

BRAZILIAN URBAN HISTORY:  
An Evaluation\*

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- HISTORIA DO RIO DE JANEIRO*. By EULALIA MARIA LAHMEYER LOBO. (Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Brasileiro de Mercado de Capitais, 1978. 2 vols. Pp. 442, 994.)
- BAHIA: A CIDADE DO SALVADOR E SEU MERCADO NO SECULO XIX*. By KATIA M. DE QUEIROS MATTOSO. (Salvador: Editora Hucitec Ltda., 1978. Pp. 387.)
- CORONELISMO: THE MUNICIPALITY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN BRAZIL*. By VICTOR NUNES LEAL. Translated by June Henfrey. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977. Pp. 237. \$16.95.)
- BAHIA IN THE FIRST BRAZILIAN REPUBLIC: CORONELISMO AND OLIGARCHS, 1889–1934*. By EUL SOO PANG. (Gainesville: University Presses of Florida, 1979. Pp. 256.)

In 1973, Paul Singer, in *Economia Política da Urbanização*, reminded urban scholars that cities—based on a surplus of production beyond the needs of the countryside—only appear in societies with a class structure. In fact it is precisely the economic system and the political relations between classes that determine the organization of rural-urban sectors and their relations of mutual determination.<sup>1</sup> Two important messages that have increasingly influenced Brazilian urban studies are implicit in Singer's discussion of urban development. The first is that cities in themselves are not discrete subjects of study but can only be analyzed in relation to the countryside.<sup>2</sup>

The second implication is that relations between town and country and the organization of both can best be viewed as a reflection of shifts in class structure and class relationships that themselves derive from changes in the mode of production or are products of the articulation of contradictory modes of production. Viewed from this perspective, changes in the political, economic, and social aspects of urban life must be seen as manifestations of larger societal structures and transformations that themselves cannot be characterized adequately as the simple and direct consequences of dependency or the organization and

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incursions of *external* economies. While the idea of dependency itself has become all but doctrine among most Latin Americanists—Brazilian urban scholars being prominent among them—a few voices are now suggesting that dependency as such does not explain all of the characteristics of urbanization in Latin America that differ from the European or North American experience.<sup>3</sup> The internal development of productive forces in “dependent” economies does seem to follow a recognizable pattern, but the social formations created through the working out of contradictions and complementarities between conflicting modes of production and changing class relations are internally determined. Brazilian urban studies would profit from particularistic historical studies of the process of social formation from this perspective in a context in which city and countryside are treated as interdependent productive and political spheres.

Brazilian urban history can be divided into four major moments corresponding to changing political and economic configurations of the society as a whole.

1. The urban centers established in the colonial period were intended as political outposts of royal power. These centers were mainly administrative and, particularly in the interior, gradually became the basis for the political control of an area by an all but autonomous local ruling class.<sup>4</sup> The expansion of royal power at the expense of private power in the early eighteenth century occurred through the creation of new bureaucratic positions, the replacement of local officials with royal officials, and the withdrawal of local powers.<sup>5</sup> Efforts to expand royal power anywhere in Brazil were generally associated with economic developments that made that region an area of increased interest, and political power was organized through the city. In some respects, many of these colonial towns may not be considered urban at all since residents generally were also farmers involved in subsistence agriculture. However, differences in power, status, and resources did exist and colonial administration provided a mode for manipulating power and organizing social projects. The countryside clearly dominated the city in this period since productive activities and the interests of the agrarian ruling class were centered in the country. However, a merchant class appeared very early in the port cities of Salvador, Recife, and Rio de Janeiro and the conflict and attraction between the agrarian ruling class and the urban merchant class was evident in Recife in the early seventeenth century and in Rio de Janeiro from the middle of the seventeenth century.<sup>6</sup> Merchants of various nationalities became prominent members of municipal councils and other urban elite organizations in São Paulo, Salvador, and Rio de Janeiro by the end of the eighteenth century. In that period, a tension between the segmentary kinship-based social and political relations of agrarian Brazil and the incipient development of

class in conjunction with the expansion of commercial agricultural production for export was already being felt.<sup>7</sup>

