Within the first seven months after Viceroy Bernardo de Gálvez issued his well-known “Instructions for Governing the Interior Provinces of New Spain” in late August 1786, three Ndé groups sought peace at Spanish presidios in Sonora and Nueva Vizcaya. The Chokonens acted first. On September 10, 1786, several of these bands requested peace with Ensign Domingo de Vergara in their Chiricahua mountain homeland north of the presidial line in Sonora. Vergara, a native of Eibar in the Basque Country of Spain, was an effective and well-respected field officer and diplomat in the Ópata garrison at Bacoachi pueblo. After more than three weeks of talks in the Apachería, Nantan Isosé and twenty-three Chokonen emissaries, including some captive Spaniards who had married into the tribe, accompanied Vergara to Fronteras presidio, where they discussed the prospects of settling near Bacoachi. In December twenty Chokonen families camped near the garrisoned town, and by mid-March 1787, more than a hundred families had moved into the district, constituting well over four hundred people.

Simultaneously, three hundred miles to the east, eight Mescalero headmen, whose bands numbered more than two hundred families, made peace with Captain Domingo Díaz at Presidio del Norte in northeastern Nueva Vizcaya, requesting to live at La Junta once again. Last, as the snow began to melt off the highest peaks of the western Sierra Madre, the Chihene Mimbres, whom Spaniards called Mimbreños, sought peace in northwestern Nueva Vizcaya. Two Mimbres headmen, Chafalote’s son Natanijú and Inclán (known as El Zurdo or “the left-handed one” to the Spaniards), presented themselves to Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Cordero at Janos presidio that same March, stating that they wished to settle at
El Paso del Norte and in the San Buenaventura Valley. By early April two Mimbres camps stood within half a league of San Buenaventura presidio, and a month later Cordero estimated that five hundred peaceful Mimbresños had moved into the surrounding valley.²

Although scholars have produced several case studies of individual Apache establecimientos, they have not adequately addressed the reasons why so many Ndé groups from the Rio Pecos to the Rio Gila simultaneously decided to give up their independence and frequent livestock raids on Spanish settlements, which they had enjoyed for more than a century, to settle on reservations.³ I argue that Apaches settled in these fixed locations for three main reasons: protection from Spanish soldiers and Indian enemies, material benefits gained within the system, and to manipulate the system to work in their favor. In other words, Apaches settled on reservations for many of the same reasons that Indian groups across Spanish America entered Catholic missions. That soldiers tried to make Indians materially dependent rather than convert them to Catholicism as the first step in the acculturation process serves as the principal difference between Spanish reservations and missions. Spanish officers ordered post chaplains “not to interfere in the governing of the Apache Indians” until “they are more civilized.”⁴

Just as in 1779, those Ndé groups who opted to settle near Spanish presidios did so in part because of the policy change authorizing Spanish officers to make that offer. Yet Bernardo de Gálvez’s “Instructions” of 1786 were more derivative, vague, and unevenly enforced than some historians have recognized. Although José and Bernardo de Gálvez’s policies each marked a return to a combined strategy of peace and war to pacify the Indians, more hawkish viceroys temporarily undermined these advances by advocating policies of all-out war on Apaches from 1782 to 1785 and 1787 to 1789. An important similarity in the two policies was that in each “capitulation” or peace agreement Spanish officers hoped to satisfy Apaches’ desire for material goods by issuing them items needed for food, hunting, and war to “attract them” and eventually “put them under our dependency.” A critical difference in Gálvez’s “Instructions,” however, was that Spanish troops would engage in ceaseless offensive rather than defensive war “against the Apaches who have declared it.” The viceroy hoped that such “incessant campaigns” into the Apachería would cause “one or more” Apache groups to become intimidated and disheartened enough to “sue for peace” under standardized Spanish terms.⁵ As we have seen, however, Ndé leaders and frontier commanders routinely shaped those conditions in practice.
As Apaches gradually became dependent on Spanish aid, Gálvez believed there were two possible outcomes. First, as a result of their alleged “warlike inclinations” and some Spanish encouragement, Apaches could use Spanish arms to fight each other to the point of “their mutual destruction.” Here Gálvez borrowed directly from Hernán Cortés’s tried-and-true method of using the Tlascalans to conquer the Mexicas, which Spanish officers had recently used to turn the Mescaleros and Lipans against each other. Gálvez hoped to extend the policy by encouraging “anger” between these two groups “and other bands of Apaches” so that the tribe would “weaken itself” and would be that much easier for Spaniards to conquer. Gálvez knew that Spanish efforts alone would not achieve this end and that the help of Comanches, their Caddoan allies, and other indigenous groups was needed to achieve “the extermination of the Apaches.” The second possibility, Gálvez wrote, was that Apaches might “improve their customs” by following our example” and “voluntarily embracing our religion and vassalage.”

Gálvez’s “Instructions” offered few specifics for Spanish officers on the administration and resettlement of Apache groups near presidios. Although seasoned presidial officers could draw on the Regulations of 1779 and Teodoro de Croix’s Apache pueblos as potential blueprints, they were unable to prevent Apaches from coming and going from the presidios in the early years. Spanish officials continued to implement policy too late. It would take another five years before Commander-in-Chief of the Interior Provinces Pedro de Nava finally refined the policy of the deceased viceroy. In the interim, both groups would continue to shape the emerging system.

PROTECTION

Portions of all Ndé groups sought protection from the intensified offensives of Spanish soldiers and their growing number of Indian allies between 1786 and 1793. The Mescaleros made peace at Presidio del Norte in 1787 partly because it offered refuge from the military operations of Spanish troops and their Indian allies, including the Comanches and Jicarillas. The situation west of the Rio Grande was more complex. Spaniards intended to squeeze the Chokonens and Chihene Mimbres between three pincers: Spanish, O’odham (Pima), and Ópata garrisons from the south; Spanish troops, Pueblo auxiliaries, Navajos, and Utes from the north; and Comanches from the east. Not all, however, went as planned. Spaniards and Indians succeeded in pushing many bands
southward. Apaches could still find food in the pine–oak forests of the western Sierra Madre and free-range cattle herds of exposed Spanish ranches, and very few of those groups living west of the Rio Grande requested peace because of military pressure alone (see Map 3.1).

After nearly a century of prolonged warfare between Spaniards and Apaches in northern New Spain, the accommodation they reached in the late 1780s represented a profound military change, which borderlands scholars have generally attributed to Spanish military pressure. “Probably the greatest military advantage which the Spaniards enjoyed over the Indians,” Donald Worcester argued, “was their organization and discipline. Even the most warlike tribes rarely could resist a well-concerted charge.” Worcester’s statement ignores the Spanish military’s limited success in making well-concerted charges on Apaches for most of the eighteenth century because of the tribe’s high degree of organization in their raiding and warfare. Apaches outnumbered Spanish troops and were difficult to engage directly. After striking quickly at night, Ndé warriors retreated to remote and rugged regions of the sierras, where the Spanish could not easily surprise them, horses traveled with difficulty, and water sources were hard to find. As a result, Spanish *presidiales* (presidio troops) frequently returned from campaigns with their horses and provisions completely exhausted, waiting several months to be resupplied.8

By the 1780s, however, Spaniards had abandoned the “well-concerted charge.” Rather than relying on European tactics to defeat Apache men in open battle, frontier officers began reforming their approach to warfare by employing guerrilla or Indian-style tactics. Although Bourbon bureaucrats in Madrid and Mexico City encouraged the heightened militarization of New Spain’s northern frontier in the late eighteenth century, the impetus for many of the reforms stemmed from the periphery rather than the core. Commander-in-Chief Teodoro de Croix, for example, responded to the poor state of the region’s defenses by increasing northern New Spain’s troops by 932 men between 1776 and 1783. A large percentage of the addition consisted of companies of *tropa ligera*, or light troops, who wore lighter armor and carried fewer weapons and horses and more mules than typical presidial soldiers. These troops could move more quickly than ordinary cavalry whether on horseback in flat terrain or on foot in rugged terrain. Field officers continued to standardize guerrilla tactics under the leadership of Commanders-in-Chief Felipe de Neve and Jacobo Ugarte in the 1780s. Tucson Captain Pedro de Allande, for example, wrote that he and his men often spent “the cold nights
MAP 3.1 Spanish-Indian military campaigns into the Apachería, 1786–1798.

Source: Adapted from the same sources as Map 2.1; Matthew Babcock, “Turning Apaches into Spaniards: North America’s Forgotten Indian Reservations,” Ph.D. diss., Southern Methodist University, 2008), 106; Sidney R. Brinckerhoff and Odie B. Faulk, “The Last Years of Arizona, 1786–1821” Arizona and the West 9 (Spring 1667): 10–11; and Spanish military reports.
without a campfire” in an effort to “more surely surprise and punish” Apaches. Coahuila governor Juan de Ugalde took even further steps. His frontier-born Spanish scouts wore buckskin breeches and jackets and carried brown cloaks and blankets, which Ugalde believed was “the best color to prevent their being seen from afar.” Similarly, his men carried muskets with barrels of blued steel to prevent their flashing in the sunlight. When attacking the Mescaleros, his scouts even wore Mescalero moccasins so that their tracks would not alert the enemy of their presence. Ugalde also employed other Indian tactics, such as advancing only at night when his troops were close to Apache rancherías, attacking at dawn, and dividing into separate squads of fourteen men each to maximize surprise and avoid detection.

