
RESEARCH REPORTS AND NOTES

PROTESTANTISM IN EL SALVADOR: Conventional Wisdom versus Survey Evidence*

Edwin Eloy Aguilar, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

José Miguel Sandoval, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Timothy J. Steigenga, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Kenneth M. Coleman, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Protestantism has grown strikingly throughout Latin America in the last two decades. Estimating such growth is hazardous in the absence of firm national survey data, but the phenomenon is clearly embracing sizable segments of national populations. In Guatemala, estimates of Prot-

*This study is dedicated to the martyrs of El Salvador's Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas (UCA): Julia Ramos and her daughter, Celina; Father Ignacio Ellacuría, Rector; Father Ignacio Martín-Baró, Vice Rector and Director, Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública (IUDOP); Father Segundo Montes, Dean of Social Sciences; Father Juan Ramón Moreno; Father Joaquín López y López; and Father Amando López. No conventional expression of gratitude can do justice to the sacrifice made by these individuals, who died on 16 November 1989 because of their commitment to academic integrity, religious tolerance, and political reconciliation in El Salvador. In presenting a secondary analysis of data collected under the supervision of Father Martín-Baró at IUDOP, we acknowledge the immense achievement of those who engaged in the scientific study of public opinion under conditions of civil war and constant threat.

The authors also wish to thank Héctor Avalos, Virginia Garrard Burnett, Charles L. Davis, the Reverend James E. Goff, Jonathan Hartlyn, David L. Lowery, Gary Marks, Catharine Newbury, James Penning, Lars Schoultz, Donald Searing, Jurg Steiner, David Stoll, and James W. White for helpful comments on this paper, as well as six anonymous *LARR* reviewers. Edwin Aguilar wishes to thank the National Science Foundation for fellowship support, and all the authors thank the Institute for Research in Social Science at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

estants in the national population ranged from 20 to 25 percent by the early 1980s, with more recent estimates approaching 30 percent.¹

Estimates in Chile were nearly as striking—somewhere around 21 or 22 percent by the early to mid-1980s. Also turning heavily Protestant was the Brazilian interior, where evangelization by the Assemblies of God found a receptive population. Estimates suggest that 16 to 20 percent of the Brazilian population are Protestant. Across South and Central America, the growth of Protestantism was nearly ubiquitous (see Stoll 1990, 3–10, 333–38). In countries like Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela, the phenomenon is more recent, but discernible growth has already occurred.

The most dramatic political impact of Protestantism has been felt in Guatemala. General Efraín Ríos Montt, who was “called to power” by junior military officers in 1982, used his brief eighteen-month reign to apply evangelical rhetoric to the task of counterinsurgency (see Stoll 1990, 180–217; Burnett 1989, 127; and Steigenga 1991, 37–48). No previous Guatemalan president had ever used the office as a “bully pulpit” as did Ríos, who sermonized every Sunday over radio and television. Although he was overthrown in 1983, Ríos did not disappear from Guatemalan political life. Six years later, he was campaigning vigorously in the 1990 presidential elections, only to be disqualified by a constitutional ban on past participants in palace coups. As of 1991, Guatemala once again had a Protestant president, Jorge Serrano Elías, this one elected. Nothing illustrates the growing strength of Protestantism more dramatically than the two Guatemalan Protestant presidencies—one military and one civilian—bracketing the decade from 1981 to 1991.

Neighboring El Salvador has also experienced the Protestant phenomenon. In the 1940s, the number of Salvadoran Protestants was estimated at less than 1 percent of the national population. By the late 1980s, however, serious public-opinion research yielded estimates in the range of 12 percent.²

Evangelical growth has been so dramatic that, throughout Latin America, Catholic authorities are decrying the “invasion of the sects,” a label applied indiscriminately to long-established Protestant denominations and more esoteric groups (see Stoll 1990, 1–24, 39–41). Underlying the denunciations is the suspicion that Protestant expansion is another form of U.S. imperialism. Many critics in the Catholic Church and on the

1. Evans (1991) offers a careful empirical assessment of the diffusion of Protestantism in Guatemala based on a 1990 survey in three departments. He estimates a cumulative Protestant total of 30 percent.

2. The 1 percent figure comes from E. A. Wilson (1983, 189). Our examination of twenty-two surveys conducted by the Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública at the Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas in San Salvador revealed estimates in the range of 10 to 14 percent, the most common figure being 12 percent. Stoll reports estimates from varying agencies of 12, 13, and 14 percent for 1985 (Stoll 1990: 335, 337, 333).

left have presumed that the Central Intelligence Agency is bankrolling evangelism to soften popular resistance to U.S. foreign policy. Knowing more about who Protestants are and what they believe may help assess the plausibility of such interpretations.

This research note seeks not to explain the growth of Protestantism in El Salvador but rather to describe the characteristics of Protestants, examine the nature of their religious experiences, and explore the implications of their religion for political attitudes and behavior. To do so, we employ survey data collected in 1988 and 1989 under the supervision of the late Father Ignacio Martín-Baró, S.J., Director of the Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública (IUDOP) at the Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas in San Salvador.³

Two national surveys were employed for this purpose. The first sample of 1,065 respondents, a survey entitled “La religión para los salvadoreños,” was taken between 11 and 26 June 1988 in seven of El Salvador’s fourteen *departamentos*. The second survey of 1,303 respondents, “Los salvadoreños y el nuevo gobierno de ARENA,” was conducted between 6 and 20 May 1989 in all fourteen departamentos.⁴ Households were sampled, with one individual per household being interviewed. In both surveys, sampling in the departamentos included urban interviews in the capital city as well as rural interviews.⁵

3. By prior agreement with Father Martín-Baró himself and with William Bollinger of the Interamerican Research Center and California State University, Los Angeles, all twenty-two of the surveys conducted prior to the assassination of Father Martín-Baró at the UCA are now on deposit with the Institute for Research in Social Science at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

4. The first sample included two departments judged by IUDOP to be “low-conflict settings” (Ahuachapán y Santa Ana), four departments judged to be “high-conflict settings” (Usulután, San Miguel, Morazán, and Chalatenango), and the capital city of San Salvador. In the fall of 1989, the Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional (FMLN) carried an offensive to previously untouched upper-class neighborhoods of the capital city. This offensive led to the reprisal attack on the Universidad Centroamericana, which took the lives of Father Martín-Baró and other university personnel. San Salvador previously would not have been described as a “high-conflict zone.”

