

ABSTRACTS FROM INQUIRY

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DUTIES TO ONESELF AND THE CONCEPT OF MORALITY

PAUL D. EISENBERG, Indiana University

Why is it that most among the relatively few moral philosophers since Kant who, like J. S. Mill, have discussed the question whether there can be moral duties to oneself, have answered it negatively? One reason is that those philosophers have supposed that all moral action must be, *inter alia*, social; and they may have thought so because of their commitment to what is here called a 'corporationist' moral view. But such a conception of morality as social is objectionable because it does not square with ordinary opinion *and* because it introduces an artificial division between types of action which go together in real life.

HISTORICISM AND HISTORICAL LAWS OF DEVELOPMENT

LAIRD ADDIS, University of Iowa

Philosophers, social thinkers, and social activists continue to puzzle over the notion of an historical law of development. What this paper attempts is: (1) a statement of what might reasonably be understood by the notion of an historical law of development as well as some historical background to the notion, (2) a discussion of the various logical possibilities regarding the status of historical laws of development, (3) an examination of the views of Karl Popper on historical laws of development and social science, and (4) a suggestion or two concerning the connection between the analysis of the notion of an historical law of development and politics.

DO ANTHROPOLOGISTS BECOME MORAL RELATIVISTS BY MISTAKE?

V. A. HOWARD, University of Western Ontario

It is argued that anthropologists become moral relativists by mistake typically in two ways: (1) by confusing moral with factual discourse (dubbed the Normativist Fallacy) which derives in turn from a failure to distinguish adequately between direct and indirect discourse in the description of moral systems and preferences; or (2) by confusing definitive with hypothetical statements in descriptive ethics (the Definitivist Fallacy). Two representative arguments illustrating these errors are analyzed and some morals drawn from the results regarding the status of relativist arguments in descriptive ethics and the prerogatives of applied anthropologists.

SCEPTICISM AND CONDITIONS FOR DESCRIPTION

PETER ZINKERNAGEL, University of Copenhagen

Conditions for description are general rules to which language must conform if it is to serve descriptive purposes. It is argued that the existence of such rules renders scepticism about them incoherent. The only way we can decide whether or not there are such conditions is by seeing in practice whether or not there are certain rules such that we cannot in fact break them without making language unfit for describing. The case is similar to that of, e.g., the law of contradiction, which is itself a condition for description. If we find other conditions, the sceptic, like anyone else, will have to accept that he is bound by them no less than he is bound by the law of contradiction.

SOCIOLOGY WITHOUT SOCIOLOGY

THE REDUCTION OF SOCIOLOGY TO PSYCHOLOGY: A PROGRAM, A TEST, AND THE THEORETICAL RELEVANCE

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The discussion of the thesis that sociology is reducible to psychology generally suffers from two short-comings: first, it is usually not stated what is to be understood by the generally imprecise terms 'sociology,' 'psychology,' and 'reduction.' But this is a prerequisite for discussing the reductionism thesis at all. Secondly, it is usually only asserted apodictically or at best illustrated by some examples that a reduction is possible, without any systematic test of the thesis. In this paper the authors try to avoid these short-comings. After having defined what they understand by 'sociology,' 'psychology,' and 'reduction' they reduce—in the sense defined—some central sociological terms like 'system,' 'structure,' etc. They then reduce some sociological to psychological statements and show the 'psychological' character of ecological, functional and contextual hypotheses. Finally, they deal with some consequences of the reductionism thesis for the advancement of theoretical sociology. The systematic test—which is reported much more extensively in another work not yet published—resulted in every case in a confirmation of the reductionism-thesis.

REMARKS ON EMPIRICAL SEMANTICS

JAN BERG, University of Stockholm

The application of semantical concepts such as synonymy and interpretation to actual situations of usage gives rise to perplexing problems. One of the few attempts to tackle these problems has been carried out by Arne Naess. Further advances along this line may become possible after a clarification of the basic concepts employed. The discussion centers around empirical synonymy and certain other notions built on this concept by Naess. Possible ways of making the system coherent are indicated.

