CARIBBEAN SECURITY: Retrospect and Prospect*

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SECURITY THEMES OF THE 1980s

During the 1980s, the major security themes that Caribbean scholars studied were geopolitics, militarization, intervention, and instability. The interface between domestic and international politics led to linkages among some of these themes and their domestic, regional, and international dimensions. For example, the militarization of Grenada in the 1980s was predicated on the need to defend the Grenadian revolution against foreign intervention and local counterrevolution. Ironically, the same buildup created the climate that led to the self-destruction of the revolution and presented the United States with a golden opportunity to intervene. In doing so, the United States succeeded in fulfilling a pre-existing geopolitical aim of its own. Elsewhere in the region, militarization and concerns about stability in Dominica, Barbados, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines raised security concerns within the Eastern Caribbean, where several countries created the Regional Security System (RSS) in 1982 to bolster subregional security and became willing accomplices of intervention when the United States intervened in Grenada a year later.

The themes of geopolitics, militarization, intervention, and instability were often subsumed under the larger theme of vulnerability. This topic became an important point of reference in analyzing the security concerns of small states everywhere during the 1980s (Commonwealth Study Group 1985; Harden 1985; Clarke and Payne 1987; Tow 1990). States were—and still are—considered vulnerable because of geographic, political, economic, or other factors that cause their security to be compromised. Vulnerability is thus a multidimensional phenomenon. One study identified six factors that can contribute to it: rivalries between or among great powers, territorial claims, possession of valuable resources, provi-

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sion of refuge to refugees or freedom fighters, corruption, and suppression of democracy (Harden 1985, 13).

Experts who have studied the vulnerability issue have noted a range of threats to which small states (and even some big ones) can be vulnerable: threats to territorial security; threats to political security, which can involve a broad range of actions deliberately intended to influence or produce specific changes; and threats to economic security, which involve actions that can undermine a state's economic welfare and also its internal politics (Commonwealth Study Group 1985, 23). All these factors have affected Caribbean countries in recent years, and some continue to do so. The size of Caribbean countries as well as their political, military, and economic limitations make them all subject to the dictates of the United States, the regional hegemon, and to a lesser extent to pressures by middle-sized powers like Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela.

In elaborating on the range of threats to which Caribbean states are vulnerable, Barbadian former Prime Minister Lloyd Erskine Sandiford observed: “Our vulnerability is manifold. Physically, we are subject to hurricanes and earthquakes; economically, to market decisions taken elsewhere; socially, to cultural penetration; and [now] politically, to the machinations of terrorists, mercenaries, and criminals” (CARICOM Perspective 1990, 6). Sandiford neglected to mention Caribbean vulnerability to U.S. foreign policy and security pursuits.

Caribbean states also suffer from power deficiencies, and many of them have weak state systems, a combination that exacerbates their vulnerability. As Barry Buzan has noted, “Where a state has the misfortune to be both a small power and a weak state . . . , its vulnerability is almost unlimited” (Buzan 1991, 113). Robert Pastor observed that vulnerability in the region has had a practical effect: it has made sustained development illusory, a situation that partly explains “the prevalence of utopian revolutionaries and millenary rhetoric” (Pastor 1992, 23).

Geopolitics

Considerable attention has been paid to the expanded U.S. military presence in the Caribbean, the geopolitics of the region that gave rise to this situation, and U.S. national security policy toward the area. Studies have shown that the 1980s witnessed dramatic increases in U.S. military instruments in the Caribbean, including direct military presence, increased military sales, aid, and training, expanded intelligence operations, and regular high-profile military maneuvers. Some of this activity derived from U.S. concerns about Marxist or other leftist governments in Jamaica, Nicaragua, Grenada, and Suriname, among other countries. Fears were also expressed that these leftist governments would facilitate Soviet geopolitical designs. Specific concerns continued regarding Cuba, based
on claims made in 1979 about an expanded Soviet military presence on the island (Tiryakian 1984; Black 1985; Phillips 1985; García Muñiz 1986; Rodríguez-Beruff 1985, 1989).

Partly because of these concerns and fears, by 1984 the Caribbean Basin had become home to twenty-one U.S. military installations, including five naval, two air force, and seven army bases. The largest forces were in Puerto Rico, Panama, and Guantánamo, Cuba, which together formed a strategic triangle spanning the entire Caribbean Basin. Another visible trend in U.S. military activity in the 1980s was the conducting of high-profile military maneuvers. Solid Shield ’80 and Readex ’80 signaled this shift in strategy, which continued in 1981 with the largest peacetime naval maneuver staged since World War II: Ocean Venture ’81, which involved some 120,000 troops, 250 ships, and 1,000 aircraft.

