

3 *Long-distance reflexives and the typology of NPs*

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1 Introduction

Part of the importance of linguistic theories, as well as other scientific theories, is that they tell you which facts are interesting, why they are interesting, and where to look for other interesting facts. The standard binding theory (BT) of Chomsky (1981) has been extremely important in this respect since it has sparked a great deal of cross-linguistic research into the binding properties of pronouns, reflexives, and other NPs, overt and non-overt. As a result, we have learned a lot about the nature of NPs in various languages, what their similarities are and how they differ, both within a given language and cross-linguistically.

It is well known that one does not have to look very hard or very far to find, say, reflexives that do not obey the same restrictions as reflexives in English. The so-called long-distance reflexives found in various languages are a case in point (see, e.g., Thráinsson (1976a, c), Napoli (1979), Yang (1983), Hellberg (1984), von Bremen (1984), Giorgi (1984), Maling (1984), Anderson (1986), Rögnvaldsson (1986), Everaert (1986a), Barnes (1984, 1986), Sigurðsson (1986a), Sportiche (1986), Sells (1987), Manzini & Wexler (1987), Wexler & Manzini (1987), Pica (1987), Koster (1987), Kuno (1987), and references cited there). The question is, however, what the existence of such reflexives implies for BT. There are various possibilities, and different suggestions can be found in the literature cited above. In the present chapter I would like to argue for the following claims among others:

- (1) a. Some of the 'long-distance reflexives' described in the literature can be accounted for by assuming parametric variation in the definition of 'binding domain', with minimal changes in the standard binding principles (cf. e.g., Yang (1983), Anderson (1986); see also Harbert (1986).
- b. There is a class of 'extra long-distance (logophoric?) reflexives' that need not be syntactically bound at all and thus do not obey principle A of

standard BT nor any extension of such a syntactic binding principle (cf., e.g., Maling (1984), and Sigurðsson (1986a)).

- c. The standard classification of NPs in terms of the two binary features [\pm anaphoric] and [\pm pronominal] leaves a few existent categories of NPs unaccounted for. By assuming the basic lexical feature [\pm independent reference] (to be explained below) and the (more BT-internal) feature [\pm R-expression] (cf. Lasnik (1986)), it becomes possible to account for the syntactic behaviour of (or explain the existence of) ‘truly long-distance reflexives’, and such an account also makes some interesting predictions about the possible existence of other NP-types, which seem to be borne out.

The organization of this chapter is as follows: in section 2, I review the main characteristics of standard BT (Chomsky (1981)), give a few examples of long-distance reflexives that are not immediately accounted for within it, describe briefly a possible extension of BT along the lines of Anderson (1986) and argue that although it – or other syntactic accounts – will work for a number of cases, there is a residue of cases that does not seem to lend itself to a syntactic account in terms of an extension of binding domains or other similar syntactic approaches (say, movement at LF). In section 3, I argue that we need to account for the fact that (standard BT) anaphors and long-distance reflexives of all types have something in common and this something is the lack of capacity for independent or deictic reference (i.e. they are all referentially dependent in some sense) rather than, say, the requirement that they must all be interpreted as bound variables. In section 4, I present a new classification of NPs, first schematically and then in terms of four binary features. Because of the mutual incompatibility of certain feature combinations, it turns out, however, that this system only predicts the existence of eight categories of NPs and it is argued that this is not too many since they all exist (although not necessarily all within a given language). Finally, section 5 is a conclusion.

2 Standard BT classification of NPs and some extensions

2.1 The standard BT

Let us assume something like the following as the standard BT:

Table 3.1. *Standard BT – feature representation*


Feature complex	Categories	Some examples
A. [$+$ an, $-$ pr]	(bound) anaphors NP-trace	himself, each other John _i was killed e_i

B.	[-an, +pr]	pronominals <i>pro</i>	he (she, it) <i>pro</i> leemos muchos libros (Sp.) '(We) read many books'
C.	[-an, -pr]	lexical NPs <i>wh</i> -trace (variables)	John, the bastard Who _i did you see e _i ?
D.	[+an, +pr]	PRO	John told Peter [<i>PRO</i> to go]

(2) The standard BT principles:

- A. A [+anaphoric] NP must be bound in its governing category (or some such well-defined local domain).
- B. A [+pronominal] NP must be free in its governing category (or some such well-defined local domain).
- C. A [-anaphoric, -pronominal] NP must be free.

If we concentrate on the overt NPs, this classification could be represented schematically as in (3):



2.2 A first revision – the syntactically defined domain extended

It is not immediately obvious how, say, reflexives in the Scandinavian languages would fit into this classification since they can occur in infinitival clauses and be bound by the matrix subject whereas their English counterparts have to be bound within the infinitival clause in such structures (see, e.g., Anward (1974), Thráinsson (1979: 289ff.), Vikner (1985), Hellan (1986a), Anderson (1986)):

- (4) a. Pétur_i bað Jens_i um [PRO_i að raka sig_{i/j}] (Icel.)
- b. Peter_i bad Jens_i om [PRO_i at barbære sig_{i/j}] (Dan.)
- c. Peter_i asked Jens_i [PRO_i to shave himself_{i/j}]
- (5) a. Anna_i telur [þig hafa svikið sig_i]
- Anne believes you (Acc) have (Inf) betrayed self
- b. Anne_i hørte [mig snakke med dig om sig_i]
- Anne heard me talk (Inf) to you about self

This shows that the binding domain for reflexives in the Scandinavian languages is larger than in English, perhaps something like the minimal tensed clause. Note also that intervening subjects of the infinitives do not seem to have any effect, not even overt ones like the *þig* ‘you’ in (5a) (assuming an exceptional Case-marking analysis for Accusative-with-Infinitive structures like this) and the *mig* ‘me’ in (5b) (if *mig* is the subject there). Similar facts have been reported for Gothic, for instance, by Harbert in a series of interesting papers (1981, 1982, 1983, 1986).