5. Urban interviews were distributed across five social strata: upper and upper-middle with 11.6 percent (1988) and 7.6 percent (1989); middle-middle with 15.8 percent (1988) and 15.0 percent (1989); lower-middle with 21.9 percent (1988) and 25.2 percent (1989); working-class with 18.4 percent (1988) and 19.9 percent (1989); and marginal urbanites with 7.2 percent (1988) and 12.4 percent (1989). The remaining interviews were with rural dwellers, 25.3 percent (1988) and 20.0 percent (1989). A potential source of bias in the samples is that they overrepresent the urban population. Given war conditions, no national census was undertaken in 1990. Therefore lacking certain knowledge of the percentage of urban-dwellers in El Salvador, it makes little sense to weight the cases in these samples to adjust them to fit unknown national parameters. What we have done is to examine whether the distribution of our central independent variable—religious affiliation—varies by urban and rural environments. We found no systematic relationship. For example, the 1988 survey reveals that the three provinces with the highest percentage of Protestants were the western mountainous rural department of Santa Ana (26.4 percent Protestant), the underpopulated east-central department of Usulután (20.4 percent), and San Salvador, the capital city (16.0 percent). Cer-

Detailed sampling reports prepared by Martín-Baró and his associates at IUDOP provided much additional information, including preliminary analyses.⁶ Perhaps the most useful datum in judging the quality of the survey is the percentage of refusals in the 1989 survey—18.8 percent of the initial household sample, a strikingly low percentage for a country in the midst of a civil war.⁷ We have found these data to be of high quality, generated by researchers who were attentive to methodological probity under difficult circumstances. Readers may judge for themselves, however, as copies of the sampling reports prepared by IUDOP are available upon request.⁸

Sociological Characteristics of Protestants

Before examining the nature of the Protestant religious experience in El Salvador, it is worthwhile to look at some basic sociological characteristics. Two previous empirical examinations of Protestantism in Guatemalan village settings have reported that Protestants tend to be recruited from groups subject to extraordinary economic pressure but that prolonged exposure to Protestantism tends to provide either motivation or behavioral propensities conducive to economic advancement (Sexton 1978; Annis 1987). Sexton and Annis both assert that Protestants may start out among the very poor but that in time some will ascend to greater economic security.⁹

Clearly, the survey data reported here are inadequate for assessing such a hypothesis because the theory predicts movement over time while the data are synchronic. Yet as a first approximation to the issue, it can be assessed whether Protestants are socioeconomically distinct from holders of other religious beliefs. If they are not, that finding would suggest that

tain other rural departments have much lower percentages of Protestants (Chalatenango, 5.0 percent, and Ahuachapán, 9.9 percent) As noted, the national average is best estimated according to all twenty-two surveys undertaken at 12 percent Protestant. Because Protestantism is growing in urban and rural areas and the correlates of Protestantism appear to be the same in rural and urban settings, we concluded that oversampling of urban areas is not an important determinant of the findings of this study.

6. For example, the average age of interviewees was 36.5 years (1988) and 37.6 years (1989), with standard deviations of 15.0 and 15.3 years, respectively. Mean educational level was 7.9 years (1988) and 7.6 years (1989), with a standard deviation of 5.6 years (1988) and 5.3 years (1989).

7. By comparison, in seventeen surveys conducted between 1975 and 1991 by the National Opinion Research Center in the United States, the average refusal rate was 17.2 percent, including some rates as high as 20 or 21 percent. See National Opinion Research Center (1991, 705–6). Other reports of major surveys in the United States indicate that refusal rates in the 20 percent range are common (Steeh 1981; Morchio 1987).

8. Those wishing copies should contact José Miguel Sandoval at the Institute for Research in Social Science, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3355.

9. Such findings support theories about the effects of Protestantism that date back to the work of Max Weber, collected in Weber (1963).

TABLE 1 *Salvadoran Monthly Income by Religious Affiliation, 1988*

Monthly Income	Non-affiliated (n = 156) (%)	Protestants (n = 174) (%)	Nonpracticing Catholics (n = 325) (%)	Practicing Catholics (n = 355) (%)
0 colones	55	54	47	51
1-450 colones	12	16	12	7
451-900 colones	12	9	12	9
901-1400 colones	3	6	10	10
1400+ colones	17	15	19	23
Totals	99%	100%	100%	100%
Mean ^a	485 col	407 col	638 col	727 col
Median ^b	795 col	700 col	800 col	1100 col
Standard Deviation ^a	1151 col	745 col	1272 col	1363 col

NOTE: $\chi^2 = 18.54$; $p = .0294$; $d.f. = 12$.

^a Calculated before collapsing data into five categories, including those with no income.

^b Median income among those who earned some income (but excluding those with zero income).

Salvadoran Protestants had not yet produced enough savings, investments, or other rewards of entrepreneurial activity during the civil war of the 1980s to yield socioeconomic differentiation.

In table 1, we have assembled part of the picture by reporting the monthly income of respondents.¹⁰ On comparing Protestants with practicing and nonpracticing Catholics and with those who profess no formal religion, discernible differences can be detected.¹¹ Protestants on average rank lower on variables measuring socioeconomic status than do Catholics while exhibiting considerable similarity to the nonaffiliated in their income profile.¹²

10. In table 1, an initial category of no income is complemented with categories that roughly correspond to quartiles. Hence, zero income to 450 *colones* represents the bottom quartile, between 451 and 900 represents the second quartile, and so on.

11. The major difference is in the relatively greater incidence of "high-income" nonaffiliated versus "high-income" Protestants. Table 2 also reveals a cluster of highly educated nonaffiliated persons. We infer that the "high-income" nonaffiliated are likely to be university-educated skeptics who have easier routes to income than the self-denying choices available to poor Protestants.

