

organized as a ruling class"? Is not the term "*dictatorship* of the proletariat" open to misunderstanding and misuse? Is there not danger in the denigration of bourgeois-democratic and universal-cultural values? Marković also takes issue sharply with Marx's views on the rights of small nations. Kolakowski in his turn accepts that certain key features of Stalinism are inconsistent with many of Marx's values, but then, as he argues, attempts to implement in practice *some* of Marx's ideas have required the abandonment or negation of others, since certain of the values are incompatible. Perhaps the best way of summarizing the conclusions is to cite a sentence from Tucker: "Both parties agree that Stalinism was *in some sense* an offspring of classical Marxism. . . . What one views as a legitimate child, the other sees as a bastard."

Apart from minor blemishes, the editing has been thorough, and the whole volume reflects great credit on all concerned.

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THE GREAT GAME: MEMOIRS OF THE SPY HITLER COULDN'T SILENCE. By *Leopold Trepper*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977. xii, 442 pp. Photographs. \$10.95.

The author of this book was the organizer from 1938 to 1942 of a Soviet spy network covering Brussels, Paris, and Berlin. The Gestapo called it *die rote Kapelle*, and as the Red Orchestra it is familiar to newspaper and thriller readers. Trepper was arrested, escaped, made his way back to Moscow, was rearrested, and survived to be released after ten years in prison.

By ethnic origin Trepper is a Polish Jew, born near Cracow in 1904. He joined the Communist party in Palestine in 1925, and was an active militant there and in France till 1932, when he went to Moscow. There he experienced the spread of fear, as a driving force over his party: "The glow of October was being extinguished in the shadows of underground chambers. The revolution had degenerated into a system of terror and horror; the ideals of socialism were ridiculed in the name of a fossilized dogma which the executioners still had the effrontery to call Marxism." He was glad to get away in 1938 to found his spy network in Brussels for Red Army intelligence. Contrary to legend, he was given no special training. He recounts in lavish detail how his network of informers worked, but he says nothing that would compromise any living survivors. He also explains how it came unstuck: his superiors in Russia sent him the addresses of his three main collaborators in Berlin, with a code word for making contact, in a code the Germans broke ten months later. Numerous arrests of Soviet agents followed. They were all quite junior, and the author does not try to assess how much real use the data which they supplied were to the Russians.

Much else of interest is here, nevertheless. Among other points, one deserves to be singled out: the long delays that often attended deciphering of spies' messages by the Russians. Maybe Stalin took no notice of Sorge's warning, three weeks in advance, that the Germans were going to attack him because the warning was not deciphered in time.

The rest of Trepper's book describes his interrogations by the Gestapo, his simple escape from them, and his much more prolonged interrogations by the Soviet secret police. Because General Berzin had recruited him, he had been suspect since 1938. In a coda, he explains how after ten years in the Lubianka, Lefortovo, and Butirki prisons he was released to meet his family, who had been living in a Moscow hovel. He returned with them to Poland, survived several more years of anti-Semitic persecution, and was allowed out to die in the West. He now lives in Denmark.

This is the book of a man who has suffered much and forgotten nothing. It shows up several prevalent notions about the nature of espionage and of communism as false. Though the author feels aggrieved, with good reason, he tries hard to tell the truth.

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THE LAST SIX MONTHS: RUSSIA'S FINAL BATTLES WITH HITLER'S ARMIES IN WORLD WAR II. By *S. M. Shtemenko, General of the Soviet Army*. Translated by *Guy Daniels*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1977. xvi, 436 pp. Illus. \$10.00.

The considerable value of the first volume of General Shtemenko's memoirs, published in Moscow in 1968 under the title *General'nyi shtab v gody voiny*, was that it gave an insight into the actual working of the General Staff during World War II. It was marred by Shtemenko's many biases, not the least of them being an evident desire to restore as much luster to Stalin's wartime reputation as was possible under the negative considerations still prevailing in the wake of the twentieth and twenty-second party congresses.

The second volume, presented in a serviceable English translation by Guy Daniels, is of considerably less value. Not only has Shtemenko covered the major developments of the war in the first volume but in the second the propaganda content is substantially higher and the informational yield correspondingly lower.

This volume deals basically with the last few months of the war. Shtemenko utilizes his narrative to present almost every action taken by Russia's allies in that period in an unfavorable light, beginning with the Warsaw uprising and ending with the fall of Berlin and the signing of Germany's Unconditional Surrender.

One service Shtemenko provides is a rather detailed description of Stalin's Kuntsevo dacha, ordinarily called Blizhniaia. He had provided in his first memoir a description of New Year's Eve, December 31, 1944, at the dacha. In this book he gives a room-by-room description of the residence where Stalin conducted so much of his business and where he died on the evening of March 5, 1953.

Shtemenko makes clear the extraordinary control which Stalin's Stavka or General Headquarters maintained over every phase of operations in the later part of the war. The greater freedom of the front commanders in the earlier period, stemming in part from disorganization and lack of communication and in part from Stalin's slow recovery of confidence after his breakdown following the Nazi attack in June 1941, had vanished. The commanders sent their plans to Stavka where they were rigorously reviewed and often radically changed. Then a Stavka overseer was attached to the operating front to make certain that the operation was carried out as approved by Stavka (and countersigned by Stalin).

The paranoia which gripped Stalin and his associates in the later part of the war over almost every act of their Western allies was, Shtemenko reveals, profound. Whatever was proposed by the West was suspect. Suspicion of resistance forces in eastern Europe was equally deep, particularly if the anti-Nazi group had had any connection with the West.

Shtemenko makes clear (without perhaps wishing this) that Soviet distrust in Poland, Rumania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia almost invariably was so great that the Russian advance was slowed and the Nazis consequently managed to wipe out or badly damage native resistance movements. As might be expected, the story of the fall of Prague and the role of the Vlasov forces in fighting the Nazis is hopelessly distorted.

Shtemenko closes his book with a description of another meeting at Stalin's dacha, this one in the summer of 1949, in which he describes Stalin in tones which can only