Accordingly, the party identification theory of electoral stability apparently cannot help us explain Weimar voting” (p. 1220). This dichotomous present/absent approach to the question of lasting attachments to political parties cannot, in my opinion, be spread evenly across the board in the Weimar case without tending to distort our understanding of the phenomenal rise of the NSDAP as an electoral vehicle from 1928 to 1932. It is necessary to differentiate strongly, as scholars such as Lipset and Bracher do, between the qualitatively higher levels of voter stability, even through the worst depression years, of the SPD, KPD, and Zentrum, and the nearly complete electoral annihilation of all non-Catholic bourgeois parties (with partial exception of Hugenberg’s anti-system Nationalists).

A more satisfactory approach might utilize party identification not as a dichotomous system-wide variable but rather as a party-specific variable within the tendence or bloc model. This, it seems to me, would more adequately take into account the organizational continuity of several parties and mass organizations, particularly the SPD and the Catholic parties, from the Kaiserreich to Weimar, as opposed to the hastily built Protestant bourgeois parties founded only after the Revolution of 1918.

The above revisions in the tendence approach might also be useful in comparing the development from Kaiserreich to Weimar to Bundesrepublik of party identification within each bloc. The mild recession of 1966–67 in West Germany and the accompanying quick rise (and equally quick decline) of the NPD, with many similarities to the NSDAP in ideology and voter appeal (see my The National Democratic Party: Right Radicalism in the Federal Republic of Germany [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970]), indicates that this line of inquiry is still of substantive as well as theoretical concern in the area of German politics.

JOHN D. NAGLE

Syracuse University

TO THE EDITOR:

I believe that Professor Nagle has essentially restated here one of the arguments which I myself tried to make in my article. I distinguished there between party identification and loyalty to a socioeconomic bloc. Thus, I interpreted the collapse of the non-Catholic bourgeois parties as resulting from the fact that they represented the same bloc as the Nazi Party, and that in the near-absence of party identification, there was nothing to prevent their voters from moving to the Nazis. By contrast, the KPD, SPD, and Zentrum represented different blocs, and bloc loyalty prevented their voters from moving to the Nazis.

Professor Nagle, as I read his letter, would prefer to treat bloc loyalty as a type of party identification. I do not think this would be fruitful since, as I suggest in my article, there are theoretically interesting differences between the two kinds of loyalty, both in the way they are acquired and in the way in which they manifest themselves in the electorate.

Two of Professor Nagle’s suggestions are particularly useful:

(1) At some points in my article, for convenience in writing, I referred to the “absence” of party identification among the Weimar electorate. What my interpretation of Weimar voting suggests, however, and all that is necessarily supported by my findings, is that the level of party identification in Weimar was very low. A dichotomy between the “presence” and “absence” of party identification is unnecessary and untenable.

(2) Professor Nagle’s emphasis on the organizational history of the parties is well-placed. This could help to explain, for example, why the inroads of the Nazi Party on other parties of its bloc were so much more complete than the inroads of the Communist Party on its rival, the Social Democratic Party.

W. PHILLIPS SHIVELY

University of Minnesota

TO THE EDITOR:

Read the Mendelson piece in the latest, December 1972, APSR, “From Warren To Burger,” 1226–1233, and came across at least one grievous error/boo-boo. (So it seems to me because I have just finished a soon-to-be-published volume on Justice Black and Due Process, etc.) Mendelson, on page 1228, claims that “there was no dissent” in the important case of Boddie v. Connecticut. There was, indeed, a dissenting opinion, a very forceful dissenting opinion written by a Justice of the Court since 1937 who had, since his elevation to the Court, fought against judicial intervention and oversight functioning regarding the social and economic activities of state legislatures: Hugo Lafayette Black.

