

in documentation and thoughtful but at times a bit difficult to follow. His general propositions are most helpful, though, to all of us who are perhaps too inclined to miss the forest and see only the trees.

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THE SOVIET SEA CHALLENGE. By *Ernest McNeill Eller*, Rear Admiral, USN (ret.). Foreword by *Admiral Arleigh Burke*. Chicago: Cowles Book Company, a subsidiary of Henry Regnery Company, 1971. xvi, 315 pp. 11 maps, 41 photographs. \$8.95.

This is a serious study, by the former director of naval history, evaluating Soviet naval power in the context of the naval history of Russia and the United States. Rear Admiral Eller intends to alert the American people to the respectable Soviet naval build-up over the last decade. He understands naval strategy well. On the eve of the Korean War, he was appointed commander of the Middle East Force in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean sectors.

According to the author the British withdrawal in the 1960s from the waters extending from Singapore to Suez created a vacuum into which Moscow and Washington have entered. Hence the Soviet presence in Mauritius; the American in Diego Garcia. Both Washington and Moscow understand fully that the Middle East constitutes the strategic land and sea crossroads of our globe. (The recent oil cutoff by Arab countries revealed that tankers steering out of the Persian Gulf are indispensable to the security of Western Europe and Japan.) However, the author's assumption that Egypt is firmly in the Soviet camp is of course by now out of date.

Despite the understandable pride Moscow attaches to her new and powerful fleet (now the largest in naval tonnage), Eller indicates that neither side has forsaken strategic considerations governing their navies. Washington continues to focus attention on strike-carriers, while Moscow is just completing her first. The United States has not abandoned its superiority in the Polaris-Poseidon-Trident submarine concept, which remains an effective trump card for NATO.

The book touches on a number of important issues. Some responsible American leaders argue that it is not, at this time, necessary to redress the naval balance favoring the USSR in naval tonnage. But they also contend that the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean are areas in which the United States cannot afford to become inferior in naval strength. United States naval strategists ask the question: Does the West have the naval capability to retain access to the vital seas and oceans given that NATO is dependent on maritime communications? And is the Soviet Union likely to deny the United States and NATO the water communications vital to the West's economic and military security? These questions obviously remain paramount.

To put naval capability within the framework of the general nuclear power possessed by both sides, perhaps C. G. Jacobsen's *Soviet Strategy-Soviet Foreign Policy: Military Considerations Affecting Soviet Policy-Making* (Glasgow, 1972) could serve as a handy complement to Eller's illuminating work. Jacobsen's part 3,

chapter 5 covers thoroughly "The Development of the Navy and the Emergence of Soviet Interventionary-Type Forces; The Soviet Navy's Acquisition of Global Capabilities and Perspectives."

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THREE FACES OF MARXISM: THE POLITICAL CONCEPTS OF SOVIET IDEOLOGY, MAOISM, AND HUMANIST MARXISM. By *Wolfgang Leonhard*. Translated by *Ewald Osers*. New York, Chicago, San Francisco: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974. xiv, 497 pp. \$15.00.

This translation of Professor Leonhard's lengthy work (the original German appeared in the spring of 1970) provides a good introduction to the more strictly political aspects of contemporary Marxist thought. His subtitle is *The Political Concepts of Soviet Ideology, Maoism, and Humanist Marxism*. The first third of the book is devoted to an account of the political aims of Marx and Engels, of Lenin, and of Stalin; and the second half to Soviet political doctrines since Stalin, to the political concepts of Maoism, and to the development of humanist Marxism (the longest section). Within this general framework the author has further deliberately circumscribed his subject by dealing with the *political* side of Marxism in the narrow sense of the word and not with philosophical, economic, or historical aspects. Those ideas, moreover, are viewed in isolation from the Marxist movement in general and from the practical problems of Marxist parties. The author also concentrates exclusively on Marxist ideas and not on other socialist or revolutionary doctrines. Within this compass he has a very straight approach: his book is divided into short sections; he uses only original texts with no reference to secondary material; and he aims at clear expositions with a minimum of comment. Each part is prefaced with a useful section mentioning the major writings of Marx, Lenin, Mao or whoever may be under discussion. The result is a readable and reliable account.

Of course it is not difficult in a book of this scope to find minor faults: it seems, for example, strange to treat Marx and Engels as though they had identical views on these questions; and sometimes one has the impression that Professor Leonhard takes what his protagonists are saying (Marx and Engels on the Communist League, for instance) too much at face value. More importantly, there are omissions in both approach and content. Methodologically, although it is legitimate to concentrate on the political aspects—as opposed to the philosophical or economic aspects—of Marxism, one cannot help feeling that understanding of the political ideas would be enhanced by additional reference to philosophical or historical context (for example, in deciding how many of Lenin's notions were based on the native Russian revolutionary tradition and how many strictly on Marx). As for the content, there could be some treatment in a book of this length (almost 500 pages) of the German Social Democrat version of Marxism. It is also curious that there is no treatment of Trotsky's ideas—rather than only his criticism of Stalin. Trotskyism is surely a force in Marxist politics. Again, although there is a good section on Mao Tse-tung, there is nothing on other Third World Marxist movements, for example, Latin America; nor on Marxist movements in the West.

But to point to these omissions is perhaps to say only that the focus of the book is narrower than it might at first appear. Indeed, half of it is devoted to