DISCUSSION:

SCIENTIFIC ETHICS AND COMMUNITY

THE APPLICABILITY OF POLANYI'S CONCEPT OF ETHICS IN THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY TO THE COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE

R. J. BROWNHILL

Michael Polanyi, in considering the scientific community, rejects scientific detachment as a norm of science. He believes it is only by an emotional immersion in one's research that one can understand reality and achieve discovery. The norm of morality within this community appears as a correct revelation of reality: a norm, which, when expanded to the community as a whole, appears as right reason. A reason which is confirmed by emotional commitment to its truth but is judged by other people's concepts of right reason. A model is produced to illustrate an individual's value system under the 'logic of commitment.'

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GOD, GUILT, AND LOGIC: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

LEWIS S. FEUER, University of Toronto

The most eminent exponents of the ontological argument for the existence of God have been characterized as well by a common emotional ingredient—a concern with individual guilt. Anselm, Josiah Royce, Karl Barth, and Norman Malcolm in their respective ways have
8—J.P.S.

made the experience of guilt a central one in their metaphysical standpoints. The hypothesis is therefore advanced that the validity which such thinkers have found in the ontological argument is the expression of a frame of mind which we can call 'logical masochism'; under the influence of such emotions, the ontologist bows his logical powers submissively before an entity the existence of which he cannot question because of the guilt that such questioning would arouse. Under such social circumstances, on the other hand, as during the eighteenth century, when the psychology of individual guilt subsided, the appeal of the ontological argument likewise declines.

PRINCIPLES OF POLEMIC IN RUSSELL

HARRY RUJA, San Diego State College

Three polemical exchanges between Bertrand Russell and F. H. Bradley, F. C. S. Schiller, and the prosecutor in Russell's trial for violating the Defence of the Realm Act in 1916 are examined in order to bring to light some paradigms of informal reasoning, with a view to encouraging research into the logic of natural language. Ten such paradigms are expressed, e.g. Agree with the contention but not for the reasons given; Agree that the criticism is valid and report that one has modified the criticized doctrine but not in the manner suggested.

THE PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC OF ORDINARY DISCOURSE

WILLIAM S. COOPER, University of Chicago

The logical properties of the 'if-then' connective of ordinary English differ markedly from the logical properties of the material conditional of classical, two-valued logic. This becomes apparent upon examination of arguments in conversational English which involve (non-counterfactual) usages of if-then. A nonclassical system of propositional logic is presented, whose conditional connective has logical properties approximating those of 'if-then'. This proposed system reduces, in a sense, to the classical logic. Moreover, because it is equivalent to a certain non-standard three-valued logic, its decision procedure is almost as efficient as that of the classical logic. It therefore proves a rational and convenient system in which to formalize English arguments.

COMTE AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS

LESLIE SKLAIR, London School of Economics

The idea of progress is developed by Comte in an extremely complex manner. This development is shown to be inconsistent on logical and empirical grounds, although it is most instructive in highlighting the problems that any theory of progress must face. The major problem is that of the relations between material and moral progress, however defined. Comtean positivism can give no satisfactory account of this, for it is bound, by its methodology, to hold that moral progress necessarily results from material and scientific progress. Comte's enduring contribution to social thought reminds us of the nature of the unsolved problems of progress.

REVIEW DISCUSSIONS:

I. PROFESSOR NARVESON'S UTILITARIANISM (Jan Narveson: *Morality and Utility*)

TIMOTHY L. S. SPRIGGE, University of Sussex

II. *POLISH LOGIC 1920-1939* Storrs McCall (Ed.)

WILLIAM KNEALE, Oxford University

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HISTORICAL OBJECTIVITY AND VALUE NEUTRALITY

JAMES LEACH, University of Western Ontario

To resolve the impasse between skeptic, idealist and positivist as to whether or not historical inquiry can be objective, an affirmative answer is argued by exposing, clarifying and challenging the common presupposition: the thesis of scientific value neutrality. The argument applies a more explicit version of the Braithwaite–Churchman–Rudner position to history and thus challenges the prevalent claim that history, unlike the law, has but one goal, the establishment of truth about the past. The important yet neglected residual issue concerns what ‘objectivity’ means when inquiry (historical or scientific) is construed as a goal-directed activity controlled by epistemic and pragmatic utilities.

