

RECENT RESEARCH ON LATIN AMERICAN URBANIZATION: A SELECTIVE SURVEY WITH COMMENTARY*

Richard M. Morse, Yale University

A COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF RECENT RESEARCH ON LATIN AMERICAN urbanization would be a large task for a team of specialists, particularly if it were to include local as well as comparative studies, the working papers which circulate through government and academic offices, and all the scholarly disciplines which now contribute to the topic. This paper is no more than a sampling of research on selected aspects of urbanization, interlarded with commentary and a bit of opinion. Except for Section 1, emphasis is upon scholarly output of the past five years. Whatever unity the presentation may have springs from the interests of a historian who is less concerned with physical and social engineering than with identifying cultural and institutional imperatives of the past which shape contemporary social process.

Even with these allowances, the paper will be found to encroach—often fleetingly—upon a great many domains: history, planning and architecture, social anthropology, sociology, political science, economics and ecology. If any “integration” occurs, it is produced by the questions raised and not by special skills of the interrogator.

* Revised version of a paper presented at the Conference on International and Comparative Urban Studies in American Higher Education, Rutgers University, June 6–8, 1965. Research was done under the auspices of a Guggenheim Fellowship, a grant from the Social Science Research Council, and a Senior Faculty Fellowship from Yale University.

1. THE ANTECEDENTS

The urbanization of modern Latin America received its initial thrust from the Iberian Peninsula and from the forces that made for European commercial capitalism and overseas expansion. If, however, one considers the urban history of the Latin American land mass, one can argue that its most splendid chapters were furnished by several of the pre-Columbian civilizations.

The fact that Spanish settlers were drawn to the sedentary and densely grouped Indian labor of the Middle and South American highlands made for ecological continuity between the pre- and post-conquest eras. Innumerable settlement sites, from rural villages to the imperial capitals of Tenochtitlán and Cuzco, kept their identity or were rebuilt under the European regime. Although frequently thought of as founded *ex nihilo* by the Spaniards, even Lima has a pre-conquest origin:

At Pizarro's arrival, there was one large center at Maranga, and scattered throughout the valley and hills that bound it were legions of other smaller ones. This structural pattern of one principal center and other secondary units loosely connected around and to it, in radial form, was to last throughout the history of the city, and is to this day characteristic of the area in which the metropolis is located.¹

For large parts of Latin America the urban history from pre-Columbian times to the present is certainly a viable subject. A traumatic break occurs in the 16th century, however, with the mass dislocation of Indian peoples, the replacement of indigenous political and ecclesiastical hierarchies with European, the reorientation of economies to trans-Atlantic trade, and the imposition of European technology and urban forms. Hardoy writes in his recent survey of pre-Columbian cities:

On the ruins and amid disintegration of an age-old heritage the cities of a culture foreign to the continent sprang up within a few decades. This was made necessary by the political, strategic and economic requirements of the conquest. None of the indigenous cities was respected by the conquest or by the colonial administration, and during the first century of independence the governments of the Latin American republics did almost nothing to defend the monuments of the ancient civilizations.²

When we look to the late-medieval Iberian Peninsula we find that two classic city types in Spain were the commercial, manufacturing centers that grew up in the north along the east-west pilgrimage routes to Santiago de Compostela, and the agro-military towns of the central *meseta*, which were primary agents for appropriating lands reconquered from Islam. For León and Castile the 12th century has been called a period of *re población concejil*: ". . . it is

principally the now-important *Concejos* or *Municipios* which occupy the lands, divide them among the settlers, and promote the colonization of untilled fields."³ The pilgrimage towns were akin to the towns of Western Europe's urban, commercial renaissance. The *meseta* towns were the product of political and military factors of the Reconquest. It was by and large the latter which supplied the model for municipal settlement in Spanish America—not simply because colonists from central Spain had a determinant influence on overseas colonization,⁴ but also because the pattern of Spanish New World conquest obeyed forces and circumstances analogous to those of the peninsular Reconquest.

In late-medieval Portugal the representative urban centers were the agro-commercial, maritime towns. They had developed along the seacoast in response to economic possibilities rather than to politico-military design.⁵ The settlement of Brazil by the Portuguese appears to reproduce this pattern. Their principal towns are agro-commercial coastal settlements, modest in size and appearance, generally haphazard or "natural" in layout. Portugal had not Spain's resources for largescale urbanization or widespread settlement of the American hinterland. Unlike the Spaniards, who settled near the sources of Indian labor, the Portuguese recruited their native work force from the interior and brought it to the coastal plantations. Not for two centuries after the discovery of Brazil did mineral strikes cause important displacement of settlers to the interior. The gold rush, moreover, did less to modify than to intensify the "archipelago" pattern of inland colonization. Brazilian settlement has been a leapfrogging process, rather than the systematic advance of a colonizing frontier.⁶ Perhaps it is not too much to say that the recent relocation of the national capital at Brasília has had the effect of creating a new "gold mine" (i.e., of political patronage) in the wilderness, from which development of the hinterland is to flow as a byproduct.

The contrast between the Brazilian and Spanish American city is symbolized in their physical plans. The Spanish chessboard has medieval antecedents; but it reached its classic phase only in the Renaissance, precisely when it was to orient the vast work of urbanization in the New World.⁷ Ricard suggests that "a Spanish American city is a *plaza mayor* surrounded by streets and houses, rather than an assemblage of houses and streets around a *plaza mayor*." He then points out the absence of the *plaza mayor* in the Portuguese tradition. The nearest equivalents are: (1) the *rossio*, an unbuilt, generally communal piece of land without special architectural embellishment which is gradually absorbed into the city center as the urban limits expand; and (2) the *largo*, which "is merely a widening of the street with no elevation of its central area."⁸

Even given these differences between Spanish and Portuguese traditions and the respective strategies of colonization, one may still identify features common to the urban history of colonial Latin America as a whole:

(1) Colonization was in large part an urban venture, carried out by urban-minded people. The municipal nucleus was the point of departure for settlement of the land—unlike the West European city, which represented a movement of economic energies away from agriculture toward processing and distribution.

(2) Despite elaborate regulatory precautions, selection of urban sites was frequently arbitrary, ill-advised, or dictated by momentary considerations. Abandonment or transfer of towns was widespread throughout the colonial period.

(3) Firstcomers tended to preempt lands surrounding a new town (even municipal common lands were often alienated to private persons) and to reserve special privileges for their descendants. An initial moment of social democracy was therefore followed by consolidation of an oligarchy based on land tenure and prior arrival.⁹

(4) In Brazil and much of Spanish America continuity of municipal institutions and processes was threatened by the displacement of city elders to their rural domains. Having radiated energies centrifugally to the land, all but the large commercial or bureaucratic cities tended to become appendages of the country.¹⁰ The substitution of locality groups for kin groups which Weber felt to be so characteristic of the medieval European town often failed to occur in Latin America.¹¹ This meant that the city was not politically differentiated from the country; it was not a "commune" trying to expand its jurisdiction over a rural area.¹² A municipality in fact included rural lands, and there were no interstices between municipal jurisdictions. More typical than the struggle between burgher and feudal groups was the conflict between local rural-urban oligarchies and agents of the royal bureaucracy.¹³

(5) Urban networks developed feebly. Geographic barriers to regional transportation were often formidable, while the crown's mercantilist policies did little to encourage centers of complementary economic production. New World cities tended to be related individually to the overseas metropolis and isolated one from another.¹⁴

Historiography on Latin American cities during the late colonial period and the 19th century does not yet afford sufficient basis for easy generalization. One underlying demographic fact, however, is that the population of Latin America, after holding steady for most of the colonial period, begins to increase at a rate that has accelerated ever since.

POPULATION OF LATIN AMERICA¹⁵

<i>year</i>	<i>population</i> <i>(millions)</i>	<i>year</i>	<i>population</i>
1570	10.2	1825	23.1
1650	11.4	1850	33
1750	11.1	1900	63
1800	18.9	1950	160

In many areas the late 18th century population increase was accompanied by economic development, technological modernization, rural colonization movements, and urban improvements for the larger cities. The picture, of course, was not one of unrelieved prosperity. In 1780 a Peruvian viceroy wrote that the backwardness of his realm might lead one to believe that only fifty years had elapsed since the conquest. Rural lands lay idle; the road system was abominable. Towns were widely scattered and scarcely deserved to be called villages. All but two cities outside the capital were losing inhabitants and deteriorating physically. As for Lima: "If this city, capital of the realm, shows more splendor, one soon discovers that its grandeur has no other sources than its rather impermanent buildings and its farms which hardly produce the most basic staples to sustain its people."¹⁶

In New Spain, on the other hand, this was a period of mounting prosperity. Liberalization of trade restrictions created a new class of urban merchants and redirected much of the old merchant capital into agriculture and mining. New Caribbean and European markets for farm products became available, while locally the "possibilities increase because Mexico City and Guadalajara grow, because mining centers like Guanajuato become important and prosperous cities."¹⁷ In Mexico City the annual incomes of the wealthiest family heads were as high as 200,000 pesos in 1800. The equivalent figure in Havana was 35,000 pesos and in Caracas 10,000 pesos. Lima had scarcely a family with an assured income of 6,500 pesos.¹⁸

In the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata Spanish administrators of the 1780's and 1790's founded many new towns designed as outposts against Indian marauding, as centers of economic production, and as assimilation points for scattered rural settlers and new immigrants. Colonization occurred in Patagonia, the Banda Oriental, and the intendancies of Salta and Córdoba. Much was also done to improve the appearance and institutions of existing cities, above all Buenos Aires.¹⁹

Of Brazil Fernando de Azevedo writes that the 17th century was one of territorial expansion, conquest and settlement, while the 18th—the century of gold—saw the development of cities and of "a new bourgeois class anxious

to dominate and already sufficiently strong to face the exclusivism of the families of landowners.”²⁰ Three new cities and 118 *vilas* were created in the 18th century as against four cities and only 37 *vilas* in the 17th. In the final years of the colonial period (1800–22) two cities and 44 *vilas* were erected. On the coast Salvador’s population doubled and Rio’s quadrupled during the 18th century. Urbanization of the interior began in earnest, particularly in Minas. *Bocas de serião* appeared 300 miles inland, with “sentinel” points at twice that distance or even much farther along the Amazon.²¹

Brito Figueroa documents urbanization in Venezuela as follows:

period	urban		rural		total
	population	%	population	%	
1759–72	185,926	29%	444,074	71%	630,000
1771–84	204,760	29	505,240	71	710,000
1800–10	354,536	34	643,707	66	998,243

Demographic and commercial development, however, failed to produce the social change that one might expect. “Colonial Venezuelan production originated on the plantations, flowed to the mercantile cities connected with the foreign market, and [its profits] returned to the plantations without changing the economic conditions which prevailed there.”²²

Brito’s analysis of the ruling class shows that the Suarezian description of a city in the *De Legibus* as a *civitas* “formed by the coalition of a number of families” was far from archaic.²³ This class was composed principally of: (1) White landowners. They formed a largely endogamous group of 658 families, proud of their blood “purity.” They lived in the cities and left administration of their *haciendas* to foremen who were generally men of color. They monopolized both the productive land and the urban political institutions. (2) Export merchants. They monopolized the export of farm and ranch products and also employed their capital in usurious loans to small farmers. Often they themselves owned *haciendas* and formed part of group (1). (3) Import merchants. These were often Spaniards well connected with the royal bureaucracy. Although they might conflict with the first two groups on commercial policy, their dependence on Spanish officialdom scarcely made them a “bourgeoisie.”

If economic development diversified the elite, it tended also to produce a coalescence of interests, agricultural-commercial, urban-rural. There appeared in the urban centers a series of socio-occupational categories (*hacendados, comerciantes, mercaderes, dependientes, bodegueros*) which had almost legal, corporate definitions. To describe the lower-class, mixed-blood groups the word *casta* was used in late-colonial Venezuela and in Spanish America

generally. The term tells a good deal about the elite as well as about the groups to which it applied. *Casta* does not convey the hermetic, segregative sense of "caste." It is more reminiscent of the Thomist-Aristotelian notion of functional social hierarchy. It refers to a "stratified social group, united by ethnic origin, common juridico-legal status, and a common type of economic-professional occupations and activities."²⁴

The point for our purposes is that if the logic of an older order survived as an organizing principle in this period of demographic and economic expansion and wider contact with the world, we might well expect it to survive even today. This would lead us to view the modern Latin American city less as an urban society in "change" (i.e., revolution, self-transcendence, obliteration of the past) than as a society in which the accoutrements and rallying cries of Western industrial civilization are being mediated to an Ibero-Catholic, creole, patrimonial order of life. As a recent ECLA study phrases it, the "traditional structure" of Latin America, "far from having been rigid and impenetrable, has been sufficiently porous to modernize many of its elements, but without achieving swift and radical 'modernization' of a lasting sort."²⁵

One may regard Latin America's rural exodus and urban growth of the 20th century as part of a movement which began in 19th-century Europe and has now reached global proportions. Or one may place the phenomenon in historico-cultural perspective. The urban centrifugalism of colonial times has become centripetal. The Latin American city now reaps as it once sowed. The rural settlement patterns which it long ago created now give their stamp to the process by which millions are drifting and regrouping across the land.