To facilitate this enhanced presence, structural and operational rearrangements were also undertaken. In a major instance, the U.S. Department of Defense upgraded its regional defense network in November 1981 to command status by consolidating the two-year-old Caribbean Contingency Joint Task Force at Key West, Florida, with the Antilles Defense Command in Puerto Rico. The result was the creation in December 1981 of the United Forces Caribbean Command, which was proclaimed responsible for “waters and islands” of the Caribbean, the Gulf of Mexico, and parts of the Pacific bordering Central and South America. This command was disbanded in 1989 because of reorganization within the defense establishment, due partly to budget cuts and partly to new regional and international developments. The command’s duties were assumed by the U.S. Atlantic Command Headquarters in Norfolk, Virginia (García Muñiz 1986; Hudson 1989; Black 1985; Griffith 1993a).

The heightened military presence resulted in part from larger geopolitical concerns. They included the resource capacity of the Caribbean (in oil, bauxite, gold, nickel, and other natural resources) and U.S. resource needs and business interests. For instance, in the late 1980s, 79 percent of the U.S. bauxite imports were coming from the Caribbean (including 52 percent from Jamaica, 9 percent from Suriname, and 4 percent each from Guyana and the Dominican Republic). Moreover, the Caribbean (including Venezuela) was supplying the United States with a significant proportion of its oil and refining 56 percent of all U.S. oil imports.

Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) in the Caribbean area have also featured in the strategic matrix. Foremost is the Panama Canal connecting the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, which is used for military as well as civilian purposes. Once ships exit the canal on the Atlantic side, they must use one or more of sixteen passages in the Caribbean Sea to reach destinations in the United States, Europe, Africa, and elsewhere. Thus the Caribbean has multidimensional strategic value, and in the context of the
East-West rivalry of the 1980s, the United States did everything possible to guard against actual and potential threats in the area (Anderson 1984; Sim and Anderson 1980; Ronfeldt 1983; Moorer and Fauriol 1984; Schoultz 1987; Searwar 1992).

In terms of the East-West conflict, the Soviet Union was viewed as having several aims in the region, including creating tensions between the United States and other states, promoting conflicts, and fostering political-military changes that could eventually facilitate Soviet-Cuban expansion (Gonzalez 1982). Many analysts considered the Soviet-Cuban nexus to be the centerpiece of Soviet strategic pursuits, partly because the only significant Soviet military presence in the Caribbean was in Cuba. This presence included modern naval facilities and troops. In September 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev disclosed that Soviet troop strength stood at eleven thousand, many more than the United States had estimated. The Soviets also boasted reconnaissance operations in Cuba, including the twenty-eight-square-mile facility at Lourdes, reputed to have been the largest of its kind maintained outside of the USSR. Yet strong Soviet-Cuban connections did not prevent differences over geopolitical issues (Blasier 1983; Duncan 1985; Pastor 1992). Nor did they prevent the Soviets from maintaining other Caribbean contacts, with Grenada until 1983 and with Guyana throughout the 1980s.

The links with Grenada lasted the shorter time (from 1979 to 1983), but they were the most dramatic of the two instances, as is evident from their military agreements and Soviet military assistance programs. Agreements were concluded with the Soviets in 1980, 1981, and 1982. Another one drafted before the October 1983 intervention was never signed. The 1980 agreement provided for fifty-eight million dollars worth of Soviet military supplies, including mortars, machine guns, and anti-aircraft guns. That of 1981 provided for armored personnel carriers, submachine guns, grenades, radios, generators and other equipment. The 1982 treaty provided for additional arms and equipment, including 50 armored personnel carriers, 30 76-millimeter guns, 30 antitank guns, 50 portable missile launchers, 2,000 AK-47s rifles, and mortars. What also worried U.S. policymakers caught in the East-West geopolitical prism was that Grenada was simultaneously enjoying extensive military and political contacts with Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam, Czechoslovakia, and other communist countries (U.S. Depts. of State and Defense 1984; Adkin 1989; Payne 1991).

