

who have migrated for labor from Moldova, has acceptance of the women's journeys increased back home?

KATHERINE R. JOLLUCK
Stanford University

EU-Russian Relations and the Ukraine Crisis. By Nicholas Ross Smith. Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar, 2016. xii, 202 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Figures. Tables. \$125.00, hard bound.
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Back in the twentieth century, it was for a time fashionable to present Ukraine as a prize to be won by the west after wrenching it from Russia's grasp. The twenty-first century version of this approach has evolved to present Ukraine as the *grand prix* in the zero-sum fight between the European Union and Russia. The reality is that EU members have long resisted Ukraine's fierce pursuit of closer ties—indeed, membership—although its evident lack of readiness may also be a factor. Quite simply, the last thing EU members wanted was Ukraine as a member; Ukraine was not a prize the EU was interested in winning.

Yet, the foundation on which *EU-Russian Relations and the Ukraine Crisis* is built is the supposed competitiveness over Ukraine in EU-Russian relations. It is therefore hard to avoid the conclusion that the book has fallen into a number of traps when it comes to Ukraine. The framing of EU-Russia relations over Ukraine as a “tug of war” is exacerbated by a failure to examine the details behind the headlines; extensive reliance on secondary sources; no appreciation for essential differences between trade agreements offered to Ukraine and, finally, neglect of the all-important interplay between domestic and international factors, particularly in Ukraine.

Ukraine was no mere bystander waiting to see what it was being offered: Kyiv had a very active (if ultimately deeply flawed) foreign policy towards both actors. While none of this matters in the neo-realist framework, it was precisely the choices and events in Kyiv that lead to the “crisis”: ultimately it was Ukraine which guided policies of Russia and the EU. The second big problem with the neorealist perspective is its presumed equivalence and discounting of key motivational and strategic differences between the two actors, with the rule-oriented, non-militarized and technocratic EU equated with a Russia intent on once again becoming a Great Power by any means. The two are on so many levels “chalk and cheese.” Admittedly, the book seeks to overcome this to scrutinize the EU and Russia along two dimensions: the role of identity and foreign policy decision makers' perceptions. Yet the neorealist focus on the competition between these two players sits uneasily alongside these explanatory factors. The empirical chapters (on trade, energy, and security) emphasize a high degree of competition, while at the same time highlighting EU's perplexing inconsistencies vis-à-vis Ukraine. For example, the author argues that while the EU sought to expand its “sphere of influence,” it made a “grave omission” of forgetting to offer membership to Ukraine. In fact, the complexity and contradictions that characterize the EU as a post-geopolitical, foreign policy actor—which have been closely scrutinized in the literature—render the “competition” argument redundant. To his credit the author finally recognizes this when he concludes that “rather than merely representing two competing imperialistic powers in Ukraine . . . their particular role identity frameworks—the EU civilian-normative power identity and Russia's Eurasian great power identity—resulted in differing but not necessarily competing roles in Ukraine” (148). After much emphasis on the competition, it turns out to be a “straw man.”

The use of exclusively English language sources (and mainly secondary) has resulted in basic misconceptions. Throughout the book there are shorthand references to the “EU’s AA policy,” but the Association Agreement itself—despite being a pivot of EU policy—does not appear to have been examined and is not actually referenced in the book. This is no small omission for a study that seeks to explore, amongst other issues, the trade triad. Contrary to the argument of the zero-sum policy “imposed on Ukraine” to drag it away from Russia, Ukraine demanded a new Agreement from a reluctant EU and the latter was made fully compatible with Ukraine’s free trade agreements with Russia. The nominally technical details of trade agreements—which are dismissed in the neorealist framework—are pivotal to understanding the strategies and goals of the EU and Russia vis-à-vis Ukraine.

This book is very ambitious and wide-ranging in its scope, but its main strength is that it offers a broad survey of EU and Russian policies toward Ukraine. It will appeal to International Relations scholars looking for an introductory text on the “Ukrainian crisis.” For those familiar with the EU’s foreign policy and with Russia and/or Ukraine, this book is unlikely to satisfy the demand for a more nuanced, granulated analysis.

KATARYNA WOLCZUK
University of Birmingham

Everyone Loses: The Ukraine Crisis and the Ruinous Contest for Post-Soviet Eurasia. By Samuel Charap and Timothy J. Colton. Abingdon, Oxon, Eng.: Routledge

for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2017. 212 pp. Notes. Chronology. Glossary. Index. Figures. Maps. \$21.95, paper.

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This slim volume dispels some myths about the crisis in Ukraine that followed the Euromaidan revolution. Samuel Charap and Timothy Colton challenge several common explanations of the crisis, such as those stressing Russia’s imperial ambitions, western expansionism, President Vladimir Putin’s preoccupation with his regime’s internal stability, and a regionally unbalanced security system. Instead, the authors stress the growing self-adversarial behavior of both the west and Russia, with little effort to find mutually-acceptable solutions and overcome what they call a zero-sum political game in Eurasia.

The book’s structure serves the argument well. In the first chapter, titled “Cold Peace,” Charap and Colton lay out the historical preconditions that made it difficult for Russia and the west to agree. They argue that the settlement that officially ended the Cold War was not satisfactory. While Mikhail Gorbachev advocated neutrality for east central Europe, referring to the option as Finlandization, the west embraced the idea of expanding NATO and the EU as its two best-functioning institutions. Both institutions expanded by leaving Russia on the periphery of the new Europe and offering assurances that the expansion would suit Russia’s interests by providing stability and good governance. Neither NATO nor the EU were interested in negotiations, instead presenting their decisions to Russia and others in the region as the only choices available. The Kremlin, too, assumed it would dominate in the region through the Commonwealth of Independent States and the application of various bilateral political and economic tools.

The second chapter shows how the established Cold Peace unraveled in the mid-2000s. The color revolutions of 2003–5 caught Russia by surprise and developed the perception in the Kremlin that western security agencies worked to undermine Russia’s internal stability and influence in the former Soviet region. In the meantime, NATO and the EU continued to expand and politicians like Mikheil Saakashvili of