2. Richard Morse has argued that, in the early nineteenth century, Brazilian cities generally registered population declines either in absolute terms or else relative to the overall populations of their regions.<sup>8</sup> For São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, for example, this “ruralization” can be viewed in terms of the expansion of commercial agriculture in conjunction with the growing markets for primary products in the industrializing economies of Europe and the U.S. and the development of “urban” features of transport, finance, and processing on the *fazendas* themselves. The city declined as a center of political power as most of the powers of the municipal councils were transferred to the control of the provincial presidents and their councils with the law of 1828. The agrarian ruling class was less visible in municipal councils but rather cooperated on a provincial basis for common economic and political purposes.<sup>9</sup> The rural subsistence population, dislocated through the expansion in commercial agriculture, migrated further into the interior, remained on the commercial estates as *agregados* or dependents, or migrated to the cities. Notwithstanding their relative “decline” in this period, the cities became for the first time recipients of substantial lower-class migration and the locus of significant productive activities. Artisan production expanded considerably in this period as did domestic industry organized around textiles, clothing, utensils, cigarettes, gunpowder, and prepared foods.<sup>10</sup> These new types of production were determined by the increased specialization of productive activities in both city and countryside. In fact, many of the skills needed for domestic manufactures established by migrants for commercial purposes had been acquired in the rural subsistence sector. The substantial change in lower-class urban productive activities (artisanal, not capitalist relations of production) clearly significantly vitiated the corporative structure controlling artisan production and marketing in this period (see the discussion on Lahmeyer Lobo and Mattoso).

3. In the Old Republic (1899–1930) there was a rapid urban expansion in the “primary cities” (São Paulo, Rio, Salvador, Recife) as the entrepot functions of the city returned on a massive scale. Industrial development was limited while the increase in the service sector was pronounced.<sup>11</sup> The abolition of slavery and the influx of free wage laborers (immigrants, freed slaves, and persons displaced from the subsistence sector) implied important shifts in class structure and the social relations of production in this period. The countryside continued to dominate the city: the municipality was dependent on the state government still dominated by commercial agriculturalists for municipal revenues, and most decisions were made on a state level. The commercial-agricultural class maintained hegemony, which also meant that import duties were not

high enough to protect developing industries. Essentially agriculture maintained a monopoly on the use of available capital. Export agriculture precipitated social differentiation. It provided the basis for the development of the city. But export agriculture also produced differentiation within the agrarian sector—calling forth a new mode of articulation between the juxtaposed social and economic formations associated with precapitalist agriculture and with commercial export agriculture. *Coronelismo*—associated with the declining private power of the paternalistic local chief in the rural areas and the ascendance of the public sector—blossomed in this period. *Coronelismo* can also be viewed as a social formation called forth by the articulation of contradictory modes of production—the capitalist mode in ascendance and the precapitalist mode in decline with both usually present in rural and urban sectors. The rural electorate of small municipalities continued to be dependent on local chiefs who delivered votes to the state party likely to be in power in return for their own appointments as well as municipal improvements such as schools, roads, a hospital, a post office, electricity, etc. However, the role of the *coronel* was always that of intermediation created by the articulation of contradictory modes of production and their political superstructures. The *coronel* himself may have played various roles on a continuum between involvement in the precapitalist mode of production in the rural locale which he controlled and the capitalist mode of production in ascendance.