THE COVERING LAW MODEL OF HISTORICAL EXPLANATION

STANLEY PALUCH, University of Colorado

It is often argued (as by Hempel and Nagel) that genuine historical explanations—if these are to be had—must exhibit a connection between events to be explained and universal or probabilistic laws (or ‘hypotheses’). This connection may take either a ‘strong’ or ‘weak’ form. The historian may show that a statement of the event to be explained is a logical consequence of statements of reasonably well-confirmed universal laws and occurrences linked by the laws to the event to be explained. Or the historian may show that a statement of the event to be explained has high inductive probability conferred upon it given statements of reasonably well-confirmed probabilistic laws and occurrences so linked by the laws to the type of event to be explained that one finds the occurrence of the particular event likely. This essay focuses on ‘strong’ explanations which meet a ‘deducibility’ requirement (for reasons given in the body of the article). It is argued that explanations in history (at least where it is plausible to construe them as ‘non-rational’) may meet a ‘deducibility’ requirement and count as genuine historical explanations although they do not meet a ‘covering law’ requirement (i.e. none of the premises of these explanations state universal or probabilistic hypotheses). It is required, however, that at least one premise in such explanations assert a reasonably well-confirmed condition (e.g. a co-variation) which can be taken as a sign or indication of the presence of laws. Rather than appealing to laws, the historian may appeal to the well-founded possibility of laws.

SITUATIONAL LOGIC AND COVERING LAW EXPLANATIONS IN HISTORY

MICHAEL MARTIN, Boston University

Donagan has argued (a) that the covering law model of explanation does not apply in certain cases in historical explanations; (b) that situational logic explanations do apply, and (c) that situational logic explanations are fundamentally different from covering law explanations. It is argued that (b) is false as Donagan construes situational logic explanations. Once situational logic explanations are correctly construed they are similar to Hempel’s rational explanations in covering law forms—hence (c) is false if situational logic explanations are correctly interpreted. Finally it is argued that one major reason Donagan gives for (a) is mistaken.

NORM AND LAW IN THE THEORY OF ACTION

RUTH MACKLIN, Case Western Reserve University

An examination is made of the dispute between the proponents of rational explanation of actions and of the deductive nomological pattern of explanation. A *rapprochement* between

these two positions is suggested, with the aim of accounting for the normative character of reasons for acting. It is argued that the disputed area is an area of intersection between facts and values, and that far from it being the case that the normative and descriptive components can be separated or isolated, the underlying precepts are to be viewed as *both* explanatory (descriptive) and normative. The discussion is divided into two general areas: (1) the normative force of reasons for acting; and (2) the normative character of rationality.

DISCUSSION:

TRANSLATION AND SYNONYMY: ROSENBERG ON QUINE

PHILIP L. PETERSON, Syracuse University

Rosenberg (*Inquiry*, vol. 10, No. 4) criticizes Quine's indeterminism of translation thesis by claiming that any indeterminism in the translation of terms is only an ordinary indeterminism to be found in science. The claim begs the issue through *presuming* the existence of, and access to, semantic characteristics ('semantic data' giving information about 'categorical (term) structure') of the language being investigated in radical translation. Rosenberg's other claim (that Quine's thesis is self-refuting) is unsuccessful through failing to recognize what is at the heart of Quine's approach, viz. skepticism.

REVIEW DISCUSSIONS:

I. ARTHUR DANTO: *ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY* and MORTON WHITE: *FOUNDATIONS OF HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE*

LEON POMPA, University of Edinburgh

II. A CRITIQUE OF BRITISH EMPIRICISM (Fraser Cowley:

A Critique of British Empiricism)

R. A. SHARPE, St. David's College, Lampeter

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PERSONAL IDENTITY IN SPINOZA

RUTH L. SAW, University of London

Spinoza's avowed aim is to discover and present the essential stages in achieving the life of human blessedness. The most important element in this progression is knowledge, of one's own nature as man, and of one's place in the universe. Utility as opposed to truth and belief will not serve Spinoza's purpose. Spinoza assumes the unity of the human individual without question, and it is doubtful whether this assumption is justified on his own principles. The concept of the human individual is examined first as a system of modifications of substance under the attributes of extension and thought, then as enduring and finally as an agent. The conclusion is reached that unity and self-identity are illusions, but the question then arises: Who or what could be under such illusions? The possibility of false claims to self-identity is examined and found to be difficult to accept.

Nevertheless, if Spinoza is taken as speaking suitably at varying levels of discourse, he has enlightening things to say about the human person, even though from one point of view his enterprise may be seen as self-stultifying.

