WORLD POLITICS
Vol. 51 • July 1999 • No. 4

CONTENTS

The Free Trade Epidemic of the 1860s and Other Outbreaks of Economic Discrimination  David Lazer  447

Old Political Rationalities and New Democracies: Compromise and Confrontation in Hungary and Poland  Anna Seleny  484

Africa’s Overgrown State Reconsidered: Bureaucracy and Economic Growth  Arthur A. Goldsmith  520

Women in the Legislatures and Executives of the World: Knocking at the Highest Glass Ceiling  Andrew Reynolds  547

Index to Volume 51  573

The Contributors  ii

Abstracts  iii

Referees, 1998  v
THE CONTRIBUTORS

DAVID LAZER is Assistant Professor of Public Policy at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He has written on the dynamics of network formation in a variety of political contexts and is currently completing a book manuscript on the spread of preferential trade agreements.

ANNA SELENY is Assistant Professor of Politics at Princeton University. She has published several articles on political-economic transformation in Eastern Europe and recently completed a book manuscript on state-society relations in the region, entitled, “The Practice of Reform and the Meaning of Revolt: From Communism to Democracy, 1949–1999.” Her current research focuses on the successful construction of social democracies under exceptional conditions in Eastern Europe and Latin America.

ARTHUR A. GOLDSMITH is Professor of Management at the University of Massachusetts, Boston, and faculty associate at the Harvard Institute for International Development. He currently directs a survey of business and government perceptions of the business climate in several African countries.

ANDREW REYNOLDS is Assistant Professor of Government and International Studies at the University of Notre Dame and a Fellow of the Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies and the Joan B. Kroc Institute for Peace Studies. His most recent books have been Electoral Systems and Democratization in Southern Africa (1999) and (as editor) Election ’99 South Africa; From Mandela to Mbeki (1999). He has written on issues of democratization and constitutional design in Southern Africa and consulted on issues of electoral system design in Africa, Europe, and Asia. His current research is a global study of democratization and constitutional design in plural societies since 1945.

Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use, or the internal or personal use of specific clients, is granted by The Johns Hopkins University Press for libraries and other users registered with the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC) Transactional Reporting Service, provided that the fee of $3.25 per article is paid directly to CCC, 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923. 0043-8871/94 $03.25
ABSTRACTS

THE FREE TRADE EPIDEMIC OF THE 1860S AND OTHER OUTBREAKS OF ECONOMIC DISCRIMINATION

By DAVID LAZER

Why was there an abrupt increase in economic openness in Europe in the 1860s? This increase may have been the result of a contagion process, in which the Cobden-Chevalier treaty between Britain and France threatened to displace third-party exports to France with British exports. As a result, most European states signed similar treaties with France, which had further ripple effects.

This article outlines a formal model of this process, based on the assumption that an agreement between two states increases the desirability of similar treaties to third parties. Propositions regarding the rate and pattern of spread of treaties are derived from this model. This article then discusses the insights these propositions may offer into the rise and fall of the most-favored-nation network of treaties between 1860 and 1929.

At a theoretical level the model aims to link the microlevel processes underlying state preferences to system-level phenomena. At a substantive level this analysis offers insight into the current explosion of regionalism.

OLD POLITICAL RATIONALITIES AND NEW DEMOCRACIES

COMPROMISE AND CONFRONTATION IN HUNGARY AND POLAND

By ANNA SELENY

Studies of democratic consolidation tend to highlight the same factors previously used to explain countries’ transitional dynamics. Yet one cannot properly understand success or failure in democratic consolidation—much less discern significant qualitative differences among consolidated democracies—by focusing exclusively on formal institutions, modes of transition, incentive structures, or exogenous factors. Close inspection of two newly consolidated democracies—Poland and Hungary—shows that despite radically altered institutional arrangements, legal structures, and political-economic incentives, the most important determinants of the models of democracy emerging today derive from pretransition conceptual frames and informal political settlements. Specifically, the core conflicts between ruling elites and society in communist Poland and Hungary, as well as the patterns of political accommodation that evolved in the management of those conflicts, continue to structure the political agenda and order debate in both countries. In Poland overlapping ethical-ideological cleavages and failures of political accommodation under the ancien régime have resulted in a confrontational-pluralist model of democracy. In contrast, Hungary’s compromise-corporatist model stems from early informal accommodation between the party-state and society that recast most conflicts as “economic” in nature. These long-standing conflicts and political patterns explain striking contemporary differences in social mobilization, party competition, and constitutional development. The article concludes with a discussion of how these models are likely to shape each country’s prospects for sustained governability and increased democratic legitimacy.

AFRICA’S OVERGROWN STATE RECONSIDERED

BUREAUCRACY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

By ARTHUR A. GOLDSMITH

How close is the link between outsized states and economic stagnation in Africa? This article shows that African public bureaucracies are not as large as often portrayed, that they have been getting smaller, and that reducing their size alone has not been a prescription for economic revival. To the contrary, the countries with higher levels of public employment, such as Botswana and Mauritius, are apt to have the better economic records. These findings suggest that a superabundance of public personnel is not in itself a major impediment to growth in Africa. Too much attention has been paid to quantitative or “first-generation” bureaucratic problems, and too little attention has been given the “second-generation” issues of bureaucratic quality.
This article reports the results of a survey of women in legislatures and executives around the world as they were constituted in 1998 (N = 180). The chief hypotheses regarding the factors hindering or facilitating women's access to political representation were tested by multivariate regression models. The regression models juxtaposed a cocktail of institutional, political, cultural, and socioeconomic variables with the following dependent variables: (1) the percentage of MPs who are women and (2) the percentage of cabinet ministers who are women.

A number, although not all, of the cited hypotheses were statistically confirmed and more finely quantified. The socioeconomic development of women in society has an effect on the number of women in parliament but not in the cabinet. A country's length of experience with multipartyism and women's enfranchisement correlates with both the legislative and the executive percentage. Certain electoral systems are more women friendly than others. The ideological nature of the party system affects the number of women elected and chosen for cabinet posts. And last, the state's dominant religion, taken as a proxy for culture, also statistically relates to the number of women who will make it to high political office. However, other long-held hypotheses were not proved. The degree of democracy is not a good indicator of the percentage of women who will make it into the legislature or the cabinet, nor is the dichotomy between a presidential or parliamentary system.