Given what we have found so far, it might not seem so difficult to give a syntactic definition of the extended binding domain in the Scandinavian languages, for instance. There is an added complication, however. What we typically find is that ‘semi-long-distance reflexives’ of this type are bound by subjects and they cannot be bound by objects. This is illustrated by examples from Danish and Icelandic below (cf. Vikner (1985), Thráinsson (1979: 288ff.)):

- (6) a. *Eg_i lofaði Önnu_j [PRO_i að kyssa sig_j] (Icel.)
 b. *Jeg_i lovede Anne_j [PRO_i at kysse sig_j] (Dan.)
 I promised Anne to kiss self

Several attempts have been made to account for facts of this sort in the spirit of standard BT. Since the main objective of this chapter is not to account for the syntactic binding of semi-long-distance anaphors of this type, I will just briefly review here the interesting proposal of Anderson (1986) (for a valuable discussion of other recent approaches and a different proposal see Harbert (1986)). Anderson argues that there is a parametric variation in principle A of BT of roughly the following kind:¹

- (7) Principle A: A [+anaphoric] NP must be
 1. bound in its governing category, or
 2. bound by a superordinate subject within its anaphoric domain.²

A1 is obviously the standard principle A of BT, and Anderson refers to NPs obeying A1 as anaphors, whereas he uses the term reflexive pronouns to refer to NPs obeying A2. The idea is, then, that languages can choose between A1 and A2, and English uses A1 for reflexives and reciprocals whereas the Scandinavian languages (and Latin etc.) would use A2 for (at least some of) their reflexives³ but Scandinavian reciprocals would obey A1 like their English counterparts, as witnessed by Icelandic examples like those in (8) (for further discussion see Vikner (1985), Anderson (1986), Hellan (1986a), and Hellan & Christensen (1986a)):

- (8) a. Þeir_i rökuðu hvorn annan_i⁴
 they shaved each other
 b. Ég sendi þeim_i gallabuxur á hvorn annan_i
 I sent them bluejeans for each other
 c. Þeir_i lofuðu mér [PRO_i að raka hvorn annan_i]
 they promised me to shave each other
 d. *Þeir_i skipuðu mér_i [PRO_i að raka hvorn annan_i]
 they ordered me to shave each other
 e. *Þeir_i telja [að ég hati hvorn annan_i]
 they believe that I hate (sbjunct) each other

Now recall that principle B of standard BT (pronominals must be free in their governing category) is in a sense the inverse of principle A. Given the variation of A expressed in (7), Anderson suggests that we should have a similar variation for principle B, namely:⁵

- (9) Principle B: A [+pronominal] NP must be
 1. free in its governing category, or
 2. subject free ((= not bound by a superordinate subject) in its anaphoric domain.

The assumption would then be that English chooses B1 and the following would seem to suggest that Icelandic chooses B2:

- (10) a. *Haraldur_i syndi mér föt á hann_i
 Harold showed me clothes for him
 b. Ég sýndi Harald_i föt á hann_i
 I showed Harold clothes for him
 (11) Pétur_i bað Jens_i [PRO_i að raka hann_i/*_j]
 Peter asked Jens to shave him

In this rather ingenious way, Anderson tries to express the well-known (partial) complementary distribution of pronouns and reflexives. The contrast between (11) for Icelandic and (12) for the Mainland Scandinavian languages would then suggest that these choose B1 rather than B2 (cf. Hellan (1983), Vikner (1985), Anward (1974)):

- (12) a. Jon_i bad oss_i [PRO_i hjelpe ham_i] (Norw.)
 John asked us (to) help him
 b. Susan_i bad mig_i om [PRO_i at ringe til hende_i] (Dan.)
 Susan asked me to call her

- c. Hon_i bad mig_j [PRO_i klippa henne_j] (Swed.)
 she asked me cut her
 'She asked me to cut her hair'

The following would also be consistent with B1 (again, see Hellan (1983) and Vikner (1985)):

- (13) a. *Vi fortalte Jon_i om ham_i (Norw.)
 we told John about him
 b. *Vi fortalte Anne_i om hende_i (Dan.)
 we told Anne about her

Note, however, that if a given language uses both A1 and A2, as the Scandinavian languages seem to do, there is nothing to prevent it from choosing both B1 and B2, which could mean, for instance, that within clauses (i.e. inside their governing categories) pronominals had to be completely free whereas within the larger anaphoric domain (say, the minimal tensed clause) they would only have to be subject free.

While we have omitted certain details in this discussion of binding in the Scandinavian languages,⁶ it should be clear from the examples given how Anderson's approach allows for an extension of the standard BT while still keeping its spirit. Note, for instance, that it is still true under this approach that (all types of) reflexives and reciprocals (i.e. [+anaphoric] NPs) must be bound in some syntactically defined domain whereas pronominals ([+pronominal] NPs) must be free in some (corresponding) domain. But now we will look at some reflexive-like elements that seem more problematic for this standard classification of NPs.

2.3 Truly long-distance reflexives, bound and unbound

There are also languages where a reflexive inside a finite clause can be bound by a subject outside the clause. Latin, Icelandic and Faroese are a case in point (cf. Milner (1978), Thráinsson (1976a, c), Anderson (1986: 84–6), Barnes (1986), Kuno (1987: 136ff.)), whereas such constructions are normally not found in the Mainland Scandinavian languages (but see Barnes (1984), Hellberg (1984)):

- (14) a. Orat te pater_i [ut ad se_i venias] (Latin)
 asks you father that to self come (sbjunct)
 'The father (your father) asks that you come to him'
 b. Ariovistus_i ad Caesarem_j legatos mittit [ut ex suis_i
 Ariovistus to Caesar ambassadors sent that of self's
 legatis aliquem ad se_i mitteret]
 ambassadors somebody to self sent (sbjunct)

'A. sent ambassadors to C., in order that he (C.) would send his [refl] (C.'s) ambassadors to him [refl] (A.)'

- (15) a. Jón_i sagði [að ég hefði svikið sig_i] (Icel.)
 b. *Jens_i sagde [at jeg havde svigtet sig_i] (Dan.)
 c. *John_i said [that I had betrayed himself_i]
 (16) Guðrun_i skilti [at Martin hevði skrivað eitt bræv til sin_i] (Far.)
 Gudrun understood that Martin had written a letter to self
 'Gudrun understood that Martin had written a letter to her'

It should be made clear that this phenomenon is truly long distance, since the antecedent (or binder) of the reflexive pronoun can be arbitrarily far away (cf. Thráinsson (1976a: 226)):

- (17) Jón_i segir [að María telji [að Haraldur vilji [að Billi heimsæki sig_i]]]
 John says that Mary believes that Harold wants that Bill visits self

Similar facts have been reported for Italian by Napoli (1979), for instance, and truly long-distance reflexives exist in several other languages as well (cf. Yang (1983), Kuno (1987), etc.; see also Giorgi (1984)).