4. Beginning with the 1930 revolution the centralization of government reduced the powers of the states at the same time that the effective electorate was substantially expanded and a significant number of powers and a revenue base were returned to the municipalities. In this period urban economic interests finally became politically dominant in Brazil. This political ascendance was expressed in fiscal policies that favored industrial development to the detriment of agrarian interests and facilitated the redistribution of tax revenues from the agrarian to the urban sector. Import substitution industries, the continued expansion of the service sector, the differential income of agricultural versus non-agricultural employment, and, more recently, the expansion of industry for export have all attracted large numbers of migrants to the major cities. Migrants have also left rural areas because of overpopulation resulting from a decline in mortality in areas still substantially devoted to subsistence production and because of the continuing effects of the expansion of commercial agriculture and the mechanization of agriculture. This effect, which Singer has called the “urbanization of the countryside,” represents still another level of differentiation in the relations of production as the countryside becomes increasingly dependent on the city for urban products and the purchase of subsistence crops.<sup>13</sup> *Coronelismo* based on corrupt electoral politics and personal and politi-

cal alliances on a state or regional basis was substantially overcome in this period due to new electoral procedures, the creation of law enforcement agencies on a local level independent of the coronel, and the distribution of revenues from a federal base. Coronelismo had helped provide a political basis for agrarian capitalism by mediating the contradictory interests of commercial and noncommercial producing areas, while the latter was gradually integrated into national and international markets.

The four studies under review fit into the history of the political and economic relations between the rural and urban sectors in contrasting ways. The books on Salvador and Rio de Janeiro are written from an urban economic perspective with little attention given to the effects of changes in productive relations in the countryside or to political dimensions of either rural-urban relations or urban development. Victor Nunes Leal and Eul Soo Pang, on the other hand, give short shrift to the economic dimension and concentrate on the rural politics of coronelismo. Neither approach is very satisfactory. Just as cities cannot be treated as discrete subjects of study, neither can economic history be correctly written without at the same time writing political history and vice versa.

The two-volume study of Rio de Janeiro (1760–1945) and the nineteenth-century study of Salvador, Bahia both evidence a concern for quantitative measurement of economic and social change. Tables and graphs of population growth, occupational structure, numbers and types of businesses and factories, cost of living and salary indexes, and the volume of exports and imports, among other tabular information, characterize both studies. Lahmeyer Lobo's study includes more than six hundred pages of detailed tables, mainly from primary sources, which is especially rich for the period from 1840 to 1930. Mattoso deals with a shorter time period and includes fewer than seventy pages of tables. However, the tables and related quantitative analysis are skillfully integrated into the narrative and reflect her familiarity with the techniques of the *Annales* school.

Lahmeyer Lobo begins from the premise that the development of the Brazilian economy was subordinated to the capitalist mode of production through the world market from the beginning of the nineteenth century (p. 76). However, she argues that the dominance of capitalism manifested itself initially only at the level of production for export and not at the level of exchange within Brazilian society. The purpose of the book then is to look at the process of change in the relations of production from a mercantile economy at the end of the eighteenth century to an industrial economy in the middle of the twentieth century as reflected in the economy and society of the city of Rio de Janeiro. Lahmeyer Lobo argues that from the end of the eighteenth century until 1880 Rio de Janeiro was characterized by the predominance of commercial and fi-

nance capital, which she says implied that the economy was not capitalistic because commercial capital "could not produce changes in the relations of production" (p. 938). To support her thesis she points to the influence of slave labor on the free labor market as well as on the underdevelopment of the internal consumer market until 1888—an argument that was current in Brazil even in the nineteenth century (pp. 105–6). More unusual is her discussion of the monopolization of industry until the 1840s within the corporations of artisans that controlled pricing, marketing, and the quality of products, as well as access to a limited number of titles of "master craftsman" within the particular corporation. Furthermore, brotherhoods based on the individual corporations were important sources of credit for artisans in this period (pp. 108–26). Lahmeyer Lobo defines the period from 1840 to 1880 as one in which manufacturing (meaning wage labor in small shops with few machines) was dominant. The factors leading to the transition from artisan production to manufacturing are not clearly delineated. Unfortunately, data indicating either that artisans seldom worked for wages before 1840 or that wage labor was common among artisans from 1840 to 1880 are also lacking. According to Lahmeyer Lobo the transformation from manufacturing to industry occurred with the abolition of slavery and the financial crisis of the 1890s "which created opportunities for military and urban professional groups to enter the elite" (p. 938). However, no data is offered to support the thesis that capital invested in secondary production after 1890 originated with a different group of investors than those involved in commercial agriculture. An alternative thesis would suggest that the crises in agriculture in the period prompted members of the agrarian ruling class to change their patterns of investment to finance capital and to industry. The period from 1880 to 1917 showed a strong tendency for a decline in the standard of living (as reflected by changes in prices of basic products and in salaries), which Lahmeyer Lobo attributes to the end of the protective power of the corporations and the dramatic increase in numbers of laborers in the urban area. This tirelessly developed and well-established evidence of rising social differentiation by the end of the nineteenth century is followed by an interesting analysis of the development of antagonistic relations between workers and employers by the early twentieth century (pp. 505–10). Clearly the polarization of class interests, which evolved in the agrarian sector with the expansion of commercial agriculture, also crystallized in the urban sector in this period.