The genesis of all these geopolitical considerations predated the 1980s. Yet that decade was marked by a U.S. Caribbean policy as dramatic as it was different from earlier ones. A significant reason was that the

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1. Robert Pastor refers to a meeting he had with Fidel Castro in January 1992 in which Castro indicated that “the Soviets opposed all our support for revolution in Latin America” (Pastor 1992, 223).
election in 1980 of Ronald Reagan to the White House heralded a different direction in foreign and security policy: harsh anticommunism accompanied by a willingness to use force without much compunction and an unapologetic pursuit of U.S. preeminence in global political, economic, and military affairs. The policy that the Reagan administration fashioned toward the Caribbean was designed to fit what former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General David Jones called “a comprehensive strategic vision that integrates regional issues within a larger global framework” (Tiryakian 1984, 50). Thus unlike President Jimmy Carter, who was at first more accommodating to leftist regimes in the Caribbean, Reagan made it obvious from the outset that he favored regimes that supported U.S. foreign policy, opposed Cuba and the Soviet Union, and endorsed free enterprise. He therefore made no apologies for rewarding those who supported U.S. interests and complied with its dictates or for punishing those who did otherwise.

In addition, whereas the Carter administration had given initial priority to multilateral relations, Reagan displayed from the beginning a preference for bilateral dealings that enabled the United States to exercise more leverage (apart from the Caribbean Basin Initiative, or CBI). Although the Carter administration was increasingly concerned about developments in Nicaragua, Grenada, and elsewhere in the region and committed additional resources to deal with them, its representatives generally respected the sovereignty of Caribbean states. The Reagan administration, in contrast, was fully prepared to violate any country’s political and territorial sovereignty if such a course was considered politically expedient or militarily necessary (Tiryakian 1984; Black 1985; Lownenthal 1986; Hudson 1989; Maingot 1990; Searwar 1992; Serbin 1990).

**Militarization**

Concern over militarization pertained to the dramatic growth of military budgets and the expansion of military and police forces in some parts of the Caribbean. Moreover, military officials in some cases were increasingly visible and influential in making and executing policy. This kind of militarization was particularly true of Suriname, Guyana, Grenada, Nicaragua, and Haiti. In Suriname and Haiti, the militarization fit the definition outlined by Samuel Finer: “the armed forces’ substitution of their own policies and/or their persons for those of recognized civilian authorities” (Finer 1988, 20).

In other cases, the situation involved civilian rulers garnering loyalty and obedience by penetrating the armed forces with political ideas and political personnel, an approach described by Eric Nordlinger (1977). Armies became practically arms of the ruling parties and were compensated with accretions of money, equipment, and personnel. This method
was precisely the one used in Guyana and the Dominican Republic (Danns 1982, 1986; Mariñez 1991). In Guyana especially, the security establishment performed not only military functions but duties in the realms of political, economic, and (later) diplomatic security (Griffith 1991).

Security consciousness heightened in the Eastern Caribbean in the aftermath of several internal and external developments: invasion scares in 1976, 1978, and 1979 in Barbados; a rebellion in St. Vincent and the Grenadines in 1979; the removal of Eric Gairy in Grenada that same year; and several coup attempts in Dominica in 1981. These events led to several security initiatives. One was enunciation of the “Adams Doctrine,” a proposition made by Tom Adams, Prime Minister of Barbados at the time, for establishing a rapid deployment force in the Caribbean to respond to intraregional threats. Adams and Brigadier Rudyard Lewis of the Barbados Defense Force (later also of the Regional Security System) proposed creation of a standing army in the Eastern Caribbean (Black 1985; García Muñiz 1986; Phillips 1986; Manigat 1988; Griffith 1993a).

Cost considerations, U.S. policy, and skepticism on the part of several Caribbean leaders prevented these proposals from being adopted. What emerged instead was the Regional Security System, created in October 1982 by five countries and expanded later to include seven. The memorandum of understanding creating the RSS defined its mandate as dealing with smuggling, search and rescue, and “national and other disasters and threats to national security.” RSS officials believed that the system’s greatest value lay in its potential for low-level deterrence, and they acknowledged that it lacked the capacity to deter or defeat large-scale foreign aggression against any of its members. They likened the RSS to an insurance policy designed to meet low-level intraregional threats, arguing that it would strike a balance between having no security mechanism at all or maintaining a large standing army (RSS 1986).

RSS units were involved in peacekeeping operations in Grenada following the U.S. intervention in October 1983, and some were deployed in Trinidad and Tobago after the attempted coup in July 1990 and in St. Kitts–Nevis in November 1994 following a major prison riot. The RSS has also participated annually in military exercises with U.S., British, and other forces. Although two unsuccessful attempts were made in the mid-1980s to expand its size and mission, the 1990 coup attempt in Trinidad and Tobago gave rise to a third effort, this one led by Barbados (Diederich 1984; G. Lewis 1986; Griffith 1992). Caribbean leaders abandoned the initiative in mid-1994, however.