It would be of interest to examine the historical demography of Latin America for the past 200 years and establish the period when urban growth rates began to pull ahead of rural ones for different regions and for different categories of city. A more fundamental job would be to identify the ways in which the 19th century city intensified its control over the country.²⁶ In my study of São Paulo, a city which is not in every way typical, some of the points brought out are:

- increasingly active political role for the city (this was of still larger importance for new national capitals);
- city now a center for commercial and intellectual contact with foreign countries after removal of colonial mercantilist restraints;
- attraction of rural aristocracy to urban residence (as in the case of Venezuela cited above) and its participation in commercial and financial activity;
- development of urban credit mechanisms which cause the commercial "enfeoffment" of the rural domain;
- construction of a fan-like railway net centering on the city;
- role of the liberal, "rational" city mind in commercializing, specializing and

Latin American Research Review

technifying agriculture and in transforming farm labor into a rural proletariat (abolition of slavery, importation of foreign contract labor, and—in other countries—abolition of tutelary protection for rural Indian communities);

—role of immigrants as entrepreneurs and their eventual absorption into the elite.²⁷

George Kubler reminds us that the greater international exposure of Latin American cities after independence made them more provincial rather than more metropolitan. He defines the metropolis as a center of binding decisions that affect networks of other settlements. "Its physical equipment tends towards uniqueness. It is costly, intricate, and exemplary, while that of the provinces is imitative, derivative, and merely typical." Even though colonial Latin America was ruled from Madrid and Lisbon, the margin for autonomy was enough to allow it to develop eight "second-echelon" metropolitan centers by the late 18th century—that is, cities commanding within their own political and regional spheres and not internationally. Kubler identifies them as Mexico City, Lima, Guatemala, Bogotá, Quito, Buenos Aires, Havana and Rio de Janeiro. Today, he claims, only three of them are properly metropolitan: Mexico City, Buenos Aires and Rio. The traveler can scarcely tell one commercial center or upper-class suburb or proletarian slum from another. There has occurred a "diminution in the cultural diversity of Latin American life, and in the range of choices being freely made."²⁸

One may argue with Kubler's two lists, but the point is sound. Political emancipation subjected Latin America to new "colonial" influences, artistic and intellectual as well as others. Present "development" strategies cannot take hold or cast an image as long as they are routine exercises in problem-solving. They need also to be informed by the style, assurance and coherence that only the defiant regionalism (as distinct from provincialism) of a great metropolis can give them.

2. RECENT URBAN GROWTH AND THE ROLE OF MIGRATION²⁹

In 1950 39% of the Latin American population, or 61 million people, lived in urban centers of more than 2,000 inhabitants, while 61%, or 95 million people, lived in rural areas. In 1960 there were 95 million in towns (46%) and 111 million in the country (54%). The urban growth rate for the decade was 55%, the rural growth rate 12%. Annually, the rate was 4.5% as against 1.4%.

An ECLA projection gives Latin America a population of 291 million for 1975, 54% urban and 46% rural.

In 1960 four countries had an urban population greater than 60% of the

total national population (Uruguay was highest with 82%). Four countries were in the 40–60% range. Twelve were below 40% urban (with Haiti lowest at 13%). By 1975 the distribution in these categories will be something like 11 (urban), 7 (equilibrium), 2 (rural).

Until 1930 Buenos Aires was Latin America's only city with more than a million inhabitants. Mexico City, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo soon joined it. Havana, Lima and Santiago were million-cities by 1950; Bogotá, Caracas and Montevideo were added by 1960. By 1970 there may be 16 million-cities, and 26 by 1980. The million-cities contained 27 million inhabitants in 1960; by 1980 they will have 90 million. The four original million-cities already present the phenomenon of conurbation.³⁰

Half or more of the population increase in the large cities is attributable to migration from the country and smaller towns.³¹ From country to country the ratio of migratory to natural increase of urban populations varies appreciably. Although the rural-urban migration had its 19th-century counterpart in the industrial countries, the movement has special implications in modern Latin America:

(1) The flow of people to large cities is out of proportion to fresh opportunities for stable urban employment, especially industrial.

(2) The city has insufficient physical resources to absorb its growing population. This is not merely to say that governments lack the wherewithal to mount vast housing programs. It is also to say that in many cities private enterprise fails to meet the demand for outright slum housing. Therefore many new migrants, along with many who abandon or are dislodged from slums, are forced to *build their own city*.

(3) The city is deficient in the regime of impersonal organization, voluntary association and administrative services which is accepted as part of the Western urban ethos. Migrants and underprivileged are thrown back upon primary, quasi-rural modes of association which serve: (a) to organize their improvised communities, and (b) to relate these communities, or their component families, to sources of urban patronage by means of "clientage" arrangements.

(4) At the same time that millions of "marginal" Latin Americans are straining for access to urban security and opportunity, their allegiance is being courted by a new stripe of "populist" political leader. Populism is a tricky term. Some define it as politics for a mass society: demagogic, paternalistic, nationalistic, non-ideological—a kind of Bonapartism or democratic Caesarism.³² Pearse, while accepting this framework, Latin-Americanizes the term by stressing the "informal and non-institutionalized" structures of clientage upon which populist politics rest. This clarifies the distinction between the urban "mass society" of a northern industrial nation and a Latin American urban society which resists "the organization of common interest groups or co-operative groups." Populism is the surrogate for such organization, bridging the gap between city life and "a tradition of rural dependence."³³

Each of these four points is dealt with more fully later on.

The causes of migration are customarily divided into push and pull factors. Germani minimizes the forces of urban attraction and finds no necessary correlation between degree of rural poverty and tendency to migrate. The so-called objective factors "are filtered through the attitudes and decisions of individuals. . . . Therefore rural-urban migration is not merely a symptom, a demographic fact and a response to a certain economic pressure, but also the expression of a mental change. . . . Thus one can say that migration is a substitute for a social revolution."³⁴

Marshall Wolfe also warns against the "oft-repeated generalizations on the 'lure' of the great cities." He then identifies four key factors at the rural end of the migration process:

(1) Resident workers on large estates are uprooted by mechanization of agriculture, shifts in commercial crops, and landowners' fears of future land tenure claims. Typically they move to roadside clusters of shacks or to peripheries of smaller towns.

(2) Nuclei of small owner-cultivators are being squeezed by population increase, land exhaustion, declining demand for seasonal labor on large estates. They may show greater initiative than the landless workers by moving into petty commerce; organizing invasions of large estates; migrating to tropical pioneer zones; becoming temporary wage laborers; or migrating permanently to towns and cities.

(3) Despite population pressures, rural settlement patterns are moving toward dispersal and impermanence. Roadside "line settlements" are increasing in number. The primary neighborhood, or small, loose cluster of families, remains more typical than the large agricultural village, or "community." Hence the difficulties of extending public services, school systems and housing programs to the country.

(4) Small towns in Latin America have always been less than effective as administrative, marketing and service centers. Even these few functions are now being eroded away. Small towns tend to grow no faster than the countryside, and they are being "ruralized" by the desertion of leadership elements and their replacement by families of landless farm workers who use the town as a base for job-seeking.³⁵

3. EXPANSION OF THE "SERVICES" SECTOR

It is often shown that rural-urban migration in Latin America outruns the possibilities for employment in urban industry. The ratio of the tertiary or "services" sector of employment to the secondary or manufacturing sector is therefore much greater than the ratio prevailing in Western Europe. It even approaches, and for many countries exceeds, the ratio in the United States, where technological multipliers have permitted a heavy growth of "services."

Relation of tertiary to secondary sector in selected countries (c. 1950)³⁶

Venezuela	2.08	Malaya	2.82
Cuba	2.00	India	2.17
Haiti	1.56	United States	1.48
Argentina	1.51	Canada	1.31
Mexico	1.48	France	1.15
Bolivia	1.40	Spain	1.09
Brazil	1.27	Italy	0.96
Paraguay	1.18	West Germany	0.85

The Latin American and United States tertiary sectors bear little resemblance. The former is heavily weighted toward petty commerce and street vending, domestic service, unskilled and transitory work, and disguised unemployment. Perhaps the most dramatic example is the division of labor frequent among shanty dwellers who comb refuse dumps, specializing in the collection of specific items or materials.³⁷ The rural exodus is sometimes called a transfer of poverty or unemployment from country to city.

Since the indices for urbanization are outrunning those for industrialization, the two processes do not seem closely linked. In the case of Brazil, Bazzanella has shown industrialization to be an efficient but not a sufficient cause of urbanization. He divides the country into three zones which he calls Retarded, Intermediate and Advanced with respect to socioeconomic development.³⁸ For each zone he then analyzes the population of cities having more than 10,000 inhabitants for the intercensal period 1940–50. Here are some of his findings:

(1) Urban population growth (i.e., urbanization) over the ten-year period is roughly equal for each zone: 47.6% (Retarded zone), 46.1% (Intermediate), 50.3% (Advanced).

(2) The percentage of the ten-year population increment which was absorbed by industry differs sharply: 5.6% (R), 12.4% (I), 19.5% (A).

(3) In 1940 the Advanced zone had 75% of Brazil's industrial workers in cities over 10,000; in 1950 it had 78%. The cities in zones (I) and (R) *lost ground* slightly during the decade with respect to their share of the urban industrial force.

(4) The increase of persons employed in the secondary sector varied with the degree of development. The total rose by 32.7% for zone (R), 59.3% for (I), 74.7% for (A).

(5) The growth of the tertiary sector was much more nearly uniform: 59.4% (R), 65.7% (I), 69.1% (A).

It can therefore be concluded that:

- the urbanization rate is more or less constant for the different socioeconomic zones of Brazil;
- growth of the tertiary sector is a necessary concomitant to urbanization and its rate of growth shows only moderate zonal variation;
- the rate of urbanization is not a function of the degree of industrialization.

Like others, Bazzanella uses the term “modernization” for cases of urbanization without industrialization, where stimuli from the outside industrial world induce changes in style of life and levels of aspiration without being strong enough to provoke structural changes in the economic system. More significant to him than the oft-deplored phenomenon of “overurbanization” is the “overruralization” which produces it.³⁹

Having studied the figures for Brazil’s most recent intercensal period, 1950–60, Celso Furtado attacks still another “excess”: overmechanization. During the decade of the ’50’s the total population increased by 3.2% a year, while the urban sector increased by almost 6% a year. At the same time the annual increase for agricultural production was 4.5% and for industrial production 9%. Yet owing to “borrowed technology” and “overmechanization,” the yearly increment to the industrial labor force was only 2.8% against 3.5% for agriculture.⁴⁰

The debate over whether urbanization, and specifically the growth of the tertiary sector, can be “excessive” is by no means ended. Denis Lambert is apprehensive. He claims that urban unemployment, open or disguised, is more onerous than rural because the minimum resources for survival are fewer in the city, and that it is more “dangerous” because social tensions are more explosive there. He also claims that rural-urban migration does not necessarily raise productivity.⁴¹ Rottenberg, on the other hand, feels that to approve of a high level of tertiary employment in rich countries as an index of progress and to disapprove of it in poor ones as an index of poverty is to argue on a non-intellectual premise. He finds it hard to call manufactured goods superior to services, or to distinguish “petty” from significant services. In rather classical fashion he assumes that people seek out the most advantageous employment open to them and that therefore the reallocation of workers produced by urbanization has narrowed the distance to an optimum employment pattern.⁴²

A controversy of this sort seems a little fatuous to the extent that it implies the possibility for substantial planned control over demographic and employment patterns during the next generation. So tidal a population movement must be accepted as a “natural force” on the order of the trans-Atlantic migration or the Industrial Revolution. What we need from the urban theoreticians are several ideal and creative models for the “under-industrialized” Latin American city which will combine the demographic, economic, sociological, historico-cultural and architectural perspectives.

