While Haiti's economic dependency and poverty are shared by other Caribbean nations, its history of underdevelopment serves as a prototype for them. Haiti's political independence, achieved in 1804, set the stage for an increasingly difficult struggle to survive among imperialist states. Haiti prefigured the modern Latin American experience and thus provides a classic example of how national aspirations in the hemisphere were derailed. Equally significant, it illustrates the manner in which commerce, rather than plantation enterprise or extensive capital investment, could foster socioeconomic decline.

This essay seeks to demonstrate that trade relations, conducted by elites that were culturally and socially wedded to the values and institutions of the metropolitan powers, created a pattern of economic dependency and cultural limitation in Haiti that has persisted into the contemporary period. These commercial relations, and the character and activities of the traders involved, have not been accorded full scholarly recognition. Although the social and political role of elite groups in Haiti has been studied by numerous social scientists, the commercial aspects of class privilege require more historical examination. The foreign and semiforeign elites emerged early in the 1800s and reached the height of

*The author wishes to acknowledge the support of the University of Minnesota Graduate School and the College of Liberal Arts.
their influence as agents of metropolitan power in the early twentieth century, before World War I. The American occupation of Haiti (1915–34) altered these groups, but did not destroy them. The European and Europeanized merchant communities of Haiti’s port cities provided both cultural and commercial links to the outside world, but ushered the black republic further along on a journey to underdevelopment.

As in most Latin American societies, Haiti’s dependency originated in the colonial era when land and human resources were diverted from food production to raising crops for export. The resulting need for staples and the growing inequities of the world market for agricultural exports imposed a system of unequal trading relations on the colonies. The mercantile structures that facilitated the skewed exchange remained in place after the demise of colonialism. As Europe and North America began rapid programs of industrial and economic expansion in the latter half of the nineteenth century, Haiti remained relatively backward—its ties with the great powers aiding their advancement, but not its own.

The Haitian elite played a significant intermediary role between the nation and metropolitan interests. As a broker and interpreter for foreigners, it assisted actively in trading. As consumers par excellence, members of this small bourgeoisie helped weave import-dependency into the fabric of society. Because of their relationship with the metropoles, they strongly identified with external cultural norms. Education and wealth helped to create a role for the elite to play at home analogous to that performed abroad by the metropolitan bourgeoisie. A satellite of that foreign class, the local leadership took Haiti’s rural hinterland as its own colony, where its modest power could be exercised.

Haitian authority over Haitian trade nevertheless did not endure. As a result of changes in international price structure, technological innovation, European and North American development, and native acculturation to foreign values, the indigenous bourgeoisie failed to conserve its status. By 1900 the Haitian merchant and entrepreneur were gradually disappearing as foreigners committed to their own national economies replaced Haitian businessmen. The manner in which this process occurred, and the backdrop of import-dependency against which it was enacted, reveals much about subsequent Haitian problems. The disincentive to productive investment, the deferment of economic diversification, and a chronic trade imbalance all can be traced to the early twentieth century. During the years 1900–15, intensely exploitative commercial relations, abetted by a sociocultural value system that rewarded foreigners, retarded local business growth.

Like other countries with roots in a colonial past, Haiti was not self-sufficient in food. In 1900 an American journalist noted its considerable reliance on imports.
Here is an island surrounded by millions of the best fish in the world, . . . yet tons on tons of salt codfish and mackerel are imported from St. John, New Brunswick. Nowhere in the world would you expect better native tobacco than here, yet hogshead after hogshead goes ashore, packed with tobacco from Virginia. Salt pork and smoked hams from Chicago, corned beef and barrels of wheat flour swing out over the ship’s side and down over the lighters, . . . not a barrel of which would be imported if the full resources of the island were developed as they should be.  

Haiti’s imports even included sugar, the chief crop of the old colony. Machinery and tools, luxury goods, lumber, prefabricated houses, textiles, medicines, paints, and chemicals also came from overseas.  

Class determined Haitian consumption habits. The peasantry bought only necessities, while the bourgeoisie regarded foreign merchandise as a lifeline to the “civilized world.” Its purchases were typical of the upper middle class in developed countries, a conformity made possible through conscientious imitation. Gentility required French brandies and perfumes, German drugs and eyeglasses, British shirts and linens. Fernand Hibbert, the leading Haitian writer of the period and a keen observer of upper-class mores and attitudes, satirized the reliance of fashionable society on these luxuries in his novel Séna. One character named Madame Henger, the Haitian wife of a German banker, subsists on an imported diet. “If we did not send for these provisions from abroad,” she asserts, “we would die of hunger in this uninhabitable land of Haiti.”  

The spirit of conspicuous consumption also permeated the political underworld of concessionary jobbing. Foreign speculators and their Haitian allies trafficked in bids for infrastructural projects. For the edification of the public, they equated expensive American equipment with progress, using consumption as an index of advancement. By the mid-1920s, the plains and harbors of the republic were littered with railroad cars in various stages of disrepair, defunct mills, rusting yachts, and other flotsam and jetsam remaining after years of impulse buying. Personal and pecuniary motives aside, the purchasers’ behavior foreshadowed the modern belief that accumulated hardware from the West would of itself deliver underdeveloped countries from the bondage of technological backwardness. A Pandora’s box of secondary assistance, unemployment, and capital outflow thus opened for Haiti during that era.  

