II Warfare and Control

I hear new news every day, and those ordinary rumours of war … of towns taken, cities besieged … daily musters and preparations, … battles fought, so many men slain, monomachies, shipwrecks, piracies and sea-fights; peace, leagues, stratagems, and fresh alarms.

Robert Burton, *The Anatomy of Melancholy* (1621), preface (from Powell 1975, 271–2)

II.1 A Narrative in Context

Our first area of investigation is how the Peloponnese was affected by wars and the actions of external power in the early hellenistic period.[1] When seeking evidence of change and continuity, or about the conditions under which people lived, the narrative of events is an obvious place to start. The present chapter first reviews the catalogue of organized violence, and the threat of it, under which they laboured for much of the period. A discussion in a later section (IV.2) will consider whether the effects of warfare on societies and landscapes were as far-reaching and enduring as one might suppose; or limited, and short-term, and mitigated by countervailing factors. In the present chapter, the focus is chiefly on Macedonian military involvement and on the Achaean 'league' or *koinon*. It may be that Macedonia's negative impact has been exaggerated. This prepares the ground for an examination of the limits of political change (Chapter III).

Previous scholarship has made few attempts to assess systematically the impact of the actions of Macedonian military power upon the Peloponnese either as a unit or as a set of regions. Although the narrative remains unclear in many details, both as regards the course of events and where Macedonian policy is concerned,[2] it has the merit of introducing important themes for later detailed consideration, such as 'the problem of Sparta', the threat from the north-west, the nature of civil conflict (*stasis*), the democracy–oligarchy opposition, the ubiquity or otherwise of Macedonian garrisons, and the nature of the so-called tyrannies.

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[1] For ease of reading, in this chapter and elsewhere, I sometimes credit a *polis* (e.g. 'Stymphalos') with taking an action or decision when it would be more truthful to make its people (e.g. 'the Stymphalians') the agent.

[2] The reconstruction by Tarn (building on predecessors such as Niese and Beloch) still looms large; but he pushes the evidence too hard (for helpful remarks, see Reger 1998). Walbank's

To understand the history and politics of the Peloponnese in this period, we need first to look back briefly to the sixth and fifth centuries, when Sparta became more than a regional power and for a time exercised supremacy over most of Greece (II.2.a). In the early and mid-fourth century, the collapse of Sparta's Panhellenic ambition, and then of its Peloponnesian hegemony, is followed by a period of turmoil as (in the words of one scholar) *la marmite saute*,[3] 'the pot boils over' (II.2.b); the legacy of this calamity continues to be influential for at least two centuries. The early phase of Macedonian hegemony under Philip and Alexander sees initial compliance on the part of most Greeks, which gives way to armed insurrection provoking mildly repressive measures (II.2.c). Under the early Successors (II.3), as the structure of governance in mainland Greece is fractured, the Peloponnese becomes a hotly contested landscape: at first sight surprisingly, considering its remoteness from Macedonia and relative lack of portable wealth; less so, if one sees it as a platform where those contemplating an assault on the north can attempt to amass power. The long era of Antigonid domination (II.4), which never extends over the whole peninsula, is characterized by alternating phases of insurrection and repression: the latter gradually gaining intensity until, around 250, Gonatas' power in the Peloponnese begins to be eroded. (The participants in insurrection are not always the same, local concerns playing a part in their decisions.) As a possible first indication of the relative importance of Peloponnesian affairs in the thinking of Macedonian rulers, it is worth noting in advance that the homeland security of Macedonia often draws its ruler's gaze to the north (see Section II.6).

Many details in what follows have been treated by other scholars, but their accounts have not consistently focused on the Peloponnese as such. A linking thread through this confusing and sometimes repetitious narrative is the motives of different states, and what means they employ in the search for power or security.[4]

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modified reconstruction is largely followed here: see Walbank 1984a on the reign of Gonatas; Walbank 1984b on 239–217 BC; Walbank 1933 on Aratos; Walbank 1940 on Philip V. Also Walbank 1988 = chs 9–16 (pp. 199–364) of Hammond and Walbank 1988.

[3] Professor O. Picard, commenting on the present author's paper at the Tours conference in 2005 (published as Shipley 2008a).

[4] As noted in the Preface, the reader will find new insights into the political relationships between Peloponnesian states in this period in Kralli 2017, which appeared as the present work

II.2 A Question of Upbringing: Hegemony and Anarchy down to Chaironeia (338)

This section will offer an account of how the Peloponnesian geopolitical landscape took the form in which the Macedonians found it when they became the masters of southern Greece. One reason why it is valuable to look back at the late classical period before considering the early hellenistic is that the literary sources (principally Xenophon and Diodoros) provide more detail of the internal workings and mutual interactions of states than do their now fragmentary successors or the piecemeal epigraphic evidence for the third century. With their help, we can build up a picture of Peloponnesian societies that can be regarded as broadly indicative of their complexion in the succeeding period, when recent events will have loomed large in the memories of those living under Macedonian rule. The end of the fifth century and the early fourth had also seen many changes of constitution in Peloponnesian *poleis*, which will help us understand what kind of societies the Macedonians encountered.

II.2.a Earlier Spartan Domination

The greatest geopolitical change in the Peloponnese between the fifth and the fourth century was the replacement of an almost unipolar landscape by one that was increasingly multipolar, as well as increasingly unstable until the beginning of the second century. Even if we grant that Sparta was one of the largest *poleis*, its near-total domination of the peninsula for such a long period would seem to require explanation; not least because the ambition of reviving that hegemony, once it had collapsed, was a dynamic element in Peloponnesian affairs for at least half a dozen generations and, at times, came close to being fulfilled.

Since roughly the mid-sixth century, the Spartans had dominated most of the Peloponnese through what modern scholarship has unhelpfully dubbed ‘the Peloponnesian league’. This was not a collective alliance, let alone a federal union, but a plurality of one-to-one alliances made individually between Sparta and other states.[5] Known from contemporary texts as ‘the Lakedaimonians and their allies’, the association embraced almost all the city-states of the Peloponnese, the most notable exception being Argos.

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went to press. A number of citations below will point the reader to detailed studies of specific episodes.

[5] Wickert 1972 was one of the first to observe its loose structure (cf. Wickert 1961). See also de Sainte Croix 1972a, appendixes 17–19 (pp. 333–41); Birgalias 2003; Bolmarcich 2005.

The alliances were probably asymmetrical in the sense that, while the ally was obliged to send forces to aid Sparta or attack a third party, the obligation was not normally reciprocal.[6] It was inevitable, given the shape of this association, that Sparta, a land-based power unlike Athens, exercised its power somewhat informally and with definite limits on its freedom of action. In a sense the 'league' existed only when called upon to act; it was not a Spartan empire.[7]

Through its nature as an relatively open entity, this plurality of relationships arguably gave greater unity to the Peloponnese than the fifth-century 'Delian league' or Athenian empire gave to Athens' allies and subjects; a *pax Laconica*, indeed. Behind the network, of course, lay the military power of a huge army, comprising three groups. First, the *Spartiatai* (in English 'Spartiates'), the citizens of Sparta proper. Second, the *perioikoi* (I.2.b), mainly in Laconia with others in Messenia; in total population about equal to the *Spartiatai*. 'Lakedaimonians' includes both Spartans and *perioikoi*. The latter were an almost equally important part of the whole community and had the same two kings as the Spartiates (officially 'kings of the Lakedaimonians', not of the Spartans) but probably no formal role in decisions about peace and war.[8] Third, a considerably larger number of serfs or 'helots' (*heilōtai*), mainly in Messenia but also in parts of Laconia.[9]

The heart of the 'league' was Lakonike, the territory dominated by Sparta and containing several dozen perioikic *poleis*.[10] Despite the Lakedaimonians' overwhelming numerical and tactical superiority in the field of warfare, political unity within the Peloponnese rested largely upon collaborative relationships between members of *polis* elites. The Spartans also seem to have promoted oligarchies, led by sympathetic members of the elite (a fellow-feeling perhaps expressed through ties of *xenia*, 'guest-friendship'),[11] as a more reliable guarantee of *polis* loyalty than could be expected from either democracy or tyranny (cf. Thuc. 1. 18–19). To this extent Peloponnesian hegemony was based on relatively ‘soft’ power and was deeply conservative: delegating economic and political organization, and the maintenance of the status quo, to leaders within each community. It could be characterized as ‘delegated power from a distance’. In contrast, the Athenian empire – to the extent that, as Diodotos of Athens is made to say by Thucydides, ‘the *dēmos* in all the *poleis* is well-disposed towards you’ (3. 47) – embodied exploitation at the international level, the exploitation of tribute-paying states by the imperial hegemon; a dynamic rather than conservative formula, whether for good or ill, applied flexibly according to circumstances, and harshly only when security required (as argued by Euphemos of Athens at Kamarina, 6. 82–7).

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[6] See e.g. the terms offered to Athens, Xen. *Hell*. 2. 2. 20; treaty of Olynthos and Sparta, Xen. *Hell*. 5. 3. 26; and esp. the inscribed treaty with the Erxadieis of Aitolia (C5l or C4e); recent work includes Pikoulas 2000–3; Matthaiou 2006; Antonetti 2012. On Sparta's early treaties, see Yates 2005.

[7] Rhodes 2009, 206.

[8] When I use the familiar terms 'Sparta' and 'Spartans', the reader should generally understand 'Lakedaimon' and 'Lakedaimonians'.

[9] On the helots see esp. Ducat 1990; Hodkinson 2000, 113–49; Luraghi and Alcock 2003; Luraghi 2009a. For helots in Hl Laconia, see Kennell 2003.

[10] On the *poleis*, see e.g. Shipley 2004a; Shipley 2004b.

[11] For an example of how effective such ties could be, see Cartledge 1982.

As we shall see in Chapter V, however, regional identities had already begun to be asserted in the fifth century, in opposition to the pan-Peloponnesian ideology that the Spartans promoted at certain times – an interesting point of comparison with the era of Macedonian domination in the long third century.

II.2.b Spartan Over-reach and Collapse (404–362)

In the generation after the Peloponnesians’ victory in what might be called, from their point of view, the ‘Athenian war’ of 431–404,[12] the leading Spartans, finding themselves in a position of unprecedented power within Greece, nurtured competing visions of how to use that power. One view came to dominate; but it proved to be over-ambitious.

Victory over Athens left the Lakedaimonians, led by the Spartans, pre-eminent in mainland Greek affairs. They were now one of a small number of major players on the southern Greek stage, the others being Athens (since the Spartans did not destroy it), Boiotian Thebes, Argos, and Corinth. The main geopolitical force within the Peloponnese was still the network of Spartan alliances. Apart from the city-states of Lakonike, the main centres of the ‘league’ were Corinth and Sikyon in their respective territories; the rest of the association of states comprising a plurality of middle-sized and small *poleis* in Arkadia, Achaea, and parts of Argolis. Separate from the ‘league’ in 404 were Argos with its local dependencies, and Elis with its own perioikic *chōra*; the Eleians were at odds with the Spartans, whom they had excluded from the Olympic festival since 420.

Within a few years of Sparta’s victory over Athens, the Lakedaimonian-led structure began to show cracks. The Spartans made efforts to capitalize on their dominant position, coercing the Eleians back into the fold in a war of *c*. 402–*c*. 400 and detaching part of their southern perioikic *chōra*, where a new Triphylian confederacy was formed from about eight *poleis*.[13] Sparta's behaviour under its dynamic leading general Lysander, however, and then under the controversial Eurypontid king Agesilaos II (r. *c*. 400–*c*. 360), provoked tacit opposition from the Corinthians, traditionally their most powerful allies. Having subsequently over-reached themselves by threatening those allies and drawing heavily upon their resources for a war against the Persians in Asia Minor, but without adequately rewarding them, the Spartans in 395 found themselves opposed by a coalition of Athens, Boiotia, Argos, and – almost unprecedentedly – Corinth.[14] The ensuing 'Corinthian war', in the course of which a short-lived political union between Corinth and Argos was effected, put an end to Sparta's Aegean hegemony, thanks to a naval defeat off Knidos in south-western Asia Minor in 394. A sign of internal disagreement, as so often, is seen in the career of King Pausanias, who appears to have undermined Lysander's harsh policies and who, after his second exile in 385, published a critique of current policy.

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[12] So designated by Cartledge 2002b, 192–227.

The Spartans' generally heavy-handed approach, which was at odds with their milder behaviour in the Peloponnese during most of the fifth century, would prove unsustainable, evoking as it did the first stirrings of regional independence; for the moment, however, they maintained their position by a controversial deal with Persia. By the King's Peace of 387/6, they abandoned the Greeks of Asia to Persian rule, knowing they could not sustain war both at home and abroad. Instead they concentrated their efforts on the Peloponnese, breaking up the city of Mantinea into four smaller settlements in 385 (Xen. *Hell.* 5. 2. 7; cf. Section III.3.a) and forcing the Phleiasians, after a lengthy siege – itself a sign of Sparta's limited power – to reorganize their constitution affairs to Sparta's advantage (5. 3. 10–17, 21–5; cf. 5. 2. 8–10). But strategy was inconsistent, or perhaps limited by lack of power. They chose not to disown the unplanned seizure of Thebes in 382 by the Spartan commander Phoibidas (5. 2. 32–5). On the contrary, he and another Spartan, Sphodrias, who attempted to seize the Piraeus in 379 (5. 4. 20–4), had their deeds in effect adopted retroactively as acts of state. This resulted in the so-called Boiotian war, during which, at Boiotian Leuktra in 371, Epameinondas of Thebes inflicted on Sparta its heaviest military defeat in memory.[15] One of the chief factors in Sparta's setback was the ongoing decline in the number of full citizens qualified to serve in the army. This in turn was probably the result of the unrestricted accumulation of land by the rich, causing the impoverishment of smaller landowners and their demotion from citizenship.[16]

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[13] Nielsen 1997; Nielsen 2004b; Roy 2015b, 269–71, 282, etc.

[14] Though Corinth had opposed Sparta after the peace of Nikias (Thuc. 5. 25–31, etc.).

[15] For earlier defeats, cf. the death of Lysander at Haliartos in 395 (Xen. *Hell.* 3. 5. 19) and that by Chabrias at Thebes in 387 (Polyainos 2. 1. 1). For underlying patterns, see Hamilton 1997.

In terms of evolving hegemony, the combination of more assertive regional identities in the later fifth century[17] and over-aggressive Spartan hegemony meant that upheaval was all the more violent when it came. It is no surprise, given the resulting collapse of Spartan hegemony, that the decade after Leuktra was one of the most turbulent in Peloponnesian history. This impression is not just a phantom created by the accidents of source survival or by Xenophon's interest in contemporary events;[18] the events of these years brought real, often radical, changes, some of them permanent. The power vacuum created by the toppling of Sparta from its position of supreme power opened the way for frequent episodes of *stasis* (internal civil conflict) and regime change (Chapter III).

Even before Leuktra there had been a climate of innovation. By 389 or earlier, for example, the first Achaean federation had been set up (with the power to grant citizenship, Xen. *Hell.* 4. 6. 1).[19] By the time Epameinondas invaded the Peloponnese in winter 370–369 and again in spring 369 – on the latter occasion reaching Laconia but avoiding a direct attack on Sparta and instead burning minor settlements on the way south to Gytheion, which was briefly besieged (6. 5. 32) – the 'Peloponnesian league' had begun to erode in the north, leaving Sparta with few allies there (6. 5. 29; 7. 2. 2).[20] Of these, Achaean Pellene was soon detached (on the unusual situation and sometimes independent behaviour of Pellene, see Sections II.3.a, V.3.d).[21] Already in 370 (so probably not yet under Theban influence)[22] the Arkadians had set up a federal state (Xen. *Hell.* 6. 5. 6).[23] Although the Thebans became patrons and protectors of the new western Arkadian 'capital' of Megalopolis ('Great City'), set up in the aftermath of Leuktra, the new *polis* has been described as 'essentially an Arcadian creation'.[24]

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[16] Hodkinson 2000, 399–445.

[17] Funke 2009.

[18] Roy 1994, 205.

[19] Rhodes 1997, 106; Rizakis 2015, 121.

[20] Roy 1994, 191.

[21] See also incidents noted by Morgan and Hall 2004, 484–5 (*Inv. 240*).

[22] Date: e.g. Nielsen 2015, 250 (effective end in 363 BC, Nielsen 2015, 267).

[23] Roy 1994, 190, argues for late 370. On internal dynamics of the league, see also Kralli 2017, 9–24.

[24] Roy 1994, 193; see also Nielsen 2002, 414–55; Roy 2005; Nielsen 2015, 264–5. The decision to found Megalopolis is best placed after Leuktra: S. Hornblower 1990.

Though demographically a serious blow to a *polis* with shrinking manpower, the loss at Leuktra of 400 *Spartiatai* (out of the 700 present) and 600 other Lakedaimonian hoplites (Xen. *Hell.* 6. 4. 15) did not, as is popularly believed, neutralize Spartan power at a stroke. The dismantling of the remainder of the 'Peloponnesian league' by the armies of Thebes and its allies was a process that took several years. In the early stages, it entailed the removal from direct Spartan control of the farmland of central and western Messenia; but for a further generation Sparta held onto coastal Messenia with its perioikic harbour towns.

Theban domination also involved the creation of a fortified city at Ithome (later called Messene) in central Messenia, and the refortification of Mantinea in eastern Arkadia. Under Boiotian influence, Messene may have become the central place of a federation (see Section III.3.b). Mantinea was to be the leading fortress of eastern Arkadia, but did not necessarily have the economic muscle to outrank Tegea, probably the most prosperous *polis* there. The other new foundation, Megalopolis, brought together physically into one centre many small communities in western Arkadia, though the new city proved somewhat soluble. The 'three Ms', as we may call them, were clearly designed to block Spartan access by land to the rest of the Peloponnese and central Greece; to a large extent they were effective.[25]

Yet for another 180 years Sparta remained one of the major players in Peloponnesian affairs, at times a dominant one;[26] it was normally, for example, a threat to some of the Arkadian *poleis*. Nor was it always friendless: the Achaeans, for example, appear to have remained mostly loyal to Sparta well into the third century. Leuktra had made the first big dent in Spartan power, and accelerated the effects of declining citizen numbers and resources; but these trends were mitigated by the significant – albeit not always decisive – military force that the city could still sometimes deploy.[27] Sparta and the other Lakedaimonians retained considerable power to act at a distance, even without most of their former helots and allies. In 368, with the aid of twenty shiploads of troops sent by Dionysios I of Syracuse, they recaptured Karyai on their northern frontier and defeated Arkadia, Argos, and Messenia at the Tearless Battle in south-western Arkadia (Xen. *Hell.* 7. 1. 28–32). In 365, with reinforcements sent by Dionysios II after his father's death, they retook Sellasia (7. 4. 12), though in the next year over a hundred Spartans and *perioikoi* were taken prisoner from among a force besieged by the Arkadians at Kromnos in Megalopolitan territory (7. 4. 20–7).

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[25] Nielsen 2015, 265–6.

[26] On the centrality of Sparta to Peloponnesian affairs in this period, see also Kralli 2017, xxii–xxxiii, 489–96.

[27] A point made even more forcefully – perhaps too strongly – by Tarn 1913, 65–6.

The setbacks of the post-Leuktra years, therefore, did not in any way apply a guillotine to Spartan history or their capacity to pursue aggressive policies. The Lakedaimonians still entertained the ambition of dominating Peloponnesian and Greek affairs; whether the distribution of military and economic power would allow them to do so by traditional means remained to be seen. The Thebans had found it necessary to adopt a different approach – a new version of Sparta's 'delegated power from a distance', though based on democracy and federalism rather than oligarchy – but the very factor of distance, and Sparta's residual weight, proved insuperable; these problems being exacerbated by local tensions which may have been all the more virulent for the internal pressure built up under Spartan rule and now released.

