In stark contrast to the Chilean case, Baer shows that privatization in Bolivia undermined water services. The case reinforces the importance of preexisting institutions for the success of privatization. In this case, the utility in Cochabamba was both inefficient and reportedly corrupt, but most importantly, it had ignored communities in the city that then resorted to creating their own independent cooperatives, thus building their own water infrastructure. While the newly privatized utility faced what turned out to be an insurmountable challenge in unifying and improving city services, the situation was compounded by weak state capacity to regulate the privatized utility, unlike in the Chilean case.

The analysis of Bolivia also examines how successful the new state-led, rights-affirming approach in Bolivia has been. While the Bolivian government has made formidable progress extending services to small towns and rural areas, progress in urban contexts has been challenging. The state has demonstrated political will to achieve the HRtWS by openly reiterating the importance of water as a human right and through substantial financial commitment and reorganization of the water sector. While access is increasing, however, quality of water services remains an issue, as water treatment is insufficient and the reliable availability of water is a problem throughout the country.

Baer’s work shines a spotlight on the role of citizen participation. Like Amartya Sen’s view on the role of democracy in development, Baer depicts citizen participation as both constitutive of the broad definition of the Human Right to Water and Sanitation and instrumental in achieving it. Baer demonstrates how citizen participation is effectively curtailed. In Chile, citizen participation is legally possible, but the overly technical procedures limit citizens’ interest and ability to weigh in on key decisions. Even in Cochabamba, despite a highly organized civil society and the policy window of the dramatic cancellation of the Suez private contract, citizen participation is limited to elected citizen representatives who have only a minority vote on the utility board. There, calls for investigation of corruption by the citizen directors on the board have been blocked. These insights raise important questions for future research: When is citizen participation effective? And given that turnout in elections for board members is very low in Bolivia and interest in participation in Chile is lacking, under what conditions can citizen participation be effectively cultivated?

The book offers an important basis for future research on the role of water scarcity, even though this is not highlighted on its pages. In fact, the analysis of Bolivia shows the constraints of the human rights–based approach. As Baer astutely points out, the individualistic view of water as a human right undermines communal approaches and misses the increasingly important perspective that views “water as commons” as an integral and threatened part of ecosystems. Indeed, even if state capacity is strong enough to achieve the minimum standard of the HRtWS, if the state’s capacity does not account for the future availability of water, these achievements may be only temporary victories.

Overall, the rich, in-depth analyses of the development of the water sectors in two archetypical and extremely different countries provide important insights, both by tracing the temporal pathways of the sectors and how they have developed and by exploring what key concepts—capacity, citizen participation, and outcomes—really mean. Baer goes beyond the facades of official narratives about Bolivia and Chile to look deeper. And in doing so, Stemming the Tide adds an important dose of realism to the human rights–based approach: It is neither necessary nor sufficient for achieving the minimum standard of the HRtWS. Instead, the analysis reveals the key role of state capacity, which is a necessary condition. The Bolivian case shows how private approaches can undermine progress if state capacity is weak. Conversely, the Chilean case reveals that privatization is not the true mechanism that led to a high-performing water sector. Baer’s work suggests instead that state capacity conditions the effect of privatization, and this view brings a strong caveat to policies around privatization that are relevant for both policymakers and scholars to consider.

**China and the Geopolitics of Rare Earths**. By Sophia Kalantzakos. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017. 248p. $29.95 cloth. doi:10.1017/S153759271800364X

— Ryan David Kiggins, University of Central Oklahoma

Having returned from a five-year posting as the New York Times Beijing bureau chief, Nicholas Kristof published an essay in a 1993 issue of Foreign Affairs entitled “The Rise of China.” In that essay, he argued that the rapid development of China would constitute “the most important trend in the world for the next century” (p. 59). During the 28 years since the end of the Cold War, Kristof’s claim about China has become conventional wisdom.

The phenomenon of China’s rise has spawned a voluminous literature in which efforts are made to divine China’s potential, power, and purpose in global relations. Sophia Kalantzakos’s *China and the Geopolitics of Rare Earths* is a recent contribution to such efforts.