The Haitian import market was primarily supplied by the United States, Britain, Germany, and France. Sixty-five to 70 percent of the goods that arrived in the republic’s ports came from North America. Britain’s share was approximately 9 percent. France supplied 10–12 percent of all imports during the pre–World War I years. Germany’s 3 percent, although modest, did not reflect the substantial profits that the Germans made through shipping. By 1909 the German-owned Hamburg
America Line had engrossed 75 percent of the carrying trade, with the rest divided between the Dutch Royal West Indian Mail and the French Compagnie Générale Transatlantique. Minor powers accounted for the remainder of Haitian trade.\(^\text{13}\)

The recorded volume of traffic in Haiti, a nation of 1.5 million in 1910, was small. Annual dutiable trade averaged about twenty million dollars for the 1900–15 period.\(^\text{14}\) If it were possible to adjust this figure for the rampant smuggling of the era, however, commerce would demonstrate a greater vitality. Clandestine illegal activity explains why metropolitan-oriented traders remained interested in Haiti and solidly entrenched there, despite the ostensibly small profits.\(^\text{15}\)

Before World War I, metropolitan firms traded in the Caribbean through commission houses. The commission house paid cash for factory goods and took charge of shipment, sales, advertising, credit, and maritime documentation. In exchange for these services, it received sales commissions from manufacturers and interest on loans extended to buyers. The home manufacturer’s advantage in using the commission house was that the latter best knew the markets and tariff regulations of specific countries. It therefore could trade more profitably and efficiently than the producers, who did not orient their overseas marketing departments toward the smaller Latin American republics. As home enterprises, the commission houses could be more readily controlled and thus inspired greater confidence.\(^\text{16}\)

Each nation had its own networks and target areas. The Germans, for example, vigorously promoted commercial expansion in the Americas. Cut off from large parts of Asia and Africa by French and British imperialism, they concentrated on developing spheres of influence in such weak, but independent, states as Haiti.\(^\text{17}\) The Germans based their success on supplying cheap duplicates of other popular European products. Their inventories also reflected German industry’s achievements in metallurgy and pharmaceuticals.\(^\text{18}\) The Germans had the largest number of showrooms and the greatest amount of government subvention. Their sales representatives were carefully trained in the language and customs of the host country. German traders often came to Haiti as clerks, later succeeding their superiors, who retired to Germany after amassing one or two hundred thousand dollars.\(^\text{19}\) German activity was not limited to the sale of national manufactures. Hamburg buyers purchased large quantities of Haitian coffee. Their home market absorbed only 29 percent of the production, but the merchant marine conveyed much of it to other western countries. Germany also bought Haitian logwood and other dyewoods.\(^\text{20}\)

French trade in Haiti was more developed. The French consumed most of the Haitian coffee and supplied luxury goods for the bourgeoisie. France provided none of the staples that the peasantry required,
however, and did not enjoy a “mass market.” French commerce remained static, but France boasted an active merchant marine, overshadowed only by that of Germany. Few other European countries had interests in the black republic. The Belgians financed one plantation and a handful of British companies were located in Haiti, but British goods depended on German carriers.

Haiti offered a number of tropical exports in exchange for foreign merchandise. Aside from coffee, it produced cotton, cacao, lignum vitae, beeswax, honey, and hides. These goods derived from peasant cultivation rather than plantation or corporate sources, and no central agency effectively coordinated production. Fluctuating foreign demand created cycles of boom and bust. Port-au-Prince levied export taxes on native commodities, but the widespread evasion of these duties through smuggling reduced the government’s revenues.

Americans, unlike Europeans, did not drink Haitian coffee. They also had alternative sources of supply for other Haitian commodities. The inaccessibility of the United States to Haitian exporters illuminates another dimension of Haitian import-dependency and subsequent balance of trade problems during this era. Coffee remained the country’s only real bargaining chip, and a small one at that.

The merchants who had organized Haiti’s unequal commerce with Europe and North America were descendants of the free people of color and the civil and military officials of the revolutionary, imperial, and early republican eras (1791–1843). Indigenous merchants owed their original preeminence to the emperor Jean-Jacques Dessalines (1804–6), who banished foreign traders. King Henry Christophe (1806–20), Dessalines’s successor and ruler of northern Haiti, permitted a few Britons to reside on the coast, but most of the import-export sector remained in the hands of Haitian "compradores.

Port-au-Prince attempted to regulate foreigners’ penetration of commerce through laws restricting their operations. Limiting aliens to seaboard cities, barring them from retail trade, and forbidding them to ply the coast all were aimed at preserving a sphere for the local businessman. Foreigners could not purchase coffee or other cash crops except through a Haitian broker, and they had to buy expensive licenses in order to trade at all. Despite the good intent of these measures, they did not secure a permanent place for the Haitian entrepreneur for several reasons. The first had to do with changes in commercial practice brought about by the transition to steam transport in the late nineteenth century. Steam permitted more frequent shipments of goods, which therefore could be ordered in smaller quantities by persons with less capital, thus cutting out the distributor. Formerly, consignee merchants ordered large amounts of stock for sale to retailers. By 1900 retailers had begun to

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0023879100021312 Published online by Cambridge University Press
import quality merchandise on their own account. In a 1903 dispatch, United States Vice-Consul Alexandre Battiste noted that no one in Haiti had sought a consignee’s patent in years. All had acquired importers’ licenses.28

Frédéric Marcellin, a scion of one of the indigenous commercial families, described the impact of these changes in his 1913 memoirs.

My father was one of the biggest sellers of French and English cloth, as there were many of them fifty years ago in our principal ports. This type is no longer encountered. It disappeared as a result of fires, revolutions that ruined families, and also because of the change created by steamboats in navigation. Formerly, important sailboats brought full cargoes consigned to the principal houses. This did not happen often. It was necessary to have considerable capital or good credit to fully load those sailboats. Today, thanks to steamers that allow stocks to be replenished rapidly, and by small shipments, importation is no longer the privilege of a few.29

Direct importation was easiest for those who could engage in high-volume trading and establish links with overseas companies and manufacturers. Foreigners thus had an important advantage, especially as aggressive and often patriotic promoters of a particular nation’s wares.30

The second cause of Haitian business decline was the worldwide drop in agricultural prices in the 1890s. Haitian purchasing power rested on the sale of a small amount of tropical produce, which faced considerable international competition. These exports could not underwrite native business development. The Sansaricq family, for example, closed its consignment house in the wake of litigation with French and British creditors. Other traders, such as the Jérémies and Geffrards, liquidated when European backers became dissatisfied with their poor showing and began to refuse them credit.31 Forced to contract, and often failing themselves, metropolitan lenders cut off such Haitian concerns as the Port-au-Prince partnership of Phillips and Laforest. The same fate befell the import-export firm of Aux Cayes entrepreneur Malherbe Pressoir. Like many of his peers, Pressoir pursued an alternative career in politics.32

