WEAVING ELEMENTAL GARMENTS: PROCLUS ON CIRCE (COMMENTARY ON THE CRATYLUS §53, 22.8–9)

Abstract In the Commentary on the Cratylus, Proclus puts forward an original but largely ignored interpretation of Circe as weaving life in τῷ τετραστοίχῳ. This paper argues that τὸ τετράστοιχον refers not to the four genera but to the four elements. Thus what the enchantress weaves are the elemental garments that weigh the soul down to the earthly realm of mortals.

1 The text is that of G. Pasquali, Procli Diadochi in Platonis Cratylum commentaria (Leipzig, 1908)  Although this paper argues that Tochtermann is right to impugn the accuracy of the LSJ rendition, her characterization of τὸ τετράστοιχον as a hapax legomenon needs qualification, since the term is used by Proclus twice more in the Commentary on the Timaeus (2.268.6-7 and 2.268.9). 5 Unsurprisingly, here again scholars are divided about the appropriate translation. Thomas Taylor renders it as 'the four elements'. 6 André-Jean Festugière, on the other hand, suggests, on the basis of In Cra. §53, 22.9, 'les quatre classes de vivants'. 7 Finally, Dirk Baltzly, in the most recent translation, makes a strong case for 'the four elements '. 8 In what follows, it will be proposed that the same applies to the Commentary on the Cratylus, since Proclus' allegoresis of Circe sits much better with the four-elements interpretation than with the four-genera reading. Let us first provide the context.
is participated in by all the gods in the cosmos (for the one Demiurge bids the young demiurges to interweave the mortal form of life with the immortal), and is completed among the gods presiding over generation, amidst whom there is Homer's Circe, who weaves all of life in τῷ τετραστοίχῳ and at the same time makes the region under the moon harmonious with [her magic] songs. 9 Among these weavers, then, also Circe is included by the theologians, indeed, the golden [one], as they say, thus indicating her intellectual and immaculate essence, both immaterial and unmingled with generation, as well as her task [which is] to discriminate the things at rest from those in motion, and to separate [them] according to divine difference. 5 The text is that of E. Diehl, Procli Diadochi in Platonis Timaeum commentaria, 3 vols. (Leipzig, 1903-6)  , 312 with n. 1. Again though, the former instance is rendered as 'les quatre classes de vivants', whereas the latter as 'l'ordre quadruple des vivants'. 8 Baltzly (n. 5), 257 n. 552: 'If the four genera of living creatures are at issue, how is the size of the sublunary area relative to the whole cosmos relevant? Moreover, one genus of the four is found throughout the cosmos-the visible heavenly gods.' The scholar compellingly argues that τὸ τετράστοιχον refers to the four elements, as Proclus seeks to dispel a Peripatetic's doubts. 9 It is probable, as Abbate (n. 3), 587 n. 224 points out, that here the general term ᾠδή has the same meaning as ἐπῳδός.
This ingenious allegoresis of Circe enables Proclus not only to buttress his interpretation of Plato's dialogue with the authority of Homer but also to illustrate an important assumption of Neoplatonic metaphysics with the poet's beautiful and suggestive image of the enchantress. Circe is, then, deciphered as an encosmic deity who rules over the realm of coming to be and passing away, distributes life there and arranges the sublunary sphere into a harmonious whole. The sorceress is referred to as 'golden', 10 because her nature remains undefiled by the contact with the material world even as she braids the eternal with the perishable.
While Proclus skilfully adapts the figure of Circe to the framework of his theology, her inclusion might have been prompted by the example in the lemma on which he comments: at Cra. 389b1-7 Socrates examines the problem of the intelligible Forms of artefacts, which he illustrates with the case of a 'shuttle' (κερκίς). 11 Given that the etymological connection between κερκίς and Circe appears (s.v. Κίρκη) in the Suda, the Etymologicum Gudianum and the Etymologicum Magnum, the association must have been quite natural for Proclus. 12 This helps explain why he refers to a deity absent from the Platonic dialogue that he investigates. 13 Before we address the difficult question 'in what Circe weaves all of life', we have to briefly touch upon the thorny issue of the originality of Proclus' account of the enchantress.
