The Rise and Fall of the Transpacific Slave Trade

In 1635, a young man from the Malabar Coast in India named Antonio arrived in Acapulco on board the ship *Nuestra Señora de la Limpia Concepción*.¹ His master, a Spanish resident of Cavite in the Philippines, had asked a sailor on the ship to take Antonio with him and sell Antonio on his behalf. The sale price upon landing was 200 pesos, paid by a slave trader who turned around and sold Antonio in Mexico City for almost double the price. The surviving documentation that details Antonio’s journey from Asia to Mexico reveals the many steps and intermediaries who were involved in the transpacific slave trade, as well as the profits that drove this commerce.

From the late 1560s through the early 1700s, individual traders brought slaves from the Philippines to Mexico aboard the ships of the Manila Galleon. This chapter examines the transpacific trade during a key period of transition for the larger slave trade to Spanish America, when slavers dealt in people from Asia and Africa. The slaves who crossed the Pacific were part of much larger influx of slaves to Spanish America.² As such, their story must be examined in the context of Spain’s effort, beginning in the sixteenth century, to supply the colonies with slave labor. This empire-wide framework allows for fruitful comparisons between the Pacific and the Atlantic trades. When they started, both operated under a licensing system, with the Atlantic trade shifting to a monopoly system in the late

¹ AGN Jesuitas 2–6 exp.32 (1635).
seventeenth century. During this transition, the Pacific remained open to individual traders, which threatened Atlantic interests. As late as 1680, the Spanish crown resisted the efforts of Atlantic traders to shut it down because it had a vested interest in maintaining some direct licensing privileges. It eventually became clear, however, that use of licenses made for a leaky system that allowed a great deal of contraband, which was against everyone’s interests, especially the crown’s, which lost duties. In time, the monopoly system prevailed in part because the companies were better able to deliver steady rents to the royal treasury and a somewhat regulated number of slaves.

The story of the transpacific slave trade serves as a unique lens for understanding the development of the larger trade to Spanish America. The period of the trade in the Pacific (late 1560s to early 1700s) indicates that the slave trade as a whole changed with the advent of the foreign asientos (monopoly companies), which worked out of West Africa. In this sense, the reorganization of the slave trade and the consolidation of supply networks in the Atlantic arena led to the Africanization of slavery at the end of the seventeenth century. In part, Africans became the consummate slaves in Spanish America because European companies that only traded in African slaves came to dominate the market. The end point also marks the larger study as a whole, which focuses on chino slaves (the general term for all slaves who traveled across the Pacific) in Mexico. After 1672, there was no market for the chinos, for the simple reason they could no longer be legally held as slaves in Spanish America. The end of the transpacific trade thus brings into focus the interconnectedness between these two stories: the rise of the monopoly slave trading companies and the end of non-African slavery in Spanish America.

The transpacific trade involved peoples from disparate places, including East Africa, Portuguese India, the Muslim sultanates of Southeast Asia, and the Spanish Philippines. Once the slaves arrived in Acapulco, they were categorized as either blacks (negros), also called cafres, or chinos.3 Many slaves, however, were not classified at all in the treasury records of incoming slaves, or in other kinds of documentation. It is therefore impossible to calculate the percentage of slaves who were from any one region.4 Any estimate of the overall trade must be understood as including both

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3 The word cafre stemmed from the Portuguese cáfer, which in turn derived from the Arabic kāfir for pagan. It was used to refer to black slaves from all parts of Africa.
4 The records of the royal treasury at Acapulco from 1590 to 1760 are found in AGI Contaduría, volumes 897 to 907.
blacks and chinos. The surviving records only allow for the general observation that Africans became more numerous in the second half of the seventeenth century. Their increased numbers point to the critical shift emphasized in this study, which is that Africans became the sole people who could be legally sold at market throughout the Spanish empire. In this regard, it is also important to emphasize that the transpacific trade shifted to Africans as the result of the crackdown on indigenous slavery in the Philippines and to changes in the supply lines to the Manila market. As the asiento holders realized that more and more Africans were arriving via the Pacific route, they moved to end the competition. They thus solidified their own monopoly control over the influx of Africans to Spanish America via the Atlantic by preventing trade on the Pacific.

The chapter is divided into three main sections. The first examines the experience of slaves on the Manila Galleon and approximates the number of people who made the journey. The second section outlines the development of the licensing system in the Pacific context and details its governing laws. It also describes how the trade actually functioned at the ground level. The final section provides a comparative perspective on the Atlantic by charting the growth of the asiento system. It describes how the Atlantic traders solidified their control, with direct reference to the Pacific.

SURVIVING THE MANILA RUN

The Manila Galleon, which sailed once a year, was the sole form of transport across the Pacific during this period. It was Spain’s link to Asia. The ships, maintained at inordinate cost to the royal treasury, crossed the ocean’s vast expanse to connect the colonies (Figure 3.1). Spaniards in the Philippines depended on the Galleon’s safe two-way crossing for their economic and political survival. So every year, royal officials in Manila and Acapulco strained to ready the ships and prepare the passengers for

5 For example, in 1682, don Tomás Mendayas purchased a negro named Antonio Ramos in the Philippines to serve him on his journey to Mexico and sold him on arrival. AGN Historia 408 f.178r (1682). Similarly, the Italian chronicler Gemelli Careri was accompanied by an African slave in 1696. Giovanni Francesco Gemelli Careri, Viaje a La Nueva España, trans. Francisca Perujo (México: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1976), 12.

6 See Chapter 2 for an analysis of the restrictions faced by Portuguese slave traders after 1640 and the end of the Iberian Union.

7 A royal decree from 1604 reiterated that Acapulco was to be the sole port allowed to receive merchandise from the Asia trade, which was absolutely banned from Peru. AGI Filipinas 43 N.1 (1604).
the months-long journey. The slaves who embarked in the Philippines labored in these arrangements and then boarded the ships as human cargo.

The Galleon was part of an empire-wide system of royally sponsored navigation routes or runs (*carreras*), which aimed to regulate trade flows and also protect ships from pirates. In this capacity, the Manila Galleon was sometimes referred to as the Eastern Islands Run (*carrera de las Islas del Poniente*). On the way to Mexico, the ships carried bales of Chinese silks and Indian cottons, porcelain, spices, and wax; they returned laden with silver. As a royal route, there were restrictions on the volume of the ships’ cargo known as the permission (*permiso*). The enforcement of these cargo restrictions, however, was notoriously slack, and it was common for galleons to carry merchandise worth four times the official allowance. Despite the dangers of overloading, merchants and officials connived to falsify ship registries and embark with as much merchandise as possible on sealed crates (*tinajas*). One Spaniard threatened before the 1620 voyage to Mexico that he would “stab any passenger found opening his crates, even if his name was Christ.” Generalized fraud was commonplace throughout the Galleon’s history.

As in the other runs, the ships of the Manila Galleon were funded by the royal treasury, which set strict guidelines for their size and design. The emphasis was on solid construction to safeguard the cargo from the perils of sea travel. For defense purposes, the Manila Galleon was supposed to sail as two armed ships: one headed by an admiral called *almiranta* and another by a captain called *capitana*. There were many years, however,

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9 For information about the Galleon’s cargo from Mexico to the Philippines during this period, see Ostwald Sales Colín, “Las cargazones del galeón de la carrera de poniente: primera mitad del siglo XVII,” *Revista de Historia Económica* 18, no. 3 (2000).

10 En route to Mexico, the permiso allowed each ship to carry a total value of 250,000 pesos in goods; on the return trip, the cargo could not exceed 500,000 silver pesos or bullion. The cargo limitations were a concession to the merchants of Seville, who wanted the Manila Galleon abolished altogether because the ships brought merchandise that competed with their own products. The law capping the amounts of merchandise and silver allowed on the Manila Galleon was first issued in 1593 and re-issued in 1604 and 1619; it was codified as book 9, title 45, law 6 of the Laws of the Indies.

11 AGN Inquisición 220 exp.8 f.109 (1623).

12 The crown limited the size of the galleons to 300 tons, but the ships were built in the port of Cavite in the Philippines, far from regular supervision. By the 1620s, the galleons weighed upward of 1,000 tons to accommodate larger cargoes. They remained that size until the eighteenth century, when galleons weighing more than 2,000 tons became common. William Lytle Schurz, *The Manila Galleon* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1959), 194–5.
when only one ship made the crossing, in part because of the high cost associated with their building and maintenance. The Manila Galleon also required significant crews to navigate and protect the ships, which traversed through the world’s “roughest seas and through the greatest currents.” Notably, the crew alone amounted to about 250 of the 400 people who generally sailed on each ship during the seventeenth century, including some blacks who were listed as “His Majesty’s slaves.”

The passage across the Pacific from Manila to Acapulco was extremely long and dangerous. The ships had to navigate against major currents with only the assistance of wind and rowing power. The trip from Manila to Acapulco could take up to six months, exposing the ships to endless storms and inclement weather. The Italian traveler Giovanni Gemelli Careri wrote vividly about his “tedious and dreadful voyage” in 1696: “There was hunger, thirst, sickness, cold, continual watching and other sufferings, besides the terrible shocks from side to side caused by the furious beating of the waves.” To add to the miseries, “the ship swarmed with little vermin of sundry colors,” so the passengers were “never clear of a universal itch.” There was nothing to do day after day except keep clear of the currents of water that poured over every inch of the ship. Gemelli may have bitterly complained, but he was a cabin passenger, which meant that he had a place to hide away from the general squalor of the ship. He also had a slave who cooked his food and tended more generally to his comfort. The conditions endured by Gemelli’s slave and the rest are almost unimaginable.