Civil strife joined technological change and poor economic conditions as a third cause of commercial failure. Such crises as the persecution of segments of the bourgeoisie by President Salomon in 1883 and the burning of Petit-Goâve during the Revolution of 1902 crippled Haitian business efforts. Petit-Goâve, described by the American minister as “one of the chief ports in the Republic for the exportation of coffee” and “a thriving community,” boasted a population of twelve thousand before its destruction by fire. By August 1902, two houses remained standing in the town; the only other surviving structure was the French-owned coffee processing plant.33

Finally, foreign competition reduced Haitian trade. The foreign
community had gradually developed after Port-au-Prince's policy on resident aliens became less restrictive in 1843. Frenchmen soon joined the tiny British group in the port cities. French Antillean immigrants were also strongly represented, especially in Cape Haitian. In the 1860s, Germans from the Hanseatic cities entered the country as employees of French mercantile houses. Syria-Lebanese and Italians arrived in Haiti thirty years later. The Syrian-Lebanese community peaked at six thousand in 1903; the Italian group numbered three hundred in 1914.

Settlement in Haiti in the late nineteenth century followed the general trend of European migration to the Americas. The foreign community in the black republic never exceeded ten thousand persons, including those who claimed dual citizenship. Drastic fluctuations in the census of certain groups reflected considerable foreign transience. For some aliens, Haiti was only a way station on their journey to other parts of the Western Hemisphere. While many did not remain long, some who did prospered because trade constituted an area of great opportunity.

Whatever their skill in conventional business areas, foreign merchants did not restrict their operations to ordinary commerce. They engaged in a substantial amount of smuggling, a practice believed by contemporary observers to involve virtually the entire foreign community. A common method of smuggling entailed evasion of customs and export duties by not registering freight. Ships bound for Europe accordingly loaded up far offshore, with the knowledge and complicity of government officials. Another ploy, but one that excluded Haitian functionaries from the scheme, utilized false rumors of impending revolution. The “revolution” invariably began the day that the steamers arrived in port to pick up cargo. Nervous custom officials, who were the appointees of the incumbent administration, would absent themselves. The exporters would then fill the ships from their own warehouses, thus saving thousands of dollars in duties.

The import-export merchants also made false declarations. British Consul Alexander Murray estimated that some exports were worth four times the declared value. Merchants retained half of the resulting profits, with the rest divided among various Haitian officials. Murray confessed that his own countrymen were deeply involved in this corruption, but noted sadly that the same Britons made the most efficient consular agents. Murray’s ambivalence suggests that the business acumen required for legitimate trade served equally the purposes of organized fraud.

Consuls and consular agents were most often chosen from the
resident alien community. It was not always possible to have a fellow citizen as consul. For example, during this era, Haitians and Germans served as United States consular agents, and other European powers farmed out their agencies to an assortment of nationalities. The ordinarily routine paperwork and the comparatively small traffic did not compel the adoption of a better system. Although the popular consular posts were not highly remunerative in themselves, they granted the trader considerable immunity from Haitian civil and criminal prosecution and provided opportunities for the expansion of personal business contacts.

Merchants also engaged in various forms of financial speculation in Haiti. Until the multinational reorganization of the Banque Nationale de la République d’Haïti in 1910, merchant bankers, most of whom were foreign, held the largest proportion of the national currency. By hoarding, dumping, and collaborating, a small group of financiers controlled the monetary structure of the country. They consolidated their position through friendships with powerful Haitians. The British firms of Lyon Hall and Roberts Dutton, for example, made shrewd use of such techniques. These concerns received advanced warning of Port-au-Prince’s decision to halve the interest on the domestic loan in 1905. The tip gave them a chance to sell quickly their own certificates at the going rate and then buy them back cheaply after devaluation.

Lending, another traditional activity, took on added luster in the Haitian milieu. Merchant-bankers charged rates of up to 50 percent on loans to the government. Haitian scholar Gérard Pierre-Charles conjectured that in the 1875–1910 period, Haiti borrowed 166 million francs, of which more than half reverted to the lenders under various pretexts. Merchant-bankers argued that the government forced them to make loans, and because some Haitian administrations were short-lived and reluctant to share their predecessors’ obligations, financiers required high interest rates to protect themselves. Smaller Haitian concerns also received loans from the bankers, but these lenders more often used their capital to compete with local firms that had acquired rewarding franchises or clienteles.

Claims filed for property damage and loss during civil disorders in Haiti provided another source of income for foreign merchants. Metropolitan governments sometimes supported these often inflated demands for indemnification at gunpoint. Gunboat diplomacy was deeply rooted in the activities of representative foreign nationals eager to involve their homeland in personal disputes with their host country.

Family ties helped solidify the aliens’ financial gains. As residents of port cities, foreigners mingled in a cosmopolitan society. Children born to them of Haitian mothers shared their privileged status. The practice of registering property in children’s names further assisted at-
tempts by outsiders to circumvent laws aimed at limiting their economic sphere. Once foreigners entered the life of the community, they were better able to influence the direction of public policy, provide funds for the government, and help shape social and esthetic standards. A reclusive use of wealth sheltered them somewhat, but their role could not be completely disguised. Many Haitians resented foreigners and also disliked those nationals who adopted foreign ways. The latter group included the offspring of unions with Europeans and persons who had sought and attained foreign citizenship for selfish reasons. In 1903 Louis Audain père asserted that eight hundred Port-au-Princiens had renounced their Haitian citizenship in order to claim the protection of another government. France, eager to maintain its influence in peripherally French areas like Haiti, made liberal use of an 1887 law that bestowed French citizenship on those born abroad of a French father or grandfather. By 1890, five thousand individuals in Haiti claimed to be French. Those born at sea or in Europe frequently changed their nationality during periods of domestic crisis or returned from foreign travels with non-Haitian identities.