12. One distinction between Protestants and the nonaffiliated emerged from our data analyses: Protestants are somewhat more likely to be economically "inactive," if activity is defined as remunerated activity. This is clearly a result of gender. Of the nonaffiliated, 54 percent are men, while 55 percent of the Protestants are women. Given traditional gender roles among poorer Salvadorans, the likelihood of remunerated economic activity occurring is slightly higher among males. But overall, one should be wary of assuming that women are more

TABLE 2 Highest Grade Completed by Salvadorans according to Religious Affiliation, 1988

Years of Education	Non-affiliated (n = 155) (%)	Protestants (n = 174) (%)	Nonpracticing Catholics (n = 325) (%)	Practicing Catholics (n = 354) (%)
None	23	24	15	14
1-6	41	41	24	24
7-9	11	12	13	11
10-12	11	13	29	27
13-21	14	10	19	25
Totals	100	100	100	101
Mean ^a	6.1	5.8	8.5	9.1
Standard deviation ^a	5.2	5.1	5.5	5.6

NOTE: $\chi^2 = 75.37$; $p = .0000$; d.f. = 12.
^a Calculated before collapsing data into categories.

The most striking findings from table 1 are that Protestants rank lowest in mean income (407 colones per month including those with no income) and in median income (700 colones per month among those who earn some income), display the greatest homogeneity in income levels (note the lower standard deviation of 745 colones), and display the lowest percentage of respondents in the high-end income category. By contrast, the group ranking the highest on income profile consists of practicing Catholics, with a mean monthly income of 727 colones and a median of 1100 colones, followed by nonpracticing Catholics, with a mean of 638 colones and a median of 800 per month. In this and subsequent measures, Protestants resemble the nonaffiliated more than any other group.

Another indication of how Protestants rank lower than Catholics is found in their educational profiles. Table 2 reports the mean years of formal education completed by Salvadoran respondents, according to religious category. Once again Protestants most resemble the religiously nonaffiliated (5.8 years, on average, versus 6.1 years for the nonaffiliated), while Catholics have more education on average, with practicing Catholics being the most educated group of all (9.1 years versus 8.5 years for the nonpracticing Catholics).

As for occupation, table 3 demonstrates that the now-familiar pattern continues to hold. Protestants and the religiously nonaffiliated tend to be concentrated more heavily in lower-status occupations. For example,

likely to be Protestants. Seventeen percent of all males in this sample are Protestant, and 17 percent of all females are Protestant. Where females are underrepresented and males overrepresented is in the religiously nonaffiliated category.

TABLE 3 Salvadoran Occupational Status by Religion, 1988

Occupation	Non-affiliated (n = 151)		Protestants (n = 171)		Nonpracticing Catholics (n = 315)		Practicing Catholics (n = 336)	
	a	b	a	b	a	b	a	b
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
Professional	4	7	4	8	7	12	12	23
Service occupations	19	35	19	40	30	48	28	53
Working-class	33	58	25	52	25	40	13	24
Economically "inactive"	44	-	52	-	38	-	47	-
Totals	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

NOTE: Columns labeled "a" include those who generated no income. Columns labeled "b" exclude those who generated no income. For comparisons of "a" columns, $\chi^2 = 50.8$; $p < .0001$; d.f. = 9. For comparisons of "b" columns, $\chi^2 = 35.6$; $p < .0001$; d.f. = 9.

59 percent of the economically active nonaffiliated are found in working-class occupations, as are 52 percent of the economically active Protestants. By contrast, only 40 percent of the economically active nonpracticing Catholics are employed in working-class occupations; among comparable practicing Catholics, the total is a mere 24 percent working-class. At the other end of the scale, 23 percent of the economically active practicing Catholics hold professional jobs and another 53 percent are in service occupations. The comparable figures among Protestants are only 8 percent and 40 percent, and among the nonaffiliated, 7 percent and 35 percent.

The sociological outline is clear. Salvadoran Protestants and the religiously nonaffiliated have less education, occupy lower-status occupations, and earn less than Catholics, whether the latter are practicing or nonpracticing. Indeed, except for very marginal differences in occupational status, the similarity between Protestants and the nonaffiliated is striking. Both groups are poor and generally educated only at the primary school level. The recruitment efforts of Salvadoran Protestants may well be directed toward this pool of poor nonaffiliated individuals, although only other research methodologies could confirm such a hypothesis. What is clear is the strong sociological resemblance of Protestants to those not affiliated with any religion.

The importance of these findings is suggested by comparing the Salvadoran Protestants described in Daniel Levine's characterization of the Catholic ecclesial base communities (CEBs) in Venezuela and Colombia (Levine 1990, 732). The CEBs represent another attempt to reinvigorate religious community. Levine found that they recruit from well-established

urban barrios, not from recent invasion sites that represent the poorest urbanites. Yet the Salvadoran data suggest that Protestant recruitment may be taking place precisely among these lower strata. Future longitudinal studies should pursue this inference.

The Protestant Experience

Central to the Protestant vision has been the idea that a person's relationship to God can be direct, unmediated, and "bilateral." Reacting against a medieval church perceived as excessively hierarchical, bureaucratic, and dogmatic, Protestants over the centuries have stressed local initiative, popular participation, and "do-it-yourself" theology. Although a multiplicity of Protestant denominations have emerged, each with its own hierarchy and theology, overall a "live and let live" attitude has characterized the Protestant experience. Decentralization does not threaten the growth of Protestantism, nor do church schisms. Indeed, Protestantism often expands as a result of schism and decentralization.

Such characteristics have seemingly been replicated in the recent spread of Protestantism in Latin America. The crux of the Protestant growth in the hemisphere over the past two decades has been that it has offered an opportunity to decentralize the religious experience. According to Thomas Bamat, Protestants tend to "create more egalitarian and participatory relations. They allow even the poorest people to assume leadership roles and they encourage emotional expression during liturgical services" (cited in Stoll 1990, 29). This point has been reiterated by David Stoll, who argues that although decentralization does not equal democratization, it does create opportunity:

It was not that the evangelical churches [of Latin America] were necessarily democratic: the most rapidly growing, such as the Assemblies of God in Brazil, could be very authoritarian. . . . But evangelical Protestantism opened up a whole new ladder of leadership possibilities. Theoretically, any male could reach the top, even if married and without formal training. For dissidents, there was always the possibility of joining another evangelical church or starting their own. For dissident Catholics confronting a local priest, there was often no place to go within the system. (Stoll 1990, 36-37)¹³

The Salvadoran data provide an opportunity to explore whether, in the midst of a protracted civil war, those who become Protestants have had

13. Nevertheless, both Stoll (1990, 309 ff.) and Levine (1990) note that Catholic ecclesial base communities share some of the qualities of Protestantism: strong emphasis on participation, Bible reading, and grass-roots theological interpretation. Both approaches may open up opportunities for women, given the emphasis on Bible reading. Participation in either forum thus may stimulate poor women to demand assistance in developing literacy skills and more prosperous women to seek leadership roles. Other features of Protestantism, however, may not be found in the base communities.

experiences that are more intimate, more people-oriented, and less “reactive” toward religious authority. In short, is there any evidence that Salvadoran Protestants experience religion differently than do Catholics?

