THE EARLY-MODERN
IBERO-AMERICAN WORLD

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How modern was the early modern Ibero-American world? What was its place within the larger Atlantic historical developments of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries? What are the potential points of contact between Ibero-American studies and Atlantic studies across the disciplines? When addressing these questions, Ibero-Americanists must invariably engage a long tradition in (predominantly Protestant) historiography, which has insisted on the essentially feudal, medieval, and regressive nature of early modern Spain and its overseas possessions, and


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has therefore tended to exclude the Ibero-American world from the larger history of Western (and Atlantic) modernity. 

 Following the seminal work of José Antonio Maravall, some scholars have recently taken issue with the assumption that the early Ibero-American world was antithetical to modernity and have instead emphasized the active and positive role that Spain and its empire played in making the modern world. Significantly, this reassessment has largely been carried out in the context of critical discussions of the baroque, the central focus of Maravall’s works. This line of inquiry has been especially productive for literary historians and, hence, also profoundly informs Reason and Its Others, the collection edited by David Castillo and Massimo Lollini. The “double spatial revolution” resulting from the geographic discoveries of the early-modern period on one hand, and from the infinite mathematical universe of science announced by René Descartes and Galileo on the other, is often seen as a precursor to the “oceanic and technological primacy of the English empire . . . while relegating the Mediterranean world to a peripheral role.” Instead, this collection means to “reexamine the legacy of modern western rationality from a ‘southern perspective’” (xvii). As its sixteen essays (not counting the editors’ introduction and the afterword cowritten by Luis Martín-Estudillo and Nicholas Spadaccini) are too wide ranging to be adequately summarized here, I will only mention a few directly relevant to the Ibero-American world. Thus, appropriating Maravall’s concept of baroque rationalism, Bradley Nelson focuses on ritualistic aspects in the writings of the Jesuit moralist Baltasar Gracián to contend that, contrary to modern wisdom, “ritual is not something that rationalism leaves behind” but is instead “at the heart of rationalism’s—and modernity’s—efforts to mark an ontological break with the past” (80). In contrast, William Chandler’s very suggestive essay proposes that we think of the baroque as a “distinctive modernity” (165) and argues for the existence of a baroque “public sphere” that operates quite differently from the bourgeois public sphere conceptualized by Jürgen Habermas, a public sphere that, though not predicated on the transparency of print or coffeehouse culture, nevertheless affords venues for participation and political agency in spectacle and rumor. Thus, if the “northern” (Protestant) philosophical discourse of modernity from Georg Hegel to Max Weber to Habermas has come to privilege Enlightenment forms of publicness over those of the baroque, William Egginton observes in another essay that it would be a mistake to associate the baroque exclusively with the Counter-Reformation, as, beneath their surfaces, the Reformation and Counter-Reformation are but two responses to the same distrust of the world of appearances, the only difference being that the former “responds by negating the lived world,” and the latter “responds by emphasizing its theatricality” (187).
Although the first two parts of *Reason and Its Others* are concerned mainly with Italy and peninsular Spain, the third part turns to the Americas and to the relationship between colonialism and modernity. Fernando de la Flor focuses on “sacrificial suffering” as a rhetorical strategy in seventeenth-century texts by missionaries and baroque poets such as Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz; George Mariscal sees a similarity between contemporary debates about the international military inventions of the United States and the debate of Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda and Bartolomé de las Casas in 1550–1551, claiming that Las Casas evinces a “radical idea of justice” and a certain modern quality “in the way in which his experiences in America alchemized his intellectual formation” (260); Margaret Greer revisits the central role that the discourse of cannibalism played in the colonialist archive by examining two Spanish tragedies, Cervantes’s *La destrucción de Numancia* and Tirso de Molina’s *Las Amazonas*, as a “type of intersubjective repression” (280); borrowing from postcolonial philosophers and critics such as Enrique Dussel and Walter Mignolo, Fernando Ordóñez focuses on the writings of the Jesuit Antonio Ruiz de Montoya and on modernity as the product of a spatially “dialectical relationship between Europe and the non-European world” (297) in an argument reminiscent of the famous essay on heterotopias by Michel Foucault (who is not mentioned, however); and, finally, Giuseppe Mazzotta explores the intellectual debt of Giambattista Vico’s *New Science* to sixteenth-century Spanish natural historians of the New World, especially Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo and José de Acosta. As a whole, this collection provides testimony to the continuing fascination that the baroque holds for the historiography of modernity, whether it is Maravall’s baroque as a state-directed and controlled mass culture, or the baroque of Latin Americans such as José Lezama Lima and Severo Sarduy as a transgressive and liberating play of forms.

Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra has emerged as one of the most prominent revisionist historians emphasizing the modernity of the early Ibero-American world. For him, historians of science and especially of the so-called scientific revolution are among the main culprits of the neglect for Spanish America in early-modern intellectual history. But whereas his award-winning first book, *How to Write the History of the New World* (2001), focused on eighteenth-century Spanish and Spanish American responses to the black legend, *Nature, Empire, and Nation* emphasizes the interconnectedness of Spanish and British cultural histories, particularly the debt owed to early modern Iberian men of science by iconic figures of the scientific revolution such as Francis Bacon and Alexander von Humboldt. For this purpose, his book collects six previously published essays, a new chapter on nineteenth-century Mexican landscape painting, and two introductory chapters that review recent scholarship in the history of science. The two introductory chapters provide a useful synthesis, high-
lighting the contributions of Juan Pimentel, José María López Piñero, and others in Spain and Spanish America, while chastising historians of the scientific revolution, such as Lorraine Daston, Katherine Park, and Richard Drayton, for continuing to ignore the Hispanic world. Chapter 3 argues that “patriotism remained a constant unifying theme” (63) in Hispanic science, from the late seventeenth-century “baroque” polymath Carlos de Sigüenza y Góngora to eighteenth-century Jesuits such as Francisco Xavier de Orrio. Chapter 4 reproduces a seminal essay, first published in *The American Historical Review* (1999), on Creole “patriotic astrology” in seventeenth-century New Spain. This argues that white Creoles—having to combat European determinist allegations about the degenerative influence of American skies and nature on one hand, and wishing to give a scientific underpinning to their social privilege vis-à-vis Indians, blacks, and mixed-race peoples on the other—gave birth to a racialized discourse of colonial difference that prefigured and antedated that of nineteenth-century Europe, which is generally credited with the invention of modern racism. The recurring point that early-modern Spanish science should be seen as an integral part of the modern Western tradition is further reinforced by chapter 5, which shifts to eighteenth-century peninsular intellectuals such as Gregorio Mayanís y Siscar and José Cadalso, while chapter 6 discusses the botanical ideas that circulated among Spanish American Creoles such as José de Caldas, with whom Alexander von Humboldt had contact during his extensive travels, to suggest that theories about biodistribution did not originate in Europe but rather in South America. The final chapter, “Landscapes and Identities,” argues that nineteenth-century Mexican artists aimed to decolonize the representation of their homeland from the foreign “scientific” treatments of Humboldt and others, who saw it as empty space, by transforming landscapes into cityscapes, thereby creating national allegories. Thus combined in one volume, these essays powerfully reinforce Cañizares-Esguerra’s scholarly project, which is to assert that “the history of science of colonial Latin America . . . does not belong in the ‘non-Western world’ . . . [because] the scientific practices and ideas that became dominant were those brought by Europeans” (46). In effect, Cañizares-Esguerra argues for a new cultural geography of scientific modernity in which intellectual innovations are understood to travel not only from (northern) Europe to the (Ibero) Americas but also vice versa.