At first it might seem that we have here a somewhat similar syntactic phenomenon to that observed in section 2.2 – i.e. some sort of syntactically definable extension of the binding domain for reflexives. It would, however, seem that one would not want to have principle B of the BT apply to this extended domain since pronominals do not have to be (subject) free in it, as can be seen from the comparison of (15a) and (18). In other words, we do not have complementary distribution of pronouns and reflexives within this domain:⁷

- (18) Jón_i sagði [að ég hefði svikið hann_i]
 John said that I had betrayed him

Note, on the other hand, that here again we find that objects do not seem to be acceptable antecedents, at least not in Icelandic:

- (19) *Ég sagði Jóni_i [að þú hefðir svikið sig_i]
 I told John that you had betrayed self

It has turned out, however, that it is quite difficult to come up with a convincing syntactic account and it is probably worthwhile to review the main properties of this kind of long-distance reflexives here. First, observe that for most speakers of Icelandic there is a correlation between the long-distance reflexive (LDR) and subjunctives. Typically, verbs of saying, thinking etc. take subjunctive complements and it is in such complements that we find the LDR. A (semi-)factive verb

like *vita* 'know', on the other hand, takes an indicative complement and then most speakers reject the LDR:⁸

- (20) *Jón_i veit [að þú hefur svikið sig_i]
 John knows that you have betrayed self

There are, however, a few verbs that can take either a subjunctive or an indicative complement. In such cases the indicative seems to imply the speaker's presupposition that the complement is true whereas the subjunctive implies a report from the subject's point of view in some sense and the speaker does not commit himself with respect to its truth (cf. Thráinsson (1976a), Maling (1984) and most extensively Sigurðsson (1986a). See also Sells (1987)). Hence the speaker can deny the content of a subjunctive complement but not that of an indicative one without creating a contradiction:

- (21) a. Jón heyrði [að María hefði komið] en hún hafði ekki komið
 John heard that Mary had (sbjunct) come but she had not come
 b. Jón heyrði [að María hafði komið] *en hún hafði ekki komið
 John heard that Mary had (ind) come but she had not come

In cases like these, the LDR goes together with the subjunctive:⁹

- (22) Jón_i heyrði [að ég hefði/*hafði svikið sig_i]
 John heard that I had (sbjunct/ind) betrayed self

It is not the case, however, that LDRs are mechanically conditioned by the subjunctive. We do not find them in adverbial clauses that contain subjunctives signalling unfulfilled conditions, for instance (23a), nor in adverbial clauses that contain subjunctives because the conjunction in question requires the subjunctive (23b) (cf. Thráinsson (1976a)):

- (23) a. *Jón_i yrði glaður [ef þú hjálpaðir sér_i]
 John would be glad if you helped (sbjunct) self
 b. *Jón_i lýkur þessu ekki [nema þú hjálpir sér_i]
 John finishes this not unless you help (sbjunct) self

But if sentences containing adverbial clauses are embedded under verbs of saying, for instance, the LDR can occur inside the adverbial clause (cf. Thráinsson (1976a: 230–1)):

- (24) a. Jón_i sagði [að hann_i yrði glaður [ef þú hjálpaðir sér_i]]
 John said that he would be glad if you helped self

- b. Jón_i segir [að hann ljúki þessu ekki [nema þú hjálpir sér]]
 John says that he finishes this not unless you help self

Second, in the light of some recent proposals suggesting some sort of movement analysis (movement in LF) to account for apparent long-distance phenomena involving anaphors (see Lebeaux (1983), Chomsky (1986a), and especially Pica (1987) (who discusses Icelandic)), it is perhaps particularly interesting to note that LDRs seem to occur freely in syntactic islands, as long as these islands are embedded under verbs of saying or believing, for instance. The subjects of such verbs can thus be the antecedents of LDRs that occur inside islands. We have actually already seen an indication of this in (24), since adverbial clauses are normally islands. This is illustrated further in (25–26), where it is shown that relative clauses and complex NP-clauses are extraction islands even when embedded under verbs of saying but in such contexts we can get LDRs inside them (see also Thráinsson (1976a: section 3.2)):

- (25) a. Jón segir [að þú hafir barið konuna sem hafi svikið þig]]
 John says that you have (sbjunct) hit the woman that has (sbjunct) betrayed you
- b. *Hvern_i segir Jón [að þú hafir barið konuna [sem hafi svikið t_i]]?
 who says John that you have hit the woman that has betrayed
 ‘Who does John say that . . .’
- c. Jón_i segir [að þú hafir barið konuna [sem hafi svikið sig_i]]
 John says that you have hit the woman that has betrayed self
 ‘John says that you hit the woman that betrayed him (refl)’
- (26) a. Jón segir [að María trúir ekki þeirri fullyrðingu [að konan hafi svikið þig]]
 John says that Mary believes (sbjunct) not that claim
 that the woman has (sbjunct) betrayed you
 ‘John says that Mary doesn’t believe the claim that the woman betrayed you’
- b. *Þig_i segir Jón [að María trúir ekki þeirri fullyrðingu [að konan hafi svikið t_i]]
 you says John that Mary believes not that claim that
 the woman has betrayed
- c. Jón_i segir [að María trúir ekki þeirri fullyrðingu [að konan hafi svikið sig_i]]
 John says that Mary believes not that claim that
 the woman has betrayed self

'John says that Mary doesn't believe the claim that the woman has betrayed him [refl]'

Thirdly, as pointed out by Maling (1984), Hellberg (1984) and Barnes (1986), and discussed more extensively by Sigurðsson (1986a), it is not the case that all long-distance reflexives in languages like Icelandic and Faroese need to be syntactically bound. Consider the following examples, for instance:

- (27) Sigvaldi_i neitaði því, að þetta væri vilji þjóðarinnar. Að minnsta kosti
 Sigvaldi denied it that this was will the nation's at least
 væri það ekki sinn_i vilji (Icel.)
 was it not self's will
 'Sigvaldi denied that this was the nation's will. At least it was not his [refl]
 will [he said]'
- (28) ... hann_i vildi ekki leyfa frá sínari_i ábyrgð, tá ið hann_i
 he would not run from self's responsibility now that he
 var komin soleiðis fyri við Sigrid.
 was come so for with Sigrid
 Hon hevði meiri krav upp á seg_i enn hin (Far.)
 she had more demand up on self than the other
 'He would not run from his responsibility now that he had got into this
 situation with Sigrid. She had more right to him [refl] than the other [girl]'
- (29) María var alltaf svo andstyggileg. Þegar Ólafur_i kæmi segði hún
 Mary was always so nasty when Olaf came said she
 sér_{i/*} áreiðanlega að fara... (Icel.)
 himself certainly to leave
 'Mary was always so nasty. When Olaf came, she would certainly tell
 himself [the person whose thoughts are being presented – not Olaf] to
 leave...'

It seems very unlikely that the concept of syntactic binding can be extended in a meaningful way to cover intersentential reflexives of this sort, and they are not limited to Icelandic or Faroese. Similar examples can be found with Japanese *zibun* (cf. Sells (1987: 455)), for instance. The example in (29) is perhaps particularly interesting, however, since the antecedent is nowhere to be seen in the immediately preceding sentence. Although examples of this sort are not discussed in Anderson's paper (1986), he has later studied them in some detail and argued that they show the necessity of setting up an additional category, namely that of logophoric pronouns (class lectures 1985). This had also been argued by Maling (1984), with reference to West-African logophoric pronouns of the sort discussed

by Clements (1975), for instance. Sigurðsson (1986a) discusses the (semantic/pragmatic) aspect of these Icelandic long-distance reflexives in some detail. Other discussions of 'logophoricity' in this (or a similar) sense include Kuno (1987: 136ff.) and Sells (1987), both dealing with a number of languages, including Icelandic. (See also note 12 below.)

