The Origins and Development of Soviet Anti-Semitism: An Analysis

Classical Marxism, in contrast to various forms of utopian socialism, anarchism, and syndicalism, treated anti-Semitism with utter contempt. The German Social Democratic leader August Bebel summed up the prevailing attitude of classical Marxism when he dubbed anti-Semitism the "socialism of fools." Lenin was even sharper in his denunciation: "Shame on those who foment hatred towards the Jews," he cried in March 1919. Yet fifty-five years after the Bolshevik Revolution the Soviet Union has become the principal exemplar of the "socialism of fools," with anti-Jewish discrimination practiced in various areas of politics and employment and in the ethnic-cultural field. Especially disquieting is the massive anti-Zionist propaganda campaign which incorporates the traditional negative stereotypes of Jews.

The remarkable development by which classical Marxism was turned on its head merits close inquiry. When and under what circumstances did the transformation occur? Essential to any discussion of the question is the need to distinguish between "folk" anti-Semitism and official state policy toward Jews. Under tsarism little distinction could be drawn between the two: anti-Semitic imagery, especially in the areas of the Jewish Pale of Settlement, was accompanied by and probably helped to sustain a government policy which placed burdensome restrictions upon Jews and which unleashed, from time to time, pogroms. If the revolutions of 1917 ended official anti-Semitism, popular myths about Jews were by no means uprooted.

Soviet studies of popular anti-Semitism, in contrast to scholarly inquiries in most major countries, are nonexistent. When Professor Lewis Feuer suggested to officials of the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences that such a study would prove valuable, he elicited a cold and strongly negative reaction. Generally, Soviet authorities, when speaking in public forums, are prone to declare that there is no Jewish problem in the USSR and that anti-

1. See George Lichtheim, "Socialism and the Jews," Dissent, July–August 1968, pp. 314–42. Marx, in his Zur Judenfrage (1844), did, however, use certain stereotypes about Jews and capitalism that were to become part of the lexicon of such Soviet bigots as Trofim K. Kichko.


Semitism has been eliminated. One is reminded of the 1931 comic novel by Ilya Ilf and Evgenii Petrov, *The Little Golden Calf*. The authors have one of their characters, in commenting to an astonished foreign Jewish reporter, caustically say, “there are Jews but [there is] no Jewish problem.”

The only sample of available data on popular opinion is provided in the Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System. The project—a series of lengthy, carefully structured interviews with former Soviet citizens, mainly Russian, Belorussian, and Ukrainian, who had fairly recently become refugees in the United States, Germany, and Austria—was conducted in 1950–51. The sample, comprising 329 persons, was structured to represent as broad a cross section of the Soviet European population as was possible under the restricted circumstances. Thus, in the selection of interviewees, account was taken of nationality, sex, age, class, and status. If unavoidably distorted, the sample can hardly be considered altogether atypical: the respondents were neither misfits nor the congenitally disaffected. Most of the respondents left the USSR involuntarily, either as forced laborers or as prisoners of war captured by the Germans. About three of every four left during World War II, the others during the 1946–50 period. A high proportion had been “unusually successful” in the Soviet system.

In 1960 I closely examined the interview data and ascertained the following: 10 percent of the respondents displayed a violent hostility to Jews—ranging from a machine-shop worker who believed that Jews “kill a child each Passover and . . . drink the blood at that time” to a mechanical engineer who had occupied an important post in the Soviet military administration in Germany before his flight to the West in 1946, who said, “I do not like these people.” Another 25 percent of the respondents held strong negative stereotypes of Jews. The stereotypes, as expressed in descending order of frequency, include:

- Jews occupy a privileged position in Soviet society.
- Jews are business and money-minded.
- Jews are clannish and aid each other.
- Jews are aggressive and “pushy.”
- Jews are sly, calculating, manipulative, and know how “to use a situation.”
- Jews are deceitful, dishonest, unprincipled, insolent, and impudent.
- Jews don’t like to work hard.
- Jews are cowards and serve only in the rear of the army.

4. Thus Premier Alexei Kosygin would say at a press conference in New York in June 1967 that “there has never been and there is no anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union” (*New York Times*, June 27, 1967).
6. The basic findings were published in Raymond A. Bauer, Alex Inkeles, and Clyde
If the interviewees had not been conscious that the interviewers were hardly anti-Semitic and in several cases were in fact Jewish, their responses might well have been even sharper. As it was, one-third of the sample revealed negative stereotyping. At least 10 percent of the respondents, many of whom made no negative comments on Jews, spoke freely of widespread anti-Semitic prejudices in the USSR. The existence of such feelings was also reported by the tiny number of Jews in the sample.

An unpublished study of the attitudes of Ukrainian refugees (entitled “The Nationality Questionnaire”), conducted by Sylvia Gilliam as part of the Harvard Project, suggests that anti-Jewish prejudice among Ukrainians was particularly strong. Using a variation of the Bogardus social distance scale, she found that 47 percent of the least educated, 51 percent of the moderately educated, and 36 percent of the well educated favored exclusion of Jews from various forms of social contact. The categories of contact were (1) work situation, (2) apartment house, (3) friendship, (4) marriage, and (5) all of these. The most frequently checked category was the last. The researcher also ascertained that Ukrainian dislike of Jews was more frequently expressed than dislike of Russians, and she concluded that the moderately educated respondent was “particularly anti-Semitic . . . in his perception of relations between his own national group and Jews.”

What is so striking about the negative stereotypes displayed in the Harvard Project is that they echo almost exactly the stereotypes of a more limited sample provided by Iurii Larin in 1929. He had in August 1928 attended a “seminar on anti-Semitism” at party headquarters in a Moscow borough. Gathered together were several score of better-educated and politically advanced urban workers who were Komsomol and party members. Most of the questions asked of the instructor revealed a strong anti-Semitic bias. Larin reported the following typical questions:

- How is it that Jews always manage to get good positions?
- Why is it that Jews don’t want to do heavy work?
- Why are there so many Jews in the universities? Isn’t it because they forge their papers?
- Won’t the Jews be traitors in war? Aren’t they dodging military service?
- Should not the cause of anti-Semitism be looked for in the [Jewish] people itself, in its ethical and psychological upbringing?

In November 1926 Mikhail Kalinin, chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets and titular head of the state, said publicly that “the Russian intelligentsia is perhaps more anti-Semitic today than it was under

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Kluckhohn, *How the Soviet System Works* (Cambridge, Mass., 1956). The material on anti-Semitism was only sketchily treated. In order to prepare this essay I went back to the interviews and examined each of them.

tsarism.” By “intelligentsia” he meant white-collar workers. Reports in the Soviet press during the twenties reveal widespread anti-Semitism among industrial workers as well. A survey conducted in February 1929 of trade union members in Moscow concluded: “Anti-Semitic feeling among workers is spreading chiefly in the backward section of the working class that has close ties with the peasantry, and among women. . . . Talk of Jewish domination is particularly widespread.”