II.2.c Waiting for the Macedonian (362–338)

Soon after the events just described, the geopolitics of Greece underwent a substantial shift with Macedonia's rise to pre-eminence. Initially, competition between central and southern Greek states continued under existing rules of engagement; but soon the burning questions for all involved were those of assessing the nature and weight of the Macedonian threat and deciding whether to work with or against the northern power. The next quarter-century would show the perils of miscalculation.[28]

In 363,[29] the splitting of the Arkadian *koinon* into two factions, one of them notionally under Theban protection, weakened Thebes' recently won influence, which was henceforth chiefly limited to Tegea and Megalopolis and was hampered by the intervening presence of the other towns. The Thebans attempted to restore their dominance over Arkadia, helping the Megalopolitans to bring back by force those who had returned to their former cities (Diod. 15. 94. 1–3);[30] but the division of Arkadia led to conflict[31] and ultimately in 362 to the indecisive battle of 'Second Mantinea', in which the Thebans defeated Sparta and Athens but Epameinondas was killed. On that day, Arkadians fought against Arkadians: on one side were ranged the anti-Theban Arkadians (the Mantineans playing a central role) together with the Eleians, Achaeans, Spartans, and Athenians; on the other the Tegeates, Megalopolitans, Argives, Sikyonians, and Messenians, among others.

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[28] Kralli 2017, 49–51, characterizes these years as 'weakness of all sides'.

[29] Date: e.g. Nielsen 2015, 267–8.

[30] Cf. Nielsen 2002, 493–7.

[31] Detailed account in Roy 1994.

After Second Mantinea, Xenophon's narrative ends and the picture (mainly from Diodoros, using Theopompos and others) is less clear for a time. The Spartans, with many *perioikoi* still at their disposal in coastal Messenia and the albeit truncated Laconia, remained the most powerful force; but they were hemmed in, were no doubt temporarily discouraged, and after the death of the towering figure of Agesilaos II in 360/59 were presumably reassessing their situation. They waited for a decade (as far as we can tell) before resuming their attempts to regain territory. In 353/2, they renewed their efforts to recapture northern Messenia, and temporarily overran Megalopolitan territory (Dem. 16; Diod. 16. 39. 1; Paus. 8. 27. 9–10). The Great City was aided by the Argives, Sikyonians, Messenians, and Thebans (Diod. 16. 39. 2) – but not by the eastern Arkadians. The Lakedaimonians captured Orneai in Argive territory, killed over 200 Argives, and plundered Arkadian Helissous (39. 4–5). The campaign ended indecisively with an armistice between the Lakedaimonians and Megalopolitans (39. 7);[32] they then remained mostly quiet for a time. Several sorties brought no lasting success, suggesting that the 'three Ms' remained an effective cordon.

For the next decade or more, the sources continue to suggest rivalry and violence between Peloponnesian states. Some were looking to safeguard themselves by projecting their interests more widely, such as Messene and Megalopolis, which were refused membership of the Delphic amphiktyony despite their alignment with the new ruler (initially perhaps regent) of Macedonia, Philip II.[33] Opposition to Philip even brought the two halves of Arkadia into alliance, though they were not reunited in one organization.[34]

Sparta's neutralization proved temporary (the city, after all, had never been captured) and, though the 'three Ms' did their job, Sparta's efforts at revival highlighted continuing divisions between groups of Peloponnesian communities. Sparta stood aside from the confrontation with Philip that led to defeat at Chaironeia in Boiotia in late summer 338. Other Peloponnesians did take part, particularly from the north and north-east; the Achaeans (and no doubt others) suffering heavy losses whose effects were still felt fifteen years later (Paus. 7. 6. 5).

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[32] Griffith, in Hammond and Griffith 1979, 481.

[33] Ellis 1994, 765–6.

[34] Schol. Aeschin. *Ctes*. 83 (*IG* v. 2, p. 49).

II.2.d Retrospective of the Period down to 338

The story of the Peloponnese down to 338 is dominated by the break-up of Spartan hegemony and by decades of resulting turmoil as new relationships were forged, all too often through conflict. Spartan hegemony in the fifth century was delegated, relatively 'soft', and conservative; but regional identities now began to be expressed. After the Peloponnesian war this regionalization, combined with over-assertive policies on the part of the leaders of Sparta, made the collapse of Spartan hegemony, when it came, all the more complete. The Thebans perhaps modified Sparta's 'delegated power at a distance' approach, using the 'three Ms' (Messene, Megalopolis, and Mantinea); but adverse factors made its efficacy short-lived. Sparta's neutralization after Leuktra, however, proved temporary. Although hemmed in, the Spartans' efforts at self-recreation highlighted disunity among Peloponnesian communities, and thus the Peloponnese in the mid-fourth century was more fragmented than before.

The peninsula in this period recalls the 'anarchic' states society explored for the modern world by Bull[35] and for the early hellenistic period by Eckstein.[36] Unlike today, when, for all the limits of their effectiveness, international organizations inhibit to some extent the behaviour of states, in classical Greece no international law existed beyond one-off treaties (ratified by oaths and sacred rituals) and the general rules of a common religion and its short-term pronouncements (oracles, omens), or shared assumptions about what was acceptable in the context of violence and what was not. Both the general and the particular injunction could be ignored or politicized. Ambition was acceptable; pre-emptive attack often deemed reasonable; prudence, oaths, treaties, and the potential threat from an outside power almost the only restraints. Yet although the Peloponnese was more fragmented, new regional blocs of *poleis*, where they existed, gave relative protection or permitted relative freedom of action (as the 'Peloponnesian league' had done). This was obviously the case with the long-established Laconian bloc and the two Arkadian groupings; possibly with the Achaean *koinon* (about whose pre-hellenistic incarnation, though it is definitely attested, we know few details);[37] potentially with the Messenian federation if such an association existed (see Section III.3.b). An interesting further case in point is Triphylia, which under the leadership of the *polis* of Lepreon attached itself to the Arkadian league in the 360s (partly or chiefly for protection from Elis), adopting an Arkadian ethnic identity that became permanent (see Section I.2.b).

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[35] e.g. Bull 1977.

[36] Eckstein 2007.

[37] Rhodes 1997, 106; Mackil 2013, 46–52, 62–3, 75–6; Rizakis 2015, 120–2.

Already in the 360s, then, there were signs that new regional groupings or blocs might offer hope of a stability such as the so-called Peloponnesian league had offered; but until Chaironeia 'ever closer union' was deferred. In places, individual *polis* autonomy was thus pooled – whether voluntarily or by coercion – in the interest of security; but a strong trend towards federalism did not develop immediately. It would accelerate in the early hellenistic period, when Macedonian hegemony would sometimes mirror certain aspects of Spartan policy earlier – such as the identification and promotion of loyalists within a *polis* – but could also be far less conservative. Few of Philip II's successors seem to have attempted to promote a common cause in the Peloponnese, as Sparta had (see Section II.2.a); he himself did so.

II.3 Temporary Kings: The Early Macedonian Years (338–301)

The history of the Peloponnese under Philip and Alexander begins with a period of widespread submission, followed after an interval by hostile action, which in turn provoked repression; though commanders and kings would vary in the degree to which they tolerated local self-determination. The means of domination, or attempted domination, were sometimes similar to those used earlier by the Spartans, but sometimes more brutal. At times these interventions were to be the agents of disorder; at other times, external domination would offer some hope of stability.

II.3.a Philip and Alexander: Acquiescence, Revolt, and Reaction (338–323)

Philip II's settlement of Greece, and his general toleration of existing constitutions, held out the prospect of a reduction in disorder and violence; but not everyone was content.

After his victory at Chaironeia in 338, Philip II received the surrender of Megara and Corinth. The *poleis* of Achaea and the Argolic Akte had also opposed him. The Eleians, Argives, Arkadians, and Messenians, earlier his friends, had not actively supported him.[38] Sparta had not opposed him; but loyalty to, and fear of, Sparta had been key factors in Peloponnesian politics, albeit mediated through local relationships (Argos and Sikyon, for example, being perennially wary of Corinth). Now the states bordering Laconia – containing perhaps more than half of the peninsula's population – gained territory at Sparta's expense. Philip invaded Laconia, detached large parts of its perioikic territory, and handed them to Argos, Megalopolis, Tegea, and Messenia (Polyb. 9. 28. 7; 18. 14. 7).[39] Presumably on this account, he was honoured with a statue at Megalopolis (*SEG* 48. 521); no doubt with similar expressions of gratitude elsewhere.[40] The Spartans lost not only coastal Messenia but also what was left of their northern borderlands as well as the Thyreatis in the far north-east.[41]

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[38] Ellis 1994, 783.

Despite this violation, the Spartans were not cowed but stood aloof from the assembly, held at Corinth in 337, that enacted a peace treaty and an alliance (*symmachia*) between Macedonia and the participating Hellenes. The association is now often imprecisely called the 'league of Corinth' or 'Hellenic league'; more accurately the 'Hellenic alliance' (*SdA* 403; RO 76).[42] Philip perhaps tolerated the Spartans' absence to show that participation was voluntary, just as he claimed.[43] Their non-participation would also entrench the Messenian–Laconian division, enabling him to 'divide and rule' while Sparta was still fenced in by the 'three Ms' as buffer states.

Having spent some of his teenage years during the 360s as a hostage in Thebes, Philip understood the *polis* system. His intervention is naturally represented as beneficent by the second-century historian Polybios (Arkadian, Achaean, and anti-Spartan) in a speech he gives to Lykiskos, a pro-Macedonian Akarnanian, set in 211 (9. 33. 9–12). Lykiskos asserts that Philip entered Laconia under pressure from the other Peloponnesians, and did no harm but brought about a negotiated settlement. He is answering a speech by Chlaineas, an Aitolian, who urges the Lakedaimonians to take the side of Aitolia against Philip V of Macedonia and plays up the abuses committed by Alexander's successors (of which we shall see examples later). In a late book of his *History*, Polybios in his own voice, while criticizing the late fourth-century Athenian orator Demosthenes for his extreme opposition to Macedonia, takes a similar view to that of Lykiskos: those Peloponnesians who brought in Philip II were not traitors, for they acted not from self-interest but in the interest of their states, freeing lands conquered long before by the Lakedaimonians and enabling the peoples of the Peloponnese 'to draw breath again' (ἀναπνεῦσαι, 18. 14. 6). (See further section III.2.a.) Whatever view we take of the choices that were made, they encapsulate the dilemma faced by Peloponnesian elites – whether acting on behalf of one *polis* or a group of *poleis* – cast adrift to some extent in a power-vacuum.[44]

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[39] Roebuck 1948; Shipley 2000a, 371.

[40] Lauter and Spyropoulos 1998, 445–7.

[41] Shipley 2000a, 386–7. See also Roebuck 1984 (= Roebuck 1948). The reallocations and their consequences are examined in detail by Kralli 2017, 61–8.

[42] Harding 1985, no. 99.

[43] Ellis 1994, 784.

To be sure, Philip's settlement imposed a certain degree of structure upon the Peloponnese. His alliance was distinguished from other such associations by having a 'leader' (*hēgemōn*), a position he naturally occupied himself, and a delegate assembly (*synedrion*) which could impose decisions upon member cities if it chose. The text of the allies' oath, together with a list of the members, is partly preserved in the very fragmentary inscription already cited (RO 76; *SdA* 403), from which it is clear that the agreed terms protected existing constitutions, implicitly both democratic and oligarchic (some had taken their present form only after Chaironeia).[45] This protective spirit was later seen as a hallmark of Philip and Alexander's rule, and became a precedent that could be invoked. In Laconia and its neighbours, however, stabilization involved change rather than continuity, as we have seen.

Despite Philip's benevolent attitude towards most Peloponnesian communities, immediately after his death the Arkadians, Argives, and Eleians sent armies to the Isthmus in 336/5 as part of the first Greek attack on his son and successor, Alexander III (Diod. 17. 8. 4–6).[46] Presumably this about-turn reflected changes in internal political power balances. The Arkadians were deterred by envoys from Alexander's viceroy in Greece, Antipater, and withdrew on the grounds that they were 'compelled by the times' to serve Alexander (Deinarchos 1. 20).[47] The unsuccessful Greek campaign ended disastrously with the destruction of Thebes in late summer 335. Chaironeia and Philip's Hellenic alliance had only temporarily dampened the fires of opposition to Macedonia's new-found power; now the fate of the leading Boiotian *polis* might have been expected to do so, but did not.

The presence of Peloponnesian troops among Alexander's army in Asia Minor is noted by Arrian (*Anab*. 1. 17. 8); they included the Argive infantry who garrisoned Sardis in 334,[48] as well as Greeks formerly in the Persian king's service, who are said to have been loyal to Alexander (3. 23). These troops were, in a sense, hostages for the good behaviour of their home cities. They are thought to have numbered several thousand, a substantial force if we consider that it did not include the Spartans.[49] The Spartans did not, however, remain inactive.

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[44] Cf. the acute analysis by Griffith, in Hammond and Griffith 1979, 474–84.

[45] O'Neil 1995, 103, notes that Philip's alliance contained both oligarchies and democracies.

[46] Campaigns of the southern Greeks against Macedonia after 338 are often called 'revolts' even though they were (at least formally) allies, not subjects, of the Macedonians. 'Attack' and 'war' are more appropriate terms.

[47] Hammond 1988, 59–60, does not adequately bring out the Arkadians' U-turn.

[48] Cf. Billows 1990, 38–9 and n. 69.

Perhaps fearing Spartan-led unrest, Alexander or Antipater may have stationed a military force in the Peloponnese under one Korrhagos (Aischines 3. 165);[50] or this may have been a response to the second attack on the Macedonians, launched in 331 under the leadership of Agis III of Sparta (r. 338–330). Without Athenian support, the campaign was unlikely to succeed. The Peloponnese suffered more than other parts of Greece, for in spring 330 Antipater invaded with an army of 40,000 (Diod. 17. 63. 1).[51] Agis was killed fighting alongside the other Greeks at Megalopolis; 5,300 Lakedaimonians (i.e. Spartiates and *perioikoi*) and allies of Sparta died (63. 2); presumably mostly allies in view of the high figure.[52] Fifty leading Spartiates were given to Antipater as hostages (73. 6), and the Lakedaimonians went quiet again, standing aside from the Lamian war a few years later (see Section II.3.b). Sparta was probably not, however, compelled to join the Hellenic alliance.[53]

Although Sparta after 331 has seemed to some historians 'a third-rate and inconsiderable Peloponnesian community'[54] and 'enfeebled beyond redemption',[55] that assessment does not take account of their enduring capacity for mobilizing and leading collective armies, their continuing ambition, and the evident determination of at least some leading Spartans to resist the entrenchment of Macedonian domination. Presumably this readiness to lead found willing followers among elites in *poleis* where Sparta's friends had not been eliminated. It is not many years before we see possible signs that the Spartans were willing to support military action, at least tacitly (see Section II.3.b and later).

The death of Darius III in 330, marking the Macedonian victory over the Persian empire, occasioned Alexander's standing down of his Hellenic allies, sent home with a collective bonus of 2,000 talents; many elected to remain in his service (Arrian 3. 19. 5–6).[56] About now, he is said to have installed tyrants in Messene (Ps.-Dem. 17. 4) and replaced a short-lived democracy at (normally oligarchic) Pellene with a tyranny under a certain Chairon (see Section III.2.b).[57] As Pellene, unlike other (and probably poorer) Achaean states, did not aid Agis' revolt (Aischines 3. 165), this tyranny may have preceded the anti-Macedonian campaign and may have deterred the people from taking part. It seems likely, however, that with these exceptions Alexander did not enforce 'regime change' widely, in contrast to some later commanders. Indeed, after his victory over Darius at Gaugamela in 331 he proclaimed that all Greek tyrannies were to be abolished and cities should live under their own laws (τὰς τυραννίδας πάσας καταλυθῆναι καὶ πολιτεύειν αὐτονόμους, Plut. *Alex.* 34. 2); a declaration others were to imitate.

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[49] Billows 1990, 40 n. 71.

[50] Aischines 3. 165 says that the Lakedaimonians and their mercenaries had 'destroyed the forces of Corrhagus'. Billows 1990, 194 n. 13, infers that Korrhagos was already in the Peloponnese before the Greeks attacked, but may be pressing the evidence too hard. See also Deinarchos 1. 34, referring to the war; Curtius 6. 1. 20, an account of the battle of Corinth.

[51] Hammond 1988, 85, 87.

[52] Rather than mostly *perioikoi* as in Cartledge and Spawforth 2002, 23.

[53] Cartledge and Spawforth 2002, 24–5.

[54] Cartledge and Spawforth 2002, 23.

[55] Bosworth 2012a.

As ever, the dilemma for southern Greek communities was whether to align themselves, even for protection against the Macedonians, with the Spartans, who despite occasional quiescence could be assumed to want to control the Peloponnese. Sparta might not, at present, be strong enough to dominate; but it might become so again. Was it worth expelling the Macedonians from the Peloponnese at the risk of seeing one's *polis* re-enter an unequal alliance with Sparta?

Events also showed that Philip and Alexander had no absolute preference for democracy, oligarchy, or tyranny; circumstances dictated their responses at the constitutional level, though in Asia Alexander appears to have favoured democracy because the Persians had favoured oligarchy.[58] Polybios (2. 41. 10) does not include Alexander among those who installed garrisons (though this is hardly evidence in Alexander's favour as Polybios also omits Antipater, who did install garrisons after the Lamian war). A general inclination to foster support by supporting democracy, however, is implied by events after Alexander's death, as we shall see.

II.3.b Further Unrest and Tighter Control (323–319)

Alexander's unexpected death at Babylon in summer 323 was followed by decades of warfare in Greece and western Asia among his generals, during which many southern Greeks fell victim to military campaigns; some being subjected to a control more invasive than under Philip and Alexander. Initially the generals acted in the name of the new joint kings, Philip III Arrhidaios (Philip II's only surviving son, Alexander's half-brother), thought by some unfit to govern,[59] and Alexander IV (Alexander's posthumous son), but within a few years they were both dead. Many parts of southern Greece changed hands several times, with casualties and economic losses on each occasion. The sources allow us to see much of the detail, giving a fuller narrative than at any time for nearly a century afterwards.

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[56] Bosworth 1994, 818.

[57] Morgan and Hall 2004, 484 (*Inv. 240*).

[58] O'Neil 1995, 103.

Alexander's death coincided with a third attack by the southern Greeks upon the Macedonians, leading to the Lamian war of 323–322, which was fought largely in Thessaly. This was partly provoked by the Exiles Decree of 324, in which Alexander ordered cities to take back political exiles,[60] which was felt by some to be intolerable. The failure of the campaign led to sterner repression. Diodoros (18. 11. 2) lists the Peloponnesian allies as Argos, Sikyon, Elis, Messene, and 'the inhabitants of the Akte', that is, the *poleis* of Argolis other than Argos and its dependencies (Pausanias 1. 25. 3–6 specifies Epidauros and Troizen, also adding Phleious). The Spartans, defeated a few years earlier, stood aside, perhaps fatally weakening the alliance. One might consider that they owed nothing to the Athenians, who had not helped Agis in 331. In the run-up to the war, however, Tainaron in Laconia provided Leosthenes of Athens with a base for a large force of mercenaries, many of them formerly in Alexander's service (Diod. 17. 108. 7; 111. 1–3; 18. 9. 2–3);[61] so the Spartans may have given tacit support to the preparations for revolt. (The Aristodemos episode in 314, see Section II.3.c, implies that Spartan permission was needed for recruiting activities at Tainaron.)