Like these other frontier officers, Viceroy Gálvez, who had personally fought Apaches before assuming office in Mexico City in 1785, believed that attacking Apaches in their own camps was the only effective way of punishing them and bringing peace to the frontier. To increase the effectiveness of these operations, Gálvez advocated additional tactical changes. First, he wanted small parties of regular troops commanded by seasoned frontier officers to do the fighting. By keeping the detachments between 150 to 200 men and further dividing them upon attack, he hoped that he could retain an element of surprise. He also believed that regular troops were better at finding pasture and water and staying quiet than frontier militia.

Along with stealth, timed offensives and increased coordination were two of the key tactical changes that enabled Spanish troops to reach more Apache families in their camps. Spanish officers were well aware that Apache groups typically traveled southward to lower elevations at the approach of winter and then returned northward to higher elevations in the spring. On July 22, 1777, Irish-born Inspector-in-Chief Hugo O’Conor reported that troops would carry out special punitive campaigns “against the western Apaches who inhabit the sierras of Chiricagua, Gila, and that of the Mimbres, from which the immoderate colds of the months of December, January and February oblige them therefore to seek refuge in other areas of more moderate temperature.” O’Conor wanted three divisions to converge on Apaches in the Sierra del Hacha (the Hatchet Mountains in today’s southwestern New Mexico) from different directions, “where, as in other indicated places, they will surely find the enemies occupied making mescal, which forms a great part of their subsistence.” O’Conor also aimed to capitalize on the next Apache migratory shift. He understood that in mid-April these same Indians
returned northward with their mescal crop to the Sierra de las Mimbres (today’s Black Range) “to plant their corn, beans, and squash in the canyons of that same sierra.” Here, O’Conor thought, was a second chance to ambush the Apaches: when they were sedentary and most vulnerable. O’Conor believed 250 men commanded by an officer who knew their territory would be sufficient to accomplish the task.\(^{11}\)

When New Mexico governor Fernando de la Concha lengthened the duration of these expeditions into the Apachería in 1788, they became even more effective. In 1784 Concha’s predecessor, Juan Bautista de Anza, had initiated a system of monthly campaigns, departing between July 15 and early November, into the Gila and Mimbres mountains. Concha, however, quickly recognized the futility of the policy. Given that the ranges lay more than one hundred leagues from Santa Fe and took two weeks to reach on a one-month campaign, troops only fought for two days. Instead, in the summer of 1788, Concha implemented a new tactical plan: departing in late August, two columns converged on the same mountain ranges and operated for sixty to seventy days.\(^{12}\)

In general troops from Nueva Vizcaya, Sonora, and New Mexico effectively organized their offensives to maximize military pressure on the Apaches. Forces in Coahuila and Texas, because of policy differences toward the Apaches, worked together much less efficiently. Finally, the least successful coordination was demonstrated in defensive operations in all of these provinces. The increased level of offensive cooperation in the late colonial period stands in marked contrast to the highly localized offensive and defensive Indian campaigns that presidiales waged previously and to which northern Mexican militias would revert between 1821 and 1846.\(^{13}\)

In addition to tactical changes, Spanish officials made important personnel changes in their military offensives in the 1770s and 1780s. Their primary goal focused on the use of peaceful Indians, including Apaches de paz, as auxiliaries to intimidate and dishearten independent Apaches “to such a degree that one or more of the Apache groups sue for peace.” Between 1777 and 1784, Croix and Neve pragmatically increased the overall fighting strength of northern New Spain’s chronically undermanned presidial troops by employing Ópata and O’odham mission Indians as soldiers in their own separate fighting units, rather than as auxiliaries alongside Spanish troops. Commanded in the field by their own elected officers, these Native-manned flying companies proved especially effective in combatting Apache groups west of the Rio Grande in the 1780s from posts at Bavispe, Bacoachi, and Tubac in Sonora.\(^{14}\)
Although Croix primarily utilized these troops to defend their settlements from Apache attacks, the succeeding commanders-in-chief, beginning with Neve, employed them offensively in the Apachería. In contrast to Spanish presidiales, Neve wrote in 1783, “Indian companies ... have the known advantage of not casting shadows, making noise, or making a cloud of dust; they conceal themselves with ease, even in flat terrain, and they discover the enemy and are able to surprise them with more frequency and certainty.” As infantry, these Indians were especially valuable in operations against Native camps hidden in the Apachería’s remote and broken terrain, where Spanish cavalry could not penetrate. Thus, Ópata and O’odham mission Indians, who were motivated to fight for the Spaniards because they, too, suffered grievously from Apache raids, made significant headway against Apache groups west of the Rio Grande and helped influence some bands to make peace.15

In the late 1780s, when the majority of Apaches first entered the establecimientos, these mixed ethnic forces from Sonora and Nueva Vizcaya worked in tandem with Pueblo auxiliaries and Spanish troops who operated from New Mexico and drove Chihene groups southward. Much like the O’odham and Ópatas in Sonora, Pueblos had loyally served Spanish interests for most of the eighteenth century, beginning with their first unified campaign against an ancestral Mescalero subgroup that Spaniards called Faraons in the Sandia Mountains in the spring of 1704. By the mid-eighteenth century, Spaniards had organized them into separate infantry units with the same command structure later employed by Croix and increasingly used them in offensive military campaigns. Although Pueblo auxiliaries did not utilize firearms or horses to any significant degree until after 1800, Spanish officials praised their agility, physical stamina, and knowledge of Apache territory and fighting tactics. They provided the backbone of Native assistance to New Mexicans in their Chihene campaigns from 1786 to 1788 and clearly influenced some Apaches to seek peace.16

In addition to employing mission Indians, as part of Ugarte’s so-called grand strategy for bringing the Apaches to peace, Spanish officers formed military alliances with different Native groups. Texas governor Domingo Cabello signed a peace treaty with eastern Comanches in San Antonio in October 1785, and New Mexico governor Anza reached a similar agreement with western Comanche divisions in Santa Fe in February 1786. Helping Spaniards fight Apaches was in no way a concession on the Comanches’ part. They had been waging war on Apaches since their arrival on the southern plains from the Great Basin in the early eighteenth
century. In the fall of 1776, Comanches dealt a significant blow to eastern Apaches when they slaughtered three hundred families who were butchering buffalo along the Rio Colorado in Texas. Indeed, responding to confederated Comanche and Caddoan, rather than Spanish territorial expansion, the Jicarillas, Lipans, and Mescaleros eventually chose to move to the southern and western peripheries of the buffalo plains.\(^{17}\)

Jicarilla Apaches and Utes, who had guided and fought alongside Anza’s New Mexican forces against the Comanches in 1779, also agreed to join Spanish military campaigns against the Apaches in New Mexico. The Jicarillas strengthened their alliance in New Mexico by campaigning with Santa Fe presidial soldiers against Mescalero Apaches in the Sierra Blanca in October 1787 in exchange for Spanish military protection on their fall buffalo hunt into the Comanchería. The Utes had been loyal Spanish allies in New Mexico since at least 1735 and had served as auxiliaries against Comanches since at least the 1760s. Perhaps because the smallpox epidemic of 1781 nearly exterminated them, the Utes agreed to an alliance with the Comanches in 1786. Now with the Comanches at peace, Governor Anza urged the Utes to redirect their campaigns to southwest of Santa Fe against the Chihenes.\(^{18}\)

Finally, on the western front, Governor Anza succeeded in weakening the nine-year Chihene Gila–Diné (Navajo) alliance, which Spaniards had been trying to break up since 1783. Combining the threat of Comanche attacks with a trade ban, Anza pressured a faction of the Athapaskan-speaking Navajo into severing their alliance with the Chihenes in March 1786 and waging war on them instead. The Navajo leaders Carlos and Antonio Pinto told Anza that their people had suffered from famine as a result of the ban, indicating that the reestablishment of trade with Pueblos and Spaniards appears to have been a strong motivation for making peace.\(^{19}\) Comanche and Navajo armed men eventually launched a series of attacks on eastern and western Apache rancherías both with Spanish forces and independently between the summer of 1786 and the summer of 1790.