The Smolensk archives have yielded considerable evidence of the widespread character of “folk” anti-Semitism. A report on one factory divides the workers at a discussion into three groups: “(1) Those strongly contaminated with anti-Semitic prejudice. This is an active group—they asked questions, objected, made speeches, wisecracked, etc. (2) The bulk of the audience, who tacitly agreed with the arguments and speeches of the former. (3) A tiny minority, who timidly tried to reason with the first group.” Fainsod observed that “many similar experiences” are recorded in the archives, indeed “a whole folder which contains nothing else.”

Twelve years after the October Revolution, anti-Semitism had remained deep-seated and virulent. Twenty years later (and over thirty years after the Revolution), anti-Semitic attitudes, as the Harvard Project indicated, continued as a pervasive phenomenon. Evidence of the intensity of popular anti-Semitism in 1953, accompanying the “doctors’ plot,” is provided by Ilya Ehrenburg and Evgenii Evtushenko. Ehrenburg commented, for example, that even though “our people had matured spiritually,” events of 1953 had shown that “the ‘thinking reed’ stops thinking at times.” He acknowledged that he had been in error in supposing that anti-Semitism, an “ugly survival” of the past, would disappear with the advent of socialism: “I now know . . . that to cleanse minds of age-old prejudice is going to take a very long time.”

If attitudes since 1953 are deliberately blanketed by a cover of silence, information continues to seep out. In September 1966 Novyi mir published an article by sociologist I. Kon entitled “The Psychology of Prejudice.” While it is predominantly an inquiry into the “social-psychological roots of ethnic preconceptions” in the United States, the Kon article makes an interesting concluding observation about anti-Semitic prejudice in the USSR: “It would seem that they [ethnic prejudices] have entirely disappeared and been forgotten—but quite the contrary, when particular difficulties arise, they make themselves felt, influencing backward sections of the population.”

The young Soviet state vigorously combatted popular forms of anti-Semitism during the period of civil war (1918–20) when large-scale violence against Jews was supported or tolerated by various White military forces. The July 27, 1918, Soviet decree ordering that “pogromists and persons inciting to pogroms be outlawed” (Izvestia, July 27, 1918) was a clear reflection of the determination of the state to uproot ideas and practices which, in fact, were considered threatening to Bolshevik rule.

During the twenties, especially toward the end of that decade, the regime continued to make strong efforts to contain the virus of anti-Jewish bigotry. If the appropriate section of the Criminal Code (banning “agitation and propaganda arousing national enmities and dissensions”) was infrequently invoked and if severe sentences for anti-Semitic offenses were rare, nonetheless educational campaigns were energetically conducted by party organs, and various pedagogical efforts were undertaken. On at least one occasion Pravda sharply attacked “the connivance of the local party, trade union, and Komsomol organizations” in various “manifestations of anti-Semitism.” The editorial emphasized that such “connivance makes it possible for the anti-Semitic campaign of persecution to go on unpunished for months and years” (Pravda, February 19, 1929).

Yet even during the twenties the record was not unblemished. In early 1926, during the bitter intraparty warfare, N. Uglanov, then a Stalin aide in charge of the Moscow party organization, sent out agitators to party cells to incite workers against both the Zinoviev Opposition and the Trotsky Opposition. The agitators hinted at the Jewish origin of the leaders of the two oppositions and suggested that the struggle was between native Russian socialism and “aliens” who sought to pervert it. Trotsky wrote to Bukharin on March 4 expressing shock that “anti-Semitic agitation should be carried on with impunity.”

This episode, though an isolated one, indicated that Stalin would hardly be fastidious in the choice of means in his political maneuvers. It was, indeed, a harbinger of things to come. For the time being, however, and until the Great Purges in the late thirties, the party and state leadership avoided all uses of political anti-Semitism. Stalin told the Jewish Telegraphic Agency in January 1931 that anti-Semitism was “a phenomenon profoundly hostile to the Soviet regime” and was “sternly repressed in the USSR.” He called it “a survival of the barbarous practices of the cannibalistic period.” The interview was not published in the Soviet press, but almost six years later Premier V.

M. Molotov read it out to the Eighth Soviet Congress and went on to characterize anti-Semitism as "bestiality" (*Pravda*, November 30, 1936). At the same time Molotov called attention to Marx’s Jewish origin and pointed out that the "Jewish people" gave "many heroes to the revolutionary struggle" and "continue to produce more and more fine and gifted leaders and organizers" in the Soviet Union. There can be little question that the publication in 1936 of Stalin’s earlier interview and the additional comments by Molotov were designed to fit a Soviet foreign policy that was aimed at solidifying its links with the West in the face of the growing Nazi threat.

Internally, the purges had the effect of liquidating the “old guard,” in which the proportion of Jews was much higher than in the party as a whole. Trotsky detected anti-Semitic undertones in the Moscow trials, but the evidence was far from conclusive with reference to the “old guard,” although in the questioning of the physician L. G. Levin a certain bigotry was apparent. However, Svetlana Alliluyeva writes that “with the expulsion of Trotsky and the extermination during the years of ‘purges’ of old Party members, many of whom were Jews, anti-Semitism was reborn on new grounds and first of all in the Party itself.”

The purge eliminated almost the entire Jewish cadre responsible for Jewish affairs. Of even greater significance was the destruction of most Jewish communal institutions, the infrastructure that was essential to the preservation of Jewish identity. Several years ago a Soviet Jewish researcher noted that the “spy mania” of the late thirties deleteriously affected all minorities who had ties with the West. And the Jews were the minority with perhaps the most intimate connections with the West. In 1939 J. B. Salsberg, at the time a leading Canadian Communist, raised the issue of political anti-Semitism in the USSR with Georgii Dimitrov, the head of the Comintern. A proposal was even advanced that a study commission be created by the Comintern to examine the matter.

The end of the thirties marked a watershed in the history of anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union. The timing is crucial for an understanding of the origin of official anti-Semitism. All too often Soviet anti-Semitism is linked to the establishment of Israel in May 1948. This is completely erroneous. From

19. Information provided me in an oral interview.
the late thirties and early forties on, if slowly and unevenly, anti-Jewish discrimination became an integral part of official state policy. Academician Andrei Sakharov, the prominent Soviet physicist and coinventor of the hydrogen bomb, recently gave emphasis to this time-demarcation. Referring to anti-Semitism in “our appointments policy,” he noted that “in the highest bureaucratic elite of our government, the spirit of anti-Semitism was never fully dispelled after the nineteen-thirties.”

He emphasized that an “unenlightened zoological kind of anti-Semitism was characteristic of Stalinist bureaucracy.” Svetlana Alliluyeva made a similar observation.

