

that many early Republican historians were doing, sifting through historical materials to write a narrative of Turkishness and identity that was indebted to neither the Ottomans nor to Sunni Islam, so that a new future could be possible.

Dole's work is thus an intimate account of a pervasive structure of loss, enabled by and embedded in Turkish secularism's politics of aesthetics. Dole is careful to state that he is not arguing that Republican reform involved the loss of what was "authentic" in people's subjectivities and in their relationships with one another and to themselves. But it did, he reminds us, involve changes that many people experienced as loss: for example, people would no longer relate to themselves in the same ways (through the same categories, in terms of the same options, etc.); they also would no longer relate to their past in the same ways—in a short time the reading of written documents from that past became very difficult for most people, while practices of commemoration and visitation became restricted. The "positive" Republican project sought to modernize institutions, knowledges, worldviews, and lifestyles, and did so by (deliberately or not) undermining inherited models of social authority, habits of thought, and forms of social relatedness. While the passing of time can always be conceived and experienced as "loss," Dole argues that Turkey's secular modernity has a particular—not inherently "good" or "bad," but particular—structure of loss built into it, especially visible through attention to its Republican politics of aesthetics. It is this structure, Dole argues, that has created spaces in which healers exist and people seek them out, and we have a much better understanding of both thanks to his work. The book ends with a useful appendix of brief descriptions of popular genres of healing in Turkey.

LAURENT BONNEFOY, *Salafism in Yemen: Transnationalism and Religious Identity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). Pp. 336. \$60.00 cloth.

REVIEWED BY BERNARD HAYKEL, Department of Near Eastern Studies, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J.; e-mail: haykel@princeton.edu
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The volume under review is a translated study from the original French on Salafism in modern Yemen since the 1970s. The study centers on the question of whether Salafism's presence in Yemen is the result of Saudi Arabia's policies of exporting its brand of Islam. The author, a political scientist, unequivocally answers that Salafism is not a Saudi export, but rather a product of complex domestic and transnational dynamics proper to Yemen itself, and cannot be captured by the official politics of state governments.

The author relies on a variety of sources to make his case: extensive fieldwork research and interviews as well as detailed analysis of texts and audiorecordings by various Salafis, many of which are polemical and center on issues of law and theology. And while in Yemen, as elsewhere, there are three types of Salafis (the quietists, the politically organized activists, and the militant jihadis), Bonnefoy's focus falls on the quietist branch and its principal ideologue, the late Shaykh Muqbil bin Hadi al-Wadi'i (d. 2001). Al-Wadi'i, a Yemeni of tribal origin, had spent time working and studying in Saudi Arabia and got caught up in the wave of arrests that followed Juhayman al-'Utaybi's seizure of the Great Mosque in Mecca in November 1979. After his release he returned to Yemen and founded the country's most important Salafi teaching center in his home village of Dammaj, not far from the Saudi border. From here his network of students spread Salafism's teachings throughout the country, but not without splits and factions emerging in due course over questions of leadership, which were often framed as differences about proper belief and practice. It is the process of Salafism becoming rooted in Yemen's religious, social, and political scene, as

well as the multiple debates and entanglements that it engendered, that Bonnefoy addresses quite ably in this book.

The study is divided into three broad sections: the first presents Salafi doctrine and practice; the second the transnational relations that Salafis maintain beyond Yemen's borders; and the third how Salafism became embedded in Yemen's political life. In denying the influence of Saudi Arabia's official proselytizing efforts, Bonnefoy makes the important point that al-Wadi'i was for at least a decade after his arrival in Yemen openly opposed to the Saudi political system. Nonetheless he also highlights the ideological affinities that al-Wadi'i shared with a number of the leading Salafi scholars in the kingdom, most notably that all social and political associations (*hizbiyya*) were to be considered forbidden and constituted unbelief (*kufir*) because these divided the community of believers (*umma*) into factions. However, Bonnefoy correctly describes Salafism in Yemen as having a complex and ambivalent relationship with Saudi Arabia, one not driven exclusively by either elite scholarly connections or state-centered relations.

Despite focusing on religious doctrine in the first part of the book, Bonnefoy eschews the idea that Salafism can be understood through a study of creedal beliefs. Instead, he presents it as a set of practices that are informed by local context, individual agency, and other factors, such as commerce, migration, and informal interactions often taking place at the subnational as well as the global levels. He also asserts that Salafism's emphasis on "the individualization of identities" and its low level of institutionalization mean that it can readily adapt to local contexts. In what is perhaps the best chapter of the book (Chapter 5), the author takes us to the one field site he researched outside the capital Sana'a. This takes place in the Education Faculty of the village of Lab'us in Yafi', a southern region that was once part of the communist People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. What Bonnefoy discovers here is that the Salafis were able to dominate this institution not due to factors related to Saudi sponsorship or even the dictates of the national Salafi leadership but rather because Salafis were able to set the terms of debate on parochial matters. For example, they advocated that the consumption of Qat as well as the French chicken that was being served at the Education Faculty was un-Islamic (not halal). They also had charismatic leaders able to connect to the locals who had spent time as labor migrants in Saudi Arabia. And finally, the Salafis were able to take advantage of the local religious revival that followed after the long period of communist rule. In this context, Salafism had become fashionable, a subculture of sorts, so that many young people wanted to join the movement.