These two volumes of detailed urban economic history constitute a mine of information and analysis and are clearly an important contribution to Brazilian urban history. The major problem is that although Lahmeyer Lobo claims to recognize both the position of Brazil in the capitalist world economy and the subsidiary commercial role of Rio de

Janeiro to the rural productive sphere in the nineteenth century, her analysis of urban history seems not to take these factors into account. Most important is her failure to analyze the transitions in social relations of production (from artisan to manufacture to industry) in terms of the reorganization of Brazilian society and economy within the framework of the capitalist mode of production. Also ignored were the relationship of these urban transformations to changes in the mode of production in the agrarian sector—both in terms of migration and in the appearance of new areas of urban production—as well as political factors affecting both the development of urban services and the growth of industry. Lahmeyer Lobo seems not to have grasped the crucial point that the city was developed by the agrarian ruling class in the image of its own interests in the nineteenth century—an image that specifically did not include the development of industry.

Mattoso's study of Salvador is similar to Lahmeyer Lobo's in her emphasis on the essentially commercial function of the city and the absence of industrial activities of any significance within the city in the nineteenth century. Mattoso does not characterize relations of production as either precapitalist or capitalist but she does assert that in the nineteenth century only 5 to 15 percent of the working population of Salvador received income through means of a salary and that even some of those undoubtedly also were paid in lodgings, board, or produce (pp. 290–91). Mattoso also suggests, as did Lahmeyer Lobo for Rio de Janeiro, that artisan corporations monopolized city manufactures until the 1840s (p. 163). Mattoso's view of a rapidly expanding urban population with few opportunities for employment and a large informal sector involved in petty trade of fruit, candy, and hot food as well as petty services also seems to support the thesis that productive activities within the city had a predominantly precapitalist flavor. It is interesting to note, however, in comparison with English urban history, that it is the absence of large-scale productive activities based on wage labor that makes the situation appear precapitalist, not the absence of an urban class of propertyless persons with no control over the means of production. Mattoso, much more than Lahmeyer Lobo, emphasizes the importance of rural migrants in urban growth, but fails to analyze either migration or the development of new urban productive activities (and the absence of significant secondary production) in terms of changes in social relations within the agrarian sphere.

The major thrust of Mattoso's study, however, is that informal vertical solidarity groups, including the family and the religious brotherhoods based principally on color or ethnic group, were the principal sources of social cohesion and the regulators of society in the colonial period. Mattoso's discussion of the family is based primarily on wills, which are used to demonstrate the frequency of the consensual union as