Many scholars perceived linkages between geopolitics and militarization. Some argued that a certain symbiosis existed between the two in

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2. The first five members were Antigua-Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. St. Kitts–Nevis joined the RSS in 1984 and Grenada in 1985.
that Caribbean militarization was partly a function of the geopolitical environment, especially U.S. security policy. A groundbreaking book on militarization substantiated connections between the two themes (Young and Phillips 1986). Other scholars, however, disputed the militarization argument. Anthony Maingot, for example, called the claims of militarization a myth (Maingot 1989, 73–79; 1990, 246–49). He argued that "the most important security-related activities in the Caribbean do not directly involve the governments of the area. . . . There has not been, in fact, a major military build-up in the English-speaking Caribbean" (Maingot 1989, 246, 249).

This dispute was essentially definitional. Maingot did not accept the expanded U.S. military presence as a manifestation of militarization. In his view, militarization is a state-level phenomenon that "denotes and connotes the perversion of civilian structures by a comprehensive emphasis on power by the military" (Maingot 1989, 246; 1990, 74). Yet earlier discussion suggests that examining militarization as a systemic phenomenon is just as credible and intellectually useful as examining it as a state-level one, as shown by several scholars (Wolpin 1972; Mehta 1985; Varas 1985).

**Intervention**

Intervention became a major security theme in the 1980s not because of numerous interventions in the Caribbean Basin but because of the power asymmetries of the states involved, ideological overtones, and the justification proffered by the intervener in one case. Most of the interventions were undertaken by the United States, although other countries took action on several occasions, as in the Honduran incursions into Nicaragua. These incursions led Nicaragua to take legal action against Honduras in the International Court of Justice (ICJ). But after discontinuation of the action by Nicaragua, the case (Nicaragua v. Honduras on Border and Transborder Armed Actions) was removed from the ICJ docket on 27 May 1992. The two countries agreed to work on improving bilateral relations (*UN Chronicle* 1992).

The most dramatic interventions were the U.S. invasions of Grenada in October 1983 and Panama in December 1989. Both events dramatized the power asymmetries of the states involved, but the Grenada action made it clear that the United States was prepared to act with impunity when the threat was perceived to be a communist-centered one within U.S. strategic space. The Grenada intervention also involved controversy about the role of Barbados, Jamaica, and other Caribbean countries in the action. Mark Adkin, a retired British army officer involved in the intervention on the RSS side, provided incontrovertible evidence that the invitation of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) to the United States was a Washington construct designed to justify U.S.
action (Adkin 1989). Some Caribbean leaders argued nonetheless that their support for U.S. action and participation in the affair were based on their own conscious decisions, not on compulsion by the United States (V. Lewis 1991).

The Panama intervention was the first one in Latin America since World War II that was not rationalized in terms of communism. U.S. President George Bush justified “Operation Just Cause” on four grounds: addressing the need to protect the lives of U.S. citizens; helping restore democracy in Panama; preserving the integrity of the Panama Canal Treaty; and bringing Manuel Noriega to justice for drug trafficking and racketeering. The drug rationale in particular demonstrates the changing nature of the U.S. national security agenda. Bush claimed vindication after Noriega was convicted on eight counts of drug trafficking, money laundering, and racketeering and was sentenced in July 1992 to forty years in prison.

Part of the intervention theme of the 1980s also arose from U.S. action in Nicaragua, which differed in being covert, a form of clandestine intervention. That covert action can be traced to November 1981, when President Reagan signed National Security Directive Number 17 authorizing nineteen and a half million dollars in funding for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to create a paramilitary commando squad to conduct raids in Nicaragua.

Covert warfare was unofficially declared in March 1982, when CIA-trained and -equipped operatives destroyed two major bridges in the provinces of Chinandega and Nueva Segovia. The CIA later provided the Contras with a manual on low-intensity warfare strategy entitled “Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare.” Between September 1983 and April 1984, the CIA itself undertook missions considered too sophisticated for the Contras, including twenty-two air, land, and sea raids. Mining of Nicaraguan harbors was also a central part of the anti-Sandinista operation. By the first week of April 1984, ten commercial vessels had collided with mines (Kornbluh 1987).