According to Hitler, Stalin told Nazi Foreign Minister Ribbentrop in the fall of 1939 that he would oust Soviet Jews from leading positions the moment he had a sufficient number of qualified non-Jews to replace them.

The Stalin commitment was more than a mere diplomatic effort to placate the newly found racist ally. If Sakharov’s assertion is somewhat vague, Professor John Armstrong states categorically that in 1942, one year after the Nazi invasion of Russia, the Soviet authorities handed down a secret order establishing quotas for Jews in prominent posts. And, according to Ilya Ehrenburg, during the summer of 1943 Alexander Shcherbakov, head of the army’s Political Commissariat and a close associate of Stalin, instructed him to play down the exploits of Jews in the Red Army.

A Soviet diplomatic official in Canada who later defected, Igor Gouzenko has related that he was told in 1939 that a “confidential” decree of the party Central Committee sent to all directors of educational institutions established quotas of admissions for Jews. Gouzenko also said that in the summer of 1945 he was informed by the chief of the secret division of Soviet Intelligence that the Central Committee sent “confidential” instructions to directors of all factories to remove Jews from responsible positions. According to Milovan Djilas, in 1946 Stalin boasted to him that “in our Central Committee there are no Jews!”


enrollment at the university and in all types of employment preference was given to Russians. For the Jews a percentage quota was, in essence, reinstated"; Armstrong estimates the quota at the time to be 10 percent.27

Membership in the federal Supreme Soviet and in republic Soviets is an indicator of official policy toward Jews, since the single nominee for each position is dictated by the party. As early as 1938 in the Ukraine only two Jews were elected to the republic Supreme Soviet out of a total membership of 304.28 Jewish deputies constituted only 0.7 percent of the total, although the Jews numbered about 5 percent of the total population living in the Ukraine. Since in most other union republics the percentage of Jews elected to Supreme Soviets was far higher than their ratio in the respective populations, the Ukrainian experience can only be understood as a state decision to appease popular anti-Semitism in the Ukraine.

Comparative data concerning the USSR Supreme Soviet is even more revealing.29 In the last election of the Supreme Soviet before the war, held in December 1937, 47 Jews were chosen (of 1,143 members)—4.1 percent of the total. In the Soviet of the Union, Jews numbered 32 of 569 members, or 5.6 percent, and 15 of 574 of the Soviet of Nationalities, or 2.6 percent. In the first election of a Supreme Soviet after the war, January 1946, the drop in Jewish membership was dramatic and hardly explicable even in terms of the sizable Jewish population losses due to the Nazi holocaust. Only five Jewish names were to be found among 601 members of the Soviet of the Union, or less than 1 percent; Jewish membership in the Soviet of Nationalities dropped from eleventh to twenty-sixth place (although Jews ranked eleventh in population in 1946).

The sensitive field of diplomacy was another area where in the early forties Jews were subject to overt discrimination. A former UNRRA official, writing shortly after the war, reported that “in recent years Jews have been barred from recruitment into the Soviet foreign service.”30 The New York Times correspondent called attention to rumors (for which there seemed to be some verification) that “Jews were no longer being accepted by the Foreign Office in the diplomatic training courses.”31

The process of anti-Jewish discrimination in the political-security area

unfolded in a steady manner during the fifties and sixties. In 1950 two Jews were elected to the 678-member Soviet of the Union and three to the 638-member Soviet of Nationalities. The 1958 Supreme Soviet had only three Jews among 1,364 members of both houses. In 1962 there were only five Jews selected by the party leaders to be "elected" to the 1,443-member Supreme Soviet. The percentage (0.35) was far below that of Jews in the total population (1.09 percent) as a whole. The percentage declined further to 0.3 in 1966, when the new membership of the Supreme Soviet increased to 1,517, but the Jewish representation remained at five. There is to be found not a single Jewish deputy among those chosen to represent Moscow or Leningrad, both containing large Jewish populations. Nor is there a Jewish deputy for any constituency in the Ukraine, Belorussia, Lithuania, and Moldavia.

Even more pronounced was the pattern of discrimination in the selection of deputies to the union republic supreme Soviets. Of the 5,312 deputies elected to these bodies in 1959, only 14 were Jewish (0.26 percent). Only one Jewish deputy was to be found among the 835 deputies in the Russian Republic; a single Jew among the 457 deputies in the Ukraine (0.22 percent, in a Jewish population constituting 2 percent of the total population); and only two Jews among the 407 deputies in Belorussia (0.45 percent, in a Jewish population constituting 1.9 percent of the total). Similar percentages were to be found in various non-Slavic republics. For example, of the 281 deputies in Moldavia, where the Jews numbered 3.3 percent of the population, there was not a single Jew; of the 200 deputies in Latvia, where Jews constituted 1.7 percent of the total, no Jew was chosen. Lithuania was an exception: Jewish representation in its Supreme Soviet paralleled the percentage of the Jews in the population with three of 209 deputies—1.44 percent.

Of far greater significance was the drastic drop in membership of Jews in the elite Central Committee of the Communist Party. In 1939, of 139 members of this body, 15 were Jewish. The percentage then was 10.8, greater than that of Ukrainians and Belorussians combined. By 1952 the percentage had dropped to 3, then to 2 percent in 1956. In 1961 the percentage declined to a mere 0.3 percent. An analyst of the Soviet elite concluded: "The Jews are the only nationality whose relative weight and absolute numbers in elite representation declined consistently in both the Stalinist and post-Stalin eras." There are no Jews in the top party organ, the Politburo; and, with

one exception, no Jewish names appear among listed key figures in either the central party apparatus or among first and second secretaries of provincial and district party organizations. The exception is the recent appointment of one, Lev Shapiro, as first secretary of the party organization in Birobidzhan (Pravda, July 25, 1970).

The Soviet diplomatic corps appears to be virtually Judenrein—in striking contrast to the situation that prevailed in the twenties and thirties. Examination of a 1962 list of 475 top Soviet officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in high diplomatic posts abroad shows, at the most, five Jewish names. A similar pattern obtains in the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Trade.

The extent to which the process of exclusion or limitation embraces the general area of bureaucratic administration, beyond the decisive political and security areas, is not known. In 1956 high Soviet officials acknowledged to interviewers that the number of Jews in various central government departments and in the administration of union republics had been reduced. One interviewer was a correspondent of the leftist newspaper, the National Guardian; the second was a former Canadian Communist official; and third was a group of French Socialist members of the Chamber of Deputies.

That the fifties were marked by an effort to reduce significantly the number of Jews employed in key positions in various union republics was made clear by Khrushchev in 1956. After noting that the nationalities in these republics "now have their engineers and professionals," he went on to say that they would take it "amiss" if Jews were to "occupy the foremost positions in our republics." The party's theoretical organ, Kommunist, was to reveal in June 1963 that "in the preparation of cadres" the "less-developed nations" in the USSR "were granted various privileges and advantages."