But it is important to note that the semantic conditions for these syntactically unbound cases of long-distance reflexives in Icelandic (and Faroese) seem to be the same as those for the ones where a reflexive inside a finite (subjunctive) clause is syntactically bound by the subject of a higher clause in the same sentence. This is shown in some detail in Sigurðsson (1986a) and it indicates that we do not want a special account of the syntactically unbound long-distance reflexives in these languages. What we need is rather an account that takes care of both the more familiar instances of reflexives inside finite (subjunctive) clauses bound by (subject) antecedents in a higher clause and the intersentential, unbound reflexives just observed. That seems to make any attempt to extend the syntactic binding domain beyond finite-clause boundaries in languages like Icelandic and Faroese, for instance, a dubious enterprise. That does not necessarily mean, however, that there cannot be languages that allow syntactic binding domains to be extended to a larger domain than the minimal finite clause but do not allow intersentential relations between reflexives and their antecedents.

Rather than concentrating on what is special about the semantics of the long-distance reflexives in languages like Icelandic and Faroese, as many of the above-mentioned studies have, I will in the following sections try to determine what, if anything, all types of anaphors and reflexives have in common and how they differ syntactically from pronominals and lexical NPs. That will lead to a new classification or typology of NPs, but the basic principles of BT will require only minimal modifications if we keep in mind that they are to be interpreted as necessary rather than sufficient syntactic conditions.

3 The common property of 'anaphors' in the extended sense

3.1 Bound-variable reading?

Contrasts like the following have frequently been observed:

- (30) a. John_i shaved himself, and Peter_j did too
(= 'Peter_j shaved himself_j, ≠ 'Peter shaved John')
- b. John_i saw his_i book and Peter_j did too
(= 'Peter saw his own book', or: 'Peter saw John's book')
- c. John_i said [that you had betrayed him_i] and Peter_j did too

(= ‘Peter said that you had betrayed John’, or: ‘Peter_i said that you had betrayed him_i’)

On the basis of examples of this sort, it has been claimed that anaphors like *himself* (normally) receive a bound-variable reading (at least in these ‘VP-deletion’ contexts)¹⁰ and hence we only get the ‘sloppy identity’ interpretation of sentences like (30a), whereas non-anaphors like the possessive *his* in (30b) and the pronominal *him* in (30c) may either be interpreted as bound variables with respect to their antecedent or be coreferential with it.¹¹ Hence (30b, c) are ambiguous.

Given this, one might expect the long-distance reflexives discussed in the preceding section to pattern with (local) anaphors in this respect. The sentences in (31), however, show that this is not the case for the Icelandic long-distance *sig*, although locally bound *sig* seems to behave like *himself* here:

- (31) a. Jón_i rakaði sig_i og Pétur_i gerði það líka
 John shaved himself and Peter did so too
 (≠ ‘Peter shaved John’)
- b. Jón_i sagði [að þú hefðir svikið hann_i] og Pétur_i gerði það líka
 John said that you had betrayed him and Peter did so too
 (= ‘Peter said that you had betrayed John’, or: ‘Peter_i said that you had betrayed him_i’)
- c. Jón_i sagði [að þú hefðir svikið sig_i] og Pétur_i gerði það líka
 John said that you had betrayed self and Peter did so too
 (= ‘Peter_i said that you had betrayed him_i’, or: ‘Peter said that you had betrayed John’)

In sentences like (31c), most speakers seem to find it rather easy to get both the sloppy and strict readings. Interestingly, however, it seems to be more difficult (if not impossible) to get the sloppy (i.e. bound-variable) reading in (32), where the antecedent does not c-command the long-distance reflexive:

- (32) Skoðun Jóns_i er [að þú hafir svikið sig_i] og það er skoðun Péturs líka
 opinion John’s is that you have betrayed self and that is opinion Peter’s too
 ‘John’s opinion is that you have betrayed him and that is Peter’s opinion too’
 (= ‘It is Peter’s opinion that you have betrayed John’)

It is at least more difficult to get the bound-variable reading here and if it were indeed impossible it would be consistent with Reinhart’s claim that ‘the antecedent must c-command the pronoun for the sloppy identity interpretation to be obtained’ ((1983c: 63) – see also Reinhart (1986: 125ff.)). But the available interpretations of (31c) and (32) show in any case that the long-distance reflexives in Icelandic are not

always interpreted as bound variables.¹² One should perhaps point out in this connection, however, that the long-distance reflexives still differ from pronominals in various respects, one being that they do not allow split antecedents:

- (33) a. Jón_i sagði Maríu_j [að þú hefðir svikið þau_{i+j}]
 John told Mary that you had betrayed them
 b. *Jón_i sagði Maríu_j [að þú hefðir svikið sig_{i+j}]
 John told Mary that you had betrayed self¹³

With coordinated antecedents, on the other hand, both pronominals and long-distance reflexives are possible, of course:

- (34) a. Jón_i og María_j sögðu [að þú hefðir svikið þau_{i+j}]
 John and Mary said that you had betrayed them
 b. Jón_i og María_j sögðu [að þú hefðir svikið sig_{i+j}]
 John and Mary said that you had betrayed self

3.2 Incapable of 'independent' or 'deictic' reference?

In his discussion of the BT classification of NPs, Chomsky (1981: 188) says that 'intuitively, anaphors are NPs that have no capacity for "inherent reference"'. This property of BT anaphors has frequently been noted and sometimes even used as a defining characteristic of anaphors (cf., e.g., Reinhart (1983c: 70), Giorgi (1984: 309)).

If we take 'capacity for independent reference' to mean the capability of 'picking up a definite referent in the world, or [freely] in the previous discourse' (cf. Giorgi (1984: 309)), it should be clear that syntactically bound anaphors of the type Chomsky (1981) was discussing will never be able to do this since they will always be syntactically bound by some (c-commanding, coreferential) antecedent. And it is well known there is a clear contrast in this respect between pronominals and lexical NPs (R-expressions) on the one hand and anaphors like the English reflexive on the other. This can be illustrated by using a diagnostic test of the following type (cf. Hankamer & Sag (1976)):

- (35) a. [Somebody in the audience gets up and leaves]
 Speaker: *He* is weird
 OR Where is *the bastard* going?
 OR Where is *John* going?
 OR I guess *his* patience ran out

b. [Same situation]

Speaker: *I like *himself*
(vs. I like *him*)

It is perhaps not a priori clear, on the other hand, how the long-distance reflexives would pattern in this respect, especially if we consider the ones that are not syntactically bound at all. Recall, however, that the long-distance reflexives differ from pronominals in that they cannot just have any old syntactic constituent as an antecedent – if there is one, it seems to have to be the subject (subject of S or of NP) in Icelandic, for instance (cf. the discussion above). But what about cases like (29), repeated here for ease of reference?