In the last chapters, Bonnefoy shows how the Salafis indigenize their movement by engaging with local Yemeni issues such as the division in the social hierarchy between the descendants of the Prophet Muhammad (*sayyids*) and tribesmen, which they condemn as nefarious. They also attack in polemical fashion the Zaydi sect, the Sufis, as well as the secular forces, such as the Socialists. In the final stage under study, which corresponds to the period after the 9/11 attacks, Salafis transform into local political actors because they are co-opted by the government of President 'Ali Saleh in his struggles against the Muslim Brotherhood, the Huthi Zaydis, as well as the local branch of al-Qa'ida. And in so becoming, Bonnefoy states that one must understand "Salafism [as] a social, political and religious practice that is ever changing" (p. 283), and therefore not as an instrument of Saudi foreign policy.

It is undeniable that Salafis adapt to whatever local context in which they find themselves, but this does not mean that they abandon their distinctive beliefs and practices or that these do not have an effect on their social and political activities. The confusion over what constitutes Salafism and the extent to which one can attribute an influence to their beliefs arises because Salafis are fragmented when it comes to questions of law and politics. On matters of creed, however, they are relatively homogenous, and this manifests itself most clearly when it comes to the condemnation of fellow Muslims who deviate from their creedal beliefs, such as Sufis, Shi'a, and Ash'aris. Furthermore, Salafis are constantly engaged in an effort at purification, delimiting boundaries between what they consider to be the true believers and those who are deviants; this

effort, whether in Yemen or elsewhere, has real social and political effects and these are often similar in a variety of different settings around the globe.

What is most valuable in the study under review is the emphasis on Salafis deriving their ideas and authority from multiple levels: the local, the global, and the transnational. This work, however, could have benefited from better editing and the correction of the multiple errors in transliteration. Finally, Bonnefoy overstates the local and transnational agency of individuals while diminishing the role that state governments play in the politics of religion. As he acknowledges but does not sufficiently emphasize, the republican government in Yemen has been promoting a version of Salafism that has a local genealogy dating back to the 15th century. It has used an array of tools in order to accomplish this (e.g., channeling Saudi funding, legal reform, control of mosques, setting school and university curriculums, etc.) and all with the aim of generating a form of “Yemeni Islam” that would break with Zaydi Shi‘ism. The government claims to rise above the sectarian and legal pluralism that defined the country’s past. This is in fact false because the Yemeni state has promoted its own version of what one might term “Republican Salafism.” Without sufficiently taking account of this state project to define Islam in Yemen, it is impossible to understand, let alone account for, the rise and success of the Salafis described by Bonnefoy. States continue to matter, for better or worse.

STIG JARLE HANSEN, *Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, 2005–2012* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). Pp. 208. \$37.50 cloth.

REVIEWED BY KEN MENKHAUS, Political Science Department, Davidson College, Davidson, N.C.; e-mail: kemenkhaus@davidson.edu
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Some books are important, some are frustrating, and some are both important and frustrating at the same time. Stig Hansen’s recent book on the Somali jihadi group al-Shabab falls into the latter category.

Al-Shabab remains, as of mid-2013, one of the most dangerous jihadi groups in the world. Though the movement is weaker now than in 2008, when it was at its peak, it still possesses the capacity to launch significant terrorist attacks in Somalia and East Africa. Interest in the group soared after its shocking attack on Nairobi’s Westgate Mall in September 2013. As a result, it has attracted a flood of studies and analyses, mainly by counterterrorism experts with limited knowledge of Somalia. However, only a handful of analyses—reports by the International Crisis Group and the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia, and studies produced by analysts with close knowledge of Somalia, such as Roland Marchal, Andre Le Sage, and Matt Bryden—have been able to provide a close, contextually rich assessment of the organization.

In this context, Hansen’s new book is a very welcome contribution to the small literature on a movement that is at once important and yet misunderstood. *Al-Shabaab in Somalia* stands out in several respects: it is the first book-length study of al-Shabab; it is by far the most detailed study of the group; it draws on actual interviews with al-Shabab members; and it is written by a scholar whose deep understanding of Somalia, and fluency in both Somali and Arabic, give him a powerful perch from which to produce a nuanced assessment of the group.

Hansen advances a number of propositions in his study, some more or less conventional, others revisionist. One of the most persistent is the argument that al-Shabab is much stronger and more cohesive than most recent analyses have allowed for. Since 2011, the group’s internal problems have been well documented. It has suffered leadership rivalries, tensions between Somali and