, Juan Ponce Enrile, one faction of the AFP staged an ill-planned coup that eventually triggered the so-called People’s Revolution of February 1986, which led to the fall of Marcos and the inauguration of Corazón Aquino as president.

This military-initiated democratization, however, did not bode well for civilian efforts to depoliticize the military. Rather, democratically elected presidents have been confronted time and again by military challenges to their power. Particularly during the Aquino administration (1986–1992), civil-military relations were repeatedly put to the test. After coming into office, the president made bold moves to change the direction of Philippine politics, retiring “overstaying generals,” signing cease-fires with the communist insurgents and the Moro National Liberation Front, harboring “leftist” advisers in the presidential office, and establishing a human rights commission to investigate and
publicize military abuses (Selochan 1998). This policy alienated large segments of the AFP, leading to a series of abortive coups, mutinies, and military revolts in the first three years of Aquino’s administration. The most serious coup attempt, of December 1989, could have succeeded if it had not been for the intervention of the United States. It was only after the president abandoned most of her reformist policies that radical elements inside the AFP could be contained (Hedman 2001).

Aquino’s successor, Fidel Ramos (1992–1998), was more successful. As a former senior military officer, Ramos managed to maintain the support of the AFP. In order to safeguard the stability of democratic rule from military intervention, he promoted loyal officers to key military command positions and appointed active and retired military officers to the bureaucracy and important government posts. This, however, had an ambiguous impact on the dynamics of civil-military relations. On the one hand, co-opting the “Ramos Boys” and encouraging military officers to run in elections strengthened the president’s personal authority and reduced the military’s disposition to intervene (Hutchcroft 2000, 243). On the other hand, it increased the AFP’s influence on policymaking and elite recruitment. Furthermore, it set the example for all following governments, who continued to appoint supporters to key military commands and co-opted powerful military leaders into high government positions in their efforts to protect the civilian administration against coup threats (Gloria 2003, 28–29).

While seemingly successful in the short run, this approach had the opposite effect in the long run, perpetuating and increasing the politicization of the officer corps and promoting political activism by the military. This was clearly demonstrated in 2001 when AFP senior commanders voiced their support for Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and joined a popular uprising against President Joseph Estrada. Even though President Arroyo has managed to avoid Estrada’s fate, she had to court military favor, plying the rank and file with subsidized housing, increased benefits, and pay raises. Distributing promotions and employing a “revolving door” policy in appointing generals to the chief of staff position (with a total of five chiefs in only thirty months), she has surrounded herself with favored high commanders. Thus, while the Arroyo administration survived, it has done so at the cost of increasing the institutional power of the military in ways that weaken overall civilian control (Hutchcroft 2008).

Thailand also encountered enormous difficulties in establishing civilian control. Until the 1992 Black May massacre, which initiated the return to democracy, the military had been the single most power-
ful group in Thai politics, second only to the palace (Crouch 1997, 213). In contrast to the Philippines, where civil-military relations worsened after the transition to democracy, the Royal Thai Armed Forces’ dominant political role has been seriously challenged since democratization in 1992 (Surachart 2001, 77). In fact, the civilian governments of Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai (1992–1995 and 1997–2001) made considerable progress in reducing military influence in elite recruitment and public policymaking. For instance, the military’s prerogatives in foreign policy issues were reduced, and the participation of active-duty officers in the cabinet and senate was put to an end. Consequently, the representation of former military officers in the senate was greatly reduced, from 152 (out of 260) appointed senators in 1992, to only 48 in 1996. When the senate was elected in 2000, retired military officers won only eighteen of 200 seats (Matthews 2005). After Thaksin Shinawatra was elected prime minister in 2001, however, attempts to reduce direct military influence in day-to-day politics were reversed. Immediately after becoming prime minister, Thaksin began to transform the military into his personal power base by granting the armed forces a large range of old and new prerogatives. In an attempt to appease and co-opt the military, Thaksin recruited fifty generals into influential advisory positions, increased the military budget, summarily approved the military spending list for the 2005–2013 period, and restored the army’s influence in foreign policy (McCargo and Ukrist 2005, 134–157). At the same time, he repeatedly interfered with the annual military promotions, systematically assigning supporters, family members, and military academy classmates to key military positions (Ukrist 2008, 127). While in the short run this strategy enhanced Thaksin’s leverage over the armed forces, in the end it had disastrous consequences for civilian rule in Thailand. Thaksin’s efforts to co-opt the military were viewed by many officers as a threat to the unity and integrity of the armed forces and as a challenge to the monarchy (Ukrist 2008, 139). In the eyes of the putschists, the September 2006 coup was a last-ditch defense against the consolidation of Thaksin’s personal regime, which would have neutralized the military as an autonomous political force.

