

parts are the introductory exposition of Marxian value theory and the diagrammatic study of infant industry economics in chapter 7, although the latter is probably more interesting as an exercise in trade analytics than as an advancement of our understanding of Soviet experience. Boltho argues that Soviet trade policy attempted to trade off the long-range gains from the development of heavy industry against the sacrifice of not importing more consumer goods in the short run. But acknowledging the need to develop infant industries does not serve to explain the prewar trade pattern, since much higher rates of exports and imports could have been consistent with the long-range goals. The actual trade pattern that did evolve can be explained more simply as a result of the shifting terms of trade in international markets, as an examination of trade statistics for the period makes clear. Thus physical exports of such basics as coal, POL, and wheat grew substantially during the first plan, while total revenue fell by half (*50 let sovetiskoi vneshnei torgovli*, Moscow, 1967, p. 44).

Regarding its presumably intended main contribution—description and analysis of the foreign trade criteria—the book is dated (it was originally presented as a doctoral thesis at Oxford in 1965). Despite Boltho's prefatory claim that "not much happened [between 1965 and 1969] in most of the Eastern European countries that could have fundamentally altered the body of the work," it is nevertheless true that many other criteria have been put forward and debated. The reader must feel short-changed not to find them in a book with this title, since Jozef Wilczynski's book (*The Economics and Politics of East-West Trade*, New York, 1969) includes more than twice as many criteria running through 1968, and covers a vast quantity of other material besides. Another weakness is the examination of price irrationality in chapter 5. The treatment here is at variance with some of the lucid insights into Marxian value theory in chapter 1. The criticism, for example, that "only average costs of production are taken into account" (p. 73) is explained by the fact that interest and rent are neglected. The analysis on subsequent pages offers variously shaped industry cost curves without any inquiry whether, for example, U-shaped curves correspond to long-run reality. Why should we not be able to add optimal-size plants at constant average cost? If it is because labor is growing scarce, then the industry-wide wage must rise, signifying a shift in the cost curve, but by no means necessarily a U-shape. And once we accept this new level, why is average-cost pricing irrational?

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LOCATION PROBLEMS IN SOVIET INDUSTRY BEFORE WORLD WAR II: THE CASE OF THE UKRAINE. By I. S. Koropec'kyj. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971. xiii, 219 pp. \$11.95.

This is an interesting and important analysis of a neglected aspect of Soviet development. The problem analyzed is whether the USSR was correct in stressing the development of heavy industry "behind the Urals" during the 1928–40 period. Political, economic, and military considerations influenced Soviet policy. Their interplay was complicated by international uncertainties and by problems of timing. Professor Koropec'kyj has assembled and analyzed a good deal of primary regional economic evidence concerning these matters, especially as they related to the Ukraine.

Ukrainian coal and iron ore supported the growth of heavy industry in the Ukraine before the revolutions, and rapid industrial growth under the five-year

plans could well have been focused on this economically productive territory. Bolshevik nationalities policy favored spreading industry "more evenly," however, and the Ukraine also appeared vulnerable to invasion. Under Stalin heavy industry expanded in the Ukraine but not as rapidly as elsewhere; in particular, the Ural-Kuznetsk Combine created a "second iron and steel base" for the USSR.

Evaluation of these decisions involves links with other industries and final consumers, freight transportation costs, construction costs, labor costs, and other intricacies. The author examines them for the period of the first two Soviet five-year plans. His sensible conclusions, in my view, suggest the great difficulty of reaching neat final judgments on these issues. Soviet investment policies were clumsy and wasteful; with the benefit of hindsight, one can reconstruct a more efficient time sequence and regional pattern of outlays among industries. With further detail on other regions and on the military-political aspects of the problem, more exhaustive analysis will be possible. Meanwhile, this study makes a notable contribution to our understanding.

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FERMENT IN THE UKRAINE: DOCUMENTS BY V. CHORNOVIL, I. KANDYBA, L. LUKYANENKO, V. MOROZ AND OTHERS. Edited by *Michael Browne*. Foreword by *Max Hayward*. New York and Washington: Praeger Publishers, 1971. xix, 267 pp. \$15.00.

UKRAINS'KYI VISNYK: VYPUSK I-II, SICHEN' 1970-TRAVEN' 1970. Paris and Baltimore: Persha Ukrain'ska Drukarnia u Frantsii, Ukrain'ske Vydavnytstvo SMOLOSKYP im. V. Symonenka, 1971. 246 pp.

Ferment in the Ukraine contains documents of protest and is a sequel to the well-known *Chornovil Papers*. Of special interest are the documents on the Jurists' Case of 1961, news of which Soviet authorities had hitherto succeeded in suppressing. The seven Ukrainian defendants included four members of the Communist Party and one Komsomol member; three (Lukianenko, Kandyba, and Borovnytsky) were lawyers. They sought to combat Russian great power chauvinism and bureaucratism and to demand the exercise of Ukrainian rights as provided for in the Soviet constitution—including the right of secession. They were tried in secret in May 1961 in a KGB prison and not in a courtroom. Kandyba, in a letter to Shelest, states: "There have been many cases similar to our own." Thus apparently a host of secret trials preceded those of 1965 that were publicized through the efforts of Viacheslav Chornovil.

The volume also includes the complete text of the remarkable "Report from the Beria Reservation" by the historian and gifted writer Valentyn Moroz. This brilliant characterization of the "empire of cogs" also provides a devastating analysis of its weaknesses and the hollowness of the world of the standardizers. Moroz observes that although Hrushevsky has been denounced, bourgeois historians such as Soloviev and Kliuchevsky have been republished because they were Russians. He asks why the Ukrainian Republic sends its prisoners abroad (to Mordovia): "Perhaps the Ukraine, like the principality of Monaco, lacks space for camps? Room was, however, found for seven million Russian settlers . . ." (p. 122). Moroz also describes conditions in the Mordovian camps for political prisoners. Regarding KGB efforts to "re-educate" political prisoners, he observes: "You cannot catch