4. THE PRIMATE CITY

"Primate cities" are a subcategory of the "overurbanization" problem. When the "rank-size" rule is applied to each of the Latin American countries, the first city nearly always towers above the other groups of cities which the model establishes. This dominance is usually most striking when the first city is compared to the group that immediately follows it. It is also noted that, except for Brazil, neither the size of a country nor the size of its urban system has any systematic influence on its urban pattern. The chief exceptions to the "primate" rule for Latin America are: Ecuador (bicephalous with Quito and Guayaquil), Colombia (with an almost "normal" pyramidal hierarchy),⁴³ and Brazil (whose immense territory contains two leading metropolitan systems and several secondary ones).⁴⁴ In only a few cases is the growth rate of the smaller cities approaching or overtaking that of the primate city or "primate pair." In Mexico and Colombia the medium cities have higher growth rates than the primate, while in Brazil and Venezuela rising growth rates are affecting both medium and small cities.⁴⁵

Berry finds "no relationships between type of city size distribution and either relative economic development or the degree of urbanization of countries." He concludes that a "few strong forces" affecting urban growth tend to produce primacy while many complex forces tend to produce lognormal distribution.⁴⁶ The ECLA study just cited calls present evidence insufficient to explain "in what manner—through bottlenecks in transportation, administration, distribution of goods, capital or skilled labor force—the present distribution of urban population has been influenced." Two alternate and perhaps mutually reinforcing hypotheses are advanced: (1) Where population is initially distributed evenly among smaller cities none of them has much power of attraction, and only one or two leading cities show strong growth. (2) Where one city acquires early dominance it inhibits the growth of close competitors while not greatly affecting the growth of smaller cities.⁴⁷ Browning leans toward the second hypothesis and offers historical evidence for the colonial period (bureaucratic centralization), early republican period (commercial and cultural concentration, nature of export economies) and contemporary period (central bureaucracy, urban real estate investments, industrialization near labor source, cartwheel rail and road systems).⁴⁸

An example of primacy is Greater Santiago, which has grown from roughly 800,000 in 1930 to nearly 2,500,000 today. It has not grown as fast as some Latin American capitals. Its share of the national population (almost 30%) is not as high as that of Buenos Aires or Montevideo. But it ranks as a typical primate city. Chile's second urban center, Valparaiso-Viña del Mar, had a 1960 population of 368,332 and in effect formed part of the urban

complex of the capital. Of particular interest is the fact that Santiago's growth is not always favored by official encouragement or acquiescence.

It is not true that Santiago represents something artificial. It developed spontaneously, against the will of the government itself. . . .

The government had done what it could to hold back Santiago. It has established no important industry in the capital and has located them as far off as possible.

Urban construction, the writer continues, was stimulated by inflation, which diverted domestic capital from economic production into urban real estate. "But even if one sharply limits this sort of abuse . . . Santiago will keep on expanding, and we should entertain no illusions about being able to hold back that growth."⁴⁹

The Mexican government has deliberately encouraged the growth of Mexico City. Food products, fuel oil, electricity and natural gas have all been subsidized to hold back living costs and to attract industry. There is evidence that freight rates have been managed to encourage shipment of raw materials rather than finished goods to the metropolitan market. While approving any reduction in the amount of sheer political favoritism enjoyed by the capital, Richard Bird warns against egalitarian regionalism for its own sake: ". . . one can make the strong argument that the growing urban center is the leading 'growth pole' in a developing country and should be encouraged, not hampered."⁵⁰

In the writing on urban macrocephalism the primate city is frequently called a parasite, a suction pump, a spreading blotch of oil, or a spider's body with shriveled legs. Browning, however, asks whether concentration of urban services is not a valuable economy for a capital-poor nation, especially a smaller one such as Uruguay.⁵¹ This raises the issue of "optimum size," an exceedingly complex one in light of the many variables involved and the open-ended possibilities of technology. Rama shifts the grounds of the argument by suggesting that the case of Montevideo be regarded not as pathological but as a pioneer "social experiment." He claims that "all of Uruguay forms part of Montevideo's metropolitan area," and that the whole country is becoming absorbed into "a rural-urban environment, that is, a way of life which participates in an urbanized society even though the population centers do not strictly constitute cities."⁵²

5. "MARGINAL" SETTLEMENTS

For many observers urban shanty towns are the most spectacular visible hallmark of the social composition of a Latin American city (though the mansions of the rich run them a close second). The leader of a squatters'

invasion is even becoming a new culture hero. An ECLA study states that "among the so-called 'popular classes' the figure of the *poblador*—probably a mixture of rural tenant and urban worker—has been acquiring undeniable importance alongside the organized minorities of industrial workers."⁵³ Indeed, he projects a more compelling image than the factory workers who, in Latin America, have rarely generated grass-roots class leadership or seriously challenged the economic system as an urban "proletariat."⁵⁴ The *poblador* has no niche in the system. He must be inventive; he must form his own community; he must challenge and force his way into the existing order.

Nomenclature for squatters' settlements varies from country to country. A generic name is *población* or *barrio* "marginal." This term connotes many kinds of marginality—geographic (peripheral location), functional (deprivation of urban services), sociological, economic and psychological—not all of which need apply in a given case. The term is slightly ironic in view of the high potential for organization, self-legitimation, and inventive accommodation to urban life which many "marginal" communities exhibit.

Marginal settlements have leaped into prominence since World War II. The *favelas* of Rio, however, date from the 1890's, and one suspects that peripheral clusters of squatters' or rural-type dwellings are a traditional urban feature, particularly in the Indian countries. Kubler describes the Indian sections of 16th century Mexico City as "casual, dense agglomerations of huts and shelters" serving as a labor reservoir for the proud, orderly Spanish city.⁵⁵

The study of another Mexican city, Mérida, shows how its colonial growth steadily displaced the surrounding Indian *barrios* outward from the urban center. The ruling class lived in the center virtually monopolizing its facilities; till 1820 they alone could be baptized and married in the cathedral. In the *barrios* Maya was spoken, indigenous costumes were worn, huts were thatched, streets were impassable for wheeled vehicles. Each *barrio* was a semiautonomous community with its plaza, church and stores, governed by its own *cacique*. Neighborhood loyalties were strong, yet in spite of inter-*barrio* rivalry and gang-fighting the humblest dweller felt superior to persons born outside Mérida. Many Indians worked in the city center, and all patronized its business institutions. The first effect of the 19th century profits from henequen was to intensify the *barrios*-center polarity (c. 1880), but by 1900 the pattern was breaking down. Well-to-do residential sections penetrated the suburbs, and the *barrios* became absorbed, culturally and administratively, into the city.⁵⁶

Current migrations to cities are in some ways reproducing the historic *barrios* phenomenon described for Mérida. The main difference is that the new groups are trying to gain *access* to the city (not infrequently by *forming* communities) while the old groups were *traditional* communities *resisting*

the assault of the city. Today the experiences of migration, of exposure to the city, of regional mingling, generally preclude the formation of urban "folk" enclaves. Yet new social polarities and discontinuities indicate that the city is becoming "ruralized" in certain ways. The work of Lewis, Mangin and Butterworth warns us not to dismiss regional origin and culture as a potential binding force for the fortuitous communities of the city.⁵⁷

One reason for placing Latin American urban ecology in a time perspective is to suggest that it may loosely conform to a historic archetype—to a "segmental" structure and growth pattern, for example, rather than to what Caplow calls the "crescive" pattern of North American cities.⁵⁸

Examining contemporary squatters' settlements, we find that the portion of total lower-class housing which they contain varies from city to city, and that their quantitative importance is easily exaggerated. Their significance for our purposes is their rapid growth ratio in many countries and their convenience as laboratories for observing social and political process:

—In Lima the *barriada* population grew from about 100,000 in 1958 (10% of the city population) to about 400,000 in 1964 (20%).⁵⁹

—In Rio de Janeiro the population of the *favelas* grew from about 203,000 in 1950 (8.5% of city pop.) to about 600,000 in 1964 (16%). By 1960 their growth rate was three to four times that of the city as a whole.⁶⁰ *Favela* growth has shifted predominantly from the central and southern zones (e.g., Copacabana) to the north and northeast (industrial concentration).

—In twelve communes of Greater Santiago the number of *callampa* family dwellings appeared to hold steady from 1952 (16,502 dwellings) to 1961 (16,042 dwellings). This is explained by (1) the campaign of the government Housing Corporation, greatly accelerated in 1959, to eradicate *callampas*, and (2) the tendency of new *callampas* to be smaller and even more provisional, thus escaping enumeration.⁶¹

—In Caracas the Pérez Jiménez regime undertook to eradicate the *ranchos* by constructing immense apartment houses. In 1954–58, 85 of these "superblocks" were delivered. When construction was suspended, they housed 160,000 persons in 17,399 apartments, or 12% of the city's population. At that time, however, 30% of the city's inhabitants were still living in *ranchos*.⁶²

—In Argentina I was told that perhaps 10% of the population of Greater Buenos Aires live in *villas miserias*, or some 800,000 people. The figure seems high, however, and in any case the rapid growth period is over. Of the *villa* dwellers some 10% are in dire need, without hope or resources, while some 30% have solid prospects of moving to their own land in five years or less. The rest are in intermediate situations. Enclaves of Paraguayan and Bolivian migrants are a distinctive feature of the *villas*.⁶³

—São Paulo has only a small percentage of its poor in *favelas*, a maximum of 200,000 persons in a metropolis of almost 5 million.

—In Mexico City squatters' shacks (*jacales*) are scattered in small nuclei, with

larger settlements appearing near the highways west of the city. The dwellings are generally of adobe and in the rural tradition. Obsolete figures (1952) show 11% of the city's population in *jacales*, 14% in *colonias proletarias* (low-density, relatively substantial squatters' huts without urban services), 34% in *tugurios* (traditional slums).⁶⁴

ECLA has made some simplified calculations to show the relation of rate of national population growth to the size of urban "marginal" population.⁶⁵ The study assumes a hypothetical country of 10 million people—3 million urban and 7 million rural. It further assumes: (1) a total of one million urban dwellers in a "marginal" category; (2) a 5 per cent annual increase in remunerative urban employment; (3) a net rural population increase of 1.5 per cent a year. Projections are then made for varying rates of over-all national population growth:

year	urban pop. remuneratively employed, increasing at 5% per year (thousands)	"marginal" urban pop. for varying annual rates of national pop. growth (in thousands and as % of total urban pop.)			
		2.0	2.5	3.0	3.5
		0	2000	1000 (33%)	1000 (33)
10	3258	808 (20)	1419 (30)	2057 (39)	2724 (46)
20	5307	124 (2)	1651 (24)	3326 (39)	5163 (49)
30	8644	absorbed	1390 (14)	4687 (35)	8482 (50)

For national growth rates of 2.5% and above there occurs an absolute increase in the urban "marginal" population, and for rates of 3.0% and above a relative increase. The calculation is highly schematic. But it is worth noting that the actual growth predicted for all of Latin America for 1965–75 is 2.9% per year. Mexico and Brazil are estimated at 3.0%, with three Central American countries and the Dominican Republic at 3.5%. Cuba on the other hand is at 2.0% and Argentina at 1.7%.⁶⁶

Two opposed hypotheses about the *barrios marginales* are: (1) that they are slums, blighted areas, belts of misery, incubators for disease, crime, social disorganization and personality disorder; and (2) that as semirural enclaves they make available new possibilities for urban social reconstruction on the basis of neighborhood communities, regional and kinship ties, mutual-aid associations, and small-group political activity.⁶⁷

Two studies have tried to ascertain "objective" indices of social cohesion, or neighborliness, for different class levels in Bogotá and in San Juan, Puerto

Rico. They find negative or inverse correlation between neighborliness and lower-class status.⁶⁸ The validity of these studies may be questioned on several counts. The interview schedules imply a cultural (i.e., North American) definition of neighborliness; this definition is presumed not to vary with social class; interviews are statistically analyzed with no description of the specific kin, association and locality groups from which they emanate. A reader who hungers for the mulligan stew of ethnography is left to gnaw the dry bone of sociometry.⁶⁹

It is difficult to generalize about the social solidarity of the various types of lower-class residence community in the absence of case studies and careful typologies country by country, or even city by city. For Santiago, Rosenblüth identifies no less than 15 varieties of dwellings or communities of the lower economic classes. Among them are: *callampas* (mushrooms), squatters' settlements built of waste materials and having no public services; *poblaciones de erradicación*, or *callampa*-type settlements removed to new sites with land titles and minimum services; *poblaciones de radicación*, the exceptional *callampas* which become permanent with expropriation and improvement of the land; the isolated huts of families who serve as caretakers for residences or construction sites; *conventillos*, or multi-family dwellings where families are distributed one to a room and have common sanitary facilities; self-help settlements in which the residents build their own dwellings with technical assistance, materials and credit facilities from the government Housing Corporation; settlements constructed by private institutions; workers' settlements built by industrial firms and enjoying urban services; and "emergency huts" built for earthquake victims.⁷⁰

These types can even be subdivided. *Callampas*, for example, may be classified by location: on active or abandoned refuse dumps, along the banks of canals and rivers, along roads or railway tracks, on public or private lands which have been invaded, or on private unimproved lands where there is a promise of sale to the squatters.

