“The Devil’s Handwriting”: Precolonial Discourse, Ethnographic Acuity, and Cross-Identification in German Colonialism

GEORGE STEINMETZ

University of Michigan

A polarization has emerged in the field of colonial studies. On the one hand, many writers describe colonialism as a direct, inexorable product of Orientalist or precolonial racial discourse and pay little attention to “social” phenomena such as capitalism, the state, and social class. Other analysts assume that cultural discourse is the product of supposedly more foundational economic or material factors. Historians in the second group explain colonial policies in terms of imperialist economic and political interests, strategies of resistance and collaboration among the colonized, precolonial social structures in the periphery, or other “quasi-objective” phenomena. Both schools tend to ignore the role of properly psychic processes in the constitution of colonial regimes, although this has been the focus of Homi Bhabha’s psychoanalytic interventions in (post)colonial theory (1994). The lack of integration of materialist, culturalist, and psychoanalytic approaches in the colonial literature echoes broader oppositions that structure the human sciences today.

Acknowledgements: Assistance from archivists at the Berlin, Freiburg, and Koblenz branches of the Bundesarchiv and at the archive of the Rheinische Missionsgesellschaft in Wuppertal is gratefully acknowledged, as is research assistance by Neil Brenner, Jeremy Straughn, and Chen Lijun, and financial support from the German Academic Exchange Service, the University of Michigan, and the John Simon Guggenheim Foundation. The interlibrary loan librarians at the University of Michigan have also been extraordinarily helpful. I would like to thank Julia Adams, John Comaroff, Geoff Eley, Julia Hell, Ann Stoler, Tom Trautmann, Gary Wilder, and three anonymous reviewers for comments on various parts of this article. Finally, I wish to thank the Ferdinand Schöningh Verlag for permission to republish the photograph of Bishop Anzer (fig. 7).

1 The phrase “the devil’s handwriting” is from the title of the memoirs of Paul Rohrbach, Um des Teufels Handschrift (literally “Of the Devil’s Handwriting”; 1953). Rohrbach was a key figure in post-1904 German Southwest African politics and a prolific German colonial propagandist. His title referred to the Treaty of Versailles, however, and not to precolonial racial discourse. Rohrbach found the phrase in George Kennan’s lectures on American diplomacy (1951:63).

2 The essays in Steinmetz (1999) exemplify some attempts to overcome the artificial separation between culturalism and materialism in studies of the state. Landmark theoretical interventions that reintegrate the social and cultural levels include Bourdieu (1977), Bhaskar (1979), and Laclau and Mouffe (1985). The need for a reintegration of the psychic into social theory has been argued forcefully by Zizek (1989, 1991) and Elliott (2000).
My goal here is to interweave these analytically distinct levels into the analysis of colonialism. My topic, more specifically, is colonial “native policy,” the core element of colonial rule, at least during the modern imperialist era. To understand the dramatically differing forms of native policy in modern colonies we need to examine the overdetermining effects of three analytically distinct mechanisms. The first factor is precolonial racial or ethnographic discourse, the “devil’s handwriting.” This refers, more specifically, to European descriptions of non-Western cultures in the period leading up to colonial annexation. Second, I am concerned with colonial officials’ symbolic strategies of class distinction vis-à-vis one another. Officials competed with one another for the cultural capital of ethnographic acuity or ethnographic discernment, a form of capital that structured the internal field of the modern colonial state. The third determinant of native policy is a properly psychic one: the colonizers’ imaginary cross-cultural identifications with the colonized.

Colonial policy was also influenced by economic forces and international military aims, of course. Yet most of the variation in the cases examined in this article cannot be explained in terms of economic or international political interests, even if these were used to justify the initial colonial annexation. Once native policies were introduced, their success or failure was decisively shaped by the responses of the colonized, their willingness to play along in these projects, as Robinson (1972, 1986) has argued. Yet such cooperation or resistance was less important in shaping the introduction of various projects for native regulation or the specific contents of policy.

DEFINING MODERN COLONIALISM

Modern colonialism can be defined as the annexation of a territory by people with ties to a foreign state who perceive the conquered population as culturally distant and inferior. Annexation is followed by efforts to appropriate the resources of the colony and to dominate its inhabitants in an ongoing way, that is, by a state apparatus. The emphasis on the colonial state and the criterion of cultural distance or difference are especially important in this definition. Colono-
colonial states, even modern ones, were institutionally weak, unable to penetrate deeply the societies over which they claimed sovereignty. Yet the significance of building a formal state apparatus controlled by representatives of the invading society cannot be emphasized enough. This in turn points to the central difference between colonialism and other modes of cultural contact *cum* exploitation or domination. Like all modern state forms, the colonial state is a permanently operating, coercion-wielding apparatus exercising “clear priority in some respects over all other organizations within substantial territories” (Tilly 1990). This definition does not require that colonial states attain or even seek acceptance or legitimacy among their subjects—Weber’s famous but misleading “legitimacy” criterion. But all modern states, including colonial ones, do seek acknowledgement of their existence. They also seek recognition of their difference from other “permanently operating, coercion-wielding” institutions and from the entire sphere that comes to be understood as “society,” largely through its differentiation from the state itself (as well as the family and the “private” sphere; Steinmetz 1993). The construction of this particular social-ontological boundary is what Timothy Mitchell (1991, 1999) calls the “state effect.”

One difficulty with this definition is that most states, even within Europe, were created via the forceful extension of sovereignty over culturally distinct territories. This has led some to describe all instances of state formation as colonial in nature (Bartlett 1993, Given 1990). To avoid such inflation of the category of colonialism, it is necessary to introduce into its definition the criterion of a systematic insistence on the deficiency and legal inequality of the colonized. As Partha Chatterjee (1993) has argued, colonial states are defined by a “rule of colonial difference”: the colonized are treated as if they were not just fundamentally different but inherently inferior. The rule of colonial difference refers to the way colonizers justify their own presence *to themselves* as well as the broad limits on native policy. Interventions in the customs and subjectivity of the colonized are organized around some notion of alterity, though this need not be coded as racial (Chatterjee 1993:14, 20). The colonized may be understood as intrinsically and irreconcilably heterogeneous, as in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century arguments for polygenesis (Stocking 1987). They may be seen as an earlier version of one’s own culture, as in social-evolutionary perspectives (J. Forster 1996; Fabian 1983). Elsewhere the colonized are described as degenerate, or fallen; this is characteristic of much nineteenth-century European discourse on China, discussed below. However the argument is constructed, all colonial states seem to insist on the fundamental difference and inferiority of their subjects. This discourse pervades the colonial state’s lineaments and policies. It is expressed not only in substantive inequality—which is also pervasive in non-colonial situations—but in structured legal inequality.

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5 On defining the colonial state see Chatterjee (1993); Young (1994); and Comaroff (1998).
6 Non-colonial slave societies, such as the southern United States before the Civil War, also exhibit a rule of difference. It seems inappropriate to speak of “colonialism,” however, when the slaves...
Colonialism differs in this respect from processes of state formation through conquest followed by systematic efforts to convert and integrate the subjugated populations, erasing their difference from the conquering culture. French political elites in the nineteenth century may have regarded the French peasantry as “savages,” but the entire point of the Third Republic policies discussed by Eugen Weber (1976) was to turn the “peasants into Frenchmen.” The conceptual boundary between colonial and noncolonial forms of rule is a fluid one, of course, due not least to the goal of some colonizers to assimilate the colonized and eventually to release them from bondage. Here we need to look carefully at actual state interventions rather than general statements of official purpose. We should then be able to determine whether English rule in Northern Ireland has a more colonial quality than, say, the French subjugation of Languedoc—or whether, as I will suggest below, German rule in colonial Qingdao was beginning to move away from a colonial status in the years before World War I.

Native policy, which encompasses all interventions by the colonial state aimed at transforming indigenous ways of life, is therefore the distinguishing feature of colonial governance, even if it is by no means the colonial state’s only activity. Native policy is where the colonial state identifies, produces, and reinforces alterity. Native policy is also the differentia specifica of the modern colonial state, because the colonialisms that emerged out of the scramble for Africa and the Pacific in the last third of the nineteenth century almost always confronted populations that had already been exposed to Europeans, at least indirectly, for decades and even centuries. It was difficult for even the most “remote” cultures to remain completely untouched and unobserved by the expanding capitalist world core and its legions of restless missionaries, explorers, and traders. As Marshall Sahlins points out, in the era “before the flag,” “Western commodities and even persons could be encompassed within [the] ‘development schemes’” of traditional cultures (Sahlins 1993:16–17). By the time the Berlin West Africa Conference ratified Germany’s entry into the colonial game in 1885, many of the people who were destined to become German subjects in Africa, Oceania, or East Asia had already acquired some familiarity with Europeans, sometimes even with Germans. Many had adopted concepts and objects from Europeans or integrated them into their own cultural schemes, and many were able to move fluidly between various cultural codes.

European colonizers and their candidates for colonial subjection related dif-

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7 This definition also suggests that there could be colonial spheres within the territories of predominantly non-colonial states. The emphasis in this definition on the presence of an autochthonous population need not be read as a defense of territorial nativist nationalism (see Goswami 2002). Rather it is the fact that modern colonizers themselves emphasized autochthony that explains why anticolonial struggles were more often organized around “nativist” identities rather than, say, internationalist ones.
terribly to this structure of precolonial cultural familiarization. Would-be colonizers often perceived partially Westernized people as shifting ambiguously and threateningly between similarity and strangeness. In the nineteenth century, European depictions of (not yet colonized) Asians, Africans, and Pacific Islanders frequently referred to supposed incompatibilities between words and deeds, appearance and essence, ostensible and hidden meanings. The recurrent complaints of European merchants and missionaries about lying, cheating, dissimulation, and mimicry indexed this felt chasm between a Westernized “exterior” and a strange and uncontrollable “interior.” The South African Khoikhoi, for example, were no longer described as abjectly savage during the nineteenth century but as “volatile,” “cultivated in deceit,” and having a disturbing “talent for mimicry.”

The long-time Governor of German South West Africa, Theodor Leutwein, described the Khoikhoi leader Hendrik Witbooi (!Nanseb/Gâbemab) as being literally a split personality, with “two souls in his breast,” one of them “Christian and decent,” the other a “cruel, fanatic Hottentot soul” (1907:305). Lying was made out to be an essential part of Samoan culture. And European Sinophobic discourse returned incessantly from the second half of the eighteenth century to the figure of Chinese *Doppelzüngigkeit* (“forked-tongued-ness”) and double-dealing.

Most nineteenth-century Europeans abhorred such indeterminacy of meaning and identity. The compulsion to stabilize the colonized Other did not stem from a rationalist intellectual episteme, however, or from some basic human need to arrest the slippage of signifiers. Nor was this simply a case of colonizers extending their assumptions about European national identity to the colonies. Colonial states were “contact zones” (Pratt 1992), fields of cross-cultural interaction. The ability of the colonized to move suddenly and unexpectedly from a position of similarity to one of difference could therefore put the colonizer at a strategic disadvantage. The overarching goal of colonial native policy was to make it impossible for the colonized to move within this ambiguous cultural space, to oscillate uncontrollably between European and non-European signifying systems. Colonial states endeavored to define a singular cultural essence beneath the shifting surface of indigenous practice and to restrict the colonized to this unitary identity. Native policy can thus be defined as state interventions organized around a specific stabilizing representation of the character of the colonized.

This is of course related to the terrain mined so productively by Homi Bhabha in his writings on mimicry and hybridity. Bhabha calls attention to the spaces for resistance that are opened up by structures of mimicry (1994a, 1994b). But

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8 “German South-West Africa,” The Owl, 18 Nov. 1904, p. 11; second quote from F. Müller (1873:79). On the emergence of the discourse of Khoikhoi mimicry in the nineteenth century and its incorporation of the earlier emphasis on “Hottentot” abjection, see Steinmetz (2001a).

9 See NZNA AGCA, Title XVII A 1 Part 3, p. 32.

10 See BArch Freiburg, Diederichs papers, vol. 24, p. 39; and discussion below.
he situates this condition mainly within colonialism and postcolonialism. I understand this as also a *precolonial* paradox, one that confronted would-be colonizers, or at least modern colonizers. The victims of colonial conquest in this period were rarely as mistaken about the identity of their Western conquerors as the Aztecs analyzed by Todorov (1984).\(^{11}\) Nor does Bhabha, to my knowledge, distinguish between the unstable forms of in-betweenness that seem always to be produced by precolonial contact and the relatively stabilized forms of in-betweenness that colonial policy attempts to cultivate. Bhabha observes that colonialism simultaneously disavows and acknowledges difference, recalling the structure of (psychic) fetishism. This reinforces the argument that native policy could not tolerate incommensurable difference on the part of the colonized, but also avoided assimilation. The desideratum of colonial policy was to find the colonial subjects in a stable position between radical difference and identity.

