

The book is harsh in tone and hyperbolic in expression. The power and influence of the USSR and its allies are vastly overstated and the glowing assessment of the long-term successes of Soviet diplomacy is wildly optimistic. Thus the Sino-Soviet split was perpetrated by the chauvinistic and power-crazed coterie around Chairman Mao. The cold war was deliberately unleashed by the United States in a bid for world domination. Israel appeared on the international scene as a tool of the moguls of capitalism in their effort to maintain control of Middle Eastern oil. Finally, in 1968 the Russians manifested the highest degree of brotherly love by saving the Czechoslovak people from the ravages of "domestic counter-revolutionary forces with the active support of international imperialist reaction" (p. 359). Such is the starkly Manichaean world of the authors.

This work is based on a relatively impressive diversity of sources, considering the polemical nature of the book and the exclusive reliance on *Pravda* and the *Sochineniia* of Lenin so typical in Soviet treatises on foreign policy. Brezhnev and Lenin are quoted only occasionally, while references to both Soviet and Western published documents (such as *The Congressional Record* and the Vandenberg papers) abound in the notes. More surprising yet, the authors frequently cite material from the Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki SSSR. The sections on the early cold war period are thickly laced with archival citations, but little use has been made of the archives for the 1950s and 1960s. Unfortunately this rather novel inclusion of archival materials has failed to produce any great revelations. In fact, many of the documents cited have been available from other sources for a long time (for example, the communiqués of the Council of Foreign Ministers). The authors have also used a selection of Western books and memoirs, though no thorough survey of the pertinent literature has been attempted. Although a few of the earlier American critics of U.S. foreign policy are mentioned, the liberal and radical revisionists (Williams, Alperovitz, Horowitz, and so forth), who are currently challenging the traditional Western interpretation of the cold war, strangely have been ignored.

Despite numerous citations to a wide range of sources, this book is not a scholarly examination of Soviet diplomacy since World War II. It is a handbook for the working politician or the agitation and propaganda specialist. Its value for the Western reader lies in its clear and forceful exposition of the official Soviet interpretation of modern international relations.

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DOKUMENTY VNESHNEI POLITIKI SSSR. Vol. 17: 1 IANVARIA-31 DEKABRIA 1934 G. Compiled by G. K. Deev, F. P. Dolia, K. A. Krutikov, V. I. Popov, P. P. Sevost'ianov, and M. D. Iakovlev. Moscow: Politizdat, 1971. 879 pp. 1.75 rubles.

The year 1934 found Russia in the midst of a profound economic and political transition. The First Five-Year Plan had ended. The Second was under way. The reverberations of collectivization were still echoing in Soviet society. Stalin continued the consolidation of his power. True, the horrors of the Great Purges were still ahead, but the assassination of Kirov in December presaged the train of events toward bloodletting. In the face of these internal reorderings, peace was essential to the Soviet state. Time was needed to achieve a measure of economic strength, political stability, and defensive force. But contemporary international developments

were foreboding. Beginning in 1930, the Japanese threat had become acute, only to be followed closely in the West by the advent of Hitler in 1933. The Russian leaders were convinced war was coming in the East and, after a year's observation of Nazi rule, in Europe as well. If war was inevitable, at least its outbreak had to be averted as long as possible. This was the task to which Foreign Commissar Maxim Litvinov addressed himself tirelessly following his formal assumption of the portfolio in 1930.

The year covered by these documents opened with considerable hope that the recent recognition by the United States would lead at least to some degree of diplomatic collaboration against Japanese aggression. No doubt Tokyo was given momentary pause by the event itself, but any expectations in Moscow that Washington would take positive steps in the Far East were dashed by Roosevelt's clear reluctance to enter further into the international arena. By the end of the year, as this fact became quite clear and the debt negotiations bogged down in acrimony, the Soviets despaired of any assistance from that quarter. On the other hand, Litvinov's efforts to draw closer to the Western democracies enjoyed some success in Europe. Although the foreign commissar's project of an eastern Locarno seemed clearly doomed by Germany's understandable disinterest, French-Russian cooperation appeared a distinct possibility. Prospects of a similar understanding with Great Britain were less encouraging. In general, these preventative attempts were frustrating in the extreme for Moscow. The Western democracies were obviously unwilling or unable to face squarely the full implications of Hitler's ambitions, certainly if it meant closer relations with the USSR. When France did sign a treaty of mutual assistance with Moscow in the following year, it was so hedged about with limiting conditions as to dull much of its impact. In addition, the disquieting political situation in France gave little cause for firm reliance on support in any crisis.

Perhaps the most striking evidence of Russia's search for peace came in September, when she entered the League of Nations, earlier characterized by Lenin as the "devil's kitchen," securing a permanent seat on the Council and a splendid forum for Litvinov's repeated appeals for cooperation against threatened aggression. But the next year was to highlight the League's impotency when Italy struck in Ethiopia.

These developments and others of less moment are documented in this latest volume of the series on Soviet foreign relations. Of course, evidence for the second arm of Soviet policy, the activities of the Comintern, is lacking and must be sought in other sources. It should be noted, however, that the previously often divergent objectives of the two instrumentalities were to merge with the historic Seventh Congress of the Comintern in 1935 in a further effort to strengthen the Soviet position.

Though there is no reason to doubt the accuracy of the material published or desire to underrate its value, the reader of the series continues to be tantalized by speculation on what does not appear. A comparison is of interest: the United States, whose foreign relations in 1934 were hardly frenetic, has published five fat volumes on the same twelve months.

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