Conversely, one may group the basic types under three larger categories:

(1) *Conventillo* type: located in older districts of the city center; access to public utilities; traditional "slum" dwelling for urban proletariat; rental occupancy; structures built as *conventillos* disappearing, being replaced by conversion of houses to multi-family use. Corresponds elsewhere to *vecindad*, *cortiço*, *callejón*.

(2) *Callampa* type: segregated urban nucleus; illegal land occupation; waste material used for construction; generally single-room dwelling without sanitary facilities; generally peripheral location with constant displacement by growth of city (though occasional *callampas* are more than 20 years old). Corresponds elsewhere to *favela*, *villa miseria*, *rancho*, *barriada*, *jacales*.

(3) Suburban settlement: semisegregated urban nucleus; land titles acquired

through settlers' initiative or by government intervention; heterogeneous building materials; construction by settlers, government or private firms; generally peripheral location; varying access to public utilities.⁷¹

With changes of emphasis and detail these three broad categories apply to the underprivileged urban areas of most of the major Latin American cities as well as many smaller ones. One might expect the index of social cohesion to increase as one proceeds from the *conventillo* or slum to the squatters' settlement to the semidetached nucleus, but it seems safer to say that there is greater variety on this score within the categories than among the modal types for each category. A *villa miseria* in Buenos Aires that is subject to frequent floods and whose Peronista population distrusts any overture by a post-Perón government is very different from a Lima *barriada* built on desert land and receptive to public or private assistance. Studies on social aspects of public housing projects often raise more questions than they answer. In Caracas the government has built more than 2,500 low-rent apartments since 1959 at the same time that an estimated 13,000 *ranchos* have been constructed (many of them by entrepreneurs who find them more profitable than apartments). The government has had trouble with its tenants. "Some who built their own *ranchos* are reluctant to leave their rent-free accommodations, while others have found apartment living too confining and have moved back to the slums."⁷²

For each city there is a constellation of factors which defines its housing problem uniquely. Yet in every case the following questions must be asked:

- (1) When is technical and social assistance more efficient and effective than architectural solutions that entail massive relocation of families?
- (2) When relocation *is* advisable, how can lessons from existing, spontaneous communities be made available for physical and social planning?⁷³

John Turner criticizes the orthodox "low cost" project "designed to give maximum comfort to the maximum number with the minimum outlay."

Unless the State is prepared to invest its limited capital resources and to restrict its building program to an insignificantly small minority of subsidized dwellings, the family will have to pay for the cost of developed land, for the public utilities as well as the land itself. This means that half or more of what they must pay for goes into installations which, relatively speaking, are luxuries. The result is that they must accept a very small house and wait, in all probability, for schools, market places and so on—the lack of which will be all the more serious for the relatively distant location which the cost of the undeveloped land imposes.⁷⁴

It is well to remember that in San Juan, Puerto Rico, where the government commands relatively generous funds for public housing: "The decline of the slum population has recently averaged less than one-half of one per cent per

year—a rate that, if continued, would give the Slum Belt two centuries more of existence.”⁷⁵

In Lima one must distinguish between the *corralón* and the *barriada*. The *corralón* is a jumble of small shacks, generally rented, which serve as reception or transit camps for rural migrants. The typical *barriada* originates in a carefully planned invasion by a group of families who are partly educated to the ways of city life and who are taking effective action to acquire—not housing exclusively—but permanent dwelling-space and, with it, the time needed to work out their problems as resources and ingenuity permit.

The “corralón” has no future; at best it crystallizes out into a typical labyrinth complex of slum courts which can only deteriorate until, eventually, they are eradicated. The “barriada,” on the other hand, will develop into a typical working and lower-middle class suburb—although slowly, as it will take the average family about 20 years to complete its house without credit assistance.⁷⁶

The studies which reveal high rates of mental illness and social disorganization among Lima’s poor refer largely to the *corralones* and the *callejones* (enclosed patio slums) rather than to the *barriadas*.⁷⁷

An investigation in Santo Domingo relies on type of employment rather than type of residence to determine social structure and mechanisms of acculturation in lower-class *barrios*. Workers are divided into a *traditional* sector (those who are jobless or who have short-term or low-paid permanent jobs) and a *modern* sector (higher-paid permanent jobs). This is felt to be a more empirical classification than into tertiary and secondary sectors. The author asserts that the non-specialized institutional life of the popular *barrios* favors a new structure of “local community” relations. Sample interviews indicate that the proportion of persons in the modern sector having *compadres* in the *barrio* (72%) is larger than in the traditional sector (53%), and that mutual aid is much more frequent in the modern sector (61%) than in the traditional (27%). The study concludes: that (1) acculturation to specifically “urban” ways is not necessarily what facilitates passage from the traditional to the modern sector, and that (2) the “local community” relations which *are* established do not necessarily obstruct the recruitment of urban dwellers to modern economic institutions.⁷⁸

These findings are corroborated and in some ways extended by a study of Puerto Rican migrants to Chicago.⁷⁹ In this setting two types of *compadrazgo* are distinguished: the horizontal, largely a nominal relation which arises from the baptismal ceremony and “may serve to unite the kin- and in-group”; and the vertical, a more utilitarian relation between upper- and lower-class Puerto Ricans typically formed at the instance of the lower-class participant and facilitating his accommodation to urban life.⁸⁰ Dividing his subjects into four

groups, Press finds that *compadrazgo* is relatively weak among the most insecure and least acculturated migrants. The strongest and most extended *compadre* ties exist among migrants who are still at a socioeconomic disadvantage, "yet whose degree of acculturation and urban outlook permits them to cope with the external environment in an independent manner and with at least partial success." In Parsonian terms, the adjustment to "universalism" has activated "particularistic" mechanisms for social solidarity. Within the third group, the middle class, *compadrazgo* is weakest and of least socioeconomic importance; it is little more than a form of close friendship. Among upper-class Puerto Ricans *compadrazgo* again becomes functional as a means of preserving cultural identity (horizontal) and of offering protection to lower-class migrants (vertical).

In a study of Cali, Lima and San Juan, Rogler brings out that recourse to particularistic ties within "marginal" urban groups is not an automatic response to challenges of the city. The comparative analysis of cities and of *barrios* within a given city, leads him to conclude that only strong sociological imperatives in the face of adversity will produce neighborhood or community organization. For him the critical issue is not whether rural community patterns are sometimes imported into the city (a datum proven largely for migrants from Indian backgrounds; see studies cited in footnote 57), but the conditions under which quasi-rural patterns are sometimes *re-created* in the city as an aggressive response to the progressive limitation of options. Rogler contrasts the effective organization of the Lima *barriadas* in the face of adversity and hostility with the "tossed salad" shanty towns and anomic slum life of San Juan, where the government attitude toward squatter settlements is relatively benevolent.⁸¹

If this analysis is correct the social planner faces an overwhelming dilemma. Stated in the crudest terms it is that the social integration of "marginal" urban groups gathers momentum under adversity and hostility, and recedes before permissiveness and benevolence. The experience thus far with public housing projects in Latin America gives some support to this hypothesis.⁸²

6. "MARGINAL" GROUPS AND THE URBAN CORE

Discussion of the internal structure of "marginal" groups leads inevitably to the question of how these groups are to relate to and participate in urban life. The cities have been given a short breathing space by the fact that migrant families arrive with relatively low expectancies and with cultural attitudes scarcely conducive to revolution-mongering. Most of them do not form a proletariat. They are not yet reintroduced to society. Their single overwhelming task is simply "to settle" (*poblar*).⁸³ Of great import for the future,

however, are the parents' hopes for their children. Let us assume the optimum case of a migrant who acquires a lot in a peripheral *barrio*, establishes legal title to it, finds more or less steady employment as a construction worker, and over the years manages to convert his shack into a plausible house. What comforts him throughout this travail is the certainty that his children will obtain middle-class schooling, jobs and respectability. In most Latin American cities his hope is today a forlorn one.

A tide of migrants is swirling at the edges of the cities. These human reservoirs are rising rapidly. If they continue to seep into the channels of city life at the present sluggish rate, they will soon begin to move and behave as an independent force. (Witness the political opposition between the *villas miserias* and the "asphalt zone" of Buenos Aires.) Their hybrid rural-urban character, now transitional, will become a fixed identity, dichotomizing the city and causing mutations in the familiar patterns of political action.⁸⁴ If urban growth rates are two or three times rural rates, we must remember that "marginal" growth rates in the city may be three to four times the general urban rates.

Although the situation is partly a result of new population pressures, the ultimate problem is not strictly Malthusian. The ratio of people to habitable land is more favorable than in most major world regions. "Population control" would be less a corrective than a palliative—or as many Latin Americans feel, less a palliative than a counsel of resignation before the challenge of human institutions.⁸⁵

The process of accommodating "marginal" populations to the established urban classes can be considered from at least three points of view.

(1) *Economic*. This takes us beyond the scope of the paper by hooking city planning to national economic planning. The central question is whether future economic development will continue indefinitely to inflate the tertiary sector with disguised unemployment and mendicancy.⁸⁶ If so—and in many countries there is every indication that this will be the case—the social planner labors under special imperatives to be inventive. For any given peripheral or satellite community there is also the microeconomic question of whether household crafts or truck-farming and husbandry might be developed. Such schemes require large, perhaps uneconomic amounts of technical assistance. It may be that they are not feasible in the larger cities, but theoretically they would cushion families against vagaries of the industrial labor market. The large-scale purchase or expropriation of choice, privately owned suburban lands might create possibilities for systematic experimentation along these lines.⁸⁷

(2) *Political*. Bourricaud has studied how conventional party politics become inserted into the Lima *barriadas*. In explaining the strength of rightist General Odría among the "marginal" population in 1962 and 1963 he stresses

the ideological apathy of the *barriadas*. He then describes the political machines, which were: (a) set in motion by transactions between the candidates' agents and the local political leaders who can deliver the votes of clientele of friends and kin, and (b) lubricated by handouts of food, clothing and other necessities. Such a system is precarious. Charity tends to reach only the disinherited and least integrated elements. It creates indifference among local leaders, who wish to show their power by delivering precisely those *community* improvements (water, electricity, sewage disposal) which the highest authorities reserve for allocation by themselves. The key question is whether the local leaders' policy of prudence, ideological indifference and calculated horse-trading will continue; or whether "it will give way, suddenly or gradually, to acute radicalization and to a sharp revolutionary sensibility. The answer to this question will probably govern the course of Peruvian politics during the next years."⁸⁸

For the Rio *favelas* Medina stresses the lack of organizations mediating between the *favelado* and political life. There is no hierarchy of candidates. The campaign of a *vereador* or *prefeito* is no different from that of a senator or president, and the issues presented to the voter are in no hierarchical arrangement.

While the great topics are being discussed, each voter looks for a personal benefaction and each *politico* strives to guarantee his constituency. This is where the most important figure in Brazilian elections appears: the *cabo eleitoral*. . . . He fills the gap between what the candidates proclaim and what they will perform. Politics is thus imbued with a highly demagogic content. The candidate presents the voter with a program of action, but to the individual he promises his personal intervention. It is this which counts.⁸⁹

An alternative to drift-and-crisis on the political scene has been proposed by the brains trust responsible for planning the *Promoción Popular* program in Chile. A primary research target is the elaboration of strategies for avoiding the disintegration of urban society, for countering overcentralization by creating and/or giving legal status to grass-roots structures for community initiative and action. It has been decided that the strongest mechanisms for reform and reconstruction will be the *comités* and *juntas de vecinos* now so widespread among urban *poblaciones*. Ideally, the *comités* will represent 200–250 families, while the *juntas*, comprised of two to four *comités*, will represent 500–1,000 families. Each *comité* is to have a general assembly and a five-man directorate elected by the assembly.

The specific aim of such mechanisms is to stimulate a change of outlook by which citizens in a marginal situation (*pobladores*) can, through new organizational structures, integrate to the values of the contemporary world which are now shared by only the most privileged sectors of the national society.⁹⁰

Latin American Research Review

The priority given to the traditional, multi-purpose, "neighborhood" *cabildo* structure in a modern urban setting and the overlaying of new structures in lieu of revamping the old speak loudly for a historico-cultural approach to social reform.