National Defense

During the authoritarian era, defense policymaking and military organization were exclusive domains of the armed forces in Indonesia, South Korea, and Thailand. In Taiwan and the Philippines, military autonomy
had been more limited because of the preeminent political role of civilian president Chiang Ching-kuo in Taiwan and as a result of Ferdinand Marcos’s strategy of emphasizing loyalty as the major criterion for appointment and promotion in the military organization, respectively (Miranda 1992, 11; Swaine and Mulvenon 2001). However, even in these countries, civilian influence in external defense issues had been rather ad hoc and unsystematic and had lacked institutionalization. Given these traditions, it comes as no surprise that postauthoritarian governments throughout the region found it equally difficult to establish full authority over national defense affairs.

In Taiwan, the institutionalization of civilian control in this area was not accomplished until 2002, when the National Defense Act and the Organization Act of the Ministry of National Defense came into effect (Swaine 1999; Lo 2001). In this underinstitutionalized civil-military environment, the top brass was able to repeatedly prevail in conflicts of interest with President Lee Teng-hui, for instance, actively thwarting attempts for military reform and preventing the civilianization of the defense ministry. To be sure, following high-profile procurement scandals in the early 1990s, some advances were made in enhancing legislative oversight of military affairs—for example, increasing the transparency of the procurement processes and reducing the classified segment of the defense budget. Despite such progress, however, civilian governments found themselves unable to significantly increase their say in military affairs until the two defense laws were implemented (Kuehn 2008, 875–876).

Following this legislation, the number of civilians in the defense ministry was increased, the command structures were reorganized, and defense policymaking was made more accountable (Chase 2008). Today, in spite of the military still enjoying considerable clout in defense policymaking and the defense ministry remaining under the leadership of a retired general, the military is neither able to single-handedly dominate defense policy nor bypass oversight and direction by the president and the parliament (Stokes 2006).

In South Korea, reforms were equally cumbersome. The Roh administration failed to implement military reforms beyond a limited opening of defense spending for legislative oversight in 1991 (Croissant 2004, 371). Hence, defense policy remained a near exclusive domain of active and retired military officers until President Kim Young-sam’s strong-handed policies enforced the reduction of military autonomy. For example, in 1993, his administration investigated a series of large-sum procurement scandals as well as corruption cases involving a number of
high-ranking officers. This not only put military issues under heightened public scrutiny, but also set the precedent for more transparency and improved civilian oversight (Saxer 2004, 394). Kim also restructured the defense bureaucracy and strengthened the defense ministry vis-à-vis the general staff (Kim, Liddle, and Said 2006, 255).

Building on these achievements, President Kim Dae-jung took another important step in expanding civilian control of external defense affairs when he installed the civilian-dominated National Security Council (NSC) as a presidential advisory body regarding security policymaking and coordination (Jun 2001, 134). During President Roh Moo-hyun’s term (2003–2008), the NSC ultimately became the primary defense decisionmaking agency with the effect of reducing the role of the military and even the civilian defense bureaucracy to one of “bystanders when it comes to real influence in defense policy-making” (Bechtol 2005, 625).