a form of marriage. Mattoso also emphasizes the common recognition by fathers of illegitimate children born in “natural families” which they headed in addition to their “legitimate families” (pp. 204–7). Data on types of household structure and headship as well as information differentiating family and household organization by class would have been especially useful to suggest possible changes in the solidarity of the domestic group in the nineteenth century. The religious brotherhoods—of which there were more than one hundred in Salvador at the beginning of the nineteenth century—provided social assistance to orphans and the poor as well as mechanisms of mutual aid for members of the brotherhood (pp. 207–11). The brotherhoods began to disappear in the 1830s when the municipality began to create its own institutions of social assistance. Even more significant, according to Mattoso, was the appearance of organizations based on class interests, which came to exercise new mechanisms of social control (pp. 224–28). Among these organizations she cites the society of agriculture, commerce, and industry created by forty-two property owners in 1832 for the development of economic activities in the province, and the commercial association of Bahia created in 1840 by a group of bankers and national and foreign merchants to promote commerce and agriculture. Lower class organizations included the carpenter’s society for mutual assistance created in 1832 and the Bahian worker’s league for mutual aid among construction workers created in 1881. Mattoso suggests that the abandonment of the vertical solidarity groups deprived the lower classes of the elite leadership and support they were used to having on the basis of kinship or ethnic group. The alliance among agrarian, merchant, and financial class fractions led to new levels of repression of popular groups and a general decline in the standard of living of most workers by the end of the nineteenth century (pp. 234–36).

It is clear that the differences between the conclusions of the two studies reflect the fact that Lahmeyer Lobo was focusing on significant quantitative changes in occupational structure whereas Mattoso was looking at qualitative changes in associational structure and changing alliances between ruling-class fractions. Nevertheless, each author provides comparative data to support the other’s argument. Lahmeyer Lobo’s argument of a significant transition in productive and class relations in the 1840s is significantly bolstered by Mattoso’s discussion of changes in associational patterns in that period. At the same time, Mattoso’s argument on solidarity relations before 1840 is enhanced by Lahmeyer Lobo’s more substantial discussion of artisan corporations and credit mechanisms in that period. Mattoso’s sensitive study of Salvador will be especially valuable to historians interested in the process of class formation. Unfortunately, Mattoso fails to consider the impact of changes in

agrarian productive relations for urban class formation—in terms of either the alliances of ruling class fractions or the decline in the corporations or brotherhoods.

Studies on coronelismo have generally been written from an almost entirely rural political perspective. Nunes Leal considers the economic dimension only in discussing municipal revenues and the concentration of rural property. Nunes Leal's work is also somewhat ahistorical in that change occurs only in the legal relations of municipality and state. Pang pays more attention to economic differences between *coroneis* but deals with them in no systematic fashion. History enters as changes in political followings and alliances, but never as social or economic transformations. Neither author considers what politics is all about: possible changes in the composition or class interests of the *coroneis* or the state governors. Nor do they consider the possibility of transformation in the social relations of production in the rural sector or their effects on coronelismo.

Nunes Leal's 1948 "small contribution"—now available in English—is still in many ways the most precise statement on coronelismo in print. According to him, "coronelism is above all a compromise, a trading of interests between the public authority, itself continually being strengthened, and the declining social influence of the local bosses—notably the big landowners" (p. 1). It is clear that for Nunes Leal the declining private power was essentially agrarian and that the ascending public authority had an urban face (p. 155). Private power was expressed through municipal government in the colonial period when municipal government was strong. Therefore, Nunes Leal approached the study of coronelismo through an analysis of relationship of municipality to the state in terms of revenues, electoral laws, police powers, and the development of education. His analysis indicates that the municipalities lost their revenue base and many other powers in 1828 to the provincial government and from that time until 1930 were politically and economically dependent on the province/state. The coronel emerged as the point of intermediation between the municipality and the state—a perspective that continues to be valuable for understanding coronelismo. However, the picture that Nunes Leal painted on the basis of the legal and fiscal superiority of the state is that of an ideal type: the state governor was very strong (except for the slight weakness demonstrated by the necessity to cooperate with the *coroneis*) and could contain any rebellion on the part of private power while the *coroneis*, on the other hand, knew that "impertinence . . . [could] only be disadvantageous." Thus, while Nunes Leal saw coronelismo as a system that functioned as a form of intermediation between two systems, one in decline and the other in ascendance, his analysis does not suggest the possibility of variation in

the point of articulation between the two systems—that is, the role of coronel and his relationship to the state. Nor does he identify the class interests to which the rise in state power corresponds.<sup>15</sup>