The United States was castigated by many countries for these actions and was also repudiated by the International Court of Justice. But as is well known, the United States denied the jurisdiction of the ICJ shortly before the court announced its decision, ignoring the ICJ ruling requiring the United States to pay reparations and refrain from any other interventionist activity. Following the political changes resulting from the Sandinistas’ defeat in the 1990 elections, the consequent ideological changes,

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and rapprochement between the United States and Nicaragua, the matter was discontinued.⁵

Instability

The Caribbean scene in the 1980s featured a significant amount of internal instability precipitated by various factors: coups and coup attempts, insurgencies, ideological disputes, political factionalism, and disputed political legitimacy, among others. Several countries were affected to varying degrees by one or multiple factors. The noteworthy cases were Cuba, Haiti, Suriname, Jamaica, Guyana, Grenada, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic. Political roller coasters continue to lurch along in Cuba, Haiti, and Suriname (Maingot 1986–1987; Sedoc-Dahlberg 1986, 1990; MacDonald 1988a; Griffith 1991; Heine 1991; Mars 1992).

But by the end of the 1980s, the manifestations (if not the root causes) of political instability had been addressed in several places, among them Grenada and Nicaragua. These changes contributed to an appreciable improvement in the regional political landscape to the point that Aaron Segal could assert that in the Caribbean, opposition political parties win elections and take office, the courts retain their independence, the press is privately owned and relatively free, civil liberties are recognized and respected, and dissent is tolerated. Segal continued, “Although there are exceptions, there is an active civil society that protests, dissents, takes its cases to the courts, contests free elections, and provides an effective opposition” (Segal 1991, 107).

Other concerns also manifested themselves in the 1980s. One example was an increase in drug production and trafficking as well as the corruption and attendant problems that ensue. Cuba, the Bahamas, Belize, Jamaica, Antigua-Barbuda, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago faced the greatest drug-related challenges. Territorial disputes between Belize and Guatemala, between Guyana and Venezuela, and between Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago also generated several crises. In the Belize-Guatemala case, the dispute caused Great Britain to establish a military garrison to guarantee Belizean territorial and political sovereignty. Yet by the end of the 1980s, all the contending parties had taken steps either to lessen tensions through confidence-building measures or to resolve their disputes altogether. In the dispute between Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago, for instance, a maritime treaty signed in April 1990 effectively settled the matter. In the Belize-Guatemala case, although Guatemala did not renounce its claim, it recognized the sovereignty of Belize in August

1991, and the two countries established diplomatic relations the following month.

THE REST OF THE 1990s AND BEYOND

Consideration of the security issues likely to command attention of Caribbean scholars and statesmen into the twenty-first century must be prefaced by discussing two sets of issues that will influence the nature of the security agenda and how it will be analyzed. The first set of issues is conceptual and theoretical, while the second relates to mediating factors or agents of change.

Beyond “High Politics”

Scholars undoubtedly will continue to use different theoretical perspectives and methodological approaches in analyzing Caribbean security dilemmas. But perhaps more than ever before, they will be obliged to work with a conceptualization of security that extends beyond the narrow definition of the term that dominated security studies until the early 1980s.

The earlier conceptualization emphasized military and political aspects of security, focused on the state as the unit of analysis, and viewed security as “high politics”—power-based, state-centered, and oriented toward the international arena. The theoretical foundation of this perspective is found in traditional realism, which stresses the competitive nature of relations among states and considers war a legitimate means of resolving conflicts. Traditional realism holds that states are rational actors pursuing their own national interests. Employing a historical perspective, traditional realism views military and economic power capabilities as taking precedence over matters like ideology and leadership (Morgenthau 1985; Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1990).

Conventional wisdom now asserts that security goes beyond “high politics.” Economic questions have been given new emphasis, and the concept of “security” now incorporates environmental aspects, with most analysts stressing linkages between security and development. This conceptualization of security also posits that internal security issues are important in their own right and that they complicate (and sometimes aggravate) external problems. Moreover, the distinction between internal issues and external ones is often blurred. The nature of threats to states and societies in the contemporary world has required reconfiguring analytical models used to examine security questions, although without completely rejecting realism (Azar and Moon 1984; Commonwealth Study Group 1985; Rothstein 1986; Mische 1989; Buzan 1991; Rupesinghe 1992; Harding 1994). As Richard Falk remarked, “To challenge the centrality of
realism does not imply its total repudiation. States do remain important actors, war does remain profoundly relevant to international relations, and many international settings can be better understood as collisions of interests and antagonistic political forces” (Falk 1991, 10).6