Compared to Taiwan and South Korea, civilians in Thailand and Indonesia have achieved little substantial progress in curtailing military autonomy. In Thailand, even before the military coup of 2006, civilians had almost no influence in defense policymaking, leaving all external defense issues to the military. When Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai in 1997 became the first civilian defense minister in twenty years, he was unable to implement most military reforms in the way they were intended. While democratization and the end of the Cold War in Southeast Asia weakened military control over foreign policy, the Thai armed forces managed to retain their preeminent position in defense policymaking, at times even excluding parliament and the prime minister’s office from these processes. With regard to defense organization, the armed forces successfully shielded institutional autonomies from civilian influence and actively defied civilian incentives to military reform. For instance, plans to improve military efficiency and civilian oversight by reforming military promotion procedures, reorganizing the command structure, and cutting the vast number of generals without duties were blocked by military veto. Only in instances in which civilian incentives for defense reform corresponded to the military’s own goals—for example, in reducing troop strength—could civilians hope to realize their plans (Ockey 2001, 198–203). Hence, at no time in the democratic period were civilians ever able to effectively steer military issues, such as the defense budget, weapons acquisition programs, arms deployment policy, force structure, and education and training. After Thaksin became prime minister in February 2001, any efforts to extend civilian influence over external defense affairs ended. In his attempt to
secure military support, Thaksin gave the armed forces free hand to self-manage their internal affairs and summarily approved procurement plans and a high increase in defense spending (McCargo and U'krist 2005, 151–157).

As in Thailand, civilian authorities in Jakarta did not increase their leverage over security decisionmaking. Indonesian presidents relied primarily on their personal relations to lead the military, leaving the restructuring of the national defense apparatus and military organization to the generals (Kim, Liddle, and Said 2006, 257–266). In fact, some small progress had been made in enhancing civilian influence and increasing transparency. For instance, Presidents Wahid and Megawati appointed the first civilian defense ministers since the 1950s, and the defense ministry for the first time outlined an official security threat assessment in its 2003 publication of a defense white paper.

Other than this, however, the Wahid and Megawati governments failed to achieve substantial progress (BICC 2006, 2–4). Day-to-day oversight by the defense ministry remained ineffective due to the lack of needed resources, institutions, and expertise (Wandelt 2007, 269). Moreover, Wahid consistently intervened in the promotion process to favor “reformist” generals. These moves, however, tended to arouse resistance rather than broad military support for defense reform and ultimately led to the army’s backing of Wahid’s impeachment. Megawati, who came into office as a result of this impeachment, was thus indebted to the army leadership and within the next twelve months had effectively abandoned almost all previous reforms (Malley 2008). Any effort toward increasing civilian influence over the military, however, has been challenged by the practice of military financing that has not changed much since the transition to democracy in 1999. It is believed that the military receives no more than one-third of its funds from the national budget (Soesastro 2003). The lion’s share of its funds come from various revenue-generating activities, such as legitimate military-owned businesses, collaboration with private businesses, but also involvement in illicit activities. This poses significant restraints on the ability of the civilian government to effectively control the military, as it is impossible to know who in the TNI gets what, how much, from whom, and for what (Sukadis and Hendra 2005). Although the parliament, in September 2004, did pass a law on the TNI that included several provisions related to military financing and prohibited military business activities, not much has been achieved so far to divest the military of its business interests (Wandelt 2007, 292). All of this suggests that civilians in Indonesia and Thailand have not had a great impact on
military reform and defense policymaking. The legislatures remain hemmed in by a lack of institutional powers, capabilities, and political will to play a stronger role in monitoring the armed forces, formulating defense policies, and developing effective oversight mechanisms (Born 2006).

The situation in the Philippines is more complicated. Historically, national defense had never been a primary function of the AFP. Given the comprehensive defense agreement with the United States and the military’s focus on internal security, civilians had no incentives to build the institutional framework to formulate defense policies and to control the military’s internal organization (Selochan 1998, 62–64). Furthermore, Marcos had abolished all formerly existing institutions and oversight instruments, leaving his personal influence as the only civilian means to control defense and military policy (Hedman 2001, 172–180). Since transition to democracy, however, elected civilians have seemingly been able to expand their influence over external defense—despite the precarious state of civil-military relations and the aforementioned deficiencies in civilian control. The new constitution laid a solid foundation for increasing civilian participation in defense issues, entitling the president to be commander in chief of the AFP and conferring to the congress the powers to appoint high-ranking officers, to decide on the defense budget, and to investigate military affairs (Hernandez 2002, 33–34). In addition, following the recommendations made by the commission for the investigation of the 2003 mutiny, for instance, President Arroyo appointed a civilian secretary of defense and a full-time security adviser (Hernandez 2005, 4). Furthermore, congress has successfully asserted itself against military demands for higher defense budgets and modernization of the armed forces (Cruz de Castro 2005, 7–11).

