The growing importance of the Arctic in international affairs is evident also in the massive proliferation of academic and popular literature on northern governance and politics these days. Readers of Polar Record’s book review section will be well aware of that. Almost all major publishers (and many more minor ones) with international distribution and readership have over the past few years published monographs or edited volumes on the consequences of Arctic transitions for diplomatic and societal relations in the region and beyond. This trend should be welcomed for the Arctic as an object of study and for polar research as a discipline. At the same time, the plurality and higher frequency of contemporary publications might overstrain both the ordinary and the advanced reader and calls for a lighthouse to provide orientation and guidance in stormy Arctic waters. No less than that is what International relations and the Arctic: understanding policy and governance edited by Robert W. Murray and Anita Dey Nultall is.

This is a fantastic and elaborate collection of essays to think about sovereignty, security and stability in Arctic affairs and the way forward for regional governance. Sovereignty is as much about security as it is about the effective handling of pressing policy problems. So no doubt, this book is right on time. To approach these topics, the book follows a tripartite structure beginning with a theoretical discussion of the concept of sovereignty in Part I, then moves on to investigate the eight Arctic state policies and strategies in Part II, and finally extends the book’s analytical scope towards actors and institutions below and beyond the Arctic state in Part III. The volume’s length of more than 700 pages and 20 essays is indicative of the time and attention to various local, national and international perspectives, interests and interpretations that is required to better understand what sovereignty is all about in a globalised Arctic. The good news about the present volume is that it does not simply treat the region as just another case for the application and replication of paradigmatic international relations (IR) theories. Rather, the book shall ‘throw light on how the Arctic as an area of study contributes to the development of the IR discipline’ (page 3–4). The contributors have done a great job doing so and their efforts will be of great interest to both the Arctic studies community and IR scholars more generally.

The editors have ceded most chapters in Part I to IR scholars rather than Arctic experts. This turns out to be a reasoned decision. The concept of Arctic sovereignty is explored from the angles of realist, neoliberal institutionalist and English School IR theory in the first three chapters with a strong focus on relevant concepts and assumptions. True, this comes here and there at the expense of debates of Arctic histories and politics, but the authors manage to pull the Arctic out of its long peripheral position in world politics and push it into the mainstreams of IR research. The fourth chapter of Part I differs from the other three in that it outlines a theory of post-sovereign/transnational politics in the Arctic: a valuable and provocative, albeit normatively inspired intervention in current debates of Arctic sovereignty and one that is reflected in later chapters discussing particularly indigenous peoples’ rights and participation in Arctic governance.

Given that the book seeks to overcome the territorial connectivity of the concept of sovereignty in IR, readers might be surprised to see all chapters in Part II of the book dedicated to the eight Arctic Council member states’ policies and strategies under the subheading ‘Arctic sovereignty in practice’. Yet, to start from more conventional discussions of Arctic politics to which these states are undoubtedly central is justifiable for analytical reasons. The book would still have benefited from including a more cautious and contextualized discussion of what sovereignty as understood here really means ‘in practice’ though. One should be reminded that this section’s definition of Arctic sovereignty as contained by nation-states in the region is necessarily as varied as the definitions of the Arctic itself. Understandably a consequence of the IR perspective the book adheres to, this conception is deeply rooted in a historical-institutionalist interpretation of who belongs to the Arctic and who does not. As one of the authors notes, the establishment of the Arctic Council in 1996 ‘changed the more traditional conception of the Arctic as related to five states – the littoral countries – into an eight-state body that included Sweden, Finland, and Iceland’ (page 292). Yet, these states, often called sub-Arctic, have little common with the five littoral states when it comes to sovereignty issues as manifest in overlapping territorial claims in the Arctic Basin, offshore resource development, border control, monitoring, patrolling and surveillance, and so on.

Advanced readers might further object that discussions of the national policy and strategy documents of the eight Arctic states have already been discussed at length elsewhere. They will be surprised by the enormous reflectivity and substantial (re-)interpretation many of the chapters provide of why the north matters for Arctic states’ sovereignty and security considerations in regional and global contexts. For all others not yet too familiar with Arctic politics, here is the state of the art of what you should know about the eight Arctic states’ ambitions and concerns in the region.

Finally, Part III of the book zooms out to address instances of ‘Shared sovereignty and global security interests’ with regard to the Arctic region. This is a necessary advancement of the concept of Arctic sovereignty and governance as examined in Parts I and II in the light of the well-documented surge of international interest across a wide array of state and non-state actors in recent years. The ways the roles and interests of indigenous groups, non-Arctic states from across Asia (China, Japan, South Korea and India) and Europe (the United


References


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Kingdom), and the European Union interfere with traditional notions of state sovereignty are well covered here. These chapters are further embedded in discussions of how involvement of these actors has serious repercussions on the complex governance regime in place for the Arctic and how international law and institutional settings like the Arctic Council and the United Nations system co-evolve and adapt. Reading these chapters is highly recommended. If one was to look for drawbacks of this third section at all, it would have been good to re-connect this part to the theory chapters of Part I and to make explicit the theoretical contribution that this book has to offer.