**A SPECTRUM OF COLONIALISMS**

Many theories of colonialism speak of a unitary “colonial situation” (Balandier 1951) and a prototypical type of colonial state. Yet even a cursory glance at the colonies of one colonial power, Imperial Germany, underscores the wide range of ways in which modern colonial regimes related to their subjects. This article focuses on two of Imperial Germany’s overseas colonies: *Samoa*, the forerunner of the present-day independent state of Samoa (formerly Western Samoa), and German *Tsingtau* (Qingdao), the port city in the Chinese Shandong province. I will also touch briefly on a third German colony, Southwest Africa (precursor of today’s Namibia). By analyzing the overseas dependencies of a single imperialist power I am able to bracket the issue of national styles of colonialism, which has so often beguiled analysts. The handful of cases explored here demonstrate that there was not even a unified *German* style of colonialism.\(^{12}\) Indeed, the differences between the colonial approaches of nineteenth-century European powers are much less striking than the parallels. One reason for these patterned similarities is the pan-European character of modern ethnographic discourse.\(^{13}\)

Some typologies of colonial rule differentiate between indirect and direct

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\(^{11}\) Captain Cook’s reception at Hawai‘i does not refute this claim: even if the Hawaiians radically misidentified Cook and the sailors of the *Resolution* and *Discovery*, as Sahlins (1981) argues, a significant period elapsed between first contact and colonial annexation in all of the Pacific Islands, including Hawai‘i. Pacific Islanders had plenty of time to get to know Europeans and their commodities. Samoans never seemed to confuse Europeans with gods, in any case, as Linnekin (1991a) reminds us.

\(^{12}\) Every national history or state can of course be described as “exceptional” when analyzed at a lower level of abstraction.

\(^{13}\) Such trans-European parallels might also stem from similar dynamics of intra-elite class conflict in Germany, Britain, and France, and from convergent patterns of cross-cultural imaginary identification. Systematic comparison across European colonial contexts would be necessary to assess these claims.
rule (Mamdani 1996) or assimilationism and associationism (Betts 1961; Wright 1991). These categories fail to capture the most salient differences among the German colonies, however. If we start instead from an analysis of the dilemma every modern colonizer faced as a result of prior familiarity of the colonized with European culture, it is possible to develop a theoretically coherent typology of native policy.

The core of colonial policy is an image of the native’s essential distance from, or proximity to, the culture of the colonizer. Colonial policy organizes its stabilizing projects around this image of the sociocultural essence of the colonized. Native policy can thus be defined as an attempt to lock the colonized into a single, stable position somewhere along a spectrum ranging from absolute difference to absolute identity, but not encompassing either of those extremes. Complete identity, or genuine assimilation, was incompatible with the rule of colonial difference. As Sartre commented in 1956, “assimilation taken to its extreme meant, quite simply, the ending of colonialism” (2001:46). Colonial programs that were ostensibly about assimilation were usually organized around a second-class or degraded version of similarity. Conversely, colonialism was not compatible with radical difference, even though programs of indirect rule and cultural preservationism presented themselves this way. The colonized culture could not be stabilized without being translated, codified. All positions between these extremes of incommensurable difference and complete assimilation were theoretically possible.

The focus on colonialism’s attempt to produce reliable, stable difference is perhaps the central difference between my analysis and Mamdani’s (1996) conceptualization of indirect rule. Indirect rule describes the creation of a sort of free space within which appointed native rulers can coerce their subjects at will. It does not allow colonizers to stabilize indigenous culture. The German colonies did have limited zones that were treated as genuinely “indirectly ruled” spaces—the Caprivi Strip (Streitwolf 1911; Fisch 1999) and Ovamboland (Nitsche 1913; Eirola 1992) in German Southwest Africa, for example. These need to be distinguished from colonial efforts to stabilize the culture of the colonized around signifiers of “tradition,” even if both situations have been labeled “indirect rule.”

Colonial massacre marks a third boundary condition to native policy, along with the limit conditions of full-scale assimilation and incommensurable difference. Colonialism, as Sartre noted, was always a contradictory system, one that “wills simultaneously the death and the multiplication of its victims” (Sartre in Memmi 1991:xxvii). The governor of Southwest Africa, Theodor Leutwein, insisted that a colonialism without the colonized was a contradiction in terms. Leutwein’s protest came in response to General von Trotha’s infamous Proclamation to the Herero on 2 October 1904, which declared that all Herero

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had to leave the colony or face death.\textsuperscript{15} Like the Herero, Leutwein lost that battle. The Herero were massacred, and the colonial economy struggled in the aftermath of the war with a severe labor shortage.\textsuperscript{16} Other sources of labor were available in Ovamboland and the British Cape Colony, requiring the state to develop new forms of native policy.

Specifying the character of German colonialism requires that we identify the central tendency or tendencies of the interventions directed at each group perceived by the colonizers as having a distinct identity.\textsuperscript{17} Located near the “difference” pole was German Samoa, where native policy tended to support a codified, redefined version of Samoan custom. The goal of German policy was to construct Samoan culture as a commensurable, stable version of alterity. Another program that attempted to secure the colonized in a durable position of commensurable alterity involved the Southwest African Witboois, at least for the decade between 1894, when they were first subdued militarily, and 1904, when they declared war on the colonial state.\textsuperscript{18} German policy in Qingdao for the first seven or eight years after annexation also sought to secure the colonized in a condition of stabilized difference. In this case, however, alterity was organized around very different metacodes. The Samoans, like the Southwest African Witboois between 1894 and 1904, were constructed as “Noble Savages.”\textsuperscript{19} German policy in Qingdao during the early years revealed none of the positive affect associated with the Noble Savagery trope. China was framed instead as a place of degradation and decline, and the Chinese were described
with racial epithets and treated as coolies (Liu 1983; Craemer 1900:229). At the urban level this entailed an apartheid-like separation of the Chinese and German districts. The only Chinese permitted to live in the European district were servants. The Germans did not simply leave the Chinese district alone, however, as would be suggested by the term “indirect rule,” but instead developed a detailed dualistic legal code which attempted to micromanage everything from the performance of Chinese theatrical productions to the size and cleanliness of Chinese dwellings.20

The Germans’ treatment of the Southwest African Rehoboth Basters exemplifies a position in the middle of the spectrum running from identity to radical difference. The term “Baster,” in eighteenth-century Cape colonial jargon, referred to people of mixed Khoikhoi and European ancestry. The Baster community that was founded at the missionary station at de Tuin in the Cape Colony in 1864–1866 decided to migrate north across the Orange River with their Rhenish missionary at the end of the 1860s, eventually settling at Rehoboth.21 The German colonizers treated the Basters’ culture as a consolidated amalgam located halfway between the European and Khoikhoi positions. Corresponding to this intermediate status, the Rehoboth people were integrated into the colonial regime as relatively privileged collaborators.22 Native policy in the Rehoboth district was oriented toward sustaining a stable form of intermediate-ness.

The German colonies also provide examples of two distinctive political constructions of similarity. The colonizers’ treatment of the Southwest African Herero illustrates a degraded, negative, abjectifying form of assimilation.23 Rather than accepting the Herero as equals, the central aim of Governor Leutwein before 1904 and of the post-war Governors vis-à-vis the survivors of the 1904 massacre was to transform the Herero from something fundamentally incomprehensible into a degraded version of the German colonizer.24 This program of negative assimilation sought to align Herero subjectivities and material practices with the culture of the colonizers, making them similar enough to

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20 See “Verordnung betr. Chinesenordnung für das Schutzgebiet Tsintau,” Amtsblatt für das Deutsche Kiautschou-Gebiet vol. 1, no. 1, 7 July 1900; Mohr (1911).

21 Missionary Heidmann, “Gemeindechronik der Bastardgemeinde Rehoboth,” RMG 3.538a, p. 15 recto; and Heidmann to Fabri, 3 Mar. 1868, in ibid., p. 43 verso.

22 The most sustained colonial argument for the Basters’ stabilized cultural intermediateness was offered by Fischer (1913; see Steinmetz 2001). For Fischer, every element within Baster material culture was a Mittelding—literally, an “intermediate object.” The typical Baster cane, for instance, was a cross between an African Kirri and a European walking stick. Likewise, Rehobother burial rituals were a “mixture” (Mischung) of “Hottentot and Christian customs” (1913:249, 282).

23 By remaining allies with the Germans even during the Herero and Nama wars of 1904–1907/1909, the Basters were able to retain their land through the German period and to minimize land losses to outsiders. See Union of South Africa (1927), map of Rehoboth between pp. 98 and 99; also Britz, Lang, and Limpricht (1999).

24 For the notion of the abject, see Kristeva (1982).

25 This paragraph is based on Wagner (1954), Bley (1996), Gewald (1998), Krüger (1999), and Steinmetz (2001a, forthcoming).
the Germans be easily manageable as a labor force, but without ever suggesting the possibility of complete identity or legal equality. The surviving Herero were to be turned into a deracinated, atomized proletariat, and their traditional social and political structures were outlawed and crushed. The Herero had been pastoralists whose entire ritual life revolved around their cattle, but after the war they were prohibited from owning land and livestock altogether. Small groups of Herero were attached as laborers to state-run and European-owned workplaces. Colonial authorities, recognizing the rootedness of collective and individual memories in place, tried to shift the Herero from their traditional territorial location in the central and northern parts of the colony to the south.25 Herero males older than seven were required to wear metal identity tags around their necks, and some employers added numbers to the names of their Herero workers.26 In addition to these interventions into Herero patterns of work and settlement, the degraded version of assimilation also sought to transform the “inner” emotions of Herero. The goal was to make the Herero “adapt to the attitudes prescribed in Southwest Africa by German law and to make these the basis for his feelings,” according to one local newspaper article.27 Paul Rohrbach, the Commissioner for Settlement in Southwest Africa (1903–1906) whose book title I redeployed for this article, specified that “our job is to divest this tribe . . . of their specific volkish and national character and to gradually meld them into a single colored work force” (1907:21).28

A very different construction of the colonized emerged in Qingdao during the decade leading up to World War I. New colonial institutions appeared after 1904 which entailed a view of the Chinese as civilizational equals. This ran directly counter to the policies of the colony’s founding period. The Chinese—especially the wealthier and more educated Chinese—were once again described as a Kulturvolk—a cultural or civilized people.29 At the same time it

25 Despite the plans of postwar officials such as Lindequist and Hintrager, the Herero were not, in fact, relocated en masse to the southern part of the colony. See statistics on the distribution of Herero in Die deutschen Schutzgebiete in Afrika und der Südsee (1912–1913), Statistical Appendix, p. 46.
26 See McGregor (1992); Gewald (1999:190); and BArch Berlin, R 1002, vol. 2591, p. 36, memo of 13 July 1911 by Governor Seitz.
27 Windiker Nachrichten, 5 Apr. 1906, translation from Bley (1996:223); my emphasis.
28 “Volkish” is the accepted translation in English for the German adjective volkisch, which combines the cultural connotations of the English word “ethnic” with the biological emphasis of the word “racial.” Use of the word volkisch was associated historically with the German nationalist right and eventually with the Nazis.
29 The opposition between Kulturvölker (“cultural” or civilized peoples) and Naturvölker (“natural” or primitive peoples) became ubiquitous in German scholarly writing in the second half of the nineteenth century, although the terms were given varying definitions (compare, for example, Klemm [1843–1852] and Vierkandt [1896]). One reviewer of this paper objected that the Chinese had never been explicitly classified as a Naturvolk. Although this is correct at the level of explicit vocabulary, the insistence by Sinophiles on the civilized or cultural character of the Chinese after 1900 suggests that the Chinese were in fact being described as having slipped closer to the position of the Naturvolk, which was the complement of Kulturvolk in the conventional binary scheme. More textual evidence for the vagaries of representations of the Chinese is given below.
was acknowledged that the *substance* of Chinese culture was radically heterogeneous and would remain so. Later colonial policy in Qingdao thus points to a version of native policy organized around a more abstract variant of similarity, one allowing multiple variants of *Kultur*. Colonial officials were not interested in turning the Chinese into degraded versions of themselves, in this emerging formation, but sought to encompass a radically heterogeneous civilization on its own terms. These policies pointed away from colonialism altogether, however, and toward some sort of partnership, perhaps along the lines of the “self-opened commercial marts” (*zikai shangbu*) that were promoted by the Shandong Provincial Governor during this period (Schrecker 1971:155). If extreme assimilation meant the “ending of colonialism” (Sartre), so did the recognition of difference without assuming inferiority.

**PRepublic of China colonial ethnographic discourse, social class, and native policy**

These examples illustrate some of variance that is masked by the idea of a singular colonial situation or by dichotomous typologies of colonial rule. The next problem is to account for the dramatic differences in the careers of different colonies. One key determinant of native policy is the “devil’s handwriting”: the images of the conquered populations which modern colonial statemakers brought with them. As defined here, any discourse is *ethnographic* which claims to represent the essential character of a given population. Ethnographic discourse is therefore broader than racial discourse; it may also refer to the population in question as an ethnic group, people (*Volk*), nation, tribe, culture, or society. Ethnographic discourse encompasses visual images as well as written texts and spoken utterances. Precolonial ethnographic discourse usually included at least implicit guidelines for the future regulation of non-European cultures. Variation in colonial native policy resulted partly from differences in precolonial representations of the colonized.