Hernando de los Ríos Coronel wrote numerous reports over his many years as attorney general (procurador general) of the Spanish Philippines

13 AGI Filipinas 8 R.3 N.37 (1626).
14 The expenses of the Manila Galleon, including crew salaries and food rations, were underwritten by the royal treasury, which regularly noted the service of African slaves. Each ship had approximately 100 sailors and common mariners (grumetes), and an armed force (escolta armada) of some 80 men, including infantry soldiers and sea gunners. In addition, there were numerous naval officers, including the admiral, captain (if there were two ships), first and second pilots, boatswains (contramaestres), guardians, overseers, the surgeon, and other officials including a notary, commissary, chaplain, chief steward, cook, water constable, and head carpenter and caulker. Schurz, 206. Manuel Carrera Stampa, “La Nao de la China,” Historia Mexicana 9, no. 33 (1959): 103.
16 Giovanni Francesco Gemelli Careri, A Voyage to the Philippines (Manila: Filipiniana Book Guild, 1963), 155. The book is an excerpt of the author’s Giro del mondo, which was first published in 1699.
about the workings of the Manila Galleon, and the transport of slaves was a regular concern. In 1605, he reported on the “many offenses to God” that took place onboard because passengers and sailors regularly took female slaves as their personal companions. He thought it particularly disgraceful that slave owners shared the women among the other travelers. Fifteen years later, Ríos Coronel reported once again on this “evil,” stressing that the presence of female slaves “angered God” and led to “many disasters.” He knew of one official who had taken fifteen such slaves, all of whom he had gotten pregnant during the voyage, causing generalized outrage among his fellow passengers.

The king was incensed: the trafficking of female slaves was “an affront to God” that required an urgent response. In 1608, he ordered officials in Manila to prevent any female slaves from boarding the ships. Noting that the voyage was “long and dangerous,” the king also commanded that all female passengers had to be married to ensure their protection. As with other prohibitions, however, the barring of women from the Manila Galleon was wholly ignored, so that approximately one-quarter of the slaves who crossed the Pacific were women. In 1620, the king noted with concern that female slaves were still making the journey across the Pacific, even though it was expressly forbidden. Accordingly, he ordered the judges of the Audiencia of Manila (the high court) to pay “particular care at the time of departure” to ensure that such slaves were not hidden onboard the ships. The concern with the transpacific trade extended beyond morality. Coronel also reported on the overcrowding of the Galleon with male slaves “who ate all the provisions,” stole from the passengers, and generally added to the ships’ unsanitary conditions.

The Manila Galleon’s high mortality provides some sense of the discomforts and very real dangers of the crossing. The ships were filled with cargo, so that even the decks teetered with crates, leaving little room for the common sailors and slaves to sleep or seek shelter from the rain. It was said that common sailors were not even given “clothes to protect them

18 AGI Filipinas 27 N.51 f.329v (1605).
20 AGI Filipinas 340 L.3 f.41v (1608). The decree was codified as book 9 title 45 law 56 of the Laws of the Indies.
21 In my data sample, 152 of the 598 slaves who crossed the Pacific were women.
22 AGI Filipinas 340 L.3 f.68v (1620).
24 AGI Filipinas 27 N.51 (1605).
against the cold” during the nights, so there were usually three or four deaths with “each new dawn.” 25 As an example, in 1629, the one ship that sailed experienced a loss of 100 people. Many of their bodies were actually kept on board until they arrived in Acapulco, adding to the ship’s insalubrious conditions. The bodies of the dead remained on the ships so that they could be taken to sanctified ground for proper burial as dictated by custom. The parish in Acapulco even had a set price scale for burials at arrival: ten pesos for Spaniards, five for Indians, and one for slaves. 26

After months at sea, the ships first sighted land off the coast of California, where they traded with local peoples for fresh food to combat the scurvy and beriberi that often ravaged the passengers. From there, the ships followed the coast southward, making additional stopovers before finally reaching their official destination. 27 These stops were only intended to take on emergency provisions and to send messengers ahead to notify officials in Acapulco and Mexico City of their impending arrival. News of the Galleon caused great excitement in Mexico City; a contemporary reported that the announcement on February 21, 1650, was celebrated with cathedral bell tolls, and again on March 2 when the ship was sighted from Acapulco (Figure 3.2). 28 However brief, the coastal stops provided opportunities for some illegal unloading of goods, which further suggests that the volume of the slave trade was higher than what was noted in the official registries.

The correspondence related to the death of hundreds of passengers on the voyage to Mexico in 1620 sheds light on how the illegal boarding of slaves in Manila took place. That year, the viceroy of Mexico reported to the king that 330 people on board the San Nicolas had perished and suggested that the loss was due to inadequate manning and inexperienced
crew members. The crown was understandably concerned and wrote to the governor of the Philippines asking for an explanation. In his response, Governor Alonso Fajardo de Tenza gave a revealing account of the people who had boarded the Manila Galleon. He said there had been no irregularities: the *San Nicolás* had sailed with the "acustomed" number of officers and the "usual seamen and gunners ... and many more Indians from this country as common seamen." In addition, there had been

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29 AGI México 29 N.33 (1620).
“some slaves” belonging to “officers and the passengers who are allowed to take them for their service.”

Governor Fajardo provided this crew and passenger information to dismiss the gravity of the loss of life. In his words, it was clear that as “the passengers are usually kept down to as small a number as possible,” then those who died “were not Spaniards.” The people who died had to “have been blacks and slaves, who were hidden after embarkation by those who took them aboard, with an eye to . . . saving the cost of the duties they owe.” He had registered “some slaves” belonging to officers and passengers with proper licenses but suggested that many more had stowed away.

Fajardo’s explanation amounted to an admission that the total number of slaves who regularly boarded the ships superseded the official registrations, and that they thus traveled without licenses. The governor was responsible for the proper functioning of the Manila Galleon, including its provisions, so Fajardo had to dodge culpability by claiming that those who died from hunger and sickness were not supposed to have boarded in the first place. It was a callous explanation, but one that testifies quite frankly to the dangers faced by the slaves who made the crossing.

LICENSING THE MANILA GALLEON

During the sixteenth century, the slave trade to Spanish America functioned under a licensing system, in which the crown issued licenses to individuals directly. In time, however, it became clear that there needed to be a way to increase the volume and ensure a revenue flow, so the crown elected to enter into contracts with merchants who could ensure the delivery of larger numbers of African slaves.31 Prior to the mid-seventeenth century, the asiento contracts specifically noted that the crown maintained the right to issue licenses, ranging from 500 to 1,500 per year, in addition to those sold to the asiento.32 Thus, throughout this period, the Atlantic trade involved many more slaves than the allotments of the asiento contracts. Moreover, this exception is critical for understanding the development of the licensing system in the Pacific, which never transitioned to

32 See, for example, the contracts with Antonio Fernández Delbas from 1615 and with Manuel Rodríguez Lamego from 1622. Printed copies in AGI Indiferente 2767 L.1 (1615–1654).
contracts. As the asiento holders solidified their control over the African slave trade, they moved to end this allowance for small-scale trading through individual licenses and to crack down on contraband at the ports of entry. The Pacific trade thus ended as a result of this shift to real monopoly control.

The limitations of the licensing system and the related contraband make it nearly impossible to quantify the transpacific slave trade. There is much speculation, but in reality the overall volume can only be roughly estimated.\(^{33}\) The figure proposed here is based on a comprehensive understanding of the workings of the transpacific trade. Despite government efforts to regulate the trade by requiring licenses, the registration of passengers and cargo, and official visitations of incoming ships, traders were able to bring an untold number of slaves without leaving any official records. Some passengers did acquire licenses to take slaves to Mexico, but officials in the Philippines (unlike in Spain) did not keep systematic records of their distribution. Moreover, many traders evaded the licensing requirement altogether by boarding their slaves after the official registrations had been taken and disembarking them off-registry. Contraband leaves no quantifiable records.\(^{34}\)

The lack of surviving documentation makes it difficult to calculate an annual average. In the 1620s, the crown claimed that 300 slaves entered

\(^{33}\) Despite the very real lack of sources and of widespread smuggling, a number of scholars have put forth estimates of the trade ranging from several thousand to much larger figures. These estimates also differ in their periodization and as to whom they included. Oropeza suggests that 3,360 chino slaves arrived in Acapulco between 1565 and 1673, calculating 30 slaves for every one of the 112 ships that landed during this period; see Déborah Oropeza Kersey, “Los ‘indios chinos’ en la Nueva España: la inmigración de la nao de China, 1565–1700” (Ph.D., El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Históricos, 2007), 69. Guzmán-Rivas estimates a much larger number, suggesting that as many as 10,000 slaves went to Mexico during the whole course of the Galleon’s history (he does not distinguish the slaves’ origins or race); see Pablo Guzmán-Rivas, “Reciprocal Geographic Influences of the Transpacific Galleon Trade” (Ph.D., University of Texas, 1960), 44. Israel estimates a yearly entry of 600 chino slaves (300 illegally) but provides no clear time frame; see Jonathan I. Israel, Race, Class, and Politics in Colonial Mexico, 1610–1670 (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), 75–6. On a different scale altogether, Luengo claims that the Manila Galleon carried more than 4 million “Filipino” slaves over its 350-year run. His estimate is based on secondary, nonacademic sources and is simply implausible; see Josemaría Salutan Luengo, A History of the Manila-Acapulco Slave Trade, 1555–1815 (Tubigon, Bohol: Mater Dei Publications, 1996).\(^{34}\) For an analysis of the recorded volume of trade at Acapulco based on royal treasury records, see Pierre Chaunu, Les Philippines et le Pacifique des Ibériques XVIe, XVIIe, XVIIIe siècles, introduction méthodologique et indices d’activité (Paris: SEVPEN, 1960).
each year off-registry.\textsuperscript{35} This figure, however, likely exaggerates the actual traffic, which truly was limited by the size of the Manila Galleon ships and the exigencies of a trading route that prioritized textiles and ceramics over human cargo. A conservative estimate is that each ship carried some 60 slaves. One hundred and forty ships landed in Acapulco from 1565 to 1700, which is the approximate period of the Pacific slave trade.\textsuperscript{36} Given that number, we can estimate that the trade overall involved at least 8,100 individuals. It is important to highlight, however, that this number is merely an approximation of the volume because of the realities of smuggling and irregular bookkeeping. The absolute number of slaves will never be known, and the historical importance of the trade is not simply one of numbers.