Certain aliens, on the other hand, adopted Haitian citizenship, but often did not properly legitimate it. Others kept their status deliberately ambiguous for political or financial reasons. J. N. Léger accused such individuals of cheating both Haiti and their country of origin. “They escape all the burdens the citizen must undertake,” he complained, “while profiting from great advantages.” They were exempt from military service, Léger observed, but this exemption did not keep them from making “senseless complaints” against Haiti, and “finding foreign ministers to sustain them” in so doing. Léger was not alone in this assessment. The British consul in 1904 characterized some resident aliens and dual nationals as “professional reclamationists,” who expected to be compensated for damages resulting from Haitian revolutions, although most major powers did not offer such awards. The notable element was the presence of a mixed, Europeanized, and often totally foreign population who used ambiguous nationality as a tool to force concessions from a weak government.

The nationality issue further undermined Haitian society when it set up distinctions between those who had recourse to external diplomatic military force and those who did not. Haiti could not coerce the great powers, but foreign navies backed up demands from the legations. Being Haitian also meant that one lacked protection from the excesses of one’s own government, while being foreign was insurance against injury and loss. In times of civil war, insurgents generally respected a house or shop that displayed the flag of a major foreign power. An attack on a foreigner invited reprisals, and sooner or later, damage claims. The urban upper class sometimes found it prudent to change citizenship. Oc-
casionally, members of the same family were variously French, German, British, or American. The prestige and security inherent in assuming a foreign nationality contrasted sharply with the risks of remaining Haitian. Léger wrote, “The peaceful Haitian who, never having filled public office and deriving from work only his means of existence, sees his painfully acquired property disappear in flames, and loses in several hours the fruit of several years labor, cannot fail to have bitter reflections when the State, after a civil war, is generous only to foreigners whose very nationality is often doubtful.”

Indeed, this concern was so strong that many bourgeois parents actively recruited foreign spouses for their marriageable daughters. In Hibbert’s novel of social mores, Les Thazar, Madame Thazar denies that a Haitian could adequately provide for her daughter. Chronic political violence, she feels, imperils native men. “What future can a Haitian have in Haiti,” she exclaims, “especially a good Haitian?” The young Made­moiselle Thazar rejects a local suitor for a German, realizing that the European’s fortunes do not depend upon the vicissitudes of politics.

In real life as in fiction, the bourgeoisie approved such marriages because the bride was thereafter sheltered under the French or German flag. Léon Des­cos, France’s minister to Haiti in the early 1900s, commented sarcastically on “the German ladies” of Port-au-Prince, whose Teutonic allegiance lasted no longer than their husbands’ tour of duty. Widows also might resume their Haitian citizenship after the death of their European spouses. Despite this apparent opportunism, a formal dignity marked marriage brokerage during the epoch. Potential sons-in-law, once admitted to the sanctum of the upper-class home, conducted themselves as they would have in similar circumstances abroad.

Genteel Haitians expected reciprocal behavior from aliens, but foreign visitors did not always represent the cream of metropolitan society. Léger grumbled that Haiti had attracted the refuse of Europe: “Waiters who robbed their bosses, dishonest cashiers, criminals awaiting sentence, escaped convicts. . . . All these people have but one obsession, to get rich. Needless to add that they don’t quibble about how. They don’t recoil before any evil act, provided that it brings them money.” adventurers could find opportunities for advancement in a country where European superiority was assumed. Frédéric Marcelin observed the aura of distinction that surrounded the white man. “Whether he remains in the cities or goes to the countryside,” Marcelin commented, “his title of foreigner, illustrated by his skin, is an irresistible passport for him.”

Léger’s and Marcelin’s observations on foreigners is complemented by evidence of their ubiquity. In 1908 the Haitian government published a Statistique générale de la République d’Haiti, which identified the principal importers and exporters. The list of businessmen, once their nationality identity is established through various sources, indi-
Table 1: Port-au-Prince Importers in 1908

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Number of Haitians (%)</th>
<th>Number of Foreign or Semiforeign* (%)</th>
<th>Total (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>20 (48%)</td>
<td>22 (52%)</td>
<td>42 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clocks and jewelry</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
<td>6 (100%)</td>
<td>6 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fancy goods</td>
<td>7 (58%)</td>
<td>5 (42%)</td>
<td>12 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction wood</td>
<td>1 (50%)</td>
<td>1 (50%)</td>
<td>2 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foodstuffs</td>
<td>16 (73%)</td>
<td>6 (27%)</td>
<td>22 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dry goods</td>
<td>4 (40%)</td>
<td>6 (60%)</td>
<td>10 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheetmetal</td>
<td>4 (36%)</td>
<td>7 (64%)</td>
<td>11 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>52 (50%)</td>
<td>53 (50%)</td>
<td>105 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistique générale de la République d’Haïti (Port-au-Prince: Abeille, 1908).

*Persons of unknown origin were included as Haitians. Persons of Haitian origin whose registration as aliens are documented were counted as foreigners. Dual nationals were included as semiforeign. There were nine cases of dual nationality and one case of unknown nationality.

cates the remarkable degree of alien penetration of the import-export sector: foreigners accounted for nearly half the participants in foreign commerce. Haitian merchants persisted in the provincial ports, where they did at least 54 percent of the business, but even in smaller towns like Jeremie and Miragoane, which remained less attractive to foreign enterprise, some Europeans made significant inroads. Port-au-Prince, the capital, experienced the greatest degree of international participation. Ninety-three percent of the merchant-bankers were non-Haitian, as were nearly 56 percent of the importers and exporters. Foreigners dominated six out of the seven categories of importation listed, leaving Haitians as the principal grocers.

Information about the export sector in 1908 is available only for Port-au-Prince, but foreign dominance was even greater than in the import sector. Of the nine coffee exporters cited, only one was Haitian. Even if the one merchant of unknown nationality is assumed to be Haitian, aliens still accounted for approximately 78 percent of the coffee trade. Non-Haitians exported nearly 79 percent of all woods, wax, and skins. Haitians formed the majority (91 percent) only in the category of rums and cane liquors.