Even in the administration of the science community, a community in which there are large numbers of Jewish workers, there are some indications that certain restrictions upon Jews obtain. In March 1962 Academician Konstantin Skriabin, speaking on the importance of appointing competent cadres in the scientific field, observed that such appointments should not be determined by the applicant's "passport," which carries his nationality identification, but "by his head, from the point of view of his ability and social usefulness" (Pravda, March 8, 1962). (The passport is acquired by urban Soviet citizens at the age of sixteen. "Point 5" on the passport lists "nationality."

37. Ibid., pp. 336-38.
38. See the transcript of the interview in Réalités, no. 136 (May 1957), p. 104.
Where the nationality of the parents is the same, the registrar automatically lists that nationality in the youngster's passport. If the parents differ in nationality, the youngster may choose either as his own.) Sakharov, in 1968, was to make the charge of discrimination in a much sharper manner. In March 1970, together with two other prominent intellectuals, he called for the elimination of the nationality identification in the passport—which is the principal means at the disposal of personnel officers for determining who is Jewish.40

The quota system in admission to universities, which is the key to social and economic advancement in Soviet society, is another disturbing aspect of the discriminatory pattern. In 1963 the Vestnik vysshei shkoly acknowledged the existence of “annually planned preferential admission quotas.”41 Nicholas DeWitt, an American specialist on Soviet education, has stated that the quota system operates “to the particularly severe disadvantage of the Jewish population.”42 He offers data to demonstrate that between 1935 and 1958 “the index of representation rose for most nationalities, but fell for Georgians and all national minorities, with a drastic decline for the Jews.” Maurice Hindus, writing at about the same time, found that the University of Moscow had a particularly restrictive policy with respect to the admission of Jews.43 The extent to which the quota system continues today to affect deleteriously the admission of Jewish youngsters, especially in major universities, cannot be determined.

The emergence of anti-Jewish discrimination as state policy in the late thirties and early forties certainly cannot be considered a function of the foreign policy of the USSR. That policy had swung sharply from a pro-West position (“collective security”) to a pro-Nazi position (the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact) and then back to a pro-West position (the Grand Alliance). Anti-Jewish discrimination, with an important exception, developed along a single line with little fluctuation. The exception involved the area of group rights, as distinct from individual or civil rights. The Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee was created in 1942, and together with the publication establishment, Emes, it was to constitute, until November 1948, the “Jewish address” in the USSR. The formation of the committee was designed to win strong Jewish sympathy in the Western world for the Soviet cause. Mention might also be made of the lifting of the earlier severe restrictions upon Judaism as a concomitant of a general easing of pressures upon the recognized religions

41. V. Komarov and V. Artamoshkina, “Takova ikh nauchnaia ob"ektivnost' I” Vestnik vysshei shkoly, December 1963, p. 78.
in the Soviet Union. In any case, the concessions did not affect the application of anti-Jewish restrictions in employment, cadre appointment, and education.

Official anti-Semitism (from which the Jewish community, as a community enjoying certain ethnic and cultural rights, was now excepted) must clearly be seen as a function of internal developments during the late thirties and early forties. Two of these internal developments stand out.

A deepening Russian nationalism, bordering on xenophobic chauvinism, was a dominant characteristic of the struggle against the "internationalism" of the "old guard." Suspicion fell equally upon those suspected of harboring sympathies for various non-Russian nationalities of the USSR and upon those who were linked, in one way or another, with the West. If nationalism was inherent in the Stalinist doctrine of "socialism in one country," its edge was sharpened through fears engendered by the growing external threat to the regime in the late thirties. World War II would only aid and abet the process, with Stalin at the end of the war according it the strongest, if scarcely a Leninist, endorsement. At a Kremlin banquet he declared the "Russian people" to be the "most outstanding of all the nations of the Soviet Union." 44

Many years earlier, in 1907, in joking about the struggle between the Mensheviks and Bolsheviks at the 1903 London Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party, he had contrasted the alleged predominance of Great Russians in the Bolshevik leadership with the predominance of Jews in the Menshevik leadership. 45 Svetlana Alliluyeva tells us that Stalin "never liked Jews." 46

A concomitant of Russian chauvinism, as it had indeed been during the tsarist era, at least since the reign of Nicholas I, was anti-Semitism. Certainly it was not accidental that official anti-Semitism made its first, if brief, appearance in 1926, when Stalinist forces were attempting to inculcate a national pride in the doctrine of "socialism in one country." Chauvinism fed upon popular prejudices. The war years were replete with examples of an unleashed bigotry linked to nationalist fervor. 47 Many of the partisan units, for example, were riven with anti-Semitism. In 1956 Khrushchev acknowledged to a visiting French Socialist delegation that popular prejudice toward Jews did influence the state discriminatory policy. He explained that if Jews continued to hold high positions in the Ukraine, for example, it would "create


jealousy and hostility toward Jews. In December 1962 he told a party-organized meeting of artists and intellectuals that if Jews were to occupy top posts, it would tend to create anti-Semitism.

The second development was the erection of a totalitarian structure geared to the mobilization of total mass energies for purposes determined by the party. Totalitarianism could, of course, tolerate no genuinely autonomous or corporate social units independent of the central manipulators of power. For those ethnic groups with a territorial base, the dismantling of autonomous structures or their penetration involved a lengthy process and could not easily be completed, especially if they were very numerous. But with the Jews, a dispersed people, the task was simpler. Their communal establishment could be completely obliterated, as happened in the late thirties and then again in 1948–49. The Jews were particularly suspect in a totalitarian structure tinged with chauvinism, for history had provided them with an international tradition which drew upon the sources of an ancient world-wide religion. For Jews everywhere there were cultural, emotional, and even family ties that transcended national boundaries.

But there was yet another feature of totalitarianism which could and would have a distinctive relationship to anti-Semitism. Hannah Arendt notes that totalitarianism requires an “objective enemy,” who, like the “carrier of a disease,” is the “carrier” of subversive “tendencies.” The very nature of a system which claims both a monopoly of truth and the control of the “commanding heights” by which the preordained goal may be reached precludes human error or inadequacy. Only plots and conspiracies by hidden forces could interrupt, hinder, or defeat “scientically” planned programs. Stalin even thought that his daughter’s marriage to a Jew was a “Zionist plot.” Other Soviet leaders may not have considered the Jew a “plotter,” but cynically may have accepted the functional usefulness of the idea. Thus the Jew could be made the scapegoat for failures or difficulties in the regime’s internal and foreign policies.