Those who adopt the strong version of the “devil’s handwriting” thesis suggest that ethnographic discourse leads inexorably to colonialism and accounts for its form. This claim is latent in Said’s *Orientalism* and more explicit in recent books like Susanne Zantop’s *Colonial Fantasies: Conquest, Family, and Nation in Precolonial Germany, 1770–1870*, a study of precolonial German representations of Native Americans. The final section of *Colonial Fantasies* points to the connections between the precolonial representations Zantop reconstructed and German colonialism during the Bismarckian era (Zantop 1997: 192–201). This overlooks the differences in (European or German) precolonial images of Americans, Africans, Asians, and Pacific Islanders, not to mention further subvariations within each of these broad categories. By the eighteenth century, many Europeans were already distinguishing between, say, Melanesians and Polynesians (e.g. D’Urville 1832; see Thomas 1997). This also ignores the mediating linkages between precolonial discourse and colonial gov-
ernance. Ethnographic or Orientalist discourse was also typically multivocal and internally contradictory, pace Said, and these different voices or strands of discourse pointed toward different sorts of native policies. European discourse on China at the end of the nineteenth century, for example, was both extremely heterogeneous (internally diverse) and unhegemonized: no single ethnographic perspective dominated the others. German representations of Samoa were also heterogeneous, but the Noble Savagery perspective clearly dominated the others. Images of the Southwest African Herero, finally, were monotonously uniform.

If we stayed at the level of precolonial ethnographic discourse, even with the proviso that such discourse was differentiated and multiacentual, our analysis would be little more than an elaboration of the “devil’s handwriting” line of argumentation. This would reinscribe the polarization between “culturalist” and “materialist” approaches discussed above. Instead, I want to reintegrate the discursive, social, political, and psychic levels. This reintegration has five components.

First, each voice or accent within a given formation of ethnographic discourse was typically associated with particular social groups. I will refer to these groups as “social classes,” with the qualification that class refers not simply to empty slots in the relations of production but to what Bourdieu calls “real” classes. These are sets of agents who not only occupy similar positions in social space (defined by their holdings of cultural, social, and economic capital), but also have similar dispositions, convergent practices, and relational self-consciousness (Bourdieu 1987; see also 1984, 1985). One social class frequently encountered among the ranks of German colonial officials consists of educated middle-class men who held advanced university degrees but had little inherited cultural or economic capital. These colonizers can be characterized in Bourdieu’s terms as a “doubly dominated” fraction of the dominant class. Like most of the industrial bourgeoisie, these men lacked aristocratic titles; like many Prussian nobles, they were also deficient in economic capital.

Secondly, racial or ethnographic ideologies do not emanate automatically from class positions. Each individual was located within a complex and competitive field of forces with various other classes. The affinities of a given German colonial actor for an ethnographic perspective were shaped partly by his grasp (conscious as well as subconscious) of the rewards that might accrue to

30 A focus on the psychic level is suggested by Zantop’s title, but it remains primarily metaphorical within her text. This metaphorical rather than conceptual use of psychoanalytic vocabulary characterizes many other recent works in cultural history, including Hunt (1992) and Rose (1998).

31 The ranks of German colonial administration also included representatives of the traditional aristocracy and the modern bourgeoisie, but these groups played a smaller and less interesting role in the two colonial regimes examined here.

32 I use the adjective “subconscious” deliberately, in juxtaposition to “unconscious,” which is associated here with processes of psychic identification. Bourdieu did not make this distinction, referring frequently to the “unconscious” workings of the habitus. I propose a psychoanalytic reconstruction of Bourdieu’s theoretical approach in Steinmetz (2001).
him by adopting a particular view of the colonized. These benefits involved prestige or cultural capital and were not primarily economic. Specifically, colonizers competed with one another for the distinction of being best able to grasp the character of the colonized and derive from that an effective native policy. I call the form of cultural capital intrinsic to the modern colonial field ethno-graphic acuity. By attending to the dynamic fields of symbolic shadow-boxing among colonial officials, we can understand their affinities for specific ethno-graphic/racial framings of the colonized.

Another shortcoming of an unmediated derivation of ethnographic ideology from class position is that it ignores colonizers’ unconscious ideological fantasies about social class. This relates to the colonizers’ tendency to use the colonized for imaginary cross-identifications. Colonial practice, like all forms of social practice, has a dual character, in which the more palpable and conscious level is doubled by a second, unconscious level. The Freudian concepts of projection and transference point to such “doubling,” the bleeding of unconscious processes into everyday life. Such cross-identifications are significant for colonial policy because they do not necessarily remain hidden in colonizers’ minds but sometimes emerge to engage the colonized as supports in the acting out of fantasy scenarios. German colonizers’ identifications often involved fantasies of upward mobility or defense against social decline. The imaginary level is relevant for the analysis of native policy because colonizers’ cross-identifications could provide additional support for a particular view of the colonized, and hence for a particular approach to cultural stabilization.

Colonists were not able to invent ethnographic material from whole cloth in order to best serve their imaginary identifications and symbolic distinction strategies, but were constrained by the inherited historical weight of earlier descriptions. In addition to discourses concerned with specific ethnic groups, colonists’ perceptions were constrained by other ideologies, including the gen-

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34 The Bourdieuan concept of competition for cultural capital can be related to the Lacanian notion of the symbolic order, in contrast to cross-identification, which is more closely related to the imaginary order (Steinmetz 2001a).

35 I am not suggesting that we view the colonized as an off-center stage or a phantasmagoric daydream realm. People in non-colonial and metropolitan settings also engage in identifications across cultural boundaries of gender, race, class, nation, etc. (see McClintock 1995, who analyses one complex example of cross-identification in a metropolitan setting). Indeed, Lagache’s (1961) discussion of the “ideal ego” (Idealich) emphasizes “heroic identification, i.e., identification with outstanding and admirable personalities” (Laplanche and Pontalis 1973:201). Colonized subjects resemble other subaltern groups in being more available for mobilization into practical scenarios of identification, however. Thanks to Ann Stoler, Gary Wilder, and Julia Hell for discussing these matters.
eral discourse on “race.” Nineteenth-century European theories of race were partially autonomous from descriptions of particular cultures, and often worked with very broad categories, as in Blumenbach’s influential schema of five races (Caucasian, Mongolian, Ethiopian, American, Malay), or its modification by Ratzel in the 1880s to include a sixth Melanesian race (Blumenbach 1865; Ratzel 1891:Part II, 580). The consignment of “Ethiopians” to the bottom of nearly all European race schemas (Martin 1993) meant that it was highly unlikely that groups like the Herero would be constructed as Noble Savages, or as a Kulturvolk, even if such a construction might have suited certain colonizers’ symbolic strategizing or ideological fantasies.

The structure of the colonial state itself, finally, influenced the contents of native policy. The state in colonial settings—or at least in these particular German colonies—had more leeway to select the social groups it would listen to than did most metropolitan states. This independence was even more pronounced in colonial states that did not depend fiscally on the local economy or where the metropolitan government was unable to supervise the colony’s daily activities. Under these conditions, colonial states could become exceptionally autonomous from both the local society and the superordinate European government. In the cases examined here, members of a given German social class, or the Träger of a given ethnographic perspective, could not influence colonial policy unless they were represented inside the colonial administration. It was the presence of educated Sinologists within the colonial government in Qingdao, for instance, which allowed the venerable strand of Sinophilic discourse to begin influencing native policy there. In Samoa, by contrast, the bearers of a dissonant understanding of indigenous culture—the German planters who defended an “ignoble savagery” perspective—were prevented from having an impact on policy by the first Governor, Wilhelm Solf.37

In both case studies I will first sketch the main lines of colonial native policy. I then shift backwards in time, reconstructing the precolonial ethnographic perceptions that guided and constrained the colonizers’ subsequent strategies. Given that discourse on the Samoans and the Chinese was not univocal, the next problem is to account for colonial statemakers’ affinities for specific ethnographic images. Here I focus on struggles for the cultural capital associated with ethnographic acuity and imaginary cross-identifications with images of the colonized.

36 There is no space to discuss the reasons for this exceptional potential autonomy of the colonial state; see Offe (1984); Block (1988); Tilly (1990:ch. 7) for the general argument. Some colonial states are forced to become fiscally responsible for their operations, of course, which constrains them in ways similar to metropolitan states.

37 The success or failure of a given approach to native policy was deeply influenced by the response of the colonized, their willingness to cooperate. This factor had less influence on the selection of native policies, however. I will return to this issue in the conclusion.
SAMOA: THE “LOTOS ISLANDS”38

Samoa was the site of the first modern German overseas plantation economy, set up by the Hamburg Godeffroy firm in the 1860s (Kennedy 1974:6, 101). In 1879, Germany signed a “friendship treaty” with Samoa, initiating a twenty-year period of informal, quasi-colonial influence on the island chain that was carried out by consuls from Germany, Britain, and the United States. The Berlin Act of 1889 stipulated that the three consuls and a European Chief Justice would administer the port city of Apia and advise the Samoan king, who continued to rule the rest of the country. On 1 March 1900, the German flag was raised at Mulinu’u peninsula in the Apia municipality. Germany became the sole ruler of the main islands of Upolu and Savai’i, and the United States took control of the eastern part of the Samoan archipelago.39

German colonial administration was set up quickly on the basis of the preceding tripartite government. The personnel of the colonial state was quite small and the Governor had a great deal of control over everything that it did. This had to do partly with the non-democratic nature of the colonial state and the relative lack of oversight by the distant metropolitan government in Berlin. Whenever colonial conflicts became severe enough to make themselves felt in Berlin, the colonial Governor received very strong backing from the Colonial Office of the German Foreign Office and from the Kaiser himself.40 The Governor was able to pass regulations on the most sweeping issues almost single-handedly and could choose to ignore opposition within the consultative body of European councilors. The archival records of local officials and specific branches of the colonial government suggest a high level of agreement with Wilhelm Solf’s overall program. Solf’s successor in 1911, Erich Schultz-Ewerth, pursued the same approach as his mentor. The non-democratic structure of colonial government, the relative sociological homogeneity of the entire group of colonial officials, and the Governor’s personal authority all justify focusing on Solf in characterizing native policy.41

38 For Robert Louis Stevenson, writing in the late 1880s, Samoa represented the “lotos islands” (1998:33). The lotus of Greek legend, described by Homer, was so delicious that those who ate it “left off caring about home and did not even want to go back.” Stevenson’s words were prophetic: he never returned to Europe, dying in Samoa in 1894. Stevenson’s use of classical similes in describing Samoa participated in a long tradition of European representation of Polynesia, going back at least to Bougainville, who named Tahiti “the New Cythera.” See Bougainville (1769 [1970]) and (1772); Bernard Smith traces this classicization of Polynesia in the visual arts (1960; 1992; also Joppien and Smith 1985–1988).


40 This strong support for Solf at the upper levels was demonstrated in his struggle with a group of troublesome settlers, discussed below.

41 I completed this article before having a chance to read Peter Hempenstall’s forthcoming book on Solf, but Hempenstall’s earlier book (1978) along with the article by Moses (1972), have dealt with some of the biographical issues here.
As noted earlier, nearly all incoming modern colonizers confronted a situation of cultural hybridity. Events in the period leading up to annexation of Samoa in 1900—the civil warfare that had occasioned the European partition of the islands (Kennedy 1974, ch. 4)—had convinced the Germans that Samoa was as volatile as the colonies in Africa or New Guinea. On the one hand, Samoans had interacted with Europeans for decades, becoming more familiar with them, and in some respects more like them. During the decades following the arrival of the London Missionary Society in 1830 most Samoans had converted to Christianity. One missionary wrote at mid-century that Christianity had abolished the “shameful rites and orgies” (Ellis 1853 Vol. 1:97–98) of this “isolated people,” who had “perhaps sunk lower in brutal licentiousness and moral degradation” than any other. Samoans had also been inducted into the capitalist world economy by the Godefroy firm and its successor, which initially bought coconuts from Samoan growers and after 1865 tried to get Samoans to work on plantations. Yet the stakes and emotions driving native politics were radically foreign to the Europeans, as they had discovered while watching Samoan battles over succession and the inheritance of traditional honorific titles (see Williamson 1975:3–50).

The Germans’ overarching goal was to stabilize Samoan culture around a codified version of fa’a Samoa or Samoa custom. Cultural difference was not attacked so much as it was accentuated and clarified. As Solf explained to one group of Samoans, “I have often told natives that the German Government wishes them to be ruled, not according to white man’s ideas, but according to the fa’a Samoa. . . . For this reason I do not wish to interfere in your Samoan titles and such things.” Schultz-Ewerth described his goal similarly in 1914 as the “preservation of Samoans’ customs and mores and their peculiar character (ihre Eigenart) more generally.” The Samoan Ali‘i Sili (paramount chief), Mata‘afa, in communications with the rest of the Samoans, agreed with this description of the government’s program, telling his people that “the Governor’s resolve . . . shows certainly that he wishes to see the Samoan customs preserved.”

The government’s regulated traditionalism sometimes entailed an surprising degree of hostility to the “modernization” of Samoans. Settlers in Samoa, like those in Southwest Africa, pressured the colonial government to intensify the exploitation of indigenous labor and the alienation of native-owned land. Na-
tive uprisings in 1904 (the *Lafoga ‘Oloa*) and again in 1907 (the *Mau*) prompted settlers to call for increased security. In contrast to Southwest Africa, however, the colonial government positioned itself against the settlers as a protector of tradition and refused to militarize the colony. Indeed, the formula “this is not Southwest Africa” was often heard in official Samoan colonial circles. There were no colonial troops or German policemen on the islands, though German Navy warships pulled in occasionally. The main jailhouse in Apia was less than awe-inspiring and prisoners escaped from it with seeming ease. Punishment by flogging, ubiquitous in Germany’s African colonies and applied to Chinese immigrant workers throughout the German Pacific, including Samoa until 1912, was banned when it came to Samoans. And rather than compelling the Samoans to work on European plantations, as the settlers demanded, the government imported Chinese laborers (Moses 1973; Tom 1986).