Studies on coronelismo since Nunes Leal have been less precise in their definitions of terms and have sometimes identified private power in any period or sphere as “coronelismo” and sometimes have seen modern party chiefs, union bosses, and other varieties of urban power brokers as “coroneis.”<sup>16</sup> For example, the study by Pang is difficult to come to grips with analytically because he defines the system of coronelismo in Bahia in terms of the political style and *persona* of the coronel, rather than in terms of the social formation of which the coronel is a product. The major thesis of the book, that “Coronelismo did not decline in 1930 but evolved into another new form of oligarchic rule” can hardly be denied if we are to accept Pang’s definitions of oligarchies (pp. 20–25) and his definitions of coroneis (pp. 36–39), which seem to include anyone in both rural and urban sectors with any kind of power.

Pang presents a fascinating view of the Bahian coronel in the old republic. Compared with his counterpart in the southwest, the Bahian coronel was less involved in party politics (pp. 39–92) and more likely to ally with other coroneis to overthrow an unwanted governor (pp. 30–32). Clearly both the coronel and the state government in Pang’s Bahia vary greatly from Nunes Leal’s model. The coroneis were stronger and the government more precarious and less identified with international trade and commercial agriculture than what Nunes Leal suggests. Furthermore, Pang discusses differences between the relationship of coroneis of the interior and the relationship of coroneis of the coast with the governor (p. 72), suggesting a variety of possible configurations of coronelismo. Pang mentions the “collective war of the coroneis” against the governor in 1919 (pp. 120–22), but gives us no basis for understanding the phenomenon. For Nunes Leal, such a “collective war” simply could not have occurred.

One of the problems in Nunes Leal’s identification of the coroneis is that he failed to distinguish between the landholder involved in mixed subsistence and export crops or in export crops in decline and large landholders involved in a prospering commercial export crop. Pang pointed out these differences but did not attempt to explain the significance of class interests for the differing roles of the coroneis. Pang’s study also suggests the possibility that a state governor in the Old Republic may not have necessarily represented class fractions associated with commerce or export agriculture. In Bahia, and probably other areas experiencing commercial decline in the Old Republic, the political weight of municipalities whose economies were still predominately precapitalist meant that the coroneis could potentially determine who would be governor.

Perhaps the intervention of 1920 in Bahia (pp. 122–27) and the “politics of presidents” in the subsequent years in which presidents, rather than governors, dealt with *coroneis* should be viewed in that context. In other words, it was probably impossible for a state government whose fiscal policies favored commerce and *caçã* growers to avoid confrontation with the *coroneis*. However, a state government which failed to institute these policies would be out of favor with the federal government. The inauguration of the “politics of presidents” (following the “collective war of the *coroneis*” against the governor) created a mode in which the federal government bought off the *coroneis* directly in return for the latter’s agreement to make peace with a state government favoring *caçã* and commerce.

This new mode of dealing with the Bahian *coroneis* presaged the course of developments in the revolution of 1930. Interventor Neiva attempted to destroy the power base of the *coroneis* through redefinition of municipal districts (p. 192). Although efficient and successful in dealing with administrative and economic problems, Neiva was a political disaster and had to resign, not least because of his relations with the *coroneis*. The interventor who followed, Magalhaes, tried a different strategy. He, unlike Neiva, gave the *coroneis* opportunities for participation in the new regime, but at the same time continued the campaign against banditry and for the effective centralization of government (pp. 196–99). Pang asserts that the quintessence of the new “old order” in Bahia (in which the *coroneis* became the elite of the new order) was based on the continued need for favor and compromise between the central and local governing elites (p. 200). While this is probably true, the “victory” that Pang claims for the *coroneis* clearly was not on a basis that allowed continuation of the old system of political control of municipalities by *coroneis* (p. 203). *Coroneis* lost control over balloting and violence in their districts within a few years of the revolution. In fact, Magalhaes supported the *coroneis* politically as persons but destroyed them as a class. The continued presence of erstwhile *coroneis* or their kin in positions of state, party, or municipal authority does not imply the survival of the system of *coronelismo* in the *Estado Novo* but rather that persons who had roles in that system were taking new roles in new systems. In fact, Pang did not analyze the history of the social formation of *coronelismo* in the Old Republic but rather seems to have written a collective biography of social mobility among *coroneis*.