This reconceptualization of security has been dictated by the changing domestic realities in many places but also by alterations in the international system. Buzan has explained that because of the nuclear paralysis imposed on the “rational use” of force among great powers, political and societal issues have become more prominent. He notes, “As the military security agenda has become more static, those for economics and the ecology have become more dynamic and more central to day-to-day concerns” (Buzan 1991, 133). Moreover, Theodore Sorensen’s list of points that the United States needs to recognize more clearly is even truer for Caribbean and other small countries with many deficiencies in resources: that nonmilitary developments can pose genuine threats to long-term security and citizens’ quality of life; that traditional concepts of national sovereignty cannot cope with torrential transborder flows of narcotics, money, AIDS and other diseases, arms, and immigrants; that no single country can combat these types of threats alone; and that new regional and international rules and institutions will be needed to combat the nonmilitary threats facing most countries (Sorensen 1992, 29).7

The nature of the security challenges facing the Caribbean makes it imperative that scholars go beyond single disciplinary boundaries and adopt an interdisciplinary approach because meaningful examination of the region’s security situation requires drawing on several fields of study, including economics, political science, history, psychology, sociology, geography, and environmental science. My hope is that the rest of the 1990s will be used as a “gestation period” when scholars with primary interests in these fields can offer the fruits of their individual and collective endeavors to deliver Caribbean security studies as “a healthy interdisciplinary infant” (see Griffith, ed., 1991).

6. As I have explained elsewhere (Griffith 1993a, 1993–1994), for me security involves protection and preservation of a people’s freedom from military attack and coercion, freedom from internal subversion, and freedom from the erosion of cherished political, economic, and social values. This conception of security is multidimensional, with military, political, economic, and environmental aspects. Security is both relative and relational.
7. Professional military officers in many parts of the world have generally opposed this reconceptualization of security. Yet public statements by some and opinions expressed in conversation with some officers from throughout the Americas at the meeting of OAS experts on security confidence-building in Argentina in March 1994 suggest a growing acceptance of this redefinition. This point was confirmed in my interviews with Brigadier Joseph Singh, Chief of Staff of the Guyana Defense Force, June 1994, Guyana; with Navy Captain Richard Kelshall, Acting Chief of the Defense Staff, Trinidad and Tobago Defense Force (he is now Trinidad’s Military Attaché in London), July 1994, Trinidad; and with Rear Admiral Peter Brady, Chief of Staff of the Jamaica Defense Force, December 1994, Jamaica. For examples in print, see Robert P. Walzer, “General Joulwan Stresses the Role of the Southern Command,” San Juan Star, 7 July 1993, pp. 2, 6; and Harding (1994).
Security studies have long been both theoretical and policy-oriented (see Nye and Jones 1988; Walt 1991; Dietrich 1993). This duality has been true of studies of Caribbean security, although with less attention to the theoretical side (exceptions being Ronfeldt 1983; Pérez 1987; Searwar 1987; Greene 1990; and Laguerre 1993). The duality will no doubt continue into the next century, as Caribbean scholars are challenged to consider how empiricism and theory-construction could enhance practical and relevant policy design and implementation. While Caribbeans will no doubt continue compiling case studies and anthologies, the importance of comprehensive single-author studies (like García Muñiz 1988; Griffith 1993a; and Morris 1994) is increasingly recognized and will probably continue in years to come. It is also to be hoped that more attention will be devoted to quantitative work (like DeRouen 1992).

The lack of access to certain research material thwarted some scholars during the 1980s and earlier by hindering meaningful data collection and analysis on certain questions. This drawback pertained especially to primary sources owned or produced by some military institutions or security-related agencies that often invoked “national security” to enshroud their activities and withhold material that was a legitimate part of the public domain. Dealing with some of these agencies frustrated many scholars and often produced comical kinds of responses or barriers from some officials.

Most analysts of Caribbean security would accept the idea that secrecy is part of the culture of the military, partly because of the nature of the work the armed forces perform. It is also understandable that, given the political histories of some Caribbean countries, some security agencies are extremely cautious about what kinds of information they release. But often denial of access arises from vendettas against certain scholars and journalists or from the whims of officials who fail to appreciate the potential benefit of good working relationships with academics and journalists, even if merely for the institutional self-interest of the military.

Security agencies have a right to withhold or delay the release of material that risks compromising their work or the security of the nation itself. But it becomes ludicrous to have almost everything deemed “classified,” especially when much of the time writers seek information with potentially benign consequences. The irony is that many Caribbean schol-

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8. An excellent recent example of an anthology is El Caribe en la post-guerra fría (Rodríguez Beruff and García Muñiz 1994).
9. Michel Laguerre recalls extensive assistance and cooperation by military officers in Haiti when he was researching and writing The Military and Society in Haiti (see Laguerre 1993, 7–8). This welcome change is one that I hope will become normative behavior throughout the Caribbean. I am pleased to note that my ongoing research on the security implications of drugs reveals evidence of this change.
ars turn instead to U.S., British, and other sources and get the desired material and sometimes more. Data from non-Caribbean sources sometimes differ from the reality in the Caribbean because of data collection problems, methodological errors, and biases of analysts. At times data are patently incorrect. These situations present researchers with dilemmas involving questions of methodological soundness and academic integrity because of the possibility that analysis and conclusions may be based on “false data.” The implications are all the worse if the work being undertaken is policy-oriented.