The government’s defense of Samoan tradition sometimes went so far as to prevent Samoans from engaging in “modern” or Westernized practices. In one case, discussed by Meleisea (1987:55), the Samoan Chief Justice Su’atele tried to introduce the more individualistic concept of a written will as a substitute for the traditional *mavaega*, “a chief’s dying wish concerning the inheritance of his title.” Schultz-Ewerth, the Imperial Chief Judge who was directly superordinate to Su’atele, ruled against him and in favor of the *mavaega* concept. This decision corresponded to the wishes of other members of Su’atele’s *‘aiga* (extended kinship/descent group), who stood to lose if the written will were allowed to stand. The government also tried to coax Samoans back into customs they were abandoning, urging them to use traditional materials rather than corrugated steel in roofing their houses, for example.

Rather than relating to the colonized within a foreign idiom, as was the case in Hererooland, for instance, the Germans interacted with the Samoans using indigenous terminology or freshly coined Samoan neologisms. The German colonial government was called the “Malo Kaisalika” or imperial government, using the Samoan term *malo*, which had traditionally meant “dominant party or faction, victorious in war” and more recently had come to refer to the Samoan governing council of chiefs. The German emperor was described as the *tupu sili* (paramount king) in dealings with the Samoans. Solf presented himself as representative of the “Kaisa’s” *pule*, using a term that had referred in earlier times to the key orator groups from six towns on the island of Savai’i with traditional privileges and had subsequently assumed the extended meaning of “authority” or “power.”

48 See the report on native law in Samoa by District Judge Imhoff, in NZNA Title XVII A 1 Part 4, p. 156; also F. Müller (1962). On the flogging of Chinese immigrants, see *Samoanisches Gouvernements-Blatt*, vol. IV, Nr. 21, 6 Jan. 1911, p. 71; and BArch Berlin, RKA, vol. 5588, letter from Solf, 28 Jan. 1911, p. 4 verso.
49 NZNA, AGCA Tit XVII A 1 Part 6, p. 145.
50 Davidson (1967:78, 433) and *Samoanische Zeitung* 19.VIII.05, pp. 7–8.
This was still colonialism, of course. The state’s fetishization of Samoan difference worked to justify the Germans’ presence and prevent any consideration of the colonized as equal. Although Solf insisted that colonial governance was “missionary work, in the broadest sense,” Schultz-Ewerth acknowledged that the official policy of preserving Samoan custom introduced a “fundamental difference between the aims of the government and the missions, insofar as the latter preach the equality of all men while the former recognizes the existing gradations of power.”51 The Samoan idiom which Solf adopted for his relations with the colonized was an explicitly paternalistic one in which Samoans were addressed as children.

The way in which Solf handled a crisis around the ceremonial distribution of fine, sacred mats (‘ie toga) almost immediately after he assumed office was emblematic of the government’s general approach to regulating Samoan custom. Samoan custom required the Ali’i Sili Mata’afa, whose appointment the Germans had supported, to carry out a distribution of mats upon assuming office. But the exchange of fine mats had provoked “many quarrels and disturbances,” based on competition among Samoan chiefs, in the past.52 This was an outcome the Germans definitely wanted to avoid. Another problem for Solf stemmed from the traditional meanings of fine-mat exchange in Samoan eyes. The circulation of the mats started in the districts with the local elites and moved from there to the tupu, who then redistributed the mats back to the districts. The direction of this flow would signal to the Samoans that the tupu owed his position to the tulefale (talking chiefs or orators) and village chiefs. According to the Germans, however, Mata’afa had been crowned Ali’i Sili by the German Emperor and his local representative, the colonial Governor, and not by the Samoans themselves. Solf decided not to ban the distribution outright, but attempted instead to choreograph the ritual in ways that underscored his own centrality. Among other things, Solf intervened directly in redistributing mats after Mata’afa’s initial distribution, thus symbolically usurping the tupu’s role.53

A related problem was the Europeans’ inability to distinguish sacred or heirloom-quality mats (‘ie o le malo) from lesser-quality mats, those which served generally as currency. Nor could the Germans understand how the Samoans attached specific monetary values to mats. The government tried to resolve these problems by creating an office, staffed by Europeans and Samoans, whose task was to determine the exact value of each mat, excepting the ‘ie o le malo, and

51 BArch Koblenz, Solf papers, vol. 27, p. 96; NZNA, AGCA Title VI 28 part 1, Schulz to Osmbahr, 8 Mar. 1914, p. 66. On relations between Solf and the missions, see Laracy (1978).
52 Captain Charles Hope of the HBMS Brisk to the chiefs of Samoa, 25 July 1866, quoted by Linnekin (1990:1). Linnekin’s article is the only scholarly treatment of the Samoan ceremonial exchange of fine mats. As Linnekin reports, such exchanges often took place in the malaga, ceremonial travels of visitors.
53 See BArch Berlin, RKA, vol. 3061, pp. 65–82, reports on Fonos in July 1901; also Samoanische Zeitung from 14–28 Sept. 1901, “Report on . . . the Governor’s Journey to Palaufi and Satupaitea.”
to provide it with a government stamp. By exempting sacred mats from this process and assigning fixed values to others, the intervention attempted to prevent Samoans from mixing monetary and sacred systems of value in ways that were incomprehensible to the Europeans. Again, native policy was oriented toward impeding the oscillation of meaning, the blending of signifying systems. Yet it also worth remarking that this stabilizing solution protected some arenas—the sacred mats—from the capitalist value form. This law sided with those Samoans who wanted to restrain the penetration of their entire culture by capitalist instrumental rationality, a process that might otherwise have eventually commodified sacred mats as well.

The colonial government actively repressed other “traditional” practices. Both Solf and Schultz-Ewerth repeated that they would uphold only “the good Samoan customs,” meaning those customs that did not threaten to undercut colonial overrule. The most significant repressions targeted the basic structure of Samoan “self-government” (Selbstverwaltung) as it was disingenuously referred to by German officials, that is, the parallel structures by which Samoans were to continue administering their own affairs within the colonial framework. The colonial government attempted to shift the center of indigenous politics away from the national level, which had become increasingly important in recent decades, and back toward the localities. The title of tupu was abolished in 1900 in favor of the newly created position of Ali’i Sili, which was itself eliminated when Mata’afa died in 1912. At the local level of Samoan politics, the Germans tried (with little success) to limit the power of the tulefale, Samoa’s traditional kingmakers.

None of this explains why the Germans seemed to be trying to roll back the clock to a condition that had existed before the partial Europeanization of Samoans in the missionary and protocolonial periods. Wilhelm Solf’s vision recalled the German naturalist Johann Forster, who accompanied Captain Cook on his Second Voyage around the world in the 1770s. Like Solf, Forster had expressed a preference for a form of “savagery” he located in Tahiti that had been “brought nearer to a more improved, more civilized” condition but lacked “these evils, which abuses, luxury and vice have introduced among our societies.” What was Solf’s ethnographic vision?

Solf’s private correspondence and published writings (e.g., Solf 1908) reveal two recurrent themes: the Samoans’ radical alterity and their relative superiority to other colonized peoples. Solf believed that the Samoans “don’t think like

54 NZNA AGCA Title XVII A 1 Part 5, pp. 6-14.
55 Linnekin (1990:7) argues that the German judges settled individual disputes “in whatever media that Samoans had used in the transaction” and treated mats as money in cases where Samoans themselves had already done so.
us, have different emotions, and therefore have to be handled differently.”

In a dispute with the author of the Kalahari Bushman ethnographies, Siegfried Passarge, Solf insisted that the “Samoans were better than the Herero and Hot-tentots in every respect.” Solf was adamant that the colonial office not assimilate the Samoans to other “Naturvölker,” and he argued that “the conditions of the natives in our colonies are so different from one another that the ambition of finding a unified method” for the treatment of native law was misguided. His argument against a unitary legal system for the German colonies emphasized the “racial specificity and the cultural level of the Polynesian population of Samoa.”

Where did Solf’s images of the Samoans come from? They could not have emerged “naturally” from interactions in the “contact zone,” since he embarked on his program of enforced radical alterity almost immediately upon assuming office. At this early date Solf’s interventions already revealed a well-elaborated view of the Samoans. Nor did Solf have any prior experience in Polynesia, although he had served briefly as a Foreign Service translator in Calcutta and as a judge in German East Africa before arriving in Apia. To account for Solf’s understanding of Samoa it is necessary to reconstruct the formation of European and German precolonial discourse which he inherited.

**SAMOANS AS “NOBLE SAVAGES”**

The dominant ethnographic perspective at the dawn of the colonial takeover of Samoa framed its inhabitants as “Noble Savages.” The framework of Noble Savagery is frequently invoked in analyses of European perceptions of the non-European Other, but it has not been carefully distinguished from other tropes.

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58 BArch Koblenz, Solf papers, vol. 27, “Denkschrift” (1906), p. 68.
60 NZNA, AGCA Title XVII A 1 Part 4, pp. 37–38, 75.
62 As Linnekin (1991b) points out, the Samoans actually began their European career as ignoble savages, following their “discovery” by the French explorer La Pérouse in 1787. Although La Pérouse remarked in his journals that “these islanders are the happiest inhabitants of the earth,” his visit provoked a deadly altercation in which twelve of his men were killed (La Pérouse 1995:384–95, 399–401). European perceptions of Samoa began to shift after missionaries from the London Missionary Society arrived in the 1830s (Williams 1838).
63 Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century contributors to the evolving trope of Noble Savagery often referred to Rousseau, but as Lovejoy (1955) pointed out, Rousseau did not actually celebrate the state of nature or equate it with nobility. In a closer reading of Rousseau, however, Todorov has underscored the pervasive role in his writing of a third, intermediate stage located between the state of nature and corrupt civilization. Rousseau’s writings valorize this idealized intermediate stage (Todorov 1993:280). The ubiquitous interpretation of Rousseau as an advocate of Noble Savagery in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was based less on a misreading than on ambiguities in his texts. More significant in the present context is the existence of a trope that depicted “savagery” in positive terms and contrasted it with a corrupt civilization. Noble Savagery was elided with the “state of nature” by some of Rousseau’s would-be acolytes. The naturalist and surgeon Philibert Commerson, who accompanied Louis-Antoine de Bougainville on his voyage in 1766–1769, discussed the Tahitians as living in “the state of natural man, born essentially good, free from all preconceptions, and following, without suspicion and without remorse, the gentle impulse of an in-
We are familiar with the argument that the contemporary non-European was constructed as non-simultaneous or \textit{allochronic} by the French and Scottish Enlightenment and within nineteenth-century social theory (Meek 1976; Fabian 1983; Stocking 1968, 1987). Much social evolutionary discourse seemed to deny any real kinship with non-Westerners, however, and attached no positive virtues to earlier developmental stages. In the dominant version of the Noble Savagery discourse, by contrast, the non-Westerner figured as an earlier version of the European himself. This was associated with a partial deracialization and a positive cathexis of the Other, who was understood as preserving many of the raw virtues and liberties that had been destroyed by the civilizing process.

European descriptions of the Samoans in the second half of the nineteenth century constitute a veritable catalogue of noble savagery. Samoans were routinely compared to figures from Greek antiquity, bringing the European into a direct, fictive kinship relationship with the “savage” (see for example La Farge in Yarnall 1998:72). Robert Louis Stevenson compared the Samoans to his heroic Scottish ancestors “who drove their chariots on the wrong side of Roman wall” (Stevenson 1996:1). Nineteenth-century Europeans typically began their accounts with the Samoans’ bodies, which were invariably described as natural and gorgeous. One German navy doctor enthused that he had “never, without exception, seen such beautiful people” (Böhr 1876:426; see also Ehlers 1895:82; Reinecke 1902:120). Samoan women were celebrated for their combination of innocence and sensuality. Stevenson’s Samoan writings (1998 [1890], 1892, 1893, 1895), which were popular in Germany, represent the pinnacle of this discourse of Samoan Noble Savagery. Polynesia had become a screen for the projection of Europeans’ fantasies about earlier stages of their own historical development, and Samoa had replaced Tahiti during the second half of the nineteenth century as the essential \textit{Ur}-Polynesia. This produced a measure of sympathetic identification with Samoan culture as well as a reluctance to see it change. This general admiration for Samoa was extremely important for the general thrust of later German colonial policy.

Nineteenth-century ethnographic texts also typically contained guidelines for native policy, even if these were often left implicit. Published writing, informal lore, and routine patterns of interaction constituted an inheritance for

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\textsuperscript{64} The trope of Polynesian women as combining voluptuousness with modesty had been introduced by Bougainville, whose published account tried to resist the conflation of Tahitian women with European prostitutes by insisting on their “natural timidity” (1772:218). Similarly, Johann Forster offered a portrait of Tahitian women as combining “modesty” with an obliviousness to any “notion of turpitude” (1996:244).