If Cañizares-Esguerra thus emphasizes the modernity of Iberian scientific thought across the early-modern Atlantic world, a somewhat-different picture emerges from the recent book of Ruth Hill, who also emerged as a prominent voice of early modern Iberian intellectual history with the publication of *Scepters and Sciences: Four Humanists and the New Philosophy* (2000). But whereas this examined the modern (Baconian and Gassendian) tendencies of Spanish and Spanish American intellectuals such as Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz, *Hierarchy, Commerce, and Fraud in Bourbon Span-
ish America emphasizes the essentially premodern aspects of viceregal culture and society. Hill would take issue, in particular, with Cañizares-Esguerra’s contention that a modern racial ideology emerged in late-seventeenth- and early-eighteenth-century Spanish America. Focusing on Alonso Carrión de la Vandera’s El Lazarillo de ciegos caminantes (1775) and on a vast archive of contemporaneous sources, Hill argues that it would be anachronistic to think of eighteenth-century Spanish American social hierarchies in terms of bodily biology rather than cultural, national, or family lineage. The modern concept of race, she argues, is the product of a liberal ideology based on the norm of equality as it emerged in the British context. Instead, viceregal Spanish America had “a norm of inequality: a written and unwritten hierarchy that ostensibly mirrored nature and its laws but was in fact a social construct” (197). In this, Hill takes issue with the frequent conflation of the eighteenth-century notion of casta with the modern notion of race, arguing that “casta was not biology” but a highly malleable “cluster of somatic, economic, linguistic, geographic, and other circumstances that varied from parish to parish, from town to town, and from person to person” (200). In a close analysis of Carrión’s work and other texts, she posits three overlapping and interdependent principles that determined subject position in late-colonial Spanish America: casta, limpieza, and estado. Thus, she concludes that it was not race but “modo de vivir, or culture . . . [that] generated local and regional hierarchies” in Spanish America before the nineteenth century (238).

Hill makes another significant claim by arguing that the proto-nationalist commonplace of conflict or rivalry between Creoles and peninsular Spaniards is inadequate for an understanding of eighteenth-century Spanish American literature and culture. Following social historians and anthropologists Michel Bertrand, Gloria Artís, and Margarita Suárez, she states that “elite criollos and peninsulares . . . viewed themselves and functioned, historically, . . . as one group” (10; original emphasis), and that Carrión’s exposé of Bourbon officialdom must be read in the context of his alienation from this “criollo-peninsular oligarchy,” whose members in Lima engaged in the same sort of illicit trafficking as their rivals in the ascendant commercial center of Buenos Aires.

Thus, while Hill and Cañizares-Esguerra both take a transatlantic approach in attempting to understand colonial American intellectual history, the former emphasizes the premodern and the latter the modern aspects of viceregal culture. However, if Nature, Empire, and Nation aims to write the early modern Ibero-American world into Atlantic history by demonstrating the transnational interconnectedness of Ibero-American men of science, the second monograph published by Cañizares-Esguerra in 2006, Puritan Conquistadors: Iberianizing the Atlantic, 1500–1700, takes a different strategy by juxtaposing two colonial archives—of early Spanish America and of early British America—that developed by and large independently from
one another. By finding similarities between these archives, Cañizares-Esguerra means to refute a long line of Anglo-American historians who have seen Anglo-Protestant and Spanish-Catholic America as ontologically different spaces, an ideological myopia that Cañizares-Esguerra sees epitomized in the “Anglo Protestant exceptionalism” practiced by historians such as Samuel Huntington.

The preoccupation with demonology is one theme that, in Cañizares-Esguerra’s view, pervades both Spanish and British archives, as Spaniards and Puritans similarly saw their role in the New World in the context of a cosmic struggle between God and Satan. He argues that “Puritans and Spaniards saw the world of colonization in remarkably similar terms,” and “for all the confessional differences, the English and the Spaniards were ultimately cultural twins” (76). To this end, Cañizares-Esguerra discusses the Satanic epic in colonial historiography, within which the devil’s minions appear in the guise of Native Americans, Spanish conquistadors, and English pirates. The term epic is employed in a very loose sense, as the texts considered range from drama to prose narratives and epic proper. Complementing this is the trope of “spiritual gardening” in works by Creoles across the early Americas, the idea that the American continent was being transformed from a spiritual desert or wilderness under the domain of the devil into God’s fertile garden.