In practice, however, no matter how impressive these alliances appeared on paper, Comanche, Navajo, and Ute manpower contributed little to Spanish campaigns against Chihenes and Chokonens. In four joint campaigns from New Mexico in 1786 and 1787, Comanche, Spanish, Pueblo, and Navajo armed men killed or captured only twenty-five Apaches living west of the Rio Grande, while Comanches alone suffered thirteen casualties. Comanches might have been more excited about fighting alongside Spaniards had they received the quantity of weapons
and supplies promised them in the 1786 treaty. Instead, because of budget limitations, Commander-in-Chief Jacobo Ugarte could only afford to furnish the most well-known chiefs with muskets, and he ordered presidial captains to supply Comanche allies with cigarros sugar, and the bare minimum of food to sustain them on their campaigns. Comanches also lost faith in the dependability of Spanish troops when Ensign Salvador Rivera’s men retreated during the heat of battle in September 1787, leaving only Comanches to fight the Chiñenes. Finally, no evidence indicates that Utes served on any expeditions against the Apaches. Instead Utes and Comanches continued to attack each other after 1786, and eventually broke their unstable alliance in early 1792.\(^{20}\)

Just as they did prior to 1786, Comanches achieved the best results against eastern Apaches when fighting them independently from the Spaniards. In late April 1787, after Lieutenant Colonel Juan de Ugalde had spent months tracking eastern Apache bands unsuccessfully, Comanches wiped out a large Mescalero band at a waterhole where tobacco grew, near El Paso del Norte. At the end of July 1787 ninety-five Comanche allies under Chief Ysampampi led a successful campaign against the Mescalero (Faraon) Apaches at the southern end of the Sierra Blanca range. The Comanches killed five Mescaleros, took thirty-five captives, and captured sixteen horses, while suffering only five casualties of their own. By mid-January 1788, Ugarte believed that the Comanches had successfully driven the Apaches out of the Sierra Blanca and noted that they also pursued them in the Rio Grande Valley.\(^{21}\)

The extent of the Spanish-Navajo alliance in the west should also not be exaggerated. In June 1785, prior to the negotiation of an alliance by New Mexico governor Anza, Navajo men participated in their most successful punitive expedition, during which five headmen led 150 Navajo and 94 Pueblo auxiliaries from Laguna Pueblo to Chiñene camps in the Datil Mountains, west of Socorro. The expedition killed more than forty Chiñenes with only two Navajo casualties. The high number of Chiñene casualties probably resulted from the Navajos divulging the hidden locations of the Apaches. At this time, Navajos had a strong incentive to comply with Spanish interests: they wanted Anza to resanction Spanish trade in New Mexico. The majority of the Diné, including their principal diplomat Antonio El Pinto, however, continued to honor their raiding and trading alliances with Apache groups west of the Rio Grande.\(^{22}\) To that end, Navajos may have used Spanish horses, muskets, and ammunition for their own purposes either in raids against Spaniards or in exchanges with Apaches.
“Suffering no doubt from the invasions of their mountain strongholds by Anza’s New Mexican forces and new Navaho allies,” the Chihene Mimbres, according to one scholar, requested peace at Janos in May 1787. Yet no hard evidence supports this statement. As we have seen, Navajos launched only one significant attack on western Apache camps in 1785. Furthermore, the Diné had close kinship and political ties to multiple Ndé groups, including the ones that made peace. The Diné headman Kasgoslan, for example, was the brother of the prominent “peaceful” Chokonen nantan El Compá, who settled first at Bacoachi and later at Janos. At the Chihene headman El Zurdo’s request, Kasgoslan and several other Diné leaders even took part in the peace proceedings with the Chihene Mimbres at Janos in the spring of 1787.23 Thus, the Diné could exert geopolitical influence in a variety of ways beyond the bounds of Spanish control.

More important was that although each Indian alliance had its own limitations, they worked well enough together, combined with the Comanches’ efforts east of the Rio Grande, to influence most Mescaleros and some Southern and Western Apache bands to move southward. By employing Hugo O’Conor’s and Fernando de la Concha’s tactical changes and relying on the scouting skills of Indian allies, these coordinated multiethnic expeditions succeeded in reaching Apache camps more frequently in the 1780s than ever before – sometimes with devastating effect. On May 24, 1786, for example, after spotting Apache fires in the Florida Mountains, Spanish and Ópata troops attacked the camp, killing five Indians and “burn[ing] down the ranchería with an incredible amount of pillage without even leaving the poles of the huts.” When troops failed to kill or capture Apaches or destroy their homes, they targeted their crops. In September 1788, Antonio el Pinto guided Concha to a “half matured” Chihene cornfield near the Mimbres Mountains. Although the Apaches remained beyond his troops’ grasp, Concha “had the ears pulled off the stalks and trampled by the horses before the eyes of three Apaches” who stood on a nearby mountaintop. Five days later, when Concha’s scouts looked for Apache tracks, they “found and destroyed a cornfield in the direction of the Tecolote [probably the Cuchillo Negro Mountains].” As Concha undoubtedly knew, corn began to ripen in late September, and Apaches harvested it in October.24 Clearly, then, as Spaniards intensified their offensives on Chihene camps just before harvest time, they disrupted their food supply. Targeting Apache crops, however, unwittingly encouraged many Ndé men to resort to raiding for subsistence at the same time that other Spanish officials were asking
presidiales to “teach” settled Apaches how to farm outside the presidios. The Ndé, then, still had options besides making peace with Spaniards.

Some Spanish officials, such as Commanders-in-Chief Croix and Neve, also hoped to deprive Apaches of their staple mescal plant. In 1780, after researching the plant as carefully as a twenty-first-century botanist, however, Croix’s legal advisor Pedro Galindo Navarro determined in 1780 that mescal was far too abundant to wipe out. The plant “naturally increased without cultivation, nor any care in almost all of the lands of these provinces,” Galindo Navarro wrote, and “it is so prevalent that the Apaches subsist on it during the seasons.” Coordinated Spanish campaigns threatened their safety, especially in their low-elevation winter camps, but Mescalero and Southern Apaches continued to eat mescal during this period. As Galindo Navarro observed, some Apache groups made “their annual harvest (which they call mescalear) in the Paraje de la Boca and other harvests not far from Janos presidio, where the plants reproduce with the most abundance.” Safely accessing seasonal harvest locales within their homeland, then, represented another reason some Ndé groups likely sought peace. Women and children, who were especially vulnerable to capture when they gathered mescal along southward-facing arroyos and mountain slopes from November to May, could clearly benefit from Spanish protection. Apache women also needed a reliable water source to process mescal hearts, and presidios were generally situated along river valleys.25

Once Apaches de paz began joining Spanish offensives in the late 1780s, independent Apaches’ need for protection grew stronger. During the winter of 1788 Chokonens at peace at Bacoachi began guiding Spaniards northward to Chihene Mimbres camps. The captive Spaniard José Gonzales commanded the Apache auxiliaries on the expedition and personally killed or captured ten Apaches. Ugarte promoted Gonzales to ensign and noted that the Chokonens’ intimate knowledge of the Apachería enabled Spaniards to locate numerous hidden Apache camps for the first time. Chokonens de paz also demonstrated their effectiveness south of the presidio line in Nueva Vizcaya, where their efforts in the western Sierra Madre directly influenced the Chihene Mimbres leader Yagonglí, or Ojos Colorados (“Red Eyes”), as the Spaniards called him, to seek peace at Janos in March 1790. Finally, after settling at Tucson in January 1793, Nantan Nautilnilce’s Tsézbiné (“Black Rocks People”) auxiliaries, whom Spaniards called Aravaipas, killed seven “rebellious” Western Apaches in April “whose heads he presented to the commander.” This attack, along with repeated Tsézbiné offensives made in conjunction
with Spanish troops, persuaded Nantans Quitolá and Quinanzos and sixty-nine Western Apaches confronted along the San Carlos River to make peace at Tucson in spring 1793. Although mission and independent Indians initially operated together to elevate the success of Spanish campaigns in the West, the addition of Apaches de paz clearly finished the process.

The scenario east of the Rio Grande was different in one major respect: the most intense military pressure came from the north rather than from the south. Based on their own testimony to Spanish officials, the overriding reason that Mescalero Apaches sought peace with Spaniards at posts in Nueva Vizcaya was because they wanted protection from Comanche aggression. Two high-ranking Spanish officers explained that no single Spanish or Comanche attack prompted the Mescaleros to request peace initially from Ensign Juan Francisco Granados in February 1787. Instead, the Indians realized that they were trapped between these two superior military forces, the Comanches posing a greater threat than the Spaniards. Like numerous other eastern Apache groups since the mid-eighteenth century, the Mescaleros specifically told Captain Domingo Díaz that they sought relief from Comanche attacks and asked that Spanish troops escort them for their annual fall buffalo hunt northward into the Comanchería. Inspector-in-Chief José Antonio Rengel further validated the Mescaleros’ claim when he offered two of their headmen, Patule el Grande and El Quemado, the option of settling in the abandoned agricultural community of Los Tiburcios near El Paso in present-day Chihuahua. In large part, Rengel presented this opportunity to the Apache leaders, so they would be farther away from the Comanches’ rapid southward expansion. Finally, in December 1787, after the Mescaleros had been residing at Presidio del Norte for nine months, Ugarte reported, “The Mescaleros did not dare to retreat to the North out of fear of meeting Comanche groups that cross in pursuit of them and the Gileños [Chiheños].”

