

WORLD POLITICS

*A Quarterly Journal of
International Relations*

Volume 55

October 2002–July 2003

WORLD POLITICS

Vol. 55

July 2003

No. 4

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ABSTRACTS

POLITICAL TRANSFER AND “TRADING UP”?

TRANSATLANTIC TRADE IN GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOOD AND U.S. POLITICS

By ALASDAIR R. YOUNG

Although there is a popular perception that trade liberalization undermines domestic regulation, under certain circumstances international trade can provide a catalyst for making domestic regulations more stringent. This article makes a case extending the applicability of the so-called trading-up thesis by finding evidence of change within the United States in response to the transatlantic trade dispute over genetically modified food. In particular, it argues that political transfer—the transfer of political concern from one jurisdiction to political mobilization in another—can prompt policy change even in the absence of the adoption of foreign standards by domestic firms.

EARNINGS INEQUALITY AND WELFARE SPENDING

A DISAGGREGATED ANALYSIS

By KARL OVE MOENE and MICHAEL WALLERSTEIN

The welfare state is generally viewed as either providing redistribution from rich to poor or as providing publicly financed insurance. Both views are incomplete. Welfare policies provide both insurance and redistribution in varying amounts, depending on the design of the policy. The authors explore the political consequences of the mix of redistribution and insurance in the context of studying the impact of income inequality on expenditures in different categories of welfare spending in advanced industrial societies from 1980 to 1995. They find that spending on pensions, health care, family benefits, poverty alleviation and housing subsidies is largely uncorrelated with income inequality, but that spending on income replacement programs such as unemployment insurance, sickness pay, occupational illness and disability are significantly higher in countries with more egalitarian income distributions. They show that this pattern is exactly what a theory of political support for redistributive social insurance programs would predict.

ENDOGENOUS DEMOCRATIZATION

By CARLES BOIX and SUSAN C. STOKES

The authors show that economic development increases the probability that a country will undergo a transition to democracy. These results contradict the finding of Przeworski and his associates, that development causes democracy to last but not to come into existence in the first place. By dealing adequately with problems of sample selection and model specification, the authors discover that economic growth does cause nondemocracies to democratize. They show that the effect of economic development on the probability of a transition to democracy in the hundred years between the mid-nineteenth century and World War II was substantial, indeed, even stronger than its effect on democratic stability. They also show that, in more recent decades, some countries that developed but remained dictatorships would, because of their development, be expected to democratize in as few as three years after achieving a per capita income of \$12,000 per capita.

AGENDA POWER IN BRAZIL'S CÂMARA DOS DEPUTADOS, 1989–98

By OCTAVIO AMORIM NETO, GARY W. COX, and MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS

This article examines a general proposition about democratic legislatures—that their agenda will be cartelized by any majority government—in the context of a case study of the Brazilian Câmara dos Deputados (Chamber of Deputies). The main question is to identify when consistent agenda control by a single majority coalition, as opposed to agenda control by shifting majorities, has emerged in the post-1988 Câmara. Consistent agenda control emerges routinely in parliamentary regimes: the government commands a majority in the assembly; the legislative

agenda is negotiated among the governing parties, typically with each able to veto the placement of bills on the agenda. However, the Câmara faces an external executive, the president, with substantial formal powers to set its agenda. Consistent agenda control thus can emerge only if the president chooses to ally with a majority coalition in the assembly. If the president always chooses to form such an alliance—a presidentially led agenda cartel—then one would expect some consistently parliamentary patterns in Brazil: the appointment of legislative party leaders to the cabinet; the use of statutes rather than decrees to achieve policy goals; the avoidance of bills that split the governing coalition. The authors find that only the Cardoso presidency displays consistent evidence of such a presidentially led agenda cartel. In this sense, the argument differs from that of Figueiredo and Limongi, who argue that presidents have consistently pursued a parliamentary mode of governance in Brazil. Yet it also differs from those who argue that presidents have consistently pursued a shifting-coalitions strategy. The results suggest that presidents make a strategic choice, with much hinging on that choice.

TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL SOCIETY AND ADVOCACY IN WORLD POLITICS

By RICHARD PRICE

This article takes stock of a plethora of recent works examining the flowering of transnational civil society activism in world politics. The author argues that this work contributes to a progressive research agenda that responds to a succession of criticisms from alternative perspectives. As the research program has advanced, new areas of inquiry have been opened up, including the need for a central place for normative international theory. The author also contends that the focus of this research on the transnationalization of civil society provides a trenchant response to an important puzzle concerning the leverage of civil society vis-à-vis the contemporary state in an era of globalization. Further, the liberal variant of transnational advocacy research constitutes a powerful theoretical counter not only to other nonliberal theories that privilege other agents or structures but also to other varieties of contemporary liberal international theory, such as those privileging preexisting domestic preference formation or state centric versions of liberal constructivism.

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