(3) *Social*. Knowledge of the total urban social structure is basic to understanding the Latin American city and the processes by which it incorporates new groups. For a long time the view of Latin American urban society was clouded by attempts to apply paradigms for class structure and dynamics extracted from Western industrial societies. It is now increasingly recognized that in Latin America: (a) the nature of "classes" and their interaction needs special definition; (b) historico-cultural factors contribute importantly to this definition; (c) a much-needed preliminary job is a straightforward description of the principal "actors" (social groups) in urban society to elucidate commitment and motive without theoretical preconceptions.

Some heuristic studies of the past two or three years have directed attention to the otiose way in which patterns of social action are accommodating to nationalism and economic change. It still appears to be a silent premise of Latin American life that individual or group advancement is more likely to occur through a change in distribution of resources than through dramatic increase in total resources available. Beneath a well-nigh universal ferment of change, Latin American society, urban or rural, seems to retain its corporative structure and patrimonial logic. The "Hoselitz hypothesis," attractive to many Latin American sociologists, finds no positive correlation between economic development and size of the middle class. Maximum economic growth can scarcely be expected in economies where private choice is still important, where conspicuous consumption motivates the upper class, and where redistribution rather than augmentation of the social dividend motivates the middle.

It is sometimes thought that the Latin American middle classes have so far been characterized not only by the dual efforts of "climbers" and "distributors" but also, in some countries, by the tragic weakness of an aimless bourgeoisie, demoralized by the enjoyment of a "white" prosperity, to the dismay of its best intellectuals. This picture may not be correct. But where do we find the self-control and discipline of the true creators of modern capitalism, the energy and austerity of the young *samurai* who built up modern Japan?⁹¹

The study of entrepreneurship is yielding clues to the social context of the economy, the sociology of urban institutions, and psychological aspects of industrial organization. A four-country ECLA study speaks of the "marginal" nature of capitalism in Latin America and the "ambivalent" attitudes of its entrepreneurs toward the roles of the state and of labor unions in economic development. Successful industrial enterprise often depends upon utilizing

political connections to exert pressure upon the central system of power. Many industrialists see their relations with workers as simply "another element of the political and bureaucratic maneuvers" in which they must engage.⁹²

Faletto recently marshaled the most promising hypotheses regarding the way in which urban "working sectors" are incorporated into "developing" societies of Latin America. In contrast to France, where the recruitment of an urban "subproletariat" from rural Italy or North Africa does not signify radical change in the working-class structure, urban workers in Latin America are a "class in formation." Here migration means not merely "transition" but also "conforming to" a new situation. The already established industrial proletariat of Latin America is not the *avant-garde* of the workers' movement but a group with diminished channels of communication to the "new masses"—even an elite which is threatened by them.

Latin America's low-paced industrialization contributes little to the consolidation of a working "class" or a working-class "culture." The scale of the migrations in relation to industrial opportunity means that the populist leader rather than the labor union becomes the agent for political organization. Even those migrants who do obtain industrial employment derive surprisingly low satisfaction from it. The worker seems "to 'use' the industrial firm rather than become integrated with it." Apparently he did not head "toward the city to work in industry but rather the contrary. The primary goal is to live in the city; the means to this end are secondary." Industry, therefore, has not "really signified a deep change in the traditional ways of life." Workers are not engaged in industrialization *as workers*. They view the process as a positive one, yet show a general tendency to abandon industrial work. Since "the system" is more or less accepted, a workers' movement is not felt to be an instrument of change or revolution so much as a pressure group for improving present conditions.⁹³

7. SOCIAL BASES FOR URBAN PLANNING⁹⁴

For anyone concerned with how sociology should inform the work of the physical planner nothing could be more suggestive than a stroll through the streets of Santiago de Chile. One should start at the Plaza de Armas, heart of the city's public life for some three and a half centuries. The colonial Plaza was surrounded by the *casas reales*, the *audiencia*, the *ayuntamiento* and the cathedral; the square itself was used for tourneys and bullfights. Later the public market was installed there, only to be replaced by a garden promenade in the 19th century when the well-to-do classes began to venture from their patriarchal houses to enjoy new cosmopolitan pleasures.⁹⁵ Today the past century still lingers in the attractive park, in the hum of petty commerce under

the *portales*, in some once-elegant French architecture. With some effort we can even evoke colonial times—the pomp of government and worship; the jostle and clamor of the mixed-race classes. For all the apparent schematism of Spanish city planning, here is a fine example of geometric design become living tissue, a case of functional adaptation and sedimentation which roots us in history while wedding us to a changing present.

From the Plaza de Armas one walks five blocks to the wide, low-squatting *Palacio de la Moneda* with its topheavy balustrade, built in 1788–99 and now serving as the presidential palace. It faces north on the *Plaza de la Constitución* and south on the *Plaza de la Libertad*. Here life and color are gone; movement is matter-of-fact and unobtrusive. The two somber plazas are framed by cement beehives—banks and ministries populated by patronage groups of the power elite, the Hotel Carrera by transient foreign advisers and businessmen. The meager neoclassical elegance of the old *Palacio* is stifled by the grey, massive buildings which glower down upon it. The names of the plazas, Constitution and Liberty, are by no means anachronistic on the Chilean scene; but they lack the realism and familiarity of “*Plaza de Armas*.” They do little to suggest that the squares were carefully designed to lessen the possibility of military attack upon the executive mansion. It is symbolic that the plan to complete the architectural vista across the *Plaza de la Libertad* with a new legislative palace was never carried out.

The vision of Santiago enshrined here dates from the 1920’s and ’30’s. It stands for early recognition of the depressed urban multitudes and of the perils they represent for the old order, if not the implications they hold for a new one. The loci of power, once embellished with neo-Renaissance façades, now seek anonymity in nondescript piles of concrete. The honeycomb windows of the banks and ministries look out from a Minotaur’s labyrinth of sinecures, thrown up by the paternalism of a new state socialism. Yet never can there be one window for each Chilean. Historically necessary, the new plazas were from the start archaic.⁹⁶

What of the future Santiago? If Chile were erratic, fanciful Brazil with the resources of a subcontinent, we might expect plans for a new metropolis. One thinks of Brasília, grown to a third of a million inhabitants in five years. Or the impudent schemes of Sérgio Bernardes to rebuild Rio de Janeiro for an “age of cybernetics” with an enormous pier-bridge across the bay, resting on seven hexagonal islands; ten-level shopping centers interconnected by moving sidewalks; 45 “cultural centers,” each structure containing 36 movie houses; 156 “vertical suburbs” built in “helical” form to a height of 600 meters, served by “vertical metros” and housing 20,000 families apiece.⁹⁷

Chileans, however, are sober and conservative. Perched on their shelf

between the Andes and the Pacific, shaken regularly by earthquakes, they deploy their modest resources cautiously. In Santiago one looks twice to tell whether an office building is four or forty years old. Adopting the practical view, we will merely underscore two social preconditions for planning: (1) population growth and (2) "populism" with all its connotations. The quantitative index of city growth warns against another centralized, monolithic, architectural solution. Not only must new solutions be "cellular" and spatially extended; they must also solicit the active collaboration of the populace. The qualitative index of "populism" establishes a cultural and social matrix for physical solutions. It is from such considerations and from a knowledge of available economic resources⁹⁸ that planners should triangulate, hopefully in collaboration, upon the familiar problems of housing, transportation, traffic circulation, zoning, public services, facilities for education and hygiene, and municipal government.

This sounds like the counsel of Mumfordian organicism and neotechnics as a corrective to the Spanish legacy of gridiron planning. In a sense, though, the counsel is to revivify that legacy. The elaborate ordinances for planning colonial towns emanated from a broad social and political philosophy to organize the settlement of a hemisphere.⁹⁹ Far from being static design, the urban chessboard was a radiating center of energy—visible symbol of an adaptive social structure, an intricate system of acculturation, and a regulated process of territorial appropriation and economic development.

When we associate Spanish urbanism with frozen design and elegant façade, we may be responding to latter-day influences upon it of Haussmann's Paris. It is not far-fetched to say that the Spanish municipal tradition is vigorously perpetuated in today's squatter invasions, which may recapitulate all the ingredients of a town-founding by a conquistador's band: careful staging and role allocation; solicitation of patronage from a powerful political figure; legitimation of the claim by planting of flags and strategic publicity; meticulous distribution of building lots; common resistance to low-echelon police; discrimination against later settlers; formation of a committee of *vecinos*; mutual-aid arrangements; gridiron layout with provision for plaza and common facilities; erection of community chapel, school and council house; priority for legalization of land titles; efforts to create a channel for claims and grievances to the highest political authority, even the president or his wife.¹⁰⁰

One of Santiago's most fascinating urban laboratories is the José María Caro district. With some 130,000 inhabitants it is the equivalent of Chile's fourth largest city. It contains at least four types of housing: privately built, government-built, self-help with government assistance, and *callampas*. Residents are organized into *Juntas de Vecinos*, collectively represented in an

Agrupación General. For several years this body has campaigned to have José María Caro erected into a single *comuna*; it now sprawls across four *comunas* of Greater Santiago. In the words of the president of the *Agrupación*:

We want to be a *comuna* because today our people, the 130,000 people of Cardenal Caro, don't want to have anything to do with anyone. They were thrown out of other communities, and all they want is something that is theirs, something of their own, and they're prepared to go after it.

According to this spokesman, José María Caro is Chile's "experimental base." It contains occupational groups of government employees, transport and railway workers, and military; it has ten blocks of migrants from Valdivia, even a few blocks of Indians.¹⁰¹

In physical terms, what does it mean for the future that these thousands of one- and two-family dwellings are being built on miniscule plots close to the metropolitan center? Will they become slums? Will they give way to high-rise construction? Or will the proprietary, small-plot mentality become ingrained? Will community and neighborhood pride win out? Or does the portent lie with those residents who take a longer route home simply for the shame of being seen on a José María Caro bus? Will the community organize to assess and assert its collective needs? Or will it continue to be a passive recipient of intermittent handouts from the uncoordinated agencies and conflicting political groups of the metropolis?

It will perhaps be said that these questions confront the Latin American city planner with three standard options: centralized planning, decentralized planning and *laissez-faire*. But let us recapitulate some historico-cultural factors that condition the choice:

(1) Latin America's powerful tradition of centralization may today take the guise of state socialism, but it retains overtones of the vegetative mercantilist, patrimonial state.

(2) As a planning strategy *laissez-faire* leads to even more chaos and confusion here than in most places; as a political and economic philosophy it favors elitism and status quo.

(3) In Latin America decentralization might specifically mean energizing the nuclear groups of society in recognition of the fact that intermediate structures tend to function ineffectively.¹⁰² The small group, like the state or central bureaucracy, has here an intermittently vigorous tradition. The farflung impersonal association will not play the role which Western urban history leads us to expect of it—except as it may be legitimized and utilized from below and from above.

(4) "Populism" is forcing the issue. As we use it, the term means not merely the participation of urban "masses" in politics but also the cultural form of participation. We find paradoxically that (a) the lower classes integrate to city life through informal clientage arrangements at the same time that (b) they show tendencies to-

ward individuality and autonomy (squatter invasions, land ownership, resistance to routinization, preference for owning a taxi or small store to working in a factory).

(5) Judged by economic indices, Latin American cities have sizable middle classes. Yet the cities almost *function* as two-class societies—in the sense that “middle classes” tend to look for accommodation within upper-class clientage systems, or else, under certain pressures, they endorse and even formulate lower-class demands for social justice.¹⁰³ The typical instigator of an urban or rural squatter invasion is a middle-class lawyer-*político*. In some ways the situation comes startlingly close to the Marxist model for class “polarization.” Be that as it may, *one might expect the Latin American lower classes to perform the role of social innovation and reconstruction which the West historically identifies with its middle classes.*

8. THE REGIONAL HORIZON

The emphasis in this paper is upon the internal adjustment of the Latin American city to modernization and centripetal population movements. However, we should avoid identifying as “critical” merely those problems which have immediate visibility, which seem politically explosive, and which relate to human deprivation. One can argue, for example, that the regional projections and interrelations of cities are as significant as their internal tensions. Although the literature on regionalism and urban networks cannot be reviewed here, mention of one schematic and suggestive study will at least enlarge the focus. It concerns São Paulo, a bellwether city with respect to modernization and industrialism.