These 1908 figures clearly contrast with data drawn from a handbook published by the Bureau of the American Republics in 1891. At this earlier date, only 31.8 percent of the leading merchants were foreign. Foreigners dominated the export sector in the capital, however, representing 83.3 percent of all such traders. The percentage of aliens in business in Haiti showed significant increase from 1891 to 1908 in six out of the ten towns for which information was available.
Despite the unmistakable foreign advance by 1908, Haitians continued to participate in national commerce. No figures are available on the profits netted by Haitians and non-Haitians respectively, nor on the specific size of business establishments, but contemporaries asserted that the most important merchants were aliens. In Port-au-Prince, taxes on foreign enterprise provided the municipality with half its revenues. Europeans did most of the trading in St. Marc and Gonaives in 1910. One French merchant monopolized more than 50 percent of Jacmel's commerce. In 1911 American businessmen learned at the Pan American Commerce Conference in Washington, D.C., that Germans and Frenchmen conducted 80 percent of the trade in principal Haitian cities. By 1913, according to Marcelin, the best concerns in the country were firmly under foreign control.

Trade rivalries accompanied foreign commercial expansion in the 1900–15 period. The increasing competitiveness impinged on the area of local politics. Relationships with a presidential candidate favored by France or Germany, for example, now assumed significance. The nationality of a businessman who acquired a concession became a matter of diplomatic concern. American and European merchants could rely on assistance from their respective governments in advancing their interests. They also had at their disposal relatively sophisticated credit, transport, and communication systems.

The foreign buildup in Haiti was part of a global struggle for markets and political influence among the great powers in the early twentieth century. France utilized the ties of language and culture to maintain a stable position for itself in the Haitian market and to cultivate Francophiles for political purposes. Its liberal lending policy encouraged dependence on the part of needy nations. Germany's self-promotion
### Table 3 Provincial Merchants in Haiti in 1908

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town</th>
<th>Number of Haitians (%)</th>
<th>Number of Foreign or Semiforeign* (%)</th>
<th>Total (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aquin</td>
<td>4 (67%)</td>
<td>2 (33%)</td>
<td>6 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aux Cayes</td>
<td>5 (42%)</td>
<td>7 (58%)</td>
<td>12 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cap Haitien</td>
<td>6 (43%)</td>
<td>8 (57%)</td>
<td>14 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gonaïves</td>
<td>6 (32%)</td>
<td>13 (68%)</td>
<td>19 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacmel</td>
<td>13 (57%)</td>
<td>10 (43%)</td>
<td>23 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jérémie</td>
<td>10 (83%)</td>
<td>2 (17%)</td>
<td>12 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miragoâne</td>
<td>9 (90%)</td>
<td>1 (10%)</td>
<td>10 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mole St. Nicolas</td>
<td>1 (33%)</td>
<td>2 (67%)</td>
<td>3 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petit Goâve</td>
<td>4 (50%)</td>
<td>4 (50%)</td>
<td>8 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port de Paix</td>
<td>10 (67%)</td>
<td>5 (33%)</td>
<td>15 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Marc</td>
<td>2 (29%)</td>
<td>5 (71%)</td>
<td>7 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>70 (54%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>59 (46%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>129 (100%)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistique générale de la République d’Haïti.

*Persons of unknown or dual nationality were categorized as in table 1. There were five cases of dual nationality and six cases of unknown nationality.

The American example illuminates the character of the international trade competition. The U.S. diplomatic style differed from that of the European nations; however, its relationship to commercial questions in Haiti remained essentially the same as that of its rivals. The United States dominated the staple commodity market, but did not have a significant business community before 1915. The reasons for its small representation were partly racial. Deepseated prejudices, which the British also shared, precluded the social mixing that characterized the behavior of Europeans in Haiti.

Given racial exclusiveness, the predominantly black American legation helped bridge the social gap. Educated Haitians understood America’s color problems. Some had experienced these firsthand while traveling in North America as representatives of their own government, and their stories of racial discrimination did not improve Haitian-American relations. But the use of black American diplomats accomplished several objectives at once: it fulfilled partisan promises to black politi-
cians at home, it substituted for an absent American resident group, and it softened the Haitian perception of the United States as a racist country. These measures, however, were not wholly adequate. Washington still needed a business community in Haiti. To this end, it supported a Syrian merchant group, despite strong Haitian objections. In order to maintain the preeminence of American exports, the United States confronted Haiti many times over the safety, rights, and privileges of this segment of the alien population, employing its diplomacy on behalf of commerce with zeal and persistence. American support of the Syrians provides an example of the pressures exerted on Haiti by the great powers in their efforts to strengthen those foreign merchants who sold metropolitan products.

Washington's chief tool in its stewardship of the Syrians, and the consequent advancement of its own concerns, was the reciprocity treaty of 1864. A product of Secretary of State William Henry Seward's policy of trade expansion in the Western Hemisphere, the treaty resembled other conventions that the United States had signed in the same era with various Latin American countries. According to its provisions, Haitian and American nationals would enjoy the same commercial rights in each others' homeland as would citizens. In reality, the treaty proved unfavorable to Haitians, who conducted little business in the United States. The treaty's limitations were exposed when the Haitian government resumed taxation on foreign clerks in 1903. The practice of recruiting clerical and managerial assistance from abroad created unemployment among Haitians and, as many Europeans later became their employers' partners or set up firms of their own, contributed another disincentive for native entrepreneurship.

The tax on foreign clerks encountered consistent American opposition. U.S. Minister William F. Powell adamantly insisted that American merchants be exempt. Few of the approximately two hundred persons whom Powell defended had ever spent much time in the United States, although some were citizens. In 1904 the Justice Department discovered that a number of them held counterfeit naturalization papers, but this revelation did not deter Powell and the State Department in their vigorous support of this largely Syrian group. Even when the Haitian government acted to expel those who were fraudulently naturalized, the American Legation protested. The fact that these individuals were not U.S. nationals was less important than the fact that they, more than any other group, brought American merchandise to Haiti. Because of Powell's intransigence, Haiti ultimately renounced the reciprocity treaty in 1904 in hopes of improving relations with Britain and Germany.

