

# **International Organization**

Michael C. Williams

Hobbes and International Relations

Michael C. Desch

War and State Strength

**Geoffrey Garrett and George Tsebelis** 

European Intergovernmentalism

David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran

Partisanship and the U.S. Tariff

**Martha Finnemore** 

Sociology's Institutionalism

**Peter Alexis Gourevitch** 

**Domestic Sources of International Cooperation** 

# IO

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### **Contributors**

Michael C. Desch is Assistant Director and Senior Research Associate at the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Assistant Professor (on leave) in the Department of Political Science, University of California, Riverside.

**David Epstein** is a Post-Doctorate Fellow in Positive Political Economy at Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Assistant Professor of Political Science at Columbia University, New York.

Martha Finnemore is Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at The George Washington University, Washington, D.C., and is Social Science Research Council/MacArthur Fellow on Peace and Security in a Changing World, 1994–96.

**Geoffrey Garrett** is Associate Professor of Management at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.

**Peter Gourevitch** is Dean of the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies and a Member of the Department of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego.

**Sharyn O'Halloran** is a Post-Doctorate Fellow in Positive Political Economy at Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at Columbia University, New York.

**George Tsebelis** is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles.

Michael C. Williams is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Southern Maine, Portland.

## **Abstracts**

### Hobbes and international relations: a reconsideration

by Michael C. Williams

Hobbes has long been a central figure in the theory of international relations. He has also been a badly misunderstood one. While often invoked to support contemporary theories of international politics, Hobbes's thinking actually challenges rational-choice theories, the structural realism of Kenneth Waltz, and the "rationalist" approach of the English school. Indeed, the skeptical foundations of his political vision place him closer to contemporary postpositivist positions, though here, too, his views raise difficult and important questions for such a stance. In general, Hobbes's theory of international relations focuses not upon the determinations of anarchy in any conventional sense but upon issues of knowledge, ideology, and legitimacy in the construction of political orders both domestically and internationally.

### War and strong states, peace and weak states?

by Michael C. Desch

For most of the twentieth century, international politics were dominated by World Wars I and II and by the cold war. This period of intense international security competition clearly strengthened states, increasing their scope and cohesion. However, the end of the cold war may represent a "threat trough"—a period of significantly reduced international security competition. If so, the scope and cohesion of many states may likewise change. Although this change will not be so great as to end the state or the states system, the state as we know it surely will change. Some states will disintegrate, many will cease growing in scope and may even shrink a little, and few will remain unaffected.

### An institutional critique of intergovernmentalism

by Geoffrey Garrett and George Tsebelis

Most intergovernmentalist analyses of European integration focus on treaty bargaining among European Union member governments. Recent articles also have examined everyday decision making through power index analysis, an approach that asserts that a government's ability to influence policy is a function of all possible coalitions in the Council of Ministers to which it is pivotal. This approach suffers from two major weaknesses. First, it fails to take into account the policy preferences of governments; it overestimates the influence of governments holding extreme preferences and underestimates that of more centrist governments. Second, power index analysis fails to consider

the important roles of the Commission of the European Communities and the European Parliament in legislative processes. Today's procedures affect the mix of agenda-setting and veto power, and this has systematic effects on policy outcomes. If intergovernmentalism is to explain choices made during treaty rounds, it must take into account these legislative dynamics.

# The partisan paradox and the U.S. tariff, 1877–1934

by David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran

Whereas historical accounts of U.S. tariff policy from 1877 to 1934 emphasize the pivotal role of parties, previous quantitative studies have failed to identify significant partisan effects. A formal model of policymaking in which strong parties aggregate voters' preferences provides empirical equations to test for partisan effects. Subsequent time series analysis shows that, even after controlling for interest group demands, partisan control of government did significantly affect the tariff. Moreover, during the period under study, the two political parties enacted tariff policies that benefited different sets of producer groups at the expense of others. Thus, political institutions did play a significant role in shaping the interests that influence U.S. foreign economic policy.