Kalantzakos demonstrates considerable ambition. She asserts in Chapter 1 that China’s current monopolistic control of the global mining, refining, and distribution of rare earths is a harbinger of China’s growing power, purpose, and intent to alter extant global norms, institutions, and bargains at the core of the post–World War II liberal international order. One aim of the book is to leverage economic statecraft theory, in addition to the notions of resource scarcity, competition, and nationalism, to advance the claim that the case of rare earths reveals
broad patterns of competition among powerful nation-states for control over strategic resources. Increasing resource scarcity, Kalantzakos argues, may contribute to increased competition and nationalism, cultivating conditions ripe for militarized disputes over strategic resource access and control. Another aim of the book is to develop economic statecraft theory and, thus, international relations theory. How and why, however, the author does not stipulate. In the end, she chides Western liberal democracies for neglecting to develop rare earth policies sufficient to reduce dependency on rare earths produced in China.

For those uninitiated in the political economy of rare earths, Chapter 2 provides a thorough overview of the critical importance of rare earths to global economic growth, security, and—especially—high-technology products, including communications devices, applications, and computing systems. This chapter is a strength of the book. The pervasiveness of rare earth utilization in the global political economy cannot be exaggerated. Any computer, Internet connected device, or system that relies on some degree of digital computation must have rare earths in order to function. The promise of the information economy is, in other words, wholly dependent on plentiful and accessible supplies of global rare earths. Raising the specter of rare earths scarcity serves as a new focal point for resource competition and nationalism among rare earths-consuming and producing economies.

Supporting the claim that strategic resource competition and nationalism are present in global rare earths markets, Chapter 3 reviews two additional cases in the form of salt and oil. The purpose of the chapter is to demonstrate how China has relied on economic statecraft during different historical periods, in order to remedy the problem of resource scarcity consistent with observations in global rare earth markets.

Drawing on these insights, Chapter 4 describes how China successfully monopolized the global rare earths market, consistent with its long use of economic statecraft. The author’s passion for the topic is palpable throughout the book, most especially in this chapter, and it is perhaps this passion that contributes to her rather fervent assessment of China’s economic statecraft as being a threat to Western liberal democracies and international order.

Such enthusiasm might have been tempered had an adequate engagement occurred with alternative views in the literature on China’s rare earths policy and economic statecraft. For example, Elizabeth C. Economy and Michael Levi’s *By All Means Necessary* (2014) argues that China’s effort to secure access to strategic resources is less threatening than advertised. Economy and Levi argue that China is adjusting how it conducts economic statecraft as it gains experience with the liberal international order. Given Kalantzakos’s understanding of the Chinese threat to the rare earths market, Chapter 5 concludes the book by advocating for Western liberal democracies to incorporate economic statecraft more directly into foreign policy to counter China. Kalantzakos’ attention to the first aim of the book is not repaid in kind to the other aim of the book.

The book’s second aim is an effort to leverage the rare earths case to further the development of international relations theory. Within foreign policy studies, economic statecraft theory has largely been brought to bear on describing, explaining, and theorizing the use of economic sanctions. David A. Baldwin’s seminal *Economic Statecraft* (1985) notes that economic statecraft is a component of foreign policy and includes a range of possible state actions within markets, undertaken to influence another actor to do what it otherwise would not do. Crucially, when employing economic statecraft, as Baldwin points out, it is useful to distinguish between the targets (or domain) of an influence attempt and the objectives (or scope) of the attempt (pp. 16–17). The fundamental logic of economic statecraft is explicit action intended to exert influence sufficient to alter the policy incentives of targeted actors.

Unfortunately, Kalantzakos’ book lacks a clear and concise explication of economic statecraft theory that describes its logic, scope, and purpose. The author describes statecraft as “essentially another way of describing the art of conducting state affairs” (p. 23). However, while claiming to rely on Baldwin in support of this definition, Kalantzakos actually employs a view of statecraft that Baldwin critically analyzes prior to offering his own concrete definition of the term, which he defines as “the instruments used by policymakers in their attempts to exercise power, i.e., to get others to do what they would not otherwise do” (*Economic Statecraft*, p. 9). Consequently, *China and the Geopolitics of Rare Earths* is not hewing directly to the theory it purports to further develop.

This problem leads the author to neglect an important causal feature of economic statecraft theory: influence. In subsequent chapters, Kalantzakos drops any reference to “influence” and, in so doing, neglects to specify and demonstrate the operational logic of strategic resources, such as rare earths, as an economic statecraft instrument. In short, why has China monopolized global rare earths? If it has done so in support of a broader grand strategy, what is that grand strategy and how do rare earths advance grand strategy objectives? What is the precise influence that China seeks to exert on target states through control of the global rare earths market? How does or will that targeted influence, arising from control of a strategic resource, provoke change in the actions taken by target states? Most importantly, how does China benefit from control of global rare earths markets and any influence gained and directed toward other states?