In a recent essay on São Paulo the architect and planner Luiz Saia divides the history of the city and its hinterland into a number of ecological phases, each dominated by one or two “principal theses” and several “ancillary theses.”¹⁰⁴ The penultimate phase corresponds to the boom years for coffee (1848–1929). Its main theses were:

- I. Development of the coffee economy in a framework of “colonial” monoculture.
- II. Implantation of a tree-shaped (“dendritic”) transport system as a result of the coffee-railway symbiosis.

Some of the subtheses were:

1. occupation of coffee zones by predatory pioneering;
2. rail penetration and linear spacing of urban settlement along interfluvial ridges;
3. polarization of the rural and urban domains;
4. functional coalescence of São Paulo-Santos, the port becoming in effect a “*bairro*” of the highland city;
5. “abstract,” “reticulated” and therefore chaotic management of both rural and urban lands.

These factors were attended by rapid population growth, reflected in an increase in the municipalities of São Paulo state from 29 (1834) to 243 (1929), and in the megaloccephalic growth of the state capital from 24,000 inhabitants (1872) to 900,000 (1929). Now that São Paulo city is a metropolis, the definition of its problems requires "a drastic change at the conceptual level."

Saia's principal thesis for the contemporary period is the mounting of an industrial system on a regional scale. This requires a leap from mere "technical" solutions to the plane of "technology" (i.e., choice *among* technical solutions informed from the social, cultural and political orders). Because of inadequate urban services and profiteering in urban real estate, Paulista industry is not necessarily attracted to the city and its outskirts. A broad dispersal pattern has already developed which is eroding the urban-rural polarity. Other ancillary theses are:

1. restoration and reinterpretation of the city's original site under "technological" (implying non-"capitalistic") auspices;
2. rearrangement and integration of haphazard "reticulated" nuclei;
3. reformulation of the problems of public services (elaboration of an integral system of rail, highway and river transportation; long-term regional planning of power resources, etc.).¹⁰⁵

Above we said that the demographic lines of force of the Latin American city passed from a centrifugal phase in the colonial period to a centripetal one in the modern period. The corollary is that the contemporary city is projecting its image, its scheme of life, its economic imperatives out across the face of the land to a degree unparalleled in the history of the area.

[Significant on-going research in Latin American urbanization is being conducted in Venezuela and Middle America.

CENDES, the Center for development studies in Venezuela, has embarked upon a three year \$1,380,000 study of urbanization in that country with support from the United Nations Special Fund. The study will 1) identify the most important aspects of the urban phenomenon; 2) determine the causes and consequences of said phenomenon; 3) arrive at specific recommendations for the resolution of present and future problems and to establish an urbanization policy within the context of national development policy; 4) serve as a prototype in method and perhaps content for similar studies in other developing countries and 5) initiate a permanent program of research on urbanization problems which may keep the government informed on developments and the consequent policy.

In a joint effort by the Colégio de México, the University of Texas Population Research Center and Universidad de Nuevo León, a large assembly of researchers since late 1963 has been engaged in a study of the nature of mobility, both geographical and social and its effect on the urbanization process. Harley Browning and others are working out a technique for "sampling" the censuses by working on a certain percentage of the total number of completed census forms and processing them in detail to determine the type of correlations that might be possible. *Editors note*]

NOTES

1. Luis Ortiz de Zevallos, "Lima: Rising Metropolis," paper for the 11th Pan American Congress of Architects, Washington, D.C., 15–20 June 1965. The Incaic period is Jorge Basadre's point of departure in *La multitud, la ciudad y el campo en la historia del Perú* (Lima, 1929).
2. Jorge E. Hardoy, *Ciudades precolombinas* (Buenos Aires, 1964), p. 13. Arq. Hardoy promises two future volumes on colonial and on modern Latin American cities.
3. Luis García Valdeavellano, *Historia de España de los orígenes a la Baja Edad Media* (3rd ed.; 2 vols., Madrid, 1963), II, 458. Also his *Sobre los burgos y los burgueses de la España medieval* (Madrid, 1960) and José María Lacarra, "Panorama de la historia urbana en la Península Ibérica desde el siglo V al X" in Centro Italiano di Studi sull'Alto Medioevo, *La città nell'Alto Medioevo* (Spoleto, 1959), pp. 319–57.
4. "[During] the very first years of conquest and settlement in America, in its unplanned aspects conquest culture represented southwest and west-central Spain rather than the north." George M. Foster, *Culture and Conquest, America's Spanish Heritage* (Chicago, 1960), p. 232.
5. See Jaime Cortesão, *Os factores democráticos na formação de Portugal* (Lisbon, 1964), pp. 58–158; Torquato Brochado de Souza Soares, *Apointamentos para o estudo da origem das instituições municipais portuguesas* (Lisbon, 1931).
6. See Christian Anglade, "Une tentative de répartition territoriale du phénomène de la capitale: le municipe brésilien," *Caravelle*, 3 (1964), 228–40.
7. Leopoldo Torres Balbás *et al.*, *Resumen histórico del urbanismo en España* (Madrid, 1954), pp. 3–148.
8. Robert Ricard, "La Plaza Mayor en Espagne et en Amérique Espagnole," *Annales, Économie—Sociétés—Civilisations*, II, 4 (Oct.–Dec. 1947), 433–38. Also Robert C. Smith, "Colonial Towns of Spanish and Portuguese America," *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians*, XIV, 4 (Dec. 1955), 1–12; Erwin Walter Palm, "Los orígenes del urbanismo imperial en América" in Instituto Panamericano de Geografía e Historia, Comisión de Historia, *Contribuciones a la historia municipal de América* (Mexico City, 1951), pp. 239–68; Luís Silveira, *Ensaio de iconografia das cidades portuguesas do Ultramar* (4 vols., Lisbon, n. d.), vol. IV.
9. Francisco de Toledo, viceroy of Peru (1569–81), wrote to his king: "[The] first settlers of the cities who remained there as magistrates assumed the power of the governors sent to them so as to give and distribute to the settlers the lands they felt to be necessary. This they did more generously than later seemed proper, and they also caused the *cabildos* to give lands to those who asked for them, with so little thought for the common good of the cities that they failed to leave aside *debesas*, or *ejidos* or *propios* in most cases, as needed to maintain the republics." *Relaciones de*

Latin American Research Review

los virreyes y audiencias que han gobernado el Perú (3 vols., Lima and Madrid, 1867–72), I, 14–15.

10. From a dialogue of 1618 we learn of a wealthy Brazilian sugar planter who amused himself by making a gift to anyone who built a house in the city: 20 milréis for a two-storey house, 10 milréis for a one-storey one. "And he did this for a long time . . . without deriving any benefit other than fulfilling his wish to see the city grow." Brandônio, *Diálogos das grandezas do Brasil* (Recife, 1962), p. 97.
11. Max Weber, *The City* (Glencoe, 1958), chap. 2.
12. However, François Chevalier describes a sporadic "free village" movement of the peons and renters on north Mexican haciendas in the late 18th and 19th centuries: "Survivances seigneuriales et présages de la révolution agraire dans le nord du Mexique," *Revue Historique*, CXXII (July–Sept. 1959), 1–18.
13. The attempt of royal officials to make the *encomenderos* of New Granada carry out their municipal obligations caused what one historian calls the revolt of a "Fronde." Indalecio Liévano Aguirre, *Los grandes conflictos sociales y económicos de nuestra historia* (4 vols., Bogotá, n. d.), vol. I.
14. For bibliography on colonial cities see articles in Instituto Panamericano de Geografía e Historia, *op. cit.* Also: Agustín Millares Carlo, *Los Archivos municipales de Latinoamérica: Libros de actas y colecciones documentales; apuntes bibliográficos* (Maracaibo, 1961); Francisco Domínguez Compañy, "Bibliografía de las instituciones locales de Hispanoamérica (época colonial)," *Revista Interamericana de Bibliografía*, VI, 3 (July–Sept. 1956), 209–23. Selected reading: Constantino Bayle, *Los cabildos seculares en la América Española* (Madrid, 1952); Herbert Wilhelm, *Südamerika im Spiegel seiner Städte* (Hamburg, 1952); R. M. Morse, "Some Characteristics of Latin American Urban History," *American Historical Review*, LXVII, 2 (Jan. 1962), 317–38; George A. Kubler, *Mexican Architecture of the Sixteenth Century* (2 vols., New Haven, 1948); John P. Moore, *The Cabildo in Peru under the Hapsburgs* (Durham, 1954), and "The Cabildo in Peru under the Bourbons" (unpublished MS); Guillermo Céspedes del Castillo, *Lima y Buenos Aires* (Seville, 1947); Juan A. García, *La ciudad indiana* in his *Obras completas* (2 vols., Buenos Aires, 1955), I, 283–475; Amílcar Razori, *Historia de la ciudad argentina* (3 vols., Buenos Aires, 1945); Julio Alemparte Robles, *El cabildo en Chile colonial* (Santiago, 1940); Edmundo Zenha, *O município no Brasil (1532–1700)* (São Paulo, 1948); Nelson Omegna, *A cidade colonial* (Rio de Janeiro, 1961). Thomas Gale (University of Kansas) with the assistance of Bernhard Ansel has collected 8,000 titles referring to "communities" in Latin America with emphasis on the historical aspect. It is in the process of being prepared according to author and area.
15. These admittedly sketchy figures include the non-Hispanic Caribbean region and are from Rosenblat and Carr-Saunders in Angel Rosenblat, *La población indígena y el mestizaje en América* (2 vols., Buenos Aires, 1954).
16. *Relaciones de los virreyes . . .*, *op. cit.*, III, 18–19.
17. François Chevalier, "La gran propiedad en México desde el siglo XVI hasta comienzos del siglo XIX," *Desarrollo Económico*, III, 1–2 (April–Sept. 1963), 51.
18. Fernando Rosenzweig Hernández, "La economía novo-hispana al comenzar el siglo XIX," *Ciencias Políticas y Sociales*, IX, 33 (July–Sept. 1963), 459.
19. John Lynch, *Spanish Colonial Administration, 1782–1810* (London, 1958), pp. 154–62. Colonization was not always successful; see Félix de Azara, *Memoria sobre el estado rural del Río de la Plata y otros informes* (Buenos Aires, 1943), pp. 1–25.
20. Fernando de Azevedo, *Brazilian Culture* (New York, 1950), p. 77.

21. Aroldo de Azevedo, *Vilas e cidades do Brasil colonial* (São Paulo, 1956), pp. 35–54.
22. Federico Brito Figueroa, *La estructura económica de Venezuela colonial* (Caracas, 1963), pp. 271, 275.
23. Francisco Suárez, *Selections from Three Works* (Oxford, 1944), p. 365.
24. Federico Brito Figueroa, *La estructura social y demográfica de Venezuela colonial* (Caracas, 1961), p. 73 n; also his *Ensayos de historia social de Venezuela* (Caracas, 1960).
25. ECLA (Economic Commission for Latin America), *El desarrollo social de América Latina en la postguerra* (Buenos Aires, 1963), p. 13. The point is developed in my essay "The Heritage of Latin America" in Louis Hartz, *The Founding of New Societies* (New York, 1964), pp. 123–77.
26. For 19th-century cities see: "Expansión urbana en la América Latina durante el siglo XIX" (symposium), *Estudios Americanos*, XIII, 67–68 (April–May 1957), 255–93; William E. Curtis, *The Capitals of Spanish America* (New York, 1888); Razoni, *op. cit.*; Gilberto Freyre, *The Mansions and the Shanties* (New York, 1963); Joaquín Capelo, *Sociología de Lima* (4 vols., Lima, 1895–1902).
27. R. M. Morse, *From Community to Metropolis, A Biography of São Paulo, Brazil* (Gainesville, 1958).
28. George A. Kubler, "Cities and Culture in the Colonial Period in Latin America," *Diogenes*, 47 (Fall 1964), 53–62.
29. For bibliography on contemporary Latin American cities see: Exchange Bibliographies, Latin American Series (Nos. 1–8, 1962–64), compiled by Francis Violich and distributed by the Council of Planning Librarians, Eugene, Ore.; Angel Rubio y Muñoz-Bocanegra, *Bibliografía de geografía urbana de América* (Rio de Janeiro, 1961); Waldemiro Bazzanella, *Problemas de urbanização na América Latina, fontes bibliográficas* (Rio de Janeiro, 1960). Comparative bibliography: William Bicker *et al.*; *Comparative Urban Development: An Annotated Bibliography* (Washington, 1965). General studies or collections of studies: Philip H. Hauser, ed., *Urbanization in Latin America* (New York, 1961); "Actes du Colloque sur le problème des capitales en Amérique Latine," *Caravelle* 3 (1964); Jaime Dorselaer and Alfonso Gregory, *La urbanización en América Latina* (2 vols., Fribourg and Brussels, 1962); Luis Calderón, Arturo Calle and Jaime Dorselaer, *Problemas de urbanización en América Latina* (Fribourg and Bogotá, 1963); R. M. Morse, "Latin American Cities: Aspects of Function and Structure" in John Friedmann and William Alonso, eds., *Regional Development and Planning* (Cambridge, 1964), pp. 361–81; Centro Latino Americano de Pesquisas em Ciências Sociais, *Situação social da América Latina* (Rio de Janeiro, 1965), pp. 50–79; T. Lynn Smith, "Urbanization in Latin America," in Nels Anderson, ed., *Urbanism and Urbanization* (Leiden, 1964), pp. 127–42; John P. Powelson and Anatole A. Solow, "Urban and Rural Development in Latin America," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 360 (July 1965), 48–62; Mauricio Gómez Mayorga *et al.*, *La superurbanización caótica* (Mexico City, 1963); W. Stanley Rycroft and Myrtle M. Clemmer, *A Study of Urbanization in Latin America* (New York, 1962). Case studies: Jorge E. Hardoy, "The Process of Urbanization in Argentina," paper for the Conference on International and Comparative Urban Studies in American Higher Education, Rutgers University, 6–8 June 1965, and two papers circulated by the Instituto Latinoamericano de Planificación Económica y Social, Santiago: Luis Ratinoff, "La urbanización en América Latina: el

