Lenin approve of the use of terror in peacetime as a permanent fixture of the regime, as Solzhenitsyn argues in the *Gulag*? These are some of the essential questions that should be considered in a new anthology of Lenin's writings.

On the nationality question, the editor has probably done justice to Lenin, although, even here, the Communist Party's weakening of the right of self-determination (which occurred in Lenin's lifetime and with his approval) is not reflected. The use of terror is discussed in a long extract that dates back to 1919, but the documents that Lenin corrected in May 1922 are not included. These documents (amendments to the draft of the criminal code) show, at least in the opinion of this reviewer, that the question of terror, and the affinity between Leninist and Stalinist use of violence cannot be dismissed with the single though elegant sentence offered on page 423. Similarly, Lenin's view of religious freedoms and rights would probably be put in better perspective if some of Lenin's opinions had been reprinted, including his correction of the proposed declaration on freedom of conscience of 1918.

The Lenin that emerges from Professor Tucker's collection—with the help of his introduction—is the familiar charismatic messiah of the Russian Revolution. No one will deny Lenin's talents in revolution, but what about his role as founder of the Soviet state? Did he lay the foundation for arbitrary rule and ideological persecution by violent means when, for example, he condemned Menshevik activists to death? Was he really the benefactor of Russia and mankind as acclaimed by both his friends and the Russian peasants, or was Bertrand Russell correct in reporting that his "most vivid impressions [of Lenin] were those of bigotry and Mongolian cruelty"?

A useful anthology should aid speculation about such questions. Professor Tucker's collection would better serve this purpose if it included selections of Lenin's works that are less popular but more relevant for contemporary problems.

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NATSIONAL'NA POLITYKA LENINA. By *Ivan Bakalo*. Munich: "Suchasnist'," 1974. 210 pp. Paper. (U.S. Mailing Address: 875 West End Ave., Apt. 14B, New York, N.Y. 10025)

Despite its title, this monograph deals only in part with Lenin's nationality policy. Its chief aim, according to the author, is to show that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union uses Lenin's name to disguise its own totally different policy. Although the first three chapters on Lenin's period cover ground treated in much greater depth and breadth by Richard Pipes (*Formation of the Soviet Union*, 1954 and 1968), and the next three chapters are similar to Ivan Dzyuba's more penetrating analysis of Soviet nationality policy (*Internationalism or Russification*, first published in 1968 in the original Ukrainian by "Suchasnist'"), the work is a good chronological survey of Soviet nationality policy from the eve of the Second Party Congress. The book is thoroughly documented, primarily from Soviet sources. References are given at the end of each chapter, but the author does not provide a bibliography and includes only an incomplete name index. The most interesting part of the volume is the chapter on the post-Stalinist period (chapter 6), in which Bakalo analyzes the new and—in his opinion—ominous turn in Soviet nationality policy manifested when the Soviet peoples were proclaimed "A New Historical Community."

As an analysis of Lenin's nationality policy, however, the work lacks subtlety and is flawed by a basic inconsistency. The author fails to explain, for example, how Lenin's approach to national aspirations, depicted as purely negative, could lead to such positive programs as the development of national cultures and the *korenizatsiia*, which were passed by the Tenth and Twelfth Party Congresses, specifically in response to Lenin's prodding. The Lenin he portrays—cast against the background of Soviet reality in the last chapters as an eloquent defender of national rights—bears little resemblance to the master tactician and propagandist who emerges from the first chapters. But if Lenin's policy was molded by opportunism alone, why accuse his successors of distorting and corrupting it? Or was there a positive core beneath that opportunism, after all?

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THE ROAD TO STALINGRAD: STALIN'S WAR WITH GERMANY, vol. 1. By *John Erickson*. New York: Harper & Row, 1975. x, 594 pp. + 8 pp. photographs. $25.00.

This is the first of a two-volume series by the noted British military historian and writer, Professor John Erickson. In reading the book, two points should be borne in mind from the outset: Erickson is one of the most knowledgeable observers of Soviet military affairs, and he has suffered from the same lack of authoritative Soviet documentation that has plagued all those who have done research in this field.

Professor Erickson's book is probably the best account to date of the first eighteen months of the Russo-German conflict of the Second World War. I am sure, however, that Erickson would be the first to admit that the work suffers from the inadequacies of official Soviet records and the general intransigence of the Kremlin about allowing access to the historical archives of the Ministry of Defense's Institute of Military History. Western historians can take some solace in the fact that most Soviet historians have no better luck in gaining approval to research the files. Recent requests from Soviet officials for copies of American declassification regulations, to be used as a basis for setting up similar procedures back home, do offer some hope for the future.

Meanwhile, Erickson has carefully analyzed and cross-checked available Soviet sources, and has used his numerous contacts to obtain interviews with Soviet war veterans. Captured German records and other sources have been used to balance the account, although there seems to have been something less than full utilization of Nazi documentation. It is often difficult to determine the sources of particular references or statements because the author has not footnoted his work. Erickson has furnished, instead, only general bibliographies for each chapter, making the book somewhat less useful as a serious research vehicle. Even so, he has put together an excellent two-sided account of the events leading to the German invasion of the USSR and the subsequent bitter fighting that ended in the great battle of Stalingrad.

The volume is divided into three general parts. Book One, which dovetails nicely with Erickson's earlier work on *The Soviet High Command: 1918–1941* (London: Macmillan, 1962), is an account of the rebuilding of the Red Army after the Finnish Campaign. The inconsistencies in Stalin's selection of the new leaders of the Red Army following the great purges are clearly shown in the narration of