Correspondence (from p. 2)

global institutions that can assure security for all nations—and that is going to take some time.

I hope in the coming SALT debate Nitze and his colleagues in the Committee on the Present Danger will discontinue this practice of setting up phony straw men that they can demolish with such relish.

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Mr. Hudson is executive director of the Center for War/Peace Studies.

To the Editors: Mr. Nitze's response to the question "How do we citizens make judgments as to whether you are right or whether they [Retired General Shoup and Admiral Eugene LaRocque are right?" unfortunately offered little in the way of guidance concerning the current debate over approval of the impending SALT II treaty. His answer, like so many others, spoke more to the issue of whether it is possible to ascertain the veracity of accurate statistics and facts. He does clearly define one of the key issues that must be wrestled with in his current SALT II treaty debate—"What do you believe our policy toward the Soviet Union should be?"

Mr. Nitze's comments point to the lack of direction provided by the Carter administration as well as its opponents. The SALT II debate seems filled with conflicting notions about the terms describing limitations on stragetic weapons and the principles underlying the treaty. A day does not pass without another expert statement explaining the "real" impact the treaty will have on our national security interests and those of our allies. I believe that guidelines are required to ensure that the debate serves to define clearly and explain what SALT II really entails.

To these ends I propose twelve critical questions that should be considered and resolved before SALT II is approved by the Senate:

- 1. Is SALT II in the strategic longterm interest of the U.S.?
- 2. Is SALT II in the strategic longterm interest of the allies of the U.S.?
- 3. What are the true intentions of the USSR in negotiating SALT II?
- 4. Does SALT II strengthen or weaken the U.S. strategic bargaining posi-

tion with the Soviet Union?

- 5. What are the real consequences of a rejection of SALT II by the U.S. Senate vs. the imagined consequences?
- 6. Can SALT II be adequately verified, especially in light of the serious situation in Iran?
- 7. Should SALT II be "linked" to other U.S.-Soviet issues, i.e., Soviet aggression in key areas of the world?
- 8. Should SALT II consideration be a time for a total and complete debate and reassessment of U.S. foreign and defense policy, with emphasis on the world position of the United States of America?
- 9. Have the Soviets used SALT I, Vladivostok, and SALT II simply to advance their world position and deceive the United States?
- 10. Is the U.S. in a transition period of lessening political influence and military power? And if so, does SALT II aid and abet this decline?
- 11. Is the USSR gradually moving into a position of military superiority that will be used to the political, diplomatic, and economic detriment of the U.S.?
- 12. Do U.S. policymakers, senators, and public opinion leaders really understand what this is all about? Do they understand and comprehend that the future security of this nature may well depend, in part, on SALT agreements?

We must all understand that SALT II is of vital importance to the future

well-being of the United States. The proponents and opponents of SALT II's **WORLDVIEW** is Available in MKROFORM from... Xerox University Micro 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 Xerox University Microfilms 35 Mobile Drive Toronto, Ontario, Canada M4A 1H6

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passage and the skeptics who have yet to make a decision on SALT II itself all have strong and, in most instances, reasonable arguments to support their position. The questions listed above must be considered and answered to the benefit of the United States before it is clear that a SALT II agreement makes

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Hunger in China

To the Editors: Miriam and Ivan London's "Hunger in China: The 'Norm of Truth'" (Worldview, March) is an excellent piece and should be read by everyone interested in trying to come to grips with that real China which we Westerners seem to find so elusive.

In speaking out on hunger in China, the Londons have over the years taken a brave and unpopular stand. Increasing evidence seems to be coming out of China itself to validate their main point-that desperate poverty, with its handmaidens of begging, vagrance, and hunger, have not been entirely eliminated by the "Socialist Transformation." Unlike other China watchers, who seem to have swept away such evidence because it conflicted with wellmeaning but pre-imposed ideas of what the Maoist revolution had accomplished, the Londons have actually contributed to our understanding of a quarter of the human race, and should be commended for this.

As someone who thinks of himself as both an admirer of the "Chinese experiment" and a skeptic of the fanciful selfevaluations the People's Republic has been in the habit of releasing, the Londons' work has helped me see China for what (I think!) it is: a poor country that has handled its immense problems better than most other poor countries, but a poor country—with all that this means-nonetheless.

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