- caso de Paraguay" (multilith, July 1964) and Suzana Prates, "Algumas consideraciones sobre el proceso de urbanización de El Salvador" (mimeog., Dec. 1964).
30. For a case study of "conurbation" see M. T. Segadas Viana, "Nova Iguacu, absorção de uma célula urbana pelo Grande Rio de Janeiro," *Revista Brasileira de Geografia*, XXIV, 2 (April–June 1962), 155–250.
 31. See Moysés Poblete Troncoso, "El éxodo rural, sus orígenes, sus repercusiones," *América Latina*, V, 1–2 (Jan.–June 1962), 41–49; Henry F. Dobyns and Mario C. Vázquez, eds., *Migración e integración en el Perú* (Lima, 1963); José Francisco de Camargo, *Éxodo rural no Brasil* (2nd ed.; Rio de Janeiro, 1960); Instituto Joaquim Nabuco de pesquisas Sociais, *As migrações para o Recife* (4 vols., Recife, 1961); Pan American Union, *Éxodo rural en Venezuela* (Washington, 195?); Nathan L. Whetten and Robert G. Burnight, "Internal Migration in Mexico," *Estadística, Journal of the Inter-American Statistical Institute*, XVI, 58 (March 1958), 65–77; Edmundo Flores, *Tratado de economía agrícola* (2nd ed.; Mexico City, 1962), pp. 204–20; Universidad de Chile, Instituto de Economía, *La población del Gran Santiago* (Santiago, 1959), chap. IX; *La Torre* (special no. on Puerto Rican emigration), IV, 13 (Jan.–March 1956).
 32. F. C. Weffort distinguishes urban populism from "coronelismo," the old-style, personalized client relationship of the rural Brazilian *município*: "Política de massas" in Octávio Ianni *et al.*, *Política e revolução social no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro, 1965), pp. 159–98. The classic study of "coronelismo" is Victor Nuñez Leal, *Coronelismo, enxada e voto* (Rio de Janeiro, 1948).
 33. Andrew Pearse, "Some Characteristics of Urbanization in the City of Rio de Janeiro" in Hauser, *op. cit.*, p. 202.
 34. Gino Germani, "Emigración del campo a la ciudad y sus causas" in Horacio Giberti *et al.*, *Sociedad, economía y reforma agraria* (Buenos Aires, 1965), pp. 74–75. Charles Rosario emphasizes the imponderables and the sense of personal crisis attending each decision to migrate: "La emigración como experiencia vital," *La Torre*, IV, 13 (Jan.–March 1956), 23–31.
 35. Marshall Wolfe, "Some Implications of Recent Changes in Urban and Rural Settlement Patterns in Latin America," paper for UN World Population Conference, 1965 (A.8/I/E66). Also ECLA, Social Affairs Division, "Rural Settlement Patterns and Social Change in Latin America: Notes for a Strategy of Rural Development" (multilith, April 1964).
 36. Torcuato S. Di Tella, *La teoría del primer impacto del crecimiento económico* (Buenos Aires, n. d.), p. 34.
 37. *Child of the Dark* (New York, 1962) by Carolina Maria de Jesus is the diary of such a person.
 38. He classifies Brazil south from the state of Rio as advanced; Pernambuco, Bahia and Minas Gerais as intermediate; the rest of Brazil as retarded.
 39. Waldemiro Bazzanella, "Industrialização e urbanização no Brasil," *América Latina*, VI, I (Jan.–March 1963), 3–26. The urban style of life may of course extend beyond the confines of a city; see Ruben E. Reina, "The Urban World View of a Tropical Forest Community in the Absence of a City, Peten, Guatemala," *Human Organization*, XXIII, 4 (Winter 1964), 265–77. For historical and comparative analysis of urbanization without industrialization see Bert F. Hoselitz, "The Role of Cities in the Economic Growth of Underdeveloped Countries," *Journal of Political Economy*, LXI, 3 (June 1953), 195–208, and "The City, the Factory, and Economic Growth," *The American Economic Review*, XLV, 2 (May 1955), 166–84. Frank Sherwood in

- an unpublished study on Brazil, "Patterns of urban growth and their political consequences," MS (1965), found there was not as high a correlation between levels of urbanization and voter eligibility and participation as between these latter and industrialization.
40. Celso Furtado, "Obstáculos políticos ao crescimento econômico do Brasil," *Revista Civilização Brasileira*, I, 1 (March 1965), 133–41.
 41. Denis Lambert, "Urbanisation et développement économique en Amérique Latine," *Caravelle*, 3 (1964), 266–71; also Camilo Torres Restrepo, "La proletarización de Bogotá," *Monografías Sociológicas* (Bogotá), 9 (Nov. 1961).
 42. Simon Rottenberg, "Note on the Economics of Urbanization in Latin America," UN document E/CN.12/URB 6 (30 Sept. 1958).
 43. Colombia is highly regionalized; a city like Medellín might be said to have primacy at the departmental level.
 44. Pedro Pinchas Geiger, *Evolução da rede urbana brasileira* (Rio de Janeiro, 1963).
 45. ECLA, "Geographic Distribution of the Population of Latin America and Regional Development Priorities," UN document E/CN.12/643 (10 Feb. 1963), pp. 28–33.
 46. Brian J. L. Berry, "City Size Distributions and Economic Development," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, IX, 4, Part 1 (July 1961), 587. Floyd and Lillian Dotson noted high growth rates for smaller Mexican cities after 1940 and suggested correlation between decentralization and technological-economic development: "Urban Centralization and Decentralization in Mexico," *Rural Sociology*, XXI, 1 (March 1956), 41–49.
 47. ECLA, "Geographic Distribution . . .," *op. cit.*, p. 32.
 48. Harley L. Browning, "Recent Trends in Latin American Urbanization," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 316 (March 1958), 115–16.
 49. Carlos Keller R. in "Seminario del Gran Santiago," *Boletín Informativo* (Universidad de Chile), VIII, 34 (Oct. 1958), 197–98. For Caracas see José V. Montesino Samperio, *La problación del area metropolitana de Caracas* (Caracas, 1956).
 50. Richard Bird, "The Economy of the Mexican Federal District," *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, XVII, 2 (Autumn 1963), 50–51.
 51. Browning, *loc. cit.*, p. 116.
 52. Carlos M. Rama, "De la singularidad de la urbanización en el Uruguay," *Revista de Ciencias Sociales*, VI, 2 (June 1962), 177–86. Also: David E. Snyder, "Urban Places in Uruguay and the Concept of a Hierarchy" (author's offprint), and "Commercial Passenger Linkages and the Metropolitan Nodality of Montevideo," *Economic Geography*, XXXVIII, 2 (April 1962), 95–112. For Uruguay's social discontinuities see Aldo E. Solari, "Impacto político de las diferencias de los países en los grados e índices de modernización y desarrollo económico en América Latina," *América Latina*, VIII, 1 (Jan.–March 1965), 5–21.
 53. ECLA, *Desarrollo social . . .*, *op. cit.*, p. 81.
 54. For a recent inquiry into industrial workers' attitudes see Guillermo Briones and José Mejía Valera, *El obrero industrial* (Lima, 1964).
 55. Kubler, *Mexican Architecture . . .*, *op. cit.*, I, 74.
 56. Asael T. Hansen, "The Ecology of a Latin American City" in E. B. Reuter, ed., *Race and Culture Contacts* (New York, 1934), pp. 124–42.
 57. Oscar Lewis, "Urbanization without Breakdown," *The Scientific Monthly*, LXXXV, 1 (July 1952), 31–41, and "Nuevas observaciones sobre el 'continuum' con especial referencia a México," *Ciencias Políticas y Sociales*, IX, 3 (Jan.–March 1963), 13–28; William P. Mangin, "The Role of Regional Associations in the Adaptation of Rural

Latin American Research Review

- Population in Perú," *Sociologus*, IX, 1 (1959), 23–35, and "Mental Health and Migration to Cities: A Peruvian Case," The New York Academy of Sciences, *Annals*, 84 (Dec. 1960), 911–17; Douglas S. Butterworth, "A Study of the Urbanization Process among Mixtec Migrants from Tilaltongo in Mexico City," *América Indígena*, XXII, 3 (July 1962), 257–74; Latin American papers for Symposium No. 26, Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research (Aug. 27–Sept. 8, 1964). "Cross-cultural Similarities in the Urbanization Process," for a critique of the folk-urban continuum and comparative bibliography see Francisco Benet, "Sociology Uncertain: The Ideology of the Rural-Urban Continuum," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, VI, 1 (Oct. 1963), 1–23.
58. Theodore Caplow hints at this possibility in "The Social Ecology of Guatemala City," *Social Forces*, XXVIII, 2 (Dec. 1949), 113–33, and "The Modern Latin American City" in Sol Tax, ed., *Acculturation in the Americas* (Chicago, 1952), pp. 255–60.
59. Junta Nacional de la Vivienda, Lima, mimeog., memo on *barriadas*. José Matos Mar states that in 1961 the percentage of Lima's inhabitants in *barriadas* stood at 26%, and that for the newly developed industrial city of Chimbote the figure reached 70%; "El caso del Perú: consideraciones sobre su situación social como marco de referencia al problema de Lima," *Caravelle*, 3 (1964), 119.
60. Figures taken with extrapolations from "As favelas do Estado da Guanabara, segundo o censo de 1960," *Boletim Estatístico* (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística), 84 (Oct.–Dec. 1963).
61. ECLA, "Urbanization in Latin America, Results of a Field Survey of Living Conditions in an Urban Sector," E/CN.12/662 (13 March 1963), pp. 5–7.
62. *Architectural Design*, XXXIII, 8 (Aug. 1963), 373–74. For an evaluation of the superblocks and their maladministration by the regime which built them see Banco Obrero, *Proyecto de evaluación de los superbloques* (Caracas, 1961); Rolando Grooscors, "Problemas de vivienda urbana en Venezuela," VI Congreso Latinoamericano de Sociología, *Memoria* (2 vols., Caracas, 1961), II, 47–51.
63. Two novels about *villas miserias* are: Bernardo Verbitsky, *Villa miseria también es América* (2nd ed., Buenos Aires, 1958), and Rubén Benítez, *Ladrones de luz* (Buenos Aires, 1959).
64. Claude Bataillon, "Mexico capitale métris," *Caravelle*, 3 (1964), 173–74; Bird, *loc. cit.*, pp. 48–49.
65. ECLA, "Geographic Distribution . . ." *op. cit.*, pp. 5–8.
66. Centro Latino Americano de Pesquisas, *op. cit.*, p. 89.
67. A sidelight on this question comes from a study of lower-class use of leisure time in Salvador, Brazil, which indicates that the proportion of activities demanding active rather than passive participation is much higher here than in "developed" urban societies: Acácio Ferreira, *Lazer operário, um estudo de organização social das cidades* (Salvador, 1959).
68. Luis Calderón Alvarado, *Poder retentivo del "area local urbana" en las relaciones sociales* (Fribourg, 1963); Theodore Caplow *et al.*, *The Urban Ambience, A Study of San Juan, Puerto Rico* (Totowa, N. J., 1964).
69. For an extended critique of the Caplow study see R. M. Morse, "The Sociology of San Juan: An Exegesis of Urban Mythology," *Caribbean Studies*, V, 2 (July 1965), in press.
70. Guillermo Rosenblüth López, *Problemas socio-económicos de la marginalidad y la integración urbana* (Santiago, 1963) and "La participación de las poblaciones