However, a closer look suggests that these institutional changes have not significantly increased civilian influence in defense decision-making and military affairs, allowing only a very superficial and crude form of control. Indeed, the military still dominates all defense-related agencies, including genuinely civilian bodies. Lacking civilian experts, former military officers make up the bulk of the Department of Defense, the National Security Council, and the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency personnel (Hernandez 2002, 43). Therefore, thus far, all major programs for military reform and modernization have been designed by the military, with congress deciding on these plans and the military pushing for approval. This pattern of civil-military relations not only prevents the development of stable and institutionalized defense decisionmaking, but also impedes constructive cooperation between
civilians and the military leadership, resulting in frustration and possible civil-military conflict (Cruz de Castro 2005).

**Internal Security**

Although differing in detail, the military had extensive constabulary functions under the authoritarian regimes in all five East Asian countries and were assigned to preserve internal security against subversion and to maintain law and order. The postauthoritarian developments in this area of civil-military relations, however, are diverse. South Korea and Taiwan have been largely successful in eliminating the military’s internal security functions. In Taiwan’s martial law era (1949–1987) and South Korea’s military-backed Fifth Republic (1981–1987), the military was responsible for organizing and coordinating internal security agencies. In South Korea, the Defense Security Command (DSC) and the Agency for National Security Planning (ANSP) had been assigned to monitor and harass political dissidents and social activists (Jun 2001, 136–139). In authoritarian Taiwan, the Taiwan Garrison Command (TGC) had been in charge of media censorship, border control, and immigration and had supervised the civilian police force and the local judicial system (Tien 1989, 207–210).

After transition to democracy, elected civilian governments in both countries quickly took steps to demilitarize the internal security apparatus and separated civilian and military intelligence. In Taiwan, the initial steps toward civilianization of internal security and domestic intelligence occurred already in the late 1980s. Immediately after martial law had been lifted, military jurisdiction over civilians was abolished. In 1992, the Taiwan Garrison Command was dissolved and its duties were transferred to civilian agencies. For example, the civilian police took over the TGC’s law enforcement agencies, customs and immigration control were transferred to the Ministry of the Interior, and the ministry-level Government Information Office and the Ministry of Transportation and Communications were assigned with censorship and media regulation (Hung, Mo, and Tuan 2003, 187–188).

In South Korea, President Roh Tae-woo replaced the DSC leadership and renamed it the Military Security Command (MSC) in an effort to distance himself from his former role as head of that agency. Both the DSC/MSC and the ANSP withdrew their members from the National Assembly in 1988. A year later, the MSC itself was downsized and its civilian surveillance bureau was ultimately dissolved (Saxer 2004, 391). Even though many analysts doubted that the DSC/MSC
had completely disengaged from supervising domestic politics under Roh, and in spite of the fact that the intelligence and security agencies remained a loyal base of support for the president (Moon and Kang 1995, 185–186), subsequent administrations were able to implement major reforms toward separating the military from internal security and domestic intelligence.

In contrast, elected governments in Southeast Asia have thus far not been able to end the military domination of internal security, counterinsurgency operations, and domestic intelligence. Confronted by numerous insurgencies, Southeast Asian armies have always enjoyed much more extensive roles in providing internal security than the Taiwanese and South Korean armed forces. For example, in the authoritarian era, Indonesia’s President Suharto had routinely relied on the army to control political parties, trade unions, students, religious leaders, and newspapers (Rabasa and Haseman 2002, 35–38). In addition, the military had been the primary provider of domestic intelligence, and approximately two-thirds of the army’s battalions had been spread out into smaller units throughout the entire country to maintain public order (Wandelt 2007).

In the Philippines, the armed forces had been involved in domestic security operations since independence in 1946, fighting local criminals, Huk rebels, Moro insurgents, and communist guerrillas in the countryside. Furthermore, in the early 1970s, the AFP had played a critical role in executing martial law and later in keeping President Marcos in power (Cruz de Castro 2005).