Other Mescalero bands sought peace at El Paso for the same reasons. On May 22, 1787, an Ndé nantan camped north of the Rio Grande in the Sacramento or Organ Mountains asked Rengel to settle at El Paso. The headman told Rengel he feared the Comanches, who had just wiped out a large Mescalero band in late April, and promised to return in three days with his people. This story, then, shows a clear correlation between a Comanche attack and Apaches seeking peace for protection.

Spanish military pressure was also a factor in the Mescalero decision to make peace at Presidio del Norte in 1787, but it came from the south,
rather than the north. According to Nantan Quijeyosyá (Zapato Tuerto or “Twisted Shoe”), as soon as they learned that Coahuila Governor Juan de Ugalde was returning to the frontier in February to attack them, they started negotiating. In fact, the “skittishness” the Mescaleros displayed in their initial encounter with Ensign Juan Francisco Granados’ men near San Carlos presidio by abandoning ten horses and six loads of buffalo hides and antelope skins and racing across Las Varas mesa may have been a consequence of their mistaking him for Ugalde. Even after Granados dispelled this initial concern, however, the Mescaleros still had good reason to be suspicious. Less than five years earlier, in April 1782, a Mescalero headman who had been leading raids in the rugged and desolate Bolsón de Mapimi that stretched across Coahuila, Nueva Vizcaya, and Durango claimed that he had requested peace in El Paso because of Ugalde’s attacks. Commander-in-Chief Croix agreed to discuss peace with him, provided that the Mescaleros cease their raiding at Mapimi and Cuencamé and surrendered. Three headmen and 137 Apaches surrendered; however, Croix deceived them and deported them to the interior as prisoners. This brutal prior experience and others like it among Chokonens and Chihenes are vital to understanding why peace-seeking Ndé people were initially so distrustful of Spanish troops despite promises of humane treatment.29

The need for Spanish military protection alone was enough for some Ndé headmen to sit down at the bargaining table, but they only agreed to settle on reservations with a lot of reassurance and many diplomatic concessions from Spaniards. Although the Mescaleros had previously settled at Presidio del Norte in 1779, two months of preliminary negotiations passed before Spaniards convinced them to return there. Even then, the Mescaleros carried a copy of the 1779 agreement with them for leverage in the proceedings. Only after significantly modifying the initial terms of the treaty to suit their needs did the Mescaleros agree to come to Presidio del Norte again.30

Similarly, Chokonens and Chihene Mimbres drove hard bargains with Ensign Vergara before portions of those groups agreed to settle at Bacoachi and Janos respectively. In March 1787, at Janos, for example, Ugarte sent Vergara three Apaches de paz and two Spanish soldiers to assure the Chihene Mimbres residing in the Sierra de la Boca that Spaniards would not kill or imprison their emissaries again. Four days later, Vergara, accompanied by the leader El Zurdo, four young men, and four women, returned from the Mimbres camps. “The famous chief Natanijú,” who had solicited peace at Janos with El Zurdo in 1778, promised to come
down soon and settle in the San Buenaventura Valley. Shocked at the Apaches’ compliance, Ugarte told José de Gálvez, “I confess to your Excellency that I am amazed ... by the wonderful judgments of God.” Ugarte thought the Apaches west of the Rio Grande had “the best intentions of settling in formal towns, ceasing their hostilities all at once on our side and theirs.” In Ugarte’s view, Vergara deserved most of the credit. During his “repeated departures” to their camps, Vergara had “courted them with what he had been able to attract them with” and had won “their confidence and affection.” Ugarte rewarded Vergara for his efforts with a promotion to first lieutenant and even recommended him for captain. Ugarte also recommended that the king bestow special recognition on Vergara for “his zeal, aptitude for war, generosity with which he has spent as much as he had until he persisted, [and] thought and confidence that he warrants from the Apaches, having been the principal instrument that God has chosen to put them in the good state that they are in.”

**THE FRUITS OF PEACE**

After more than a century of violent conflict and treacherous acts on both sides, faithful diplomacy was essential to building trust between Apaches and Spaniards. In addition to seeking Spanish military protection, Apaches also wanted as many material benefits within the establecimientos as Spaniards were willing to offer them. These consisted of food rations, gifts, spoils from battle, trading privileges in neighboring pueblos, and, most importantly from an Ndé perspective, the recovery of captured kinsmen. In exchange Apaches agreed to return their captive Spaniards and unbranded livestock, stop their raids into Spanish territory, and help Spaniards defeat other independent Ndé groups.

Apaches east and west of the Rio Grande requested food rations when their provisions were low as a result of environmental stress or from the strains of war. As a condition for making peace at Presidio del Norte in spring 1787, the Mescaleros persuaded Captain Domingo Díaz to issue the bands rations although Ugarte’s initial terms forbade this. Chokonens and Chihene Mimbres also asked for rations at Bacoachi in the fall of 1786 and at Janos in the spring of 1787.

Apaches likely sought these provisions for three reasons. First, they wanted to avoid the risk of ambush by their enemies, particularly the Comanches, while hunting, gathering, or farming in their own territory. Second, a prolonged regional drought may have diminished their food resources. Third, they may have needed food during the transition to settled communities, as they were still learning farming techniques and managing livestock.
supply. The Mescalero “Nation,” Captain Domingo Díaz explained, exists “in total poverty as much from the small number of horses they have, as from the scarcity of rains of these past years, [for] the harvest has not supplied them with their fruits, with which they sustain themselves for part of the year.” Spanish troops also suffered from this drought. Owing to “the scarcity of corn and other provisions” at Presidio del Norte, for example, Díaz ordered three hundred fanegas (a measure that is approximately 1.5 bushels) of seeds from El Paso to supply the Mescaleros de paz for the rest of April and May. Finally, early frosts wiped out Spanish crops and probably ravaged Ndé plantings as well. The most devastating frost struck Nueva Vizcaya on August 27, 1786, completely destroying the fall harvest. That same year, Gálvez wrote that Nueva Vizcaya was “a province notably afflicted with the rigors of war and with illness and the scarcity of food.” These losses created a food shortage, prices skyrocketed, and famine and disease spread across the region. According to Bishop Esteban Lorenzo de Tristán, half of Nueva Vizcaya’s population died. Gálvez, in fact, died of a fever from this same epidemic in 1786.

The trend of drought, disease, and early frost continued in 1788 and lasted until 1789. Scholars have argued that Indian raiding increased because of these environmental pressures. Yet, the large number of Ndé people requesting rations at the establecimientos suggests that some Indians responded to these same environmental stresses by making peace.

Like other Native peoples of the Southwest, peace-seeking Ndé bands also routinely sought gifts from Spanish officials as a sign of their friendship. During the fall of 1786, small groups of Chokonens filed into Fronteras, Sonora, to verify their people’s resettlement at Bacoachi and to test Spaniards’ willingness to help them. Several Chokonen men, for example, requested and received Spanish horses to transport their families to Bacoachi. The Mescaleros seemed even more adept than the Chokonens at extracting Spanish concessions. When Rengel met with Mescalero nantans El Quemado and Patule in El Paso the following spring, he issued horses to both men, a Spanish suit to El Quemado (Patule had received one already), and hats or shirts to each of the six young men accompanying the headmen. Likewise, instead of giving gifts to a single principal chief as Ugarte had intended, Díaz bestowed gifts on all eight Mescalero band leaders at El Norte and their kinsmen in June. These Spanish overtures held symbolic importance for Ndé people. Whenever someone gave a gift outright without requesting one in return, the Ndé recipient held the gift-giver in high esteem for his or her generosity and wealth.
By serving as scouts and auxiliaries in Spanish military campaigns, Apache men could also acquire unbranded horses and other spoils from battle. Although they usually attacked rival Ndé groups in addition to their own kinsmen, peaceful Apache scouts and auxiliaries could still enhance their prestige by redistributing these items as status goods among their people. These material benefits translated into social and political power; peaceful Apache leaders and young men of rising status agreed to perform this service both in the treaty proceedings and in practice. They also had valuable resources at their disposal to exchange as commodities with Spaniards and Native allies, including the Rarámuri (Tarahumaras) and Diné.37