In certain ways the data suggest only marginal differences between the religious experiences of Catholics and Protestants. For example, Catholicism may be less hierarchical than is commonly supposed.¹⁴ In analyzing the number of respondents who know their pastor or priest, it was found that 95 percent of Protestants knew their pastor while 83 percent of practicing Catholics knew their priests, a high level among both groups. Thus although the results bespeak a somewhat greater degree of intimacy among Protestants, the difference is not as vast as might be supposed.¹⁵

Another analysis, however, offers dramatic testimony to the nature of the Protestant experience. In comparing whether respondents had ever been visited by a pastor or cleric in their home, Protestants overwhelmingly reported having received such visits (77 percent), whereas only 28 percent of practicing Catholics had been visited in their home by a priest. These data suggest that a high degree of “congregational intimacy” between religious authorities and believers is a distinctive feature of Protestantism and a likely source of its appeal.¹⁶ Protestantism in El Salvador, as elsewhere in contemporary Latin America, appears to be a highly decentralized religious experience, in which a driving force may well be the lack of hierarchy and the opportunity for neighborhood bonding to take place via “in-home” religious services.¹⁷

This pattern of intimacy is reinforced by frequent attendance at religious services. Analysis of the data reveals that Protestants attend worship services twice as frequently as practicing Catholics: 9.3 times per month

14. If Levine is correct, much of the appeal of the base communities derives from their “Protestant-like” qualities: meetings in homes, emphasis on prayer and direct communication with God, and the provision of opportunities for women (Levine 1990, 742–44).

15. Yet statistical significance is highly influenced by the stark contrast between practicing Catholics and Protestants on the one hand and nonpracticing Catholics and the nonaffiliated on the other. This gap may serve more than anything else simply to validate the labels. Non-affiliated and nonpracticing Catholics would not be expected to know “their” pastoral agent well because they would not have one.

16. The fact that Protestant churches often begin as living-room operations and expand only slowly to occupy larger church-like dwellings is one source of the frequency of “home visits” by Protestant pastors, as is the tendency toward church formation by schism. One’s pastor may be one’s neighbor who has started the congregation (or even the denomination) via living-room services, which then rotate from house to house. In commenting on an earlier version of this manuscript, Héctor Avalos (now a Ph.D. in religious studies but once a “boy preacher” for an evangelical sect in another Latin American country) reported that “in my former church, the frequency of a cleric’s visits was also a measure of his or her work performance by members.” Letter, 15 Nov. 1991, Chapel Hill, N.C.

17. Sigifredo Bieske, a German Protestant missionary in Costa Rica, stresses the importance of family-centered recruitment strategies (Bieske 1990, 18–21, 115–16). In our study, 18 percent of Protestants who reported having converted from Catholicism attributed their conversion to “home visits” by evangelists.

vs. 4.7 times per month. One-third of the Protestants (34 percent) attend as many as ten services per month, with a significant percentage (12 percent) attending services daily. Such frequent attendance can certainly provide structure and discipline in the lives of the poor. In the best of cases, it may also provide bonding and emotional support.¹⁸

If Protestantism is characterized by a strong commitment to a direct and unmediated relationship with God, then prayer ought to be intense among Protestants. The data suggest that Protestants indeed pray more frequently than do Catholics. Some 58 percent of the Protestants pray more than once a day, compared with about 33 percent of the Catholics.

In passing, it should be noted that El Salvador is an intensely religious society. Even among those professing no religious affiliation, 72 percent assert that they pray at least once a day, and 91 percent of “non-practicing” Catholics pray at least daily. Whatever legacies Catholicism has left in El Salvador, routine prayer is one of them. Protestantism may have enhanced that tendency but did not create it. Moreover, the content of prayer seems to have remained similar.¹⁹

But what about the content of belief? Do Protestants hold different theological beliefs than Catholics? The data suggest significant differences in the literalness with which Protestants and practicing Catholics interpret traditional Christian concepts. Some 93 percent of the Protestants reported believing in an extraterrestrial heaven, versus 86 percent of practicing Catholics, and 75 percent of the Protestants believe in a meta-human hell (one not on this earth), versus only 48 percent of practicing Catholics. Catholics, whether practicing or nonpracticing, are significantly more likely to believe in “a terrestrial hell” than are Protestants (34–35 percent as opposed to 14 percent).²⁰

18. Joseph Eldridge, a former Protestant missionary to Honduras, explained: “When people attend church services three, four or five times a week, they either come to love their fellow worshipers or to dislike them. If the former, then bonding and real community grows—the kind of self-confident community that may even begin to challenge authority on occasion. If the latter, then individuals may leave to join or to found another congregation. . . . and Protestantism per se is not necessarily impaired.” Eldridge made these remarks in an informal presentation at Chapel of the Cross in Chapel Hill, N.C., 14 Feb. 1991.

19. Additional analyses indicate that between 43 percent and 52 percent of all prayers pertained to personal welfare, regardless of belief category (nonaffiliated, Protestants, nonpracticing, and practicing Catholics). Six percent of Protestants and 10 percent of practicing Catholics prayed for an end to the civil war. Seventeen percent of Protestants and 23 percent of practicing Catholics prayed to give thanks for all their blessings. Overall, the content of prayer seemed roughly similar.

20. Some readers have expressed much interest in the conceptual distinction between a “meta-human hell” and “terrestrial hell.” This conceptual distinction was imposed by the original survey researchers, for whom such theological distinctions were undoubtedly commonplace. A “meta-human hell” refers to a place not on this earth while a “terrestrial hell” refers to a human existence so painful that it might be conceived as the equivalent to doing penance. Conceiving of hell as “meta-human” is the traditional Christian conception. Thus to imagine a terrestrial hell would be to reinterpret the conventional understanding.

Overall, the survey responses suggest that many Salvadorans interpret traditional Christian concepts in a strikingly literal manner. For example, belief in miracles ranges from a “low” of 79 percent among the nonaffiliated to a high of 95 percent among Protestants and practicing Catholics alike. Moreover, as many as 62 percent of the nonaffiliated believe in heaven and 39 percent of them believe in a meta-human hell. So while the Protestant propensity toward literal interpretation of concepts traditional to Christianity is strong, such views are widespread in Salvadoran society. Practicing Catholics thus share many beliefs with Protestants.