The slave licensing system had several purposes. One, it allowed the crown to determine who could profit from trading in the Spanish colonies, as everyone who wanted to bring a slave to the Indies had to have a license, including officials, crew members, and passengers.\textsuperscript{37} Two, the licenses provided a way to regulate the movement of individual slaves across the empire. In this sense, the licenses served as travel permits and were part of a wider effort by the Spanish crown to control access to the Indies, as everyone (free and slave) who wanted to travel to, from, and across the colonies needed some kind of license or permit. The licensing system thus acknowledged that this was a unique trade involving human beings.

In Spain, the House of Trade (\textit{Casa de Contratación}) issued the licenses; elsewhere, this charge belonged to the highest royal representatives, such as the governor in the Philippines and the viceroy in Mexico. Individuals could obtain these licenses duty free as a special favor (\textit{merced}). Merced

\textsuperscript{35} The estimate was referred to in a decree ordering the collection of duties at Acapulco. AGI México 1066, L.8, f.68r (1626); transcribed in Richard Konetzke, \textit{Colección de documentos para la historia de la formación social de Hispanoamérica, 1493–1810}, 3 vols., vol. 2 (Madrid: CSIC, 1953), 291–2. The law was codified as book 8, title 18, law 4 of the Laws of the Indies.

\textsuperscript{36} The officials of the royal treasury at Acapulco documented the entry of ships; no ships arrived on at least nineteen occasions, mainly because of shipwrecks. For a list of the names of incoming ships, see Shirley Fish, \textit{The Manila-Acapulco Galleons: The Treasure Ships of the Pacific, with an Annotated List of the Transpacific Galleons 1565–1815} (Central Milton Keynes, England: Authorhouse, 2011).

\textsuperscript{37} Following Scelle, Palacios Preciado, a historian of the African slave trade to Cartagena, divides the licenses into three categories: licenses issued to individuals who meant to keep them in their personal service, licenses to individuals who intended to sell them on arrival, and licenses to traders who committed to bringing large numbers of slaves to specified regions to support their economies. Jorge Palacios Preciado, \textit{La trata de negros por Cartagena de Indias, 1650–1750} (Tunja: Universidad Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombia, 1973), 24–5.
licenses were primarily granted “as rewards to His Majesty’s ministers.”

This allowance stemmed from the customary practice of allowing royal officials to transport a few slaves as recompense for the officials’ service. The merced licenses allowed particular individuals to travel with their property, as long as they did not intend to trade and profit from the sale of slaves on arrival. Many officials who served in the Philippines acquired slaves during their stay and took them along to their next posting or even back to Spain when they retired. For instance, after his long tenure as attorney general of the Philippines, Hernando de los Ríos Coronel, an assiduous observer of bureaucratic protocol, acquired licenses in 1621 to travel to Mexico (on his way to Spain) with two slaves, Juan Terrenate and a “chino named Cosme.” Numerous petitions from other officials testify to the outflow of slaves from the Philippines via this channel of merced licenses.

Once in Mexico, individuals had to get an additional license from the viceroy if they wanted to continue on to Spain. These were leniently granted under the economic calculation that this kind of licensing did not encourage trade. One official received a license to take two chino slaves named Andres de Roa and Joseph del Rosario. In his application, he explained: “It is common practice to acquire licenses to pass to the kingdom of Castile without paying duties because the price of the slaves is greater here [Mexico] than where they are going.” The price differential was apparently taken to mean that officials would not sell their slaves on arrival and profit from the trade, but rather keep them in their personal service.

The story of Gregorio Moreno, described as “an Indian of the Chinese nation from the Philippine islands,” testifies to the length of the journeys

38 A 1579 decree allowed persons in His Majesty’s service to take slaves to the Indies duty free (libres de derecho) with special license. The decree was codified as book 8, title 18, law 8 of the Laws of the Indies.

39 Officials were jealous of this privilege. Admiral Monte Bernardo de Quiróz, for example, became involved in a long suit to ensure he would not have to pay duties for the slaves he brought from the Philippines. AGN Reales Cédulas Duplicadas 16 exp.4 f.2 (1628).

40 AGI Filipinas 27 N.121 f.698 (1621).

41 See AGI Filipinas 29 N.80 (1604) and AGI Filipinas 20 R.9 N.61 (1615), among many others. Officials mainly petitioned for these licenses from the Philippines, but also from Mexico. General don Juan de Salaeta, for example, received a license from the viceroy, later confirmed by the crown, to “take in his service two chino slaves named Andres de Roa and Joseph del Rosario” to Castille. AGN Reales Cédulas Duplicadas 29 exp.236 f.383v (1669).

42 AGN Reales Cédulas Duplicadas 29 exp.236 f.283v (1669).

43 A number of other license petitions testify to the outflow of slaves from Mexico to Spain, such as one granted to Marco Antonio Ferrer for the passage of a fourteen-year-old chino named Venturo Juárez. AGN Indiferente 4182 exp.10 (1613).
undertaken by slaves in the employ of Spanish officials who used such merced licenses.\textsuperscript{44} After being “removed from his land and the home of his parents” and taken to Mexico, his owner don Lope de Ulloa took him to Peru, back to Mexico, and from there to Seville, where Moreno actually petitioned the government for funds to return home.\textsuperscript{45} Moreno said he had been made to cross more than 4,500 leagues and now found himself “helpless in a distant land,” with “nothing to eat, not even a piece of bread.”\textsuperscript{46} Moreno presented a number of witnesses to testify to his story, and they all called on the crown to help this impoverished man. Remarkably, the king approved Moreno’s request and gave him “100 gold coins” to make the journey, though it proved difficult for him to collect the bequest.\textsuperscript{47}

Individuals who did not qualify for merced licenses had to buy them, be it from the crown or after 1595 from the asiento holders.\textsuperscript{48} The purchase of such licenses obligated individuals to pay significant duties for their property. As such, this part of the licensing system was primarily instituted to ensure the payment of royal duties. Individuals who acquired licenses acknowledged that trading was a favor granted by the crown, which required that they pay for the privilege in the form of duties. The general understanding was that the price of the license included the duties, although the amount of duties and how they were collected changed over time for both the Atlantic and Pacific trades. Individual license holders working on the Atlantic generally paid the duties at the time they acquired them in Spain, which tied the acquisition of the permission to trade with the requisite payment. They could also pay for their licenses and associated duties on arrival, but at a significantly higher price.\textsuperscript{49} Similarly, individual

\textsuperscript{44} Moreno self-identified as an “yndio de nacion chino de las islas Filipinas.” AGI Filipinas 35 N.84 f.1241 (1607).
\textsuperscript{45} AGI Filipinas 1 N.86 (1607).
\textsuperscript{46} AGI Filipinas 5 N.34 (1607).
\textsuperscript{47} The gold coins (ducados) would have been given in the form of a letter of credit. AGI Indiferente 449 L.A1 f.143v (1607). AGI Filipinas 5 N.54 (1608).
\textsuperscript{48} A royal decree from 1595 specified that the licenses could be purchased from the crown or the asiento holder, who was obligated to make the licenses available to anyone who wanted them at storefronts in Seville and Lisbon. The decree was codified as book 8, title 18, law 1 of the Laws of the Indies.
\textsuperscript{49} In the early decades of the seventeenth century, individual licenses averaged 30 ducados plus 20 reales in duties if purchased in Spain, versus 40 ducados plus 30 reales in duties if paid in the Indies. Linda A. Newson and Susie Minchin, From Capture to Sale: The Portuguese Slave Trade to Spanish South America in the Early Seventeenth Century (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 23.
traders working on the Pacific had to pay the duties at the time they acquired their licenses from the governor of the Philippines.\textsuperscript{50}

Alternatively, individuals could take the risk of bringing slaves without licenses and hope that they would be able to disembark upon arrival without being noticed by port officials. This kind of contraband was referred to as trading off-registry (\textit{fuera de registro}), as the slaves were not listed in the ships’ official registries. The crown’s concern with contraband and the avoidance of the licensing system points to the importance given to the collection of duties.