*China and the Geopolitics of Rare Earths* gestures toward answering these questions but falls short of doing so, leaving much to the imagination of the reader. This is due partly to conceptual fuzziness and partly to not heeding Baldwin’s counsel to clearly describe and explain influence.
targets and influence objectives. The conceptual ambiguity, inattention to operational logic specification, and inadequate attention to alternative views of China’s resource policy unfortunately complicate efforts to bolster support for the broader theoretical claims posited in the book.

This book does not achieve the full scope of its ambitions. The elements for delivering on its promise to economic statecraft theory are present—resource scarcity, competition, and nationalism, in addition to strategic resource control. But the author does not fully leverage economic statecraft theory in a fashion sufficient to explicate the connections and patterns necessary to substantiate its broader claims concerning international relations theory. The author, nonetheless, should be lauded for ambition, and for casting valuable light on an important research area that demands further attention.

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In her book, Marie Berry combines an impressive command of scholarly literature with 261 interviews to ask whether there is a relationship between war and the postwar mobilization of women, and if so, what that relationship is. Women, War, and Power argues that “while war is destructive, it is also a period of rapid social change that reconfigures gendered power relations by precipitating interrelated demographic, economic, and cultural shifts” (pp. 1–2). It provides evidence for that argument using a historical-institutionalist approach to its two featured cases, conflicts in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990s. Noting scholarly attention to women’s increased presence in war as combatants, Berry argues that women are also increasingly involved in protest and resistance movements (p. 3). She juxtaposes this argument with the finding that countries where there has been a recent war are more likely to have women well represented in legislative bodies (p. 4) in order to frame the puzzle: What is it about war that increases women’s political participation?

The answer to this question lies, Berry argues, in one of the less-studied features of war: its gender transformative potential (p. 6). She notes that while many scholars have studied war changing politics, very few have paid attention to gender as a factor in that process. The author proposes that war mobilizes women as women in both everyday politics and formal political structures. A useful Venn diagram (p. 13) shows the diverse political roles that Berry analyzes in postwar environments. The book then goes over the historical roots of mass violence in both Rwanda (Chap. 2) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (Chap. 5), with attention to the demographic, economic, and cultural shifts in each place after the wars (Chaps. 3 and 6). These chapters provide both useful background information and a theoretical foundation on which original contributions about gender (Chaps. 4 and 7) are built. Berry explains (Chap. 3, p. 76) that one cultural shift after the 1994 war in Rwanda was that women were able to “frame themselves as ‘more peaceful’ due to lower participation” in the violence, and were able to “use this idea to justify increased involvement” as “legitimate public actors.”

It is through this cultural shift that Women, War, and Power analyzes a wide variety of increases in different sorts of political participation for women postwar, including the transformation of everyday lives, the making and joining of grassroots organizations, resistance and defiance of problematic state political developments, the utilization of humanitarianism, and participation in a wide variety of formal political structures. After showing these dramatic increases, Berry turns (in Chap. 8) to ask if these mobilizations have been effective or enduring: What if any limits do postwar booms in women’s participation have? She argues that political settlements of conflicts often impede women’s political participation, that international humanitarian efforts often undermine local women’s nongovernmental organizations (even if accidentally), and that patriarchal norms and practices can be reinvigorated postwar (pp. 178–79). Berry concludes by exploring a wide variety of implications for thinking about the complexity of war for gender relations, the multiple layers of postwar political transformation, and how these things matter for policymaking.

There is much to be praised about this book. As I mentioned, the empirical work is of impressive depth and breadth. The interviews, document reviews, and contextualization in the literature are impeccable. The book also draws much-needed attention to the many different transformative effects of war on demographic, economic, and cultural compositions of postwar societies. It brings gender into those conversations in a sophisticated and important way. It both describes and analyzes postconflict political participation in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina with significant detail. Berry’s central argument is itself a significant contribution: While others have argued that women’s political positions can change significantly for the better postwar, the meticulous engagement with the ways in which that happens and the limits to that transformation are worth reading, even for specialists in gender and conflict. The book is well written, well organized, and easy to read—a virtue that few political science monographs have.

A smaller contribution, but probably what resonated with me most about the book, can be found in the last section of its conclusion. Called “an absence of war, still far from peace,” the section notes that “the end of violence . . . did not bring about a ‘positive’ peace or a ‘gender just’ one” (pp. 218, 219). This revisits Berry’s important critique of the war/not war dichotomy.