Finally, Spanish officials granted Apache men and women passports that enabled them to trade their animal skins, mescal, and other products with vecinos in neighboring communities. In the treaty terms at Bacoachi in 1786, Chokonens had secured an important concession: “to exchange and sell their goods” in all Spanish towns without injury. Spanish officials had typically tried to restrict all trade with Apaches because of the ongoing war against them and their incorrect notion that Apaches were incapable of producing any trade goods other than stolen livestock, the Indians’ main exchange commodity when under siege from all sides. Under normal circumstances, however, Southern Apaches manufactured a variety of trade products, including deer and antelope skins, mescal, coiled basketry, and pottery. From an Ndé perspective, gift exchange served as an important activity for leaders seeking to enhance their political and social prestige and for the establishment of fictive kinship ties with Spaniards. Western Apaches called the custom tedó’díi (“to exchange gifts”), and it could be done at any time between members of the same sex. Its key component was usually reciprocity: when an Apache man or woman gave a gift, such as a horse, knife, or dress, they typically expected the other person to give something in return. The parties involved did not need to exchange the same type of item or even one of equal value. In fact, part of the fun was trying to obtain the best bargain.38

Perhaps recovering their kinsmen, captured by Spanish soldiers and their Indian allies on military campaigns, represented the most important reason for Ndé groups to make peace. In response to Mescalero demands at Presidio del Norte, Ugarte ordered that all Mescalero men, women, and children imprisoned in Chihuahua and Santa Rosa and employed against their will in the workhouses of Encinillas, Mexico, be returned to their people in April 1787. During the fall of 1788, in another extraordinary
case, Chokonen nantan El Compá, named principal chief of the peaceful Apaches at Janos by Commander-in-Chief Nava three years later, surrendered to Santa Cruz Captain Manuel de Echeagaray near the Gila River. El Compá and his children wanted to be reunited with their wife and mother, whom Echeagaray held captive. Similarly, during negotiations with Lieutenant Colonel Antonio Cordero in Chihuahua in April 1791, Chihene Mimbres headmen demanded that Cordero return eleven prisoners, mostly women and children, before their bands would agree to settle at establecimientos near Carrizal and Namiquipa.39

Unfortunately, owing to chronic supply problems, Spanish presidial commanders frequently failed to meet adequately the subsistence and commercial needs of peaceful Apaches. Although seriously flawed, the establecimiento system still offered Ndé men the opportunity to hunt game and Ndé women the opportunity to harvest mescal without fear of military attack.40

OTHER MOTIVES

Prior to settling on reservations, Apaches already recognized that they could manipulate the system to suit their own needs. They could draw on over a century’s worth of Spanish contact experiences that included converting to Catholicism and settling near missions and in pueblos, negotiating short-term peace agreements at presidios, and, of course, raiding for livestock and captives around these same locations. By making peace with Spaniards, Ndé men and women knew that they could gain advance knowledge of Spanish troop movements to help protect those bands who remained independent. In addition, Ndé men understood that they could use the establecimientos as bases for small-scale livestock raids in Spanish territory.

During the late eighteenth century, numerous Spanish officials accused Apaches of using peace as a pretext for obtaining information. When an emissary appeared before the Governor of El Paso to ask for peace on behalf of the Chihene nantan Chafalote in December 1778, Croix later concluded that “these pretensions had no other purpose, than of making, as long as they lasted, their exchanges and acquiring information about our ideas.” Similarly, in November 1786, two Lipan leaders and six families tried to reinitiate trade with Pecos, New Mexico, which they had not had for more than thirty-five years. Commander-in-Chief Jacobo Ugarte suspected, based on past history in Coahuila, that “the commercial interests that they claimed were not their true motive.” Noting the
Lipans are “the most refined and astute heathen Indians that we know,” he believed they were intent on “finding out with this motive, the state of our friendship and alliance with the Comanches.”

Although recovering captives and obtaining trade goods and information were viable motives for short-term peace agreements, these reasons alone were insufficient cause for Apaches to remain at the presidios. Similarly, both Apaches and Spaniards learned useful information about the other’s plans, movements, and resources from restored captives.

Finally, many Apaches continued to raid Spanish settlements even after seeking peace. Spaniards had purposely positioned the majority of the presidios along Apache raiding routes (see Map 3.2). Opportunistic Ndé men saw the establecimientos as a convenient way to keep their women and children safe, while they raided for livestock and captives in other provinces. In the past, the vast majority of Spanish officials, such as Janos lieutenant Narciso de Tapia in 1778, had viewed truces with Athapaskans as “feigned and deceitful peace” and commonly regarded Apache allies as “fake friends.” In his “Instructions” of 1786, Viceroy Bernardo de Gálvez correctly noted that the “inconveniences” of making peace with seminomadic Apaches including the warriors “leav[ing] their families in safety” in order to carry out their raids “with greater peace of mind” and “greater confidence, because they are better informed concerning our ideas, customs, and movements.” Gálvez, however, urged presidial commanders to tolerate such raids. As Apaches themselves had maintained many times, “they do not offend their friends by the harm which they impute to other subjects of the king who live in territories where actually no peace has been made.” In short, Gálvez believed, “the deceitful peace pacts of the Indians produce better results than open war.”

Thus, his policy of “peace by deceit,” which embraced peace at the local, rather than the provincial or state, level, constituted peace on Native terms.

In general, Spaniards tended to exaggerate the extent of Apache raiding in northern New Spain and used Apaches as scapegoats for raiding groups that comprised multiple indigenous groups and even Spaniards themselves. Raiding and rustling were especially heavy in periods of drought-induced famine and epidemic disease, such as in Sonora in the summer of 1781. In the first six months of that year, unidentified “Indians” killed sixty-eight Spaniards and captured forty-seven. When Spaniards redeemed eleven of these captives, the captives reported, “most of the aggressors were captives, O’odham, Ópatas, Yaquis, gente de razón, a few Seris, and very few Apaches.”
Throughout the 1780s Spanish criminals, escaped convicts, delinquents, and “other classes of lost and vagabond people” joined forces with independent Rarámuri (Tarahumaras), Topios, and Tepehuanes from the Sierra Madre, and fugitive Indians from the missions and pueblos to raid and kill across Nueva Vizcaya and Sonora. While some Apache men also joined these interethnic bands prior to 1786, which Spaniards called quadrillas, or “gangs” of “enemigos domestics,” most of the time, Commander-in-Chief Felipe de Neve revealed, they falsely blamed their “insults, thefts, and killings” on “the enemy tribes, who have not committed them, nor even taken notice of them.” Ironically, these men conducted many of their illicit activities at the same time they were supposed to be serving Spanish interests in search parties to recover stolen livestock from Apaches. Apparently, instead of tracking down the Apaches, they found it much easier to raid for branded free-range livestock themselves and say that they recovered it from Apaches. The gangs also killed a lot of Spaniards. After being captured, Nueva Vizcayan gang leader Joseph Armenta bragged that his banditos had killed 197 people, and he had personally killed seventeen. Thus, Neve concluded that the Apaches “cannot be the perpetrators of all the hostilities” in Nueva Vizcaya and Sonora. Instead, he said Armenta’s gang and at least two others had been doing most of the killing and livestock stealing for the last ten to twelve years in Nueva Vizcaya and rebel bands of Seris and Tepocas committed similar raids in Sonora.44

As Spanish and Comanche military pressure increased on Ndé groups in the late 1780s, many more of them moved south, including disgruntled
Apaches de paz, and forged alliances with this cultural mosaic of Nueva Vizcayans. Jacobo Ugarte reported that throughout the spring and summer of 1787 small and large raiding parties of Rarámuri and other “Indians in revolt” hid out in the Sierra Madre and converged on the mining camps and settlements around Chihuahua, Parral, and in the Ostimuri district bordering the Sierra Tarahumara to conduct livestock raids. Given that they killed only five Spaniards from mid-April to July 20, it appears that resources were their principal aim. According to Ugarte, the renegade Nueva Vizcayans served Apache interests as guides and auxiliaries, and the Ndé headman Queyeyá and his ranchería, who were admitted to peace at Bavispe, had moved south through the western Sierra Madre and joined these raiders.45

A critical bond between Apaches and these interior groups appears to be the Chihene Gila–Rarámuri alliance, which had endured for roughly fifty years. In the 1730s Chihenes forged an alliance with the Rarámuri and embarked on joint raids in northern Nueva Vizcaya. Apaches always needed horses and mules, and the Rarámuri could either exchange them or serve Chihene interests as guides and auxiliaries and raid with them. In addition, both groups shared common grievances toward Spaniards. Spaniards appropriated their lands for grazing, established mines in their territory, and raided their rancherías for laborers and servants.46

As of the spring of 1773, the Chihenes had an alliance with 1,700 supposedly pacified Rarámuri people living in thirty-five towns near Chihuahua. The Rarámuri stole horses and mules from Chihuahua presidio and traded them to the Chihenes. The exchanges took place in the Sierra de Rosario, where the Rarámuri pastured their stolen livestock, and received chamois and arrows from the Chihenes. In late November 1778, Croix noted that the Rarámuri committed hostilities in alliance with Apaches and independently. Bernardo de Gálvez later evaluated this alliance and suspected that not all Rarámuri allied with the Apaches, but he suspected some “fugitive Tarahumaras [Rarámuri]” united with them.47