\textsuperscript{65} I trace the way Samoa came to fill a place that had originally been filled by the image of Tahiti in my forthcoming book.
early colonizers in which connections were drawn between the Samoans’ cultural essence and techniques for their domination. Although Stevenson was only an unofficial actor in a setting that was not yet formally colonial, and publicly supported the Samoans’ futile struggle to avoid colonial takeover, his writings and daily activities in Samoa provide a sense of the kinds of native policy that were being elaborated in the protocology. Stevenson’s everyday relations with Samoans at his estate in Vailima were in many ways strikingly similar to Solf’s later colonial activities (1895, Vol. II:270, 272). Like Solf, Stevenson addressed Samoans as children, behaving toward them like a benevolent, pedantic patriarch. Stevenson’s case also adumbrates a common scenario that would be enacted many times during the German colonial era, in which Germans identified with the elite positions within the society they were trying to rule. Such identification was somewhat paradoxical insofar as Europeans constructed themselves in their imaginations not just as chiefs but as Samoan chiefs. Stevenson was clearly pleased that his Samoan workers “really and fairly accept[ed] him as a chief” (1895, Vol. II:196). He was thrilled when a chief called out his Samoan name at a kava-drinking ceremony (1895, Vol. I:193). As a settler in a land that was still ostensibly governed by its natives, Stevenson’s implicit identification with the Samoans did not clash with the colonial rule of difference. Stevenson was running a colonial estate, after all, not a colonial state. For colonial officials, however, such identifications had to remain largely unacknowledged. At the same time, colonial rulers like Solf were ideologically predisposed and politically empowered to involve colonized subjects in the acting out of their fantasies.

**CLASS DISTINCTION AND CLASS EXALTATION**

Given that Solf embarked on his conservationist project almost immediately after his arrival in Apia, we have to ask how he assimilated the discourse of Samoan Noble Savagery. It is possible, of course, that he had been exposed to literature on Polynesia before arriving in Samoa. Solf was well educated and ethnographically curious. We do know that he immersed himself in the existing literature on Samoan custom soon after arriving in the islands. He also quickly became part of the community of old Samoa hands in Apia. Samoan specialists in the German Foreign Office were another source of ethnographic imagery for Solf, and most of them viewed Samoa through the lens of Noble

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66 For another example of the precocious invention of Samoan native policy see the narrative of the Acting British Consul in Samoa from 1856 to 1858, William T. Pritchard (1866:68, 90, 96–97, 103).


68 See NZNA, AGCA, Title XVII B 2, Solf’s speech to the people of Alataua, Satupaitea, 18 July 1901.

69 One of Solf’s Samoan translators, Thomas Trood, had arrived in Samoa in 1857 and had served for many years as British Vice-Consul (Watson 1918).
Savagery. Schmidt-Dargitz, who had served in Samoa for six years during the 1890s, described to Solf the “highly attractive traits of this clever Kanaka people” in a letter written in 1899.\(^70\) Solf’s preferred interlocutor and informant on things Samoan within the Colonial Department was Oskar Stuebel, a former German Consul in Apia who had published a foundational study of Samoan culture, *Samoanische Texte* (1896).

Solf’s political program of enforced radical alterity might then appear to flow directly from the dominance of this ethnographic perspective on Samoa. To understand how Solf and most of the other German colonial officials in Samoa assimilated this discourse, however, we have to turn our attention to the force-field of intra-European class relations. The adoption of this ethnographic viewpoint was hardly a foregone conclusion, since dissonant counter-perspectives were available in the colony. One alternative strand\(^71\) was based among a group of German settlers who complained that the government was encouraging Samoans to see themselves as “better than any white who is not a government official,” as one of them put it in a letter to Solf.\(^72\) The group’s main spokesman, Richard Deeken, was accused of abusing the workers on his plantation.\(^73\) Rather than adopting the settlers’ perspective, however, Solf became involved in a drawn-out struggle with Deeken, eventually throwing him in jail and having him expelled from the colony.\(^74\)

Several additional conclusions can be drawn from the “Deeken affair.” One is support for the claim that formations of ethnographic discourse are rarely completely monoaccentual. A second is that the colonial state may be autonomous enough from the locally dominant social classes—the various settlers and the large plantation owners—to simply ignore their interests. In Germany, by contrast, social classes in positions analogous to the Samoan settlers had more power to censure the state if it openly and repeatedly contravened their interests (Steinmetz 1993). The settler opposition in Samoa was not represented within the colonial state apparatus, and was therefore unable to influence official native policy. Interestingly, the settlers also failed to elaborate a full-fledged alternative ethnographic perspective, although they expressed a diffuse hostility to Samoans. Sometimes they even echoed the government’s argument that Samoan tradition needed special protection.\(^75\) This suggests that

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\(^{70}\) BArch Koblenz, Solf papers, vol. 18, letter from Schmidt-Dargitz, 31 May 1899, pp. 115–16.

\(^{71}\) A second alternative was associated with the missionaries, but Solf was no more sympathetic to them (Laracy 1978).

\(^{72}\) BArch Koblenz, Solf papers, vol. 25, p. 239 (letter from Tyszka to Solf, 1 July 1904).

\(^{73}\) These settlers called for a liberalization of the restrictions on the sale and leasing of native land (Tyszka 1904).

\(^{74}\) For Solf’s complaints about Deeken, see BArch Koblenz, Solf papers, vol. 25, p. 63, Telegram to Foreign Office, 1 May 1904. On Deeken’s jail term and extradition, see ibid., p. 101, telegram of 6 June 1904; ibid., pp. 6–7, Stuebel to Solf, 7 Jan. 1904; and ibid., vol. 24, pp. 97–98, Solf to Foreign Office, 28 Sept. 1903.

\(^{75}\) See Deeken (1901:197); and von Tyszka (1904:28).
the Noble Savagery perspective was strong enough to partially blinker even its opponents, whose might have been expected to elaborate a program of abjectifying assimilation.

Solf’s affinity for the dominant vision of Samoans was reinforced by his symbolic shadow-boxing with the dominant fractions of the German elite and by his imaginary class identifications. For Solf, the colony was simultaneously a mundane social setting, a site in which he could demonstrate his exquisite taste and judgment in matters concerning exotic cultures, and a stage for ideological identifications.

With respect to the first dimension, Solf used Samoa to distinguish himself (and by extension, his educated peers) from both the older aristocratic state elites and the capitalistic settlers. The wealthy son of a Berlin industrialist, Solf had written a Sanskritist doctoral dissertation (Solf 1886) and later studied law. Aristocratic cultural capital still dominated the world of the German foreign service, however. Solf’s flaunting of his more hermeneutic approach to non-European cultures was an attempt to showcase the sort of ethnographic perception that his particular holdings of cultural capital made possible. To Solf and others with a similar composition of cultural capital, the hermeneutic approach promised leverage for distinction vis-à-vis both the older nobility and the modern businessmen.

Solf insinuated that members of the traditional nobility were too enmeshed in the brutal ways of the military to appreciate the nuances of Samoan culture, and capitalist settlers too crassly materialist. The language in which Solf attacked Deeken and his cohorts also suggests that he was concerned that his own bourgeois family background might allow others to lump him in with the boorish and avaricious settlers. Discussing the settlers’ racist treatment of Samoans, Solf speculated that most of them were too uneducated to “think their way into” the Samoan’s peculiar “logic” and “foreign ways of thought” and therefore tended to fall back on stock phrases like “bloody Kanaka, this damned nigger!” At the other boundary of social class, Solf’s tense relations with members of the traditional German upper class can be traced back to his earliest career posting with the German Consulate in Calcutta in 1889, where he had worked under Baron von Heyking. The relationship between the aristocratic Heyking and the bourgeois Solf was extremely antagonistic from the start, and reached crisis proportions, tellingly, around Heyking’s disapproval of Solf’s participation in the venerable Asiatic Society of Bengal. Solf’s emphatic self-presentation as a sensitive student of exotic cultures was a bid for distinction in an occupational milieu that was still dominated by aristocrats like Heyking and still disdainful of his capitalist class of origin.

76 See Moses (1972:44); and BAeck Koblenz, Solf papers, Findbuch, p. 3.
77 “Bloody” and “Nigger” are in English in the text. BAeck Koblenz, Solf papers, vol. 27, p. 66.
The second dimension of Solf’s social class project was more psychological than sociological, although the two perspectives can only be distinguished analytically. When Solf spoke to Samoans he often held the emblems of the traditional Samoan talking chiefs, the large staff and the *fue*, or fly whisk. He opened and concluded meetings with Samoan leaders with the traditional kava-drinking ritual. His communications were often framed within Samoan fables and figures of speech. One might interpret these as little more than a cynical political ploy. But Solf also styled himself as a Samoan “chief,” proclaiming, for instance: “I do not come here as the Governor, but . . . as a Chief amongst Chiefs.” Even more revealingly, Solf’s language sometimes blurred his identity with that of the Ali‘i Sili, in phrases like: “it is difficult for me, Mata’afa.”

If one accepts a view of subjectivity that allows for a disjuncture between conscious thought and unconscious wish-fulfillment or fantasy, it is possible to argue that Solf, and men like him, sought a kind of imaginary class *exaltation* by inserting themselves into elite roles in colonized societies. And even though these were imaginary roles, their pursuit had implications for the colonized. The colonizers’ relations with non-European cultures, even with colonized elites, cannot be understood simply as a quest for a *mirror* for their own class positions and consciousness, as Cannadine (2001) has suggested—unless we take seriously the emphasis on distortion and fantasy in the Lacanian formulation of the mirror phase (Lacan 1977a). Many colonizers sought more than mere confirmation of their class identity.

In his simultaneous identification with Samoan elites and struggle against German ones, Solf sheds a very different light on the thesis of the “feudalization” of the late-nineteenth-century German bourgeoisie. Historical writing on the Kaiserreich has often argued that the German bourgeoisie began to ape the manners of the German aristocracy, feudalizing itself in the process. This argument is clearly incorrect or overly general as stated. Most educated middle-class men in Wilhelmine Germany distanced themselves symbolically from the cultural signifiers of the traditional upper classes. There is no indication that Samoan signifiers carried latent or implicit references to the Prussian aristocracy.

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80 See the text of Solf’s speech in *Lufilufi* (BArch Koblenz, Solf papers, vol. 26, report to Foreign Office, 4 Aug. 1905, pp. 29–30).

81 Both quotes reported by *Samoanische Zeitung*, 28 Sept. 1901.

82 European nobles at this time obviously had less psychic need for imaginary upward cultural mobility than members of the Bildungsbürgertum or industrial bourgeoisie. Only by reconstructing the field of intra-elite class conflict and attending to possible variations in the responses of colonizers from different class backgrounds can we understand the functioning of the “colonial mirror.” Although none of the colonial officials examined in this article were members of the traditional Prussian nobility, Lothar von Trotha’s “heroic” identification (Lagache 1961:41–42) with an image of Herero cruelty during the 1904 war in South West expressed anxiety around class decline and sadism against the local representative of the middle-class usurper, Governor Leutwein, whose career was basically destroyed by von Trotha and his cronies.

83 The decisive critique of the “exceptionalist” interpretation of Imperial Germany is Blackbourn and Eley (1985). For a more recent discussion, see Steinmetz (1997).
racy for Solf, or for anyone else. Yet Solf did seek a kind of imaginary ennoblement, a fantastic form of social mobility, through his interactions and identifications with Samoans.\(^{84}\)

Imaginary identification with the colonized was more related to daydreaming than to any real bid for fungible cultural capital. Indeed, critics tried to embarrass Solf with his self-styling as a pseudo-Samoan chief (Tyszka 1904). Unlike actors such as R. L. Stevenson, however, colonial officials were able to use the power of the colonial state to quiet their critics. They were also able to enlist large numbers of real people in the enactment of their imaginary identifications.

We can now make sense of Solf’s strong adherence to the Samoan Noble Savage perspective and his equally impassioned rejection of the settlers’ alternative. The Noble Savagery approach allowed Solf to accomplish three tasks simultaneously: to stabilize indigenous culture; to accrue a form of cultural capital specific to the colonial arena; and to achieve a kind of status exaltation through imaginary identifications. By appreciating the intricate nuances of a radically incommensurable culture, he was able to claim superiority to the Deekens and von Heykings. Only if the Samoans were constructed as noble and were positively cathected would it make psychic sense to identify with an imago of their chiefs.

The Samoan case also reveals two sorts of limits on what colonizers can try to do with the colonized. One constraint involves the always-already-given formation of precolonial discourse. Given the weight of earlier ethnographic descriptions it would have been too much to expect Solf to rethink the Samoans single-handedly—as a Kulturvolk, for example—even if he had wanted to. Such a rearticulation was unlikely without a broader representational campaign, probably involving a cultural struggle by the Samoans themselves. This points to the second limit on Solf’s activities, which was the Samoans’ willingness to cooperate in the creation of his practico-discursive dispositif. A large number of Samoans, including Mata’afa, were willing to play their part in Solf’s colonial theater.

**QINGDAO: “GERMAN CHINA” AND CHINESE-IDENTIFIED GERMANS**

Qingdao was invaded by German battleships in 1897 and coercively “leased” from the Chinese government for 100 years (Schrecker 1971). Policymaking in the colony during the first few years was guided by a view of the Chinese as intrinsically inferior, and there was little interest in preserving a culturally distinctive Chinese environment (Schweitzer 1914:151). Streets in the Chinese

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\(^{84}\) It is also clear from Solf’s papers that he identified with the imago of the English gentleman (see also Franke [1954:32] on Solf’s Anglophilism while at the university in Göttingen). Such Anglophilism seems more like a form of middle-class self-assertion than evidence of self-feudalization, however. Even during the Wilhelmine period, Max Weber and others constructed England as the “normal” case in contrast to a “deviant,” nobility-dominated Germany.
neighborhoods were laid out on a grid pattern to facilitate police control,\textsuperscript{85} in contrast to the European district, which had an attractive, irregular street plan (Godshall 1929:124). The planners of the city-colony included large buffer zones between the European and Chinese districts (see Figure 1). The German Navy imported a number of prefabricated “tropical houses” (\textit{Tropenhäuser}), rather than using local materials, which would have resulted in Chinese-looking dwellings (Deimling 1900:56). And since “there is one thing which the German has a very difficult time giving up” when he leaves home—the German forests—“millions and millions of trees and bushes were planted” in the colony.\textsuperscript{86} Colonial policy in Qingdao during this period can be described as radically \textit{unhermeneutic}.