The crown acknowledged that traders regularly landed their slaves in ports throughout the Indies and bribed customs officials to unload their merchandise, but it proved difficult to curtail the practice. In 1624, the king wrote that it had come to his attention that owners “concealed their slaves” by not registering their licenses and that some even used “false licenses.”\textsuperscript{51} More gravely, the king knew that port officials accepted such slaves and approved their sale, “saying they had great need for blacks” in their parts of the empire. The crown was not opposed to some profiteering; it merely sought to collect its share. Most traders, however, begrudged the crown’s regulations and did everything in their power to avoid the added expense of the duties. The subterfuge included boarding slaves to work as sailors, even though their owners had every intention of selling them on arrival. As the crown admitted, “experience showed” that all slaves bound for the Indies were for trade.\textsuperscript{52}

The crown expressed a growing concern with the influx of slaves via the Pacific in a number of royal decrees, which primarily attempted to regulate the trade to ensure that the royal treasury obtained a share of the profits. These decrees, and the corresponding proposal submitted by royal officials that prompted them, tell the story of how the licensing system developed in the Pacific. The crown first acknowledged the trade in the last years of the sixteenth century, decades after it started. In 1597, the king wrote to both the governor of the Philippines and the viceroy of Mexico about his concerns with the trafficking

\textsuperscript{50} There was a brief period when the crown changed this policy in the late 1620s and tried to get royal officials to collect the duties at Acapulco, but this was a short-lived effort.

\textsuperscript{51} AGI Indiferente 2767 L.1 f.182 (1624).

\textsuperscript{52} Regulations issued in 1674 to the royal navy (\textit{Instrucción de los generales de la armada}) specified that all slaves had to be boarded with licenses, so officials had to ensure that the blacks who traveled as sailors were duly trained and made to return to Spain. The orders were codified as book 9, title 15, law 133 of the Laws of the Indies.
He had been informed that it was common for the passengers of the Galleon to board with slaves, who were described as being “blacks and also from places like Japan.” This practice bore too close a resemblance to a profitable trade and called for immediate action. Certain passengers were to be allowed to bring slaves onboard for their personal service with special licenses, but that was all. Government officials had permission to leave with a specified number of slaves at the end of their service in the colony: the outgoing governor could take six slaves, judges four, and other officials two. Merchants “of great fortune” and other “honorable persons” were likewise allowed two slaves each. To ensure enforcement, the viceroy and royal officials in Acapulco were ordered to confiscate the property of those passengers who “exceeded their number.”

The wording of the 1597 decree suggests that the crown initially sought to limit the trade to merced licenses (conceived as travel permits rather than trading rights). The catch, however, was that owners came to employ such licenses to travel with slaves they intended to sell. To contemporary observers, it seemed that every single passenger had at least one slave, from the highest official to the lowliest sailor, to “help them in their necessities.” They all claimed that they needed slaves to help them survive the difficult transpacific journey.

Several decades later, Attorney General Coronel suggested a new quota system to reduce the volume of slaves to diminish overcrowding. The 1597 decree already limited the number of slaves allowed to officials and mon-eyed passengers, but the licensing system was plainly not being enforced. According to Coronel’s frank assessment, officials were using merced licenses to engage in small-time trade, and the rest of the crew and passengers were boarding slaves without any licenses whatsoever. According to him, owners commonly circumvented the system by bribing officials at Acapulco, where the going price to unload an unregistered slave was 20 pesos.

This acknowledgment prompted a policy change and an opening in the Pacific trade. Coronel had written to the king with a plan to curtail the

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53 AGI Indiferente 606 L.2 f.49 (1597). The decrees were codified as book 9, title 45, law 54 of the Laws of the Indies.
54 Ibid.
56 AGI Filipinas 340 L.3 f.257v (1620).
traffic. The crown, however, recognized the possibility for profit and opted to open the licensing system to individuals who could buy licenses, rather than limiting it to officials with mercedes. This was an opportunity to collect duties. The king likely reasoned that if owners were willing to pay substantial bribes, he could force them to pay duties and thus carry out their trade in a legal fashion. In 1620, the crown decreed that passengers and sailors were to be allowed one slave each, with the exception of “persons of quality” who could board with more slaves “in proportion to their wealth.” Such persons could afford to acquire more licenses. This decree significantly increased the total number of slaves who were legally allowed onboard. The earlier one from 1597 had specified which officials could receive merced licenses to travel with their personal servants and forbid any trading. In contrast, the 1620 decree allowed one slave to everyone who made the crossing, so long as the owner acquired a license from the governor. The change was made in acknowledgment of the increased volume of the trade and was intended to encourage traders to register their merchandise and pay the appropriate duties. To strengthen that effort, the decree ordered that license holders had to pay the duties on arrival in Acapulco, rather than in the Philippines. The change would allow owners to use the proceeds of the sale of their slaves in Mexico to pay for the duties. This move was likely driven in part by a similar change in the Atlantic, where the crown had earlier ordered that duties be collected in Veracruz and Cartagena. The drive was to increase collections by linking the payment of duties to the sale of the merchandise, rather than to the acquisition of the licenses.

A subsequent decree confirmed the crown’s desire to regulate and profit from the Pacific trade. In 1626, the crown reiterated that “all slaves brought from the Philippines to Mexico” had to be licensed and registered. The king ordered owners to pay 400 reales (equal to 50 pesos) per slave in duties, which was slightly less than the amount paid in the Atlantic at that time. The rate was in keeping with the asiento contracts, which

57 AGI Filipinas 340 L. 3 f. 257r (1620). The decree was codified as book 9, title 45, law 55 of the Laws of the Indies.
58 The move to collect the royal duties in the Indies was a concession to the Portuguese asiento holder Gonzalo Váez Coutiño; he only had to pay duties on the actual slaves he delivered to the Indies rather than paying for the duties as part of the licenses he acquired back in Spain.
59 AGI México 1066 L.8 f.68 (1626); transcribed in Konetzke, 1953, 2:291–2. The decree was codified as book 8, title 18, law 4 of the Laws of the Indies.
dictated that the rates on individual licenses had to match the asiento licenses.\footnote{The asiento contract from 1615, for example, had set the duty rate at 40 ducados, which equaled approximately 440 reales. AGI Indiferente 2767 L.1 (1615). One ducado equaled 11 reales castellanos and 1 maravedí (or 375 maravedíes); and one real equaled 34 maravedies; and one peso (also called real de a 8) equaled 8 reales. The equivalencies were set in an ordinance from 1497 called the Real pragmática de Medina de Campo.} The 1626 decree firmly acknowledged that this was a trade, which the crown tried to control through the established licensing system.

The king’s financial concern is evident in the wording of the original 1626 decree, in which he accused the treasury officials at Acapulco of being sneaky (mañosos) and remiss of their duty by permitting the entry of “great numbers” of unregistered slaves “under the protection of generals, admirals, and passengers.”\footnote{AGI México 1066 L.8 f.68 (1626).} He had been informed that the ships of the Manila Galleon arrived each year laden with slaves. Their numbers were so great that Acapulco’s population supposedly consisted mainly of slaves, with every household in possession of “three, four, six, ten, twelve, and sometimes sixteen and even eighteen slaves.” Overall, the king calculated that more than 300 slaves entered Acapulco each year, representing a loss in revenue of 15,000 pesos per year. The king’s anger is palpable: this was large-scale fraud that directly affected the crown’s finances. To prevent the ongoing deception, the 1626 decree forbade notaries in Mexico from drawing up slave titles if the seller did not have a letter from the treasury at Acapulco certifying that the slave had indeed been registered and the duties paid. Notaries were also encouraged to denounce owners who did not have the appropriate documentation in return for one-third of the price of the sale. Moreover, the officers of the Manila Galleon were now required to “give guarantees that they would not bring slaves without declaring them” or risk certain confiscation of their property.\footnote{Ibid.}

Significantly, the 1626 decree describes the incoming slaves as chinos, not blacks, even though the crown surely knew that many were in fact Africans. The original wording suggests that the king purposely chose not to acknowledge the entry of Africans via the Pacific so as not to provoke the asiento holders. By maintaining that all the Manila Galleon slaves were chinos, the government could claim they were a separate category than the slaves of the asientos and hence not subject to the same contract regulations. This rendering suggests that the crown may have responded to the increasing restrictions in the Atlantic arena by expanding the licensing
system in the Pacific, keeping it as a separate privilege and source of revenue.\textsuperscript{63}

Overall, the traffic may not have been as large as the king imagined, but it certainly was significant. The volume is evident in documentation from the years following the 1626 decree, when there was some attempt at implementation. In 1629, for example, the viceroy personally ordered the arrest of General Antonio de Plaza for bringing forty slaves off-registry.\textsuperscript{64} Despite repeated attempts to require licenses, traders evidently continued to circumvent the system. Even this case, however, was probably an exception. The more typical passenger brought just one slave, such as the Galleon’s pilot who arrived in 1645 with a ten-year-old chino slave named Lucas de Arauso, whom he sold on arrival.\textsuperscript{65}

The 1626 decree coincided with a time of growing and more general concern about the Manila Galleon trade. The Marqués de Cadereyta, viceroy of New Spain from 1635 to 1640, looked to the trade as a possible source for income. With the help of another zealous reformer, Pedro de Quiroga y Moya, the viceroy ordered a full inspection of the ships to check for contraband and to ensure the collection of duties for all merchandise.\textsuperscript{66}

The government’s suspicions regarding the inflow of contraband were well founded. When Quiroga carried out a personal inspection in 1637, he valued the cargo of the ships at more than 1 million pesos, which was four times the official allowance.\textsuperscript{67} The duties charged for this cargo were the highest in the history of the Manila Galleon, which outraged colonists in the Philippines who depended on the trade. Their coordinated opposition eventually forced the viceroy to backtrack on his attempt to collect revenue from this source.

\textsuperscript{63} Duties were paid on at least some of the slaves who entered during the following decade. Slave deeds notarized in Acapulco commonly stated, “derechos pagados.” AGN Jesuitas 4–50 (1634).