After defeating Athens and the southern Greeks in 322 – though the Aitolians fought on until 321 – Antipater installed a 'supervisor (*epimelētēs*) of the Peloponnese', one Deinarchos of Corinth (probably based in his home city and probably with military backup; Plut. *Phok*. 33. 3),[62] as well as garrisons. We have seen reason to doubt that such garrisons were common before the Lamian war; they would have made it almost impossible for the southern Greeks to launch their campaign, and in any case their imposition would have been incompatible with the aims and terms of Philip's Hellenic alliance. After the war, it was another matter, and Deinarchos may have been backed up with a detachment of troops which could be regarded as a garrison. Polyperchon's later proclamation of restoring the constitutions that existed under Philip and Alexander – possibly an attempt to revive the Hellenic alliance[63] – implies that, where change occurred, it had been brought about by Antipater after the Greek defeat. Indeed, regime change at this date appears to have been widespread (see Section II.3.c). In light of the Greek attack on the Macedonians, power perhaps had to be enforced more crudely; Greek loyalty to the Hellenic alliance could no longer be taken for granted, or conjured up by threats of force made from a distance.

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[59] Carney 2001 accepts the mental infirmity but shows that Arrhidaios retained considerable agency as king.

[60] They may have included his own discharged soldiers: Cartledge 2016, 234.

[61] Hammond 1988, 107. On Tainaron as a Spartan base, not an international mercenary market as such, see Couvenhes 2008.

[62] Killed on Polyperchon's orders in 318, Plut. *Phok*. 33. 5. He is not the famous orator, also Corinthian but a metic at Athens (Suda s.v. Deinarchos conflates them).

II.3.c The Subversion of Antipater's System and Growing Antigonid Power (319–301)

Antipater's attempt to 'pacify' southern Greece by force was disrupted by rivalry between other commanders. In 319, shortly before his death, he handed the regency of Macedonia, and effective leadership of the Hellenic alliance, not to his son Cassander (Kassandros) but to an older Macedonian, Polyperchon. In juridical terms, however, it was not Antipater's action but Cassander's violent response that made the logic of Philip's post-Chaironeia settlement unsustainable. That was perhaps unsurprising in the context of the warfare already under way among Alexander's generals in Egypt and Asia. Cassander's aspirations made the Peloponnese a springboard for those contesting control of northern Greece and Macedonia, inverting the previous geopolitical relationship.[64]

According to Diodoros, Polyperchon realized that Cassander could take over the cities of Greece from his father, since in some of them Antipater had planted garrisons while in others he had put his friends in charge of oligarchic constitutions (Diod. 18. 55. 2). In response to the threat from Cassander, Polyperchon proclaimed (in the name of Philip III) the cancellation of Antipater's measures against the cities that had fought against the Macedonians, and the restoration of 'the constitutions you had under Philip and Alexander' (56. 3).[65] This further confirms Alexander's generally *laissez-faire* attitude to constitutions in cities that remained loyal. Polyperchon also, however, followed the more high-handed example shown by the Exiles Decree by himself decreeing in 317 which cities were to take back their exiles as part of the restoration measures; though he allowed an exception for Megalopolis (56. 4–5). Conversely, he then ordered Argos to expel its former leaders from the time of Antipater, so that they could not hand the city over to Cassander (57. 1). Both measures amounted to support for democracy – or at least for those described as democrats – since the city-states had enjoyed it under Alexander, and this brought him the support of Athens; and despite his concession oligarchic Megalopolis remained sympathetic to Cassander (68. 3), as we shall shortly see. No doubt, however, Polyperchon was obliged to maintain or install garrisons in order to protect *poleis* from Cassander.

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[63] Dixon 2014, 51.

[64] For Hieronymos of Kardia as a major source for Cassander's 'ruthless' energy, see J. Hornblower 1981, esp. 224–5.

[65] See also discussion by Billows 1990, 198–9.

Polyperchon escalated his interference, ordering the cities not merely to expel but to put to death those who had been magistrates in Antipater's oligarchic regimes (Diod. 18. 69. 3) – though again this was part of his effort to restore constitutions to their earlier state. Most cities obeyed and made an alliance with him, but Megalopolis resisted; perhaps the only oligarchy strong enough to do so.[66] Diodoros describes in detail the resulting siege of Megalopolis (70. 1–72. 1), in which the Macedonians suffered heavy losses; we may suppose that many Peloponnesians were casualties on the Macedonian side. Although Polyperchon left a force in place to continue the siege, no more is heard of it and he presumably withdrew the army before the point at which Diodoros records (under the same year) the failure of the operation (74. 1). Polyperchon was perhaps more popular than Cassander among democrats, but his support came at a price; and his failure at Megalopolis weakened his appeal, as Diodoros observes in the context of Cassander's choice as governor of Athens in 317, the philosopher Demetrios of Phaleron (74. 4).

Also in 317, Philip III, under the influence of his powerful wife Eurydike, transferred the regency from Polyperchon to Cassander (Justin 14. 5), who was emboldened to launch a campaign in the Peloponnese. While he was away, Polyperchon invaded Macedonia with Olympias (mother of Alexander the Great) and put to death Philip and Eurydike (Diod. 19. 11. 1–7). Cassander was besieging Tegea when he heard the news (19. 35. 1), whereupon he agreed terms (of which we have no detail) with the citizens and hastened north to intervene. He would not be the last Macedonian commander who was forced to give up a Peloponnesian campaign in favour of pressing matters at home (see Section II.6).

In 316 Cassander took control of Macedonia and put Olympias to death in her turn (Diod. 19. 51. 1–6). Thereupon he decided on another Peloponnesian campaign (52. 5). Landing at Epidauros, which he doubtless pressed into submission, he forced Argos to adhere to his cause (54. 3), gained the support of the cities of Messenia 'except for Ithome' (54. 4; i.e. the *polis* we generally call Messene), which may now have been allied to Polyperchon;[67] and secured Hermionis (the *polis* and territory of Hermion in Argolis) by negotiation (i.e. threats?). Returning to Macedonia, he left a garrison at the Isthmus (54. 4). His problem in the coming years, however, was keeping control of his power base in the south.

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[66] O'Neil 1995, 104.

Cassander's next campaign forced Polyperchon and his son Alexandros (who was in charge of Corinth) onto the defensive; but in 314 they were still secure.[68] Help came from Alexander's former general Antigonos Monophthalmos ('One-eye'), based in Asia Minor, who sent Aristodemos of Miletos to forge an alliance with Polyperchon and raise a mercenary force against Cassander (Diod. 19. 57. 5). Aristodemos landed in Laconia, and with Spartan permission to recruit – presumably in Laconia, not only among Spartans – he came away with 8,000 soldiers from the Peloponnese (60. 1; so not only Laconians either). Although the Spartans had not, as far as we know, taken any steps against Macedonia since 331, this may be a sign that Kleomenes II and Eudamidas I, though little known to history, were not bereft of policies. Through Aristodemos, Antigonos appointed Polyperchon commander (*stratēgos*) of the Peloponnese (60. 1). At Tyre in Phoenicia, he issued his famous proclamation of Greek freedom (61. 3),[69] echoing that of Alexander after his victory at Gaugamela in 331 (Plut. *Alex*. 34. 2). In 313 he despatched fifty warships to the Peloponnese (Diod. 19. 62. 9).[70] Antigonos' strategy was evidently founded on a combination of financial inducements to potential recruits and a deliberate invocation of Philip and Alexander's earlier support for the *polis* system; it does not betoken a belief in the inherent superiority of democratic politics.[71]

This, as we shall see, did not prevent the Antigonids from imposing a garrison to keep a town loyal; the same pragmatism had been characteristic of Philip and Alexander. Cassander, on the other hand, is sometimes considered to have weakened his military effort by too readily supporting oligarchies 'and supplying them perforce with garrisons', in contrast to Antigonos who did so only out of necessity.[72] Polybios notes that Cassander (but also Demetrios, Antigonos' son) installed garrisons in the Peloponnese (2. 41). These years saw a number of notorious atrocities committed in his name. His general in Argos, Apollonides, captured Stymphalos and massacred hundreds of pro-Polyperchon democrats (Diod. 19. 63. 1–2, under 315/4). Cassander himself invaded the Peloponnese again, took Kenchreai, ravaged the territory of Corinth, seized two rural forts (φρούρια) where Alexandros had installed garrisons, and allowed the anti-Polyperchon faction in Orchomenos to massacre their opponents even though they had taken refuge in a sanctuary (63. 4–5).

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[67] The failure to secure the support of Ithome is missed by Hammond 1988, 146, perhaps unaware that Ithome was the original name of Messene (see Shipley 2004b, 561–4 (*Inv. 318*). See further Chapter III n. 124. The story presumably confirms that the fortifications of Ithome–Messene were now complete. A Messenian–Macedonian treaty of *c.* 317 (*SEG* 47. 381; cf. 41. 320; 51. 456), was perhaps made when Polyperchon and his son Alexandros garrisoned Ithome in 317 (Diod. 19. 60. 1; 19. 64. 1; Themelis 1991, 86–7 no. 1).

[68] Billows 1990, 108, 111.

[69] Dillery 1995, 266.

[70] Billows 1990, 117 and n.

[71] On the Successors' use of the language of *polis* freedom, see Cartledge 2016, 234–5.

Despite invading Messenia, Cassander temporarily gave up plans for a siege of the city when he found that Polyperchon had garrisoned it (Diod. 19. 64. 1). After installing a governor in Megalopolis and presiding at the Nemean games, he once more returned to Macedonia (64. 1). Alexandros sought to expel Cassander's garrisons, but was unexpectedly induced to desert his father and become Cassander's *stratēgos* in the Peloponnese (64. 2–4). A fleet sent by Seleukos (at this stage governor of western Asia, and allied to Antigonos) appeared at Kenchreai but left on learning of Alexandros' treachery (64. 4). Treachery by commanders seems a regular occurrence in these years (we shall see several examples later).

Cassander's Antigonid opponents, nominal upholders of Greek freedom, are not immune from charges of atrocities committed or condoned. We have noted that Polybios includes Demetrios among those who installed garrisons. Antigonos' envoy Aristodemos, having attacked and encircled Alexandros and the Eleians who were besieging Kyllene (Diod. 19. 66. 2, under 314/3), freed Patrai and Aigion from Cassander's garrisons, but allowed many citizens of Aigion to be killed while his army was looting the town (66. 2–3). In the same year, the fate of Dyme showed that brutality could be even-handed. Alexandros captured the town for Cassander with great slaughter, but provoked a decisive revolt by the survivors; they in turn, aided by the Antigonid force from Aigion, massacred their opponents (or possibly just the garrison; 66. 4–6). Alexandros was then assassinated at Sikyon (which he held); control of that city and of Corinth passed to his widow, the aptly named Kratesipolis ('Cityholder'), who suppressed opposition by crucifying some thirty citizens (67. 1–2).

Later Telesphoros, nephew of Antigonos, succeeding in expelling all of Cassander's garrisons except those of the late Alexandros at Sikyon and Corinth (Diod. 19. 74. 1–2, under 313/2).[73] In winter 312/1, however, abandoning Antigonos' cause, he captured the *polis* of Elis, robbed the sanctuary of Olympia of 500 talents, and garrisoned Kyllene (87. 1–2). A further Antigonid commander, Ptolemaios or Polemaios, having 'razed' (κατασκάψας, lit. 'destroyed by digging') the fortifications of Elis erected by Telesphoros, 'liberated' that city, repaid the money Telesphoros had taken from Olympia, and negotiated the handover of Kyllene (87. 3).[74]

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[72] Hammond 1988, 157.

[73] On the chronology of 312, see Billows 1990, 122 n. 52; cf. 225.

Antigonid forces now controlled nearly all the northern Peloponnese. Cassander, however, had not given up. Having disposed of the young Alexander IV in *c.* 310 (Diod. 19. 105. 2), in 309 he won Polyperchon his old enemy to his cause – just as he had earlier brought over Polyperchon's son Alexandros – sending him south as *stratēgos* of the Peloponnese (20. 28. 1–4). Polyperchon appears to have kept control of various mercenary garrisons; but in 308 Ptolemy, the Macedonian ruler of Egypt, 'liberated' Sikyon and Corinth from Kratesipolis (20. 37. 1; Polyainos 8. 58 says she handed it over against the wishes of her garrison) and attempted to revive the Hellenic alliance (Suda s.v. Δημήτριος ὁ Ἀντιγόνου).[75] Whether Ptolemy was interested in acquiring control of mainland Greece is debatable; probably a mixture of motives led him to intervene: pre-emptive harassment or distraction of Macedonia in its own 'back yard' may have seemed necessary to the security of Egypt and its own maritime possessions, while any opportunity to promote his reputation for success and benevolent patronage was not to be turned down lightly.[76] He does not, however, appear to have followed through: disappointed by the lack of support from a surely demoralized Peloponnese, he departed, leaving garrisons in those two *poleis* and allowing Cassander to keep the places he possessed (Diod. 20. 37. 2). Antigonos' position was weakened further by the desertion of Ptolemaios,[77] prompting him to launch, with his son Demetrios Poliorketes, the expedition that resulted in the liberation of Athens in 307 from the governorship of Demetrios of Phaleron.[78]

Alexander's legitimate heirs being dead, from 307/6 the leading Successors each adopted the title of *basileus*, 'king'. Antigonos I Monophthalmos and Demetrios I Poliorketes continued to harp upon the theme of Greek freedom. Their consistency, whether based on conviction or on calculation, won them friends and civic honours.[79] In 304 Demetrios took Kenchreai (Plut. *Demetr*. 23. 1–3). Next spring (303) he 'liberated' Sikyon from Ptolemy (Diod. 20. 102. 2; Polyain. 4. 7. 3), refounding it on a new site (Diod. 20. 102. 2–4; Plut. *Demetr*. 25. 2).[80] Straight afterwards, he took Corinth from Cassander's general Prepelaos, garrisoning it at the request of the citizens (Diod. 20. 103. 1–3) – surely meaning the pro-Antigonid faction. It is, perhaps, from this date that we can begin to see the 'Fetters of Greece' (πέδαι Ἑλληνικαί) operating as an Antigonid chain of control comprising the four main harbours on the east coast – Corinth, Piraeus, Chalkis, and Demetrias – though they were not necessarily so named until a century later (by Philip V, according to Polyb. 18. 11. 5; cf. Livy 32. 37. 4, *compedes Graeciae*), by which time only three remained (Piraeus now being free; see Section V.1.c; cf. Plut. *Arat.* 16. 6; Strabo 9. 4. 14).

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[74] Billows 1990, 131. Telesphoros, surprisingly, reappears as an associate of Antigonos some years later.

[75] Billows 1990, 144–5 and n. 18; also 201.

[76] On the mix of Ptolemaic motives, cf. Shipley 2000b, 205–7. Bagnall 1976, 135, dates Ptolemaic tenure of Corinth and Sikyon to 308–303.

[77] Billows 1990, 145.

[78] Several years later, in 305, Polyperchon may have seized Corinth from Ptolemy: Hammond 1988, 176 – but wrongly citing Diod. 20. 100. 6.

Demetrios moved on to 'liberate' Boura and another place with a garrison (φρουρά, Diod. 20. 103. 4), probably Skiros in south-eastern Arkadia.[81] Orchomenos was next on his list; with revealing ruthlessness, after the city's resistance was overcome with siege engines Polyperchon's garrison commander and eighty other opponents of the Antigonids were crucified in front of the walls, while 2,000 mercenaries were taken into Antigonos' army (103. 5–6). This hastened the surrender of 'those nearby occupying the forts' (presumably rural) and 'those garrisoning the *poleis*' (οἱ σύνεγγυς τὰ φρούρια κατέχοντες … οἱ τὰς πόλεις φρουροῦντες, 103. 7), which should mean the other Arkadian *poleis*. Continuing his triumphal progress, Demetrios went on to liberate Troizen[82] and Epidauros;[83] presided over the Heraia festival at Argos (Plut. *Demetr*. 25. 1–2); and may have

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[79] On the frequency of honours to Antigonos and Demetrios, e.g. at Athens, and their probable spontaneity, see Billows 1990, 236 and n. 120. But B. exaggerates the originality and importance of Antigonos: see Derow 1993.

[80] Billows 1990, 170.

[81] 'Skyros' in the MSS of Diodoros (20. 103. 4); but the island in the Sporades can hardly be meant. Geer 1954, ad loc., notes Wesseling's suggestion of 'Skiros'. The only place of that name appears to be the possible town in N. Laconia (Shipley 2004a, 577), which may be identical with the Arkadian 'settlement' (*katoikia*) of Skiros 'near the Mainalians and Parrhasians' (Herodian, *On Orthography* 3. 2. 581. 23). It lay in a part of Sparta's perioikic territory given to Tegea by Philip II in 338 (Michel 452; Shipley 2000a, 373–4, 387).

[82] See McCabe's Halikarnassos no. 17, the honorific decree for Zenodotos, discussed at Billows 1990, 440 n. 120. Cyriac of Ancona recorded a corresponding decree at Troizen. Z., a citizen of Halikarnassos, had helped liberate Troizen from a garrison; the occasion is identified as Demetrios' campaign. See also Billows 1990, 208 and n. 54.

[83] *IG* iv^2 1. 68 and 58. Billows 1990, 172 and n. 19 cites these, though 68 is evidence only because it was erected at Epidauros, while 58 only records Epidauros honouring a man also honoured at Athens as a member of Demetrios' court, see *IG* ii^2 495.

'liberated' Elis.[84] Demetrios the 'liberator' was now in full control of the northern and central Peloponnese; control that was all the more secure for his personal presence (in partial contrast to the situation a generation later under Antigonos II Gonatas).

At the Isthmia of 302, Demetrios announced a new Hellenic alliance modelled on that of Philip, with a *hēgemōn* and council (*synedrion*; Diod. 20. 102; Plut. *Demetr*. 25. 3; cf. Diod. 20. 46 for his earlier plan). The new charter, like that of 337, is partly preserved (*IG* iv^2 1. 68).[85] In its fragmentary text the names of the Eleians and Achaeans occur, but there must have been other members; it is not known whether Sparta was now among them. Despite Demetrios' occasional use of garrisons, the treaty left member cities autonomous and ungarrisoned[86] under their 'ancestral' constitutions, as in the earlier alliance, but required them to contribute military manpower, have the same friends and foes as Antigonos and Demetrios, and uphold their kingship. Macedonian control may have been firm: restrictions on calling magistrates to account were built into the constitution,[87] and a general 'in charge of common protection' was to be appointed.

Having swept across the northern Peloponnese with irresistible force, and doubtless dragooned political leaders in other *poleis* besides Orchomenos into loyal acquiescence, Demetrios was prepared now to adopt once more a public approach aimed at evoking the spirit of Philip and Alexander's alliance, and to earn himself plaudits for so doing.

II.3.d Retrospective of 338–301

Philip II's Hellenic alliance, and his general toleration of existing constitutions, seemed to augur more peaceful times; but first his death, then Alexander's departure for Asia, and finally Alexander's death all became the occasion for an attack on the Macedonians by the southern Greeks. Each attack failed, and the last provoked a U-turn in constitutional policy by Antipater; a repressive departure from the usual (though not consistent) Spartan and Theban policy of 'delegated power at a distance'. In the post-Lamian war climate, some of Alexander's immediate Successors used not only garrisons but sometimes forcible political restructuring as instruments of domination, until Demetrios I – who since 314 had, with his father, proclaimed a more tolerant approach – set up a new Hellenic alliance in 301.

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[84] Inferred from an instruction in the charter of the Hellenic alliance (see next note) which enjoins the Eleians to erect a copy of the document: *IG* iv^2 1. 68 l. 136 (face B, fr. 5).

[85] *SdA* iii. 446; part trans. in Austin^2 50; Bagnall and Derow 1981, no. 8; Harding 1985, no. 138; Ager 1996, no. 14; Canali de Rossi 2001, xvii no. 44 (giving addenda to *ISE* 44).

[86] Fr. 1 mentions the capture of garrisons by league members as warranting intervention; but this must refer to royal garrisons of a key nature, perhaps such as Corinth.

[87] Rhodes 2005, 7.