In the Boddie case, as in countless hundreds of opinions before, Black criticized the employment of the Frankfurter/Harlan et al. “fundamental fairness”/“shock the conscience” standard to evaluate the reasonableness and consti-
tutionality of state legislation. "Such a test," Black wrote in dissent, "willfully throws away the certainty and security that lies in a written Constitution, one that does not alter with a judge's health, belief, or his politics. I believe the only way to steer this country toward its great destiny is to follow what our constitution says, not what the judges think it should have said."

Knowing that Black would not like the thought of being associated with the subjective "shock the conscience"/"fundamental fairness" doctrine he so thoroughly criticized during his tenure as Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, I do hope you print this correction.

HOWARD BALL

Hofstra University

TO THE EDITOR:

I am very disturbed by the political bias that Professor Yang used in his review of my book, The Politics of Formosan Nationalism, APSR, 66 (June, 1972), 654-655. It might well have been written in Peking or Taipei because both regimes have blacklisted me for years and jailed hundreds of persons advocating self-determination for Taiwan.

My main objection is that he ignored the key purpose of the book, which was to present the views of native Taiwanese at home and abroad toward their postwar condition. My personal views were not the focus, as Professor Yang implies, nor do I feel today as I did three years ago when the book appeared. The changes in world politics since 1970 affect Taiwan especially, and have turned many who used to support the Taiwanese cause toward Peking or the KMT. Today the right of all 15 million on Taiwan to decide their future is paramount.

Professor Yang's criticism of my aim does not stand up, but I prefer to allow readers to judge for themselves the difficulty of studying native opinions in Taiwan, Rhodesia, Southwest Africa, or any Communist nation. The book explains fully why I could not use quantitative surveys as I have often done in Japan (the USIA told me it has never been able to ask sensitive political questions in Taiwan polls). To suggest that I should have surveyed overseas Chinese opinions ignores the fact that most are not Taiwanese but mainlander descendants with little interest in or knowledge of Taiwan. I used all available secondary sources, including official Nationalist books and media, but never accepted official "facts" as automatically valid or relevant to the perception of the 13 million Taiwanese whose attitudes were my concern.

Finally, to claim that my book "performs a disservice to the betterment of Sino-American friendship" is to apply a standard which should never be used in academic reviews: I was not writing to please any government or further official policies. That would be the sole yardstick used by the two Chinese regimes in deciding whether or not to allow publication of a book. I am glad it is not used to censor American newspapers, magazines, or academic work.

DOUGLAS H. MENDEL, JR.
University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee

TO THE EDITOR:

I regret very much that Professor Mendel was "disturbed" by the "political bias" in my review of his book, The Politics of Formosan Nationalism. First, the "key purpose" of the book was recognized rather than "ignored," if one noted my remarks throughout the review. My major reservation was that the author passionately represented the views of an elite minority as being the voice of all 15 million people in Taiwan.

Professor Mendel wants his readers to believe that both the difficulty of scientific research inside Taiwan and the inadvisability of interviewing overseas Chinese would justify "those limitations" in the measurement devices of his behaviorist methodology. Consequently, his readers are expected to accept his conclusions that only the views of certain elite minority groups can be presented. Surprisingly, Professor Mendel mentioned nothing about the statistical lacunae and factual discrepancies I had cited, even though "all secondary sources available, and all KMT official data" were consulted. Besides, debunkers would not be impressed with the omission of a well-balanced bibliography.

Inasmuch as Professor Mendel stated in his book that he could fulfill his duty as a political scientist "to make his research available to the public as well as to governments and other scholars," one wonders whether Professor Mendel would still disclaim any credit should his advice have been adopted by the American Government in 1969 and after. Since that time, changes in world politics and the Nixon Administration's new China policy have not only crippled the movement of Formosan independence but also disconfirmed the predictions of The Politics of Formosan Nationalism. Obviously, the counsel of Professor Mendel's book did not serve the best interests of the governments concerned. Finally, Professor Mendel admitted in his letter that his own views were not the focus nor does he feel today as he did in 1969 when he read the final proofs before