By far the most popular Circe episode with ancient allegorists is the transformation of Odysseus' companions and the hero's miraculous resistance (Od. 10.233-335). 14 Proclus himself adduces this episode in his Commentary on the First Alcibiades. 12 See Tochtermann (n. 4), 84 n. 29. Duvick (n. 1), 127 n. 125, on the other hand, points to κερκίζειν, which, naturally, also appears frequently in the Cratylus (e.g. 387e1, 388a4, 389a8). 13 The Commentary on the Cratylus is different from Proclus' other commentaries in that it has come down to us in the form of 'useful extracts' (ἐκλογαὶ χρήσιμοι) from Proclus' 'scholia' (σχόλια) on Plato's Cratylus (see the manuscripts' title). While the commentary is thus a series of excerpts taken from the notes on Proclus' lecture, the identity of the student/compiler remains unknown (see e.g. Pasquali  As he clarifies that embodiment is by no means natural to souls (256.10-257.9), Proclus quotes Od. 10.326 to illustrate that souls 'clothed' (ἠμφιεσμέναι) in bodies which nevertheless strive to live an immaterial life in the world of generation 'have drunk this potion but not been charmed'. 16 Subsequently, Proclus puts forward an allegorical interpretation which presents (257.10-258.3) Circe as responsible for the realm of the earthly and for the transmigration of the souls. 17 What is the relation between this account of the enchantress and the account Proclus offers in the Commentary on the Cratylus?
Scholars have variously answered this difficult question. Félix Buffière emphasizes the affinity between the two accounts. 18 So does Erich Kaiser. 19 But Sibylle Tochtermann stresses that the 'Tenor' between the two interpretations is quite different. 20 Undeniably, there is a correspondence between the two accounts, since in both cases Proclus assigns to Circe the realm of the earthly, that is, the world of becoming (In Alc. 257.13-14, In Cra. §53, 22.7-8). Thus in both commentaries the implication is that the soul's descent into generation and its imprisonment in the body are as abominable as the transformation of Odysseus' men into animals. Yet in the Commentary on the Cratylus the sorceress is not so much in charge of the cycle of metempsychosis but rather in charge of the cosmic weaving. Thus Proclus alludes here specifically to Od. 10.220-3, where Odysseus' comrades arrive at Circe's palace, hear the enchantress' beautiful singing and see her great 'imperishable' (ἄμβροτος) web, which they immediately recognize as the work of a goddess. Tochtermann rightly observes that the moral dimension of Proclus' allegoresis is not that conspicuous in the Commentary on the Cratylus. At the same time, however, she overemphasizes the difference between the two accounts. If we seek to ascertain in what Circe weaves all of life, it is more fruitful to treat the two accounts as complementary and to read them in light of Proclus' Commentary on the Timaeus, the only other work by Proclus where τὸ τετράστοιχον appears. 16 Proclus quotes (In Alc. 257.9) Homer faithfully but with πῶς instead of ὡς. In his allegoresis, he equates (257.10) Circe's drugs with 'oblivion' (λήθη), 'error' (πλάνη) and 'ignorance' (ἄγνοια), on which see further P. Lévêque, Aurea Catena Homeri: une étude sur l'allégorie grecque (Paris, 1959), 37 n. 1; Courcelle (n. 4), 29; and Tochtermann (n. 4), 82. 17 Proclus also combines the topic of the metamorphoses caused by the sorceress with a reference to the Platonic notion of 'dissimilarity' (ἀνομοιότης). However, Proclus speaks here (In Alc. 257.11) of the 'region of unlikeness' (ἀνομοιότητος τόπος), whereas what Plato has (Plt. 273d6-e1) is rather the 'ocean of unlikeness' (ἀνομοιότητος πόντος). While, curiously enough, the latter phrase also appears earlier in the Commentary on the Alcibiades (34.6), a useful discussion of this issue is given by e.g. Courcelle (n. 4), 27-9. The idea that Plato's πόντος is to be interpreted in conjunction with the Odyssey can already be found in Numenius (fr. 33 des Places), on which see M. Domaradzki, 'Of nymphs and sea: Numenius on souls and matter in Homer's Odyssey', G&R 67 (2020), 139-50, at 149. 18 Buffière (n. 4), 557. The scholar does not refer specifically to the Commentary on the Alcibiades, but suggests that Proclus' interpretation of Circe as 'une des divinités qui président à la génération' is consistent with the Pythagorean-Platonic account where she 'diriger la ronde des renaissances' (discussed by him extensively at 500-20 Earlier scholars characterized Proclus' metaphysics as a convoluted and arbitrary development of Plotinus' thought. 