All things considered, this book will be of great value to researchers of Arctic studies and international relations. Each chapter is easily accessible to get a thorough assessment of the respective topic. Together, this is a rewarding compendium about sovereignty and international relations in the Arctic. Good to have this book close at hand. (Sebastian Knecht, Freie Universität Berlin, Ihnestr. 26, 14195 Berlin, Germany (s.knecht@transnationalstudies.eu).)


I confess: I was sceptical about this two-volume encyclopaedia from the moment I saw the title. Surely half of it wasn’t about the Arctic Circle, the imaginary line at approximately 66°33’N marking the latitude above which the sun does not rise on Midwinter Day and does not set on Midsummer Day. Could the book actually have a mistake in the title! Fortunately – or unfortunately depending on one’s perspective – the mistake was not in the title, but rather in the book’s basic definitions. For the editor claims that the Arctic Circle is, in fact, all of the region north of that line, an area that most of the experts I have met during 30 years of conducting research about the polar regions call simply ‘the Arctic.’

This begs the question of why the title therefore didn’t address the Antarctic Circle, given that its definition is much the same as for that line in the north. And when I write much the same, I mean it, as the entry for the Antarctic Circle (page 28) states: ‘The 66.5° S latitude is considered the southernmost boundary of the Antarctic Circle.’ I don’t know if this was cut and pasted from the Arctic Circle entry, but clearly the Antarctic is not normally defined as the area north of the Antarctic Circle!

There are numerous perplexing questions about this encyclopaedia. First and foremost is: where in the list of contributors are most of the world-respected polar experts? Certainly there are some extremely distinguished scientists, including Marthin Bester, John Cooper, Lawrence Duffy, and Valery Lukin. But, to look at the area I know best, the history entries seem to have avoided the major names in the polar world, such as William Barr, Tim Baughman, Susan Barr, Alan Gurney, Roland Huntridge, Bob Bryce, Ian R. Stone, Ann Savours, Douglas Mawson, for Roald Amundsen but not Fridtjof Nansen, for James Clark Ross but not John Franklin, and for Bob Bartlett but not John King Davis. And although there are entries on the Alfred Wegener Institute, the Norsk Polarinstitutt and the Netherlands’ Dirck Gerritz Laboratory, there are no entries for the Scott Polar Research Institute, the British Antarctic Survey, or the Australian Antarctic Division.

Where the encyclopaedia does hit its stride is in its coverage of native Arctic peoples – for which the editor wrote about half the entries – and the wildlife of both regions. It also has a number of unusual and interesting topics, such as Dinosaurs of Antarctica, Drifting Research Stations in the Arctic Ocean, Ice Worms, and the Lena Massacre of 1912.

But I am no expert in these areas, so I cannot speak to the accuracy of the entries. However, the entries for topics with which I am familiar contain numerous factual errors. For example: that the Northeast Passage was ‘not successfully crossed until the early twentieth century’ (page xvii) ignores Adolf Erik Nordensköld’s first navigation of it in Vega (1878–80); Amundsen’s measurements during his navigation of the Northwest Passage did not confirm ‘the location established by James Clark Ross’ for the North Magnetic Pole (page 23), but rather showed that the Pole had, in fact, moved north of where it had been in 1831; the British Antarctic Survey was not established in 1962 (page 48), but was simply renamed from the Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey; and the Australian Antarctic Expedition was not ‘mainly financed by the Australian Association for the Advancement of Sciences’ (page 122), as the AAAS donated £1000, which was less than the Commonwealth government, three separate Australian states, the British government, and three private individuals. Moreover, Bob Bartlett did not sail Roosevelt north of 88° on Peary’s final expedition (page 130), but was part of the sledging operation with dogs that took him to 87°48’N before he was ordered by Peary back to the ship, which was at Cape Sheridan on the northeast tip of Ellesmere Island; James Cook did not grow up in Scotland (page 205), but in Yorkshire; the Argentine occupation of South Georgia did not ‘end after a couple of days with the recapture of Grytviken’ (page 325), but lasted until the island was retaken on 25 April, more than three weeks after Argentine troops moved in; the British Antarctic Expedition’s Southern Party did not comprise just Shackleton, Frank Wild, and Eric Marshall (page 336), but also included Jameson Adams; Shackleton’s farthest south was not ‘just under 100 miles (160 km) shy of the South Pole’ (page 336), because the 97 geographical miles from the Pole were equivalent to 112 statute miles or about 180 km; and Mawson was not the first to explore the Shackleton Ice Shelf (page 373) because it was...