The Americans were not alone in pressing for advantages. By means of a commercial agreement reached in 1900, French goods entered

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0023879100021312 Published online by Cambridge University Press
Haiti at very low rates. In exchange, Haitian coffee, cacao, and spices paid the minimum duty in France and Algeria. The treaty also promoted French shipping. Although French imports became cheaper as a result of these arrangements, Haitian consumers did not benefit. The price of French goods remained the same, and only the merchant community profited from the changes.  

France’s commercial policy in Haiti was aimed at preserving, rather than further developing, a traditional clientele. The French took a nationalistic approach to trade, especially after the 1907 reorganization of their foreign office. The reformed Quai d’Orsay joined political and commercial affairs; and French officials abroad increasingly served as brokers for home manufacturers. Cultural matters also played an important role in the advancement of French interests. Complaisant Haitian notables were inducted into the Legion of Honor. The French did not limit their pressure on Haiti to the perpetuation of French cultural values, but also lobbied against growing Haitian contacts with Germany. Their efforts did not dislodge the Germans, however, and in 1905 France canceled the privileged entry status of Haitian coffee and cacao. Haiti then renounced the Franco-Haitian commercial treaty, which by then was of little further value.  

France’s policies also touched on the Syrian question. Because of France’s historic interests in Lebanon, some four hundred Syrians in Haiti regarded themselves as entitled to French protection. Haiti disputed the Syrian claim, but the French minister was initially inclined to honor it. Cooperation between the Syrian community and French diplomats allegedly had been so close that one Syrian merchant illegally expatriated a large quantity of Haitian coin with the complicity of the French legation and under the cover of its seal. Trouble began when French merchants from Martinique and Guadeloupe, who traded in Haiti, complained about Syrian competition. The Franco-Syrians, who had originally placed orders through the larger French commission houses, were becoming more independent. French Antilleans then used their greater leverage with the French minister in Haiti to secure his indifference and passivity to the Syrians’ problems with the Haitian government.  

The British attitude toward its twenty naturalized Syrians was similarly motivated. In a 1904 complaint to the Foreign Office, the Manchester-based Central America Trading Company expressed its concern about the welfare of its Syrian agents in Haiti. The Foreign Office assured the company that a British gunboat would soon arrive in the island. The reply contrasted sharply to one later made to an Anglo-Syrian. In response to this independent merchant’s protest against discrimination in Haiti, the Foreign Office asserted that his British citizenship did not entitle him or his non-British partners to protection. His Majesty’s gov-

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0023879100021312 Published online by Cambridge University Press
ernment was prepared to act energetically only when persecuted Syrians represented a home firm.\(^{81}\)

Two British companies were among the leading foreign enterprises in Haiti, but the British consul realized that these traders, unlike so many others, did not rely heavily on metropolitan support. He considered the existing businesses as “merely British in name, but Haytian and German in their interests and sentiments.”\(^{82}\) One concern was “a purely American import house,” incorporated in the United States. Many proprietors, moreover, were mulattoes married to Haitian women.\(^{83}\) Britain’s commercial position in Haiti harmonized with its general Caribbean policy of retrenchment and acquiescence to American diplomatic objectives. It confined its activism to its colonies and made no effort to draw Britons in the independent countries into strong unions for the purposes of aggressive business development.\(^{84}\)

In contrast, the German government and its subjects in Haiti enjoyed the closest collaboration of all. As early as 1897, the German minister organized a patriotic society among German residents. Its activities included fund raising for the Imperial navy, and by 1901, the Germans had collected DM 816,500.\(^{85}\) Eleven years later, the German community established a school for Germano-Haitian pupils in Port-au-Prince. Subsidized by tuition as well as gifts from the Hamburg America Line, Hamburg businessmen, and the Kaiser himself, the school gave children of mixed descent a German education.\(^{86}\)

Germany’s dedication to maintaining the metropolitan connection was also reflected in its conflicts with Haiti. The German navy responded to political unrest in Haiti by demonstrations of force designed to prevent any possible attack on German life or property. Maneuvers in Haitian waters in 1902 and the landing of troops in 1911 both demonstrated to Port-au-Prince the readiness of the Imperial forces.\(^{87}\) Commercial questions caused friction in 1901, when Berlin began a tariff war with Haiti to secure treaty privileges equal to those acquired by the French. No accord was reached until mid-1908, when a compromise settlement allowed the Germans to expand significantly their shipping and import trade in Haiti.\(^{88}\)

Haitian policymakers were not indifferent to foreign penetration, intervention, and pressure. Like other Latin American governments, the Port-au-Prince administration was sensitive and vulnerable to charges of “selling the country.”\(^{89}\) Haiti tried to defend itself through protectionist legislation and a skillfully pursued multilateral diplomacy that was designed to keep the great powers off balance.\(^{90}\) Haitian statesmen were also masters of camouflage and delay. “It is worse than useless to enter into a discussion on points of international law with the Haytian Government,” British Consul Murray observed. “There is nothing they like better than such a correspondence, in the course of which they make
lengthy replies at long intervals interlarded with copious quotations culled from various authorities.”

Ultimately, Haiti’s attempts to defend its integrity were defeated from within. Foreign influence had penetrated the core of the political and cultural leadership class, and kinship ties as well as outlook now linked these Haitians to external interests. Such prominent families as the Lespinasses, the Lecontes, the Légers, and the Ménos, who together provided a president, diplomats, cabinet officers, and other officials, were related by marriage and blood to powerful foreigners, whose outlook they increasingly came to share.