Submission, resistance, repression; but also structure and pacification: these had been the hallmarks of Philip II's settlement. The situation, as we have noted, created a familiar dilemma for those who were politically active in a *polis*: how to balance peace against independence. Alexander may have taken Greek forces into Asia partly as hostages for their cities' good behaviour; if so, it did not work. Despite unrest in Greece, however, he sent them home after the defeat of Darius (apart from those who wished to remain in his service) rather than dispose of them. Macedonian royal power in southern Greece after Chaironeia was a relatively light-touch affair, despite (or because of) the destruction of Thebes.

The Lamian war changed the terms of business between Macedonia and the southern Greeks. We now see garrisons and oligarchies being promoted by Antipater, with *polis* regimes owing loyalty to their external sponsor. This was to become a standard technique in the decades to come. Nevertheless, the decision of Polyperchon to win support by favouring constitutional reversal shows that the relationship between warlord and city was a dialogue; he preferred to influence the citizens, not coerce them if it could be avoided. It could not always be avoided, however, and the struggle between Polyperchon and Cassander in 319–314 was a particularly black period for the Peloponnese, with a second wave of misery in 314–312. The general population, not just the politically active, must have been desperate for some sort of peace.

Although we should not regard the Antigonids as inherently better behaved than others in this period, they contributed a measure of stability by generally adhering to their stated aim of respecting *polis* freedom. But Demetrios had to use considerable force in his triumphant campaign of the late 300s; and the best version of stability he could offer through his alliance's charter was to protect the interests of elite groups who were willing to keep their *polis* loyal, or at least neutral. This was, nevertheless, a situation involving dialogue and negotiation: *polis* leaders had to sign up to a code of conduct. It may be a case of one-sided diplomacy backed by the threat of force, but it was not the end of civic politics, such as had almost been brought about during Cassander's campaigns.

The pendulum swung between coercion and acquiescence, as it had under Spartan and Theban leadership; but all was still predicated upon the continuance of the *polis* system and of civic politics. This left considerable room for *polis* agency whenever the majority view of a citizen body changed. It is remarkable how many *poleis*, despite being forced or persuaded into Macedonian-sponsored alliances, despite having suffered in the wars of the Diadochoi, and despite the frequent imposition of garrisons, could still decide to send citizen soldiers against the Macedonians – and sometimes (as in 331, and subsequently in the early third century) to follow their old hegemon, Sparta, in so doing. To many, Spartan leadership may have seemed preferable to Macedonian coercion; perhaps on the principle that 'our masters then Were still, at least, our countrymen'.[88]

II.4 The Military Philosophers: Resistance and Reaction under the Antigonids (301–222)

The narrative of the first three-quarters of the third century forms the centrepiece of our historical study; but with the end of Diodoros' eighteenth book we enter a period devoid of continuous narrative sources apart from fragments of (that is, quotations from) contemporary authors and later retrospectives, chiefly Justin's useful epitome of Pompeius Trogus.[89] It is true that four *Lives* by Plutarch (*Demetrios*, *Pyrrhos*, *Aratos*, and *Agis–Kleomenes*) and, in less detail, passages of the second-century AD traveller Pausanias supplement the narrative. These are complemented by the piecemeal epigraphy; and from the 220s by the early books of Polybios (cited as 'P.' in the remainder of this chapter). On this basis, the present section attempts to lay a foundation for the discussion in Chapter III of issues including the degree to which military power rested upon garrisons and tyrannies; the aims of Macedonian rulers and whether there was a *pax Macedonica*, or indeed a *pax Achaica* later; whether Sparta's aims were still limited to imposing a more traditional *pax Laconica*; the behaviour of other states towards Sparta; and whether the pooling of sovereignty in the interests of security (or other interests) represented a partial or wholesale withdrawal from the political framework in which the *polis* was primary.

II.4.a First Interruption and Restoration of Antigonid Power (301–287)

Antigonid leadership of the new Hellenic alliance had been established for only a year or so when it was interrupted; though the hiatus would prove temporary. In 301, at Ipsos in south-eastern Asia Minor, Antigonos and Demetrios were defeated, and Antigonos killed, fighting a coalition of the other leading Successors: Cassander, Lysimachos, and Seleukos. This resulted in the break-up of the alliance, leaving Demetrios with only a few coastal towns, chief among them Corinth.[90] At this point the city-states of the Peloponnese, some of them organized into blocs (most obviously Laconia; perhaps Messenia; in a different sense Eleia), presumably acted as wholly independent entities for a brief interval. Within three or four years, however, in 298 or 297, Cassander had died and Demetrios re-entered Greece. Before long, he controlled not only Corinth but also most of east-central Greece beyond the Isthmus, from Megara to Thessaly, and once more dominated Argolis, Achaea, and Arkadia.[91]

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[88] Byron, *The Isles of Greece*, 65–6 (quoted from Quiller-Couch 1900, 693).

[89] See Yardley *et al.* 2011, esp. appendix 5 (pp. 331–4) on what Justin leaves out.

Around this time Pyrrhos of Epeiros, whom in 301 Demetrios had left to govern Greece (Plut. *Demetr*. 31. 2), attached himself to Ptolemy I of Egypt. In his place Demetrios appointed his son Antigonos (the future Antigonos II Gonatas), who appeared in this role in some part of Greece by 296.[92] When in 294 Demetrios captured Macedonia, Gonatas continued to govern southern Greece, though he does not appear to have tried to reconstitute the Hellenic alliance – a sign, perhaps, that his core interests lay outside the Peloponnese. These years represented the latest swing in Macedonian policy, back towards ruthless pragmatism, following Demetrios' more conciliatory gestures before Ipsos (see Section II.3.c). They also mark the beginning of temporally (though not spatially) continuous Antigonid domination of parts of the Peloponnese, especially in the north-east, until the 240s and perhaps, in places, until the early 220s.

Sparta has been absent from the narrative for some while (with only hints of tacit resistance: see Sections II.3.b, II.3.c), so it is doubtful whether (as Tarn claims) containment of Sparta was Demetrios' main aim in the Peloponnese.[93] Later in the 290s, however,[94] he seems to have tried to extend his mastery to the whole peninsula – an achievement Philip had never claimed despite invading Laconia – and focused his attention on Laconia and Messenia, both of which had perhaps stood aside from his Hellenic alliance of 302 (see Section II.3.c). After defeating Archidamos IV of Sparta (r. *c*. 305–*c*. 275) in a battle at Mantinea in 294 (Plut. *Demetr*. 35. 1; Polyain. 4. 7. 9), Demetrios invaded Laconia and in a second battle killed 200 of the enemy and captured 500 (Plutarch does not specify how many of these 700 were Spartans, other Lakedaimonians, mercenaries, or allies). He then unsuccessfully besieged Messene (Plut. *Demetr*. 33. 2), which struck an alliance with Lysimachos either now or in the mid-280s (*SEG* 41. 322);[95] if now, it is the latter's first recorded involvement in the Peloponnese. Demetrios was prevented from consolidating his control of Sparta, however, as news of victories won by Ptolemy in Cyprus and Lysimachos in Asia Minor drew him away (35. 3–4).[96] Up to this point, he had adopted a more hard-line policy than before, dictated by military needs.

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[90] Tarn 1913, 11, is more positive ('a good deal of the Peloponnese'); cf. Will 1984, 101.

[91] Tarn 1913, 50–1.

[92] Tarn 1913, 20, citing *IG* xi. 2. 154A. 43–4 (296 BC), an Antigonos donating wood for a festival of Dionysos on Delos; *SEG* 48. 1033.

[93] Tarn 1913, 66–8.

[94] Will 1984, 105.

II.4.b Gonatas Meets Resistance (287–*c*. 267)

The next two decades saw the Antigonids apparently still in control of the northern Peloponnese, but seemingly doing little to combat the anti-Macedonian federation whose seeds were sown around 280 in Achaea; perhaps less troubled by it than by Pyrrhos' invasion in the late 270s.

In 287 Demetrios departed from Greece, for the last time as it turned out, to invade Asia Minor; he left Gonatas in charge,[97] but probably assigned him only enough manpower for defensive operations.[98] Athens, where the once popular Demetrios was now deeply disliked (if the moral narrative in Plut. *Demetr*. 26–7 is to be believed), had just revolted with partial success when Demetrios was captured by Seleukos; dying in captivity some years later.[99]

In the aftermath of his father's capture, Gonatas was concerned to defend the Antigonid fortresses. He retained Corinth and had the loyalty of Argos and Megalopolis ('of necessity', says Tarn: they needed protection against Sparta[100]). (The alliance between Messene and Lysimachos, previously mentioned, may instead belong in the years around 285.[101]) But when Pyrrhos abandoned Lysimachos and returned to Gonatas' side, it was northern Greece and Lysimachos that occupied Gonatas' attention.[102]

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[95] *SEG* 41. 322 (*c*. 295?); cf. 45. 290; 51. 457 (*c*. 295 or *c*. 285?); Themelis 1990, 83–5, dates it 286–281; Matthaiou 1990–1 links it to Demetrios' attack on Messene (followed by Kralli 2017, 102–3), though at Matthaiou 2001, 229–31, he leaves the date open.

[96] Cartledge and Spawforth 2002, 31 (references at 238 n. 8).

[97] Tarn 1913, 92, 100–1.

[98] Tarn 1913, 103.

[99] Shipley 2000b, 124.

[100] Tarn 1913, 114.

[101] See n. 95 above.

[102] Tarn 1913, 115–18. The secret alliance between Gonatas and Pyrrhos is known from Phoinikides, *Auletrides*, fr. 1; see Hammond and Walbank 1988, 235 and nn. 2–3. (The statement of Eusebios that in 285/4 Gonatas took Sparta really refers to Doson in 222: Tarn 1913, 121 n. 21.)

Tarn assumes he was unpopular because he levied taxes upon the cities as Demetrios had done;[103] but there is no evidence for such a practice (see Section IV.2.b). We must also consider the question, discussed more fully in Chapter III, of how far Gonatas' power in the Peloponnese rested upon the systematic use of garrisons and tyrants; for now, we may note that it is hard to see a definite Antigonid policy in this respect before about the 270s, though Gonatas most probably maintained the tough stance towards the Greek *poleis* that his father had adopted in the 290s (see Section II.4.a).

In 281/0 a battle at Kouroupedion (or Koroupedion) near Sardis in western Asia Minor occasioned the death of Lysimachos directly, and indirectly that of Seleukos – the last two survivors among Alexander's generals. This conjunction of events, remote in space though it was, had an impact upon the Peloponnese, for it drew Gonatas away once again; this time to try to retake Macedonia. He was defeated at sea by Ptolemy Keraunos (exiled son of Ptolemy I),[104] an outcome which probably occasioned Sparta's first assault on Macedonian power in half a century. Also in 281/0, Areus I (r. 309–265) – who probably more than all other Spartan kings modelled himself on Alexander's Successors[105] – took the lead in promoting a further attack. Justin claims that 'more or less all the states of Greece' (*omnes ferme Graeciae civitates*, 24. 1. 2) rose against Macedonia; presumably a substantial number of Peloponnesians were involved.[106] Their only substantial achievement, however, was an attack on Aitolia,[107] a stratagem to avoid attacking Antigonos directly (24. 1. 3).[108] They failed to liberate Delphi from the Aitolians, however; and the venture collapsed after a costly defeat in Aitolia in which many Peloponnesians must have perished. Many states refused to give the Spartans any further aid, fearing that they wished to dominate the Peloponnese (*existimantes eos dominationem, non libertatem Graeciae quaerere*, 24. 1. 7)[109] – the eternal dilemma.

Another response to chaos in Macedonia – perhaps in concert with Areus' expedition – may have been the revival of the Achaean league as a federal union, which took place during the 124th Olympiad, 284–280 (P. 2. 41. 12); probably at the end of that quadrennium, in the aftermath of

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[103] Tarn 1913, 115.

[104] Tarn 1913, 131.

[105] See e.g. Cartledge and Spawforth 2002, 28–37; Palagia 2006; more briefly, Shipley 2006a.

[106] Tarn 1913, 132–4, lists possible allies, but relies too much on inference. Kralli 2017, 119, argues that Isyllos' pro-Spartan hymn to Apollo Maleatas and Asklepios, inscribed at Epidauros (*IG* iv^2 1. 128) and dated to *c*. 280, should precede Areus' defeat.

[107] Shipley 2000b, 125.

[108] See also Tarn 1913, 132–3.

[109] Tarn 1913, 133.

Kouroupedion. Polybios claims that the earlier league had operated a democratic system, though the only evidence he gives is the abolition of the mythical kingship. In recent times, he says, the cities had fallen out with another and succumbed to Macedonian domination in the persons of Demetrios, Cassander, and Gonatas. Elsewhere he appears to imply that some of them had been under Macedonian domination (2. 41. 9–10; see Section III.2.c). Now the four westernmost *poleis*, those furthest from Gonatas' stronghold at Corinth, took the initiative: first Patrai and Dyme, then Tritaia and Pharai. (The absentee in that district is Olenos, which probably still existed but may have been in decline.[110]) They were joined soon after by Aigion, Boura, and Keryneia. Polybios thus implies (though without specifics) that from the start the aim was to throw off kingly, specifically Macedonian, domination. We shall examine more closely in Chapter III the evidence for direct impositions by the kings. If there is any substance in the claims, the revival marks a break in their control of the northern Peloponnese, which in places had been almost continuous since the early 290s.

After their setback in 281/0, few Peloponnesians helped defend central Greece against an attack by the Galatai ('Gauls' or 'Celts') in 279; in some cases allegedly for fear of Spartan domination (Paus. 4. 28. 3 on the Messenians; 8. 6. 3 on the Arkadians; but at 7. 6. 7 he attributes their absence to indifference in view of the fact that the Galatai had no navy).[111] Among the Achaeans, only the Patraians sent a force, which suffered such heavy losses that their *polis* was reportedly 'dioikized', perhaps into settlements that had formerly been dependent *dēmoi* (Paus. 7. 18. 6 names Mesatis, Antheia, Bolina, Argyra, and Arba);[112] but it appears to have recovered before long, judging by Polybios' reference to the *chōra* of the *polis* in the 240s (4. 6) and by archaeological evidence (Sections IV.5.c, 6.a). The invasion of the Galatai,[113] however, led to Keraunos' death and in *c.* 277 to Gonatas' capture of Macedonia. Although he succeeded in holding on to his homeland – the start of over a century of continuous Antigonid rule there – it seems the Spartans continued to machinate against him: if Tarn is right, they established a relationship with Apollodoros, tyrant of Kassandreia in Chalkidike (Paus. 4. 5. 4), himself in contact with the new Seleukid king, Antiochos I (r. 280–261; Polyain. 6. 7. 2). This led nowhere, however, for Gonatas soon expelled Apollodoros from his city.[114]

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[110] Morgan and Hall 2004, 483 (*Inv. 238*).

[111] Tarn 1913, 150.

[112] Morgan and Hall 2004, 477–8 (the *demoi*), 483–4 (*Inv. 239* Patrai), at 484.

[113] For a radical rethink of the invasion, and of the terms 'Galatai', 'Celts', and 'Gauls', see Campbell 2009.

[114] Tarn 1913, 172.

If it is correct to infer that the first four member *poleis* of the revived Achaean league – like the next two to join – had to divest themselves of (implicitly pro-Macedonian) governors or garrisons in order to combine, then it was perhaps after Demetrios' failure to return from Asia that Gonatas, following his father's example, sought to apply direct pressure to the northern Peloponnese through renewed impositions. The specific discussion of governors and garrisons in Chapter III, however, will suggest that Gonatas pursued such a policy only piecemeal and opportunistically; it would have been too costly, and indeed impractical, to attempt to impose a blanket system of puppet governors or 'tyrants'; he had more pressing concerns. We shall see, too, that there are some signs that the so-called tyrants of Peloponnesian *poleis* emerged from within their own citizen body. It is tempting to make a parallel with the Roman temporary magistracy of the *dictātor*, a man chosen by election or acclamation; the model had existed since at least the mid-fourth century, and perhaps recalls the archaic Greek role of *aisymnētēs* (arbitrator), a man brought in to resolve civil discord.

It is also intriguing to wonder why Gonatas did not, as far as we know, strike at the renascent league before its membership rose to ten with the accessions of Aigion, Boura, and Karyneia in 275 and of Leontion, Aigeira, and Pellene in 274. Either he could not muster the resources to act against it – perhaps because of more urgent business – or he did not think it worthwhile. In the latter case, it seems possible that from the Macedonian point of view it mattered little whether a city was kept friendly by a governor, with or without a detachment of infantry at his back, or was made quiescent – not actively hostile to Macedonian interests – by the realities of power relations. In any case, evidence concerning Pyrrhos' invasion of the Peloponnese (see the next paragraph) suggests that Gonatas' writ was still seen as running in substantial areas.

In 273,[115] Pyrrhos, having abandoned his campaigns in Italy and Sicily, and no longer Gonatas' ally, invaded the Peloponnese as a preliminary to assaulting Macedonia, as the early Successors had done – another testimony to the peninsula's significance for them, which perhaps was not so much positive (resources, manpower) as negative (its capacity to distract rulers and divert military resource if not kept inactive). At Megalopolis, he was met by envoys from Sparta (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 26. 20), whom he is reported to have told that he had come 'to liberate the cities under Antigonos' (ἐλευθερώσων τὰς ὑπ' Ἀντιγόνῳ πόλεις, 26. 10); if accurately reported, this implies that a substantial number were still seen as being under Macedonian domination, despite the tally of the Achaean league's members having reached double figures.[116] Other envoys came from Athens, Achaea, and Messene (Justin 25. 4. 4); the last of these helped Sparta against Pyrrhos shortly afterwards (Paus. 4. 29. 6), so these diplomatic missions are not evidence of any inclination towards Pyrrhos' cause.[117] The tide turned in Gonatas' favour in 272, in any case, when Pyrrhos treacherously attacked Sparta at the instigation of the exiled royal pretender Kleonymos (Plut. *Pyrrh*. 26. 9) but was defeated by the Spartans and Macedonians, cooperating for once (27–30); soon meeting his end while attacking Argos (31–4).

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[115] Date: Derow 2012b.

Gonatas had neutralized the danger from Pyrrhos in concert with the Lakedaimonians, and may have expected a time of calm in the Peloponnese. Antigonid power there, patchy and unsystematic as it appears to have been, may have been marginally diminished by the revival of an Achaean league; but Gonatas may not have been overly troubled by this development, so long as direct threats, for example to Corinth, did not materialize and the Ptolemies or Seleukids did not gain a foothold. Indeed, after the defeat of Pyrrhos it is possible that Gonatas' domination of the Peloponnese was reinforced, if Trogus (in Justin's summary) is correct in his claims:

> (1) After the death of Pyrrhos there occurred, not only in Macedonia but also in Asia and Greece, vast military campaigns. (2) For not only were the Peloponnesians handed over to Antigonos by treachery (*per proditionem Antigono traditi*), (3) but – since men variously felt fear or joy according to whether their particular cities had either hoped for assistance from Pyrrhos or had lived in fear of him – accordingly they either made an alliance with Antigonos or, because of hatred of one another, rushed into conflict.
>
> (Justin 26. 1. 1–3)

Talk of 'treachery' may refer, as Tarn suggests, either to Ptolemy II (r. 283–246) abandoning his interest in the Peloponnese for the time being, presumably for strategic reasons; or perhaps more likely to internal treachery within *poleis* by those ready to sacrifice independence in order to promote their own group's fortunes.

II.4.c Concerted Revolt and Harsh Response (*c*. 268–*c*. 252)

Spartan–Macedonian cooperation did not last; Antigonid power was soon subjected to another serious attack by Sparta among others; and the Ptolemies did indeed gain a beachhead. In the early 260s, probably in autumn 268,[118] an alliance of southern states launched a full-scale attack. Its failure was to have grave consequences for the Greeks. Modern scholarship calls the episode the Chremonidean war after the Athenian politician who proposed the relevant assembly decree.[119] The allies comprised Athens, Sparta, Elis (now post-tyranny), the Achaeans, five eastern Arkadian *poleis* (Tegea, Mantinea, Orchomenos, Phigaleia, Kaphyai; but not Megalopolis in the west), a number of Cretan towns,[120] and crucially Ptolemy II Philadelphos of Egypt (r. 283–246), who sought to check Gonatas' power in the Aegean.[121] Areus of Sparta, too, had his own ambition: the usual Spartan one of restoring Lakedaimonian hegemony in the Peloponnese.[122]

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[116] Tarn consistently dismisses this, but perhaps insists too much.