The study of *coronelismo* is related to urban history through such themes as state formation and the historical development of class relations. At times the coronel can be seen as playing both sides of the fence, facilitating the expansion of commodity relations within the precapitalist agrarian sphere and simultaneously struggling to maintain intact the sphere of precapitalist relations of production that he controlled.

However, the balance was a precarious one and could be tipped by circumstances that made the coronel feel either that his interests were no longer vested in an important way in the agrarian precapitalist relations of his município or else that his precarious position in the realm of commerce and commodity relations made the maintenance of the rural precapitalist political economy increasingly critical to his interests. In the former case, the coronel moved from a position of intermediation between modes to join the capitalist class fraction reflected by his investments. Once a "coronel" was wholly involved in the export sector and had no significant rural resource and power base he was no longer a coronel.

In the Old Republic both city and coronel expressed the character of the dominant system of production and the ruling class associated with it. Both were subordinate to large-scale commercial agriculture, but both were in some sense antagonistic to the system that created them. The resolution of those antagonisms arose out of the dramatic shift in the dynamic center of the productive system after 1930, an economic shift accompanied (and to some extent made possible) by the rising political power of urban, industrial interests. The success of the industrial, bourgeois faction, however, rang the death-knell for the coronel. The direct relation between the reorganization of subsistence agriculture and industrial profits determined that if the coronel was to retain local prominence it would only be on the basis of a reorganized system of production and social relations in which personal ties, loyalty, and power had but little place.

Historians of the economy—even the urban economy—often ignore the ways in which class politics have shaped and permeated economic structure. On the other hand, political historians often do not recognize that politics is economics by other means. Brazilian urban history—if there is to be such a field—could become a fitting forum in which the interpenetration of the development of the Brazilian polity and economy as well as the city and the countryside can be illuminated.

#### NOTES

1. Paul Singer, *Economia Política da Urbanização* (São Paulo, 1973), pp. 11–14.
2. Richard Morse made a similar point in "Trends and Patterns of Latin American Urbanization, 1750–1920," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 16:4 (Sept. 1974), p. 434.
3. Dependency theorists include André Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America* (New York, 1969); Fernando Henrique Cardoso and E. Faletto, *Dependencia e desenvolvimento na América Latina* (Rio de Janeiro, 1970); Manuel Castells, "La urbanización dependiente en América Latina," in Castells (ed.), *Imperialismo y urbanización en América Latina* (Barcelona, 1972); Samir Amin, *Accumulation on a World Scale* (New York, 1974); and Harold Brookfield, *Interdependent Development* (London, 1975). Recent criticisms of the uses of dependency theory in urban history include Singer, *Economia Política*, pp. 63–113; Marcos Kaplan, "La ciudad latinoamericana

