In his introduction to the Pelican Classics edition of John Stuart Mill’s *Principles of Political Economy*, the economist Donald Winch wrote that:

> Like all liberal theorists, [Mill] took the individual as the basic unit of discourse. His contact with traditions antagonistic to the one in which he was brought up merely served to strengthen his attachment to individualism by enlarging his conception of what individuality should comprise. Institutional arrangements in society should be judged basically in terms of whether they enhanced this individuality by widening the sphere of independence and choice. In so far as social, political and economic conditions inhibited or prevented individuals, or groups of individuals such as the working classes, from partaking fully in the benefits of the social union, these should be removed by direct intervention or negative prohibition.

*(Winch, 1970, p.48)*

In essence, Mill, according to Winch, believed that in order to protect liberty in general, some specific freedoms ought to be constrained, a view that had also been held by John Locke. From a behavioural public policy perspective, this will also be my conclusion in this book.

However, before reaching my conclusion it may prove instructive to detail how I arrived at it. As noted in the Introduction, in a previous book I contended that the motivational force of reciprocity – of responding in kind to good, and bad, intentions and/or actions – can and should be nurtured by policy makers to aid individuals in the pursuit of their own private predilections and public sector groupings in the pursuit of their collective objectives *(Oliver, 2019)*. To borrow
from the economist Amartya Sen (1999), to the extent that public sector services, such as health and education, provide people with the capabilities to pursue their privately held goals in life, an environment that crowds in reciprocal motivations in those sectors is perfectly consistent with sustaining and extending liberty. As I previously contended, the urge to act reciprocally – and a concern with that which facilitates indirect reciprocity (namely, a good reputation) – lies deep within the human psyche, and probably evolved because this motivational force brings forth benefits and protection to the group. Moreover, and importantly, since the individuals that comprise a group are more likely to fare well if their group is flourishing, a reciprocal cooperative spirit is compatible with – indeed, is probably principally driven by – the pursuit of individual long-term self-interest. Hence, out of this evolutionary process arose instinctive tendencies and social norms that favour conditional cooperation and that justify punishment of those who transgress.

Admittedly, that subgroups often act cooperatively and reciprocally to the detriment of the wider group is an unfortunate possibility that has long been recognised. The Scottish Enlightenment philosopher David Hume, for instance, wrote that ‘Factions subvert government, render laws impotent, and beget the fiercest animosities among men of the same nation, who ought to give mutual assistance and protection to each other’ [Hume, 1777/2018, p.155]. Hume elsewhere noted that ‘Robbers and pirates . . . could not maintain their pernicious confederacy, did they not establish a new distributive justice among themselves, and recall those laws of equity, which they have violated with the rest of mankind’ [Hume, 1751/2018, pp.33–34]. There are also risks associated with negative reciprocity, including undue or excessive retribution and spiralling retaliation, but if harnessed in the right way reciprocity can serve substantively as a force for good, as also emphasised by Hume, as we shall later see.

Reciprocity as a motivational force can, and sometimes is, embraced, if peripherally, by several different behavioural public policy frameworks, but is central to that favoured in this book;
namely, to nurture reciprocity in the positive sense so that people may be able to better pursue their own conception of a flourishing life, and also in the negative sense, to constrain those who might otherwise exploit the liberty that has been granted to them and in doing so impose unacceptable harms on others.\(^2\) Given the centrality of reciprocity to this framework, it seems apt at this point to reflect a little further on the concept.\(^3\)

**THE ORIGIN OF RECIPROCITY**

Those who write on the evolutionary origin of reciprocity present varied, if related, arguments. The evolutionary biologist Joseph Henrich, for instance, sees reciprocity as underpinning the mutual protection that became ever more necessary after our ancestors descended the trees and became ground apes (Henrich, 2016), whereas the ethologist and primatologist Christopher Boehm notes that reciprocal tendencies strengthen as a necessary feature of insurance when individual success in a hunt is uncertain (Boehm, 2012).\(^4\) Boehm reports that when chimpanzees hunt, those that gain initial control of the carcass will share just enough to enable them to retain control, and there may be reciprocation between givers and receivers when their relative success (or lack thereof) is reversed in the future.\(^5\) According to Boehm, archaic homo sapiens killed larger game than do chimpanzees, and thus there was more sharing, and in hunter-gatherer societies dominance over meat was often negated entirely by having it shared out by a neutral person (see also Sapolsky, 2017, p.323).