21 Laudably, the recent trend in research on the Lycian philosopher has been to seek to do justice to the originality and depth of his thought, as scholars have painstakingly reconstructed Proclus' rich and complex system of divinities. 22 However, Circe's place in the hierarchy has so far received no scholarly attention. Given that the enchantress presides over the realm of γένεσις (In Cra. §53, 22.7-8, In Alc. 257.13-14), her weaving must be of the lower kind. Indeed, in the Commentary on the Cratylus Proclus counts Circe among the deities who complete the weaving in the world of becoming ( §53, 22.7-8). She is, however, preceded by several other weaving deities: the young demiurges (22.4-6), Kore (22.1-3) and Athena (21.21-22.1). This suggests that Circe is a goddess in the series of Athena, whose power passes through the σειρά of Kore before it eventually reaches the sorceress. 23 A detailed investigation of all these weaving deities would take us deep into the maze of Proclus' polytheistic theology. Fascinating as this journey in itself might be, it would distract us from our modest purpose, which is to establish in what Circe weaves all of life. Accordingly, the ensuing discussion will be confined to the young gods, whose weaving is particularly relevant for the question of this paper. 24 When Proclus says (In Cra. §53, 22.4-6) that the one Demiurge orders the young demiurges to weave together the mortal and the immortal, he is referring to Plato, who introduces these νέοι θεοί at Ti. 42d6 to explain the genesis of mortal bodies: the Demiurge hands down the second creation to the young gods because, if he himself had produced the living creatures, they would be immortal (41c2-3). Yet before he passes the task of ζῴων δημιουργία over to his servants (41c4-5), the Demiurge clarifies (41c6-d2) that he had 'sown' (σπείρας) and 'instituted' (ὑπαρξάμενος) the divine part of the ζῷα, which he now delivers to the young gods so that they could weave onto it the mortal and thus generate the ζῷα proper. In his commentary on the dialogue, Proclus explains (In Ti. 3.233.13-234.5) that what the Demiurge 'sows' is the 'soul' (ψυχή), that is, a 'rational principle from rational principles' (λόγος ἐκ λόγων), which he 'institutes' by producing the 'vehicle' (ὄχημα) of the soul and the 'life' (ζωή) contained within it. Most generally, then, the one Demiurge engenders two eternal components of the ζῷα: the rational soul and the first vehicle. Onto 21 In his otherwise very helpful and in many aspects pioneering discussion of Proclus' allegoresis, Friedl (n. 14), 71, for example, passes the following judgement: 'Das in seiner klaren Konstruktion zu einer übersichtlichen Einheit verbundene Gedankengebäude Plotins ist bei Proklos zum Tummelplatz scholastizistischer Distinktionen und Teilungskünste geworden, für die auch das Prinzip der Entwicklung keine innere Begründung mehr geben konnte. these, the young gods weave the mortal, which comprises the irrational soul and the second vehicle. More specifically, though, the Demiurge creates the 'highest pinnacles' (ἀκρότητες) of the irrational life and their vehicle (both of which are eternal), whereas the young gods fashion the mortal extension of this irrational life and its perishable vehicle, which connects the immortal vehicle to the individual's material body (3.236.31-237.14). Thus the first vehicle brings about the mortal irrational life in the second vehicle, which then gives rise to the various irrational faculties in the earthly body. 25 Hence if Plato has the Demiurge put every soul into one ὄχημα (Ti. 41e1-2), Proclus differentiates three distinct vehicles of the soul: (1) the first is 'congenital' (συμφυές), 26 lasts forever and makes the soul encosmic; (2) the second is 'pneumatic' (πνευματικόν), 27 makes the soul a 'citizen of generation' (γενέσεως πολῖτις), precedes and survives the body but is eventually jettisoned; and (3) the third is 'shell-like' (ὀστρεῶδες), 28 makes the soul chthonic and endures only for the time of an individual life upon earth, since it changes with each rebirth. 29 Only the first indissoluble vehicle is engendered by the one Demiurge, whereas the two perishable ones are woven onto the first one by the young gods. Now, in the Commentary on the Cratylus Proclus specifies ( §53, 22.7-8) that the weaving performed by the young demiurges is brought to an end by Circe and other deities in charge of generation. How could the enchantress' weaving in τῷ τετραστοίχῳ be related to that of the young gods?