Apaches at war and peace appear to have coordinated policy of strategic raiding. The Ndé and Rarámuri “gangs” escalated their raiding before and after the Chihene Mimbres peace talks with Antonio Cordero in the San Buenaventura Valley in 1787. In April, prior to seeking peace, confederated Ndé and Rarámuri destroyed more than 500 head of livestock in Nueva Vizcaya. Then in May, as Mimbres–Spanish negotiations began in earnest, they captured only sixty-one and killed none. Once peace broke down in June, they killed 240 more animals. According to
one Spanish officer, these mixed Athapaskan-led bands preferred to raid rather than make peace because they feared Spanish troops would intern them as prisoners.\textsuperscript{48} Although scholars have correctly noted the multi-ethnic makeup of these bands, it seems clear that their members were culturally indigenous. The poorly understood Nednhi Apache band of the western Sierra Madre may have also developed from these groups and Apaches de paz.\textsuperscript{49}

Mescaleros and Chiienes vociferously voiced their displeasure with Spaniards’ aggressive offensives into the Apachería during the summer and fall of 1788 by intensifying their raids south of the presidial line from Coahuila to Sonora, launching their heaviest assaults in Nueva Vizcaya. As one anthropologist has aptly noted, “the presidio line was a sieve through which the Apaches penetrated at will,” and this was especially true when they were responding to enemy assaults on their families. In late June 1788 Viceroy Manuel Flores reported that rebel Mescaleros attacked Coahuila and that all Apache groups attacked Nueva Vizcaya, including allied Rarámuri, Tepehuanes, and renegade mestizos. According to testimony from Spanish troops and officials at Parras and Saltillo, Chiene and renegade Rarámuri armed men – not former Mescaleros de paz – carried out these raids in eastern Nueva Vizcaya. Meanwhile, Mescaleros and Lipans continued to carry out livestock raids in Coahuila on a much smaller scale.\textsuperscript{50}

Although Apaches clearly targeted Spanish livestock, one should not assume that Spaniards owned every horse, mule, and cow Apaches captured. At the height of Spanish–Apache hostilities in the late 1760s, Apaches had destroyed so many Spanish ranches and towns and stampeded such a large number of horses and cattle that wild herds quickly formed across vacant hills and plains. As Nicolás de Lafora traveled through Sonora in the spring of 1767, he noted “an infinite number of stray and wild cattle” grazed on the Cerro de Quisuani around Santa Rosalía and other abandoned pueblos near Las Ures mission. In the wake of abandoned mining settlements, wild horse herds could also quickly form. Lafora observed that near the mining town of Baroyeca, “There are still droves of mares, notwithstanding that the enemies have driven off a great many.” The line between wild and domesticated horses and cattle, then, could often be very thin. In general, wild herds sought out good water sources, which made them easy targets for Apaches, who knew where to find them.\textsuperscript{51}

Ndé groups also had a variety of other motives for moving south of the presidio line besides raiding for Spanish livestock and captives. For
decades Mescaleros and Lipans had used Nueva Vizcaya, Nuevo León, Nuevo Santander, and Texas “as a refuge and asylum” from the attacks of Comanches and Caddoans. In 1789 or 1790 an unidentified Spanish official, most likely Antonio Cordero, noted that numerous Chihene Mimbres bands had moved southward into the uneven terrain from the presidial line to the districts of Cosihuiriacich and Chihuahua. They came here, he explained, to avoid military pressure from Spanish patrols, “to live more comfortably than in their country because of the multitude of mescal that abounds in the mountains,” and to raid for the livestock in the well-supplied haciendas in the region.52

When Ndé war parties launched their most damaging attacks on Spaniards they had specific reasons for doing so. As Spanish detachments from Janos and San Buenaventura approached Namiquipa in February 1789, unidentified Apaches ambushed them from a rocky hill. Assaulting the troops with a shower of arrows, they killed one soldier, wounded four, and wounded two horses. Spanish troops managed to kill two Apaches and wound several others. After returning at 8 P.M. that night with more men on horseback, Apaches killed another soldier, wounded seven, and killed six horses. In the two attacks, the Apaches killed two soldiers and a vecino; wounded fifteen soldiers and eight vecinos; and captured, wounded, or killed twenty-six Spanish horses. The Spaniards killed only two Apaches. Although Spanish troops failed to recognize any familiar faces, they suspected these Apaches were “Mimbresños,” including those from El Chiquito, Quesicha, and Vívora’s bands, who were avenging a prior attack on their people near the plains of Babícora led by Captain Manuel de Casanova.53

**NDÉ MOTIVES FOR PEACE: BEYOND NUMBERS**

Those Mescalero, Southern, and Western Apache groups that decided to make peace and submit to Spanish authority from 1786 to 1793 sought to protect their people from Spaniards and other Indians, recover relatives, and reap the material benefits of the establecimientos. Finding ways to make the system work in their favor undoubtedly facilitated that major step. Some borderlands scholars have focused too exclusively on Spanish soldiers in the field, but the coordinated military pressure from Spaniards, Comanches, Navajos, and Indian flying companies after 1786 clearly placed extreme pressure on Apaches east and west of the Rio Grande. Although the voices of Ndé groups west of the Rio Grande are mostly silent, the Mescaleros acknowledged that Comanche attacks were their
primary motive for seeking peace. According to Commander-in-Chief Jacobo Ugarte, a combination of diplomacy and war brought about the peace with the Chokonens, Chihene Mimbres, and Mescaleros. He also maintained that Apaches had reduced their raiding because of the repeated Spanish-led punitive expeditions that had transpired on a monthly basis year-round.54

Gathering a large quantity of Apache captives and prisoners of war constituted the principal military profit Spaniards and their Indian allies achieved in the wars against Apaches after 1786. From April 19, 1786, to December 31, 1787, in all five Interior Provinces, Spaniards took 365 Apache prisoners, while Apaches and their allies took only 30 Spaniards (see Table 3.1). By June 12, 1789, Spanish forces in Nueva Vizcaya, Sonora, and New Mexico had captured 665 Apaches, over 90 percent of whom were women and children.55 The disparity grew even wider once the reservation system solidified. From 1792 to 1795, independent Apaches reported only eight Spanish captives, while Spaniards, with plenty of help from Apaches de paz, took 674 Apache prisoners (see Table 3.1).

This Spanish military victory was hardly absolute. The killing on both sides was nearly even. Between 1786 and 1787, Spaniards killed 328 Indians, while Apaches and their allies killed 310 Spaniards, more than 75 percent of whom were in Nueva Vizcaya. Most important, independent Apaches and their allies maintained a corresponding advantage in stolen livestock. Apaches and their allies captured 5,506 Spanish horses, mules, and cattle and Spaniards recovered less than half (see Table 3.1). With such a large surplus, Ndé headmen had a means of bargaining with Spanish officers to recover their captives. Those Apache families who retrieved their relatives often chose to make peace, while those who did not either remained neutral or made war. Just as Spaniards combined diplomacy and war, so did Apaches.

Cold winter temperatures and spring and fall frosts affected all peoples of the Southwest during the tumultuous 1780s and prompted Ndé groups to come to the presidios to harvest mescal. Drought possibly helped influence the Mescaleros to make peace at Presidio del Norte in 1787, but Spanish military protection, the Indians’ principal need, enabled their collection of food, even in dry periods. Spaniards, however, could not guarantee the Apaches’ protection, especially if the Indians’ camps were dispersed in surrounding mountains, where they were vulnerable to attack from other Spaniards, Comanches, or independent Apaches. Apaches de paz were also distressed by Spanish Indian policy. The Chihene Mimbres nantan Ojos Colorados resented the Spaniards’ supposedly
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*Texas, Coahuila, New Mexico, Nueva Vizcaya, Sonora

“just policy” of combining peaceful diplomacy with unrelenting warfare because it meant that they made war on his people at the very same time that they asked for the Indians’ loyalty and friendship.\(^5\)

Finally, Apaches found a variety of ways to gain advantages both during and after the peace process. They extracted material advantages through trade and gifts. By retaining at least a semisedentary mode of living and refusing to become sedentary agriculturalists, Apaches maintained more cultural independence than Spaniards initially intended. Some Apaches de paz continued to raid for livestock south of the presidial line in conjunction with confederated Ndé and Rarámuri bands, just as they had in the past. Once the establecimiento system solidified in the 1790s, these transgressions occurred less frequently and intensely across the northern frontier of New Spain, much like Gálvez had hoped.

Even though Apaches had clear motivations for settling on Spanish-run reservations, they never did so with the intention of becoming sedentary agriculturalists as the Spanish had envisioned. By continuing to gather wild plants, hunt game, and conduct livestock raids on a small scale, these peaceful Apaches met their subsistence needs when rations fell short and ensured their cultural independence for more than forty years. At the same time, Spaniards benefited from avoiding the expense of a full-blown Apache war and from an overall reduction in the frequency and intensity of Apache raids throughout the northern frontier of New Spain, allowing their population and economy to grow and prosper.