- urbanas en el crecimiento urbano," MS (Jan. 1965). Also ECLA, "Urbanization in Latin America . . .," *op. cit.* Joaquín Edwards Bello, *El roto* (Santiago, 1920) is an early novel of lower-class Santiago life.
71. Rosenblüth, "La participación . . .," *op. cit.*
 72. *New York Times*, 15 Dec. 1964.
 73. See G. H. Dietz *et al.*, *Housing in Latin America* (Cambridge, 1965); C. A. Frankenoff, "Low-cost Housing in a Latin Economy," *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, XVII, 4 (Spring 1964), 79–86. Charles Abrams, *Man's Struggle for Shelter* (Cambridge, 1964) provides a comparative context; in chap. 12 he points out difficulties of self-help programs. For Puerto Rico, which has had much experience with public housing, see Kurt W. Back, *Slums, Projects, and People* (Durham, 1962); Helen I. Safa, "From Shanty Town to Public Housing," *Caribbean Studies*, IV, 1 (April 1964), 3–11; A. B. Hollingshead and L. H. Rogler, "Attitudes toward Slums and Public Housing in Puerto Rico" in Leonard J. Duhl, ed., *The Urban Condition* (New York, 1963), pp. 229–45. The last two studies illustrate the frustrations and social disorganization which the move from slums to public housing (*caseríos*) may produce.
 74. John C. Turner, "An Interpretation of the Housing Problem in the Light of Popular Experience," mimeog. lecture, Junta Nacional de la Vivienda, Lima.
 75. Caplow *et al.*, *Urban Ambience . . .*, *op. cit.*, p. 228.
 76. Junta Nacional de la Vivienda, memo on *barriadas*, *op. cit.* Oscar Lewis illustrates differing levels of social cohesion among Mexican *vecindades* in "The Culture of Poverty in Mexico City, Two Case Studies," *The Economic Weekly* (June 1960), 965–72.
 77. Baltazar Caravedo, Humberto Rotondo and Javier Mariátegui, *Estudios de psiquiatría social en el Perú* (Lima, 1963); Richard W. Patch, "Life in a Callejón, A Study of Urban Disorganization," AUFS, West Coast South America Series, VIII, 6 (June 1961). For a strategy with respect to such zones Viceroy Manuel de Guirior established a vigorous if paternalistic precedent. In 1780 he wrote of his troubles with Pitipití, a settlement of 2,000 persons of all *castas* near the plaza of Callao that was subject to "grave and continuous disorders." Deserters took shelter there; theft, murder and assault were endemic. The haphazard grouping of shacks made it hard to intervene without risking violence. "*But keeping always in mind the necessity which created this first settlement, I seized a good opportunity, and without any disturbance or casualties the inhabitants were all moved near the town of San Simón de Villavista, a quarter of a league from Callao. There, with the streets and facilities that were given to them, they are building houses and ranchos where they can live more obedient and civilized lives.*" *Relaciones de los virreyes . . .*, *op. cit.*, III, 90 (italics added).
 78. André Corten, "Como vive la otra mitad de Santo Domingo: estudio de dualismo estructural," *Caribbean Studies*, IV, 4 (Jan. 1965), 3–19.
 79. Irwin Press, "The Incidence of Compadrazgo among Puerto Ricans in Chicago," *Social and Economic Studies*, XII, 4 (Dec. 1963), 475–80.
 80. In Cali a similar distinction exists between the "traditional" and the "economic" *compadrazgo*. Centro Interamericano de Vivienda y Planeamiento, *Siloé, el proceso de desarrollo comunal aplicado a un proyecto de rehabilitación urbana* (Bogotá, 1958), p. 9.
 81. Lloyd H. Rogler, "Slum Neighborhoods in Latin America," unpublished paper. Ernesto Ruiz reports on anxiety and insecurity in a Puerto Rican slum in "Algunas

Latin American Research Review

- observaciones e interpretaciones sobre un arrabal puertorriqueño," *Revista de Ciencias Sociales*, VII, 1–2 (March–June 1963), 149–67.
82. Research by North Americans on Latin American slum and shanty dwellers hums with a war chant against venerated theoretical models for urban society. What the new interpretations prove is not so much the ethnocentrism of Maine or Durkheim or Wirth as the naïveté of contemporary American social science and the inability of its practitioners to deal simultaneously with generalized models and cultural systems. The "culture of poverty" invites the same mischievous inversion which Marx performed for Proudhon's "philosophy of poverty."
83. An ironic twist to Alberdi's injunction of the last century: *gobernar es poblar*.
84. A Peruvian sociologist claims that in his country this social sector is establishing its cultural identity as a *cholo* group, that it is not taking what he feels to have been the Mexican path of total Westernization. Aníbal Quijano O., "La emergencia del grupo 'cholo' y sus implicaciones en la sociedad peruana" (Lima, 1964, mimeog).
85. "[Many Mexican] economic and political planners consider a rapid population growth as an exciting national challenge, opportunity, or stimulus rather than an obstacle to national progress." Arthur F. Corwin, *Contemporary Mexican Attitudes toward Population, Poverty, and Public Opinion* (Gainesville, 1963), p. 49. Also J. Mayone Stycos, "Opinions of Latin-American Intellectuals on Population Problems and Birth Control," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 306 (July 1965), 11–26.
86. See "Creation of Employment Opportunities in Relation to Labour Supply" in Hauser, *op. cit.*, pp. 118–48.
87. In *Los dueños del Perú* (Lima, 196?), pp. 63–67, Carlos Malpica lists "urbanizable" private landholdings of one million square meters or more in the environs of Lima and Callao, a total of 119 haciendas. These lands, generally held for speculation, are carefully protected against invasions by squatters, who are forced into arid, sandy zones.
88. François Bourricaud, "La place de Lima dans la vie politique péruvienne," *Caravelle*, 3 (1964), 138–46. Also Torcuato S. Di Tella, *El sistema político argentino y la clase obrera* (Buenos Aires, 1964); Alfonso Trujillo Ferrari, "Atitudes e comportamento político do imigrante nordestino em São Paulo," *Sociologia*, XXIV, 3 (Sept. 1962), 159–80.
89. Carlos Alberto de Medina, *A favela e o demagogo* (São Paulo, 1964), pp. 97–98.
90. Comisión Promoción Popular, *Informe* (4 vols. mimeog. Santiago, Aug. 1964).
91. José Medina Echavarría, *Consideraciones sociológicas sobre el desarrollo económico en América Latina* (Montevideo, 1964), pp. 69–77. Also: ECLA, *Desarrollo social . . .*, *op. cit.*; Andrew H. Whiteford, *Two Cities of Latin America* (Beloit, 1960); Miguel Othón de Mendizábal *et al.*, *Las clases sociales en México* (Mexico City n. d.); Octávio Ianni, *Industrialização e desenvolvimento no Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro, 1963); José Luis de Imaz, *La clase alta de Buenos Aires* (Buenos Aires, 1962) and *Los que mandan* (Buenos Aires, 1964). An extended essay which cites interesting literary material is Juan José Sebrelli, *Buenos Aires, vida cotidiana y alienación* (4th ed.; Buenos Aires, 1965). Juan Carlos Argulla studies the impact of recent industrialization on social classes and social process in Córdoba, Argentina, in "Aspectos sociales del proceso de industrialización en una comunidad urbana," *Revista Mexicana de Sociología*, XXV, 2 (May–Aug. 1963), 747–72.
92. ECLA, "El empresario industrial en América Latina," UN document E/CN.12/642 (11 March 1963), with 4 appendices containing case studies of Argentina, Brazil,

- Chile and Colombia. Also: Louis Kriesberg, "Entrepreneurs in Latin America and the Role of Cultural and Situational Processes," *International Social Science Journal*, XV, 4 (1963), 581-94; Fernando Henrique Cardoso, *Empresário industrial e desenvolvimento econômico* (São Paulo, 1964); Juarez Rubens Brandão Lopes, *Sociedade industrial no Brasil* (São Paulo, 1964); Albert Lauterbach, *Management Attitudes in Chile* (Santiago, 1961); Charles H. Savage, Jr., *Social Reorganization in a Factory in the Andes* (Ithaca, 1964); T. C. Cochran and Ruben E. Reina, *Entrepreneurship in Argentine Culture* (Philadelphia, 1962). Warren K. Dean has done a historical study which shows how the organizational structures of the Brazilian *fazenda* was transferred to industrial management: *São Paulo's Industrial Elite, 1890-1960*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Florida, 1964.
93. Enzo Faletto, "Incorporación de los sectores obreros al proceso de desarrollo," Instituto Latinoamericano de Planificación Económica y Social, Santiago, multilithed (Dec. 1964). Also: Alain Touraine, "Industrialisation et conscience ouvrière à São Paulo," ed., "Ouvriers et syndicats d'Amérique Latine," special No. of *Sociologie du Travail*, III 4 (Oct.-Dec. 1961), and esp. Touraine's own study (pp. 77-95): Bertram Hutchinson, *Mobilidade e trabalho* (São Paulo, 1960).
 94. For a general statement see Desiderio Graue, "Coordinación de la labor del sociólogo y del urbanista frente al fenómeno ciudadano y el problema de la vivienda," VI Congreso de Sociología, *op. cit.*, II, 62-75.
 95. See Benjamín Vicuña Mackenna, *Historia crítica y social de la ciudad de Santiago* (2 vols., Valparaíso, 1869).
 96. These reflections were suggested to me by Luis Ratinoff.
 97. "Rio admirável mundo novo," *Manchete* (17 April 1965), 42-87.
 98. In capital-poor Latin America a fixed investment of \$100 generates average annual production of \$40-50, but only \$10-12 if put into residential building. Hauser, *op. cit.*, p. 37.
 99. Zelia Nuttall, "Royal Ordinances concerning the Laying Out of New Towns," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, IV, 4 (Nov. 1921), 743-53 and V, 2 (May 1922), 249-54.
 100. See William Mangin's account of a Lima invasion in *Architectural Design*, XXXIII, 8 (Aug. 1963), 368-69; also J. P. Powelson, "The Land-Grabbers of Cali," *The Reporter* (16 Jan. 1964), 30-31.
 101. "Población Cardenal Caro ¿llegará a ser comuna?" *La Voz* (Santiago), 21 March 1965.
 102. A Lima informant told me that a *barriada* of about 450 families is optimum for development work. Comisión Promoción Popular (*op. cit.*) contains discussions of the ideal size for nuclear urban communities.
 103. Middle-class Chileans who try to assimilate to the upper class and its ways are called *siúticos*. They are analyzed in Frederick B. Pike, "Aspects of Class Relations in Chile, 1850-1960," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, XLIII, 1 (Feb. 1963), 14-33. For a general statement see A. Pizzorno, "Sviluppo economico e urbanizzazione," *Quaderni di Sociologia*, XI (1962), 21-51.
 104. Luiz Saia, "Notas para a teorização de São Paulo," *Acrópole*, XXV, 295-96 (June 1963), 209-21.
 105. For Paulista regional ecology see: Pierre Monbeig, *Pionniers et planteurs de São Paulo* (Paris, 1952); Aroldo de Azevedo *et al.*, *A cidade de São Paulo, estudos de geografia urbana* (4 vols., São Paulo, 1958); Caio Prado Júnior, *Evolução política do Brasil e outros estudos* (4th ed.; São Paulo, 1963), pp. 95-146. For regional studies

Latin American Research Review

of other cities see: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, Conselho Nacional de Geografia, *O Rio de Janeiro e sua região* (Rio de Janeiro, 1964); Mary C. Megee, *Monterrey, Mexico: Internal Patterns and External Relations* (Chicago, 1958); Jean Tricart, "Un exemple du déséquilibre villes—campagnes dans une économie en voie du développement: Le Salvador," *Développement et Civilisations*, 11 (July-Sept. 1962).

ADDENUM. The following three articles, all by Kingsley Davis, should be appropriately inserted in the footnotes above: "Colonial Expansion and Urban Diffusion in the Americas"; "Las causas y efectos del fenómeno de primacía urbana con referencia especial a América Latina"; "The Place of Latin America in World Demographic History." They appear as Nos. 131, 144 and 145, respectively, of the Reprint Series of the Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley.