Notes and Comments

Party System Volatility in Post-Communist Europe

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In their 2014 article in the *British Journal of Political Science*, Eleanor Neff Powell and Joshua A. Tucker examine the determinants of party system volatility in post-communist Europe. Their central conclusion is that replacement volatility – volatility caused by new party entry and old party exit – is driven by long-term economic performance. This article shows that this conclusion is based entirely on a miscalculation of the long-term economic performance of a single country, Bosnia-Herzegovina. The study’s reanalysis suggests that little is known about what causes party system volatility in post-communist Europe. Given the negative consequences traditionally associated with party system volatility, this area of research cries out for new theoretical development.

In their well-cited 2014 article in the *British Journal of Political Science*, Eleanor Neff Powell and Joshua A. Tucker examine party system volatility in post-communist Europe.1 Following Birch, they highlight the importance of disaggregating volatility into two components: volatility caused by new party entry and old party exit, and volatility caused by vote switching across existing parties.2 Whereas Birch refers to these components as ‘replacement volatility’ and ‘electoral volatility’, Powell and Tucker refer to them as ‘Type A Volatility’ and ‘Type B Volatility’. Standard measures of volatility, such as the well-known Pedersen Index, conflate these different components of volatility.3 This is problematic if the two components of volatility have different causes and consequences.

The extent to which party system volatility is driven by replacement or electoral volatility is likely to vary across different contexts. In particular, one would expect replacement volatility to play a larger role in democratizing countries (where parties form, disappear, split and merge as they adapt to a new electoral and institutional environment) than in established democracies (where the parties’ identities have stabilized).4 Powell and Tucker provide support for this claim when they show that volatility is primarily driven by replacement volatility in the post-communist countries of Eastern Europe, but by electoral volatility in the established democracies of Western Europe.5 In this note, we challenge their central claim that replacement volatility in post-communist Europe is driven by long-term economic performance.

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1 According to Google Scholar, Powell and Tucker’s article and its working paper versions had already been cited ninety-five times by the end of April 2015 (http://bit.ly/1p7cKVy).
3 Pedersen 1983.
4 Birch 2003, 121.
5 Powell and Tucker 2014, 9.
Powell and Tucker provide measures of replacement and electoral volatility, and show how they relate to the standard indicator of party system volatility, the Pedersen Index:

\[
\text{Replacement Volatility (Type A)} = \frac{\left| \sum_{t=1}^{n} P_{ot} + \sum_{t=1}^{n} P_{w(t+1)} \right|}{2},
\]

\[
\text{Electoral Volatility (Type B)} = \frac{\left| \sum_{t=1}^{n} \left( P_{o} - P_{t(t+1)} \right) \right|}{2}
\]

among all stable parties,

\[
\text{Total Volatility (Pedersen Index)} = \frac{\left| \sum_{t=1}^{n} \left( P_{o} - P_{t(t+1)} \right) \right|}{2} = \text{Replacement Volatility} + \text{Electoral Volatility},
\]

where \( p \) refers to a party’s vote share, \( o \) refers to parties that contested only the election at time \( t \), \( w \) refers to parties that contested only the election at time \( t+1 \), and stable parties refer to those parties that competed in elections at times \( t \) and \( t+1 \). They then calculate volatility across eighty-nine pairs of elections in twenty-one post-communist countries from 1989 to 2009. Their data comprise the largest dataset on volatility in post-communist Europe and represent a valuable contribution to the existing literature.

Powell and Tucker use their data to re-examine the causes of party system volatility in post-communist countries. Specifically, they investigate how a host of economic, political and institutional variables that have been employed in previous studies affect replacement and electoral volatility.\(^7\) Their results, which we were able to verify,\(^8\) are shown in the first two columns of Table 1. As the results in the first column indicate, there is no evidence that electoral volatility varies in a statistically significant way with any of the covariates from the existing theoretical literature.

As already indicated, though, the vast majority of party system volatility in post-communist Europe is driven by replacement volatility. The results in the second column of Table 1 indicate that GDP Change From 1989 is the only statistically significant determinant of replacement volatility. GDP Change From 1989 is calculated as the ratio of GDP in a given election year to GDP in 1989, and is designed to ‘tap into overall voter satisfaction with the performance of the current government […] relative to the previous communist era’.\(^9\) The negative and statistically significant coefficient on GDP Change From 1989 indicates that replacement volatility decreases with ‘long-term economic recovery’.\(^10\) Powell and Tucker state that ‘such a finding fits in very well with big-picture theoretical ideas about the extended role of the transition in structuring post-communist political behavior (Kitschelt et al., 1999; Tucker, 2006)’.

As we now demonstrate, though, there are strong reasons to doubt the claim that long-term economic performance is driving replacement volatility in post-communist Europe. In Figure 1, we plot replacement volatility against GDP Change From 1989. Recall that values of GDP Change From 1989 less than 1 indicate that election-year GDP is less than GDP in 1989, and that values greater than 1 indicate how many times larger election-year GDP is compared to GDP in 1989. The downward-sloping solid black line represents the fitted values from a bivariate regression of replacement volatility against GDP Change From 1989; the dashed black lines represent two-tailed 95 per cent confidence intervals.