In the business world, the intermarriage pattern facilitated the formation of closely held companies with links to foreign corporations. The classic examples are the Central Railroad of Haiti and the Plaine du Cul de Sac Railroad. Intrafamilial transfers of stock within these two interlocking bodies are supposed to have baffled their own managers. Marriage ties to foreigners included the diplomatic community. For example, John B. Terres, a black American consul who resided permanently in Haiti, was the brother-in-law of two partners of the semiforeign banking house of Dejardin, Luders, and Company. All three men had wed Germano-Haitian women and lived in a suburban family compound where they grew and processed tobacco. Lemuel Livingston, U.S. Consul at Cape Haitian, also married into a local family. Livingston was later associated with the highly speculative Haytian Pineapple Company, one of many plantation ventures that failed during the American occupation of 1915–34.

Haitians assigned a high value to family relations. Chronic economic stress and political strife gave weight to the importance of the family as a stable, protective institution. Family linkage helped lower the bourgeoisie’s resistance to overt foreign intervention. When the United States landed its marines in July 1915, the groundwork for political and military occupation had been laid long since by elite intermediaries who had helped extend the market systems of the metropoles.

The American occupation began as a counterinsurgency campaign. Its ostensible purpose was to end a cycle of political upheaval that had accelerated and intensified in Haiti after 1913. The cause of the crisis lay in Haiti’s dependency and underdevelopment, and in the weakness of its leadership. The United States encountered resistance to its “pacification” campaign, but ultimately succeeded in imposing an armed peace and a handpicked government on the Haitians. American officials knew less of Haiti’s problems than their European peers did and cared little about them. Their chief objectives were to detach Haiti from its commercial reliance on other powers, to check the spread of European influence, and to tie the republic more closely to the United States as an economic
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and political satellite. Strategic concerns deriving from the politics of World War I and traditional jealousy of European influence in the Caribbean provided the historical context for the intervention decision.  

Although the United States considerably neutralized French and German power in Haiti, the occupation compounded, rather than solved, the problem posed by the metropolitan connection. Suspicious of the allegiances of the foreign and semiforeign elites, the Americans barred them from genuine political power, but protected those who identified with the U.S. objectives. The occupation thus perpetuated the status of the foreign and semiforeign groups. Six thousand foreigners remained in business throughout the 1915–34 period. In 1919, at least 46 percent of the merchant community was non-Haitian, including newly arrived businessmen who were encouraged by the “law and order” recently established by the marines.  

The Americans made minimal attempts at genuinely altering the economy. They did not open Haiti to extensive commercial plantation exploitation. Laws forbidding foreign landownership were repealed, but Haiti's complicated land-tenure system, lack of infrastructure, and hostility to corporate penetration discouraged investment in planting and manufacturing. Some American companies, which had been organized to sell stock only, never began operations. Haiti made its main contribution to the Caribbean plantation economy in these years by exporting labor to the sugar estates of Cuba and the Dominican Republic.  

Import dependency and modest agricultural export constituted the most pertinent facts of Haitian economic life during the 1900–15 era. Financiers did not consider substantial investment in Haiti worthwhile and settled for advantages that could be derived from the status quo. This approach meant fostering the mercantile communities to the detriment of Haitian economic autonomy and developing more sophisticated methods of commercial exchange. This pattern sustained a political and social climate that made the oligarchical system normative. Cosmopolitan groups shared power at home, while Washington and other foreign capitals determined Haiti's international status.  

In metropolitan decisionmaking as in commerce, the trading elites played a crucial role. Regarded abroad as the most responsible locals, they acted principally as brokers. Because they managed a society that remained largely closed to investment, they enjoyed considerable strength. Finance capitalism, which appeared in Haiti in 1910 as a result of the multilateral loan and bank reorganization, only accelerated a process that was already underway. As compared to foreign investment in other Caribbean states, the sixteen-million-dollar loan of 1910 was small. Foreign banking emerged slowly and did not hinder the continuing operations of local merchant lenders. To be fully profitable, banking needed more than firm political control. As long as sluggish business conditions
characterized the economy, there was little incentive to displace traditional merchant-bankers.\(^{100}\)

Mercantilist activity, in turn, necessitated the mediation of agents who could operate in the world of the provincial producer as well as that of the international bourgeoisie. Merchants were not enthusiastic about unrestrained metropolitan enterprise, for their raison d’être rested on the country’s very inaccessibility to direct central control. The American occupation left the foreign and semiforeign elites reduced and chastened, but hardly nullified. Those who were able to adapt to altered conditions survived the period. The Americans were not, after all, interested in making more changes in Haiti than their own needs dictated. Haiti’s underdevelopment and dependency did not trouble them as much as the uses to which rival states might put those problems. Once the competitors had been reduced, the foreign and semiforeign elites could continue the system of commercial exploitation and cultural hegemony that long tradition had endowed with authority.

NOTES


8. Powell to Hay, 10 June 1903, Consular Dispatches from Haiti (hereafter CD), RG 59,
NA; République d’Haiti, Statistique générale de la République d’Haiti (Port-au-Prince: Imp. de l’Abeille, 1908), pp. 54, 57.

9. Fernand Hibbert, Scènes de la vie haïtienne: Sèna (Port-au-Prince: Imp. de l’Abeille, 1905), pp. 98, 99. Of Hibbert, Sténio Vincent wrote: “Mr. Fernand Hibbert’s novels have an unquestionable documentary value. . . . Mr. Hibbert is an important witness and his testimony cannot be ignored. By the quality and choice of their quite trenchant observations, Hibbert’s novels reveal to us the total spirit of the social sphere, yield up to us the souls of citizens who are cogs in the political machine. The types presented are not fictional characters. They are living. We meet them in the street.” En posant les jalons, vol. 1, p. 206.

10. Charles Cowan to the State Department, 19 July 1915, State Department Decimal File (hereafter DF), No 838.00/1208; dispatches of Minister Furniss to the Secretary of State, 15 September 1910, 838.602501/7; 27 October 1910, 838.304/1; 4 April 1911, 838.602; 25 July 1911, 838.34/29.

