

Yet, despite the commonality of experiences, the studies also demonstrate the wide range of responses from different localities with varying political-economic and ecological circumstances. The authors of this volume dispel the myth that environmentalism is a luxury of the middle class. They effectively demonstrate that the poor and marginalized also can mobilize environmentalist discourses to defend and reclaim land, forest, water, minerals, and healthy living and working conditions. This view of environmentalism is critical in that it sheds light on the notion that environmentalist discourses are not only a tool of the powerful elite. They can also be mobilized in defense of subaltern groups against larger, dominant interests.

In general, the authors favor large scale political-economic analysis of environmental issues over more local and detailed cultural analyses of the issues surrounding resource use. It cannot be denied that a political-economic framework for analysis is critical because it highlights the broader issues of unequal power relations that frame debates over resource use. Yet the result of this analytical focus is that at times the local-level actors appear to be a homogenous group, lacking social differentiation. Differences between the gender, generations, ethnicity, and class are sometimes too quickly glossed over. Two chapters in the book are notable exceptions, chapter 12 by Warren and chapter 14 by Yap. Warren's chapter provides a fresh look at issues of resort development in Bali, emphasizing that "in Indonesia, environmental issues have become highly politicized, not only because the environment became . . . a surrogate for the expression of dissent on broader issues, but also because they are ultimately connected with questions of cultural identity and social security" (p. 229). Her close analysis of the cultural symbols associated with social action against resort development provides an alternative way to look at resource conflicts that is underexplored elsewhere in the book. Additionally, Yap's chapter on local initiative in the Philippines draws critical attention to the ways in which local people foster connections to multiple (and at times competing) social and political institutions in order to better position themselves as the political, economic, and social terrain shifts under their feet. This detailed attention to the unexpected ways in which coalitions form, break up, and realign across social groupings provides a highly differentiated and locally specific view of the ways in which local social groups form in response to the loss of control over land and natural resources.

For anyone interested in obtaining a deeper understanding of natural resource conflicts in Southeast Asia, *The Politics of Environment in Southeast Asia: Resources and Resistance* is essential reading. However, I would encourage readers to read this largely political-economic study together with others studies on environmental politics in Southeast Asia which focus more on the cultural logic of resource conflicts. Read together, such alternative and complementary frameworks for analysis of environmental issues highlight the tensions that are emerging region wide in the struggles to control natural resources.

AMITY A. DOOLITTLE
Yale University

A Moment of Anguish: Singapore in Malaysia and the Politics of Disengagement.
By ALBERT LAU. Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1998. viii, 312 pp.
\$25.00 (paper).

Albert Lau's study is an important contribution to studies of Malaysian and Singaporean politics. Singapore's separation from Malaysia in 1965, after only two

years as a part of the Federation, has been fairly well studied. Lau, however, is able to bring new evidence which adds depth and perspective both to the events of 1963–1965 as well as to the subsequent history of both Malaysia and Singapore.

Lau's account is well written, coherently organized, and well documented; it should become the definitive treatment of these events. His credibility is strengthened by his broad range of source material, including official reports and interviews with Singapore and Malaysian officials and the newly opened diplomatic records of Great Britain, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, all of which contain extensive reports of events as they occurred together with prognostications on future developments. Lau has brought all of these together in a readable, well-balanced, and thorough account.

His narrative is chronological, and it focuses on four pivotal events which led to Singapore's separation from Malaysia. A chapter is devoted to each. The first was the snap election within Singapore, which Lee Kuan Yew called immediately following the formation of Malaysia in September 1963 and in which the Peoples Action Party (PAP) thoroughly trounced candidates fielded by the Malaysian Alliance parties. The next was the decision by the PAP to contest seats in Malaya in the first Malaysian national elections in April 1964. This was contrary to a supposed "gentleman's agreement" between Lee and Tunku Abdul Rahman at the time Malaysia was formed. Despite aggressive campaigning and apparent widespread popularity, the PAP only won one seat outside of Singapore. The third problem was the race riot, which broke out in Singapore during the Muhammad's birthday celebration on 21 July 1964. Lau lays much of the blame for this disturbance on the activities of Syed Ja'afar Albar, UMNO Secretary-General and editor of the *Utusan Melayu*.