\textsuperscript{64} AGI México 32 L.1 f.37 (1629).

\textsuperscript{65} AGN Inquisición 583 exp.5 f.537 (1661).

\textsuperscript{66} Quiroga was a high-ranking Spanish magistrate who had been appointed to carry out an official visit (visita) or assessment of the viceroyalty’s finances. For a discussion of his efforts, see William J. McCarthy, “Between Policy and Prerogative: Malfeasance in the Inspection of the Manila Galleons at Acapulco, 1637,” \textit{Colonial Latin American Historical Review} 2, no. 2 (1993).

Tellingly, the cargo of the two ships in 1637 included 186 slaves belonging to various owners. Somewhat suspiciously, treasury officials recorded that they all had licenses and paid the duties. This was the one time when so many licenses were ever recorded at Acapulco, likely because Quiroga’s presence forced the treasury officials to record their entry and make arrangements to collect the full payment of the duties owed, which totaled 9,300 pesos. As it turned out, however, this new determination to enforce trade regulations was extremely short lived. The governor of the Philippines Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera suspended the sailing of the Manila Galleon for one year in protest and petitioned the king directly for an intervention. Corcuera’s antics succeeded in convincing the king that Quiroga’s efforts were misdirected and potentially disastrous to the normal functioning of the Manila Galleon trade. As a result, in 1638 the king instructed the viceroy to cease the inspections and return to normal operations. The crates were not to be opened or weighed on arrival, as Quiroga had insisted, to determine the amount owed. Rather, the duties were to be collected based on the evaluation of the cargo made by the governor before the ships left the Philippines. This move suggests that the crown decided to allow the governor to make the estimation of what the Manila merchants could actually pay. It was obvious that they could not afford (or agree) to pay the actual duties owed, so the treasury would have to accept a lesser amount.

More specific to the slave trade, the crown ordered officials at Acapulco to assume that the duties on the “slaves who come from the Philippines” had already been collected in Manila and to accept the documentation provided by the governor. The 1626 decree, which had ordered the collection of duties in Acapulco to ensure payment, was subsequently ignored. After the Quiroga debacle, traders were allowed to carry on with little oversight. Some traders may have acquired licenses in Manila and paid the appropriate duties, but many others simply made special deals to avoid the added cost. Such dealings took place in Manila at the time of use, available at https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107477841.004
boarding, as well as on arrival in Mexico. The reality of contraband suggests that the asiento holders had some reason to worry that the Pacific opening might become a threat to their interests. The danger was twofold. One, allowing a regular annual entry of upward of 100 unregistered slaves was a distinct profit loss because it added slaves to the market at a time (1630s and 1640s) when asiento holders received licenses for only 500 to 700 slaves for entry at Veracruz. Two, the entry of unregistered slaves was a competitive disadvantage because the asiento holders had to pay substantial duties for each licensed slave, which cut into their profit margin in a way that would not have happened to traders who sold slaves illegally.

During this period, asiento holders were limited to a certain number of ports, primarily Cartagena de Indias, Veracruz, and Buenos Aires to a lesser extent. They were not allowed, in other words, to disembark slaves at any other port on first entry.

At Acapulco, the three mandated visitations were carried out by the captain of the port (castellano del fuerte), the officials of the royal treasury, and a representative of the viceroy. The first visitation involved drawing up a general registry of the cargo and matching the ship’s contents to the official evaluation sent from Manila. Its purpose was to collect the duties owed to the treasury, which were generally set at 10 percent of the value of the merchandise. A second visitation checked for contraband and registered all crew and passengers. In the third visitation, officials oversaw the transfer of the merchandise to safety at port. AGI Filipinas 43 N.1 (1604).

The documentation of the visitations that took place in Acapulco reveal that royal officials kept very sporadic records. There was no systematic record of the entry of slaves, with or without licenses. Moreover, there were years with no registrations at all. It appears that officials simply accepted bribes from individuals without the requisite licenses and did not register the true number of incoming slaves. The Acapulco treasury records from just one year provide a general sense of the record keeping. The accounts from 1612 had only three entries for slaves—debits from the nonpayment of duties and credits from the sales of embargoed property. The first listing was an obligation for 150 pesos “for the duties owed on three slaves who were confiscated.” That amount would be credited back to the treasury when the owners paid the necessary fines and duty fees to regain their property. Owners who did not pay the duties had their property embargoed and sold at auction. The second listing was a credit for 98 pesos, which was the amount owed to the crown from the sale of all confiscated property were divided in thirds, minus the sale costs: one-third for the royal treasury, another third for the official who handled the sale, and the final third for the person who made the original denunciation (i.e., alerted the officials to the contraband).

The proffits from the sale of all confiscated property were divided in thirds, minus the sale costs: one-third for the royal treasury, another third for the official who handled the sale, and the final third for the person who made the original denunciation (i.e., alerted the officials to the contraband).
two slaves who had arrived the previous year without registered licenses. The third listing was a similar credit for 48 pesos, also from the sale of a confiscated slave.\textsuperscript{78} Overall, the treasury records from Acapulco are insufficient to calculate the actual entry of slaves, as officials obviously did not record the slaves they allowed to disembark illegally. Moreover, they only seem to have embargoed the slaves of those individuals who refused to pay the necessary bribes.

Notably, the transportation contracts that dictated the responsibilities of trading agents included veiled references to this malfeasance. One such contract involving a chino slave named Francisco stipulated that the agent “would not pay any duties.”\textsuperscript{79} Moreover, in the event that officials in Acapulco “tried to take the slave” or “if there was any impediment to disembarking,” the agent was to “pay the cost of bringing him to land.” Acapulco officials also made things difficult for owners who were not on hand to make arrangements when the Galleon arrived.\textsuperscript{80} In 1602, officials detained Gracia, a china slave who belong to Pedro de Vega, and placed her in embargo because she had been sent without a license. Vega had to come down to Acapulco from Mexico City in person to pay the duties he owed and claim his property. Officials, however, refused to release Gracia, so Vega had to get a special dispensation from the viceroy to recover his property. It seems that the officials in Acapulco wanted to retain Gracia as contraband and sell her at market to pocket the third of the price normally given to informants.

High-ranking treasury officials in Mexico City were aware of the discrepancies in the port records. The treasury books from Acapulco for the years from 1600 to 1603 recorded the entry of only seven slaves.\textsuperscript{81} According to Gil Verdugo el Aguila, however, the head accountant of the royal treasury of Mexico, more than 200 blacks arrived in Acapulco during that same period.\textsuperscript{82} It is difficult to explain such manifest omissions, but apparently the treasury records sent to Spain were incomplete, as they contained only partial records of the actual entry of slaves. At the highest level of colonial government, the viceroy of New Spain could only

\textsuperscript{78} Similarly, in 1615, the treasury noted a credit of 350 pesos from the sale of six female slaves and one male, who were sold at auction as confiscated property. AGI Contaduría 903 (1615–1620).
\textsuperscript{79} AGN Historia 407 f.166 (1619).
\textsuperscript{80} AGN General de Parte 6 exp.566 f.210v (1603).
\textsuperscript{81} AGI Contaduría 901 (1597–1603). AGI Contaduría 902 (1601–1615).
\textsuperscript{82} Document cited in Vila Vilar, \textit{Hispanoamérica}, 179 n.74.
complain, repeatedly reporting to the crown that the passengers of the Manila Galleon always brought “a great number of slaves” off-registry.\footnote{AGI México 29 N.27 (1619).}

The profits to be made on the transpacific trade were undeniable, even if we take into account that some traders used agents (sometimes crew members) who received a cut.\footnote{The seamen who acted as intermediaries were given power of attorney to act as the owner’s legal representative and thus were able to sign the slave title at the time of sale. AGN Indiferente 1355 exp. 37 (1634).} These go-betweens would arrange for the sale in Mexico and return the profits to the original investor. The typical contract stipulated that the agent would “provide food and beverage and comfort” to a said slave in return for one-third of the selling price.\footnote{Sailor Manuel Juan de Alcántara agreed to transport a slave named Gaspar from the Malabar Coast on the account of Francisco de Arauso. AGN Historia 407 f.321 (1642). English translation in Gonzalo Aguirre Beltrán, “The Slave Trade in Mexico,” Hispanic American Historical Review 24, no. 3 (1944): 421. Similarly, Jacinto de Contreras, the appointed scribe of the ship San Lúis, arranged to sell Baltasar, “de casta Bengala,” on behalf of Joseph de Acuña. AGN Jesuitas 4–50 (1635).} Soldier Juan Méndez, for example, brought a slave named Manuel on the account of a Spanish resident of Cavite, promising to “feed him during the trip … and God willing take him to safety at Acapulco to be sold.”\footnote{AGN Jesuitas 4–50 (1635).} For this trade to be profitable, especially considering the danger and high mortality rate on the Galleon, the price differentials in Manila versus Mexico had to be significant, and they were. The trade was even more lucrative for those who ignored the licensing requirements.