11. Powell to Hay, 23 July, CD; Le Moniteur, 2 March 1910; Furniss’s dispatches to the Secretary of State, 27 October 1910, DF, 838.304/1; 6 August 1910, 838.602; 13 May 1913, 838.77/76; R. D. Longyear, “Railroad Mileage and Operation in Haiti,” 22 July 1925, 838.77/336. For a general discussion of this problem, see Frank, Capitalism, pp. xii–xiv; Furtado, Economic Development, pp. 303–4; Cockcroft et al., Dependency, pp. 365–75.


22. Commercial Relations, 1901, p. 567; Vansittart to Lansdowne, 16 March 1905, and Shue to Lansdowne, 16 June 1902, in Great Britain, Foreign Office, British Foreign and State Papers, General Correspondence, Hayti, FO 35/182, and FO 35/178 respectively.
23. R. D. Longyear, “Haitian Coffee: Its Cultivation and Preparation for Shipment,” 9 September 1922, DE 838.61333/47; Powell to Hay, 10 June 1901; Battiste to the State Department, 23 August 1900, CD.


35. Descos, En Haïti, p. xxii, also xxii, n. 1.

36. Madison Smith to the Secretary of State, 2 February 1914, DE 838.00/829; Schmidt, The U.S. Occupation, p. 35.


40. Furniss to Root, 20 November 1908, United States, Department of State, Numerical File, RG 59; Murray to the Foreign Secretary, 20 November 1908, FO 371/468.

41. Henry M. Smythe to W. W. Rockhill, 30 January 1897, CD.

42. Ibid.; Smythe to the State Department, 6 February 1897; Battiste to David Hill, 18 July 1900; Terres to Loomis, 27 April 1903, CD.
43. Chatelain, La Banque Nationale, p. 46; Louis Gation, Aspects de l’économie et des finances d’Haiti (Port-au-Prince: Imp. du College Vertières, 1944), p. 191; Murray to the Foreign Secretary, 3 December 1910, and 11 November 1910, FO 371/915.


49. Léger, La Politique, p. 57.


53. Léger, La Politique, pp. 47–53.


57. Léger, La Politique, pp. 24, 25.


59. The most useful of these included: Livre bleu d’Haïti/Blue Book of Haiti; Descos, En Haiti; Records of the Gendarmerie d’Haïti (Garde d’Haïti), 1915–34, United States Marine Corps Records, RG 127, NA; Georges Corvington, Port-au-Prince au cours des ans, vol. 4 (Port-au-Prince: Henri Deschamps, 1976); Pearn, L’illusion héroïque.

60. Statistique générale, pp. 54, 57.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.


72. Powell to Sherman, 5 May 1898, CD; Adee to Powell, 5 October 1903, Foreign Relations, 1903, p. 378; Vansittart to the Foreign Secretary, 17 March 1904, FO 35/181.


74. The Haitian Minister to Murville Fèrère, 18 March 1904, Kurt Fisher Collection, Schomberg Research Center, New York Public Library; Adee to Van Dyne, 6 November 1905, CD; Vansittart to the Foreign Secretary, 17 March 1904, FO 35/181.

75. Battiste to the State Department, 20 August 1900, CD; A. Cohen to the Foreign Secretary, 17 May 1901, FO 35/176.


77. Léger to Fèrère, 8 August 1905, CD.

78. Passport Bureau memorandum; and Powell to Hay, 17 August 1904, and 14 September 1904, CD.

79. Powell to Hay, 13 March 1905, CD.


81. Foreign Office to Abraham Shameh, 29 August 1904, FO 35/181.

82. Vansittart to Grey, 18 July 1906, FO 371/81.

83. Ibid; idem to idem, 6 June 1905; Jerome to the Foreign Secretary, 23 August 1905, FO 35/182.


85. Powell to Hay, 17 November 1897, and 30 January 1901, CD.

86. Furniss to the Secretary of State, 30 April 1912, DF, 838.42; Schmidt, The U.S. Occupation, p. 34.

87. Le Soir, 6 December 1899; Powell to Hay, 10 July 1904, CD; Furniss to the Secretary of State, 19 August 1911, DF, 838.00/675.


89. Manigat, L’Amérique Latine.


91. Léger to Adee, 30 March 1905; Léger to Fère, 18 April 1905; Léger to the Haitian Secretary of State, 25 March 1907, Eugene Maximilien Collection, Schomburg Research Center, New York Public Library. Alexander Murray to the Foreign Secretary, 3 December 1910, FO 371/1915.

92. Oliver Wardrop to the Foreign Secretary, 8 April 1903, FO 35/179; Bellegarde to A. N. Léger, 12 June 1932, Maximilien Collection; Powell to Hay, 17 May 1902, enclosure no. 1, CD; James P. MacDonald to R. W. Austin, 8 July 1912, DF, 838.6156M14/1; Furniss to Root, 13 October 1908, Numerical File, 2126/308; Dantès Bellegarde, Ecrivains haïtiens (Port-au-Prince: Société des Éditions et de Librairie, 1947), pp. 146–48; Waller to Lejeune, 20 August 1917, John A. Lejeune Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

93. Furniss to the Secretary of State, 6 June 1910, DF, 838.77/1; John Russell, Daily Diary Report, 5 May 1920, DF, 838.00/1641; Munro, Intervention, p. 246.

94. Furniss to the Secretary of State, 30 May 1910, DF, 838.6102.


100. For accounts of the bank loan and reorganization of 1910, see Manigat “Substitution;” Munro, Intervention, pp. 245–55. For merchant banking after 1910, see Furniss to the Secretary of State, 16 February 1912, DF, 838.51/305; République d’Haïti, Exposé géné­rale de la République d’Haïti, 1913, p. 25; G. Ph. Nieder to the Secretary of State, 10 December 1914, DF, 838.51/375; idem to idem, 23 December 1914, DF, 838.51/376; testimony of Rear Admiral William B. Caperton, Senate, Inquiry, pp. 299, 323; Munro, Intervention, pp. 336, 373. For the continuance of merchant banking in Latin America in general, see Aughinbaugh, Selling Latin America, p. 297.