In *Utilitarianism*, Mill (1863/1969) wrote that we control ourselves in the face of internal and external sanctions, with the internal mediated by our conscience, but that our feelings for others, where they exist at all, are much weaker than our feelings for ourselves. Mill further contended that where feelings for others exist they do so due to a concern for their utility – a concern for them. One might acknowledge Mill’s view, but it seems that a concern for others evolved because that is the best means to serve oneself, at least in the long
term. Despite the different nuances of the evolutionary arguments presented in the previous paragraph, these explanations share a common underlying reason for the origin of reciprocity; namely, that reciprocation and cooperation arose not from altruism in the pure sense of the term [i.e. from unconditional giving], but from a sense of individual self-interest.6 This is not self-interest in the form of avaricious egoism [i.e. a desire to benefit oneself irrespective of the consequences for others], but rather an implicit recognition – an evolved sense – that whatever benefits the groups in which we find ourselves is likely to benefit us also.

Presumably, few would doubt that humans are influenced by a mix of motives, including those that can be characterised as reciprocal, egoistic and perhaps even altruistic, or that the relative strengths of these motivations vary both interpersonally and, over time and context, intrapersonally. Hume acknowledged this long ago when he wrote that ‘there is some benevolence, however, small, infused into our bosom; some spark of friendship for human kind; some particle of the dove kneaded into our frame, along with the elements of the wolf and the serpent’ [Hume, 1751/2018, p.78]. However, the view that people are often driven to benefit others ultimately to benefit themselves has a long history in political philosophy. For example, in the middle of the nineteenth century, the political scientist Alexis de Tocqueville, in his seminal Democracy in America, wrote that ‘The Americans ... are fond of explaining almost all the actions of their lives by the principle of self-interest rightly understood; they show with complacency how an enlightened regard for themselves constantly prompts them to assist one another and inclines them willingly to sacrifice a portion of their time and property to the welfare of the state’ [de Tocqueville, 1835/1998, p.230].7

Earlier still, Hume himself suggested that cooperation and reciprocity evolved organically over eons when the mutuality that is necessary for small family units to subsist eventually extends to cover whole societies; he wrote,
suppose the conjunction of the sexes to be established in nature, a family immediately arises and particular rules being found requisite for its subsistence, these are immediately embraced; though without comprehending the rest of mankind within their prescriptions. Suppose that several families unite together into one society, which is totally disjoined from all others, the rules, which preserve peace and order, enlarge themselves to the utmost extent of that society; but becoming then entirely useless, lose their force when carried one step further. But again suppose, that several distinct societies maintain a kind of intercourse for mutual convenience and advantage, the boundaries of justice still grow larger, in proportion to the largeness of men’s views, and the force of their mutual connexions. History, experience, reason sufficiently instruct us in this natural progress of human sentiments, and in the gradual enlargement of our regards to justice, in proportion as we become acquainted with the extensive utility of that virtue.

*(Hume, 1751/2018, p.20)*

He went on to infer, a little more succinctly, that reciprocity evolved because it benefits each party to an exchange; that two men pull the oars of a boat by common convention for common interest, without any promise or contract .... Whatever is advantageous to two or more persons, if all perform their part, but what loses all advantage if only one perform, can arise from no other principle. There would otherwise be no motive for any one of them to enter into that scheme of conduct.

*(Hume, 1751/2018, p.103)*

Assuming that reciprocity is a fundamental motivator of human behaviour does not negate the possibility that the other motivations, particularly the more selfishly egoistic driver, can in some circumstances crowd out the notion of give and take for one of take and take some more, which could ultimately be detrimental to the group and the individuals of whom it is comprised. Thus, we might conclude that in hunter-gatherer societies (and perhaps before), reciprocity...
evolved for the good of the group and its individual members, but that as societies grew and became more atomised, opportunities were in turn furthered for the egoistically inclined to act upon their motivations with less fear of being observed. Thus, a form of social contract, manifested in most of the world’s major religious codes and embedded in laws, became necessary to reinforce the socially beneficial norm of (positive and negative) reciprocity. Hume acknowledged the strengthening effect of laws on civility, believing that even in his day the modern administration of government had attained a very advanced state of ‘humanity, clemency, order, tranquillity, and the other social virtues’ that, he claimed, would have amazed the ancient Greeks (Hume, 1751/2018 , p.68).