Slaves could be purchased cheaply in Manila and sold at much higher prices in Acapulco or elsewhere in Mexico (Figure 3.3). For example, Adrian, born in Manila, was sold in that city’s market for 37 pesos in 1637, and for 200 pesos in Acapulco one year later.\footnote{AGN Historia 407 f.230 (1627). AGN Historia 407 f.229 (1628). AGN Historia 406 f.187 (1616). AGN Historia 406 f.187 (1619).} The final sale usually doubled or tripled the original price.\footnote{The profit margin on African slaves was even more marked; one slave named Ignacio, a “negro cafre,” was purchased in Manila for 100 pesos and sold at Acapulco for 380 pesos. AGN Historia 408 f.101 (1667).} The increase in prices is exemplified in the case of a slave named Andrés. After living in Mexico for more than 35 years, Andrés could still remember the name of all his former masters and the prices paid for him. Originally from Cochin, he had first been sold
Figure 3.3. Where Chino Slaves Lived. Map prepared by Eric Johnson, Numeric and Spatial Data Services Librarian, Miami University.
in Malacca for the equivalent of 19 pesos, then in Manila for 50 pesos, Acapulco for 150 pesos, and finally in Veracruz for 250 pesos.  

A similar pricing differential marked the experience of a chino slave named Adrián: he was sold at auction in Manila for 37 pesos when he was just 12 years old and again a few years later in Acapulco for 200 pesos. Notably, the person who purchased him in Mexico expressed great concern about the legality of his title, perhaps because the document designated that Adrián was a “creole” (criollo) and “native of Manila,” which hinted that he was actually an Indian and could conceivably demand his liberty by claiming he was an indigenous vassal and thus protected from enslavement. To facilitate the sale of this questionable slave, the seller signed a promissory note that explained that he would send further documentation of Adrián’s legal status on the next Galleon. It was easier to sell slaves from outside the Philippines because they were obviously not Indians. In 1635, Gaspar, who was originally from the Malabar Coast, was sold in Manila for 62 pesos “as a captive slave subject to servitude with proper title.” Having “all the precautions, certificates, and judicial diligences,” he was resold in Acapulco for 205 pesos just a few years later. Many more cases beyond these examples testify to the significant gains that were made by the traders who engaged in this traffic.

The price that could be obtained in Mexico City, the commercial center of the slave trade in Mexico, was usually higher than in Acapulco. In part, the price difference occurred because of the expenses involved in transporting the slaves from Acapulco to the capital, which was a long, hard journey. The China Road (Camino de China) that joined the port to Mexico City was approximately 600 kilometers long, traversing rivers and

89 Andrés’s testimony of his sales went something like this: “A Portuguese pilot named Antonio Gomes, who said he was Christian, purchased him for 25 fardados, which are each worth 6 reales, and took him to Makassar and to the Maluka Islands.” AGN Inquisición 456 exp.2 f.55 (1650).
81 AGN Historia 407 f.274 (1635).
82 AGN Historia 407 f.321v (1642). AGN Historia 406 f.75r (1643).
83 Andrés de la Trinidad, a slave from Bengal, sold in Manila for 90 pesos and for 270 pesos in Acapulco just a few years later. AGI Escribanía 1028A (1657). Similarly, Antonio, who was originally from the Malabar Coast, sold in Manila for 150 pesos. By the time he reached Mexico City just one year later, he was worth 318 pesos. AGN Historia 407, f.400 (1644).
84 A black slave named Salvador, a “bozal recently arrived from the Philippine Islands,” sold for 200 pesos in Acapulco and then 470 pesos in Mexico City just a month later. AGN Jesuitas 4–50 (1635).
mountains, so the freight charge was considerable. In 1662, a chino slave named Manuel traveled from Acapulco to Mexico City with Cristobal Pérez, who was paid 20 pesos “for taking the said slave and providing him with sustenance.” Pérez received an additional 20 pesos for transporting a large container of silks and wax candles on his one horse, so he and Manuel probably walked the whole way, which would explain why Manuel arrived in the capital “in delicate health and with little strength.” Nonetheless, Manuel was sold at auction for 300 pesos, so the cost of the journey was probably worthwhile for the seller.

The disparity in prices also led to special orders, which involved buyers in Mexico making arrangements to have slaves purchased in Manila and sent to them on the Galleon. For example, in 1627 doña Teresa Serín of Mexico City placed an order for a domestic slave. The following year, her contact in Manila sent a “white girl with small eyes” named Isabél, promising that this china was a strong “washerwoman and good slave.” These personal stories give a human face to the transpacific trade. They also suggest there was an evident demand for these slaves’ services, which traders could meet with a limited capital outlay.

ATLANTIC SLAVERS AND THE END OF THE TRANSPACIFIC TRADE

As already noted, the transpacific trade must be understood in relation to its Atlantic counterpart and the transformation of the asientos from limited royal contracts to large-scale monopoly companies during the course of the seventeenth century. It is therefore useful to chart that development briefly, especially because the asiento holders started to refer to the entry of slaves through Acapulco as an infringement of their privileges from the earliest years. At first, the asiento holders could do little to prevent the influx through individual licenses, neither did they have the personnel to document widespread contraband. In time, however, they succeeded in abolishing the allowance for individual licenses in the

95 AGN Inquisición 447 exp.5 f.217 (1662).
96 Ibid.
97 AGN Indiferente 2440 exp.21 (1627).
98 In 1666, for example, don Francisco de Corbera y Mesía, an oidor of the Audiencia de Manila, purchased a slave named Ignacio for 100 pesos in the town of Rosario Doctrina for Captain Cristóbal Jiménez de los Covos, a resident of Mexico City, who had requested such a slave on special order. After the sale, Corbera sent Ignacio to Cavite to await the next ship to Acapulco. AGN Historia 408 f.99 (1666).
Atlantic, which was a major step in the articulation of the asiento as an actual monopoly system. Moreover, the asiento holders slowly built an administrative infrastructure that allowed them to tackle the licensing system in the Pacific trade as well.

From 1586 to 1701, the Spanish crown entered into a series of contracts with merchants, and later companies: the first were Portuguese, then Genoese, and briefly Dutch and Portuguese again. Throughout these many years, asiento contracts often overlapped, and there were times when the slave trade functioned only through individual licenses. The important fact is that all the asiento contracts built on the previous ones and retained the concessions given to different holders, regardless of their nationalities. Their privileges built up over decades, until the asiento emerged as a true monopoly at the beginning of the eighteenth century. This shift came about because the crown increasingly identified the slave trade as a source of revenue and thus awarded greater and greater concessions to those who could deliver a steady rent.

Portuguese traders dominated the asiento from 1586 to 1640, which corresponds roughly to the years of the Iberian Union. In part, the king contracted with the Portuguese because they were his vassals, but the primary reason was that they controlled the closest supply lines, having established factories along the West Coast of Africa starting in the fifteenth century. From the crown’s perspective, the Portuguese asiento holders were merely intermediaries, charged with ensuring a steady supply of slaves by making arrangements with the men who actually acquired the

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99 With the ascent of the Bourbons, the asiento went to the French Real Compañía de Guinea in 1702. The crown then awarded the asiento to the English in 1713 as part of the peace treaty that ended the War of the Spanish Succession. For a discussion of the English asiento in relation to the trade to Mexico, see Antonio García de León, “La Real Compañía de Inglaterra y el tráfico de esclavos en el Veracruz del siglo XVIII, 1713–1748,” in Rutas de la esclavitud en Africa y América Latina, ed. Rina Cáceres Gómez (San José: Editorial de la Universidad de Costa Rica, 2001). There was no free trade until 1789, when the king finally authorized any Spanish subject to bring slaves to the Indies without the need for any licenses or the payment of any duties. The goal was to increase the volume of trade and thus “meet the dire need for such laborers (brazos).” AGN Reales Cédulas Originales 142.exp.144.f.182 (1789).

100 The Portuguese who purchased the asientos belonged to the same merchant families who controlled the royal monopolies for the West Africa trade, which ensured that they had steady access to slaves. Enriqueta Vila Vilar, “La sublevación de Portugal y la trata de negros,” Ibero-Americanisches Archiv 3 (1976). For a recent discussion of the Portuguese asientistas (contract holders) and their commercial networks, see Filipa Ribeiro da Silva, “Crossing Empires: Portuguese, Sephardic, and Dutch Business Networks in the Atlantic Slave Trade, 1580–1674,” The Americas 68, no. 1 (2011).
slaves in Africa (commonly called *negreros*). From the beginning, the asiento was supposed to facilitate the large-scale entry of African slaves to Spanish America. According to the negotiations between the crown and the Portuguese, what was needed was “a great multitude of blacks to help the Indians in the work of the mines, the tillage of the land . . . and other husbandry.” The Portuguese succeeded in meeting this stated goal. Their contracts specified only 132,000 slaves, but it has been calculated that they brought between 250,000 and 300,000 African slaves to Spanish America between 1596 and 1640.

During the Portuguese period, the asiento holders did not have monopoly terms. They merely paid an annual rent, ranging from 95,000 to 170,000 ducados, for the right to manage a given number of licenses, ranging from 2,500 to 4,250 slaves. In essence, the asiento holders purchased individual licenses, which they could then sell to other people or use themselves. For this to be profitable, the annual rent was less than the set value of the licenses (the duties were paid separately). Further evidence of the early asientos’ weakness is that the Portuguese asiento holders organized relatively small trading voyages, which were also highly controlled. They had to register their ships in Spain; collect their cargo at pre-specified locations in Africa; and sail straight to either Veracruz or Cartagena, which were the only ports in Spanish America where they could disembark in order to limit contraband. On arrival, royal officials had to carry out a formal visit (visita) prior to unloading to search for contraband and confirm that the number of slaves boarded in Africa matched the number of licenses that were registered in Spain. The visitations were carried out in the presence of the agents or factors (factores) of the asiento holders, who were supposed to assist royal officials in maintaining accounts of all slave arrivals.