If both chauvinism and totalitarianism lent themselves to the absorption of popular anti-Semitism, the character of party leadership since the thirties helps explain the transmission and persistence of “folk” imagery about the Jew. A close study of the top 306 party executives on both national and regional...
levels (in 1958 and 1962) shows that almost half of them have peasant fathers. Only 6 percent have white-collar origins, while a little more than a quarter come from the proletariat. The transmittal of negative stereotypes about Jews from the “folk” level is thus fairly direct. Moreover, the limited and narrow schooling of most Soviet leaders does little to overcome characteristic popular stereotyping. Almost 40 percent of party leaders either acquired no education beyond secondary school or attended only a party school. Of those who completed a college education, 40 percent studied engineering and 30 percent studied agronomy—“narrowly specialized and highly applied skills.” Training in the broad humanistic disciplines was negligible.

The training experience of the party leaders is also not particularly conducive to broadening their horizons. About a third of the leaders studied specialized work in farming, a third in industry, and a third in ideology. Most then worked in the organizational apparatus before reaching their top posts. The difference between the training and experience of the top party leaders before and after the Great Purges of 1937–38 is enormous. If broad intellectual horizons distinguished the prepurge party leader, a provincial and cramped outlook characterized the new party leader. Within such a restricted range, the traditional conception of the Jew emerges as an accepted and acceptable one.

The onset of the cold war deepened both the chauvinist and the totalitarian tendencies in Soviet life. The impact upon the Jewish community was devastating. At the end of 1948 and in early 1949 all specifically Jewish cultural institutions, including those that survived the Great Purges and the few that had been established during the war, were obliterated. Certain patterns of anti-Jewish discrimination were already apparent before and during World War II. The cold war aroused morbid suspicions of imperialist plots emanating from the West. Earlier suspicions about Jews and Jewish institutions now inevitably sharpened.

It would be a mistake to view the destruction of Jewish institutional life as a reflection of Soviet policy toward Israel. The contrary is true. Even as Soviet authorities were preparing the ground for liquidating Jewish communal structures, Moscow’s relations with Israel were warm and cordial. The brutal murder of Shlomo Mikhoels, the chairman of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee and therefore the leader of the Soviet Jewish community, was carried out by the KGB with Stalin’s personal endorsement as early as January 1948. In May 1948 the USSR played a leading role at the United

55. See Alliluyeva, Only One Year, p. 154, and Ehrenburg, Post-War Years: 1945–54, p. 125.
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Nations in creating the State of Israel and was the first to extend it formal recognition. In the Arab-Israeli War that followed and which lasted until early 1949 the Soviet state was both a harsh critic of the Arab side and a vigorous supporter of Israel, enabling the latter to obtain great quantities of military supplies from Communist-dominated Czechoslovakia. Not until 1950 did the Soviet policy switch to one of overt antagonism toward Israel. 58

Much has been made of the appearance in Moscow's main synagogue in October 1948—the occasion of the Jewish New Year—of Israel's first ambassador to the USSR, Mrs. Golda Meyerson (Meir). The fervent emotion which her presence stirred among Moscow's Jews was, indeed, powerful and overt, and it could scarcely have gone unnoticed in Kremlin circles. Yet, eight months before her entrance upon the scene, the crucial decision to decapitate the leadership of the Soviet Jewish community was taken. And one month before Mrs. Meir's synagogue visit Ilya Ehrenburg, at the "request" of the editor of Pravda, wrote an authoritative four-column article that provided the ideological rationale for hostility to Zionism. 57

The Ehrenburg article merits closer examination than it has previously been given. Though he attacked Israel as a "laughable dwarf capitalist state," the principal thrust of his article was against the concept of the unity of the Jewish people. Only "obscurantists pretend," he stated, "that some mystical bond exists between the Jews of the whole world." In fact, he insisted, "little exists in common between a Tunisian Jew and a Jew from Chicago who speaks and thinks American." What concerned him (and the editors of Pravda) was the need to isolate Soviet Jews from the outside world. Soviet Jews are "citizens of a socialist society" and therefore are united by a "comradeship-in-arms" with all Soviet peoples. They have no ties with Jews who "bear the yoke of capitalist exploitation." It was less the links with Israel that aroused anxiety among Soviet leaders than links with the important and large American Jewish community. If Israel was criticized, it was because it was shaped by the "intrusion of Anglo-American capital."

Clearly, an anti-Semitism that found its reflection now in the eradication of Jewish communal institutions was an outgrowth of a powerful chauvinist drive, which in turn was a response to the deepening East-West conflict. But that drive was to transcend the purely secular. Once unleashed, the chauvinism was to take on, during 1949-53, a distinctive racist quality. Intellectuals of Jewish origin, who in most instances had become completely assimilated, were now dubbed "cosmopolitan," "rootless," and "passportless." Ehrenburg

57. The article appeared in Pravda, Sept. 21, 1948. That the "request" was made by the Pravda editor is disclosed in Ehrenburg, Post-War Years, p. 125.
himself was identified, at one public rally, as "Cosmopolitan Number One."  

A recent study of anti-Jewish bigotry defines "political anti-Semitism" as "an attempt to establish the corporate Jew as a general and public menace, the implication being that some official public remedy is called for." If until 1949 official anti-Semitism lacked an ideological rationalization and was shielded from public view, the campaign against "cosmopolitanism" clearly identified the "corporate Jew" as the enemy. To make the identification even clearer, editors listed the real names of Jews in parentheses after their adopted Russian names.

But a more insidious identification emerged in January 1953, with the fabrication of the "doctors' plot." The "corporate Jew" in Soviet society was not merely alien to that society, he was an instrument of the "international corporate Jew," or rather of "international Zionism." "Murderers in white aprons"—as the doctors, mainly Jewish, were called—were accused of working in behalf of the "international Jewish bourgeois national organization," the Joint Distribution Committee, which had given them orders to "wipe out the leading cadres of the Soviet Union." If Stalin had not died in March and the trial of the doctors had been held, there could have been, in the words of Isaac Deutscher, "only one sequel: a nationwide pogrom."

That exactly fifty years after that infamous forgery, *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion,* made its appearance in Russia a similar crude concoction was introduced testifies to the vigor and virulence of popular anti-Semitism. State authorities could easily transmute popular belief into official policy when it would serve their interests. Those interests in 1953 could hardly be said to have been determined by external considerations. When the Soviet Union broke off relations with Israel in February 1953, it was far less because of foreign policy considerations than because of the need to justify an internal policy that required Israel, in the guise of Zionism, to be portrayed as an enemy. The corporate Jew, defined earlier as "cosmopolitan," was now re-defined as "Zionist." It must be emphasized, in this connection, that the beginning of a pro-Arab policy on the part of the USSR did not appear until 1954.

The ideological rationalization of anti-Semitism was dropped with Stalin's death and the emergence of the "thaw." But in the public disclosure of the "doctors' plot" as a gigantic hoax, nowhere was it made clear that

58. Ibid., p. 132.
political anti-Semitism was at its roots. The ideology was merely shelved to be refurbished when an opportune occasion arose. For the next fourteen years the ideology was absent but anti-Semitism remained as state policy, in the form of discrimination against Jewish communal-cultural life, civil discrimination in the political-security area, and discrimination in administrative and cadre appointments and in quota systems in universities.