Since the focus of this book is to offer a new political economy of behavioural public policy, I will at this point offer some thoughts on how particular evolutionary explanations of the two forms of self-interest considered – i.e. egoistic and enlightened self-interest – might relate to perhaps the most important implication of prospect theory, inarguably the most influential behavioural economic theory that has thus far been developed. The influence of prospect theory includes it having had a prominent role in the development of behavioural public policy, and it is typically held by behavioural economists that this theory predicts that humans are systematically biased in their decision-making. However, these predicted behaviours, which are sometimes observed, may be deemed perfectly reasonable when considered in the contexts in which they likely evolved.

SCARCITY, ABUNDANCE AND REFLECTION

In times of extreme scarcity and shortages, it may be rational to be an egoist.⁹ Indeed, your very survival could depend on it. In his study of the Netsilik Inuit people of Northern Canada, Boehm (2012, p.219) acknowledges as such when he writes that the ‘capacity to make strategic decisions . . . enabled people like the hungry Netsilik to reject their own customary sharing practices when food became so scarce that trusting in a long-term system of indirect reciprocity became life
threatening. At that point, the group social control that kept such systems going would simply fade away.' With food that scarce, one can either choose between being an egoist and face a chance of starving, or being a reciprocator and definitely starve. Commenting on native Americans a little further south, de Tocqueville contended that they were often forced into egoism due to scarcity induced by the encroachment of Europeans:

The Indians, who had previously lived in a sort of abundance, then find it difficult to subsist, and still more difficult to procure the articles of barter that they stand in need of . . . . At length they are compelled to . . . . It is impossible to conceive the frightful sufferings that attend these forced migrations . . . . Hunger is in the rear, war awaits them, and misery besets them on all sides. To escape from so many enemies, they separate, and each individual endeavours to procure secretly the means of supporting his existence by isolating himself, living in the immensity of the desert like an outcast in civilised society. The social tie, which distress had long since weakened, is then dissolved.


Thus, when want is widespread, people are perhaps driven by necessity to behave in ways that mirror individual selection; that is, they are fully focused on their own survival in the moment. On the flip side, if everything that is desired is so abundant that most people could easily satisfy the majority of their desires via their own efforts, perhaps egoism would also dominate, because there would be little need to cooperate and reciprocate. However, it is probably reasonable to assume that most people, the majority of the time, face neither extreme scarcity nor enjoy unlimited abundance in either hunter-gatherer or modern societies. It is somewhere between these extremes, where cooperation may best serve people’s interests, that is the more common circumstance.

To see how these contextual motivations might relate to modern behavioural economic theory, let us turn, as promised, to
prospect theory – developed by the psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Prospect theory essentially makes two principal modifications to the standard theory of rational choice (i.e. von Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility theory): first, rather than final assets, the subjective carriers of value are assumed to be gains and losses around a “reference point” – with the reference point generally assumed to be the status quo, the accustomed position, the most likely or expected outcome, or the aspiration level – and with losses weighted roughly twice as much as gains of the same magnitude (which implies loss aversion); and second, it is assumed that probabilities are subjectively weighted, such that low probabilities are overweighted and high probabilities are underweighted, rather than processed in their objective mathematical form. Tversky and Kahneman (1992, p.306) state that the ‘most distinctive implication of prospect theory is the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes’ known as the reflection effect. Note the significance of this effect as the most distinctive implication of the most influential alternative to the dominant economic theory of rational choice. The fourfold pattern of risk attitudes is summarised in Table 1.1.