LANGUAGE AND KNOWLEDGE IN SPINOZA

G. H. R. PARKINSON, University of Reading

This paper argues against the thesis of Professor Savan, that Spinoza's views about words and about the imagination are such that he could not consistently say, and indeed did not think, that philosophical truths can be expressed adequately in language. The evidence for this thesis is examined in detail, and it is argued that Spinoza should have distinguished between two types of imagination, corresponding roughly to Kant's transcendental and empirical imagination. Finally, it is suggested that the bulk of the argument of the *Ethics* is conducted on the level of the 'second kind of knowledge', reason, but that it also contains examples of the use of the first and third kinds of knowledge.

SPINOZA'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

GUTTORM FLÖISTAD, University of Oslo

This paper is a discussion of which kinds of knowledge Spinoza himself employs in developing the system of the *Ethics*. The problem is raised by Professor D. Savan and further discussed by G. H. R. Parkinson. The thesis is (1) that no occurrence of the first kind of knowledge is to be found in the *Ethics* (against Parkinson), (2) that the main part of the analysis in the *Ethics* is conducted on the level of the second kind of knowledge (in agreement with Parkinson), and (3) that the third kind of knowledge occurs frequently and plays a most important role in the *Ethics* (in part against Parkinson). The relation between knowledge and language, the distinction between two types of imagination, or two ways of imagining things, the translation of knowledge of modes of extension into knowledge of the mind, and the relation between the second and third kind of knowledge are main parts of the argument. The third kind of knowledge derives its significance in the *Ethics* from the definitions and axioms, particularly in Part 1. These definitions and axioms form the basis of the whole system of the *Ethics*, and at least some of them, it is suggested, belong to the third kind of knowledge.

FREEDOM, EMOTION, AND SELF-SUBSISTENCE

THE STRUCTURE OF A SMALL, CENTRAL PART OF SPINOZA'S "ETHICS"

ARNE NAESS, University of Oslo

A set of basic static predicates, 'in itself', 'existing through itself', 'free', and others are taken to be (at least) extensionally equivalent, and some consequences are drawn in Parts A and B of the paper. Part C introduces adequate causation and adequate conceiving as extensionally equivalent. The dynamism or activism of Spinoza is reflected in the reconstruction by equating action with causing, passion (passive emotion) with being caused. The relation between conceiving (understanding) and causing is narrowed down by introducing grasping (*λαμβάνω*) as a basic epistemological term. Part D, 'The road to freedom through active emotion', introduces a system of grading with respect to the distinctions introduced in the foregoing, including 'being in itself', 'freedom', etc. Active emotions are seen to represent transitions to a higher degree of freedom, the stronger and more active ones being the more conducive to rapid increase in degree of freedom. Elementary parts of the calculus of predicates are used in order to facilitate the survey of conceptual relations and to prove some theorems.

BASIC CONCEPTS IN SPINOZA'S SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

JON WETLESEN, University of Oslo

Spinoza's philosophical anthropology is reconstructed with a view to its relevance to theoretical and practical problems in social psychology. An attempt is made to show how he conceives the interrelations between cognitions, sentiments (i.e. emotions and attitudes), and interests (i.e. drives and desires) as relational concepts and as anchored in social interaction rather than

in a purely individualistic conception of man. Spinoza's determinism is interpreted as a personal and social causation, rather than a physical, causal determinism, and his theory of cognition is interpreted partly in relation to the Hegelian distinction between undialectical and dialectical thinking.

SPINOZA ON POWER

R. J. MCSHEA, Boston University

Spinoza's concept of 'power' finds expression in every major topic of which he treats. Some of the ways to the understanding of that concept are: the metaphysical, the genetic, and the political. I. Metaphysically, Spinoza distinguishes power from force or energy and defines it as the ability of a system to survive. The most interesting application of this definition is to that system, man, for whom survival means realization of his essence, achievement of understanding. II. The depth and generality of Spinoza's concept of power can be appreciated more clearly if we refer to its sources in (1) the classical analysis of 'virtue' beginning with Plato, (2) the traditional theological ponderings on the nature of God, and (3) the method and pre-suppositions of physical science. III. At the metaphysical level of analysis, power and liberty are shown to be all but synonymous. Spinoza's analysis of political power undermines previous authoritarian, hierarchical, and élitist theories of government and ends with a proof that both individual and social power flourish best under democratic government.