

Professor Avrekh characterizes the interparliamentary action as a tug of war within the Duma and the government which led to ministerial and parliamentary crises that sharpened the crises of the ruling element and led to the bankruptcy of the bourgeois-*pomeshchik* parties. His rigid adherence to class motivation and definition and his assumption that the oppositional and governmental policies were complete failures leave the reader with the polaric choices familiar in the old Bolshevik arguments.

The Kadets—the essential element of the parliamentary effort—are identified as the intellectual segment of the bourgeoisie who feared revolution and were motivated mainly by political and economic considerations. Avrekh will not accept the possibility that the social revolutionary course could have been rejected on philosophical grounds—as the least desirable way to realize a stable and affluent society—and the parliamentary solution preferred. Hence any recognition of the real limitations of the Duma is seen as an accommodation with the ruling forces and the Right; and efforts to protect the fledgling institution against charges of illegality, with their drastic potential for further restrictions, are regarded as evidence of treachery and cowardice. Anything to the right of the Kadets is flatly reactionary, and ultimately the Kadets must be so stamped, because of their opposition to the “democratic,” proletarian revolution.

A consistent Leninist, Avrekh does not admit the viability of a constitutional solution. To identify the failure of the regime’s nationalist policies with the collapse of the parliamentary movement is to beg the question. The problem of the Third Duma requires at least an analytical focus on the possibilities for accommodation to the realities of the period. The land settlement, education, and western zemstvo laws were about what could be expected, given the “relationship of forces.” But they were not necessarily the last word in their respective legislative areas. Avrekh’s exposition of the parliamentary course of labor bills (trade union, insurance) is enlightening. It is eminently clear that the bureaucracy, regardless of its motivation for enacting these bills, understood the need for reform and was aware of the workers’ attitudes—as opposed to those of management and its special interests.

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FAREWELL TO THE DON: THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION IN THE JOURNALS OF BRIGADIER H. N. H. WILLIAMSON. By *H. N. H. Williamson*. Edited by *John Harris*. New York: John Day, 1971. 290 pp. \$6.95.

This book is based on a diary kept from April 1919 to early 1920, when its author served as a volunteer with the British military mission in Russia, in the Don Cossack region. His job was to advise the Don army on the use of artillery supplied through the aid effort mounted by Churchill on behalf of the anti-Bolshevik forces after the Allied governments failed to achieve either a peace conference or a clear policy on intervention. The book is the story of the painful disillusionment of an adventurous young officer whose energies were fired by conservative anti-Communist zeal. Consisting almost entirely of his own experiences, the diary presents an intensely personal microcosm of the larger conflict. The editor, who is responsible for its publication, has added general comments which attempt to put these reminis-

cences into context, but what the book really has to offer is a few intimate details in the complex story of the Allied intervention in Russia.

Brigadier Williamson and his fellow Allied officers, with a few exceptions, were virtually ignorant of Russia and the events which preceded their coming in 1919. Williamson tells how he arrived there, "in a spirit of adventure and of preservation of the traditional ethics of the caste to which I belonged," to help Russians "loyal to their murdered Tsar." He was therefore both baffled and angered to discover that the Russian commander was "morbidly sensitive against aristocrats, courtiers, and officers of the ex-Imperial Guard" and that his own British superiors were quick to issue "emphatic orders" against any sign of support for monarchists. Worse still, from beginning to end he found that the leaders on both sides, Russian and Allied, "were always wrong" and that the war, often an astonishingly primitive conflict, was fought with incredible inefficiency, waste, and bungling.

Williamson is correct in the latter judgment, of course, but what his account reveals exceptionally well is the naïveté and ineptness of so many of the Allied officers who were sent to Russia by the intervention. If his book contains numerous errors, they somehow make its message seem even more authentic. The value of this simple memoir lies in its lower level—hence all the more vivid—portrayal of the agonizing frustration felt by those heroic but confused officers who found themselves fighting a war they did not understand under conditions that brought death more often from disease than from bullets. The general reader will find the book exciting but often misleading; the specialist will find in it another footnote to the history of the period.

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THE WHITE GENERALS: AN ACCOUNT OF THE WHITE MOVEMENT AND THE RUSSIAN CIVIL WAR. By *Richard Luckett*. New York: Viking Press, 1971. xviii, 413 pp. \$10.00.

"St. Petersburg is referred to as St. Petersburg throughout," writes Mr. Luckett in his preface. This sentence is a warning: the author dislikes not only the reforms of the March Revolution, but believes that even the tsarist government introduced a few too many innovations. One wonders how Luckett, an Englishman, refers to his royal family. After all, the family name, Windsor, was adopted at the same time and for the same reason that the name of the Russian capital was changed.

Indeed, Luckett is a conservative who cannot see any justification for revolutionary upheaval. However, his conservatism is rarely relevant, for he has no interest in political issues. His insistence on calling the Russian capital by its pre-1914 name is merely a manifestation of the same eccentricity which makes him write that the national independence struggle of the Finns was somehow more a part of the Russian Civil War than the wars of the other nationalities—Poles, Letts, Estonians, Georgians, and many others.

Luckett has no patience for describing the issues over which the Civil War was fought. He does not analyze the political views of the White leaders, and he has little understanding of the brittleness of the alliance of forces which made up the anti-Bolshevik side. He is content to say nothing more than what is obvious