There can be no doubt that Cañizares-Esguerra is correct in pointing out that demonology played an important role in both Spanish and English works about the New World. As Fernando Cervantes showed in his important book The Devil in the New World (1994), theologians of the sixteenth century attributed an active role to the diabolic and were accordingly prone to interpret similarities between Native American and Christian rituals not as evidence of a natural tendency toward the true God but rather, in a Manichaean fashion, as idolatrous perversions and infernal parodies instigated by an envious Satan among his Amerindian minions. It is therefore no great surprise that Cañizares-Esguerra finds the devil wherever he looks in the colonial archive. His encyclopedic command of this primary archive is nothing short of stunning, however, and, from this point of view, he provides a bibliographic tour de force, charting an indispensable road map for subsequent comparative history of the early Americas.

One does have to wonder, however, whether Cañizares-Esguerra’s eagerness to tweak the noses of U.S. exceptionalists by asserting similarities between Spaniards and Puritans has not blinded him occasionally to some important differences. To mention only one example that is bound to raise eyebrows, he argues that the English cult of the Virgin Queen Elizabeth was “remarkably similar” to the New Spanish cult of the Virgin of Guadalupe, as “both were subsets of the genre of the Satanic epic” (76). Cañizares-Esguerra is correct in assuming that, in comparison with the
Native Americans that Europeans encountered, English and Spaniards shared many common cultural traits that originated in a centuries-old shared history of Christianity. *Conquest* hereby operates as his comparative third term that in his Pan-American Atlantic approach is supposed to make the Spanish American experience normative and the British American experience the variant; hence, Puritan conquistadors. However, the comparison works only if *conquest* is used in the most general sense, that is, as in medieval Latin, as an acquisition by force of arms. This is potentially misleading unless we also note the radically different forms that European conquest took in Spanish and British America. Thus, in Puritan New England, conquest was predicated on the legal notion of *vacuum domicilium*, the fiction that America was an empty space or "virgin land" that could be lawfully settled by the English, whereas the Spanish conquest was predicated on the model of *reconquista*, the subjugation and conversion of infidels, new American vassals whose labor could be exploited. This fundamental difference had profound consequences for the encounter between Europeans and Native Americans, for the colonial societies that developed in each realm, and for the role that diabolism played there. Thus, whereas Puritans did, at times, see themselves as victimized by the devil and his minions (as in the Salem witch trials), for Franciscans in New Spain the victims who had to be redeemed from the devil were not primarily European settlers but rather native neophytes. Possibly resulting from Cañizares-Esguerra’s eagerness to find examples of "demonological discourse" wherever the devil is mentioned, some textual analyses in *Puritan Conquistadors* tend to run over the finer points of the primary texts. For example, in the discussion of Shakespeare’s *The Tempest*, the presence of the "angel" Ariel, the "monstrous" Caliban, and his mother, the "witch" Sycorax, as well as the occurrence of the storm, are seen as evidence that "Shakespeare considers America a space where great preternatural battles are fought between angels and demons for control of Nature" (123). In fact, however, Ariel is never called an angel in the play, but instead an "airy spirit"; also, we only have Prospero’s word for the allegedly demonic origins of Caliban and Sycorax (Prospero himself is a problematic character called a sorcerer by Caliban); and it is Prospero, not Sycorax, who creates the "tempest set off by demons."

The shared Christian past of European imperialists aside, another path for comparative scholarship on the early-modern Atlantic is suggested in Sabine MacCormack in *On the Wings of Time: Rome, the Incas, Spain, and Peru*. Although not comparative in itself, this book argues that "Roman and classical literature provided a framework not simply for the comprehension of empires, Inca and Spanish, in their mutual and contrapuntal resemblance to Rome, but for the construal of historical experience itself" (xv). The insight that classical learning played an important role in the apprehension of the New World is, of course, not particularly surprising.
or new. Anthony Grafton emphasized that the early-modern humanist recovery of the ancient world of texts helped to mitigate the “shock of discovery”; Walter Mignolo argued that this recovery of ancient learning had a “darker side” in European imperialism and colonialism; and Barbara Fuchs has shown how classical and European rhetorical models could be (and were) employed by European and non-European writers for political resistance. But no one has, to my knowledge, demonstrated in such detail just how pervasive and ubiquitous classical models were in Spanish historiography about the New World, in writers as diverse as the royal chronicler Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo, the Dominican Bartolomé de Las Casas, the Jesuit José de Acosta, the Spanish traveler and soldier Pedro de Cieza de León, the native lord from Huamanga Felipe Guaman Poma de Ayala, the mestizo Inca Garcilaso de la Vega, and even the viceregal chronicler Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa, all of whom drew on classical Greek and Roman writers equally as diverse: Aristotle, Plato, Cicero, Tacitus, Seneca, Valerius Maximus, Quintilian, Vitruvius, Gellius, Lucretius, Vergil, Horace, Ovid, Lucan, and others.