The top left quadrant in Table 1.1 summarises the prospect theory risk attitude prediction when a person is faced with a large probability of a gain – for example, a 0.99 chance of winning £1,000 and a 0.01 chance of winning nothing. If an individual is offered a choice between this risky option and the certainty of its expected value of £990 (i.e. 0.99*1,000), prospect theory predicts that the

<table>
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<th>Gain State</th>
<th>Loss State</th>
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<td><strong>High Probability</strong></td>
<td><strong>Low Probability</strong></td>
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<td>(The Certainty Effect)</td>
<td>(The Possibility Effect)</td>
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<td>Fear of Missing Gain</td>
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<td>Risk Aversion</td>
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<td>Hope to Avoid Loss</td>
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Table 1.1 The reflection effect
individual will place a high weight on the certainty, will reject the risky option and will thus display risk aversion.\textsuperscript{11} The bottom left quadrant summarises the predicted risk attitude when a person is faced with a small probability of a gain, such as a 0.01 chance of winning £1,000 and a 0.99 chance of winning nothing. Here, prospect theory predicts that the individual will overweight the chance of winning, would thus prefer the gamble over its expected value of £10 (i.e. 0.01*1,000), and will therefore be risk seeking. The top and bottom right quadrants of Table 1.1 can be read similarly, and show that prospect theory predicts opposing risk attitudes for losses as compared to gains in both large and small probability scenarios.\textsuperscript{12} That the predicted risk attitudes are apparently reflected across gains and losses for both high and low probabilities gives the reflection effect its name; this fourfold pattern of risk attitudes contrasts with that of universal mild risk aversion or risk neutrality predicted by standard rational choice theory.

Tversky and Kahneman (1992) provided some empirical support for the full fourfold pattern of risk attitudes, but perhaps strangely given the import of the reflection effect to modern behavioural economic theory, controlled testing of the full effect is quite scarce. Moreover, the evidence that has been gathered is somewhat mixed, with support seemingly to some extent dependent on the magnitude of the outcomes used (see Oliver, 2018, and the references therein). There are several possible explanations for why this evidence is mixed. For example, perhaps the methods used by researchers are not always entirely fit for purpose, or it could be the case that the data is not always analysed appropriately. Or perhaps prospect theory, like the standard theory of rational choice, in assuming that people will assess a risky option by somewhat mechanistically weighting the subjective value of its outcomes with their associated (weighted or unweighted) probabilities, does not fully describe the processes that have evolved to help humans deal with uncertainty.

Anatomically modern humans emerged 200,000 years ago and hunter-gathering was the dominant form of social organisation until
the development of agriculture about 12,000 years ago. The consideration of well-defined probabilities, used in games of chance, stretches back only a few centuries, although through the avenues of formal education and pastimes such as gambling on sporting outcomes, a widespread exposure to well-defined probabilities is more recent than that. It is thus plausible that the way in which humans deal with uncertain events now is still influenced heavily by the processes that evolved to help our hunter-gatherer ancestors (and their predecessors) deal with uncertainty in their search for food (and sexual partners), which are likely to have been driven by perceptions of frequency of success, based on recent experience, and by magnitude of outcome.

If food was considered to be relatively abundant due to high rates of recent success and sizable prey, it is likely that hunters would be less inclined to take risks to secure food than if it was relatively scarce simply because they did not need to in order to satisfy their immediate needs. Their focus may well have been on securing sufficient food to sustain themselves over the relative short term, rather than the maximisation of expected value. If the likelihood of securing a good catch was high but still involved an element of risk, such a pursuit would implicitly have a high expected value; however, there would still be a chance of failure, which could have catastrophic consequences. An alternative strategy that promised a less impressive but still sufficient catch but with less or no risk attached to it may well have had a lower expected value (in terms of calorific content, perhaps), but if it had a higher chance of sustaining life by guaranteeing sustenance, it would be a sensible strategy to pursue, particularly in the absence of any facility for the long-term storage of meat.

Conversely, if food was thought to be scarce due to infrequent recent hunting successes and modest prey, then without taking risks people may have realised that there would be an insufficient catch to sustain them. In this circumstance, the expected value of a risky hunting expedition would equate to a very modest, possibly worthless, catch. Although the hunters would not have calculated the
expected value of the hunt with any degree of accuracy, they would have had to have been guaranteed a haul very much greater than the expected value in order to feel that the guarantee is sufficient to offset the risk. Implicitly, through necessity, they would have been driven to seek risk.