Aside from the ways in which Protestants and Catholics envision hell, do they interpret other religious concepts differently? The survey data reveal another such area. When asked about the ultimate purpose of religion, 40 percent of the Protestants responded “personal salvation,” while only 19 percent of the practicing Catholics chose this response. In a context of poverty and protracted civil war, recourse to Protestantism could be interpreted as a conflict-averse “survival strategy,” thereby enhancing the tendency to view personal salvation as the ultimate end of religion.²¹ As will be shown in a subsequent section, Catholic believers are marginally, but significantly, more likely to endorse an activist church that confronts social injustice and tries to transform society as an agent of God on earth. Protestants, in contrast, are more likely to want to transform themselves, seeking personal rather than societal salvation.²²

Judging from our data, the experience of Salvadoran Protestants can be summarized as follows: they participate in a home- and neighborhood-centered religious environment characterized by familiarity with church authorities and intense religious practice. Protestants tend to be especially literal in interpreting traditional religious concepts in an environment where literal interpretations are common. And Protestants are highly likely to view religion as a route to personal salvation.

These being the characteristics of Protestantism in El Salvador, what indirect political effects are imaginable? The most widespread assumption is that Protestantism generates political conservatism. If Protestants favor ideologies of self-help via self-control, they would seem to be less likely to endorse highly interventionist states as a solution to social ills. In this sense, they may resemble other political conservatives. Because Protestantism generates such a strong sense of personal responsibility for im-

21. See Steigenga (1991) for this interpretation of the spread of Protestantism in neighboring Guatemala.

22. As David Stoll has taken pains to argue, Latin American Protestantism is a complex and internally differentiated phenomenon. Consequently, there may well be Salvadoran Protestants with a strong orientation toward righting social wrongs and transforming human society. The Lutheran Church endorses such an orientation in Salvador according to Jorge Cáceres P. (1991).

proving one's own situation, it could undermine support for endorsing governmental intervention to improve social conditions.

Yet an alternative line of reasoning also exists. Levine (1990) has noted the democratizing potential of decentralized religious communities, such as Catholic ecclesial base communities (CEBs). Because Protestant groups share some of the attributes of the CEBs, an analogous argument could be made: those who learn to interpret the world on their own via intensive Bible study might become politically emboldened and more capable of fulfilling the role of the proactive democratic citizen. In a different sense, David Martin suggests that Protestantism might enhance pluralism because it "represents an advanced form of social differentiation and can operate best where hitherto monopolistic systems are disintegrating" (Martin 1990, 294). Is it possible that the diffusion of Protestantism might unintentionally generate additional political space for a host of groups?

Political Implications of Religious Belief

Citizens evaluate the society surrounding them as a preliminary step toward thinking about government. The degree of justice or injustice perceived will structure what citizens expect from their government. At a minimum, it could be assumed that perceiving injustice is a necessary precondition for citizens to demand that government or other agencies (such as the Catholic Church) take an active role in restructuring society. If society is not perceived to be unjust, then neither government nor the church will be expected to change it.

How do Salvadorans perceive their society, and do the Protestants among them view society much differently than do other Salvadorans? The survey data reveal that more than 70 percent of Salvadorans in all categories of religious belief consider the existing social system to be unjust. Protestants are most likely to see the existing system as just, but only 26 percent would characterize their society as "very just" or "somewhat just." Thus although Protestants are somewhat more likely to view their own society in positive terms, perceptions of injustice prevail among all Salvadorans, regardless of religion.²³ The potential for seeking assertive government is present even among Protestants.

Because the religious experience of Protestantism emphasizes intense interaction in small units of worship and personal salvation, how do Salvadoran Protestants interpret the proper role of the church? Do they see the church as playing a role in rectifying the widely perceived injustice?

23. It is perhaps important, however, that among Protestants who perceive injustice, a higher percentage attribute the existence of injustice to "God's will" (12 percent) or to "disobedience to God" (7 percent) than do members of other religious groups. Such responses might well indicate an acquiescent orientation toward existing social injustice.

Or are such responsibilities to be viewed as individual rather than collective, reasoning that "By taking care of myself, I take care of society by not becoming a burden to others"? Or do Salvadoran Protestants perceive social injustice as immutable and incapable of being addressed?

One concept that has been much discussed in the post-Medellín era in Latin America is the duty of the church to assist the poor.²⁴ A recent strand of theology has stressed that poverty violates one's humanness, therefore one's capacity to relate to God. If so, then the role of the church in addressing poverty becomes a key issue. When Salvadorans were asked whether the church should "prefer the poor," individuals of all religious affiliations divided along the same lines. Some 42 to 44 percent favored the "preferential option for the poor" while 56 to 58 percent opposed such a posture by the church. Those opposing preferential attention to the poor most frequently appealed to the equality of all human beings, presumably including equality before God. On this topic, then, Salvadoran political attitudes reflected a good deal of conservatism in the late 1980s, regardless of religious affiliation.²⁵ Slightly less than half of the Salvadorans surveyed endorsed a socially preoccupied church, but slightly more than half believed that the church should not accord special concern to the living conditions of the poor.

Yet churches could be active in other ways, as in mediating social conflicts. In response to the question of whether the church should get involved in social conflicts, Protestants were less willing to endorse a role for the church in this regard. Two effects seem discernible in producing deviations from the 41 percent to 43 percent of individuals who otherwise might prefer an active role for the church.²⁶ Active Catholics were more likely (51 percent) to endorse a role for the church in resolving social conflicts, whereas Protestants were significantly less likely (24 percent). The reticence of Protestants to envision the church as an agent for conflict resolution is striking,²⁷ but perhaps equally important is the finding that

24. We are referring here to the 1968 meeting of the Latin American Conference of Bishops in Medellín, Colombia, at which a call was made for the Catholic Church to exhibit a "preferential option for the poor."

25. Here we are defining *conservatism* as reticence to use social organization in efforts to remedy distributive inequalities.

26. That is, if the nonreligious group is taken as a baseline, 43 percent of the nonaffiliated would endorse church activism in social conflicts and 41 percent of nonpracticing Catholics would endorse such activism.

27. There was some ambiguity in the key concept in the question. The original survey item referred to "the Church." Respondents could have interpreted the item as referring to all churches, to the Catholic Church as the dominant church, or to "my church," whether Catholic or Protestant. Given the survey instrument, we were unable to discern the referents that respondents invoked. A few items asked for evaluations of the Catholic Church. Those items are less pertinent to the point of our study and hence have not been discussed. But for the record, 32 percent of Salvadoran Protestants evaluated the work of the Catholic Church in Salvador as "very good" or "good" while 25 percent evaluate it as "bad" or "very bad," with the remaining 43 percent of Protestant respondents offering neutral evaluations.

most Salvadorans did not envision a productive role for the church in resolving social conflict. Apparently, conflict was so endemic to the Salvadoran experience in 1988 and 1989 that all Salvadorans found it difficult to imagine human agents who could stop it, even those purporting to serve divine ends. Protestants were especially reluctant, viewing the primary social role of the church as evangelization, that is, incorporating more people and influencing them to do right.²⁸

If Salvadorans believed that the church should not attempt to resolve social conflict, what did they believe in the late 1980s about the political implications of their religious commitments? One possibility was that, perceiving injustice, individuals would have opted to support the guerrillas of the Frente Farabundo Martí de Liberación Nacional (FMLN) and fight injustice through armed insurrection. But when asked whether a Christian should support the guerrillas, most Salvadorans did not believe that supporting the FMLN was a legitimate Christian option. Yet the difference between Protestants and Catholics was significant: only 13 percent of the Protestants believed that Christians could support the guerrilla movement while 33 percent of practicing Catholics could envision such support as appropriate. Individual decisions to pursue "liberation" via a religiously-sanctioned commitment to revolution are clearly more likely to occur among Catholics than among Protestants. The latter were more likely to respond in follow-up probes that "all violence goes against God's will."²⁹

From such findings, readers might infer that Salvadoran Protestants endorsed the government's counterinsurgency campaigns. But that was not the case. A 1989 post-presidential election poll by IUDOP revealed otherwise in asking what the new ARENA government should do about the civil war. About as many Protestants as Catholics favored negotiating with the rebels (79 percent versus 77 percent).³⁰ Indeed, the percentage of Protestants favoring negotiation was marginally higher than in the other groups and the percentage favoring militarization marginally lower. Both these positions are consistent with the belief that "all violence goes against God's will."

Another indication of Salvadoran Protestants' lack of bellicosity was

28. Roughly 60 percent of Protestants hold to this view, versus 39 percent to 45 percent of the other categories under study.

29. By a margin of 36 percent among Protestants to 21 percent among Catholics and 26 percent among the nonaffiliated ($p = .002$), violence was held to be against God's will.

30. Throughout 1990 talks were held under the auspices of the United Nations, leading to the participation of the left in 1991 legislative elections for the second consecutive time under the label of *Convergencia Democrática*. In the elections, this coalition tallied 12 percent of the vote, the Christian Democrats 28 percent, and ARENA 44 percent. Talks resumed after the 1991 elections and eventually led to the successful negotiation of a peace accord under the direct supervision of outgoing UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuellar. It began to be implemented in the early months of 1992.

TABLE 4 *Salvadoran Choices of Justifiable Concessions in Negotiating with the FMLN, according to Religious Affiliation, 1989*

<i>Concession</i>	<i>Nonaffiliated (n = 198) (%)</i>	<i>Protestants (n = 163) (%)</i>	<i>Catholics^a (n = 897) (%)</i>
Reduce army to 1979 level	34 (33)	23 (35)	27 (26)
New elections after ceasefire	37 (25)	23 (31)	29 (20)
"Purify" the armed forces	68 (24)	68 (25)	73 (21)

Note: Primary figure is the percentage endorsing this concession. Figure in parenthesis is the percentage responding "I agree, more or less" or "Don't know." The row entries represent not alternative answers to the same question but rather the percentage indicating, in response to different questions, that a task should be attempted. $\chi^2 = 25.5$; $p < .0003$.

^a Breakdown between practicing and nonpracticing Catholics is unavailable in this survey.

found by asking what concessions were justifiable in negotiating with the rebels. Table 4 shows that that Protestants were nearly as likely to favor making concessions to the FMLN to achieve a peace settlement as other groups. Indeed, the major difference is that Protestants tended more toward neutral response categories (those found in parentheses), which might itself suggest a propensity to opt out of political conflict. Protestants' lack of bellicosity is relative, to be sure. Like Catholics and the non-affiliated, Protestants were dubious about the wisdom of reducing the size of the army. But like other Salvadorans, a majority of Protestants wanted to "purify" the army, presumably by retiring or removing those who had violated human rights.³¹

Finally, what are the partisan orientations, electoral experiences, and expectations for the political future exhibited by Protestants, Catholics, and the nonaffiliated? At the time of the 1989 survey, power had just been transferred from the center-right government of President José Napoleón Duarte, a Christian Democrat, to that of Alfredo Cristiani of ARENA, a party long suspected of committing human rights violations.³² In the 1989 election, ARENA received 53 percent of the valid vote, the Christian Democrats dropped to 38 percent, and the newly recognized leftist coalition called *Convergencia Democrática* garnered a modest 4 percent.

31. The issue of reducing the size of the army was not merely theoretical. A central issue in the 1991 negotiations between the FMLN and the ARENA government was the FMLN proposal to "follow the Costa Rican model" by abolishing the Salvadoran Armed Forces. That proposal was not accepted, but significant restructuring did become a major part of the peace agreement.

32. Former U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador Robert White has accused the late Roberto D'Aubisson, ARENA founder and former army intelligence chief, of masterminding the assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero in 1981.

Significantly, Protestants proved to be less conservative and less closely linked to ARENA than some critics had believed. Conspiratorial interpretations would have it that Central American Protestants are a tool of U.S. foreign policy. Yet the findings in table 5 indicate that Salvadoran Protestants are less likely than Salvadoran Catholics to believe that the 1989 elections were honest. They were also less likely to vote than Catholics. But when they did vote, they were less likely to have voted for ARENA³³ and less inclined than Catholics to believe that human rights violations would decrease under ARENA.

Such results hardly support a conspiratorial interpretation that the "invasion of the sects" is functioning as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy. Because Salvadoran electoral processes were generally endorsed by the United States³⁴ and were presented internationally as proof of the democratization of Salvadoran society, the finding that poor Protestants expressed considerable doubt about the integrity of the electoral process is striking—doubly so because poor Protestants expressed significantly more doubt than did more highly educated and prosperous Catholics.

If Salvadoran Protestants were an effective tool of U.S. foreign policy, they should have at least given credence to U.S.-arranged elections. But they were even less convinced than Catholics. This finding suggests the opposite of the "common knowledge" about politico-religious alliances in Central America. Rather than Central American Protestants being a "tool of the United States" and confronting a "radicalized" Catholic Church, the reality is closer to a situation in which poor Protestants doubted the integrity of electoral processes and the possibility of reform, while more affluent Catholics were generally willing to take a chance on the possibility that U.S. pressure for electoral reform might produce mean-

33. The high percentage of voters who refused to reveal their vote makes such an inference hazardous. At least, the percentage of those not reporting was about the same (more than 30 percent) among all religious categories. Whatever measurement error this response creates thus appears to be random across common social categories. In a separate multivariate analysis not reported here, neither age, years of education, gender, income, occupation, nor religion predicted the response that "the vote is secret and need not be revealed." This item was apparently the only one in the survey that a high percentage of respondents refused to answer. We interpret this phenomenon as a well-placed insistence on the right of citizens to protect their political privacy in a setting where violations of secrecy of the vote have been commonplace, with tragic consequences. Although such insistence makes it difficult to calculate the Salvadoran vote, this response does not invalidate the survey. These same respondents expressed a variety of views critical of the Salvadoran government and society, and they endorsed a number of policy proposals not favored by their government at the time. Clearly, then, Salvadorans were not intimidated about expressing their views. Surveys always have limitations, but the most important ones deal with the inability to capture the richness and nuances of views held by respondents. We see little evidence of intentional misrepresentation of views in these data.

34. The elections have been criticized as "demonstration elections" in which civil liberties were insufficiently respected to permit bona fide readings of the public will and as elections called for the purpose of justifying further foreign assistance by the U.S. government. See Herman and Brodhead (1984).

TABLE 5 *Voter Views on Elections, Parties, and the Political Future of El Salvador in 1989, by Religious Affiliation*

<i>Voter Opinion</i>	<i>Nonaffiliated (n = 198) (%)</i>	<i>Protestants (n = 161) (%)</i>	<i>Catholics^a (n = 891)^b (%)</i>
Believe elections were honest ^c	40	46	59
Did not vote ^d	55	44	37
Voted ^e			
for ARENA	33	31	40
for PDC	7	14	10
annulled vote	8	8	7
refused to tell	39	41	34
other response	13	6	9
Expect human rights to be protected better by ARENA ^f	27	30	40

^a The 1989 survey did not distinguish between practicing and nonpracticing Catholics.

^b The number of cases varies among blocs in this table, being lowest in the third bloc (for whom voted) because overall electoral turnout rate was estimated from self-reports at 59 percent.

^c $\chi^2 = 31.7$; $p = .0002$; d.f. = 6.

^d $\chi^2 = 21.3$; $p < .0001$; d.f. = 2.

^e $\chi^2 = 26.7$; $p = .ns$; d.f. = 8.

^f $\chi^2 = 17.0$; $p = .001$; d.f. = 4.

ingful outcomes. Whatever the political implications of Protestantism in El Salvador, they do not entail a close association with the governing rightist party or with the electoral processes that brought ARENA to power.

Our data suggest a complex picture of what Protestantism implies about political attitudes among Salvadorans. Most Protestants perceive injustice existing in Salvadoran society, as do most Salvadorans. But most Protestants do not endorse an especially assertive church, one that would intervene on behalf of the poor or mediate social conflicts. Only 24 percent to 42 percent of Protestants feel comfortable with a vision of the church that seeks to restructure human society to do God's will. The more dramatic the social application of Christianity, such as supporting the guerrillas, the less comfortable most Protestants feel.³⁵

At the same time, it is clear that Salvadoran Protestants are not

35. The same generalization can be made about Catholics, but the relative degree of endorsement of church activism or heroic personal attempts to right social wrongs via participation in a revolutionary group is significantly higher, even if still low in absolute terms.

simply agents of the militaristic right. Like all Salvadorans, Protestants wanted a negotiated settlement to the war that had devastated the country since 1979. They perceived the need to make concessions to the guerrillas slightly less clearly but in roughly the same terms as did other Salvadorans. Nor were Protestants especially enthralled with ARENA. As can be inferred from a post-1989 election poll, Protestants were less sanguine about the electoral process, about ARENA, and about the political future under ARENA than were Catholics.

Conclusion

The data from IUDOP reveal that Protestants are recruited from the poorest and least-educated elements of Salvadoran society. In these areas, Salvadoran Protestants resemble the religiously nonaffiliated in sociological terms in that both groups come from the poorest strata of society. Contradicting Weberian visions of the Protestant Ethic lifting poor converts into higher social strata, our data give little indication that Protestantism has led to upward social mobility in El Salvador.³⁶

Conservatism is indeed implicit in the worldview of Salvadoran Protestants. But it is not always doctrinal conservatism, nor is it fully grounded in distinctive beliefs about theological topics or political objects. Rather it is the kind of conservatism associated with personal discipline, with minding one's own business and trying to solve one's own problems rather than the world's. Constantly under political and economic pressure in an environment of protracted civil war, many Salvadoran Protestants seem to have decided to mind their own affairs. Indirectly, such a reaction may imply a less activist church. But if the immediate effect of Protestantism is a turning inward, this response can also be understood as a way of marshaling one's strength for imposing order on a disorderly world. The shared experience of regular interaction in a congregational community can mobilize emotional and moral resources. In this sense of "emotional ecology," Protestantism becomes a survival strategy.

Does this response suggest avoidance of the world and political withdrawal? Not necessarily. Although Salvadoran Protestants come from the ranks of the poor, more Protestants vote than do the equally poor Salvadorans who are not affiliated with any religion. Thus Protestantism is not necessarily an electorally demobilizing experience. Salvadoran Protestants rejected violence as a form of political action in 1989: they rejected

36. With synchronic data, unfortunately, we cannot empirically discount the possibility that the Protestants under study might have been even poorer than the religiously nonaffiliated prior to conversion. Given the finding that both groups include many who border on extreme poverty, we find such a possibility unlikely.

association with guerrillas but favored negotiation between the FMLN and the government, although they did not necessarily view “the church” as an appropriate broker among the parties. Protestants may feel particularly comfortable with representative democracy, in which citizens participate as individuals, but less comfortable with the notion of the church as a corporate actor.