[117] Tarn 1913, 269 n. 33.

As far we can tell, the main action of the war was concentrated in the area from Attica to the Isthmus. Antigonid tenure of Acrocorinth blocked direct land contact between Athens and Sparta, and repeated Spartan attempts to force a passage were unsuccessful (Paus. 3. 6. 4–6). Gonatas raided the coastal demes of Attica, defended by Ptolemy's admiral Patroklos, whose main priority, however, seems to have been the Cyclades. Probably at this time,[123] Methana was occupied by the Ptolemaic navy as a base, and renamed Arsinoë;[124] part or all of its fortification wall was built or rebuilt about now.[125] It played an important surveillance role in the Saronic gulf,[126] and has been called part of 'Patroklos' ring around Attica'.[127] Under their new *ethnikon*, the people of 'Arsinoë in the Peloponnese' dedicated statues of Ptolemy II and Arsinoë II to Poseidon at Kalaureia (*SEG* 59. 367).[128]

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[118] Walbank 1984a, 236.

[119] It is correctly viewed as an attack, not a revolt (Habicht 1997, 147). See now O'Neil 2008, dating the war from 268/7 to 262/1 or possibly 263/2.

[120] *Syll.*^{3} 434–5; *IG* ii^2 687; Austin^2 61. Phigaleia is almost certain, cf. Φια[–, l. 39. Possible Cretan towns: Walbank 1984a, 236 n. 24. In *c.* C3f, perhaps not now, Messene made an alliance with five W. Cretan *poleis*: Aptera, Eleutherna, Sibrytos, Anopolis, and perhaps Phalasarna (*SEG* 60. 458; 58. 369; Themelis 2010, 60–2).

[121] So Walbank 1984a, 237, following Will 1979, i. 180 ff.

[122] Walbank 1988, 280. Tarn 1913, 293, sees the Spartans as recreating the Peloponnesian league; a fair point if we take the new association to be a network of alliances with Sparta, but Tarn probably means something more structured, given the usual view of the 'league' in his day. On the motives and interests of the Peloponnesian participants, see now Kralli 2017, 128–32.

[123] Bagnall 1976, 135.

[124] *IG* xii. 3. 466 = Foxhall *et al.* 1997, 273 no. 12; Gill *et al.* 1997, 74–5, where it is noted (74) that Patroklos may have chosen Methana as a base. Cf. Jameson *et al.* 1994, 87 (Ptolemaic from *c.* 268); 88 (reign of Ptolemy II); Bagnall 1976, 135–6.

[125] Gill *et al.* 1997, 73; the site no. is MS103.

[126] Tarn 1913, 341.

[127] Bagnall 1976, 135.

[128] Wallensten and Pakkanen 2009.

The Greek alliance broke up, however, after being defeated by Gonatas at Corinth (perhaps in 265/4) in a battle during which Areus lost his life (Plut. *Agis*, 3. 4; Trog. *Prol*. 26).[129] A recent reading of the war makes Ptolemy's caution about committing land forces to Greece a major factor in the campaign's failure.[130] Gonatas' victory led to the installation of a garrison in Athens (Paus. 3. 6. 6) and thirty-three years of direct Macedonian rule.[131] He followed up with a naval victory over Ptolemy near Kos (perhaps in 261),[132] which may have led to an Antigonid 'thalassocracy', or domination of the sea, in the 250s – a particularly obscure period.[133] We hear of no further Ptolemaic intervention in the Peloponnese until the next diplomatic move against Macedonia in the early 240s (see Section II.4.d) and subventions to Sparta in the mid-220s (see Section II.4.e). Corinth kept its Macedonian garrison, now commanded by Gonatas' half-brother Krateros.

Frustratingly, sources for the decade after the battle of Corinth are almost non-existent.[134] A Spartan attack on Megalopolis, in which the 'tyrant' Aristodamos repulsed king Akrotatos, may have occurred a few years after the battle.[135] The only other possible military incident involving Sparta at this time is an unsuccessful attack on Mantinea *c*. 250 (Paus. 8. 10. 5), whose genuineness is disputed. It is hard not to imagine that the defeat of the allies brought about an extension of Macedonian control, at least in the north-east and in parts of Arkadia.[136] Despite Gonatas' victory, however, it is evident that within a few years the Achaean league began to erode his power.

II.4.d The Achaean League Erodes Gonatas' Control (*c*. 252–239)

For whatever reasons, Gonatas was unable to stem the tide of Achaean league power permanently. Sikyon, after a series of 'tyrannies' or rather executive magistracies (Plut. *Arat*. 3–4; see Section III.2.b) that did not necessarily remove it from Antigonid control,[137] was 'liberated' in spring 251 from a governor who may have been seen as too friendly to Macedonia; the agent of change was Aratos, the 20-year-old son of a former leader of the city.[138] He had been an exile from boyhood, and his coup led to other, presumably anti-Macedonian, exiles being recalled (Plut. *Arat*. 9). To guarantee Sikyon's freedom, he enrolled it – presumably by persuading enough of the leading citizens to back the plan – in the Achaean league, even though the *polis* was Dorian (9. 6).[139] Cases such as this suggest that ethnic identity in federal leagues could have a primarily political value rather than denoting a (real or fictive) common ancestry.[140] (We return to regional identities at Section V.2.) The attachment of Sikyon to the league cannot have been welcome news for Gonatas, despite doubts raised on this point. It posed a clear threat to his possession of Corinth.

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[129] Tarn 1913, 301. For the chronology, see Reger 1998, citing Dorandi 1991, 24–6, who in turn corrects Heinen 1972, 182–6; O'Neil 2008, 78–9, favours 265/4 for the battle.

[130] O'Neil 2008, esp. 83–9.

[131] Habicht 1997, 150.

[132] Walbank 1984a, 239–40. Reger 1998, reviewing Gabbert 1997, notes alternative dates.

[133] Walbank 1984a, 242–3.

[134] Tarn 1913, 311.

[135] Dated 260 by Tarn, acc. to Walbank 1933, 36; Walbank 1984a, 231, suggests *c*. 255.

[136] It is doubtful that the Arkadian league was revived: Nielsen 2002, 265; Nielsen 2015, 268), *contra* Tarn 1913, 359 n. 44.

[137] Walbank 1984a, 243.

By 249, Gonatas' influence in the Peloponnese may have been confined to Argos and perhaps some small towns in Argolis.[141] At Corinth a son of Krateros, Alexandros, was now in charge but no longer subservient to Gonatas, carving out for himself a separate power base.[142] The Macedonian fleet based there was thus outside Gonatas' control.[143] After Alexandros' death, however, Gonatas took Acrocorinth by subterfuge from his widow, Nikaia, between 247 and 245 (Plut. *Arat*. 17. 4–6).[144] In midsummer 243, Aratos was able to return the compliment (18–23).[145] This put an end to simultaneous Macedonian control of all four 'Fetters'. Megara followed Corinth into the Achaean league (P. 2. 43. 5), where they were soon joined by Troizen and Epidauros (Plut. *Arat*. 24. 3; *IG* iv² 1. 70). In the context of this stage in Aratos' career, Polybios explicitly states that his overriding aims were 'the expulsion of the Macedonians from the Peloponnese, the suppression of the tyrants, and the re-establishment on a sure basis of the ancient freedom of every state' (P. 2. 43. 8).

Gonatas, however, may not have given up hope of controlling the northern Peloponnese, for he allegedly made an agreement with the Aitolians to partition Achaea.[146] This plot (alleged by Lykiskos at P. 9. 34) prompted the formation of a coalition between Sparta, the Achaeans, and Ptolemy III of Egypt (r. 246–221), which may possibly be related to chariot victories won at Nemea and Olympia by Berenike, either Ptolemy's queen or a princess of the royal family, celebrated by the contemporary poet Poseidippos.[147] Events at Sparta over the following years, however, drove a wedge between that city and the Achaean league, hitherto its ally against the Macedonians.

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[138] Month of Daisios = Attic Anthesterion, Plut. *Arat*. 53. 5; Walbank 1933, 176, 202.

[139] Kralli 2017, 159–60, considers the motives of the league in admitting Sikyon.

[140] Beck 1997, 165–6.

[141] Tarn 1913, 366.

[142] Named 'king' in *IG* xii. 9. 212 from Eretria: Walbank 1984a, 247.

[143] Tarn 1913, 366.

[144] Tarn 1913, 372–3. Date: Walbank 1933, 178–9; Walbank 1984a, 250.

[145] Tarn 1913, 398–400, argues that there had been no hostility between the Achaeans and Gonatas, that he realized it was beyond his resources to retake Corinth and the *poleis* that followed it into independence. Both ideas are unconvincing; the latter in view of the Aitolian treaty.

The meteoric career of Agis IV (r. *c*. 244–241), the Spartan king in the Eurypontid line, is known chiefly from Plutarch's joint life *Agis and Kleomenes*, while the other subject of that joint *Life*, Kleomenes III (r. *c*. 235–222) of the Agiad dynasty, receives more nearly contemporary but hostile coverage from Polybios in his second book.[148] We shall return to Kleomenes later (Section II.4.e), but the two kings may be introduced together here.

We have seen time and again that even after severe defeats the Spartans did not see themselves as a spent force; but they still faced the problem of shrinking citizen numbers (see Section II.2.b). Increased reliance on mercenaries was one consequence; on Lakedaimonian *perioikoi*, another.[149] Both Agis and Kleomenes, like other leading men and women in the *polis*, were motivated by the desire to restore Sparta's hegemony, just as a number of their predecessors had been. To this end, they were prepared to embrace reform of debt and landholding – the first such proposals at Sparta, as far as we know – even at considerable personal cost to themselves and their peers, for the estates of richer families had clearly grown at the expense of the rest.[150] These schemes would reassign land to demoted Spartans and recruit *perioikoi* into the Spartiate citizen body from which the core of the Lakedaimonian army was drawn.

Perhaps fearing Agis' reformist tendencies, Aratos as leader of the Achaean league dissuaded him from meeting the Macedonians in battle at the Isthmus (Plut. *AK* 15).[151] When Agis returned home, he found that his proposals had been sabotaged by other rich citizens, and he was judicially murdered together with his mother and grandmother, influential supporters of his programme (*AK* 14–20). Agis' widow, Agiatis, was now given to Kleomenes, son of Agis' co-king, Leonidas, thus bringing the property of the Eurypontid royal line into the Agiad; but she is credited with making her first husband's ideals live again in her second, the future Kleomenes III. Sparta's underlying socio-economic, and thus military, problems remained severe; he would address them more ruthlessly when the time came (Section II.4.e). Even then, and after his defeat, the debate about possible remedies would continue to split the citizen body down to the reign of Nabis at the end of the third century.

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[146] Tarn 1913, 400–1.

[147] C. Austin and Bastianini 2002, nos. 82, 87; Cameron and Pelling 2012b (active 284–*c*. 250). On the identification see Thompson 2005; Dixon 2014, 94–5, opts for the queen.

[148] Shipley 2000b, 143–7; more detail in Cartledge and Spawforth 2002, 38–58.

[149] Shipley 2017a.

[150] Bresson 2016, 148–9, considers the possible numbers.

[151] Tarn 1913, 401.

At this time there was no inveterate enmity between Sparta and the league; they had fought Gonatas together in the 260s; but Agis' attempted reforms, though not revolutionary in the sense in which they have sometimes been interpreted (see Chapter III), surely aroused wide interest across the Peloponnese, and may be considered symptomatic of wider stresses. A general concern must have been reawakened among civic elites, whether oligarchic or democratic, by any suggestion of land reform and debt cancellation. These slogans could not mean the same in Sparta as elsewhere,[152] but a number of scholars have rightly emphasized the property-owning, oligarchic character of the Achaean league.[153] Aratos himself was a wealthy man from his early days;[154] later owning, for example, an estate, evidently of some size, in the territory of Sikyon or possibly Corinth (Plut. *AK* 40. 9) and, with his wife, property worth 60 talents (Plut. *Arat*. 19. 2). Any suggestion of land redistribution would alarm landed proprietors like himself; proposals to cancel debts would jeopardize the prospects of rich creditors. Both measures, as will be argued in Chapter III, extended only as far as the lower echelons of citizen bodies – themselves a privileged group. While they might apply to citizens of other *poleis*, such as resident aliens or, in Laconia, the free *perioikoi*, there was no suggestion of benefiting those beneath citizen status, such as slaves or free men too poor to qualify for citizenship. Nevertheless, they provoked enthusiasm in some quarters and consternation in others.

In 241, having avoided battle at the Isthmus, the Aitolians sacked Achaean Pellene, though Aratos claimed in his memoirs to have killed 700 of them there (Plut. *Arat*. 32. 3).[155] Tarn notes the Aitolians' ambitions in the western Peloponnese, evidenced by the ties they fostered with Elis, Phigaleia, and Messene as well as the later invasion of Laconia by which they aimed to restore those exiled after the fall of Agis (P. 4. 34. 9).[156] In spring 240 Aratos, who had earlier tried to kill the 'tyrant' Aristomachos I of Argos, unsuccessfully attempted to depose his son and successor Aristippos II (*Arat*. 25. 4–5) and was fined by his own league.[157]

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[152] Cartledge and Spawforth 2002, 40.

[153] Evidence assembled by O'Neil 1984–6; cf. Cartledge and Spawforth 2002, 43.

[154] Larsen 1968, 305–6.

[155] Probable peace treaty between Achaea, Aitolia, and Macedonia in 241/0 (Plut. *Arat*. 33. 1): Kralli 2017, 169.

[156] Tarn 1913, 382 n. 36. *Syll.*^{3} 472 (Schwyzer 1923, no. 71, *IPArk* 28), from Phigaleia: Messenian decree referring to Aitolian envoys. Messenian–Aitolian alliance: *SdA* 472; Walbank 1984a, 250, dates it to later 240s, perhaps 244.

In Tarn's view this period marks the breakdown of Gonatas' system;[158] but, as we shall see (Section III.2.c), it is hard to identify a system at all, though there is a pattern in Gonatas' relations with civic leaders.

II.4.e Sparta's Resurgence and Further Defeat (239–222)

Gonatas was succeeded in 239 by his son Demetrios II. Even though the Macedonians no longer controlled Corinth, it appears some tyrants were able to lean on them for support. Demetrios appears to have acted vigorously to shore up the remaining Antigonid presence in the Peloponnese; but without the key stronghold he had limited scope for action. Instead the Achaean league continued to grow with accessions of both western and eastern Arkadian *poleis*: Heraia (Polyaen. 2. 36), probably Kleitor and Thelphousa,[159] then Megalopolis (probably in 235; P. 2. 44. 5), and within a year or two Orchomenos (*IG* v. 2. 344),[160] Mantinea, Tegea, and probably Kaphyai (implied by P. 2. 46. 2).[161]

In 233 Demetrios invaded the Peloponnese, attacking the Achaeans; at this time, unusually, allies of the Aitolians. It must have been on this occasion that three of the newest members of the Achaean league – Tegea, Mantinea, and Orchomenos – became instead members of the Aitolian league;[162] evidently with Achaean permission during the Achaean–Aitolian *rapprochement* of these years (P. 2. 46. 1). This bizarre-seeming move must have been made as a security measure in face of Demetrios' aggression; perhaps with the consent of the *poleis*.

Under Gonatas' nephew Antigonos III Doson, king from 229, the major power struggle in the Peloponnese would no longer be between the Achaeans and the Macedonians, but between the Achaeans and the Spartans. Upon Demetrios' death in 229, the tyrant of Argos – having perhaps enjoyed his support – gave up power and became a general of the league (see Section III.2.b); Polybios (2. 44) notes the demoralizing effect of the king's death upon his adherents in the Peloponnese. The league's authority now extended over minor *poleis* in Arkadia and Argolis, including Hermion and Phleious. Within a few years, Kleomenes III would come close to re-establishing Spartan hegemony over the eastern Peloponnese. On the other side, Plutarch (*AK* 24. 8) tells us that Aratos' ambition was to bring into the Achaean league the Spartans, Eleians, 'and whichever Arkadians were inclined (προσεῖχον) towards the Lakedaimonians'; perhaps they were the only states unwilling to join.

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[157] Date: Walbank 1933, 204.

[158] Tarn 1913, 405.

[159] Mackil 2013, 107.

[160] Austin^2 68.

[161] On these Arkadian accessions, see Kralli 2017, 180–8.

[162] They were 'in sympolity with the Aitolians', τοῖς Αἰτωλοῖς … συμπολιτευομένας, when Kleomenes III seized them a few years later, P. 2. 46. 2.

Early in Kleomenes' reign, probably in 229,[163] after he had taken back from the Aitolians the eastern Arkadian *poleis* of Tegea, Mantinea, Orchomenos (P. 2. 46. 2), and perhaps Kaphyai[164] – the ephors sent him to seize the fort of Athenaion near Belbina, which had been one of Sparta's north-western dependencies until the intervention of Philip II but was now Megalopolitan; Plutarch justly calls it 'an entrance to Laconia' (*AK* 25. 1–2).[165] In response, the Achaeans resolved upon war (P. 2. 46. 4).[166] Aratos retook Kaphyai; in retaliation, Kleomenes captured Methydrion and ravaged the territory of Argos (*AK* 25. 7). In 227 he inflicted heavy defeats on the Achaeans near Mt Lykaion in Arkadia (26. 1; P. 2. 51. 3) and at Ladokeia in Megalopolitan territory (*AK* 26. 1; P. 2. 51. 3); the Achaeans in turn recovered Mantinea (*AK* 26. 1). Later in 227, Kleomenes was defeated at Leuktron near Megalopolis (27. 3) but captured Heraia and Asea (28. 5). We are not told how he administered the places he seized: whether by introducing reforms in the interest of one group within the citizen body, or, perhaps more likely, through the now usual technique of installing a garrison.[167]

Building on his military successes, Kleomenes now eliminated internal opposition (*AK* 29–31) as a prelude to a programme of institutional transformation similar to that which Agis IV had attempted. He arranged the assassination of four out of the five ephors (29), exiled eighty other citizens (31. 1), and enacted sweeping reforms (32) by which the core territory of the Spartan *polis* was redivided and many of the other Lakedaimonians (the *perioikoi*) brought into the Spartan citizen body (presumably without losing any land they owned in their home *polis*).[168] The Spartiate core of the army, which had fallen to 700 or fewer[169] by the accession of Agis IV *c.* 244 (5. 4), was brought up to a strength of 4,000 (32. 1–2); the role of those who remained as *perioikoi* was probably formalized; and the traditional education (*agōgē*) was 'revived', or more likely redesigned. When, in the same year, his co-king, Archidamos V, died or was assassinated, Kleomenes ensured the elevation of his own brother Eukleidas to the vacant throne – the only occasion in Sparta's history, as Plutarch notes (32. 3), when both kings were from one family.[170] An alliance with Elis in the north-west of the Peloponnese, implied by later actions, was probably forged now.

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[163] Talbert 2005, 241 n. 6 (Talbert 1988, 73 n. 1).

[164] Walbank 1933, 72–3, asserts that Kleomenes' deal with the Aitolians in 229 resulted in the transfer of these four cities to him, which they had acquired in 233 (this at p. 67). This may be an inference from the fact that Aratos attacked Tegea and Orchomenos in 229 or early 228 and later took Kaphyai (Plut. *AK* 25. 3 and 7). Date of 229: Walbank 1933, 206.

[165] Belbina: Shipley 2004a, 579 (*Inv. 326*).

[166] Walbank 1933, 206.