The early colonizers of Qingdao did not lack a vision of the Chinese, but it was a predominantly \textit{racial} one. To understand this we need to recall that Qingdao was founded in the era of the Boxer Rebellion, and that this movement emerged first in Shandong province, before spreading north to Beijing (Esherick 1987). Germany was heavily involved in the joint expedition of the Great Powers against the Boxers, contributing almost 20,000 troops as well as the “Supreme Commander” for the Allied forces, Count Waldese. Anxious to satisfy the German Kaiser, who had called on the departing troops to “\textit{take no prisoners}” and “\textit{show no mercy},” Waldese embarked on a series of ruthless punitive expeditions against Boxer sympathizers in the region around Beijing (Sharf and Harrington 2000:211).\textsuperscript{87}

This campaign brought the Chinese under the sign of the generic “\textit{native}” or colonized racial Other. A German play called “Our Boys in Jiaozhou” in 1899 began with the lines “here among these Kaffirs,” using the South African racial epithet as a generic term for “natives” (Schmasow 1899). The colony’s official gazette remarked that “there can hardly be a single human race that has a less romantic appearance than the Chinese.”\textsuperscript{88} The descriptions of Chinese officials by the “conqueror” of Qingdao, Admiral Otto von Diederichs, are replete with racist slurs. The Admiral found numerous examples of what he understood as typical “scoundrelish behavior, and of the simplemindedness and superstition that accompanies it” as well as “the trickiness and unreliability of the yellow race.”\textsuperscript{89}

But by 1904, new colonial institutions embodying a program of rapprochement and cultural mixing were being superimposed on the original apartheid-like infrastructure in Qingdao. Captain Oskar von Truppel, who governed from

\textsuperscript{85} \textit{Denkschrift betreffend die Entwicklung des Kiautschou-Gebiets}, vol. 3 (1899–1900), p. 27.
\textsuperscript{86} Weicker (1908:82); also Berensmann (1904:596). Chinese who damaged trees in the colony could be sentenced to forced labor and up to fifty lashes (Mohr 1911:151–52).
\textsuperscript{87} See Soesemann (1976) for the full text of Kaiser Wilhelm’s so-called “Hun speech” (\textit{Hunnenrede}).
\textsuperscript{88} \textit{Amtsblatt für das Deutsche Kiautschou-Gebiet}, 11 May 1901.
\textsuperscript{89} BArch Freiburg, Diederichs papers, vol. 24, pp. 42, 45. Diederichs called his Chinese counterpart, General Zhang Gaoyuan, a “helpless weakling” (ibid., p. 24), and treated him with disdain.
1901 to 1911, presided over what he called a “demilitarization” of the colony. German troops pulled back into the city of Qingdao from the surrounding area and stopped provoking the Chinese provincial government. 90 A changing view of the Chinese became evident along with this shift in policy. One colonial bank director publicly praised Truppel in 1904 for making the Chinese “what they should be,” namely “fully equal citizens [Bürger] of our colony.” 91 Several years later, a photograph of the wives and children of Governor Truppel and the Shandong Governor Zhou Fu appeared in the Berliner Abend-Zeitung with a caption—“The children of the two Governors”—that seemed to put the Chinese and German Governors on equal footing. 92 When a number of upper-class Chinese moved to Qingdao during the 1911 Republican Revolution, the ban on Chinese residence in the city center was partly lifted. 93 Whereas the dwellings of the Chinese apprentices for the Qingdao dockyard were visually indistinguishable from comparable buildings in Germany (Figure 2), other public buildings such as the railway stations (Figure 3) and the new Governor’s mansion (Figure 4), completed in 1907, combined Chinese and European design elements.

The most striking example of this new form of native policy, which might be characterized as a program of exchange among cultures conceptualized as different but equal, was the Qingdao Chinese-German College (deutsch-chinesische Hochschule). This preparatory school for university-bound Chinese students brought German teachers together with Chinese ones in an atmosphere of respect for a civilizational equal. 94 The original idea for the school came from the Imperial Navy Office, which still had official control over the colony, but the detailed plans were developed by the Sinologist Otto Franke. This signaled the growing importance of educated middle-class specialists in the formation of native policy in Qingdao. 95 When the school opened in 1909 it had a mixed...

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90 On the German depredations in the towns and countryside around Qingdao see BArch Koblenz, Diederichs papers, vol. 24, p. 49; Schrecker (1971); Stichler (1988, 1989); Zhu (1994: 314ff.); Dongfang Zazhi (Shanghai 1904), vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 8–9; Wu (1993: 64); Wenshi Zhiliao Xuanji, no. 5 (Dec. 1978), pp. 75–79; and Shandong sheng lishi xuehui (1961, vol. 3, appendix 53, passim).
91 BArch Freiburg, Truppel papers, vol. 59, p. 3. The citizenship rights of even the wealthier Chinese residents of Qingdao were not equal to Europeans’ rights, but some Chinese were allowed to participate in elections to a mixed council of advisers to the colonial government.
92 Tägliche Sonder-Beilage der Berliner Abend-Zeitung, “Bilder vom Tage,” 16 June 1910, p. 3. Truppel’s papers suggest that he had friendly relations with Zhou Fu; see BArch Freiburg, Nachlass Truppel, vol. 33, Truppel’s correspondence with Zhou Fu (Tshoufu) from Sept. 1903 through Feb. 1908. On Zhou Fu, who governed Shandong from May 1902 until the end of 1904, see Schrecker (1971: 151).
93 Schüler (1912: 361–62); Kolshorn (1911/1912: 168).
94 This paragraph draws on the informative book by Kreissler (1989: 131ff.); see also Tsingtauer Neusten Nachrichten, 26 Oct. 1909, p. 2; Mou 1914; Wenshi Zhiliao Xuanji, no. 1; Franke (1911, 1954); BArch, RM 3, vol. 7001; and Mühlhahn (1999).
95 Franke was not actually employed in the Qingdao government when the school was created but traveled to Beijing to conduct negotiations with the Chinese government concerning the school (Franke 1954: 121ff.). His earlier involvement in Qingdao is discussed in more detail below.
Figure 1. Construction plan for Qingdao, 1898, showing the superimposition of the street plan and buildings, in red, over the existing Chinese village (“Tsintau Dorf”), in black, and the buffer zone between the Chinese settlement (“Chinesen-Stadt Tapautau”) and the city (“Tsintau Stadt”) (from Denkschrift betreffend die Entwicklung von Kiautschou, 1898, Anlage 2).
Figure 2. Settlement of Chinese Apprentices, at the big harbor in Qingdao (1910) (BArch Freiburg, Nachlass Truppel, vol. 62, p. 12 recto).

Figure 3. Qingdao Rail Station (1904) (Ansichten von Tsingtau und dem Hinterlande [n.p.: n.d., ca. 1910]).
curriculum of Chinese and German subjects, including Chinese language and classics and “Western” sciences like physics and chemistry. Religious teaching, which in this context meant European religion, was banned at the Qingdao College—a significant gesture of cultural reconciliation, in light of the centuries of conflict surrounding Christian missionaries in China, culminating most recently in the Boxer rebellion. The colony’s annual report for 1907/08 noted that “the Chinese government has insisted on a parallel Chinese track and curriculum” alongside the German one, commenting that “we agree with their concern that young people not lose touch with their own literature and culture.” According to the report, “the young men should be educated to love their fatherland . . . but also to appreciate German culture and to develop their country according to these values.” Otto Franke insisted that the goal was not to transform the students into Germans or “characterless cultural hermaphrodites” (1911b:204). At the school’s opening ceremony in 1909, speakers from both sides endorsed the idea of combining the best of Chinese and European/German culture. A toast was raised to the Chinese Emperor, the Chinese national anthem was sung, and the school’s German director proclaimed that “all of the cultural peoples (Kulturvölker) are linked by a common bond,” and should “share their discoveries.” Here the Chinese were unambiguously (re)inscribed

96 Denkschrift betreffend die Entwicklung des Kiatschou-Gebiets, vol. 11 (1907/1908), pp. 10–12.
into the dominant pole of the racial/anthropological binary and placed on the same cultural level as the colonizer. The Imperial German and late Qing dynasty flags flew alongside one another in front of the school (Figure 5). 97

Although Governor Truppel objected to the degree of Chinese influence on the school, he was unable to change the agreed-upon plan, which had received backing from an even higher position: the State Secretary of the Imperial Navy Office, Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz (Kreissler 1989:134; Franke 1954:121–22). The balance of power in the colony was shifting partly toward the “Sinologists” and their allies. A recent historical collection published on the occasion of the hundredth anniversary of the German invasion of Qingdao concludes with a section entitled: “German Qingdao: A Model for Cultural Exchange or a Classical Example of Colonial Exploitation?” 98 Neither answer is fully correct. By 1914, Qingdao, had become a practical palimpsest of radically differing approaches to colonial governance.

97 BArch Freiburg, Nachlass Truppel, vol. 81, p. 1.
98 Hiery and Hinz (1999, Part IV).
What were the discursive roots of these two approaches to colonial policy in Qingdao? The ethnographic basis for the second period was a very old Sinophilic perspective whose origins can be traced to the Jesuit mission in China. The most important dimension of the Jesuits’ discourse in the present context was their description of China as a place where hereditary aristocrats did not exist and the commercial bourgeoisie was subordinated to the educated. As Jonathan Spence notes, Matteo Ricci, the first Jesuit in China, presented a “picture of a vast, unified, well-ordered country” run by a “professional bureaucracy” selected on the basis of merit (1998:33). Several German Jesuits were able to flourish in the pursuit of scientific activities under the aegis of the Chinese state, and disseminated positive images of China in Central Europe.

The idea of a country in which power was based on merit rather than money or titles seemed like a utopia to many educated middle-class Europeans in a period before the discourse of Noble Savagery. In Latest News from China (1697/99), Leibniz insisted that “human cultivation and refinement [was] concentrated . . . in Europe and in China.” Europe was superior to China in terms of theoretical or scientific knowledge, Leibniz thought, while China exceeded Europe with regard to social and political arrangements. In a famous burst of relativism, Leibniz called for “missionaries from the Chinese” to Europe, and insisted that the exchange of knowledge between the two cultures “must be reciprocal” (Leibniz 1994:51; 1990:64, my emphasis). The leading German Cameralist philosopher during the eighteenth century, Johann von Justi, went even further, writing that China was “much more civilized and enlightened than we Europeans” (1978:35). And Frederick the Great’s most famous interlocutor, Voltaire, praised China as rationally governed (policé) with a “strictly empirical” and atheistic historiography unencumbered by ideas of creation and sin (1963, Vol. 1:66, 71).

Although the Boxer rebellion crystallized Sinophobic racism, the roots of these sentiments can be traced back at least to the eighteenth century. Whereas Sinophilic panegyrics were anchored most strongly among academics, missionar-

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100 Several editions of Ricci’s writings appeared in German, as did writings by other Jesuit China missionaries such as Giacomo Rho, Fernao Guerreiro, Jean-Baptiste Du Halde, and Louis Le Comte.

101 These German Jesuits included Johann Adam Schall von Bell, Johannes Schreck, and Kilian Stumpf (Duhr 1936; Väth 1991; Malek 1998; Ruland 1973:45; Reil 1978:62, 64, 73).

102 Leibniz (1994:45, my emphasis).
ies, and other sectors of the knowledge-based middle class, Sinophobia’s original social base was the European merchants along the Chinese coast in the eighteenth century. Despite these associations between Sinophilia and intellectuals and Sinophobia and merchants or upper-class Europeans, there were no omnihistorical correlations between class and ethnographic vision. Only when we analyze ethnographic perspectives historically and relationally, placing different observers of China within a common field, can we make sense of these social determinations. The specifically modern connotations of Sinophobia in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries help to explain its attractiveness even for intellectuals in that period (for instance, Hegel 1956:112–38).

Whereas Chinese despotism had seemed more enlightened than European monarchy to Leibniz, the Enlightenment and the French Revolution pushed the imagination of German thinkers like Hegel beyond monarchy. One attraction of places like Tahiti for Johann Forster or Namaqualand for the French explorer François Le Vaillant at the end of the eighteenth century was the idea of radical freedom, the weakness of despotism. But modernizing European intellectuals were still linked politically to the bourgeoisie in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. During the nineteenth century, as the bourgeoisie began to displace the traditional upper classes in politics and economic life, its old oppositional alliance with the intelligentsia disappeared. The educated German middle classes were now doubly dominated by two more powerful elites. The move back toward Sinophilia is thus one sign of an increasing competition between economic capital, aristocratic cultural capital, and educated cultural capital.