The two scenarios just described – i.e. high and low frequencies of success, signalling relative abundance and scarcity – respectively mirror the top and bottom left quadrants of Table 1.1, where probability serves as a proxy for prior frequency of success. With decent sized (but not enormous) gains a possibility, there seems to be reasonable evolutionary – natural selection – explanations for why people may implicitly display the risk attitudes predicted by prospect theory.17 But what about the right-hand quadrants that focus on potential losses?

Let us first consider the top right-hand quadrant – a high probability of a loss, implying, in an evolutionary sense, a high frequency of recent losses, in turn implying relative scarcity. It seems unlikely that our hunter-gatherer ancestors would have ventured out on a hunt when the best possible outcome was to catch nothing at all, and thus we can assume that it may seem quite unnatural for people to consider a gamble that offers only a chance of an absolute loss and a corresponding chance of nothing. In such circumstances, the reference point that people adopt might be their aspiration level rather than the status quo, and indeed hunter-gatherers may have viewed any game caught that did not reach something a little above their subsistence requirements (i.e. their minimum aspiration level of a comfortable amount of food) not as a gain, but as a loss. If potential losses in this scenario are interpreted as such, one may take the view that the only thing that can offer salvation is the small chance of meeting subsistence requirements – or, at any rate, that a guaranteed loss that is anything close to the expected loss of the gamble is unhelpful for survival. If this reasoning is correct, then the analogue of a high probability loss is not a high probability gain, as is generally assumed under prospect theory; rather, it is a low probability gain, and
a similar attitude of risk seeking, inconsistent with the predictions of standard rational choice theory, is expected.

This just leaves the low probability of a loss in the bottom right-hand quadrant, which if one’s aspiration level is again the reference point, might imply relative abundance. That is, there is only a small chance that the hunter-gatherer will not secure his aspiration of a comfortable amount of food; but there is a chance nonetheless, and if it does come to pass it could spell disaster. In such a situation one may be willing to sacrifice an amount that is somewhat higher than the small expected loss of the risky option in order to guarantee the avoidance of catastrophe (but the sacrifice would still be small, and thus one would be trading off only a small proportion of one’s aspiration level, which is manageable). \(^{18}\) In effect, we would see implied risk aversion in this standard insurance scenario, a situation that parallels, with a consistent risk attitude, the high probability gain in the top left quadrant. Here, the analogue of the low probability loss is therefore not a low probability gain; it is a high probability gain, with expected implied risk aversion that is consistent with the predictions of both standard rational choice theory and prospect theory.

If the above interpretations are correct, then when potential outcomes are decent but not enormous, people will out of necessity act in a way that implies greater risk seeking in circumstances of relative scarcity than those of relative abundance. When food was relatively abundant (or at least not extremely scarce) but not guaranteed, people may have evolved strategies where they were willing to give up some of their catch when they were fortunate in the expectation that those they shared with would reciprocate when their fortunes were reversed, which is, as alluded to in endnote 16, in essence a risk-averse insurance strategy that ensures stable sustenance (and is essentially Boehm’s (2012) explanation for the origin of reciprocity mentioned earlier). When food was very scarce with a low frequency of a successful catch, on the other hand, then unless the catch is very large, people might not be in a position to share any of it; they may need the entire catch just to survive, and thus they may be forced to
continue to take risks, to be egoistic and hope to survive until a period of relative abundance returns.¹⁹

To sum up, when resources are limited, as they invariably are, but we are not in desperate need, we tend to share in order to increase our individual security. This cooperation – these reciprocal actions – mitigate the misfortune that we might experience if we relied entirely on ourselves. Negative reciprocity – the threat and act of punishment – at least in part emerged to crowd in expected positive reciprocity among those who might otherwise transgress, and thus inevitably places constraints on the freedoms of those who are egoistically inclined. In short and to reiterate from the Introduction to this book, to protect freedom and security in general, some specific freedoms must be constrained.