- (29) *María var alltaf svo andstyggileg. Þegar Ólafur, kæmi segði hún*
Mary was always so nasty when Olaf came said she
sér_{VP}; áreiðanlega að fara . . .*
himself certainly to leave
 ‘Mary was always so nasty. When Olaf came, she would certainly tell himself [the person whose thoughts are being presented – not Olaf] to leave . . .’

Here there is no syntactic antecedent in sight for the reflexive. One might think, therefore, that cases of this type could be interpreted as instances of ‘independent reference’.

I want to argue, however, that cases like (29) are not instances of independent reference and there is a clear difference between pronominals and long-distance reflexives of this type with respect to the ‘independence’ of their reference (cf. also Sigurðsson (1986a: 14)). Thus it is impossible to begin a book or a short story or a chapter or any such section of a narrative by something like (29). We need an introduction of some kind – an introduction where it is made clear whose thoughts are being presented. The use of pronominals needs no introduction of that sort. Hence (36) could very well be the beginning of a novel or of a smaller section of some narrative, and the pronominal *hann* has independent reference in the sense that it needs no previous mention but will become clear from the situation described. Given this introduction, we can then go on as in (29):

- (36) *Hann; lá einn í myrkrinu og hugsaði. María var alltaf . . .*
 ‘He lay alone in the dark, thinking. Mary was always . . .’

This shows, then, that even the intersentential reflexives cannot have independent or deictic reference in the sense that pronominals can. It is this property which seems to be common to all ‘anaphors’ in the extended sense – i.e. the NPs that are

not of the lexical NP or the personal-pronoun type – be they locally bound, long-distance bound or syntactically unbound. This must be made explicit in our classification of NPs.

4 Towards a new classification of NPs

4.1 Schematically

What we have found so far, then, is that not all ‘anaphors’ in the extended sense, taking ‘anaphors’ now to mean the NPs not capable of independent reference, need to be syntactically bound. But it is also important to recall too that not all NPs that are capable of independent reference have to be free in a particular domain. More specifically, non-reflexive possessive pronouns need not be free at all in languages like English and German, for instance:

- (37) a. John_i saw his_{i/j} book
- b. Hans_i sah sein_{i/j} Buch

The same is true for the 3rd person plural possessive in Danish:


- (38) De_i så deres_{i/j} bog
- they saw their book

These possessive pronouns are, however, like regular pronominals in that they have the capability of independent or deictic reference (cf. (35a) above).

1st and 2nd person personal pronouns in languages that do not have 1st and 2nd person reflexive pronouns behave the same way as the English (and German) possessive pronouns with respect to binding. In other words, they need not be free at all and in that respect they contrast with their English counterparts, for instance. This is illustrated in (39), with examples from Icelandic, Danish, and English:

- (39) a. Ég_i rakaði mig_i (Icel.)
- b. Jeg_i barberede mig_i (Dan.)
- c. *I_i shaved me_i

Given this, we could present the observed types schematically, as shown in (40):



Examples:

1a: <i>he</i>	2: <i>his</i>	3a: <i>himself</i>	4: Icel. & Far. <i>sig.</i> &
1b: Icel. <i>hann</i>	Ger. <i>sein</i>	3b: Dan. <i>sig</i>	more LDRs
1c: <i>the bastard</i>	Icel. <i>ég</i>	3c: Ital. <i>se</i> (?)	

Domains 1a and 3a:	‘Governing category’ (or some such well-defined local domain)
Domains 1b and 3b:	Minimal tensed clause (or something like that)
‘Domain’ 1c:	Any domain
Domain 3c:	Minimal indicative clause (or some such definition) – see, e.g., Anderson (1986), Yang (1983), Giorgi (1984, and references cited there)

We have already presented some evidence for the classification given in (40), both with respect to the four basic types of NPs assumed there and the different anaphoric domains. As pointed out in section 2.2, there are several languages where the anaphoric domain for reflexive-like elements is not simply the governing category but rather an extended domain like the minimal tensed clause (domains 1b and 3b in (40)), even though something like governing category may seem the correct domain for reciprocals in these languages (cf., e.g., (8) above). It is also conceivable that rules of anaphora need to refer to a larger domain like the ‘minimal indicative clause’ (3c), although we saw in 2.3 above that such an extension would not do for Icelandic or Faroese, since the long-distance reflexives in these languages need not be syntactically bound at all. Sentences of the type given in (41) have been presented as arguments for the claim that something like the minimal indicative clause is the relevant domain for (the stressed) *se* in Italian (cf. Napoli (1979), Yang (1983) – compare also Giorgi (1984)):

- (41) a. Gianni_i e molto contento di *se*_{i/*j}
 Gianni is very happy with self
- b. La signora_i mi_j dice [PRO_j di giacere presso di *se*_{i/*k}]
 the woman orders me to lie near self
- c. La signora_i dice [che io giaccio presso di *se*_{i/*j}]
 the woman orders that I lie (subjunct) near self
- d. *La signora_i dice [che io giaccio presso di *se*_{i/j}]
 the woman says that I lie (indicative) near self

For all I know, however, it may very well be that Italian *sè* is like its Icelandic and Faroese counterparts in that it need not be syntactically bound at all, and that may be true of all ‘logophoric’ reflexives. It seems to hold for the logophoric *yè* in Ewe, for instance (cf. Clements (1975)). If that is true, then we may not need a syntactically defined anaphoric domain like 3c at all.


Now observe that we really should be more explicit about what it means that certain NPs ‘need not be free in any domain’ or ‘need not be syntactically bound in any domain’. What is the relationship of these NPs to other types of NPs? Could they observe certain BT principles but not others? In particular, how could we specify them in terms of features like [\pm anaphoric] and [\pm pronominal]? Is the classification suggested here compatible with feature specifications of that sort? In the following subsection I shall show that it is indeed advantageous to continue to use binary feature specifications of that sort, and if we add two more binary features, we will arrive at a quite explicit and interesting typological classification of NPs.

4.2 A (partially) new classification in terms of features

First, recall that lexical NPs (or R-expressions) are specified as [$-an, -pr$] in standard BT. Since this seems to be a sort of a default value, it is perhaps somewhat strange that principle C refers specifically to this feature combination. More importantly, however, Lasnik (1986) has argued quite convincingly that we need to be able to express the fact that the so-called pronominal epithets (*the bastard*, etc.) do have certain things in common with names (*John*, etc.), as assumed in standard BT, but also behave like pronominals in certain ways. He suggests, therefore, that we need the binary BT-feature [$\pm R$ -expression], and ‘pure’ R-expressions, like names, have the feature specification [$-an, -pr, +R$] but pronominal epithets are [$-an, +pr, +R$].