From time to time, when pent-up social tensions or anxieties required release, the regime was not averse to having the Jews become the scapegoat. Thus during the campaign against economic crimes (pilferage, currency speculation, bribery, etc.) in 1961–64 the authorities found it convenient to identify Jews as the major culprits in activities that were well-nigh universal. Of the nearly 250 persons who were publicly known to have been executed, more than 50 percent were Jewish (80 percent in the Ukraine alone). Press accounts frequently highlighted the Jewish origin of the alleged criminals.

The simultaneous drive against religion found the sharper edge of the state propaganda sword wielded against Judaism. The notoriously anti-Semitic book, *Iudaizm bez prykras* (*Judaism Without Embellishment*), by Trofim K. Kichko—only one among many such works—could scarcely avoid comparison with Julius Streicher's *Der Stürmer*, replete with typical Nazi-type caricatures of Jews and vulgar stereotypes of Jewish belief and behavior. The outcry of Western Communist parties compelled the Soviet party leadership, in April 1964, to disavow the Kichko work, though not, of course, the policy position embodied in similar writings.

In the crackdown on literature in March 1963, anti-Semitism was used as a distinct, if minor, motif. Khrushchev in cataloguing the sins of Evtushenko's *Babi Yar* told a rather scandalous tale about a Jew who had supposedly worked for Nazi Field Marshal Paulus at Stalingrad. Not until three years later was this tale, with its clearly anti-Semitic overtones, revealed by a Soviet writer to be a malicious fabrication.

The ideology of the "corporate Jew" was to re-emerge in the summer of 1967, this time to serve as a scapegoat device to channel off internal dissatisfaction that must have appeared to Kremlin rulers as potentially disturbing.

62. *Pravda*, Apr. 6, 1953, described the hoax, but never mentioned anti-Semitism. Nor did Khrushchev in his secret speech to the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956. Instead, he wrote to Bertrand Russell, seven years later, saying that "there never has been... any policy of anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union..." See *Pravda*, Feb. 28, 1963.


Sometime during late July a high-level decision was taken in Moscow to launch a massive internal and external propaganda campaign depicting Zionism as a major threat to the Communist world, the newly independent states, and the national liberation movements. In the first week of August 1967 an article entitled “What Is Zionism?” appeared simultaneously in the principal provincial organs of the USSR. Its opening paragraph struck the dominant note of the campaign: “A wide network of Zionist organizations with a common center, a common program, and funds exceeding by far the funds of the Mafia ‘Cosa Nostra’ is active behind the scenes of the international theater.”

Stereotypic images of the Jew abound in the paranoid portrait sketched by the author. The global “Zionist Corporation” is composed of “smart dealers in politics and finance, religion, and trade” whose “well-camouflaged aim” is the “enrichment by any means” of the “international Zionist network.” Exercising control over more than a thousand newspapers and magazines in “very many countries of the world,” with an “unlimited budget,” the world Zionist “machine” services the vast monopolies of the West in their attempt “to establish control over the whole world.”

If the campaign had its psychological roots in the dark phantasmagoric past, which had been nourished in Stalin’s last years, it also served a pragmatic political purpose. Since the Soviet Union’s Arab client states had suffered a major debacle in the Six-Day War and the Communist regime itself had been badly thwarted in its diplomatic endeavor at the United Nations to compel an Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory, a convenient scapegoat was needed to rationalize severe setbacks. Tiny Israel was surely not the major factor. The enemy must rather be presented as a hidden, all-powerful, and perfidious international force, linked somehow with Israel. “World Zionism” was the ideological cloth that could be cut to fit the designated adversary.

The flight from reality reached its nadir in the USSR in the fall and winter of 1967. In October Komsomolskaia pravda, the mass-circulation newspaper of the Young Communist League, offered its readers a surrealistic description of the enemy: “an invisible but huge and mighty empire of financiers and industrialists,” Zionism is the lackey “at the beck and call of the rich master whose nationality is exploitation and whose God is the dollar.” With overwhelming economic and political power at its disposal, Zionism is able to exert “effective moral and psychological influence upon the sentiments and minds of people . . . in many countries.” About a dozen countries are specifically mentioned, but the author notes that the giant octopus commands “wide possibilities” in almost seventy countries of the globe. Most notably subject to Zionist influence is the United States. To document his
thesis, the author rattles off unusual data: the number of Zionists in America totals 20 to 25 million (there are about 6 million Jews in the United States); the percentage of Zionists among physicists "including those engaged in secret work on the preparation of weapons for mass destruction" is 69 percent; and the percentage of Zionists among industrialists is 43 percent. Especially strong is Zionist influence in the mass media, where its adherents own 80 percent of the big publishing houses.

Communist stalwarts were given further insights in December by a key party organ, Agitator, which instructs activists on basic tactical guidelines. The author, Iurii Konstantinov, found the World Zionist Organization to be a "political, economic, and military concern" with broad interests ranging from "religion to intelligence" and having at its disposal "extremely large funds" obtained from "Zionist multimillionaires." The influence of the Zionist operation is demonstrated by its alleged ownership or control of 1,036 newspapers and magazines published throughout the world. If this failed to stretch the credulity of the reader, the author retreated to the more conspiratorial warning: Zionists work hard to shield their influence from public view. Agitator advised party activists that anti-Zionist propaganda would be accused of being anti-Semitic. But this, the journal emphasized, was a mere ploy, for the Zionist is the major purveyor of anti-Semitism.

A disturbing if not surprising feature of the propaganda campaign was the rehabilitation of the Soviet Union's leading purveyor of anti-Semitic bigotry, Trofim K. Kichko. He reappeared in October 1967 with an article in a Ukrainian party youth organ which described a plot of "international Zionist bankers," including the Rockefellers, to transform the Middle East into "a strategic launching pad aimed against the socialist world, against the international workers' and liberation movements." Curiously, the Rockefellers appear in the writings of Kichko and his colleagues, just as they had in Nazi mythology, as the archetype of the Jewish banker. In January 1968 Kichko was awarded the highly prized "certificate of honor" by the Supreme Soviet Presidium of the Ukraine.

Having been duly honored, the Ukrainian "authority" on Judaism proceeded to write a new book, Iudaizm i sionism (Kiev, 1968). The edition was unusually large—sixty thousand copies—and designed "for a wide circle of readers." Kichko's virulent bigotry is again evident in his description of Judaism as a doctrine that teaches "thievery, betrayal, and perfidy" as well as a "poisonous hatred for all other peoples." The ultimate objective of Judaism, it appears, is the fulfillment of God's promise that "the whole world belongs to the Jews." This doctrine, he argues, has been pressed into the service of Zionism in order to help it create a "World Jewish Power" in Palestine and to fulfill the "territorial-colonialist ambitions" of the "imperialist allies
and admirers" of Zionism. Zionism, Kichko finds, is the reverse side of the coin of "cosmopolitanism," an ideology preaching that "the Fatherland of every person is not the country in which he is born, but the entire world." The author of the Protocols could not have found a more apt spiritual descendant than Kichko.