CONSTRAINING FREEDOM

As aforementioned, it is my contention in this book that in most circumstances an evolved sense of long-term self-interest is good for most – perhaps all – people in a society. The political economy of behavioural public policy that I will propose calls for a nurturing of these reciprocal instincts, which, if undertaken with care, may help people in the pursuit of their privately held goals in life, whatever those goals might be, and may facilitate the public sector in meeting its predetermined broadly agreed-upon objectives. Thus, the argument will be that the general environment and our institutions and policies should be shaped so as to crowd in the beneficial effects of reciprocity. So long as the general structures of society are conducive to cooperative behaviours, there is, I maintain, no call for policies that interfere too much in the choices that people make, so long as those choices are not harming others; if you allow people to be free, most have the [evolved] mental apparatus to seek and find practices of mutual benefit without the hands-on involvement of third parties who claim to know better.²⁰

That said, great freedom, without any counteracting measures, does of course offer a lot of scope for the egoistically inclined to act
upon their motives, and can indeed serve those people very well, certainly in the short term, but also in the long term if their behaviours go undetected and/or unpunished and do not fundamentally damage the groups to which they belong. Hume believed that being seduced as such was more often caused by weakness than by malicious intentions. He commented that:

Some extraordinary circumstances may happen, in which a man finds his interests to be more promoted by fraud or rapine, than hurt by the breach which his injustice makes in the social union. But much more frequently, he is seduced from his great and important, but distant interests, by the allurement of present, though often very frivolous temptations. This great weakness is incurable in human nature.

(Hume, 1777/2018, p.151)

Whether fraudulent or frivolous (or both, or neither), egoistic actions have the potential to harm the wider group.21 Consequently, Hume, like his friend Adam Smith, saw the threat of negative reciprocity as vital in sustaining justice and in holding society together, maintaining that ‘[m]en must ... institute some persons ... whose peculiar office it is ... to punish transgressors, to correct fraud and violence, and to oblige men, however reluctant, to consult their own real and permanent interests’ [Hume, 1777/2018, p. 151]. Hume ultimately felt that despite our inclination to act reciprocally, there could be no civilised society without laws, magistrates and judges, serving to discourage egoists from manipulating, coercing, exploiting or otherwise harming others.22

Ludwig von Mises, a doyen of the Austrian School of Economics, a group of thinkers who are associated with free market liberalism, also saw the threat of negative reciprocity as foundational to the proper functioning of society. ‘The liberal understands quite clearly’, he wrote,

that without resort to compulsion, the existence of society would be endangered and that behind the rules of conduct whose observance is necessary to assure peaceful human cooperation must
stand the threat of force if the whole edifice of society is not to be continually at the mercy of any one of its members. One must be in a position to compel the person who will not respect the lives, health, personal freedom, or private property of others to acquiesce in the rules of life in society. This is the function that the liberal doctrine assigns the state: the protection of property, liberty, and peace.

(von Mises, 1927/2005, p.17)

On this, von Mises is close to Mill’s famous harm principle, which states

that the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise.

(Mill, 1859/1969, pp.12–13)

The contention in this book is that nor are these good reasons for manipulating him. In his introduction to Mill’s book, the philosopher Isaiah Berlin wrote that ‘[m]en want to curtail the liberties of other men, either (a) because they wish to impose their power on others; or (b) because they want conformity . . . or, finally, (c) because they believe that to the question of how one should live there can be . . . one true answer and one only’ (Berlin, 1969, p.xviii). From a behavioural public policy perspective, I will argue that there is a further reason for curtailing liberties: that is, to prevent those who might [often implicitly] use the instruments of behavioural science [for example, the phenomena embedded within, and the implications of, prospect theory, that I have argued are consistent with behaviours
that may have evolved for good reasons in other circumstances), typically by distorting the exchange relationship, to benefit themselves and impose unreasonable harms on others.24

Thus, in sum (and, for emphasis, to once again repeat from the Introduction), the political economy of behavioural public policy that I will propose as the most appropriate way forward for this still relatively new field of analysis is one that respects freedom over actions that do not negatively affect others, but that nurtures reciprocity, both in its positive form in order to better equip people in the pursuit of privately held and policy-related objectives, and in its negative form in justifying regulation against behavioural-informed harms. It is, I argue, an approach that sits firmly within the liberal tradition. Of course, not everyone will agree with my direction of travel, and thus before developing my arguments further, it is I think necessary to at least acknowledge some of the other possible routes.

FOOD FOR THOUGHT

1. Do we reciprocate mostly to benefit others or ourselves?
2. When might it be necessary to be an egoist, and when might it be sensible not to be?
3. Is negative reciprocity essential to the proper functioning of society?