Given this, let us now assume that the property of being capable – or not capable – of independent reference in the sense discussed earlier can be expressed by a binary feature too, namely [$\pm ind\ ref$]. If we take [$+anaphoric$] to mean, as before, that the NP in question must be syntactically bound (in some domain), it is obvious that the feature specifications [$+ind\ ref, +an$] are incompatible. We can also assume that the feature specifications [$-ind\ ref, +R$] are incompatible, since R-expressions (= referential expressions) must be capable of independent reference (by definition, one would think). This will then give us the following possible classes of NPs (where a * indicates an impossible specification):

(42)



Now let us assume the version of BT principles A and B suggested by Anderson (1986, cf. section 2.2 above; see also the discussion in Yang (1983), Mohanan (1982), and Harbert (1986) for other possible parametrizations of BT) and the version of principle C suggested by Lasnik (1986). That gives the following BT:

(43) A revised BT:

- A A [+anaphoric] NP must be
 1. bound in its governing category, or
 2. bound by a superordinate subject within its anaphoric domain.
- B A [+pronominal] NP must be
 1. free in its governing category, or
 2. subject free (= not bound by a superordinate subject) in its anaphoric domain.
- C A [+R-expression] NP must be free.¹⁴

The categories defined by this BT and the feature system shown in (42) will then include the ones given in Table 3.2:

Table 3.2. Revised BT – feature representation

	Feature complex	Categories	Some examples
1.	[+ind ref, +R, -an, +pr]	pron epith	<i>the bastard</i>
2.	[+ind ref, +R, -an, -pr]	true R-expr	<i>John</i>
3.	[+ind ref, -R, -an, +pr]	pronominals	<i>he</i>
4.	[+ind ref, -R, -an, -pr]	poss prons/1 st , 2 nd pers prons	<i>his; sein; ég</i>
5.	[-ind ref, -R, +an, +pr]	PRO(?), etc.	<i>ham selv</i>
6.	[-ind ref, -R, +an, -pr]	anaphors	<i>himself</i>
7.	[-ind ref, -R, -an, +pr]	pron LDRs(?)	<i>aapan; taan (?)</i>
8.	[-ind ref, -R, -an, -pr]	(logoph) LDRs	<i>sig</i>

A few of the claims and suggestions made in Table 3.2 need further clarification or discussion. We will proceed in the order given in the table.

First, we should say something about the distinction between categories 1 and 2, i.e. pronominal epithets and true R-expressions. For one thing, it has been observed that pronominal epithets can have antecedents like pronouns, as long as they are not syntactically bound by them. Names do not share this property (cf. Lasnik (1986)):

- (44) a. John_i promised me to come to my talk but the bastard_i never came
- b. ?John_i promised me to come to my talk but John_i never came

Thus apart from condition C, there seems to be some sort of a repetition constraint on names that does not hold for pronominal epithets. This difference is not accounted for by the binding theory – it is mainly shown here as an argument for the claim that these types of NPs differ in some respects at least.

More importantly, however, there are languages that do not seem to observe condition C (cf. note 14). If these languages do observe condition B of BT, we would expect that pronominal epithets would have to be free in their governing category but names would not have to be, given the feature specifications assumed here. According to Lasnik (1986), this seems to be what we find in Thai:

- (45) a. cɔn_i chɔp cɔn_i
 John likes John
- b. cɔn_i khít wáa cɔn_i chàlàt
 John thinks that John is smart
- c. *cɔn_i chɔp ?áybaa
 John likes the nut
- d. cɔn khít wáa ?áybaa chàlàt
 John thinks that the nut is smart

The feature specification of pronominals (category 3) needs no further comment, but category 4 is the possessive pronouns and personal pronouns that need not be free in any domain (cf. (37), (38), and (39) above) and these receive here the default specification [-R, -an, -pr]. That is meant to imply that they are not subject to any of the rules that refer to the plus-values for these features. That seems to be exactly the effect we want.

Turning now to category 5 in Table 3.2, the obvious suggestion would seem to be PRO, in accordance with standard BT. This is somewhat questionable, however. First, there has been some controversy as to whether this is the right way to account for the distribution of PRO (cf. Manzini (1983), Bouchard (1985)). In addition, for the PRO-theorem to follow from BT, it is crucial that the anaphoric

domain relevant for [+anaphoric] NPs and [+pronominal] NPs be governing category, as in standard BT, but we have seen ample evidence above that this is not always the case. Consequently, we have parametrized principles A and B of our BT so it is no longer clear that the PRO-theorem would follow. Instead, new possibilities are predicted for the specification [+an, +pr]. It should, for instance, be possible to find an NP that was so specified where [+anaphoric] implied that it had to be bound in its governing category (condition A1 in (43) above) but [+pronominal] meant that it had to be subject free in its anaphoric domain (condition B2 above). Something like this seems to be a correct statement of the conditions on Danish *ham/hende selv* 'him/her self', for instance, as indicated by the following (cf. Vikner (1985)):

- (46) a. Susan_i fortalte Anne_j om hende selv_{*i/j}
 Susan told Anne about her self
 b. *Susan_i bad Anne_j om [PRO_i at ringe til hende selv_{i/j}]
 Susan asked Anne to ring to her self

As the reader can undoubtedly figure out, there should be other possibilities for category 5 too, given the parametrized versions of conditions A and B and the varying domains for pronominals and anaphors. It should also be mentioned here that Mohanan (1982) argues that there are 'pronominal anaphors' in Malayalam, i.e. overt NPs that must be specified as [+an, +pr], and the reason is obviously the same as the one we have found here – i.e. that the domains where anaphors must be bound and pronominals must be free do not always coincide. We will return to Malayalam in our discussion of category 7 below.

Nothing further needs to be said about category 6, except that the reader should remember that we are assuming possible variations in the anaphoric domain, so this category will not only include 'regular anaphors' bound in their governing category but also the reflexive pronouns of Anderson (1986), for instance, i.e. NPs obeying condition A2 of (43) above, and possibly other 'long-distance' reflexives, as long as they need to be bound within a syntactically specifiable domain.