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101 The negreros were a varied lot, from rich merchants who provided the capital for whole slaving ships to sailors who carried a couple of slaves for more modest profits. Enriqueta Vila Vilar, *Hispanoamérica y el comercio de esclavos: los asientos portugueses* (Sevilla: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1977), 59–60, 141.

102 AGI Indiferente 746 (1599).


104 Vila Vilar, 1977, 30, 78. See, for example, the contract of the Portuguese merchant Agustín Cuello from 1609, which is transcribed as document 28 in Scelle, 1:812–25.

105 During the Portuguese period, the slaving ships were mainly small caravels, which carried upward of 200 slaves. Vila Vilar, 1977, 131–4.

106 Their ships (called *navios negreros*) were only allowed to carry human cargo, so as to prevent them from profiting from the sale of any other merchandise.
These visitations were often perfunctory. The slaving ships of the asiento holders regularly carried more slaves on board than what was noted on the official registries.\textsuperscript{107} In fact, their ships often arrived with no registered licenses whatsoever.\textsuperscript{108} In this sense, part of the Atlantic trade was carried out along similar lines as in the Pacific, where traders regularly traveled without licenses and disembarked off-registry. The asiento holders, however, would never admit that they too were bypassing the licensing system. Instead, they steadily gained concessions to transform their part of the trade into a real monopoly, independent of licenses.

The Portuguese were the first to be concerned with the transpacific trade. Juan Rodríguez Coutiño, who held the asiento from 1601 until his death in 1604, collected some payments from individuals who purchased licenses to bring slaves in through Acapulco.\textsuperscript{109} He must have realized, however, that most slave traders on the Pacific traveled without licenses. Manuel de Sousa Coutiño (possibly his brother), who worked for asiento holders as the “general administrator of the slaves taken to the Indies,” reported with alarm that more than 500 blacks had recently arrived in Mexico “by way of China.”\textsuperscript{110} The Coutiños could do little to ebb this flow via Acapulco, but subsequent asiento holders took purposeful action. Similarly, Manuel Rodríguez Lamego, who was awarded the asiento contract in 1623, insisted that the crown prohibit the entry of slaves through Acapulco.\textsuperscript{111} There was nothing in his contract, however, that prohibited the entry through individual licenses or that empowered the asiento holders to seize contraband slaves, so his demands likely went unheeded. It was not until many decades later that a different asiento holder gained these concessions. The Portuguese asiento holders expressed clear concern that the transpacific trade could jeopardize their fledgling business.

During these early years, the primary threat was oversupply. An increased number of Africans had the potential of reducing their selling price if there was a glut on the market. In addition, there was the issue of

\textsuperscript{107} Enriqueta Vila Vilar, “Los asientos portugueses y el contrabando de negros,” Anuario de estudios americanos 30 (1973).
\textsuperscript{108} For example, 146 ships arrived at Veracruz between 1604 and 1640; of these, 73 arrived with no registered licenses, including 16 ships belonging to the asiento holders Gonzalo Váez Coutiño and Manuel Rodríguez Lamego. Vila Vilar, 1977, appendix (cuadro) 3.
\textsuperscript{110} Ibid. The administrator was based in the Atlantic port city of Cartagena de Indias – the major entry point for slaves bound to Peru.
\textsuperscript{111} Aguirre Beltrán, 1944, 419.
increased choice for the buyers. Chino slaves were clearly cheaper, so the asiento holders may have feared that buyers would purchase chinos rather than Africans.\textsuperscript{112} The story of a slave named Francisco reveals that the price differentiation was indeed a major concern for buyers. In 1619, the administrator of a sugar plantation placed a special order for a black but was instead delivered a chino named Francisco. The plantation overseer paid 287 pesos for this chino slave, which was considerably less than the going price for an African (Appendix 2).\textsuperscript{113} The overseer was assured that Francisco was among the best slaves in Manila and that he “could be trusted with an entire household.”\textsuperscript{114} No doubt pleased by the savings, the same buyer might well have placed orders for similar chino slaves in the future.

An interesting petition from a group of miners from Zacatecas suggests that buyers in Mexico saw the Pacific route as an alternative supply line for slaves. Claiming to be desperate for laborers, in 1638, they asked the crown to grant them permission to bring 500 African slaves (\textit{cafres}) on the Manila Galleon to work in the mines.\textsuperscript{115} By that time, the Portuguese asiento holders had enough influence to sideline that plan and arrange to increase their own deliveries to Veracruz, which were only prevented by the onset of war between Spain and Portugal.

After the end of the Iberian Union and the dissolution of the Portuguese contracts, the trade in the Atlantic went through a decade of anarchy and increased contraband. There was an attempt to have the merchants of Seville take control of the slave trade, but they were unable to deliver a

\textsuperscript{112} During the seventeenth century, the average sale price for a black slave was 347 pesos, in contrast to 292 pesos for a chino slave. See Chapter 4 for a discussion of slave prices and how they changed over time. According to Brady, from 1527 to 1623, the price for African slaves in Mexico ranged from 250 to 500 pesos for males and 300 to 470 pesos for females; see Robert L. Brady, “The Domestic Slave Trade in Sixteenth-Century Mexico,” \textit{The Americas} 24, no. 3 (1968): 288. According to Bakewell, the going price for an African slave (negros and mulatos) in Zacatecas in 1656 was 270 pesos, in contrast to the price of a chino slave at 200 pesos. P. J. Bakewell, \textit{Silver Mining and Society in Colonial Mexico: Zacatecas, 1546–1700} (London: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 123.

\textsuperscript{113} AGN Historia 407 f.166 (1619).

\textsuperscript{114} AGN Historia 407 f.160 (1619).

\textsuperscript{115} AGI México 33 L.2 f.17 (1637). AGI Indiferente 2796 (1638). Bakewell writes that the Council of Indies did not make a decision regarding the petition, but Vila Vilar argues that the miners were declined and made to enter into an agreement with the Portuguese asiento holder, who promised to deliver 500 slaves every year through Veracruz. See Bakewell, 200–201; Vila Vilar, 1976, 178. Notably, the miners of Nueva Galicia and Nueva Vizcaya had made a similar request decades earlier. In 1600, they reminded the king of all the times they had requested allowance to import at least 3,000 slaves from Africa, adding that they would also accept “chinos, japones, and jabas [Javanese], who come from the Philippines.” AGI México 258 f.139 (1600).
sufficient quantity of slaves. As a result, the crown was forced to contract again with foreigners. By this time, however, Dutch or English traders controlled the main supply lines out of West Africa. As the crown could not contract openly with merchants from competing colonial powers, it turned to intermediaries.

In 1663, the crown entered into a new seven-year agreement with two Genoese merchants named Domingo Grillo and Ambrosio Lomelín, who promised to deliver 3,500 slaves annually.\textsuperscript{116} The Genoese did not bring slaves directly from Africa; they simply carried slaves from Dutch Curacao and English Barbados and Jamaica to the major ports of Spanish America. The annual rent of 300,000 ducados included the payment of all royal duties, which marked a critical simplification over the earlier system based on the asiento buying individual licenses, which had separated the cost of the licenses from the cost of the duties owed. The crown clearly realized that it was easier to receive payment from one monopoly company than to worry about the collection of duties.

In exchange for a steady income, the crown made a critical concession: individual licenses would no longer be issued, with the exception of those granted as favors (merced licenses). The asiento holders became the only traders who were allowed to bring slaves to Spanish America via the Atlantic; all other slaves were to be confiscated as contraband. The Genoese claimed that the entry of other blacks would reduce their ability to sell their own slaves, which would “harm the royal treasury” as they would be unable to pay the annual rent.\textsuperscript{117} Several decades later, the asiento holders tried to abolish individual licenses in the Pacific trade as well.

The Genoese period is notable for several other innovations. First, the Genoese succeeded in gaining entry to more ports than had been allowed to the Portuguese, including Portobelo, Caracas, Santo Domingo, and Havana. Grillo also tried to secure access to the ports of Buenos Aires and Lima, but these remained definitely closed to the asiento holders until the eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{118} The growing interest of the asiento holders in

\textsuperscript{116} For a detailed analysis of this period, see Marisa Vega Franco, \textit{El tráfico de esclavos con América: asientos de Grillo y Lomelín, 1663–1674} (Sevilla: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1984).

\textsuperscript{117} The 1663 contract is transcribed in “Apendice II” in Vega Franco, 203–17.

\textsuperscript{118} The powerful merchants of Lima succeeded in keeping out the asiento holders, who would have curtailed their own profitable trade, which involved bringing slaves from Cartagena for sale in the viceroyalty of Peru. The crown prohibited the asiento holders from landing in the Pacific until 1713, when article 10 of the English asiento gave them the right to embark from Panama to Peru or any other port. See Palacios Preciado, 172.
Acapulco has to be understood as part of this general push to expand their reach beyond the Caribbean ports and enter the markets along the Pacific. Second, the Genoese amplified the bureaucratization of the asientos. Their factors were more powerful and numerous than those of previous asientos. Their contract instituted an altogether new position called the judge conservator (juez conservador), who supervised the factors at the three major ports of Cartagena, Portobelo, and Veracruz. This appointment was usually given to the president of the local Audiencia, which meant that some of the most important royal officials in the colonies came to be in the simultaneous employ of the asiento holders. Remarkably, this was not perceived as a conflict of interest, even though the same men were charged with preventing fraud as well as with protecting the asiento holders, who were not above deception. This added manpower allowed the asiento holders to document contraband and move to prosecute offenders.