More than a half century before the U.S. Army established their first Indian reservations at military posts in the American West, Spanish officers had implemented the earliest and most extensive system of military-run reservations in the Americas.\(^5\) By 1793 approximately two thousand Ndé people, from a variety of groups that Spaniards called Mescaleros, Faraones, Mimbrenos, Gileños, Chiricaguí, and Aravaipas, had settled in eight establecimientos situated near seven presidios in Nueva Vizcaya and Sonora, and in the sparsely inhabited agricultural community of Sabinal in New Mexico, south of Belen, on the Rio Grande in New Mexico. Lastly, from 1793 to 1799 Lipans remained at peace in Texas, Coahuila, Nuevo León, and Nuevo Santander, and in the fall of 1798 three Lipan rancherías under Nantans Conoso, Moreno, and Chiquito settled in a ninth establecimiento along the banks of the Salado River in Coahuila near Laredo presidio, and their people resettled there the following spring. Some of these bands would remain at peace well into the Mexican national period until presidial troops stopped issuing rations to them in 1832.\(^5\)

The next chapter examines how this system functioned in practice.
Notes

1 For Gálvez’s policy, see Gálvez, Instructions, which contains a transcription of the original Spanish document. On the Chokonen peace at Bacoachi, see Commander-in-Chief Jacobo Ugarte to Capt. Juan Perú, October 9, 1786, Chihuahua, roll 9, microfilm, Janos Historical Archives, Special Collections, University Library, University of Texas at El Paso Library (hereafter JHA-UTEP); Gov. Pedro Corbalán and Lt. Col. Roque de Medina to Ugarte, “Extracto deducido de los partes que … solicitaron los Apaches del poniente bajo el nombre de Gileños,” Chihuahua, February 1, 1787, Audiencia de Guadalajara, Legajo 286, Archivo General de Indias, Seville, Spain, Max Leon Moorhead Collection, Western History Collections, University of Oklahoma, Norman (hereafter AGI, Guadalajara, Legajo number, MLMC); Ugarte to the Marqués de Sonora [Minister of the Indies José de Gálvez], no. 59, Chihuahua, February 1, 1787, AGI, Guadalajara, 286, MLMC; Navarro García, Don José de Gálvez, 438, 458; José Luis Mirafuentes Galván, “Los dos mundos de José Reyes Pozo y el alzamiento de los apaches chihuihui (Bacoachi, Sonora, 1790),” Estudios de Historia Novohispana 21 (2000): 104.

2 Capt. Domingo Díaz to Ugarte, Presidio del Norte, March 29, 1787; Ugarte to the Marqués de Sonora, no. 77, Arizpe, April 16, 1787; Ugarte to the Marqués de Sonora, no. 88, Arizpe, May 14, 1787; Lt. Col. Antonio Cordero to Ugarte, San Buenaventura, May 1, 1787; and Cordero, “Diario de ocurrencias, May 1–21,” May 22, 1787, San Buenaventura, AGI, Guadalajara, 287, MLMC.


4 For Indians’ selective use of Spanish missions and their adaptations to them, see Deeds, Defiance and Deference, 197–198; Weber, Spanish Frontier, 115–117. For the quotation, see Commander-in-Chief Pedro de Nava, “Instructions for Dealing with the Apaches at Peace in Nueva Vizcaya, Chihuahua, October 14, 1791,” in Hendricks and Timmons, San Elizario, 109, para. 35. For the original document, see ff. 363–77, microfilm, Archivo General de la Nación, Provincias Internas, legajo 66, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley (hereafter AGN, PI, legajo number, BL-microfilm). Additional copies are in AGI Guadalajara 289 and the Ciudad Juárez Municipal Archives II, r. 133, 1788, bk. 1, ff. 325–349, available on microfilm at UTEP.
5 Gálvez, Instructions, 34, 36, 40–41, paras. 20, 24–25, 39–42. The fourth quotation is from 34, para. 20. All others are from 36, para. 24. The majority of scholars have argued that Gálvez’s policy represented a clear synthesis of Spanish Indian policies since 1768 that also contained some innovations. See Weber, Bárbaros, 183–184; Weber, Spanish Frontier, 229; Moorhead, Apache Frontier, 123; Park, “Spanish Indian Policy,” 340–341. Others have emphasized the newness of this policy without, as David J. Weber has pointed out, adequately explaining what was truly new about it. See Bancroft, History of the North Mexican States and Texas, 648–649; Faulk, “The Presidio: Fortress or Farce?,” 27; Moorhead, Presidio, 100–101; Weber, Spanish Frontier, 444n116. For the hard line advocated by Spanish viceroys, see Moorhead, Presidio, 92–98, 108–109. Most U.S. military officers also viewed force as the only way to subdue and begin to acculturate Indians. See Sherry L. Smith, The View from Officers’ Row: Army Perceptions of Western Indians (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1990), 92, 106.

6 Gálvez, Instructions, 37–39, 41, 44, paras. 29–30, 34, 42, 53–54. The first and last two quotations are from para. 42, the second is from para. 34, the next three are from para. 53, and the sixth is from para. 54. The italics are my own. For Nava’s policy, see Pedro de Nava, “Instructions for Dealing with Apaches at Peace in Nueva Vizcaya, Chihuahua, October 14, 1791,” in San Elizario: Spanish Presidio to Texas County Seat, ed. Rick Hendricks and W. H. Timmons (El Paso: Texas Western Press, 1998), 102–109.

7 For O’odham, see Jacoby, Shadows at Dawn, 13, 289.

8 For quotation, see Donald E. Worcester, introduction to Gálvez, Instructions, 1. On the proficiency of Apaches at raiding and warfare and the ineffectiveness of Spanish fighting techniques against them, see Gálvez, Instructions, 81–83, paras. 203–205, 208, 210; Matson and Schroeder, “Cordero’s Description,” 345–348; Williams and Hoover, Arms of the Apacheria, 22–23. Scholars arguing that Apaches sought peace exclusively because of military pressure from Spaniards and their Indian allies include Alfred Barnaby Thomas, “Historical Background” in Thomas, Forgotten Frontiers, 54, 72; Brinckerhoff, “Last Years of Spanish Arizona,” 8–9; Park, “Spanish Indian Policy,” 341–342. Moorhead adds that some “Apache warriors surrendered voluntarily … to become reunited with their captured families.” Moorhead, Apache Frontier, 274. Anthropologist William B. Griffen suggests that drought may have been a possible cause. See Griffen, Apaches at War and Peace, 63.


12 Ugarte to Viceroy Manuel Antonio Flores, Chihuahua, July 31, 1788, Archivo General de la Nación, Provincias Internas, Legajo 65, Center for Southwest Research, Zimmerman Library, University of New Mexico (hereafter, AGN, PI, 65, CSWR-UNM); Ugarte to Gov. Fernando de la Concha, Chihuahua, July 22, 1788, AGN, PI, 65, CSWR-UNM; and Concha to Ugarte, no. 34, Santa Fe, June 24, 1788, AGN, PI, 65, CSWR-UNM.

13 Moorhead, Apache Frontier, 74–78; Cuauhtémoc Velasco Ávila, “Negociaciones con los lipanes a fines del siglo XVIII: avances y retrocesos,” in 52nd Congreso de las Americanistas (Universidad de Sevilla, Spain: July 17–21, 2006); Gálvez, Instructions, 60, paras. 120–121; DeLay, War of a Thousand Deserts, 145–148.

14 For the quotation, see Gálvez, Instructions, 39, para. 34; Croix, “General Report of 1781,” Arizpe, April 23, 1781, in Thomas, Teodoro de Croix, 156–157, 159–160, paras. 330, 340, 344, 346; Commander-in-Chief Felipe de Neve to J. de Gálvez, Arizpe, December 1, 1783, paras. 42–43, AGI, Guadalajara, 520, MLMC.

15 For the quotation, see Neve to J. de Gálvez, Arizpe, December 1, 1783, paras. 41–42, AGI, Guadalajara, 520, MLMC; Navarro García, Don José de Gálvez, 440; Mirafuentes Galván, “Los dos mundos de José Reyes Pozo,” 79; Croix, “General Report of 1781,” in Thomas, Teodoro de Croix, 199, para. 461; Radding, Wandering Peoples, 256–263; Spicer, Cycles of Conquest, 101–102, 133.


21 Nelson, “Campaigning in the Big Bend,” 225; Ugarte to Concha, Arizpe, January 23, 1788, and Anza to Ugarte, Santa Fe, October 20, 1787, AGN, PI, 65, CSWR-UNM.


23 For the quotation, see Moorhead, *Apache Frontier*, 186; Cordero, “Diario de ocurrencias y novedades [2–15 April],” San Buenaventura, April 16, 1787, AGI, Guadalajara, 287, MLMC.

24 For the first quotation, see Rengel to Ugarte, “Diario de las operaciones,” Janos, May 29, 1786, roll 9, JHA-UTEP. For the remaining quotations, see
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Adlai Feather, ed., “Colonel Don Fernando de la Concha Diary, 1788,” *New Mexico Historical Review* 34 (October 1959): 297, 300. For corn ripening and harvesting, see Basso, “Western Apache,” 469.