In the early summer of 1968 the theme of the world Zionist plot began to be employed in a new direction. The locus of Soviet concern was no longer only the Middle East, where a scapegoat was needed to explain the failures of Soviet policy. The basic fear of the Communist leadership now centered on Czechoslovakia, where the humanizing and democratic tendencies of the Dubček leadership threatened to burst the integument of Soviet totalitarianism. World Zionism would now be depicted as the spearhead of international capitalism engaged in an effort to subvert Communist states and exacerbate relations between them. (Similarity to the fundamental elements of the old Protocols is here especially marked.) The object of the new propaganda line was to cloak brute military intervention with the trappings of a racist ideology, by now somewhat threadbare.66

An article in the authoritative foreign policy journal, Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn', published in June 1968, signaled the change in emphasis of the Zionist theme. Entitled "Israel, Zionism, and International Imperialism," it was written by a leading Soviet "expert" on Zionism, K. Ivanov. He recapitulated the international conspiracy thesis, linking world Zionism, Jewish capitalism, Israel, American imperialism, and West German revanchism in a gigantic plot to overthrow Communist rule. Since Western imperialism is unable to destroy by military means the Communist states of Eastern Europe, he argued, it has been forced to rely upon ideological subversion. The key role is played by world Zionists who "are trying to instill into the minds of Jews in various countries, including the socialist countries, that they have a 'dual citizenship'—one, a secondary one, in the country of actual domicile, and the other, the basic, spiritual and religious one, in Israel." The potential enemy was clear—a "fifth column" of Jews who had fallen prey to the "dual citizenship" concept. Ivanov charged that the imperialist intelligence services and psychological warfare agencies were spending hundreds of millions of dollars, using the dual citizenship concept, to "subvert and corrupt" the "fraternal militant community of the socialist countries." The target of the subverters and corrupters, it was apparent, was Czechoslovakia.

In August 1968, just a few days before the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, leading Soviet organs, including the important Defense Ministry newspaper *Krasnaiia zvezda*, as well as *Komsomolskaia pravda*, dealt at length with mysterious “saboteurs” who threatened to undermine the socialist commonwealth. Judaism was singled out for condemnation as prescribing “racial exclusivism” and as justifying “crimes against ‘Gentiles.’” Woven into this warped fabric of thought were such characteristic threads as the sinister role of “Joint,” the danger of the dual citizenship concept, and the challenge of the international Zionist conspiracy.

Specific public identification of the names of the “saboteurs” might have proved unseemly at the time. But Moscow, already during July, had put Czechoslovakia and the world on notice about whom it regarded as the culprits desecrating the Communist image: Eduard Goldstuecker, chairman of the Union of Writers and vice-rector of Charles University; František Kriegel, Politburo member and chairman of the National Front; Ota Śík, deputy premier and the leading economic reformer; and Bohumír Lomský, minister of defense. All were considered to be Jews (although Śík has emphasized that he is not). Kriegel was to receive personal Soviet attention. He was included in the top leadership group that met in Moscow with the Soviet authorities. Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin is reported to have refused pointblank to negotiate with Kriegel, snarling, “What is the Jew doing here?” Bertrand Russell in a letter to the *Times* of London on September 16 revealed that Kriegel had been subjected to “vicious treatment” in Moscow. It is believed that the Russians wanted to prevent his return to Prague but President Ludvík Svoboda refused to budge unless Kriegel was allowed to come back with his colleagues. Unlike the other top Czech officials, Kriegel’s signature is absent from the Moscow agreement.

No sooner had the Soviet troops crossed the Czech frontier than official Soviet organs were set to work to portray Czechoslovakia as the embodiment of a “counterrevolution” in which secret Zionists played a decisive role. On August 23 *Izvestiia* described an omnipresent “counterrevolutionary underground” that included at its core the Club of Non-Party Activists (KAN). The Soviet newspaper charged that three of its leaders—Rybaček, Musil, and Klementjev—were “agents of the international Zionist organization, ‘Joint.’” Aside from the fact that the “Joint” has not functioned in Czechoslovakia for twenty years, none of the three “agents” was Jewish.

The official *White Book* on the invasion, a documentary volume published on September 10 by Moscow and distributed widely in several languages (the authors were identified as the “Press Group of Soviet Journalists”), reiterated the theme that KAN was led by agents of international Zionism. It went on to add that an important reason for the intervention of the Warsaw
Pact powers was the effort by certain forces “to bring about a change in Czechoslovakia’s position with regard to the unanimous condemnation by the socialist countries of Israel’s aggression, and, in particular, to restore diplomatic relations with that country.”

The theme of a conspiracy threatening Czechoslovakia was carried into 1969. In March Tass reproduced in detail a lengthy story which had appeared in a Lebanese Communist newspaper, Al Dunia. The story disclosed the decision of a “secret meeting” that had somehow escaped the attention of the world press: “A secret meeting has recently been held in London. Taking part in it were representatives of the biggest Zionist organizations and supporters of the so-called United Organization of Czech and Slovak Politicians Inside and Outside Czechoslovakia.” The plot involved Jews within Czechoslovakia who held “responsible posts” in political, economic, and cultural spheres, and who maintained “strong contacts with Zionism.” The purpose was nothing less than the overthrow of the socialist system in that country and the restoration of capitalism. The Tass dispatch was carried in all the leading Soviet organs and on Moscow Radio.

If the campaign against Zionism served the opportunistic function of justifying the application of brute force, it also reflected a deep-seated anti-Semitism in some sectors of the Soviet leadership. Especially revealing of this bigotry was a major Izvestiiä story of September 4, 1968. It purported to be an exposé of the Czech Foreign Minister Jiří Hájek, who had courageously flown to the United Nations on the occasion of the invasion to present his country’s desperate situation before the Security Council. To the Izvestiiä editors and their masters, seeking a Zionist label to pin upon the unreconstructed Hájek, it must have seemed natural to suppose that he was of Jewish origin. The article, besides describing a lurid past for Hájek (the details of which were pure concoction), emphasized that he had “changed his name some time ago from Karpeles to Hájek.” Karpeles is a characteristic Jewish name among East Central Europeans.

The deliberate malice turned out to be an indelicate journalistic boner, for as Volksstimme, the organ of the Austrian Communist Party, revealed shortly afterward, Izvestiiä had confused Jiří Hájek with another Hájek, whose first name was Bedřich and who had previously been “Karpeles.” The Czech foreign minister had not changed his name and he was not Jewish. Hájek was later to comment to the liberal Czech journal Reporter: “I should like to emphasize that I would not be ashamed to be a Jew, because I think that in this country we discarded racism some time ago.” But the boner offers a telling insight into what “research” information the Soviets relied upon for their campaign against Zionism.