The period after the Genoese was as tumultuous as the years before in terms of the number of people involved as asiento holders, but they all had the added advantage of the Genoese concessions. From 1696 to 1701, the asiento briefly reverted to the Portuguese, who did much to build on those trading privileges to strengthen their monopoly. Manuel Ferreira de Carvalho, the representative of the Guinea Company, figures prominently as one of the men who pushed most forcefully to end the Pacific trade, specifically by trying to abolish individual licenses as had been done in the Atlantic. This was a daring move that went against the licensing allowances detailed in the then recent Compilation of the Laws of the Indies (Recopilación de leyes de los reynos de las Indias), first printed in 1680, which codified some of the decrees from previous decades that allowed the passengers and crew of the Manila Galleon to travel with slaves.

119 Under the Genoese asiento, the ports of Cartagena, Portobelo, and Veracruz were each assigned a head factor (real factor), aided by two other agents. In addition, the asiento holders placed factors at the other allowed ports of entry: Cumaná, Caracas, Santo Domingo, Habana, and San Juan, as well as in other ports such as Lima to watch for contraband. Vega Franco, 128–30.

120 Ibid., 129.

121 The crown signed a contract with Bernardo Marín de Guzmán in 1692, who acted as a front for the Portuguese Companhia de Cabo Verde e Cacheu de negocios dos prêtos, which was reorganized as the Companhia da Guiné (Guinea Company). In 1696, the asiento went to it, whose main stockholder was the king of Portugal.

122 The Recopilación catalogued decrees from decades past that addressed myriad subjects having to do with the administration of the Spanish colonies. Recopilación de leyes de los reynos de las Indias mandadas imprimir y publicar por la Magestad católica del rey don Carlos II, 4 vols. (Madrid: Julian de Paredes, 1681).
The company wanted this allowance forfeited and to have all slaves who did not arrive via their expressed order confiscated as contraband.

The Recopilación had a section titled “On slave duties” that articulated the crown’s position on the role of the asiento holders at this time.\textsuperscript{123} Significantly, the decrees that touched on the slave trade across the Pacific, except for one, were catalogued in a different section altogether, titled “On the navigation and commerce of the Philippines.”\textsuperscript{124} The one decree grouped with the asiento regulations was a copy of the 1626 mandate ordering the collection of duties in Acapulco discussed earlier.\textsuperscript{125} The choice of the decrees that were included in the Recopilación as laws and where they were catalogued within the collection are suggestive in several ways. It seems that the crown wanted to conceive of the Atlantic and Pacific trades as operating under different mechanisms, which would allow it to maintain certain licensing rights, both to give as mercedes and to sell to collect additional duties. After the Genoese period, that was no longer possible in the Atlantic, but the crown tried to keep the rights for the Pacific. That said, by 1680, the crown had also come to depend on the ever more powerful asiento holders to deliver larger numbers of African slaves to Spanish America. As such, the Pacific exception had to be carefully articulated, so as not to appear to be reneging on the asiento contracts.

The asiento holders were not persuaded. After 1680, they pushed to amend the Recopilación by insisting that the crown issue additional decrees limiting the entry of slaves at Acapulco. The first concession was given to the powerful Dutch merchant Baltasar Coymans, who briefly held the asiento in recognition that the Dutch controlled some of the major supply ports. The 1687 royal decree read:

It has come to my attention that the ships from the Philippines introduce many pieces [piezas] of slaves, which is a grave danger to my service and harmful to the asiento . . . so I declare that all blacks that come on those ships are illegal [de mala entrada] and can be confiscated by the said asiento holder or his factors.\textsuperscript{126}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{123} Book 8, title 18 of the Laws of the Indies.
\bibitem{124} Section titled “De la navegación y comercio de las Islas Filipinas, China, Nueva España y Perú,” Book 9, title 45, laws 54, 55, and 56 of the Laws of the Indies.
\bibitem{125} “Que se registren y paguen los derechos de esclavos traídos de Filipinas a la Nueva España,” October 16, 1626. The decree was codified as book 8, title 18, law 4 of the Laws of the Indies.
\bibitem{126} AGI Escribanía 187A f.8v (1687). The change to counting slaves as “piezas” rather than individually occurred during the Genoese period; a “pieza de indias” was a slave “de siete cuartas de altura, sano, y sin defectos.” The new measure allowed the asiento holders to pay fewer duties for arriving slaves who did not meet those criteria. See Vega Franco, 31.
\end{thebibliography}
To further the restriction, in 1692, the asiento holder Bernardo Marín de Guzmán, representing Portuguese interests, persuaded the crown to specify that individuals could only bring blacks to the Indies from Manila for their personal service. In the event that the owner had to sell his property, the sale price had to be less than the price on the original slave title. Any person who was found to profit from such a sale had “to pay the asiento holder the value of the negro.” The clause was clearly aimed at preventing passengers from bringing slaves for sale through merced licenses for personal servants.

The Portuguese Guinea Company, however, wanted more definitive prohibitions on all slaves, even those who came as servants, so they took concerted legal action against the competition to instigate this change. In 1699, the company sued some of the passengers of the Manila Galleon who arrived with slaves, all blacks, even those who had licenses to bring them as personal servants. The factor sought a specific ruling – that from then on “all blacks introduced by the ships from the Philippines” be declared forfeit and handed over to the asiento. Moreover, all the naval officers who claimed that the slaves were for their personal service would have to make a deposit (fianza) and pledge that the said slaves would “be returned by way of the same ship.” Notably, when the defendants testified at court, they all referenced “the permission given by His Majesty to the people who come from those islands.” In other words, they all cited the 1626 decree catalogued in the Recopilación that did indeed allow passengers to bring slaves.

The case was first heard in Mexico by the juez conservador, who sided with the asiento and declared that the entry of the slaves in question was indeed illegal. The judge specifically cited the royal decree from 1687 as trumping the Recopilación. The defendants then appealed to the Council of the Indies, where their lawyer argued that the said decree could not be understood to refer to slaves brought as servants, because that would be “contrary to the published laws” (i.e., to the Recopilación). In the protracted legal battle that followed, the Guinea Company continued to maintain that the Pacific allowance did not “conform to the dictates of the asiento” and thus constituted an illicit trade.

127 AGN Reales Cédulas Duplicadas 24 exp.88 f.263 (1692).
128 AGI Escribanía 187A (1700).
129 AGI Escribanía 187A f.10v (1699).
130 AGI Escribanía 187A f.15 (1699).
131 AGI Escribanía 187A (1703).
In the end, the defendants succeeded in having the ruling revoked in 1705 and regained possession of their property (the slaves had remained embargoed in Mexico City).\footnote{AGI Escribanía 960 (1705).} By this time, the asiento was in the hands of the Real Compañía de Guinea of France, who did not pursue the matter of Acapulco. As one of the lawyers noted, the “declaration of war” by the Grand Alliance meant that the Spanish king had larger concerns.\footnote{AGI Escribanía 187A (1705).} The international market for slaves was fundamentally changed after the War of the Spanish Succession, when the British were awarded the asiento, with all the privileges previously accrued. The eighteenth-century asiento thus emerged as a true monopoly, with the legal capabilities, economic might, and political weight to determine the supply lines and shut down interlopers in the Pacific. The transpacific trade, which was always part of a much larger trading system concentrated in the Atlantic arena, was a relatively short interlude in the history of the slave trade, which underwent fundamental changes in the context of the Spanish empire.

\section*{Conclusion}

Slaves were a side business in the Manila Galleon trade of the seventeenth century. Traders brought them along as personal servants and to help them guard their precious crates filled with silks and porcelains. It was small-time trading, done through individual licenses or as contraband. The space on the Manila Galleon ships was too limited, and the length of the journey was too long, for the transpacific trade to match the volume of the Atlantic slave trade. Dutch and Portuguese asiento holders, nonetheless, perceived the transpacific slave trade as a real threat, so they lobbied the Spanish crown to end it.\footnote{Royal decrees regulating commerce from the Philippines to Mexico in the eighteenth century made no mention of slaves. AGN Reales Cédulas Originales 45 exp.149 f.510 (1726).} Traders who delivered chattel in the eighteenth century, at least according to the law, had to disembark at designated ports on the Atlantic side of Spanish America.

The Atlantic asiento holders made it their business to shut down the competition, and in this they were also helped by a decline in demand. After about 1660, masters were no longer willing to pay top price for non-African slaves.\footnote{In 1659, María de la Cruz, a china slave, and her three-year-old son Joseph sold in Mexico City for 400 pesos. When the two were sold again a year and a half later, the price was 230} The ambiguous identity of chino slaves and their
resemblance to Indians made purchasing them a high-risk investment. As a result, fewer slaves were boarded in Manila. Then after 1690, passengers who arrived in Acapulco with slaves for sale had their property confiscated. 136 Ship officials who traveled with personal servants had to make sworn testaments before disembarking that their slaves would return to the Philippines. In 1704, General Theodoro de San Lucas swore that he “brought two slaves named Amaro and Carlos in his service and that they would return in his assistance, both married with wives in Manila.” 137 Apart from the ship captain’s personal servant, no other slaves arrived on board the Nuestra Señora del Rosario that year. The trade was over.

pesos. ANM Nicolás de Arauz 12 f.8 (1660); ANM Nicolás de Arauz 12 f.16–18v (1659); ANM Nicolás de Arauz 12 f. 40–40v (1659).

136 In 1690, the crown ordered royal officials to confiscate slaves who arrived on the Manila Galleon. AGN Reales Cédulas Originales 23 exp.3 f.7 (1690).

137 AGN Marina 3 exp.2 f.16–18, 20–23 (1704).