[167] Kralli 2017, 215, following Urban 1979, 168–9, points out the E. Arkadian *poleis* supported Kleomenes before his reforms at Sparta, and that there is no evidence of calls for reform there.

[168] Shipley 2017a.

The second phase of Kleomenes' military campaigns ranged further afield. In 226 he ravaged the territory of Megalopolis (33. 2), helped pro-Spartans in Mantinea expel their Achaean garrison, threatened Achaean Pharai, and defeated the league near Dyme and at Lasion,[171] expelling their garrison from the latter and handing the town to the Eleians (35. 5). His continuing successes induced Ptolemy III to transfer financial support from the Achaean league to Sparta (P. 2. 51). At this point in the narrative, Plutarch (*AK* 36. 1) reports an offer made by Kleomenes to the Achaean league to return their captives and 'places' (χωρία, probably towns and outlying forts) in return for making him their leader,[172] Aratos having resigned.[173] The Achaeans were minded to accept – the two states had been allies against Macedonia within living memory – but Aratos frustrated their wish by opening a channel of communication with Doson, secretly at first (37. 1–3); a refusal which Plutarch says spelled disaster for Greece.

As early as winter 227/6 (possibly even in late 229),[174] Aratos made contact with the king (P. 2. 47–50), and by early 225 agreement had almost been reached (*AK* 38. 2).[175] Polybios, in the voice of Chlaineas the Aitolian, comments on why Doson agreed to help the league, 'observing that his own domination (δυνάστεια) would not be firmly based if you [*the Spartans*] obtained the governance (ἀρχή) of the Peloponnese' (9. 29. 10). It is a telling comment; Polybios evidently believes that Antigonos now had little or no power in the peninsula but foresaw problems if Sparta, rather than Achaea, should gain the hegemony. It is further evidence of the fundamentally precautionary nature of Antigonid intervention in the Peloponnese. The agreement entailed returning Corinth to Macedonian control.[176]

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[169] 'Not more than 700 Spartiates' (ἑπτακοσίων οὐ πλείονες Σπαρτιᾶται); not 700 *families*, as in the Loeb translation.

[170] On the implications of the land reorganization, see Shipley 2017a.

[171] Talbert 2005, 243 n. 29 (Talbert 1988, 82 n. 3) notes that the MS reading of Langon has been emended to Lasion.

[172] παραδιδόναι … τὴν ἡγεμονίαν, sc. of the league, not of 'the Greeks' as in the Loeb translation.

[173] If Kralli 2017, 244–5, is right to argue that Kleomenes would not have wanted the generalship of the league, this offer may have been made in the expectation that it would be declined.

[174] Walbank 1933, 206.

[175] Date: Walbank 1933, 207. Kralli 2017, 245, argues that the league's failure to retain Corinth, Orchomenos, and probably Heraia proves that it 'had lost control' of the situation.

News of the realignment – formally a revival of Demetrios I's Hellenic alliance, as Polybios implies (2. 54. 4) – led Kleomenes to embark on the most aggressive, wide-ranging, and successful part of his campaigns (225–224), by which he briefly became master not only of Arkadia but also of the north-eastern Peloponnese and eastern Achaea (P. 2. 52). He expelled the Achaean garrison from Pellene, won the support of Pheneos and the fort of Penteleion, and by means of a surprise attack during the Nemean games was able to garrison Argos (Plut. *AK* 38. 6–8) – the first time Sparta had captured its ancient foe (39. 1). At Argos (and perhaps elsewhere?) he promised a reform programme including the cancellation of debts (41. 6), which induced the peoples of Kleonai and Phleious to join his cause (40. 1) and led Aratos to fear that Corinth might follow them (41. 2). Having secured Troizen, Epidauros, and Hermion, Kleomenes besieged Acrocorinth and ravaged Sikyonia (P. 2. 52; *AK* 40. 6–8). The renewal of the Heraclid leadership that might have made the Peloponnese great again – nostalgically lauded by Plutarch under the influence of Phylarchos (37. 2–4) – must have seemed certain to some.

Probably by early 224, however, a group in Argos, aggrieved at Kleomenes' failure to deliver reform, conspired to bring back the Achaeans (P. 2. 52–3; Plut. *AK* 41. 5–42. 5).[177] Fearing an invasion of Laconia, Kleomenes abandoned Corinth and Argos to the Macedonians (P. 2. 54) and retreated to Tegea, effectively giving up his new conquests at a stroke (*AK* 42. 7). Probably in late 224, Doson took Kleomenes' north-western forts at Aigys and Belbina. In spring 223 he recovered Tegea by siege, Orchomenos by assault, and Mantinea by siege, also receiving the surrender of Heraia and Thelphousa (P. 2. 54; *AK* 44. 1).[178]

Kleomenes, however, broke out of Laconia once more in a surprise attack. Having attacked Megalopolis three months earlier (P. 2. 55. 5; 9. 18. 1–4; or five months?),[179] he now devastated its urban centre (though he did not occupy the city) after the citizens, influenced by the young Philopoimen among others, refused to take the city out of the Achaean league (P. 2. 55; Plut. *AK* 44–6). In spring 222 he ravaged Argive territory but failed to tempt Doson out to battle (P. 2. 64; *AK* 46. 5–8). When Doson did move, Kleomenes expelled the Macedonian garrison from the hill of Olygyrtos (or Oligyrtos) near Kaphyai in north-eastern Arkadia.[180] But the game was almost up: Ptolemy III cancelled his financial subventions (P. 2. 63), and ten days later Kleomenes' army was almost wiped out at Sellasia in northern Laconia (2. 65–9; *AK* 48–9).[181] Sparta's renewed military strength is made clear, ironically, by the casualty figures. Plutarch (49. 8) states that many (or 'most') of Kleomenes' mercenaries (ξένοι) were killed, along with all but 200 of the 6,000 Lakedaimonians present; if true, this represented almost one-third of the entire Lakedaimonian population (assuming that Kleomenes' reforms had successfully raised Spartiate numbers to 4,000 and that the defined number of the *perioikoi* was 15,000, as in Agis' plans twenty years earlier). There is some uncertainty about the text, however;[182] and in any case Justin (28. 4. 9) numbers the survivors as 4,000. At any rate, it was a disastrous outcome.[183]

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[176] Details are awaited of alliances concluded between Philip V and Greek states at the start of his reign; the texts, displayed at Corinth, were deliberately destroyed, perhaps by the Romans in 198: *AGOnline* ID 1883 (2010); *SEG* 48. 390; 61. 245.

[177] Date: Walbank 1933, 208.

[178] Date: Walbank 1933, 208.

[179] Walbank 1957–79, i. 258, shows that either P. has miscalculated or the number has been corrupted in transmission.

Kleomenes escaped to Egypt, killing himself three years later after a futile attempt to overthrow Ptolemy IV (P. 2. 69; 5. 35–9; Plut. *AK* 50–8). Doson captured Sparta – the first invader to do so – but had to leave urgently to meet an Illyrian threat in the north, once again showing where the ultimate priorities lay for rulers of Macedonia. On his way north he is said to have restored the earlier form of government at Tegea (P. 2. 70), presumably installing a Macedonia-friendly regime. Once back in Macedonia, he unexpectedly died. Polybios understandably emphasizes the role of chance (2. 70; cf. *AK* 48): if Kleomenes had held out for a few more days, Sparta might have survived. Despite this counterfactual possibility, the Achaean league and the new Macedonian king, Philip V, would probably have achieved their desired outcome before many years had passed, in view of the overwhelming manpower and resources available to the Macedonians.

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[180] Walbank 1957–79, i. 460, on Polyb. 4. 11. 5; cf. 4. 70. 1.

[181] Usually dated 222 or 221. Walbank 1933, 170–2, accepts arguments for a date of 223, but later adopts 222 (e.g. Walbank 1984b, 469; Walbank 1992, 173).

[182] The Teubner text (Ziegler 1971) reads τῶν ξένων <τοὺς> πολλοὺς λέγουσι καὶ <τοὺς> Λακεδαιμονίους ἅπαντας πλὴν διακοσίων, ἑξακισχιλίους ὄντας. The Loeb (Perrin 1921) lacks the supplements; Marasco 1983, 163 and 583–5, tacitly adopts them.

[183] Rightly emphasized by Marasco 1983, 583. He is unnecessarily troubled (584) by the 6,000 Lakedaimonians; the figure does not necessarily contradict the 4,000 of *AK* 32. 3, who are Spartans (in principle a subset); cf. Shipley 2017a. The *numbers* are certainly very high compared with Cl battles: Krentz 2005.

The immediate results of Sellasia were Achaean control of the Peloponnese and the end of the Spartan dyarchy (already modified in the direction of sole kingship by Kleomenes,[184] and by earlier kings such as Areus); the city's incorporation into Doson's Hellenic alliance (implied by P. 4. 24. 4);[185] and the placing of some of its last remaining northern *perioikoi* under Achaean protection, presumably within the league.[186] Despite this further reduction in perioikic territory, Polybios' view – expressed both in his own voice (2. 70) and in the speech of Lykiskos (9. 36. 4–5) – is that Doson treated the Lakedaimonians mildly. We have noted that in Polybios' opinion Doson feared Spartan control of the Peloponnese; but allowing for Polybios' Achaean bias, it is equally possible that Doson would not have wished to eliminate either of the potential hegemons but preferred to maintain a balance of power. Whether or not this is the case, his mild response looks like another attempt at soft, or delegated, power from a distance.

The issue of control of the Peloponnese appeared to have been settled; but, as so often in the periods covered by the present study, it was far from the end for Sparta as an active force. Within a very few years, it would again be a thorn in the side of the Achaeans and the Macedonians.

II.4.f Retrospective of 301–222

Ipsos had led to the rapid demise of the new Hellenic alliance and to new inter-Macedonian wars in the Peloponnese; Demetrios' policy hardening as he tried to achieve sovereignty over the peninsula. His ejection from the drama in 287 fomented further conflict among the Successors. A further Greek 'rising' in 281/0 forced his son Gonatas, too, into a harsher stance involving, when opportunities presented themselves, support for local governors ('tyrants' to their enemies). The 'forced marriage' of Sparta and Macedonia against Pyrrhos might have been expected to result in a more harmonious, even shared hegemony; but the Chremonidean war put paid to that, and may have provoked repression on Gonatas' part (unfortunately, the sources for *c.* 262–251 are very thin). For whatever reasons, it appears he was unable to stem the tide of Achaean league power for long. He lost Sikyon; eight years later Corinth. In response to Gonatas' death in

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[184] See Marasco 2004 (*non vidi*). Also Shipley 2005a.

[185] Cartledge and Spawforth 2002, 57, following Walbank 1957–79, i. 470.

[186] Shipley 2000a, 377–9. Kralli 2017, 247–51, considers in detail Gonatas' awards of Spartan territory to Sparta's neighbours; and that the Sparta–Megalopolis arbitration referred to in *Syll.*^{3} 665 (*IvO* 47; C2b) took place immediately after Sellasia.

239, Demetrios II may have tried to boost pro-Macedonian governors, but without Corinth his scope for action was limited.

Macedonian intentionality and design must not be overstated; an important thread in the story is the retention of 'agency' by the Peloponnesian states. At Sparta, the reforms of Agis IV were blocked by internal forces, but were adapted and carried through in the 220s by the more ruthless Kleomenes III, who at one stage might have become leader of the Achaean league. Only Aratos' desperate U-turn and the league's alliance with Antigonos III Doson appeared to offer resolution of the 'eternal questions' of control of the Peloponnese and, for many, of Sparta; but after defeating the Spartans Doson treated them mildly – perhaps minded to divide and rule, as Philip may have been in 338, and not wishing to build up the Achaean league too far.[187] His Hellenic alliance of *c*. 223 can be seen as a new attempt at 'delegated power from a distance'.

An account of this period, in large part, must be effectively a commentary on the inadequate sources; it is not always possible to establish with certitude the configurations of alliances and alignments, or detect long-term continuities in particular states' external allegiances. The reconstruction attempted here suggests, however, that even with full evidence it would be unwise to suppose that one could draw lines on a map enclosing a Macedonian 'sphere of influence'; or that the period falls into defined phases (for example, of resistance and freedom); or that Gonatas pursued a systematic strategy of constitutional change. Nevertheless, it is possible to observe that Antigonid domination of the Peloponnese from soon after 301 (especially in the north and north-east) brought more order than chaos and continued the 'dialogue' model of king–*polis* relations. As already noted, Macedonian rulers appear to have alternated between harshness and mildness, though the former was more usual and our sources make clear that, at least at certain junctures, the Macedonians were seen as exercising conscious domination of a significant part of the peninsula: we may recall the telling words attributed to Pyrrhos (he came *to free* the Peloponnese, Section II.4.b) and Doson (fearing to *lose control* to Sparta, Section II.4.e).

The addition of the Achaean league to the existing blocs of city-states (eastern and western Arkadia) and centralized regions (Eleia, Messenia, Laconia, Argolis) appears to continue the earlier trend towards regional entities (the main exceptions being Sikyon and Corinth). It also seems to have tilted the balance of power against Macedonia. Federal and similar unions were not new; Spartan hegemony represented an alternative model, one that seemed preferable to some participants when compared with either Macedonian or Achaean domination (after a long period when Sparta was aligned with the league). At times, Sparta could be a focus for opposition. It represented, however, a different kind of threat to the autonomy of *polis* elites, whose interests Demetrios' league had attempted to safeguard; and it is the *polis* context, above all, that must be kept in mind despite the rise of multi-community unions: those groups among Peloponnesian elites who persuaded their fellow citizens to attack Macedonia again and again would not have done so if they had not been desperate to safeguard their own political freedom (as well as economic: see Chapter IV).

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[187] Kralli 2017, 255, indeed, regards the league's success in 222 as illusory.

II.5 The Soldier's Art: Achaea between Macedonia and Rome (222–197)

The story of the post-Sellasia period is primarily that of the relationship between the Achaean league and Philip V of Macedonia, their ally for some twenty years from his accession in 221. The young king, as hegemon of Doson's Hellenic alliance (built around the Achaeans), could expect his partners to spare him some of the effort of keeping the Peloponnese quiet; but Doson's intervention, and the forcible reconstruction of Sparta, by no means spelled the end of unrest. Instead, a situation developed which reinforced separatist tendencies in areas such as Arkadia. The grit in the mechanism was internal tension between groups with differing interests within *poleis*, whether inside or outside the league. Internal schism at Sparta, for example – as later elsewhere – appears to reflect a clash between those who thought compliance with Macedonia under Achaean management the safest course, and those who preferred their *polis* to be independent, perhaps because they feared being marginalized or worse under the league. Additionally, pressing socio-economic tensions were a threat to stability, though it is important to read these precisely (see Chapter III).

An external factor in the shape of the Aitolian league gave the Spartans an opportunity to undermine Doson's settlement, and opened up new rifts within the peninsula which embroiled Philip in years of warfare. He might nevertheless have succeeded in maintaining control, but other agents – above all, Carthage and Rome – ultimately made it impossible. It was to be the last generation of Macedonian power in the Peloponnese; but that end could not be foreseen yet, and for a few years Philip seemed destined to take over the role of benevolent guardian.

II.5.a Aitolian Opportunism and Spartan Alienation (222–217)

Doson had revived the Hellenic alliance, in whose name the campaign of 222 against Sparta had been waged and which was designed to fence in the Aitolians.[188] Their response was predictable; but Polybios suggests (4. 7) that people in the Peloponnese thought their troubles were over and neglected military preparations, only to find themselves embroiled in a defensive war. Aratos had to act swiftly to restore the Achaeans' military capability. On the one side were the Hellenic alliance, supported by the Achaean league and officially Sparta; these 'Allies' (*socii* in Latin) have given their name to the 'Social' war (220–217). With Aitolia were ranged only Elis and – at first covertly – Sparta.[189]

The Aitolians had controlled the Delphic amphiktyony since 277, subsequently expanding their territory as far as the Maliac gulf in Thessaly. Living by raiding was nothing new for them (cf. P. 30 fr. 11), and Polybios comments that they had always presented a danger to the north-western Peloponnese (5. 3; cf. 4. 62); elsewhere he notes the vulnerability of that area to raids from the Adriatic, specifically Illyria (2. 5). More recently, they had cultivated close relations with *poleis* in the western Peloponnese, notably in Eleia and at Arkadian Phigaleia, which by 221 was a member of their league (4. 3. 6), doubtless against the wishes of some of its citizens.

Messenia, however, had been affected little by the war of Kleomenes (P. 4. 5. 5), appearing in Plutarch's life of the king principally as the place where in 223 the people of Megalopolis took refuge (*AK* 45. 2, 7–8). Now the Social war was provoked by Aitolian raids upon Messenia as well as Achaea (P. 4. 3–4, 6, 11–12);[190] this was sheer opportunism on the part of the Aitolians, observing Lakedaimonian 'alienation' (ἀλλοτριότης) from the Messenians (4. 5. 4). The raiding, combined with the enrolment into the Aitolian league of Phigaleia on Messenia's northern border, jolted the Messenians into taking part in the war (5. 4. 5). Spartans no doubt recalled the machinations in their interest by exiled Messenians in Megalopolis before its sack by Kleomenes (2. 55); these men had presumably not survived or were still excluded from their *polis*, which according to Polybios was strongly oligarchic around 220 (4. 31). These circumstances may have made the Spartans wary of Messene, though there may have been anti-Achaeans still in the *polis*.

At Sparta, despite the pro-Achaean government imposed after Sellasia, an anti-Macedonian view gained ascendancy, and soon the city was following an independent line. When the Achaeans declared war on Aitolia (P. 4. 13) and sought help from both Sparta and Messene (4. 15), the Spartans allegedly made secret overtures to the Aitolians (4. 16) in defiance of their new obligations;[191] they were to pursue an anti-Achaean strategy during the war except when compelled to behave otherwise. The Aitolians in their turn declared war, attempting unsuccessfully (4. 15–16) to detach Messene (and presumably other Messenian towns, perhaps more manipulable for having once been Lakedaimonian *poleis*) from the cause of the league; no doubt they were aware of anti-Achaeans within Messenia. In the north, the Aitolians renewed their attacks on the territories of Pellene and Sikyon; and in an infamous episode (4. 16–19) destroyed the north-western Arkadian city of Kynaitha, a member of the Achaean league, even though it was anti-Achaeans in the *polis* that had invited them in, after returning from exile and gaining the upper hand.[192]

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[188] Cartledge and Spawforth 2002, 61.

[189] Summary at Scullard and Derow 2012.

[190] Note also the stopover in 220, presumably with raiding, at Messenian Pylos by the Illyrian commanders Demetrios of Pharos and Skerdilaidas, Polyb. 4. 16.

Among the Messenians, as already noted, there were competing tendencies. They are castigated by Polybios (4. 31–2) for their reluctance to adhere to the allied cause, though like the Spartans they were eventually forced to declare their support in 218 (5. 3–4). In Sparta, however, despite a Macedonian garrison (20. 5. 12),[193] there had been *stasis* as early as 220 (4. 22–3), prompting some to urge Philip to 'hand over the state [πολίτευμα, i.e. Sparta] and the magistracies to his own friends' (4. 23) – a revealing example of how Macedonian power could be delegated. Despite what we can deduce was a significant group of pro-Achaeans in the city, its commitment to the Allies quickly proved hollow; at least, the anti-Macedonians kept the upper hand despite the continual recurrence of *stasis*, such as in 219 (4. 34) and 218 (4. 81), presumably pitting pro- and anti-Achaean factions against one another; the ephors of three successive years being killed or exiled. For the moment Philip stayed his hand, but a comment by Polybios, earlier in his account of the war, has interesting implications: he says Philip retained Orchomenos in contravention of the post-Sellasia settlement because it was strategically important for access to the interior of the Peloponnese (4. 6). Despite its humble status (it is not one of our 'top twenty' Peloponnesian *poleis* (in Section V.2.a) though it issued coins in the early and mid-fourth century: TABLE IV.3), Orchomenos does indeed control entry to and exit from the northern end of the eastern

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[191] Polyb., however, makes this assertion in the course of general reflections on the situation (4. 16), so it may be an anticipation of the alliance developed at 4. 35. Walbank 1957–79, i. 463, doubts its truth.