There can be little doubt now but that the campaign against world
Zionism was to have been climaxed with a staged show trial, reminiscent of those of the early fifties. Both Le Monde (September 12, 1968) and the Times of London (September 13) carried an article written by a prominent Czech Communist which disclosed that the Soviets were insisting that an “anti-Zionist trial must be staged, starring Mr. Kriegel and Professor Eduard Goldstuecker.” The author further stated that Moscow was prepared to “produce evidence” for such a trial within three months. Additional confirmation came from Bertrand Russell in his letter to the Times on September 16. On the basis of “excellent authority,” he was convinced that the Soviets were “pressing for a trial in the classic Stalinist tradition of the ‘Doctors’ Plot’” in order to divert attention from the aggression in Czechoslovakia.

A speech delivered by Dubček on October 11, carried both in the press and on radio but scarcely noticed in the West, strongly suggested that he was vigorously resisting pressure for a staged show trial. The address was devoted to a report on his negotiations with the Soviet Union, held the previous week in Moscow, during which he was compelled to accede to wide-ranging demands upon Czech freedom. While cataloguing the humiliating concessions, Dubček digressed to observe that there are “those who believe the moment is propitious for a return to the practices of the 1950s.” The allusion to the notorious Slánský trial was all too clear.

Had the show trial been held, the central figure of the proceedings in absentia would no doubt have been Professor Goldstuecker, who had left Czechoslovakia for England. The Soviet press has hurled more abuse upon him than any other Czech reformer. Literaturniaia gazeta on October 2 devoted special attention to him, giving emphasis to his Jewish origin. After noting that Goldstuecker had been an “active member” of a Zionist youth organization when he was a teenager, the periodical recalled that he had been appointed by Czechoslovakia as its ambassador to Israel. The article then curiously reminded its readers of an earlier show trial: “But after one year he was recalled; trials in Czechoslovakia had already begun of a number of public figures accused of criminal contacts with world Zionism.”

During 1969 the official Soviet mass media continued and intensified their drumbeat about omnipresent Zionist power. The trade union journal Sovetskie profsoiuzy, in its January issue, accused Zionism of inciting the Polish youth uprisings of the previous year and of exerting a “disintegrating influence” upon Czechoslovak youth. The entire thrust of Zionism, the author argued, was the use of Jewish citizens in all capitalist countries to conduct “subversive work” against the USSR and to “undermine from within” the friendship of the various Soviet peoples. A Soviet newspaper that specializes in anti-Zionist diatribes, Sovetskaia Rossia, carried on January 24 a long
exposé that focused upon Zionism’s “provocative and treacherous” propaganda campaign to convince Jews that they have a “dual loyalty.” In February the mass circulation weekly Ogonek underscored the massive threat of the Zionists. Having at their disposal vast resources, the Zionists “infiltrated their agents into the press, the radio, the television and the cinema of all States.” The impact of that “infiltration” was spelled out in various foreign broadcasts by Moscow Radio during March—encouragement of counterrevolution during “the last ten years” in Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, support of “subversive activities in African countries,” and the propagation of militant anti-Communist and chauvinist propaganda.

The climax of the campaign was the publication of an extraordinary book (seventy-five thousand copies) entitled Ostorozhno: Sionizm! (Beware: Zionism!). Written by Iurii Ivanov, the book weaves together in 173 pages the various strands of the anti-Zionist theme spun over the course of the past three years. Zionism is presented as a giant international “concern” which might appropriately be titled “World ‘Ministry’ on the affairs of ‘World Jewry.’” With “one of the largest amalgamations of capital” available to it, the “Ministry” maintains an extensive “international intelligence center” and a “well-organized service for misinformation and propaganda.” The objective of the concern’s various “departments,” which operate under a “single management,” is “profit and enrichment” aimed at safeguarding “its power.” Details of international Zionism’s influence on the policy of Israel, which it considers as its own “property,” as well as its cunning efforts aimed at subverting both the socialist and new national states, are spelled out. Elaborated also is the ramified network of Zionist propaganda organs buttressed by the major mass media which have been “penetrated” by “sympathizing elements.”

The significance of this obsessive and irrational work might be minimized as an isolated literary phenomenon were it not that its publication was accompanied by a synchronized campaign of laudatory reviews in almost all the major Soviet newspapers and magazines, and in broadcasts by Tass in numerous foreign languages. The voice of the official Soviet authority was not disguised. It spoke clearly through Pravda (March 9): “From the pages of Iu. Ivanov’s book emerges the true and evil image of Zionism, and this constitutes the undoubted importance of the book.” Since the ideology of the Ivanov book had been so strongly endorsed, Soviet journalists could feel free to give vent to the wildest concoctions. Thus V. Vysotsky, writing on May 31, 1969, in Belorussia’s leading newspaper, Sovetskaiia Belorussiia, “discovered” that a secret meeting of Zionists had taken place in London in 1968 at which it was decided to take over the entire Arab world—Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and the rest of the Arab peninsula. From this base, Vysotsky went on, the Zionists planned to attain “mastery over mankind.”
using all possible devices—"force, bribery, slynness, perfidy, subversion, and espionage."

The fantasy world of the ancient Protocols of the Elders of Zion continues to display a remarkable vitality. It is clear, however, that the racist ideology serves an internal function—as it did during 1949–53. The existence of Israel, as in 1953, was incidental. This became especially evident in connection with the campaign justifying the intervention in Czechoslovakia. Anti-Jewish discrimination had become an integral part of Soviet state policy ever since the late thirties. What it lacked then was an official ideology rationalizing the exclusion of Jews from certain positions or justifying the suspicion focused upon them. First during 1949–53, and then more fully elaborated since 1967, the "corporate Jew," whether "cosmopolitan" or "Zionist," became identified as the enemy. Popular anti-Semitic stereotyping had been absorbed into official channels, generated by chauvinist needs and totalitarian requirements.

As distinct from Hitlerism, however, the ideology of the "corporate Jew" was not and is not fully integrated into Soviet thought. It functions on a purely pragmatic level—to fulfill limited, though clearly defined, domestic purposes. This suggests the possibility that it may be set aside when those purposes need no longer be served. But, since chauvinism is still dominant and totalitarianism is far from dismantled as a structure of power, it is difficult to anticipate that in the near future the racist ideology will be relegated by the Soviet leaders to the "dustbin" of history.

67. In 1970 the USSR published a revised and augmented edition of Ivanov's Ostoroshno: Zionism! which charged that the "Jews Rothschilds" are "parasites in the economy of many countries" and were engaged in financing the Czech "counterrevolution." The new edition contends that Zionists have also penetrated the inner circles of the Vatican. The shrill vituperations of the Soviet press against Zionism continued throughout 1970 and into 1971.