Notwithstanding the problems with data sources in some security agencies, security analysts can still pursue their research agendas meaningfully, partly because of alternative primary and secondary source material. Knowledge about this material and its availability is aided immensely by bibliographies. An excellent bibliography was published in 1992 by two researchers at the Institute of Caribbean Studies at the University of Puerto Rico. *Bibliografía Militar del Caribe* is comprehensive, well-organized, and deals with the English-, Spanish-, French-, and Dutch-speaking parts of the Caribbean (García Muñiz and Vélez Natal 1992). Every scholar researching military and political security issues should secure a copy.

*Agents of Change*

Several international and regional factors in the late 1980s and early 1990s have precipitated changes suggesting that the Caribbean security agenda for the rest of the 1990s and into the new century will differ somewhat from that of the 1980s. The most significant international development has been the end of the cold war (Kemp 1990; Nye 1992). One implication of this development for the Caribbean is that U.S. policy and action toward the area will be free of the previous East-West ideological cloud, thereby altering the character of U.S. relations with Caribbean countries. Castro’s adamant pursuit of communism will mean that communism in the region will continue to worry Washington, but not to the degree that it did previously.10

As one recent study has shown (Morris 1994), the end of the cold war does not detract from the strategic value of the Caribbean. As already discussed, its strategic significance is reflected in economic, geographic, and communications attributes that have transcended East-West geopolitics, even though they were affected by it during the cold war. Thus it may be realistic to expect that U.S. militarization of the region, having been predicated on East-West national security considerations,

10. Pastor commented, “Without the Soviet Union, Cuba is an irritation, not a threat” (1992, 273). This statement caused me to ask myself (again), was Cuba ever really a credible threat?
will be reduced further. Moreover, there is reason to believe that both the propensity to intervene unilaterally and the raison d’être for intervention will be altered. Any intervention, whether by the United States or other hemispheric states, is likely to be intervention sans ideology, rationalized on humanitarian grounds.

While reasons exist for optimism about potential benefits of the end of the cold war, concern has been expressed that this ending might cause renewed neglect of the Caribbean and its being given the cold shoulder once again. Political pressures within the United States for more attention to the "domestic agenda" (especially the huge budget deficit) as well as competition for attention by regions such as the Balkans and the Middle East are likely to relegate the Caribbean to a lower level on the scale of priorities, with attendant consequences for relations regarding trade and aid.

An ominous example was the admission by U.S. AID Deputy Administrator Mark Edelman that the United States slashed twenty million dollars from the 1990 aid package for Jamaica in order to augment the sum earmarked for Poland. 11 Although the sum of money involved is only a small fraction of U.S. aid appropriations, the symbolism is tremendous. Moreover, in May 1993, Robert Gelbard, then Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, reported during a hearing held by the U.S. House Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs that the Clinton administration proposed to cut 1994 economic support funds for Latin America and the Caribbean by seventy-seven million dollars. Military assistance was to be slashed by seven million. 12 Further, the Department of State explained in May 1994 that it planned to close embassies in Antigua-Barbuda and Grenada partly because of the strategic insignificance of those countries and partly "to shift resources to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union." 13 Thus there is more than a little validity in Mark Rosenberg’s statement that "the Caribbean runs an acute risk of irrelevance" if it does not adapt to the changing international environment (Rosenberg 1993, 9).

As might be expected, the East-West military and political fixation of the United States during the 1980s influenced its multilateral dealings as well as its bilateral relations. During the 1980s, some Caribbean countries suffered the consequences of U.S. displeasure while others secured

the benefits of its approval through institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), and the World Bank, along with the Caribbean Basin Initiative. The end of the cold war should now lead to changes in U.S. attitudes toward these areas. Optimism in this respect is such that in its 1992 report, the Inter-American Dialogue declared: “We cannot recall a time when the opportunities for constructive and sustained cooperation among Western Hemisphere nations have been greater . . . or when the potential payoffs from such cooperation have been larger. The Cold War is over and U.S. policy toward Latin America is no longer shaped and constrained by a preoccupation with security matters” (Inter-American Dialogue 1992, v).