Three aspects of the Sinophobic formation are crucial to my analysis. The first is the racialization of the Chinese, their transformation into generic “natives.” Secondly, China was described as having lost any praiseworthy qualities it once may have had, through corruption, decadence, and exposure to the West. Like other precolonial peoples, the Chinese were seen as having become ambiguous, dangerous mimic men, strategically deploying their fluency in Western ways to deceive and manipulate hapless Europeans. Third, specific features of Chinese culture that had been singled out for praise in the Sinophilic literature were now negatively revaluated.

The racialization of the Chinese was critical in wresting them away from their status as a Kulturvolk and aligning them with the catalogue of epithets associated by Europeans, above all, with Africa. This was accomplished in a series of moves over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Europeans had traditionally located China among the upper links of the Great Chain of Being (Lovejoy 1964), or in some separate and parallel universe. During the eighteenth century China began to be included in the schemas of race theorists, craniologists, and physical anthropologists. Carl von Linné’s System of Nature

103 I discuss Le Vaillant (1790, 1796) in Steinmetz (2001a); on Forster, see Nicholas Thomas’ introduction to the re-edition of Johann Forster’s Observations (1996).
(1735) categorized the Chinese as *Homo/Monstrous* along with the “Hottentots,” who were seen by most Europeans as the epitome of debasement during the eighteenth century (Merians 1988). During the nineteenth century the Chinese changed color from “white” to “yellow” in European perception (Demeel 1992). Other writers focused on Chinese facial features or skull shape. Following a standard line of comparison in the Cape Colony, John Barrow suggested physical similarities between the Chinese and the Khoikhoi, moving from there to speculations about their shared origins (1801, Vol. 1:277–83). A German discussion of Barrow included an engraving of Chinese and Khoikhoi faces (Figure 6).

The description of the Chinese as deceptive mimic men received its key impetus from the publication in 1748 of George Anson’s *Voyage Around the World*, which was translated into German in 1795. Commodore Anson’s account of his five-month stay in Macao and Canton was presented as a point-by-point refutation of “jesuitical fictions” (Anson 1974:368, 236), drawing instead on the merchant accounts. Dishonesty, artifice, falsehood, and corruption were

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104 The excerpt from Linné here is from Eze (1997:13).
105 See also Barrow (1805). Conversely, the Khoikhoi were often referred to as “Chinese” at the Cape during this period. Both of Barrow’s travel narratives were translated into German.
the key Chinese traits, for Anson (ibid:351). In a passage that was repeated in many subsequent texts, for example, Anson described one of the tricks used by Chinese merchants: stuffing ducks full of gravel to increase their weight (ibid:355–356). Such deception was closely tied to the Chinese talent for “imitation” (ibid:367). Along similar lines, Herder insisted that Chinese education was little more than training in “manners” (Manieren), and that not just the Chinese national character but even their language was “artificial” (Herder 1985:285).

Sinophobic discourse also encompassed an overarching condemnation of every aspect of Chinese culture that had been praised by the earlier writers. Where the Sinophiles had described Chinese rulers as wise and benevolent philosopher-kings, Montesquieu transformed China into the prototype of despotism and tyranny. China had been applauded by Sinophiles for its conservative stability; the new modish opinion re-coded this as stasis and decline. The absence of a hereditary nobility and sharp class distinctions and the domination of property by education had pleased the Sinophiles, but seemed repugnantly conservative to the Sinophobes (Barrow 1805b:259). The Chinese examination system was viewed as a sham rather than the centerpiece of an exemplary meritocracy. Ferdinand von Richthofen asserted that the Chinese Mandarins were not actually learned but “conceited and supercilious” (Richthofen 1907, Vol. 1:18). Justi had described the Chinese court as thrifty in comparison to the wasteful courts of Europe; Barrow portrayed it as impoverished. The Jesuits had sought common ground with Confucianism; Barrow wrote that Chinese religious beliefs not only “appear absurd and ridiculous” to Europeans but were equally “inexplicable by the people themselves who confess them.”

While Sinophiles eschewed any thought of dominating China, Sinphobic texts often included recommendations for a colonial takeover and practical native policy. The most influential German contributor to this explicitly colonial approach was the geographer Baron Ferdinand von Richthofen. Richthofen accompanied the first Prussian Embassy to the Chinese Emperor in 1860, and returned to China in 1868 to travel for four years, scouting out sites for future mines and ports. As Osterhammel (1987) has shown, Richthofen’s (1907) travel diaries are an excellent source for reconstructing his specific colonial perspective. Noting at the very beginning of his diaries that “I was prepared for

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106 Montesquieu’s *Spirit of Laws* was translated into German four years after its original publication.

107 Barrow (1805b:284). *Contra* arguments for the negative or positive exceptionalism of German precolonial representations of the non-West (compare Zantop 1997, and Berman 1998 for the contrasting views). German discourse on China was almost indistinguishable from representations elsewhere in Europe. There were nationally-specific themes in German colonial fiction, of course, but these were integrated with tropes and ethnographic material that was pan-European (see Hell and Steinmetz forthcoming, and my discussion of *Effie Briest*, below).

108 This paragraph draws on Osterhammel’s excellent essay (1987); see also Stoecker (1958: ch. 5).
disappointments all around,” Richthofen reveals the extent to which he was predisposed to view China through the Sinophobic filter (1907, Vol. 1:23). Richthofen assimilated the Chinese to other colonized peoples, referring to them explicitly throughout his diaries as natives (Eingeborenen)—a category that was juxtaposed to “whites,” as in much colonial law (ibid:26, 84, 116, 119). He objected to the European missionaries’ adoption of Chinese clothing, food, and other customs as a “descent to the customs of a lower race,” insisting that missionaries should “assume a superior standpoint to the native in every respect.” And as Osterhammel points out, Richthofen “traveled by horse, cultivated an aura of unflappability, commanded a servant, did not lift a finger himself, and punished immediately on the spot” (1987:179)—a colonial habitus.

Sinophobic racism reached something of crescendo during the last years of the nineteenth century, and brought with it increased calls for a partition of China. The diaries of Elisabeth von Heyking convey this distinctive mixture of imperialist designs on China and racist imagery. A fairly successful novelist specializing in tales of romance set in overseas locales, Elisabeth von Heyking was living in Beijing during the years leading up to the German annexation of Qingdao with her husband, the German Consul (discussed above in the context of Solf in Calcutta). These conservative Sinophiles were not opposed to Chinese despotism, like Montesquieu and Hegel a century earlier, but simply wanted to replace it with a European colonial despotism. In February 1897, Elisabeth wrote: “Whatever the Chinese might have been before, today they are nothing but dirty barbarians who need a European master and not a European ambassador!” (Heyking 1926:205, also 207, 215). She agreed with her husband’s dehumanizing description of the Chinese officials he worked with in the Zongli Yamen (Foreign Office), calling them “forbidding, staring masks” (1926:191). It is worth noting that these epithets were now applied to the upper-class, educated Chinese who had been the focus of adulation by the Sinophiles.

A DOUBLED DISCOURSE

These racist representations did not completely displace the Sinophilic ones. European discourse on China, even at the end of the nineteenth century, was internally fractured and non-hegemonized. China continued to be represented as an advanced civilization. The German anthropological journal *Globus* frequently described the Chinese as a Kulturvolk that was “just behind the Europeans in the scale of intellectual development” (Karl Andree in *Globus*, Vol. 14,

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109 For example Heyking (1926:199). The partition idea was not endorsed by German Foreign Office officials (Michael 1986), but its ubiquity around the turn of the century is suggestive of the aggressively imperialist atmosphere at the time.

110 Admiral von Diederichs gave a nearly identical description of the Zongli Yamen officials, commenting on their “stupid facial expressions” (BArch Freiburg, Diederichs papers, vol. 24, p. 11). See also Heyking’s novel *Tschun* (1914).
1868:20). Another *Globus* article drew an explicit parallel between the Europeans and the Chinese within their respective parts of the world, arguing that there were three races in China (black, brown, and yellow) and that the “yellow” Chinese were engaged in civilizing their own “savage” (black and brown) neighbors just as the Europeans civilized theirs (Garnier 1875). Gustav Klemm, author of a ten-volume *Cultural History of Mankind*, defended China’s “wonderful form of government, wise laws, advanced moral institutions, in sum, its unique culture” against Sinophobic prejudices (1847:ii).

The continuing multivocality of discourse on China led individual Europeans to contradict themselves and reverse their evaluations from one moment to the next. Texts which set out to criticize Chinese culture were often infused with elements that undercut their intended message, and individual Germans who tried to strike an arrogant colonial posture in their daily interactions with the Chinese often found that their self-presentation was paradoxically permeated by gestures suggesting a latent identification with the target of their manifest disdain. In the first edition of his *General Ethnography*, Friedrich Müller claimed that China could not even “be compared to the West, much less measured by its standards, due to its completely heterogeneous character” (1873:54), but in the second edition, the Chinese figured as one of the various “human races” arranged as successive “moments in a general process of cultural development” (1879:74–77). The anthropologist Oscar Peschel argued in 1867 that the Chinese were even superior to Europeans in one sense (Peschel 1867), but nine years later he insisted that “it is everywhere noticeable that the Chinese do not advance beyond a certain grade of intellectual development” (1876:374).

One of the most interesting examples of the proliferation of disparate codes within a single text is Theodor Fontane’s novel *Effie Briest* (1894). Initially, the “Chinaman” in *Effie Briest* represents the generalized object of desire. This recalls the Sinophilia of writers like Leibniz and Klemm who wreathed China’s extreme heterogeneity in positive affect. But after figuring first as the “exotic”—as a “whole new world to discover” (Fontane 1967:48)—the Chinaman shifts meaning and appears increasingly as a ghost that seems to be mobilized by Effie’s husband as a “means of education” for his young bride (ibid:126). And at a third level, Fontane taps into an aspect of Sinophobia that was most pronounced when the novel appeared, the theme of decay and degeneration. By the late nineteenth century, the topic of degeneracy had been elaborated in ways that linked the “extinction of the primitive peoples” to the enfeeblement of modern Germans and Europeans. China’s place in Sinophobic discourse as the supreme example of a degenerate civilization allowed the Chinaman in Fontane’s novel to articulate sexual transgression with death. Effie suffers a social death of ostracism when her husband discovers the evidence of her earlier affair, and at the end of the novel she is buried outside the Christian graveyard, like the Chinaman before her. Fontane’s novel draws on the full register of
Sinophilic and Sinophobic ideologemes. The arc of the novel, in which repression, illness, and death inexorably overwhelm the protagonist’s initial fascination with the Asian-exotic, neatly tracks the evolution of European discourse on China from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries.

The pressures of Sinophilia are also detectable even within Richthofen’s writing. In a speech to the Berlin Geographical Society at the beginning of the 1870s, for instance, Richthofen referred to the “western and eastern Kulturvölker,” putting China and Europe on the same level.\(^{111}\) By the time he published the first tome of his massive study of China, in 1877, Richthofen attempted to “summarize the totality of Chinese culture” in a way that explicitly encompassed the Sinophile discourse. Here, China presents us on the one hand “with the picture of a splendid accomplishment of the human spirit”; And yet it is “precisely the purified standpoint afforded by the comparatively higher perspective of European civilization which allows us to pay just tribute to this culture.”\(^{112}\)

**CLASS DISTINCTION AND IMAGINARY IDENTIFICATIONS IN GERMAN-CHINA**

In order to understand the role of social class in shaping different groups’ and individuals’ affinities for specific perspectives on China we need to ask first about their strategies for accruing the cultural capital associated with ethnographic discernment. As we saw with Samoa, visions of the colonized Other were adopted partially in order to take a position against colonizers from different social classes. China’s function in this regard was similar to Samoa’s. Both were radically anomalous cultures, from the German perspective. The appreciation of either culture required forms of cultural capital associated with the educated middle class rather than merchants or the older nobility. The fact that this was indeed a kind of “culture war” in which older forms of cultural capital were threatened with devaluation is revealed by the strenuous rejection by members of the older elite of the efforts of educated middle-class “ethnographers” to assert new criteria of distinction. Otto Franke observed that Baron and Baroness von Heyking regarded any interest in Chinese culture as a sign of a “subaltern mentality” (Franke 1954:98). Heyking’s extreme displeasure with Solf’s participation in the Calcutta Asiatic Society many years earlier seems to have reflected a similar view.

The other determinant of European affinities for particular views of China is located at the level of imaginary cross-cultural identification. The prevailing European fantasy involved projecting oneself into the role of a Chinese Mandarin or a philosopher-king ruling over a literate and civilized people. Such identifications did not allow one to accrue cultural capital within the relation-

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\(^{112}\) Starting in the 1890s, Richthofen’s publications took on a more explicitly colonial tone (1897, 1898, 1902).
Figure 7. Bishop Anzer in Mandarin clothing (from Gründer 1982: fig. 33).
al, symbolic force-fields of struggle for cultural capital. But they did provide an imaginary solution to the tensions of membership in a dominated sector of the elite.