“The influence of classical traditions from the ancient Mediterranean on the Andes was enormous” (13), MacCormack writes; but she would take issue with postcolonial critics such as Mignolo by contending that the metaphorical invocation of European antiquity “did not mean that the Spanish were imposing their own European past on the Andean past and present” (14). Not only were “the Romans themselves exceedingly strange and distant” in the wake of their recovery by humanists, but also, and more important, native writers themselves participated in the construction of these metaphors. Indeed, of particular interest is MacCormack’s discussion of how indigenous Andean writers such as Joan de Santa Cruz Pachacuti Yamqui Salcamaycua and the anonymous authors of the so-called Huarochiri manuscript could have recourse to classical texts as a “communicative bridge of sorts between Andean people and Spanish newcomers” (5). But while, for Spaniards, “the difficulty was collecting and understanding information, not writing it down, the effort that was required of an Andean author writing a book consisted primarily in shaping and sequencing the narrative, not in ascertaining its content” (46). Here, too, classical metaphors could be helpful, as authors juxtaposed imperial development, Inca and Roman, in the Andes and Europe, respectively. MacCormack also deals with these comparisons in the turbulent era of Peruvian civil wars after conquest, and in representations

of new colonial cities. “However much . . . the conquest of Peru was a tale of warfare, destruction, and loss,” she writes, “the foundation of the cities and the vicissitudes of their early history told the opposite story, which was about genesis and regeneration” (106), as city planners were able to draw on a long textual tradition, from Aristotle to Alberti. Later chapters examine the pervasive influence that classical natural historians such as Pliny had on sixteenth-century Spanish chroniclers such as Fernández de Oviedo, Cieza de León, and Acosta, and also consider issues of language and translation in Antonio de Nebrija and Inca Garcilaso. An epilogue contrasts the uses of classicist and prophetic rhetoric by writers such as Columbus, López de Gómez, and Zárate, who drew on Plato, Seneca, and biblical prophecies to make sense of the New World in terms of revelation. The Roman past, MacCormack concludes, was “free from the weight and certainty of the prophetic thesis” and could, in allowing for “contradiction, for uncertainty, and for not knowing, not claiming to know,” serve as a heuristic device for Europeans and Andeans alike in coming to terms with the New World (272).

While both Cañizares-Esguerra and MacCormack suggest provocative lines of inquiry by investigating the roles that Christianity and the classical past played in New World encounters, John H. Elliott’s Empires of the Atlantic World synthesizes the Atlantic histories of the Spanish and British empires from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century and juxtaposes them to address their political, economic, social, and cultural aspects. The book’s three parts—“Occupation,” “Consolidation,” and “Emancipation”—treat historical figures (e.g., Hernán Cortés and Christopher Newport), issues and themes (e.g., the symbolic occupation of New World space and the missionary project), and administrative developments (e.g., imperial reform and centralization). “Comparative history,” he writes, “is—or should be—concerned with similarities as well as differences” (iv). This is a formidable task, to be sure, but Elliott’s sound judgment, experience, and remarkable command of an enormous body of primary and secondary literature make him uniquely qualified.