- como factor de transmisión de control socioeconómico y político externo durante el periodo contemporáneo," Paper for the 39th Congress of Americanists, Aug. 2–9 1970, Lima; Richard M. Morse, "Trends and Issues in Latin American Urban Research (Part II), 1965–1970," *LARR* 6:2 (Summer 1971), pp. 50–55; and Anibal Quijano, "The Urbanization of Latin American Society," in Jorge E. Hardoy (ed.), *Urbanization in Latin America: Approaches and Issues* (Garden City, 1975), pp. 109–53.
4. Nestor Goulart Reis Filho, *Evolução Urbana do Brasil (1500–1720)* (São Paulo, 1968) is the most important work demonstrating the political uses of urban planning in the colonial period. Roberta Delson, "Town Planning in Colonial Brazil" (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1975) has demonstrated how the same principal of town planning as a means of instituting royal control (or the imposition of order by a local ruling class) continued and expanded in the eighteenth century with the establishment of new towns in the mining region of interior Brazil.
  5. Reis Filho, *Evolução Urbana*, pp. 36–38; Dauril Alden, *Royal Government in Colonial Brazil* (Berkeley, 1968), pp. 279–87.
  6. Charles Boxer, *The Golden Age of Brazil* (Berkeley, 1975), pp. 106–25; Lahmeyer Lobo, *Historia do Rio de Janeiro*, p. 26; Rae Flory and David Grant Smith, "Bahian Merchants and Planters in the 17th and Early 18th Centuries," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 58:4 (Nov. 1978), pp. 571–94.
  7. A. J. R. Russell-Wood, *Hidalgos and Philanthropists: The Santa Casa de Misericórdia of Bahia, 1550–1755* (London, 1968); Elizabeth Kuznesof, "Clans, the Militia, and Territorial Government: The Articulation of Kinship with Polity in Eighteenth-Century São Paulo," in David Robinson (ed.), *Social Fabric and Spatial Structures in Colonial Latin America* (Syracuse, 1979), pp. 181–226 and "The Role of the Merchants in the Economic Development of São Paulo, 1765 to c1850," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 60:4 (Nov. 1980); John N. Kennedy, "Bahian Elites 1750–1822," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 53:3 (Aug. 1973), pp. 415–39.
  8. Richard Morse, "The Development of Urban Systems in the Americas in the Nineteenth Century," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 17:1 (Feb. 1975), pp. 4–26.
  9. Warren Dean, *The Industrialization of São Paulo, 1880–1945* (Austin, 1969), pp. 67–73; Nícia Vilela Luz, *A Luta Pela Industrialização do Brasil (1808–1930)* (São Paulo, 1961), pp. 111–16.
  10. De Queiros Mattoso, *Bahia*, pp. 171–74; Elizabeth Kuznesof, "Household Composition and Headship Related to Changes in the Mode of Production: São Paulo 1765–1836," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 22:1 (Jan. 1980), pp. 102–4.
  11. Singer, *Economia Política*, pp. 105–13; Lahmeyer Lobo, *Historia*, pp. 443–548.
  12. The discussion of coronelismo owes much to conversations with Steve Soiffer. For an analysis of coronelismo from this perspective, see Stephen M. Soiffer and Gary N. Howe, "Patrons, Clients, and the Articulation of Modes of Production: An Examination of the Penetration of Capitalism into Peripheral Agriculture in Northeastern Brazil," unpublished manuscript.
  13. Singer, "Migrações Internas: Considerações Teóricas sobre o Seu Estudo," in *Economia Política*, pp. 31–60.
  14. Nunes Leal, *Coronelismo*, pp. 88–96, 116–17, 125–29; Raymundo Faoro, *Os Donos do Poder* (Pôrto Alegre, 1975), pp. 663–79.
  15. More recent works on coronelismo include Jean Blondel, *As Condições de Vida Política no Estado da Paraíba* (Rio de Janeiro, 1957); Faoro, *Os Donos*; Antonio Barroso Pontes, *Mundo dos Coroneis* (Rio de Janeiro, 1970); Maria Isaura Pereira de Queiroz, *O Mandonismo Local na Vida Política Brasileira* (São Paulo, 1960); M. Suxiliadora Ferraz de Sá, *Dos Velhos aos Novos Coroneis* (Recife, 1974); Celson Jose de Silva, *Marchas e Contramarchas do Mandonismo Local* (Belo Horizonte, 1975).
  16. Faoro, *Os Donos* and Pereira de Queiroz, *O Mandonismo Local* utilize especially imprecise definitions of coronelismo.