According to Plato (Ti. 42c4-d2), release from the cycle of reincarnation is only possible when reason triumphs over the 'troublesome mass' (πολὺς ὄχλος) which (1) has adhered to the soul 'of fire, water, air and earth' (ἐκ πυρὸς καὶ ὕδατος καὶ ἀέρος καὶ γῆς), and which (2) is further characterized as 'turbulent' (θορυβώδης) as well as 'irrational' (ἄλογος). When commenting on this difficult lemma, Proclus explains (In Ti. 3.297.21-3) that 'souls descending to earth take on from the elements one type of garments after another: airy, watery, earthy' (εἰς γῆν κατιοῦσαι γὰρ αἱ ψυχαὶ προσλαμβάνουσιν ἀπὸ τῶν στοιχείων ἄλλους καὶ ἄλλους χιτῶνας, ἀερίους ἐνυδρίους χθονίους). 30 Proclus thus equates Plato's troublesome mass of the four elements with 'the second vehicle (δεύτερον ὄχημα) and the life (ζωή) within it'. 31 While this pneumatic vehicle forms around the soul during its descent through the celestial spheres, it weathers through the round of rebirths until the soul cleanses itself of its irrationality. Yet although the second vehicle precedes and survives the body, its formation overlaps with that of the third vehicle. 32 Most importantly, however, the Commentary on the Timaeus makes it clear (3.320.14-15) that both the body and the pneumatic vehicle are made of the four elements. Indeed, Proclus states in no uncertain terms (3.320.18-26) that the two perishable vehicles differ primarily in the variety of their garments, for the organic body is not 'merely a complex of simple (ἐκ τῶν ἁπλῶν) elements but also of homoiomerous (ἐκ τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν) ones'. 33 Proclus makes interesting use of the Anaxagorean notion of homoiomeries 34 to show that, while the second and the third vehicles are obviously not identical, they are nevertheless both aggregates of the four elements. The crucial difference is that the shell-like vehicle forms through the accretion of additional elemental vestures.
The above account of incarnation could be corroborated by many passages of Proclus, but suffice it to cite here the Elements of Theology. 35 In this work, the soul's vehicle is also said ( §209, 182.16-17) to descend 'by the addition of garments increasingly material' (προσθέσει χιτώνων ἐνυλοτέρων) and the descent itself is likewise presented (182.19-20) as being due to the soul's 'acquisition of irrational lives' (ἀλόγους προσλαβοῦσα ζωάς). This is consistent with what Proclus says in the Commentary on the Timaeus. As a matter of fact, in his groundbreaking edition, E.R. Dodds points precisely to In Ti. 3.298.1, where the soul's second vehicle is ἐκ παντοδαπῶν χιτώνων συγκείμενον, which means-as the scholar acutely observesthat 'it consists of successive layers of the four elements, which are successively attached to the immortal vehicle in the course of the soul's descent'. 36 Hence the 32 As Opsomer (n. 25), 151 points out: 'Weder das pneumatische Fahrzeug noch der irdische Körper noch die mit ihnen verbundenen Lebensfunktionen bilden sich spontan. Im Timaios überschneiden sich hier zwei Beschreibungstypen: Einerseits erwerben die Seelen selbst ihre Körper und niederen Lebensfunktionen und gestalten diese selbst; bei ihrem Abstieg beispielsweise kleiden sie sich in übereinander gelagerte Schichten der vier Elemente-die so genannten Hüllen (χιτῶνες), die materieller werden, je tiefer die Seelen absinken. Andererseits sind es die jungen Götter, die sich um die Schöpfung des Sterblichen kümmern und die den Körper und die irrationale Seelengestalt anfertigen.' 33 Proclus makes the same point at In Ti. 3.321.1-7, where he clarifies that the young gods create the vehicles for the irrational souls (i.e. Plato's troublesome mass) by taking 'the simple' (τὰ ἁπλᾶ) elements, which they then 'glue together' (κολλῶντες) to thus generate 'the homoiomeries' (τὰ ὁμοιομερῆ), whose composition is therefore also 'from the four elements' (ἐκ τῶν τεττάρων στοιχείων). 34 2017), 122-38 have criticized Dodds's statement as misleading on the grounds that the pneumatic vehicle 'is made from the ethereal envelopes of the planetary bodies (which are, of course ethereal, not material)' (138 n. 40). However, In Ti. 3.320.14-321.7 (discussed above) Proclus specifies that both the body and the second vehicle are established ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων. Furthermore, as Ramelli (n. 29), 116 n. 71 notes, Proclus often uses the term ἄϋλος in a relative sense, that is, 'not meaning without matter or body in an absolute sense, but as compared with heavy earthly bodies'. Given its intermediary status between the first immaterial vehicle and the third material one, the pneumatic vehicle should be seen as a transitional stage between the two extremes.