Although both empires followed similar lines in terms of these broad themes, the shape that these themes assumed was often distinct in the Spanish and British empires, ultimately causing divergent historical trajectories during the nineteenth century. As Elliot observes, “differences in size and density of the indigenous population would profoundly affect the subsequent character of the two colonial worlds.” Spaniards subdued highly complex and hierarchical societies such as the Mexica, whose empire included millions of people, whereas even the more sizable polities that the English encountered, such as the Powhatan Confederacy, included only some thirteen to fifteen thousand. Thus, although some early English colonists were inspired by the Spanish model of living off the labor of the conquered population and extracted mineral wealth, this quickly proved
impracticable in the more sparsely populated North, which was devoid of gold and silver. It therefore became quickly apparent that the English would be "'planters,' not 'conquerors'" (9), except where Native Americans failed to cede their land, and English wealth would be based on commercial agriculture, particularly tobacco. The roughly one-hundred-year time lapse between the foundations of colonial societies in Spanish and British America also played an important role: "The fact that the English were embarking on overseas colonization at a time when their society was acquiring a more commercial orientation . . . inevitably gave a slant to the English colonial enterprise that was not to be found in the opening stages of Castile's overseas expansion. . . . The very fact that the agent of colonization was to be a trading company pointed towards a future English 'empire of commerce'" (26–27). Finally, the paucity of precious metals in British America left the Crown relatively uninvolved in the colonial enterprise, at least initially, while in Spanish America the Crown, attempting to secure a share of booty in minerals and labor, constructed an elaborate administrative apparatus.

The most fundamental reason for this divergence, Elliott argues, lay in the organization of religion. England's Protestant Reformation created a number of sects, each with its distinctive religious, social, and cultural characteristics (Anglican Virginia, Puritan New England, Catholic Maryland, Quaker Pennsylvania), yet "the very character of settlement in British North America made it impossible in the long run for orthodoxy, whether of the Anglican or the Congregationalist variety, to hold the line against the encroachment of new sects and new beliefs" (210). In contrast, Spanish America was relatively homogeneous, its diversity stemming mainly from economic, environmental, and demographic particularities. In Elliot's words: "religious diversity reinforced the political diversity that was already such a striking feature of British American colonial life" (215), whereas in Spanish America "the mutually reinforcing alliance of throne and altar . . . created a church whose influence pervaded colonial society" (198), attempting to enforce a Counter-Reformation orthodoxy that was "deeply skeptical of innovation, and heavily reliant on a set of authoritative texts," and that "placed a high premium on unity and consensus," as well as on hierarchy and order (206).

According to Elliott, this difference also profoundly affected the period of emancipation. While British America's population increased enormously during the first half of the eighteenth century largely as a result of an influx of European immigrants of non-English (and non-Anglican) stock, "there was nothing comparable in the Hispanic world . . . not least because of the crown's continuing formal prohibition on non-Spanish immigration" (259). The Seven Years' War ended in victory for England and disaster for Spain, yet also "exposed major structural weaknesses" in both empires. Anxiously aware of this, authorities in Madrid and London at-
tempted to reform the fiscal, administrative, and commercial apparatuses of their respective empires to generate more revenue from their colonies to pay for imperial defense. Whereas London’s approach was mainly heavy handed, inconsistent, and unmindful of the potential impact on colonial sensibilities, Madrid—partly because of the greater wisdom of Charles III’s conservatively enlightened ministers, and partly because of their awareness of the overall weakness of the Spanish empire—tended to be more coherent and systematic in its reforms, aiming not so much to subordinate the colonies to the metropolis economically as to modernize the imperial economy by lifting old privileges and restrictions in favor of free trade within the empire. Nevertheless, both metropolises faced strong colonial resistance, and even rebellions. In Spanish America, this resistance was in part driven by a long-standing local patriotism reaching back to the conquest and the attempt to implement the New Laws of 1542. After the thirteen British colonies seceded, “a handful of Spanish American Creoles were beginning to think the previously unthinkable” (367). However, starting as they did in the 1810s, after the Spanish peninsula had been invaded by Napoleon and the Spanish Atlantic trading system had collapsed, the Spanish American revolutions occurred at an internationally inauspicious moment. As a result, the new Spanish American republics found themselves on the fringes of an international trading community, overshadowed by an increasingly confident and assertive United States, and “saddled with a colonial legacy, both politically and psychologically” (400). Thus, the road was paved to unequal development in the Americas during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