Similarly, Thailand’s armed forces had enjoyed a free hand in running the counterinsurgency operations against the communists in the 1960s and 1970s and, in the 1980s and 1990s, against Muslim insurgents in the nation’s three southernmost provinces. Given these legacies of military autonomy in counterinsurgency and persisting problems with ethnoreligious separatism and political extremism, it is unsurprising that military officers have been reluctant to give up their involvement in internal security even after transition to democratic rule. Instead, the Southeast Asian militaries consolidated their authority and autonomy in this area of civil-military relations. The Indonesian National Police (INP) had been incorporated into the armed forces in the 1960s but were removed from the military organization in 1999. However, the institutional division of labor between INP and TNI remains unclear. The police are responsible for internal security, but gray areas remain, such as counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, where roles are poorly defined. In 2005, for instance, President Yudhoyono
ordered the military to engage in the “War on Terror” (Wandelt 2007, 269). Moreover, the police lack the capacity to effectively fulfill their responsibilities in upholding law and order, and even though its internal security role has been officially abolished, the military’s intelligence agency (BAIS) continues to engage in domestic intelligence gathering under exclusive authority of the military, without presidential or parliamentary oversight (BICC 2006, 5–7; Jemadu 2007).

In Thailand, immediately following the end of the military regime in May 1992, efforts were made to decrease military influence in internal security affairs. For instance, the army was stripped of its control over the Capital Security Command, a constabulary military unit assigned with the restoration of public order in times of national emergency (Murray 1996, 190–191). However, during Thaksin’s term of office, the military’s internal security role again expanded considerably. For instance, the army was called upon to deal with protests in rural areas and played a pivotal role in the “war on drugs” in 2003. Since the 2006 coup, the military has again taken control of the domestic security apparatus. The junta, the so-called Council for Democratic Reform, created a number of special operation units tasked with quelling political protest. In addition, it passed a bill that guarantees the military’s internal security role beyond the election of a civilian-run government in December 2007 (Ukrist 2008, 136–138).

Given that the Philippines had been confronted with a range of violent insurgencies and a comprehensive defense agreement with the United States, securing the state from internal threats had been the main function of the AFP since the country’s independence. Immediately after the transition to democracy, President Aquino attempted to improve civilian oversight of the military’s intelligence and constabulary functions. For example, the notorious Philippine Constabulary (PC) was removed from the military and merged with the civilian Philippine National Police (Hernandez 2005, 4). The intelligence services were restructured and legal safeguards were introduced to prevent human rights abuses by the military. Responsibility to oversee the activities of the National Intelligence and Security Authority was transferred to the president’s national security adviser. Nevertheless, major problems persisted as the Aquino, Ramos, and Estrada governments all failed to implement further reforms in this field. One of the thorniest issues was the precise division of labor between the police and the military, as 95 percent of the civilian police employees consisted of transferred former PC personnel (Teodosio 1997, 31). Moreover, the political elite seemed oblivious to the possibility that continuous military deployment in in-
ternal security operations could make officers less amenable to civilian control. Only in the aftermath of the 2003 “Oakwood” mutiny, when a group of 300 officers occupied a mall and hotel complex in Makati City to protest against the allegedly corrupt civilian government, the Arroyo administration took steps to reform the military and police (Hernandez 2002, 41; Cruz de Castro 2005, 17–18; Robles 2008).

**Civilian Control and the Consolidation of Democracy**

As the preceding discussion shows, East Asian democracies do not converge on a single pattern of civilian control of their armed forces. Rather, states in the region diverge regarding the extent to which elected governments implement control and oversight in different partial areas of civil-military relations. This is summarized in Table 1, which codes each country in the three issue areas on a three-point ordinal scale: full civilian control (+); significant constraints on civilian control (0); and military dominance (−).

Our analysis supports the arguments brought forth by Andrew Cottey and others that the institutionalization of civilian control in young democracies is a gradual process, consisting of two analytically distinct sequences, or “generations” (Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster 2002). “First generation problems” refer to the challenges of securing the democratic civilian regime against military intervention and institutionalizing civilian decisionmaking power over the political center—in our conceptualization of civilian control, the area of elite recruitment and policymaking. The “second generation problems” include the need to extend and institutionalize civilian decisionmaking power into former exclusive domains of the military, particularly internal security and external defense policymaking. Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Forster argue that newly democratized countries need to successfully solve first generation problems before they can hope to tackle second generation problems.

However, Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster also stress that although the solution to first generation problems is a necessary prerequisite before going on to the second generation, it is not sufficient to generate civilian control of foreign and internal security policy, thus justifying separating out these three areas of civilian control. In this regard, Taiwan is a paradigmatic case. It exemplifies how the first generation problems of proofing the political system against military coups and reducing the genuinely political prerogatives of the military had indeed
Table 1 Partial Areas of Civilian Control

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Notes: The first year under each country marks the respective beginning of democratization in the country.
- = Military dominates decisionmaking power in this area.
0 = Significant constraints into civilian decisionmaking power, but military does not dominate.
+ = Civilians dominate decisionmaking power in this area.
been solved in the early years of democratization. In light of such progress, civilians were able to deepen democratic rules and processes and to extend their influence over defense policymaking. The institutionalization of effective civilian oversight over military internal affairs and defense policymaking, however, was still a protracted process confronted with setbacks and was only achieved after the two defense laws were implemented in 2002—fifteen years after the transition to democracy (Kuehn 2008). The South Korean experiences have been similar (Saxer 2004).

At the same time, our analysis of the Southeast Asian cases shows that only after solving the first generation problems are civilians able to engage in extending their influence over defense issues. Without firm control over the core political decisionmaking areas, elected governments in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand had neither the institutional and organizational resources nor the political capital to confront the military. Given these circumstances, demanding more say in defense policy would have possibly provoked a backlash by disgruntled officers upset about “meddling” civilians.

Finally, our discussion provides evidence that there is a strong relationship between the degree of civilian control and the overall course of democratic development and consolidation. This is particularly evident in Thailand, where the military was responsible for the breakdown of democracy in September 2006. Meanwhile, in the Philippines and Indonesia, military officers have been routinely co-opted into the central government; have held seats in parliament; and—in Indonesia—effectively run the local government. This lack of civilian control has severely incised the working of elections as an instrument of vertical accountability of government vis-à-vis the citizens. Similar effects can be seen in the area of horizontal accountability (O’Donnell 1999). The military’s discretion over core aspects of external defense and—in Southeast Asia—internal security have effectively shielded these policy fields from legislative oversight, judicial review, and popular scrutiny for the better part of these countries’ democratization periods. While civilians in the Northeast Asian countries have ultimately developed working oversight instruments, in Southeast Asia, civilian influence in these fields remains tentative at best, excluding significant policy areas from horizontal accountability. The militaries’ extended internal security roles and far-reaching institutional autonomies also have consequences for the state of rule of law in Southeast Asia as counterinsurgency operations regularly lead to human rights violations. In Thailand, for example, the use of military force and paramilitary vigilantes under military command against
assumed insurgents in the three southernmost provinces has resulted in a high number of civilian deaths, extrajudicial killings, and “disappearances” (Srisompob and Panyasak 2006, 9).

Similarly, in the Philippines, the military has been repeatedly accused by national and international organizations of arranging extrajudicial killings of left-wing political activists and targeting civil society groups under the pretext of fighting communist front organizations (Alston 2007).

In summary, the preceding suggests that the inability of the elected civilian authorities to effectively control the military and the existence (and repeated interference) of the military as a political veto power outside the democratic institutions has led to a significant weakening of overall “democratic quality” (Diamond and Morlino 2005) in the three Southeast Asian cases.

Conclusion

This study reveals that civil-military relations in East Asia are a complex phenomenon that defies simple approaches or rash generalizations. Building on a multidimensional concept of civilian control, we have analyzed the changes, advances, and setbacks of achieving civilian control in five countries that have made the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule. While democratization has brought major changes to civil-military relations in all five cases, only in Taiwan and South Korea have civilians succeeded in curtailting military influence in politics. In contrast, in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, the military has shown itself more or less resilient in guarding its prerogatives in the postauthoritarian era.