The overall pattern of belief and behavior suggests a generally consistent orientation that favors changing social structures by changing people. Protestants perceive injustice in the world around them, but they believe that people must change in order to address social evils. That belief implies a need to evangelize in order to change more people. But it also implies a need for Protestants to assure themselves that change really has occurred, which requires intense religious practice. This intensity improves the chance that declaring oneself an evangelical will actually lead to behavioral change. Intense religious practice can also encourage individuals to assume new roles and to develop new competencies.³⁷

Some theorists have suggested that potential for cultural change is inherent in the spread of decentralized religious authority in Latin America. Writing of the Christian base communities, Levine observed that the creation of “confident, articulate, and capable men and women from a hitherto silent, unorganized, and dispirited population” via religious association may “demystify authority by giving the tools of association to everyone, making the effort legitimate in religious terms and thus fostering the growth of a truly independent civil society” (Levine 1990, 718, 758–59). Stoll has made a similar argument about Protestantism (1990, 314–17, 329–31). We concur regarding the Protestants of El Salvador.

Under very specific circumstances, organized poor people, including Protestants, may decide to challenge authority structures. Identifying which circumstances, however, would lead well beyond confines of this study.³⁸ But we concur with the Reverend Joe Eldridge that Protestants, after reflecting on Biblical texts, may decide that they need to press public authorities for help.³⁹ In a broader sense, Salvadoran Protestants may be said to be distinguished by their lack of political uniqueness. They are neither political apologists for the right nor supporters of the insurrectionary left. They vote more frequently than some but less than others.

37. One of the most important roles is that of reading the Bible out loud, a skill that many women lack. Participating in a congregation may therefore lead to acquiring skills that are empowering. On the ways in which Protestantism may redefine gender relations, see also Stoll (1990, 318–19) and Brusco (1991).

38. Cornelius (1974) provides an excellent overview of the conditions necessary to encourage political demand-making by the poor.

39. Eldridge recounted in his talk in Chapel Hill the story of how, in the midst of a sermon about Christ on the cross, Biblical references to thirst prompted an outburst of concern about the lack of water in the surrounding Honduran squatment. This concern led to petitioning public authorities, who actually responded to the problem.

The votes they cast in 1989 seemed to be neither greatly different nor more conservative than those of Catholics.⁴⁰

These findings help to place the “invasion of the sects” into perspective. The diffusion of Protestantism in El Salvador may be a cultural challenge, but it is not an overtly political one. Rather, Protestantism has provided a strategy for emotional husbandry and personal survival in one of the most difficult environments for the poor in this hemisphere. If so, it may not be truly “alien” to the Salvadoran experience.

40. A perfectly valid question is whether apparent differences are truly a result of Protestantism or whether other independent variables including variables highly correlated with Protestantism (such as low income) might be the “true cause” of the variations observed. A four-page technical report showing that the results hold up under multivariate analysis can be obtained from Kenneth Coleman, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C. 27599-3205.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- ANNIS, SHELDON
 1987 *God and Production in a Guatemalan Town*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- BIESKE, SIGIFREDO
 1990 *El explosivo crecimiento de la iglesia evangélica en Costa Rica*. San José: Editorial Universitaria Centroamericana (EDUCA).
- BRUSCO, ELIZABETH
 1991 "The Reformation of Machismo: Asceticism and Masculinity among Colombian Evangelicals." Paper presented to Latin American Studies Association, 4-6 Apr., Crystal City, Virginia.
- BURNETT, VIRGINIA GARRARD
 1989 "Protestantism in Rural Guatemala, 1872-1954." *LARR* 24, no. 2:127-42.
- CACERES P., JORGE
 1991 "The Churches in El Salvador: From Prophetism to Mediation." Paper presented to the Latin American Studies Association, 4-6 Apr., Crystal City, Virginia.
- CORNELIUS, WAYNE A.
 1974 "Urbanization and Political Demand-Making: Political Participation among the Migrant Poor in Latin American Cities." *American Political Science Review* 68, no. 3 (Sept.):1125-46.
- ELDRIDGE, JOSEPH T.
 1991 "Pentecostalism and Social Change in Central America." *Towson State Journal of International Affairs* 25, no. 2 (Spring):10-21.
- EVANS, TIMOTHY R.
 1991 "Percentage of Non-Catholics in a Representative Sample of the Guatemalan Population." Paper presented to the Latin American Studies Association, 4-6 Apr., Crystal City, Virginia.
- HERMAN, EDWARD S., AND FRANK BRODHEAD
 1984 *Demonstration Elections: U.S.-Staged Elections in the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, and El Salvador*. Boston, Mass.: South End Press.
- LEVINE, DANIEL
 1990 "Popular Groups, Popular Culture, and Popular Religion." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 32, no. 4:718-64.
- MARTIN, DAVID
 1990 *Tongues of Fire: The Explosion of Protestantism in Latin America*. London: Basil Blackwell.
- MORCHIO, GIOVANNA
 1987 Memo to Board of Overseers, National Elections Study, on "Trends in NES Response Rates." University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
- NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER
 1991 *General Social Surveys, 1972-1991: Cumulative Codebook*. Chicago, Ill.: National Opinion Research Center.
- SCOTT, DAVID C.
 1991 "Salvador Election Results Prompt Rebel Cease-Fire Plan." *Christian Science Monitor*, 25 March, p. 4.
- SEXTON, JAMES D.
 1978 "Protestantism and Modernization in Two Guatemalan Towns." *American Ethnologist* 5, no. 5 (May):280-302.
- STEEH, CHARLOTTE
 1981 "Trends in Nonresponse Rates, 1952-1979." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 45, no. 1 (Spring):40-57.
- STEIGENGA, TIMOTHY J.
 1991 "The Protestant Role in State-Society Relations in Guatemala, 1871-1989." M.A. thesis. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
- STOLL, DAVID
 1990 *Is Latin America Turning Protestant?* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Latin American Research Review

WEBER, MAX

1963 *The Sociology of Religion*. Boston, Mass.: Beacon.

WILSON, EVERETT A.

1983 "Sanguine Saints: Pentecostalism in El Salvador." *Church History* 52, no. 2 (June): 186-98.