In many regards, Jeremy Adelman’s Sovereignty and Revolution in the Iberian Atlantic is in agreement with this account of Spanish American independence; however, he would disagree with Elliot about the underlying reasons of revolutionary conflict. Whereas Elliot places Spanish American revolutions in the comparative context of long-term imperial developments reaching back to the sixteenth century, particularly with regard to the “fundamental question” of Creole or colonial identities within trans-oceanic empires (234), Adelman locates them in the short-term context of the eighteenth-century crisis of Spanish imperial power and the resulting attempts at imperial reform. Thus, whereas Elliott emphasizes continuities between Creole patriotism in colonial times, the revolutionary ideology that fueled Spanish American independence, and modern nationalism, Adelman emphasizes discontinuity. Although Creole patriotism may have been in evidence long before the push for independence, Adelman argues that there was no contradiction between it and imperial citizenship. Spanish American Creoles “could feel at home imagining themselves simultaneously as Spaniards, Spanish Americans, and citizens (vecinos) of Caracas” (9). If independence nevertheless came to Spanish America, it was “less out of internal conflicts and more from the compound pres-
sures of several centuries of rivalry between Atlantic powers” (4). In this sense, the point of comparison with which to understand Spanish American independence is not British America but rather Luso-America: independence did not come when there was intra-imperial conflict but when national sovereignty was threatened by or lost to outside aggressors. “The breakdown of the Spanish empire in South America did not begin in the peripheries,” he argues; “it started in its core and issued its shockwaves outward” (219). Thus, the emergence of nationalism and the social revolutions that accompanied the movements toward independence “were not the cause of imperial breakups, but rather their consequence” (8).

The first three chapters of Adelman’s work lay out the economic origins of eighteenth-century imperial crisis, siting reform in the context of a series of wars in which both the Spanish and the Portuguese empires suffered repeated humiliations. Because of these, statesmen such as José de Gálvez in Spain and the Marquis of Pombal in Portugal aimed to transform empires that had been built on conquest into mercantilist societies, gradually lifting long-standing restrictions, guilt monopolies, and privileges under the motto of “comercio libre” so as to integrate merchants within the political balance of power, though “without a violent break with established customs and hierarchies” (47). In both nations, these attempts at reform found limited success where inter-imperial warfare did not compromise their effectiveness. If they also occasionally were met in the colonies with opposition, even rebellion, this was not a precursor to independence but rather “complex local responses to—and checks on—the peninsular model of nation building through empire” (53). Slavery played a crucial role in these developments. Unlike in the British and French Caribbean, or in British Chesapeake, South American slavery typically thrived not in a “plantation complex”—large estates producing staples through monoculture and thousands of individually owned slaves—but rather in small-scale operations with a hybrid labor pool (slave and free) and diversified products, both agricultural and manufactured. Even in Brazil, Adelman argues, “where slavery was most dynamic . . . it was not dominated by a plantation complex” and “slave and free labor complemented each other, rather than operated as substitute” (62–63). An important consequence was that, unlike those in British and French colonies, Spanish American planters were less dependent on metropolitan investments or privileged access to markets and, in fact, became increasingly independent in part as a result of imperial reforms that opened direct trade between Africa and America, and left this largely in the hands of American rather than European merchants. “Colonies were becoming freer from metropoles because they were becoming more dependent on unfree labor,” Adelman concludes (99). Despite official efforts to the contrary, the metropolitan grip on colonial exporters and traders slipped during the turbulent years after the French Revolution, when both Spain and Portugal desperately

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but unsuccessfully attempted to avoid being drawn into the disastrous struggle between Britain and France.

Subsequent chapters present the larger argument. Aligning himself with historians such as François-Xavier Guerra, José Carlos Chiaramonte, and Jaime E. Rodríguez O. who argue that political community and personal status in viceregal Spanish America derived from “pre-modern concepts of relations between political sovereigns and subjects,” Adelman maintains that it was “in the relationships between the component parts of empires that modernity was made” (143–144). “The sense of contributing to saving the empire from the French,” and of “being affronted by Spain’s imperial centralism,” Adelman concludes, “fueled the drive to ... secede from the peninsula” (218).

Adelman’s focus on similarities between the Spanish and Portuguese empires illuminates the historical developments of each realm. In *A Nation upon the Ocean Sea*, Daviken Studnicki-Gizbert similarly examines the intimate connections between Spain and Portugal in the early-modern Atlantic world only to find their radical differences. He provides a fascinating history of the Portuguese nation in Spain’s imperial project from the late fifteenth century to 1640, when Portugal seceded from the empire. Written in lively prose spiced with many stories of exemplary individuals as well as narrative snapshots of places, the book investigates “how different collectivities coordinated the work of material sustenance—labor, production, trade—with the other pursuits of life at a time of increased commercialization and accelerated capitalist development” (13).

The early-modern Portuguese nation was a diasporic maritime community, consisting of migrants, traders, artisans, mariners, and servants; it was “a nation without a state, a collectivity dispersed across the seas” (5), “an archipelago that arched across the early state boundaries emerging across the European landscape” (19). Unlike Spain, Portugal “did not so much claim sovereignty over the Atlantic as dwell upon it” (9), embracing and exploiting an expanding economy that seemed to work independently of political, moral, or religious laws, whereas Spain, when challenged by its international rivals, “opted for a policy of retrenchment and closure” (13).

One important feature that gave the Portuguese community in the Atlantic its distinctive character was that more than half of its members were New Christians (converts), largely as a result of the mass exodus from Castile and Aragon in 1492 and the decision of Dom Manuel I to forcibly convert the Jews on Portuguese territory. Over time, the social distinction between Old and New Christians eroded and formerly distinct cultural practices hybridized as a result of intermarriage, to the effect that “socially and economically the Portuguese bourgeoisie constituted a single entity” (25). Studnicki-Gizbert investigates several consequences of these developments, from the close relationship between trade and community in the various Portuguese communities around the Atlantic to the dual...
role of the merchant house as an abode and commercial operation that cut across political borders and mercantilist systems. Because this "vast machine" extended beyond imperial control "to enmesh itself in foreign markets and form partnerships with foreign merchants" (120), Portuguese trading houses were regarded with suspicion by imperial officials in Madrid. At the same time, they were indispensable to Spain's economy, as the most powerful bankers, monopolists, and revenue farmers of the empire were Portuguese. Studnicki-Gizbert explores this intricate web of relations by examining the literary activities of Portuguese merchants as they lobbied Spanish officials in Madrid to push for economic reform, and as they circulated knowledge among themselves in maps, charts, economic treatises, and accounts of plants and commodities. The final chapter recounts the rupture of the Portuguese nation after the restoration of Portuguese sovereignty in 1640; the fall of the Count-Duke of Olivares, its main backer in the Spanish court; and the triumph of his conservative enemies, all of which unleashed the Inquisition and other organs of the Spanish monarchy to crack down on Portuguese merchant houses for their suspected crypto-Judaism. "The defeat of the Portuguese and of Olivares," writes Studnicki-Gizbert, "represented an incalculable symbolic victory for those who had opposed not only these individuals but also the ideas they sought to advance" (174).

As a group, the books under consideration here testify to the vitality of early-modern Ibero-American studies in the wake of what has been called the transnational turn in the humanities. Treating the diversity of scientific, literary, political, economic, and comparative history, the authors are in agreement that the Ibero-American world had a central role to play in larger Atlantic developments. However, the question of the modernity of the Ibero-American world depends in part on which aspects of early-modern culture one focuses and in part on how one defines modernity—as the triumph of Western liberal democracy or of an imperial nation-state that subjects its citizens to unprecedented levels of control and scientific scrutiny. While some such as Cañizares-Esguerra insist on the modernity of certain aspects of the early-modern Ibero-American world by pointing to its (largely unacknowledged) role at the vanguard of scientific change, to its essential similarity to the British American world, and to certain continuities between viceregal Creole patriotism and nineteenth-century nationalism, others such as Hill and Adelman insist on the essentially premodern nature of Spanish America before the nineteenth century, thereby emphasizing also the essential difference between the early-modern Ibero-American and British American worlds.