Given these patterns, does our analysis allow any inferences regarding what factors might account for differences in civil-military relations and the status of civilian control after the transition to democracy? While our analysis did not aim at a rigorous delineation of causal relations, let alone a systematic test of competing hypotheses, we think that it suggests three arguments that deserve closer scrutiny.

First, success or failure in crafting civilian control could reflect to some degree the influence of the predecessor nondemocratic regime and the mode of democratic transition (Agüero 1995; Beeson 2008). From this perspective, Taiwan stands out as the country that had already inherited a relatively strong degree of civilian authority over the military before transition started. Other Asian countries have not been
so fortunate. The militaries in Indonesia and Thailand possessed strong traditions of political interventionism that were deeply inscribed into the officer corps’ worldview. Furthermore, in the Philippines, the mode of transition facilitated the pathologies that resulted from the deinstitutionalization of civil-military relations during the Marcos regime. Similarly, the specific modes of transition to democracy in Indonesia and Thailand left many features of military supremacy untouched. However, legacies of authoritarian rule do not predetermine the post-transitional patterns of civil-military relations but are rather “filtered” through the specific path to democracy (Aguero 1995, 28–30), as is demonstrated by the trajectory of civil-military relations in South Korea. Here, even though the regime had donned a “quasi-civilian façade” (Finer 2002), the military had arguably been the most powerful political actor during the authoritarian regimes of the 1970s and 1980s, which not least came into power by military coups and were led by military strongmen like Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan. However, the transition to democracy helped dilute these legacies, since the military actively decided in favor of a return to the barracks, while the election of Kim Young-sam as president provided the military-as-institution with sufficient trust that their corporate interests would be taken care of.

Second, our analysis seemingly makes a case for the classic modernization theoretical argument that democratic deepening becomes more probable with higher levels of socioeconomic development. Adam Przeworski (2008), for instance, argues that rising per capita income raises the costs of open resistance against the democratic order, which in turn provides incentives for playing to the rules. While not being a theory of civil-military relations per se, the available statistical data support this line of reasoning. For the years 1974–2006, the Center for Systemic Peace lists 256 military coups, of which 230 (89.8 percent) took place in countries with a per capita GDP of less than $4,000; countries in the range between $4,000 and $8,000 experienced nineteen coups (7.4 percent), while only seven coups (2.7 percent) were counted in countries whose per capita GDP was more than $8,000 (Center for Systemic Peace 2006). No military coup has been attempted in countries with a per capita income higher than $11,905 (Spain, 1981). In East Asia the pattern seems to hold. Of the five countries we studied, the Northeast Asian cases belonged to the “low-risk zone” of above $8,000 at the outset of the transition (Taiwan’s per capita GDP in 1986 was $8,418.75) or got there shortly after the transition took place (South Korea: $8,108.14 in 1988). The Southeast Asian cases, however,
remained in the “high-risk zone” of below $4,000 until 2003 (Indonesia and the Philippines), while Thailand remained in the “medium-risk zone” of below $8,000.

However, our systematic qualitative analysis raises questions regarding the persuasiveness of this argument. For one, the quantitative data only catches the relationship between development and open military intervention. While this might explain why the Taiwanese and South Korean democracies had been able to prove themselves against military coups while the Philippines and Thailand have not, the argument does not account for the finer-grained differences we outlined earlier. For instance, the economic development thesis does not provide any explanation for the protracted processes of institutionalizing full civilian control over national defense in Taiwan. It seems, therefore, that the level of socioeconomic development influences only the first generation problems of securing the stability and survival of the democratic regime against military adventurism.

A second objection to the economic development argument stems from the case of Thailand. Here, the military deposed the elected civilian government in spite of the fact that it could hurt the tourism industry and create an economic backlash. This questions Przeworski’s proposed causal mechanism that economic development supports the democratic regime by making violent forms of political opposition more costly. The Thai coup in 2006 rather underlines that in young democracies the military may act against the economic rationales of the society at large, if its cost-benefit calculations result in the conviction that not intervening will be more damaging to its main corporate interests (or even society at large) than the coup d’état.