[192] For reappraisal of the Kynaitha episode, see Kralli 2017, 179–80.

[193] There is a view that it was removed by 220; this may be an inference from the later outbreak of *stasis*. See Cartledge and Spawforth 2002, 61–2; Ehrenberg 1929, 1435.

Arkadian plain, and thus Sparta's main route to the north coast of the Peloponnese. The reality was, perhaps, that because of Sparta's unreliability Philip could not afford to relax his grip upon any of his strongpoints; though it would take a lot to make him attack Sparta directly.

The Spartans veered between a reluctant pretence of participation in the allied cause in 219 (P. 4. 33) and an unwillingness to abide by Doson's settlement; that is, different Spartans held opposing views.[194] The anti-Macedonian tendency became dominant; Sparta regained its dual kingship, elevating to one throne the young Agesipolis III (r. 219–215) under a regent; to the other a certain Lykourgos (r. 219–*c.* 212), who was allegedly unrelated to either royal house and had 'bought' his descent from Herakles with presents to the ephors (4. 35); he was perhaps from a non-royal Heraclid family (like the famous Lysander, Plut. *Lys.* 2. 1) but nevertheless related to the Eurypontid line.[195] The Spartans now moved to open hostility towards the Achaeans and their allies. Lykourgos attacked Argos' southern possessions, recapturing a string of former Lakedaimonian perioikic *poleis* in eastern Parnon (Polichna, Prasiai, Leukai, and Kyphanta) but failing to take the inland fort of Glyppia (or Glympeis) or the concealed harbour town of Zarax (P. 4. 36).

In 218, however, the Spartans once more behaved in contradictory fashion, presumably because of internal disagreements. First they were induced to change tack by following the lead of one Cheilon,[196] described by Polybios as a claimant to Lykourgos' throne who cultivated the support of the 'mass' (πλῆθος, 4. 81. 2–3) with promises of land redivision along Kleomenean lines. After securing the murder of the ephors, however, he failed to capture Lykourgos, only driving him into exile briefly before himself being forced to leave (4. 81. 9–10). Differences of view among Spartans – and perhaps among the wider community of perioikic Lakedaimonians, whose influence upon Sparta was probably growing during the late classical and early hellenistic periods[197] – may have corresponded to different economic interests and political allegiances within the propertied class. Rather than a division between 'hawks' and 'doves' both seeking Sparta's ancient goals, the confrontation may have been between pro- and anti-Achaeans.

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[194] A 'vaguely Cleomenean political tendency' survives Sellasia: Cartledge and Spawforth 2002, 58.

[195] Walbank 1957–79, i. 484, on 4. 35. 14. Cartledge suspects the claim of fraud was a slur (Cartledge and Spawforth 2002, 62).

[196] Cartledge and Spawforth 2002, 64. The name Cheilon, equivalent to Chilon, was also that of Sparta's C6m lawgiver (e.g. Hdt. 1. 59); was it assumed?

[197] Shipley 2017a.

The anti-Achaean group may have included any of Kleomenes' new citizens who had survived Sellasia, if they had not been relegated to their former status. With Lykourgos back in charge, the Spartans, 'fearing Philip's presence' (4. 81. 11), demolished the Megalopolitan fort at Athenaion in south-western Arkadia (which he had captured earlier, 4. 60. 3), in order to prevent it being used against them.[198]

By now Philip had been in the Peloponnese for up to a year (since late 219, P. 4. 67). Aitolian violence in the territories of western Achaean towns (Dyme, Pharai, Tritaia, 59–60) included the seizure of the fort at Dymaiōn Teichos. In response to Philip's decision to take the campaign into Epeiros (61), the Aitolians sacked the Macedonian city of Dion (62); Philip responded with a series of victories in Aitolia (63–5). After returning to Macedonia to deter a Dardanian invasion (66), he suddenly reappeared at Corinth around midwinter (67) and launched a veritable *Blitzkrieg*: destroying an Aitolian force (68–9), capturing Psophis (once Arkadian, now Eleian; 70–2), Eleian Lasion, and Stratos in the territory of Arkadian Thelphousa, and restoring all three to the league as well as amassing booty from Eleia (73, 75). Arkadian Alipheira was taken from its Eleian–Aitolian garrison (78). Triphylian Typaneai, looted by its supposed allies from Aitolia, almost suffered the same fate as Kynaitha but survived to place itself in Philip's hands. So did Arkadian Heraia and Arkadian (now Aitolian) Phigaleia, the latter expelling its Aitolian garrison (79). Finally, he captured the remaining Triphylian towns, replacing an Aitolian garrison in the most important of them, Lepreon, with his own (80). By spring 218 he had retaken Dymaiōn Teichos, plundered Eleian territory once more (83), and appointed a commander for Peloponnesian affairs (ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ Πελοπόννησον, 87).

To this sustained onslaught, Lykourgos responded by invading Messenia (P. 5. 17), which had now committed itself to the cause of the Allies (5. 4. 5); its capture would have isolated Triphylia and almost united the territories of the three anti-Macedonian powers (Aitolia, Elis, and Lakedaimon). Lykourgos' campaign was a failure, but he captured Arkadian Tegea (5. 17) and also Glyppia (20), which he had failed to take from the Argives in 219. The Eleians overran the territory of the long-suffering Dymaians (17); but in Laconia Philip finally attacked Sparta's southern *perioikoi* (19).[199] Ravaging of the land was followed by a direct assault on Sparta, but the city held out (21–4).[200] A further bout of *stasis*, or perhaps a dispute resolved politically, led to Lykourgos being exiled again, this time on suspicion of planning a tyrannical coup (29). ‘Tyranny’ is a familiar slur in this period; his plans may have been no more unpatriotic than Kleomenes’ ruthless actions in the 220s, but perhaps fell victim to the perennial schisms inside Sparta. In winter 218/7 the Aitolians again raided coastal Achaea (30). In 217 Lykourgos, back in power, launched a second invasion of Messenia (91–2), seizing Kalamai, though an Aitolian attempt to join him was thwarted by the bravery of the people of Kyparissos (92).

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[198] Pikoulas 1988b, 115–17; different from the Athenaion near Asea (Paus. 8. 44. 2–3), Pikoulas 1988b, 65–6.

[199] Shipley 2000a, 377–9, 381–3.

Despite their uneven success, the Allies were gradually gaining the upper hand. A further Aitolian raid on Achaea was defeated (P. 5. 94), and the forces of Dyme, Patrai, and Pharai invaded Eleia (95. 7). To add to the continual episodes of plundering in the countryside, Philip’s supposed Illyrian allies under Skerdilaïdas treacherously raided Achaea and began attacking merchant ships, including Macedonian, around the Peloponnese (95, 101). At this point in summer 217, however, Philip learned of Hannibal of Carthage’s victory over the Romans at Lake Trasimene in Italy, and concluded peace at Naupaktos (103–5); partly under the impulse of mediation by East Greek states (Chios, Rhodes, Byzantion) and Ptolemy IV of Egypt, but also with a view to strengthening his hand in the Adriatic.[201]

Sellasia had made possible a new tutelary role for the Macedonians, and the young Philip at first won great popularity with the states of the northern and eastern Peloponnese which he led under the aegis of the Hellenic alliance. Polybios says, in a later context, that Philip had been ‘as it were the beloved of the Greeks’ (οἷον ἐρώμενος τῶν Ἑλλήνων, 7. 11). Garrisons were now at least as likely to be imposed by the Macedonians’ enemies as by the king. Polybios even reports that in 218 Philip eliminated certain of his courtiers who sought to undermine Aratos and reduce Achaea to the same subjugated status as Thessaly (4. 76, 82, 84–7; 5. 1, 2, 25–6, 28). Policy considerations, however, imposed a limit upon his commitment to the Peloponnese; the reason for removing those advisers may have been that he had greater ambitions than merely to dominate that region.[202] Polybios may be right to speak of a transformation in Philip’s personality at a later stage (7. 11–14; cf. 4. 77); but, as on many other occasions in this period, it was chiefly circumstances that compelled a Macedonian leader to resile from milder and at times supportive policies.

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[200] Cartledge and Spawforth 2002, 63.

[201] Scullard and Derow 2012.

[202] On the transition from Doson, and on Philip’s ambition, see Errington 1989b, 94.

Aitolian, and later Illyrian, aggression had given Sparta and Elis an opportunity to undermine Doson's settlement, embroiling the young king in continual warfare and eventually causing a decline in his celebrity. In terms of economic damage, the Social war had affected mainly the north and west of the peninsula, together with the small *poleis* of eastern Parnon; while eastern Arkadia, Korinthia, and Argolis had remained almost untouched. Conversely, Philip had successfully taken the war into Eleia, Triphylia, and Laconia and briefly into Aitolia and neighbouring areas, recouping some or all of the losses the Allies had incurred; but both Allied and enemy communities had suffered continual destruction and the removal of portable wealth and agricultural produce.

Although the war ended without resolution, the Allies were generally in the ascendant. Before long, however, the entry of a new factor would radically change the balance of power in Greece and indirectly add to disorder and suffering in the Peloponnese. It would also raise in a new form the perennial question of domination of, and stability in, the peninsula.

II.5.b From the Peace of Naupaktos to the Macedonians' Expulsion (217–197)

The interval between the Social war and the departure of the Macedonians began with most of the Peloponnese still divided between two blocs: the Achaean league (supported by Macedonia) on the one hand, embracing most of the peninsula; Sparta and Elis on the other, aligned with the Aitolians. Events are less well understood than for the preceding years, however, for Polybios' text is fragmentary after his fifth book, though it can be supplemented by Plutarch's *Aratos*, *Philopoimen*, and *Flamininus* as well as by Livy (cited as 'L.' in this chapter) where he adapts lost passages of Polybios. Five years after the war, however, Rome was caught up in Peloponnesian affairs, which in turn led to the involvement of Pergamon.

Although Lykourgos had stirred up the south-eastern Peloponnese and provoked serious retaliation from Philip in 218 before losing the towns in and beyond Parnon that he had briefly retaken, the Spartans may have kept their *perioikoi* in central and southern Laconia.[203] The years 217–207 have been characterized as obscure ones in Spartan history,[204] but it was probably in 215 that Lykourgos expelled the young Agesipolis III (who reappeared later in Rome: P. 23. 6. 1; L. 33. 26. 14) and became sole ruler;[205] dying within a few years, however, for his son soon appears as king.

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[203] This is a different view from that at Shipley 2000a, 378. Nabis' short-lived recovery of the *maritimi vici* in 193 (L. 34. 13. 1) would thus be reversing, not a recent dispossession, but a now well-established Argive suzerainty. We cannot be certain.

[204] Cartledge and Spawforth 2002, 64.

Oligarchic Messene, under hostile pressure from Aitolia and from its neighbours in Eleia and Laconia, had belatedly supported the Allies (Philip and Achaea). There had evidently been *stasis* leading to democratization, the 'notables' (ἀξιόλογοι) being banished and their land shared among new owners (P. 7. 10. 1). Probably the constitution was changed to Achaean-style moderate democracy, with Philip's encouragement. In 215 or 214, however, he invaded the long-suffering region, inflicted damage upon the *chōra*, and was reportedly urged by Demetrios of Pharos minded to seize Messene itself to complement his stronghold at Corinth; the citadels of Acrocorinth and Mt Ithome being the two horns by which the ox of the Peloponnese could be mastered (7. 10–14, esp. 12. 3).[206] Polybios makes the decline in Philip's popularity begin now. Aratos told the king to his face that his actions were treacherous; the king gave way (7. 12), but caused harm to Messenian territory later (8. 12; at 16. 16–17, P. castigates the errors of other historians on this episode).

Rome's first war against Philip, the 'first Macedonian war' (*c.* 212–205), was provoked by his negotiations with Hannibal. It was fought out mainly in north-western Greece, but also involved the northern Peloponnese in new troubles as Rome attacked Philip's Achaean and other allies, while he in turn carried the war into Eleia and north-western Greece, regions friendly to Rome. In 212, at the moment when the Romans were about to capture Syracuse in Sicily by siege and were negotiating an alliance with the Aitolians, the Syracusans made secret overtures to Philip; the fact that their envoy was a Lakedaimonian (L. 25. 23. 8–10; we are not told whether Spartan or perioikic) suggests some in Sparta saw their interests as bound up with those of the Allies. Attalos I of Pergamon also became involved on the Roman side, later (in 210) purchasing the island of Aigina after its capture by the Romans; he may have envisaged it as a counterweight to Ptolemy's naval base at Methana,[207] for the two are clearly visible from one another.[208]

At Sparta, the poorly documented rule of Machanidas began in or after 212 and lasted about four years;[209] he may have been regent for Lykourgos' son Pelops (cf. L. 34. 32. 1).[210] Like Kleomenes III and Lykourgos, he seems to have pursued a policy of direct aggression against Macedonia and Achaea. In 210, the Spartans had to decide whether to accept an alliance with the Romans, fellow allies of the Aitolians. Polybios (9. 28–39) dramatizes the issue in a formal debate at Sparta in which opposing speakers, Chlaineas from Aitolia and Lykiskos from Akarnania, review the history of Macedonian power in the Peloponnese since the time of their great-grandfathers, and whether the Macedonians have been a force for good or ill (cf. Sections II.3.a, II.4.d–e; III.2.c). Pragmatically, the Spartans concluded that they needed Rome's support against the Achaeans, renewed their alliance with the Aitolians, and were added (in the name of King Pelops) to the list of signatories to the recent Roman–Aitolian treaty (L. 34. 32. 1, in a later context). The military balance was thus tilted decisively against Macedonia and Achaea.[211]

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[205] Cartledge and Spawforth 2002, 62.

[206] Walbank 1957–79, ii. 56–61, esp. 56–7.

[207] Errington 1989b, 102.

[208] Derow 2012a.

[209] What we know is summarized by Volkmann 1969a and discussed by Cartledge and Spawforth 2002, 65–7.

Philip continued to aid the league against the Spartans and Aitolians; but in response to envoys from Alexandria, Rhodes, Athens, and Chios, he entered into discussions with a view to ending hostilities. Having attended an allied council at Aigion, at which the Aitolians demanded that the Achaeans return Pylos to the Messenians, now allies of Sparta, he presided at the Nemean games of 208, but interrupted his visit to repel Roman forces ravaging the territories of Sikyon and Corinth (on all this, see L. 27. 29. 9–31. 1–2). Back at Nemea, he made himself popular by removing his royal diadem and purple robe during the games, but harmed his reputation by abusive relationships with local women (P. 10. 26. 4; L. 27. 31. 4–8). On the positive side for Philip, however, Livy mentions (in a later context) that, after the Romans sacked and depopulated Dyme, Philip refounded it (32. 22. 5; cf. 27. 32. 11; Paus. 7. 17. 5); the city subsequently remaining pro-Macedonian. Furthermore, an expedition against the Romans in Eleia brought him and his allies copious amounts of booty (as during the Social war); but he was called away to North Greece to defend Macedonia from its neighbours, leaving only 2,500 troops to defend his allies (L. 27. 32. 1–10). Despite his absence, the Achaeans defeated the Aitolians and Eleians near Messene (27. 33. 5).

The Achaeans asked for Philip's help against Machanidas, once more encamped near Argive territory (P. 10. 41. 3; L. 28. 5. 5), prompting the king to return to the Peloponnese via Corinth and march towards Phleious and Pheneos (28. 7. 16). On learning, at Arkadian Heraia, that Machanidas had attacked Elis but withdrawn to Sparta, he went on to an Achaean council at Aigion (28. 7. 17), where he promised to hand control of Heraia and the Triphylian towns to the league, and of Arkadian Alipheira to the Megalopolitans, who claimed it (28. 8. 6); though the transfers of possession did not happen for almost a decade. Once again, however, he was drawn away by the demands of campaigns further north (28. 8. 10).

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[210] Cartledge and Spawforth 2002, 65.

[211] This may be the occasion on which Damostratos of Sparta, who had helped resolve a dispute between Sparta and Messene, was honoured at Messene (*SEG* 47. 390 ~ 51. 477; C3; Themelis 1997, 108–12; P. 9. 28; 16. 13. 3).

Also in 208, the Achaean commander Philopoimen equipped the Achaean infantry with heavier armour (P. 11. 9–11; Plut. *Philop*. 9).[212] At some point Machanidas must have captured Tegea, since in 207 he addressed his army there before advancing on Mantinea (P. 11. 11. 2). The capture by so-called Spartan 'tyrants' of the Belbinatis, their former north-western possession, is attributed to Machanidas; it remained Spartan until *c*. 190 (L. 38. 34. 8).[213] Later in 207, however, the Achaeans defeated the Spartans heavily at Mantinea, Philopoimen personally killing Machanidas,[214] and retook Tegea (P. 11. 12–18). Polybios says 4,000 Lakedaimonians died and an even larger number were captured (ἔτι πλείους, 11. 18. 10); as in the case of Sellasia in 222, we are not told whether any of these were Kleomenes' new citizens who had retained their status, but in view of the very large figures it seems likely that some had.[215] It has been claimed that the battle, known as Third Mantinea, had a salutary effect on Spartan thinking;[216] but it no more marked the end of Spartan aggression and hegemonic ambition than had Sellasia, and was ultimately no more decisive.

Instead, the death of Machanidas brought to the throne Nabis (r. 207–192), a younger contemporary of Kleomenes III.[217] Probably married to a niece of Aristomachos II, the former 'tyrant' of Argos,[218] he maintained Sparta's anti-Achaean, anti-Macedonian policy; and was ambitious, like Agis and Kleomenes, to restore Spartan greatness through social and political reform. Sparta's relations with its neighbours, other than Messenia, remained hostile; but Nabis has been seen as a modernizer.[219] He minted coins bearing his name and possibly his portrait,[220] strengthened Sparta's fortifications (in and after 195),[221] and is said to have maintained a mercenary guard (P. 13. 6. 4; cf. 16. 13. 1–3), fine horses (13. 8. 3), and a palace (*regia*, L. 35. 36. 1); doubtless he aimed to put Sparta's image on a par with the post-Alexander Macedonian dynasties, as had Areus I. He probably exiled political opponents (e.g. 34. 26. 12; 36. 35. 7). More heinous allegations may be set out in increasing order of implausibility: that he extirpated the two royal families (despite being a Eurypontid himself), including the boy king Pelops (Diod. 27, fr. 1); assassinated Lakedaimonians in exile; made war on Megalopolis upon a trivial pretext; attracted criminals to his service and deployed them to cause trouble elsewhere in the Peloponnese; and operated a torture machine in the likeness of his queen (P. 13. 6–7). It is, however, accepted that he freed 'the slaves' (τοὺς δούλους, 16. 13; *servi* in L. 34. 31), probably meaning helots in Laconia, some of whom Kleomenes had allowed to buy citizenship but only during a military emergency (Plut. *AK* 44. 1).[222] The claim that he is freeing slaves and reallocating land to the poor is neither denied nor justified by Nabis in 195 in a speech in Livy (34. 31), though the terms Livy uses may reflect Polybian prejudice.[223] Nabis seems to have encouraged trade and was honoured as a benefactor at the key Aegean trading centre of Delos (*Syll.*^{3} 584). Perhaps unsurprisingly, Polybios (13. 6–8) and Livy (esp. 31. 25) call him a tyrant; a judgement made easier, like the less credible allegations just noted, by his having broken a peace treaty (see later). Nabis was to be the last king of Sparta.

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[212] Larsen 1968, 375; M. F. Williams 2004.

[213] Cartledge and Spawforth 2002, 66; Ehrenberg 1929, 1437.

[214] On the maltreatment of Machanidas' body (after this, the first Achaean defeat of Sparta without Macedonia's help) and the signal it was meant to send to Sparta, see Kralli 2017, 333.