25 For quotations, see Assessor Pedro Galindo Navarro to Croix, Arizpe, February 23, 1780, Audiencia de Guadalajara, Legajo 276, Archivo General de Indias, Seville, Spain (hereafter, AGI Guadalajara, Legajo number, Seville). For Felipe de Neve’s similar intentions, see Neve to J. de Gálvez, Arizpe, December 1, 1783, AGI Guadalajara 520, MLMC. For a description of a successful attack on Apache winter camps during the spring of 1785, see Navarro García, *Don José de Gálvez*, 448. On mescal processing, see Hodgson, *Food Plants*, 17–18, 33, 40.


28 Ugarte to Flores, “Informe General,” Arizpe, December 10, 1787, para. 32, AGN, PI, 76, BL-microfilm; Ugarte, “Extracto de las novedades ocurridas en la paz con los Apaches,” Arizpe, July 15, 1787, AGI, Guadalajara, 287, MLMC.


31 For the first four quotations, see Ugarte to the Marqués de Sonora [J. de Gálvez], no. 75, Janos, March 20, 1787, AGS, GM, 7031, Exp. 9, Simancas. For the final quotation, see Ugarte to the Marqués de Sonora [J. de Gálvez], no. 59, Chihuahua, February 1, 1787, AGI, Guadalajara, 286, MLMC.

32 Moorhead, *Apache Frontier*, 212, 213, 220; Corbalán and Medina to Ugarte, “Extracto deducido de los Partes,” Chihuahua, February 1, 1787, AGI,
Guadalajara, 286, MLMC; Cordero to Ugarte, San Buenaventura, May 1, 1787, F3, S1, JPR-UTA.

33 For the first quotation, see Díaz to Ugarte, no. 77, Presidio del Norte, March 29, 1787, AGI Guadalajara, 287, MLMC; Lt. Gov. José Antonio de Arrieta to Capt. Narciso Muñiz, El Paso, February 8, 1778, El Paso, F3, S1, JPR-UTA. For the second quotation, see Díaz to Ugarte, Guajiquilla, April 13, 1787, AGI, Guadalajara, 287, MLMC; Rengel to Díaz, El Paso, April 27, 1787, AGI Guadalajara 287, MLMC.


35 For scholars who argue that Indian raiding increased because of environmental concerns, see Spicer, Cycles of Conquest, 166; Ortelli, Trama de una guerra conveniente, 193–194.


37 Griffen, Apaches at War and Peace, 104. For a discussion of the difference between status and consumer goods among Apaches, see Anderson, The Indian Southwest, 106–107. For Rarámuri, see Spicer, Cycles of Conquest, 23.


39 Moorhead, Apache Frontier, 274–275, 219, 194; Griffen, Apaches at War and Peace, 60, 62; Dobyns, Spanish Colonial Tucson, 94; Cordero to the Janos commander, El Paso, August 12, 1791; [Cordero], “Noticia de los prisioneros solicitados por los capitancillos Mimbrenoś,” Chihuahua, April 18, 171; Cordero to Capt. Manuel de Casanova, Chihuahua, January 17, 1791; and Nava to Casanova, Chihuahua, July 7, 1791, all in F7, S1, JPR-UT Austin.

40 Griffen, Apaches at War and Peace, 27.

41 For the first quotation, see Croix, “Resumen de las muertes y robos ejecutadas por los enemigos en las provincias internas de Nueva España,” Chihuahua, January 23, 1779, AGI, Guadalajara, 270, Seville; Anza to Ugarte, no. 507, Santa Fe, November 18, 1786, AGN, PI, 65, CSWR-UNM; and for the last two quotations, see Ugarte to Anza, Chihuahua, January 26, 1787, AGN, PI, 65, CSWR-UNM.

42 For the first two quotations, see Tapia to Capt. Narciso Muñiz, Janos, February 11, 1778 and Tapia to Muñiz, Janos, February 28, 1778, F3, S1, JPR-UTA. For the remaining quotations, see Gálvez, Instructions, 42, 41, paras. 46, 45, 43.
Croix, “Resumen de las muertes y robos” and “Extracto de novedades ocurridas con los indios enemigos en las provincias internas de Nueva España, desde el mes de enero último hasta el de la fecha,” Arizpe, June 30, 1781, AGI, Guadalajara, 267, Seville. The quotation is from the second document.


For the quotation, see Ugarte to the Marqués de Sonora [J. de Gálvez], no. 129, Arizpe, August 14, 1787, AGS, GM, 7031, Exp. 9, Simancas; Ugarte to Flores, no. 175, Chihuahua, May 15, 1788, AGN, PI, 76, BL-microfilm. For a similar argument that the primary objective of these bands was to acquire animals for subsistence and trade in Nueva Vizcaya and Sonora, see Torre Curiel, Twilight of the Mission Frontier, 132; Ortelli, Trama de una guerra conveniente, 98.

Spicer, Cycles of Conquest, 36; Deeds, Defiance and Deference, 119–120.

For the quotation, see Gálvez, Instructions, 62, para. 128; Thomas, Forgotten Frontiers, 6; Croix, “General Report of 1781,” Arizpe, October 30, 1781 in Thomas, Teodoro de Croix, 122, para. 190.

No signature] to Ugarte, no date [1790], roll 10, JHA-UTEP; Ugarte to Cordero, Arizpe, May 4, 1787, roll 9, JHA-UTEP.

Precisely when the Nednhi formed and who they were remains poorly understood. For speculation on Ndèhí origins, see Edwin R. Sweeney, Mangas Coloradas: Chief of the Chiricahua Apaches (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998), 5, 14–16.

For the quotation, see Spicer, Cycles of Conquest, 238; Moorhead, Apache Frontier, 191, 243, 250–252; Griffen, Apaches at War and Peace, 62–63. For evidence of Chihene (Gileño and Mimbreno) raiding in Nueva Vizcaya from May through November 1788, see Jacobo Ugarte, “Extracto de hostilidades
ocurrudas en las provincias internas del poniente de Nueva España,” Chihuahua, July 3, 1788, AGS, GM, 7042, Exp. 1, Simancas; Cordero, “Diario de operaciones de guerra,” Janos, June 14, 1788, F5, S2, JPR-UTA; Claudio Serna to [no recipient], San Buenaventura, July 29, 1788; [Cordero] to the Commander-in-Chief [Ugarte], Janos, September 16, 1788; Ugarte to Cordero, San Buenaventura, October 2, 1788, roll 9, JHA-UTEP; [Cordero] to Ugarte, Janos, November 17, 1788 and Ugarte to Cordero, Salvador de Orta, December 2, 1788, F5, S2, UTA. For evidence of Apache raiding in Sonora in August, see Lt. José Tato to the Janos commander, Bavispe, August 22, 1788, roll 9, JHA-UTEP.

51 Lafora, *Frontiers of New Spain*, 121.

52 For the first quotation, see Teodoro de Croix, “General Report of 1781,” Arizpe, October 30, 1781, in Thomas, *Teodoro de Croix*, par. 57, 89. For the second quotation, see [no signature] to Ugarte, Janos, no date [1790], roll 10, JHA-UTEP. For the intriguing but unsupported claim that these raids were carried out by groups of Mescaleros de paz from Presidio del Norte, see Int.-Gov. Felipe Díaz de Ortega to Antonio Valdés y Baran, Durango, December 6, 1787, AGS, GM, 6952, Exp. 58, Simancas.

53 Ensign Antonio Torres to Cordero, Namiquipa, February 15, 1789; Phelipe Perú to Lt. José Manuel Carrasco, Namiquipa, February 15, 1789; Marrujo to Cordero, Namiquipa, February 15, 1789, all in JHA, roll 9, JHA-UTEP. For the identification of these Apaches as Chihenes (Mimbresinos), see Marrujo to Cordero, Namiquipa, February 15, 1789, and [no signature: Cordero?] to Ugarte, Janos, February 19, 1789, roll 9, JHA-UTEP.


55 Ugarte, “Noticia de los enemigos muertos y apresados por las armas del Rey,” Chihuahua, May 29, 1789, f. 165, AGN, PI, 193, microfilm, Mexico City, courtesy of Brian DeLay (hereafter, Mexico microfilm).


Internas,” September 5, 1793–December 4, 1794, AGI, Guadalajara, 289–290, Seville; Azanza to Alvarez, Mexico, August 27 and September 26, 1798; April 26 and June 26, 1799, AGS, GM, 7029, Simancas. For the cessation of rations in 1832, see Ensign Rafael Carbajal to Commander-in-Chief Ramón Zuñiga, Janos, January 22, 1832, roll 25, microfilm, Janos Archives, Main Library, University of Arizona (hereafter JA-UA); Griffen, *Utmost Good Faith*, 30.