More important to explain for the variance between the cases seems to be the type of threats to national security that the respective countries see themselves confronted with. Our analysis of civil-military relations in Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines gives credence to the argument “that challenging internal threat environments, combined with few external threats, can seriously undermine civilian control of the military” (Desch 1999, 111–112). Undoubtedly, internal conflicts represented the most serious threat to territorial integrity and national security in all three countries. Not only did persistent internal conflicts make the civilians dependent on the military’s coercive power and thus inhibit the reduction of military prerogatives in internal security and other areas, but, in addition, the inability of elected governments to provide for peaceful means of settling social conflicts undermined the legitimacy of the civilian actors and the democratic institutions. This pro-
vided the breeding ground for the extension of military influence and interventionism into the political realm. Under these conditions, the officers’ corporate ideology did not develop into an ethos of political neutrality and subjection to the principle of civilian supremacy. Instead, it fostered military role expansion and the development of a “new professionalism of internal warfare and national development” (Stepan 1973) that idealized the armed forces as the suprapolitical agents of national salvation and the sole guarantors of the national interest.

In South Korea and Taiwan, in contrast, the combination of clearly defined external threats and the absence of intrastate armed conflict seemed to have provided a domestic and international threat environment that facilitated civilian supremacy. The lack of internal challenges to state power reduced the role of the military as provider of regime stability, allowing for the successful cutback of its formerly pronounced internal security role. The existence of a clearly defined existential threat to national survival (North Korea and the People’s Republic of China, respectively) motivated the military to focus on its core function, channeling its organizational resources toward defense against the external enemy.

What can be learned from this analysis? We propose two main conclusions. First, in terms of the conceptualization of civilian control, the analysis has shown that civilian control means more than the absence of military coups or other forms of open intervention. By distinguishing different “areas” of civil-military relations, a systematic and nuanced analysis of the different states of civil-military relations and their development over time can be drawn. Second, our findings enable us to draw some tentative conclusions about possible future trajectories in civil-military relations in East Asia. The Southeast Asian democracies will most probably be plagued by further instances of military assertion and a lack of civilian control for some time to come. Given the deep entrenchment of the militaries in the respective political systems, the manifold problems of consolidation of democracy in general, and the persistence of internal conflict, civilians will most likely have neither sufficient capabilities nor compelling incentives to confront the military and diminish military decisionmaking power in the political arena. Accordingly, any significant extension of civilian influence over the security sector remains unlikely. In South Korea and Taiwan, however, the foundations have been laid for the further strengthening and consolidation of civilian control. While the prospects seem auspicious for the Northeast Asian cases, one caveat remains. It is mandatory that civilians use the mechanisms of civilian control responsibly. Civilian
politicians must not use advances in civilian control as instruments in the partisan political struggle. Taiwan, an otherwise exemplary case of a “healthy” development of civil-military relations, is paradigmatic in this regard. In 2004, the Chen administration proposed to the legislature a special arms procurement package aimed at bolstering Taiwan’s defense capabilities. By the end of 2007, the request had been refused more than fifty times by the opposition-dominated parliament. Since the package was drafted by the opposition itself, prior to its electoral defeat in the presidential elections of 2000, the move was widely regarded as political maneuvering (Kuehn 2008, 885). However, the Taiwanese experience is hardly singular, since similar developments have also been detected in South Korea (Bechtol 2005). Should this become a regular pattern in the future, the relationship between civilians and the military again could deteriorate. If at some point officers become convinced that civilians compromise national security for short-term political gains, they might lose trust in the civilian leadership. This could rekindle military opposition against further attempts to increase civilian control over sensitive security issues and even endanger prior gains of civilian influence over defense and security policy.

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Notes

We would like to thank Stephan Haggard and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.

1. This definition lies at the core of most of the recent proceduralist and institutionalist traditions of democracy theory (cf. Dahl 1971).
2. The bill entitles the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), a military unit led by the chief of the army, to bar public demonstrations, to hold detainees without charge for up to thirty days, to carry out warrantless searches, and to set up “anti-poverty campaigns” in the countryside.

3. All income data are in international dollars (base year 2000), as available from Penn World Table 6.2 (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2006). The latest data available for all countries refer to 2004, for Thailand to 2003.

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China’s Rural Development Policy: Exploring the “New Socialist Countryside”
MINZI SU

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