The feature specification for category 7 in Table 3.2 above would mean that we had an NP that need not be syntactically bound in any domain (that is what we take [–anaphoric] to mean) but had to be free in the domain relevant for pronominals in that language. This seems an entirely plausible possibility. Thus it has been reported in the literature that the 'anaphor' *aapaṅ* in Marathi is a long-distance anaphor in that it can occur in a finite clause with an antecedent in the matrix clause but it cannot have its antecedent in the same clause (cf. Wali (1979: 405–6); see also von Bremen (1984: 203, 212)):

- (47) a. *Minilaa; vaaṭṭa [ki aapaṅ; cuk keli]*
 Mini thinks that self mistake made
 b. **Minine; aaplayaala; baḍavle*
 Mini self to hit
 (intended sense: 'Mini hit herself')

Similarly, Mohanan (1982) observes that there is what he calls a 'pronominal long-distance anaphor' in Malayalam, namely the *taan* mentioned in Table 3.2. It must be free in the minimal clause that contains it, just like pronouns (Mohanan (1982: 169)), but it requires an antecedent of some sort (167–8), like an anaphor. This antecedent can, however, 'be removed from the anaphor by any number of clauses' (175). The following sentence is meant to show how the combination of these two conditions works (cf. Yang (1983: 185)):

- (48) [[*Moohan; taane_{s_i/j/k} nuḷḷi enṇə*] amma; acchanooṭə paraṅṅu enṇə]
 Mohan self pinched that mother father said that
raajaawinə_k tooṅṅi
 king felt
 'The king felt that the mother told the father that Mohan pinched him/her
 (i.e. pinched the mother or the king)'

Now if these LDRs in Marathi and Malayalam just discussed need not be syntactically bound at all, then [-ind ref, -R, -an, +pr] would be the correct specification for them in our framework, as suggested, since they apparently must be free in the domain relevant for pronominals. If they must be syntactically bound, on the other hand, then they are of type 5 in our classification. I do not have any evidence that would determine this for the Marathi case. But while Mohanan (1982) claims that *taan* normally obeys a c-command condition, he also points out that the following is good, where the antecedent in fact does not c-command the reflexive (op. cit. 171):

- (49) *Moohante; wiṣwaasam [taan; ḍhiiranaaṇə enṇə] aapə*
 Mohan's belief self brave is that is
 'Mohan's belief is that he is brave'

This is very reminiscent of Icelandic sentences like (50) (cf. Maling (1984: 222); see also (43) above) and the semantic/pragmatic conditions appear to be the same (Mohanan (1982: 171)):

- (50) *Skoðun Siggu; er [að sig; vanti hæfileika]*
 opinion Sigga's is that self lacks talent
 'Sigga's belief is that she lacks talent'

Hence I suspect that the Malayalam long-distance anaphor could very well be like its Icelandic counterpart in that it need not be syntactically bound at all but rather obeys pragmatic (logophoric) restrictions. More evidence is needed, however, to determine this. But if this is the case, then the feature specification of type 7 would be the correct one, as suggested in Table 3.2. Otherwise it would be of type 5.

Finally, category 8 includes the long-distance reflexives of Icelandic and Faroese and these have a minus-value for all features, indicating that they do not obey any of the syntactic binding conditions of (43) above. They do, however, obey certain pragmatic or logophoric conditions, as mentioned in section 2.3 and discussed most recently and extensively by Sigurðsson (1986a), Sells (1987), and Kuno (1987). We will return briefly to that issue in the final section.

5 Conclusion

I believe that we have seen in this chapter that there are more types of NPs in the languages of the world than the standard BT might lead us to expect.¹⁵ Some of the observed cross-linguistic differences can be accounted for by assuming parameterized binding conditions while others involve different specifications (or non-specifications) of the binary classificatory features assumed here. The only 'new' feature proposed in this chapter is the lexical feature [\pm independent reference]. We have seen that this is closely related to the BT-feature [\pm anaphoric] in that no [+anaphoric] NPs (= NPs that must be syntactically bound) will be [+independent reference]. Similarly, there is a close relationship between the BT-feature [\pm R-expression] and our lexical feature [\pm independent reference], since no NPs having the feature specification [+R-expression] will have the feature value [–independent reference]. Despite this, we have seen that these features are not identical, since it is not only [+anaphoric] NPs that are [–independent reference] nor is it only NPs marked [+R-expression] that are [+independent reference]. This indicates, I believe, that there is a close relationship between BT and lexical content of NPs but BT is nevertheless autonomous in the sense that not all binding properties of NPs follow from their lexical content. If they did, it would be difficult to imagine how non-overt NPs could have different binding properties.

We have, however, said very little about the binding properties of non-overt NPs here. Lasnik (1986) contains some discussion of these within a framework that assumes the binary BT-feature [\pm R-expression] adopted here. It should be noted, however, that some of his more difficult cases disappear in the present framework because of the interaction of the lexical feature [\pm independent reference] with the other three features. An interesting suggestion can also be found in Rögnvaldsson (1988) to the effect that object gaps in Modern Icelandic could be

analysed as being of category 7 in our classification whereas empty subjects (in *pro*-drop languages) would presumably be of category 3, the latter having 'independent reference' in our sense but the former not.

Finally, I would like to emphasize that there is a lot more to be said about long-distance (logophoric) reflexives than what has been said here. But I would like to maintain that this is about as much as one would like to say about their syntactic binding properties. That does not mean that they do not obey any syntactic conditions, only that they do not have to observe the syntactic binding conditions on [+anaphoric] NPs. In general, we can look at the BT as a set of necessary syntactic binding conditions that must be observed by the NPs that are subject to them. In the case of regular, clause-bounded reflexives, there may also be certain semantic requirements that need to be fulfilled. Hence not all objects and not even all subjects will be equally good antecedents for reflexives (or anaphors), as has frequently been observed (see, e.g., Maling (1986), Rognvaldsson (1986), Kuno (1987); cf. also Hellan (1986a)). In that sense, there is certainly a semantic/pragmatic side to clause-bounded reflexives in addition to the syntactic binding conditions that these typically observe (see also Sigurðsson (1986a) and von Bremen (1984)). But in this chapter I have tried to argue that the syntactic binding conditions on anaphors in the standard BT should not be extended in an attempt to cover the truly long-distance reflexives that need not be syntactically bound at all. That might seem obvious, but then again I am sure that there are ingenious people who can think of fairly abstract syntactic analyses that capture some of the facts discussed here. But it seems to me that one should rather continue to try to get a better grasp of the semantic/pragmatic (logophoric) concepts involved (cf., e.g., Sigurðsson (1986a), Sells (1987), and Kuno (1987), while accepting the claim made here that these do not obey the syntactic binding conditions on anaphors, although some of them could obey the condition on pronominals, as we have seen. They may also be sensitive to other syntactic or structural properties not discussed in the present chapter.

Acknowledgements

Some of the ideas in this chapter were presented at the Third Workshop on Comparative Germanic Syntax in Åbo in June 1986, at the Seventh Biennial Conference of Teachers of Scandinavian Studies in the British Isles at University College London in March 1987, at the Groningen Workshop on Long-Distance Anaphora in June 1987, and at linguistics colloquia in the fall of 1987 at Boston University, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, CUNY Graduate Center in New York, Brandeis University, Cornell University and Harvard University. I would like to thank all the audiences for valuable comments, both public and private ones. Thanks are also due to Guy Carden, Joan Maling, Eiríkur Rögnvaldsson, Peter Sells

admitted that the requirement that certain (long-distance) reflexives be bound by **subjects** does not follow from anything in this kind of approach but must be stipulated in the binding conditions. For a rather different way of achieving some long-distance (and subject-) binding effects see Lebeaux (1983, 1985) and Chomsky (1986: 164–84). See also Pica (1987). We will briefly discuss the plausibility of such approaches in section 2.3.