It should be immediately clear that the three observations from Bosnia-Herzegovina are distinct outliers with respect to GDP Change From 1989. Whereas the mean value of this covariate is 5.66 for Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is only 0.98 (\( \sigma = 0.39 \)) for the remaining eighty-six observations. In fact, the average value for Bosnia-Herzegovina is fully 2.78 times larger than the next-largest value, Poland 2007. An obvious concern is that the negative relationship between replacement volatility and long-term economic performance is driven by Bosnia-Herzegovina.

\(^6\) Birch (2003, 123–4) provides two measures of electoral volatility, one of which is the same as Powell and Tucker’s Type B Volatility; her measure of replacement volatility differs from Powell and Tucker’s Type A Volatility.

\(^7\) For specific information on each of the covariates, see Powell and Tucker (2014, 13–15).

\(^8\) Herrnson 1995.


\(^10\) Powell and Tucker 2014, 1.

economic performance reported by Powell and Tucker is being driven by the unusual observations for Bosnia-Herzegovina. To examine this possibility, we re-estimated our models after dropping the observations from Bosnia-Herzegovina. The results, which are shown in Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1, indicate that none of the covariates discussed in the existing theoretical literature has a statistically significant effect on electoral or replacement volatility. Most relevant is the fact that there is no longer any evidence to support Powell and Tucker’s claim that replacement volatility is driven by long-term economic performance. While the coefficient on GDP Change From 1989 remains negative, it is far from being statistically significant; indeed, the standard error is now larger than the coefficient. A jackknife procedure, in which we sequentially drop each country one at a time and then re-estimate the models for each of the reduced datasets, reveals that it is only the outlier observations from Bosnia-Herzegovina that are substantively influencing the results.

Yet the values of GDP Change From 1989 for Bosnia-Herzegovina are not just highly unusual; they are, in fact, incorrect. Recall that GDP Change From 1989 is supposed to be calculated as the ratio of GDP
in a given election year to GDP in 1989. This variable comes from Pop-Eleches, who obtained the underlying data from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). This underlying data, which were kindly provided by Grigore Pop-Eleches, includes all the information necessary to calculate GDP Change From 1989 for every country in the sample except Bosnia-Herzegovina. The problem with Bosnia-Herzegovina is that the reported GDP data only go back to 1994. Correspondence with Powell and Tucker reveal that they used 1994, instead of 1989, as the baseline year when calculating the values of GDP Change From 1989 for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Although a choice like this might ordinarily be expected to cause few problems, this is not the case here. We were able to locate economic data back to 1989 for Bosnia-Herzegovina from the EBRD’s more recent Transition Report 2012. In Figure 2, we show how real GDP in Bosnia-Herzegovina varies over time using 1989 as the baseline year. It should be immediately obvious that Powell and Tucker’s decision to use 1994 (the filled black circle) as the baseline year produces very misleading values for GDP Change Since 1989. Unlike most of the countries in our sample, Bosnia-Herzegovina had to fight for its independence. The 1992–95 Bosnian war essentially destroyed the nation’s economy, which is clearly visible in Figure 2. Bosnia-Herzegovina’s GDP in 1994 was just 12.7 per cent of what it was in 1989. Although GDP was more than five to six times larger in the 2000s than it was in 1994 (the values calculated by Powell and Tucker), it actually remained less than it was in 1989. Once we use 1989 as the baseline year, it soon becomes clear that the long-term economic performance of Bosnia-Herzegovina is not unusual at all – the mean value of GDP Change Since 1989 is 0.64, less than one standard deviation from the mean.

12 Pop-Eleches 2010.
13 This explains why previous articles that have employed the GDP Change From 1989 variable have excluded Bosnia-Herzegovina from their analyses (Pacek, Pop-Eleches, and Tucker 2009; Pop-Eleches 2010).
14 Zettelmeyer, Ricka, and Sanfey 2012, 103.
sample mean. In Columns 5 and 6 of Table 1, we present results from models in which we substitute in the correct data for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Using the correct data, there is no evidence that replacement (or electoral) volatility in post-communist Europe is driven by long-term economic performance.

In their recent article, Powell and Tucker revisit the determinants of party system volatility in post-communist Europe. They conclude that replacement volatility is ‘largely a function of long-term economic recovery’.15 As we have demonstrated, though, this conclusion is based entirely on a miscalculation of the long-term economic performance of a single country, Bosnia-Herzegovina. To the extent that Powell and Tucker have correctly identified the key theoretical variables in the existing literature, our reanalysis suggests that we know little about what causes party system volatility in post-communist Europe. None of the variables they propose has a statistically significant effect on either electoral or replacement volatility. Given the negative consequences traditionally associated with party system volatility, this area of research cries out for new theoretical development.

REFERENCES


15 Powell and Tucker 2014, 1.