The fantasy of becoming a Chinese Mandarin was so powerful that some Germans were culturally converted by the very people they were consciously working to convert or conquer. Bishop Anzer of the Steyler Mission provides an especially interesting example of this, since he was the most powerful and most vigorously colonialist of the German missionaries in Shandong province. Anzer’s actions during the 1880s and 1890s were oriented toward humiliating the Chinese and provoking an incident that would justify a German military intervention in the province. Indeed, the official justification for the German Navy’s invasion of Qingdao in 1897 was the murder of two of Anzer’s missionaries in southwestern Shandon, probably by members of the anti-missionary society Dadao Hui (Big Sword Society; see Schrecker 1971:33). Like his Jesuit predecessors and the missionaries criticized by Richthofen for descending into the “customs of a lower race,” however, Anzer often wore Chinese clothing, spoke Chinese, ate Chinese food, and adopted other elements of a Chinese lifestyle (Figure 7). Most revealingly, Anzer worked to gain official recognition by the Chinese as a Mandarin, and by 1902 he had attained the rank of first class Mandarin (Gründer 1982:288). This striving for a form of distinction that was not at all fungible in the European (pre)colonial cultural market drew Anzer toward the Chinese elite. At the same time, his search for symbolically recognizable status pulled him toward the Sinophobic discourse associated at the time with the most powerful sectors of the German elite.114

A final complication in this arena of imaginary cross-identification with the colonized is revealed by Baron von Richthofen. As Jürgen Osterhammel has noted, Richthofen’s Chinese diaries are paradoxical in that their consciously colonialist stance is constructed around a mimicry of the authoritative posture, if not the clothing, of the Chinese mandarin. Osterhammel views Richthofen’s behavior as ironic (1987:179), but there was more than irony in his role-playing. Richthofen’s contradictory class location (Wright 1979) can help explain his combined deployment of the Sinophilic and Sinophobic codes. By articulating Wright’s notion of contradictory class locations with Bourdieu’s theory of cultural capital we can understand how some locations are strongly attached to one particular ethnographic perspective and imaginary identification, while others tend to embrace multiple, contradictory perspectives and identifications.

By the time he published his diaries Richthofen was himself an educated Ger-

113 Anzer was assisted in his move up the Chinese hierarchy by Max von Brandt, the German Consul who preceded von Heyking in Beijing (von Brandt 1901, vol. 3, p. 77; also Bornemann 1977).

114 Anzer’s approach to his class dilemma differed from Solf’s, partly due to the missionary’s humble origins—his father was a peasant and butcher, not an industrialist (Kuepers 1974:21, note 1; Bautz 1990:195–96). As an arrivé even within the dominated world of the educated, Anzer was poorly positioned to assert the distinctive virtues of the social class into which he had arrived.
man “Mandarin” in Ringer’s (1969) classic sense. Richthofen established and headed various geographic institutes and societies and served as Rector of the University of Berlin. When Germany annexed Qingdao, Richthofen was a member of an official committee of academics and industrialists advising the government on colonial policy, the *Kolonialrat*. In addition to his academic status as German Mandarin, Richthofen was a scion of the Prussian aristocracy, and his career and subjectivity were shaped by that social class and its proximity to power. Richthofen’s parents were close to the royal family of Württemberg (Engelmann 1988:7) and his family belonged to the *Alter Briefadel*, second in age and prestige only to the *Uradel* among the German nobility (Hampe 2001:182). His family origins and connections to Prussia’s political elite and to the business world pushed Richthofen toward Sinophobia, while his status as academic Mandarin pulled him in the opposite direction, toward the Sinophilia characteristic of practicing Sinologists, and toward an imaginary identification with the role of Chinese Mandarin. Fittingly, Richthofen’s massive five-volume geographical project, *China*, received financial support from two Prussian Ministries—Culture and Commerce (Richthofen 1877:Vol. 1, XI).

**CLASS STRUGGLE WITHIN THE COLONIAL STATE**

The emergence of a “multivocal” colonialism in Qingdao in the decade before the Japanese invasion in 1914 is explained by the perceived association between Sinophilia and ethnographic acumen, the growing number of Sinologists or translators within the colonial administration, and some Germans’ identification with the Chinese. The initiatives for policies of cultural exchange emanated mainly from the university-trained translators and Sinologists. A later German Consul recalled this shift in the center of gravity away from what he called the “more effective” consular service personnel to the “professionals” (*Fachleute*) and career translators (*Dolmetscherlaufbahn*) in China. He accused the latter groups of having undergone a process of “Sinification” due to their “long stay in the country.”

The tone within the colonial administration was increasingly set by men like Otto Franke, who drew up the plans for the Qingdao *Hochschule*, and Dr. Schrameier, the long-serving Commissioner for Chinese Affairs in the colony and author of the Qingdao *Landordung* (property regulations) which tried to

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115 Richthofen’s travels in China between 1868 and 1872 were “financed by the Bank of California during the first year and thereafter by the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce” which “represented British and American business interests” (Osterhammel 1987:170).

116 There were important exceptions to this rule: Weber’s *Religion of China* was structured around the standard Sinophobic assumption of Chinese stagnation and relied primarily on de Groot, a Professor at the University of Berlin who considered China “semi-civilized” (de Groot 1892:X). As Pigulla (1996:35) notes, Weber blindly accepted de Groot’s claim that the Chinese *conform* to the world rather than *dominating* it.

stem land speculation. Franke became the first Professor of Sinology in Germany in 1909, the year in which the Qingdao Hochschule opened, and was later called the “most prominent sinologist in Germany.” Franke’s strategies for cultural class distinction resembled those of Wilhelm Solf, and two men’s careers overlapped at numerous points. Franke and Solf had both studied Sanskrit with the same professors at Göttingen and Kiel. In 1887, Franke enrolled in the newly founded Seminar für Orientalische Sprachen at the Friedrich-Wilhelm-Universität in Berlin to study Chinese, and again met Solf. A year later Franke began a career as a translator with the German consular service in China. Having been told by Solf about his unpleasant interactions with von Heyking in Calcutta, Franke suddenly found himself in 1897 working under the same man, who was now the German Consul to China. Franke acted as translator during the Chinese-German “negotiations” concerning the annexation of Qingdao and strongly disapproved of von Heyking’s haughty manner with his Chinese counterparts (1954:100). Franke noted later that both of the Heykings had adopted the view of the Chinese as “dirty, cowardly, retarded, and disgusting” that was common among Europeans at the time (ibid:98, also p. 37). Like Solf, Franke preferred to associate with intellectuals, “scientists,” and especially other Sinologists while abroad, and this pattern persisted throughout his career. During a posting in Shanghai Franke attended sessions of the local Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, just as Solf had participated in the Bengal Asiatic Society. Like Solf, Franke had a clear distaste for German military types and aristocrats, and was ambivalent at best about businessmen. He disparaged officials who were ignorant about China and Germans who believed in the “yellow peril” and exhibited an “artificially heightened race feeling” (Franke 1911a:vi).

In addition to these cultural distinction strategies directed toward other Europeans, Franke cross-identified with Chinese elites. In his memoirs Franke recalled his proud refusal to follow the “typical custom of waiting indefinitely in the antechamber” (1954:117) in order to meet an official in the Prussian Ministry of Culture, and speculated that his pride had cost him a teaching post. Just a few pages earlier in the same text Franke had reported on Prince Chun’s refusal to perform three kowtows to Kaiser Wilhelm during his “Atonement Mission” to Berlin after the Boxer rebellion (ibid:111; Hetze 1987). Franke’s identification seemed to include a mixture of cultural pride and humiliation which he associated with the image of the Chinese. Franke presented himself as be-

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118 Schrameier was a member of the Bund deutscher Bodenreformer. His Landordnung was intended to prevent land speculation in the colony. See Matzat (1986) for the long list of Schrameier’s publications on the topic and also Weicker (1908:110); on Franke, see Leutner (1991).


120 Franke later recalled having felt especially happy during a period spent with a “homogeneous circle” of journalists at a Cologne newspaper (Franke 1954:73, 95, 129).

121 Franke’s memoirs were written before Germany’s defeat in World War II but were not published until 1954. His narrative of Prince Chun’s “atonement mission” may have been overdetermined by the earlier humiliation of Germany in the Versailles Treaty, but there is no textual evidence for this in his memoirs or his Geschichte des chinesischen Reiches (1930–1936).
ing more interested in how he was seen by “educated Chinese” than by other Germans (Franke 1954:100), but his pronounced *ressentiment* vis-à-vis these German elites sheds a different light on the entire complex.

The ultimate result of such fantasies of identification within a colonial context is that they tend to countermand the rule of difference. This points to one of the central paradoxes of Sinophilia during the colonial period in Qingdao. The fantasy of becoming a Chinese Emperor or Mandarin was difficult to reconcile with the asymmetrical assumptions of colonial domination. The logical conclusion for German Sinologists in Qingdao would have been to abdicate German colonial claims and pursue a German-Chinese partnership. Franke openly condemned colonialism in China. Indeed, Governor Truppel recognized that Chinese participation in running the Chinese-German College was “injurious to German sovereignty in the Protectorate” 122 and resisted it. The full force of this contradiction was never felt, however, because identification remained largely unconscious and the German colony fell to Japan in 1914.

**Social and Cultural Theory and Colonial State Formation**

This paper has explored the force of precolonial descriptions of non-Europeans in shaping native policy. Rather than rejecting colonial discourse theory for its reductionism, I have attempted to embed its claims *socially*, within symbolic struggles for cultural distinction, *psychically*, within processes of imaginary identification, and *politically*, acknowledging the significance of the structure of the colonial state and the role of resistance and collaboration by the colonized. This emphasis is not intended to deny the significance of economic or military considerations or formations of discourse that are not concerned with particular ethnic groups. Each of these additional factors was important in over-coding the effectivity of the mechanisms discussed in this article, and in their own right.

Responses by the colonized placed limits on the ability of any paradigm of native policy to be successfully implemented or reproduced. Robinson (1972, 1986) has called attention to the impact of patterns of collaboration and resistance on the structure of colonial governance. Without insisting with Robinson that the “foundations of empire” are *entirely* non-European, collaboration and resistance were crucial factors in the success or failure of any colonial policy. The relative success of policies of “regulated preservation” in Samoa depended on the willingness of Samoans to collaborate in the practical definition of their culture that was expressed in these policies. The Southwest African Witboois, after cooperating with practices that constructed them as noble warrior-savages for an entire decade, took up arms against the German state in 1904, putting an abrupt end to Governor Leutwein’s program. 123

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122 As recalled by Franke (1954:125). Franke claims to have been critical of the German annexation of Qingdao at the time and even seems to view the Boxers’ “fury” as a justified reaction to European imperialism (Franke 1954:100).

123 The Witbooi soldiers who had been fighting alongside Germans against the Herero in the
Colonial governance also encompassed policies that were concerned with economic, military, or settler issues. These interventions inevitably affected the colonized, however, even if they were not conceptualized explicitly as native policy. These motives are more visible in German Southwest Africa than in the two cases examined here. The German government’s decision to allow investors to buy up huge chunks of land in Southwest Africa, and to sit idly on their property waiting for diamonds to be discovered throughout the 1880s and 1890s, had enormous implications for the Herero, even if this was an “economic” rather than a “native” policy. The decision at the highest levels of the German government to grant General von Trotha “supreme executive power” in 1904 and to shift authority for the colony temporarily to the War Office and General Staff (Bley 1996:159) was motivated by a focus on security for the colonial settlers. Even the internal polemic against Trotha by Leutwein and German Chancellor Bülow was framed almost entirely in terms of the Hereros’ economic indispensability to the colony.124

It is worth exploring in this context the partial exceptionalism of Southwest Africa compared to Samoa and Qingdao. One of the reasons economic and military considerations were able to trump native policy so decisively during the 1904 war in Namibia was that ethnographic discourse on the Herero was so overwhelmingly negative. Because the Herero had been defamed so systematically for such a long time and the representations were so overwhelmingly homogeneous, individual German colonizers had little material to work with in pursuing projects of imaginary class exaltation. There were no footholds for carving out opposing ethnographic stances. As a result, the conflict between Trotha and Leutwein in 1904 was framed around the issue of how to define the field—as a colonial or a military one—and not as a conflict over native policy.125 Leutwein insisted that the decision concerning the extermination or banishment of the Herero was a political, not a military decision, and that it therefore fell under his purview as Governor. The fact that he was forced to contest the definition of the field rather than insisting on the superiority of his own ethnographic discernment reflected the monolithic character of discourse on the Herero. This uniformity of discourse, in turn, reflected the more general European racial theories and schemas, which were overwhelmingly negative about sub-Saharan black Africans. In Samoa and Qingdao, and in the case of the South-

first half of 1904 were cunningly disarmed before they had heard about their leader’s declaration of war against the colonizers and deported to Togo, where most succumbed to the drastic change in climate. The other Witboois who were not killed in battles with the Germans were imprisoned at the notorious prisoner-of-war camp on Shark Island, where the death rate was extraordinary (RKA, vol. 2140, p. 88 verso, Telegram from Oberleutnant Estoff to Foreign Office in Berlin, 10 Apr. 1907). In 1910, the remaining ninety-six members of the Witbooi people were deported to Cameroon, including the Protestant minister “little Hendrik Witbooi,” son of the former Kaptein and a long-time protégé of the Rhenish Missionary Society. A small number of survivors returned to Southwest Africa in 1913 (VEM, 2.597, pp. 28–30, 56).


125 See RKA vol. 2089, p. 21 (Leutwein, 28 Oct. 1904 to Colonial Department of Foreign Office); also pp. 32–33 (Leutwein to Trotha, 30 Oct. 1904).
west African Witboois, by contrast, the details of European ethnographic representation affected colonial native policy. There was no unmediated, direct effect of economic interests on colonial native policy.

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