4. I am here assuming the 'dialect' of Icelandic that requires case agreement between the two parts *hver* 'each' and *annar* governed by the verb *raka* 'shave'. There are also speakers who prefer to have the first part *hver* agreeing with the subject, which in this instance would give nominative. These speakers will not allow the first part to occur inside a prepositional phrase, so we get the following contrast:

- (i) a. Peir (N) litu hver (N) á annan (A)
 they looked each at (the) other
 b. Peir (N) litu á hvorn (A) annan (A)
 they looked at each other

As suggested by the English glosses, the first variant is probably more similar to the English *each . . . the other*, which may not have exactly the same properties as the usual reciprocal. Hence I have chosen the Icelandic version which corresponds more closely to the well-known reciprocal, although there are probably some differences between Icelandic and English reciprocals, which need not be discussed here.

5. Again the formulation is mine rather than Anderson's – cf. note 1 above.
 6. Note, for instance, that while (13) suggests that pronominals must be free in their governing category in Norwegian and Danish, and not merely subject free in their anaphoric domain as argued for their Icelandic counterparts, Anward (1974) claims that local (i.e. clause-bounded) 'reflexivization with non-subject antecedents' is 'optional' in Swedish, which would mean in the present framework that pronominals are only subject free in their governing category in Swedish. That would follow neither from B1 nor B2, given sentences like (12c). All the examples Anward gives (1974: 21ff.) involve possessive constructions like (i), which seem to be good in Norwegian too, for instance (Arild Hestvik p.c.):

- (i) Vi gav honom_i hans_j bössa (vs. sin_j bössa)
 we gave him his gun

If this is true, something more needs to be said, but one must also try to distinguish between pragmatic preferences and syntactic requirements here, as always (see section 5).

7. Anderson (1986) suggests a syntactic account of the LDRs in Icelandic and he assumes that Icelandic subjunctive clauses are 'ambiguous' in the sense that they can either count as anaphoric domains for reflexives or not. When they do, the pronominal inside the subjunctive clause is subjectively free (as it is in infinitival clauses like (11)), but when they do not we can have pronominals coreferential with the matrix subject. Hence we get the apparent non-complementarity of pronouns and reflexives observed in (15a) vs. (18).
 8. There are, however, some speakers for whom this correlation between LDRs and subjunctives is less strict in that they allow LDRs in the indicative complements of some verbs, including *vita* 'know' (cf. Sigurðsson 1986a: 8). I am ignoring this dialect here.
 9. But note that there is not a strict correlation between LDRs and non-factivity either,

since true factive verbs (or emotive verbs – cf. Kiparsky & Kiparsky (1970)) like *harma* ‘regret’ typically take (a special type of) subjunctive complements (cf. Thráinsson (1979: 190ff.)), and we can find LDRs inside these too:

- (i) Jón_i harmar [að þú skulir hafa svikið sig_i]
John regrets that you should (sbjunct) have betrayed self

Sigurðsson (1986a: 25) claims that the difference between true factive verbs and semi-factive verbs like *know* or predicates like *be obvious* is that in the latter the speaker is not only presupposing the truth of the complement but also asserting it or ‘taking responsibility’ for it.

10. Sells, Zaenen & Zec (1986: 175) argue that English sentences like the following:

- (i) John defends himself better than Peter

have both the sloppy identity and strict identity (coreferential) reading (in addition to ‘object comparison’). The corresponding Icelandic sentence in (ii) can only have, I believe, the ‘sloppy identity’ reading:

- (ii) Jón varði sig betur en Haraldur
John defended himself better than Harold (Nom)
(≠ ‘better than Harold defended John’)

(The ‘object comparison’ reading is ruled out by case marking – to get it we would need the Acc. *Harald*.)

11. For discussions of bound-anaphora interpretation, sloppy identity and related issues, see e.g. Reinhart (1983c), and Sells (1986, 1987), and references cited there.
12. Sells (1987) presents a very interesting analysis of logophoricity. His main point is that there is ‘no unified notion of logophoricity *per se* and that logophoric phenomena are instead a result of the interaction of [. . .] more primitive notions: the source of the report [his SOURCE], the person with respect to whose consciousness (or ‘self’) the report is made [his SELF], and the person from whose point of view the report is made [his PIVOT – roughly Kuno and Kaburaki’s ‘empathy’ (1977)]’ (Sells 1987: 445). These primitive ‘roles’ in discourse may figure in different ways in the ‘role-oriented anaphora’ found in various languages. Sells maintains that ‘PIVOT is the crucial role in *zibun*-binding: for Icelandic it would seem that SELF is the important one’ (1987: 473). He wants to argue, however, that all logophoric binding (binding to SOURCE, SELF or PIVOT) is variable binding. We have seen that this does not seem to be the case for Icelandic *sig*. The following sentences and their interpretation (originally from Thráinsson (1976a, c)) play an important role in Sells’s argumentation for his claim:

- (i) a. Aðeins Jón_i telur [að María elski hann_i]
Only John believes that Mary loves him
b. Aðeins Jón_i telur [að María elski sig_i]
Only John believes that Mary loves self

Following Thráinsson (1976a), Sells (1987: 467) claims that (ib) can only have the bound-variable interpretation whereas (ia) only has the ‘referential’ one. While it is true that the bound-variable reading is much more prominent than the referential one for (ib), it is probably possible to get them both. Similarly, it is probably not the case that

the reflexive is absolutely required in (ii) as Sells (*ibid.*) reports (presumably based on a footnote in Thráinsson (1976c)):

- (ii) Enginn_i telur [að María elski sig/?hann_i]
 nobody believes that Mary loves self/him

13. One could argue that this follows from the fact that objects cannot function as antecedents of long-distance reflexives (cf. (19) above).
14. Actually, Lasnik (1986) argues that condition C needs to be parametrized too since it holds in English but not in Thai, for instance. He suggests, on the other hand, that it may hold universally that pronouns cannot bind R-expressions – this additional requirement possibly being a part of a more general prohibition against the binding of a more referential expression by a less referential one. We need not go into details of this sort here, however.
15. I do not pretend to have discussed all the types of NPs that may exist. Thus we have not discussed expletive pronouns nor considered where they would fit into the proposed typology. ‘Indefinite’ pronouns like English *one* have also been left out. Finally, note that Icelandic *sig* can sometimes be translated by English ‘oneself’ and then it can have arbitrary PRO as antecedent (*það er gott [PRO að raka sig í sturtu]* ‘It is good to shave oneself in the shower’). More puzzling are examples like this:

- (i) Það er verið að raka sig
 there is being shaving oneself
 ‘One is shaving oneself’

I leave these for further research.

