As political and military conditions in the RVN deteriorated throughout 1964, it became manifestly clear to the White House that the United States would have to increase significantly its presence in Vietnam to stave off defeat. With U.S. credibility at stake and his own political fortunes attached to the outcome of the war, the president never wavered from his commitment to Vietnam, notwithstanding the ample evidence of decay there. Thus Johnson, McNamara, and McGeorge Bundy, among others, took crucial steps in early 1965, such as intensifying the air war, deploying ground troops, and authorizing offensive operations against the VC. By midyear the United States was well on its way toward taking over the war.

At the same time, military critics and politicos were divided over U.S. policy and prospects in Indochina. Maxwell Taylor and Westmoreland initially pointed out the risks of greater intervention and urged that the United States maintain its support role, but not engage in combat. Within two months, however, Westmoreland, sensing that defeat was imminent and recognizing the political realities of escalation, would request combat forces and assign them an offensive mission.