[215] Walbank 1957–79, ii. 294 (on P. 11. 18. 10), does not comment on this point.

[216] Cartledge and Spawforth 2002, 67.

[217] Or he may have seized power on the death of Pelops, for whom he may have been regent as Machanidas may have been earlier. See Cartledge 2012; Volkmann 1969b. On Nabis see esp. Cartledge and Spawforth 2002, 67–79.

[218] Named Apia, rather than 'Apega' as at Polyb. 13. 7. 6; see Walbank 1979, 421 ad loc., citing Wilhelm 1921; cf. Cartledge and Spawforth 2002, 54, 69.

[219] Cartledge 2012.

The Romans had left their Aitolian allies to do the main fighting, and by 206 Philip had forced the Aitolians to negotiate by attacking their common sanctuary at Thermon. In 205, when the Roman senate turned its attention back to Greek affairs after neglecting them for two years (L. 29. 12. 1), the peace of Phoinike was concluded. Livy's summary (29. 12. 12–14)[224] lists 'Nabis, *tyrannus* of the Lakedaimonians', among the signatories. As in the case of the Roman–Aitolian alliance, however, the entry may have been added after the event (but hardly with the title 'tyrant'!) to show the city's commitment to Rome or to secure protection against Philip.[225]

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[220] Hoover 2011, 139 (comment); 142 nos. 608–9, AR (609 with ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΝΑΒΙΟΣ, 'Of King Nabis'); 148 no. 635, AE (no portrait or legend).

[221] Kourinou 2000, 53 (stamped tiles of 'King Nabis'), 59–61, 277.

[222] Piper 1984–6; Cartledge and Spawforth 2002, 69, 70. For helots in Laconia, see Kennell 2003.

[223] e.g. 11, *quod servos ad libertatem voco, quod in agros inopem plebem deduco* ('that I am calling slaves to their freedom, that I am bringing the mass of poor men into the fields'); 14, *multitudinem servis liberandis auctam et egentibus divisum agrum* ('the mass increased by freeing slaves and the land divided among the needy').

[224] Austin^2 80.

[225] Habicht 1997, 195–6; Shipley 2000b, 374.

Philip's interests now turned away from the Peloponnese, as he sought control of the Aegean and became involved in direct conflict with Pergamon. Despite the formal end of war, in 204 Nabis attacked Megalopolis (P. 13. 8. 4–7). In 201, he treacherously attacked his ally Messene, which only the proximity of Philopoimen's army deterred him from holding (16. 13. 3; 16. 16. 17).[226] In retaliation, after the Achaeans had declared war upon Sparta (L. 31. 25. 1), Philopoimen invaded Laconia in 200 and defeated Nabis (P. 16. 36–7), though he remained in power.

The campaigns by Philip in the Aegean and further afield stoked the fires of Roman concern and led to the second Macedonian war (200–197).[227] He attempted to retain the support of the Achaeans by offering them Orchomenos and repeating his earlier promise to make over to them Heraia and the towns of Triphylia, and to Megalopolis Alipheira (L. 32. 5. 4–5; cf. 28. 8. 6).[228] In 198, however, Attalos I of Pergamon induced the Achaeans to desert Philip for Rome, partly for fear of Nabis (32. 19–23). The league's choice seems to have been controversial at the time.[229] This second *volte-face*, reversing that of Aratos a generation earlier, represents a real turning-point in Mediterranean history. It left Philip isolated and sealed his fate. It also brought the Achaeans back onto the same side as the Spartans for the first time in decades; an uneasy situation for both, likely to result in the eventual incapacitation of one or the other.

In early 197,[230] Philip, under pressure from Rome to withdraw from southern Greece, told his governor in Corinth and Argos to offer the latter city to Nabis on a temporary basis; the two rulers agreed to seal their 'friendship' (*amicitia*) with marriages between Philip's daughters and Nabis' sons (L. 32. 38. 1–3).[231] Livy, doubtless following Polybios, presents Nabis as motivated only by a desire to plunder the city, and as feeling no commitment to Philip. Even more redolent of propaganda are the claims that, while confiscating the wealth of the richest Argives, Nabis ordered those who would not declare all their possessions to be tortured (32. 38. 7–8), and that his wife later robbed the rich ladies of their finery (P. 18. 17. 3–5; L. 32. 40. 11). Be that as it may, the key fact is that he proposed in Argos, just as Kleomenes had a generation earlier, reforms including debt cancellation and land redistribution. Livy attributes this to a desire to turn the common people against the aristocracy; but it is open to doubt whether Nabis' aims were so destructive. The measures were perhaps intended rather (as is argued in Chapter III) to bring to power a group of the elite who had not hitherto enjoyed the leadership of the *polis* and who would be loyal to a benefactor. If the parallel with reforms at Sparta can be extended, Nabis may well also have aimed to increase Argos' military manpower.

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[226] Further sources listed by Cartledge and Spawforth 2002, 246–7 n. 21.

[227] Errington 1989a, 244–8, 252–8.

[228] Walbank 1940, 97 and n. 1; 148 and n. 5.

[229] Eckstein 1987.

[230] Or 198: Errington 1989a, 276.

[231] Accepted by Chrimes 1949, 28; over-interpreted by Will 1979–82, ii. 158.

By accepting Philip's overtures Nabis did not intend to desert the Romans; such a U-turn would have been worthy of the Achaeans, and foolhardy, for Sparta had been consistently anti-Macedonian and pro-Roman since 210. Indeed, he at once arranged talks with Flamininus and Attalos, held in the territory of Mycenae,[232] at which he agreed to conclude an armistice with the Achaeans and not to help Philip (L. 32. 39. 10–11). Clearly, his overriding aim was to maximize Sparta's advantage, for he insisted on garrisoning Argos and refused to let the Roman commander Flamininus consult the people of the city to confirm that they had invited him in; but the question of Argos was left unresolved; and, while Attalos focused on cultivating Sikyon, Flamininus pressed the Macedonian governor of Corinth to surrender that city (L. 32. 40. 1–6).

It is credible that Nabis' dealings with Philip were an opportunistic feint designed to keep his options open while taking control, like Kleomenes, of an old enemy of Sparta. He paid dearly for his boldness. The defeat of Philip by the Romans at Kynoskephalai in Thessaly in summer 197, and Philip's consequent exclusion from central and southern Greece, marked the end of the Macedonian presence in the Peloponnese – and thus of our main narrative – but not the end of troubles for Sparta.

II.5.c Retrospective of 222–197

The last years of the Macedonians' involvement in the Peloponnese were a brutal time, despite what might have seemed to be the drawing of their sting by Aratos in the 220s. Delegation of control to the Achaean league should have meant that the king did not have to intervene directly – another variation on Macedonian hegemonic practice in the peninsula. Doson and Philip may have hoped that *polis* regimes would prove more stable within a federal union aligned with a Hellenic alliance under their military patronage, than when, as previously, they had been supported piecemeal with garrisons or by patronage of governors ('tyrants' to their enemies). The league, however, proved unable to control Sparta; the Hellenic alliance was quickly challenged by the Aitolians, exposing divisions and providing Sparta with new opportunities for seeking to revive its influence. Generally Philip could rely only upon the northern and north-eastern Peloponnese, watched from the stronghold above Corinth which he had reacquired in 222. Partly under the pressure of external forces, internal divisions within *poleis* and within regional blocs bedevilled any attempt at consistency. The war and its aftermath forced the hegemon to resile from hitherto mild and popular policies; and his aborted threat to Messene appears to have lessened his credibility.

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[232] Livy's *haud procul urbe Mycenica* probably translates a Polybian reference to the *chōra* of Mycenae rather than to the town itself.

Mediterranean strategic considerations, however, now played a greater role in the search for answers to the 'eternal questions', those of (for Macedonians) controlling the Peloponnese and (for the Peloponnesians) of restraining Sparta. When delegated control of the Peloponnese did not work, conflicts within the peninsula were a distraction and a drain on resources, especially once people's eyes were increasingly turned to the west. After a period when their interests diverged – and perhaps sensing that they no longer had a critical need for Philip's support – the Achaeans deserted the Macedonians. This ultimately led to the betrayal of Sparta by the Romans under Flamininus (remarkably similar to that by Philip II). Unsurprisingly, this unsatisfactory non-solution merely stoked the fires of intra-Peloponnesian conflict for another half-century.[233]

II.6 Control and Geostrategy

After the upheavals of the late fifth century, the peoples of the Peloponnese suffered further in the kaleidoscopic conflicts of the early fourth. The rest of that century was equally dangerous. Sparta's defeat in 371, and the humiliating Theban invasions of Laconia in the 360s, did not put an end to conflict; neither did Philip II's hegemony over southern Greece create a permanently pacified landscape or substantially rearrange the geostrategic dynamics. The 'long third century' of Macedonian domination (338–197) was rarely, if at all, characterized by a *pax Macedonica*. Cities continued to clash over territory. The old internal hegemon, Sparta, remained aggressive at times, competing for territory with Messene, Megalopolis, eastern Arkadia, and Argos and coming close to regaining a dominant position. Smaller centres of power survived in Arkadia, only briefly united in a larger association.

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[233] For the view that Achaean power never replaced Spartan because it, too, remained reliant on external help, see Kralli 2017, 147–8.

The major *poleis* of the north-east remained individually powerful. From the 270s, the Achaean league rose to prominence, changing the balance of military resource to the disfavour of the Macedonians. Macedonian warlords and kings continually (though not continuously) projected power and exerted pressure from their base on the Isthmus, while another external power, Ptolemaic Egypt, interfered opportunistically, especially from nearby Crete.

Anti-Macedonian military campaigns were relatively frequent: some led by Sparta, notably the attack by Agis III; some enjoying Ptolemaic support, such as the Chremonidean war. Each one ended in disaster; but then the Achaean league began to grow in military weight, leading to changes of control in many states. Yet even the defeats of Sparta in 222 and 207 did not bring about the end of violent confrontation, which persisted after the establishment of Roman hegemony (not yet 'rule'). Even in the second century, Rome could not prevent regional problems from running out of control, though for decades Rome was the arbiter of disputes rather than of armed conflicts.

This chapter has attempted a new, comprehensive narrative for the Peloponnese in the late classical and early hellenistic periods, and has identified two 'eternal questions'. (*a*) For those powerful enough to aspire to hegemony over the peninsula, the issue was how control and stability could best be maintained. The response depended on the answers to two prior questions: in whose interests was control to be exercised, and how liberal or restrictive was that control to be? Hegemons appear to have responded differently at different times. (*b*) For states other than Sparta, the question was how Sparta could be prevented from re-establishing its dominance.[234] A further question arose at moments of opportunity and decision: how much local or internal power, if any, should Sparta be left with? The consistent response was 'a considerable amount', at least down to 195.

To Sparta's neighbours, the second question may have been uppermost. Many leading Spartans clearly wished to dominate the peninsula; perhaps to recreate a Peloponnesian league based on time-honoured networks among *polis* elites. This traditional model of *pax Laconica* appears to have commanded loyalty for a long time among certain Peloponnesians, particularly when the alternative was Macedonian domination. Even the Achaeans fought alongside Spartans at times. Others, however, may have seen no future for themselves under Sparta, which had always favoured friendly oligarchies and had to some extent thrown away its reputation in the 390s. In the next chapter we shall examine what lay behind calls for constitutional change in Peloponnesian *poleis*, and how it may relate to the composition of citizen bodies. The divisions within them were perhaps responsible for making the prospect of old-style Spartan hegemony intolerable. It is perhaps no coincidence that the first moves in the formation of the new Achaean league were made well away from Macedonian-held Corinth, but also well out of reach of any possible Spartan influence.

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[234] Though some, including certain Arkadian *poleis*, remained broadly loyal to Sparta: Kralli 2017, 130, 220, 493–4, etc.

On the question of 'pacification', Macedonia's interest seems to have been consistently focused on preventing assaults and distractions. Hence we see a strategy of delegated control and sometimes of more supportive patronage, though periods of milder rule usually proved unrealistic. Sometimes a king seems to have operated a policy of 'divide and rule', or of not destroying one of two potential hegemons. Some such thinking may explain why, like the Thebans in the 360s (who left Sparta with the coastal *poleis* of Messenia), neither Philip II nor Doson deprived Sparta of all its *perioikoi*, still less destroyed the *polis* of Sparta as the Spartans had destroyed Mantinea in 385, Philip II Olynthos early in his reign, and Alexander Thebes in 335. The Spartans themselves had refused to obliterate Athens in 404.

A positive analysis, of course, would see the Antigonids in the third century, like Philip II earlier, as wishing to be seen as champions of Hellenism (as long as Hellenism was biddable). For this reason, as much as reasons of economy, Macedonian kings attempted, when the geopolitical storms subsided, to operate a relatively 'hands off' policy in the Peloponnese. Many Peloponnesians and other Greeks may have admired Sparta for its leadership and sacrifices in the Persian wars, for overthrowing Athens' fifth-century empire, and latterly for repeatedly attacking the Macedonians; such historical considerations had not been present to save Mantinea or Thebes.

The relative priorities of Macedonian kings, as we have often noted, are shown by the number of occasions on which a ruler's attention was drawn away from this part of Greece, usually by affairs in northern Greece: namely, in 317 when Cassander was besieging Tegea (Section II.3.c); in the late 290s when Demetrios was campaigning in the southern Peloponnese and was distracted from news from the eastern Mediterranean (end of Section II.4.a); in the mid-280s when Gonatas left the south in the charge of Pyrrhos (Section II.4.b); in 222 when Doson could not stay to consolidate his victory at Sellasia (Section II.4.e); in winter 219/8 when Philip V went to fend off the Dardanians (Section II.5.a); in 208 when he rushed home from Eleia (Section II.5.b); and not long after, when he returned to Macedonia after forcing Machanidas to abandon an expedition (Section II.5.b).

On a larger scale, recent scholarship has also identified a perennial eastward gaze on the part of Macedonian rulers from Cassander to Philip V, though it was steadier at certain times than at others.[235] Demetrios Poliorketes, for example, being determined to recover Asia, neglected security in Greece and reduced Greek freedom, but thereby jeopardized his greater aim. Gonatas learned from his father's failure and gave up the aim of recovering Asia, preferring as a compromise domination of the Aegean; to this end, he stubbornly restored his position in Greece and, as a result, survived what was in essence a Ptolemaic attack in the Chremonidean war. Gonatas' three successors maintained the Aegean focus, but realized that for this purpose it was necessary to prevent outbursts within Greece. After the peace of Phoinike, Philip V involved himself even more in the Aegean, which may have contributed to the Achaean decision to switch sides.

A different spatial pattern can be seen in Spartan history in these years: a prevailing interest in the western Peloponnese and north-western Greece, reflected in perennial alignment with Elis and Aitolia. In earlier periods, though also active throughout the eastern Peloponnese, Sparta had often maintained an almost proprietorial interest in the Olympic festival and, through its ally Corinth, in Adriatic networks. For Sparta, indeed, there were three land routes out of Laconia (since Taÿgetos impedes direct land travel into Messenia): the Eurotas–Alpheios furrow (also a way into Messenia if needed), the Orchomenos route (whose importance Philip V recognized), and the eastern route via Thyreatis and Argos (blocked after 338 except when Kleomenes and briefly Nabis controlled Argos).

In short, security considerations meant that the Macedonians needed to keep the lid on the Peloponnesians, and in particular prevent a revival of Spartan power unless it was balanced by Achaean; the Peloponnese was important to them instrumentally, not as an end in itself. Even the longstanding domination of Corinth, and the lavish investment in its amenities which they probably made,[236] are explicable in this light.

A compelling feature of this period, despite Macedonian power, is the degree to which – whether under external domination, Spartan overlordship, or the authority of a multi-*polis* association – the individual *poleis* retained a considerable degree of 'agency', of practical freedom to act as they chose; to act, that is, as politics within their decision-making body ebbed and flowed. A corollary of this is that within *poleis* and regional blocs, as already observed, division and competition were fundamental dynamics of the geopolitical landscape. This is explored further in Chapter III, which examines the nature of politics in Peloponnesian communities, and enquires what effects if any Macedonian power had upon politics.

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[235] Buraselis 1982, esp. 177–9.

[236] Dixon 2014, 201–3: ship building yards, the Diolkos, water-supply; 207, Demetrios' attempt to build a canal.

While he castigates the histories of Theopompos, Polybios concedes that Philip, Alexander, and their generals displayed 'courage (ἀνδρεία), love of toil (φιλοπονία), and in short virtue' (ἀρετή; 8. 10. 5); while even Alexander's immediate successors 'caused their own glory to be handed down in numerous memoirs' (παραδόσιμον ἐποίησαν τὴν ἑαυτῶν δόξαν ἐν πλείστοις ὑπομνήμασιν, 8. 5. 12). But he also, in the voice of Chlaineas the Aitolian, whipping up anti-Macedonian feeling in 211, characterizes the post-Lamian war period as one of abusive treatment of the Greeks by Antipater, with political officers hunting down anti-Macedonians (9. 29). Lykiskos the Akarnanian responds that Alexander's successors did both good and bad (9. 34). This polarity of interpretation is another issue which the examination of *polis* politics will help us explore.

II.7 Epilogue: 197–146

After Kynoskephalai, Flamininus continued in his attempts to ensure that Philip surrendered Corinth (P. 18. 11. 13). By a resolution of the senate the Greek states in Europe not held by Philip were to be free and 'use their own laws' (νόμοις χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἰδίοις), while those Philip held in Europe were to be surrendered to the Romans (18. 44. 2–3). According to Polybios, the Aitolians suggested that this meant that the latter group, in particular the three Fetters, were to be Roman possessions (18. 45. 1–6); but Flamininus persuaded the senate's commissioners in Greece that Rome must free them all. Accordingly, at the Isthmian games in summer 196 he proclaimed the freedom of those Greeks who were subject to Philip (18. 46. 5); that of the others being implied *a fortiori*, if Polybios reports his words accurately. Corinth, Triphylia, and Heraia were handed over to the Achaean league (18. 47. 10).

Aware, no doubt, that pacification of the Spartans was a key to Peloponnesian stability, Flamininus secured a mandate from the Panhellenic congress to attack them (L. 33. 45. 4), even though they had supported Rome against Philip V. Securing Achaean support on the pretext of liberating Argos (34. 22–4), he successfully invaded Laconia in summer 195 (34. 28–9) and removed much of what remained of perioikic territory from Sparta's control; it was probably soon after this that the league (*koinon*) of the Lakedaimonians was created.[237] In 193 Nabis attempted to retake those towns, but in 192 he was assassinated by Aitolian troops in Sparta (35. 35–6). Sparta fell to Philopoimen; apart from the imposition of a narrow oligarchy, the main innovation was its enrolment in the Achaean league (35. 37. 2). Once Messene and Elis followed in 191, the league was all-powerful.

Yet only three years after Nabis' fall, the aggrieved Spartans attacked hostile exiles at Las near Gytheion and declared Sparta's independence from the league; whereupon Philopoimen seized the opportunity to intervene once again with savage violence and abolish the constitution (L. 38. 30–4). Even so, the Spartans remained 'bad Achaeans' over the years to come; Messene, too (which had been a semi-detached league member at an earlier date: P. 4. 31–2), seceded on one occasion. Such demonstrations presented a now supremely confident Roman senate with opportunities to stop the Achaeans becoming too powerful; initially Rome's friend, the league became suspicious of Rome's motives and became suspect itself. According to Polybios, by the middle of the century the ordinary people of Greek states were among those most vehement in condemning Rome (e.g. 38. 12. 45). Arguments between the league and states such as Athens and Sparta led to diplomatic clashes with Rome, and ultimately to the Achaean war of 146. That resulted in the destruction of Corinth by Roman troops, and the abolition of the Achaean league. The main alternative to a traditional *pax Laconica* had failed.

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[237] On the subsequent history of the *perioikoi*, see Kennell 1999.