The fourth development arose as relations between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur worsened in the second half of 1964. Lee and the hard-liners in the PAP, particularly S. Rajaratnam and Toh Chin Chye, began to organize an opposition coalition, the Malaysian Solidarity Convention, which would have included other "democratic," multiracial, and socialist parties in the Malay states, Penang and Sabah and Sarawak. This move, together with conflicts over taxes and the budget, drove the final wedge between the two political orders. Negotiations for some sort of "disengagement" were underway from August 1964, as it became clear that there was virtually no common ground between the "democratic, multiracial and socialist" Malaysian Malaysia of Lee and the PAP and the conservative, "feudalist," communal politics of the Malay-dominated Alliance. Finally, after delicate negotiations between Malaysian Deputy Premier, Tun Razak, and his old school chum, Goh Keng Swee, the deal to separate was struck as both Lee and the Tunku sat on the sidelines.

Lau's story is one filled with little ironies. The most striking is the tacit comparison that he provides of PAP policies during the 1960s and their current stance. Lee Kuan Yew's passion for democracy, multiracialism, and socialism seem to have cooled in the past 35 years. On the other hand, it is clear that whatever the rhetoric, the political battles of the 1960s were ruthless, winner-take-all affairs. Given the example of the PAP's dealings with its former partners, the communist-led Barisan Socialis (whose leaders were summarily incarcerated without trial or appeal as soon as Lee could get the Malaysian security forces to do the job for him), and the subsequent history of PAP dominance in Singapore, it is probable that Kuala Lumpur was justified in pushing the Singaporeans out of the nest. Within a decade, Lee and Co. might well have taken the whole pie for themselves. Failing that, it was probably best for the PAP to get out of Malaysia. Otherwise, they certainly would have been arrested before they had the chance to defeat the UMNO. One is tempted to speculate,

however, that had the two sides managed to stay together, perhaps they would have kept each other honest.

While it is true that this may be seen as the definitive account of Singapore's separation, it should be understood that it is not the only way the events might be seen. Lau's story is the Singapore story, it is not the Malaysian and not the UMNO story. I think that a Malaysian historian would have given a different account. This is not to say that Lau is biased or even partial. Nevertheless, Lau is a Singaporean, writing about Singapore. Clearly one thing that has happened in the past 35 years has been the creation of quite distinct national identities.

CARL A. TROCKI

Queensland University of Technology

Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia: Political Culture and the Causes of War. By STEPHEN J. MORRIS. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999. xiii, 313 pp. \$49.50 (cloth); \$18.95 (paper).

In the preface to this helpful but uneven study, Stephen Morris lays claim to a method of analyzing foreign relations that "goes beyond the established realist tradition." To frame his discussion of the interactions among China, Cambodia, Vietnam, and the former Soviet Union in the Cold War era, Morris suggests that "culture" was frequently as important a factor as rationality in decision making. Unfortunately, Morris's definition of culture seems oversimplified and Manichean in its emphasis on the "paranoia" that he finds in Marxist-Leninist regimes. On page 12 he goes so far as to suggest that Marxist-Leninist regimes can be fruitfully studied in terms of a Paranoid Personality Disorder.

While Morris has no knowledge of Chinese, Vietnamese, or Khmer, his fluency in Russian and his access to recently opened archives in the former Soviet Union produce valuable insights throughout the book. At many points where I found myself muttering, "Interesting!," the relevant endnote reflected these archival forays.

Chapters 1 through 4 ("The Local Genesis of the Conflict," pp. 23–119) provide a readable narrative, illuminated by *trouvailles* from archives in Moscow and Aix en Provence, but I differ with Morris on several points of detail. On page 39, for example, he suggests that Pol Pot "imbibed" Maoist ideology after 1966 when he first visited China. I would argue that Pol Pot rarely "imbibed" anything and that after 1966 he may simply have come to prefer Chinese patronage, which was more flattering than the guidance he had been receiving, up to then, from his *soi-disant* "older brothers" in Vietnam. On page 68 and elsewhere, Morris lambastes the Khmer Rouge for their "unrealistic" and "irrational" foreign relations, but fails to suggest what a sensible policy toward Vietnam might have been, aside from succumbing to Vietnamese patronage and demands. Vietnam itself, in any case, soon embarked on a similarly "irrational" policy toward China, drawing less on Marxist-Leninist quarrels or paranoia, as Morris seems to suggest, than on perceptions of threats to sovereignty, based in part on historicocultural considerations.

On page 72, Morris claims that there is "little independent evidence" that the Thai and Vietnamese were attacking Cambodia in 1976. In fact, a mass of Khmer Rouge documents that deal with national defense have surfaced in Phnom Penh since Morris completed his research. These materials suggest that, from 1976 onward, frequent skirmishes along Cambodia's borders, initiated by Thai, Vietnamese, and