Part of the initial optimism related to political reconfiguration within the United States, notably recapture of the presidency by the Democratic Party in 1992. It was expected that President Bill Clinton would set a new direction in foreign policy toward the region that would differ dramatically from the previous twelve years under Republican administrations. Clinton himself gave that impression during the presidential campaign. But as is too often the case, election campaign promises are not always honored—for whatever reason. And in the foreign policy arena, the political and business elites who define “the national interest” often subordinate party affiliation to other considerations.

Hence, contrary to the impression of a marked new direction that the candidate gave in the hustings, Clinton the candidate has become a captive of bureaucratic, party, and interest-group politics, all of which favor continuity over change in U.S. dealings with the Caribbean. The most dramatic evidence is Clinton’s flip-flop on the Haitian immigration issue. During the campaign, he differed clearly with George Bush, but even before his inauguration, he reneged on his pledge of a lenient policy, declaring his intention to stay the course set by the outgoing president.

Thus although important foreign policy nuances have been achieved by the Clinton administration in relation to the Caribbean, no appreciable change has been made in the general thrust of foreign policy outside the international context noted. Joseph Tulchin characterized the expected continuity in this way: “[T]he fact of the matter is that policy toward the Caribbean is, and is likely to continue to be, an exercise in crisis management in which the pressure of domestic politics plays a critical role” (Tulchin 1994, 186). The domestic agenda will certainly become manifest now that the Republican Party has secured landslide congressional and gubernatorial victories in the fall 1994 elections.

A second international development with probable consequences for the Caribbean is the creation of economic blocs. During the 1980s, European countries consolidated their efforts at economic integration. The European Community now boasts a unified market of 320 million
consumers in an economy larger than that of the United States and twice that of Japan. In Asia, ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) agreed in January 1992 to create a free-trade area as a step toward establishing a common market. The early 1990s also witnessed considerable movement toward formation of a free-trade area in North America in the linking of Canada, Mexico, and the United States through the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). It created the world’s largest market, with annual production of more than six trillion dollars and some 370 million consumers. Although each NAFTA country expects to benefit from the arrangement, the U.S. International Trade Commission anticipates that considerable benefits will accrue to the United States, especially from the deal with Mexico, including expanded trade opportunities, lower prices, and more opportunities to exploit economies of scale (Griffith 1993b; Wilson 1992).

A probable consequence of this megabloc phenomenon for the future economic security of Caribbean countries is the reduction or even loss of economic assistance, foreign investment, and preferential trading arrangements. Concerning NAFTA, for instance, Caribbean observers fear that the anticipated increase in trade resulting from the removal of trade barriers in Mexico will help displace U.S. trade with Caribbean countries and reduce the benefits of tariff preferences under schemes like the Caribbean Basin Initiative, the General System of Preferences, and Section 936 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code (D. Lewis 1991; Hutchinson and Schumacher 1994).14

David Lewis has suggested that NAFTA, in implementing U.S.-Mexico free trade without providing for the status of CBI benefits, would adversely affect the interests of the CBI beneficiary countries. He argues, “The damage would be in reducing the preferential advantage of Caribbean and Central American countries in direct competition with Mexico over export markets and attraction of investors” (D. Lewis 1991, 104). Another study found that Mexico’s preferential access to the U.S. market threatens to frustrate efforts by Caribbean Basin countries to develop competitive exports in non-resource-based products, which the Caribbean Basin Initiative tried to promote in part to stimulate modernization and growth in the region (Hutchinson and Schumacher 1994).

At the regional level, the democratic winds of change that began sweeping the hemisphere in the 1980s will certainly affect the security agenda. Several political and institutional contributions were made to the democratic wave in the hemisphere, particularly efforts by the Organization of American States (OAS). For example, in 1985 the OAS incorporated the Cartagena Protocol into its charter, marking a turning point in

the organization's role in democratic governance. The protocol proclaimed promotion of democracy as one of the OAS charter's "essential purposes" and identified the principle that the effective exercise of representative democracy should be the basis for the political organization of states in the hemisphere.

OAS efforts to preserve and promote democracy were given a fillip in 1990 when the OAS Permanent Council voted to create the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy to give advice and assistance to countries where democracy or institutions needed to sustain it are at risk. The following year, the OAS General Assembly adopted Resolution 1080, which established a mechanism for dealing with any "sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process or the legitimate exercise of power by the democratically elected government" of any OAS member country.15 But the OAS failed to act when put to the test on some of these initiatives in regard to Haiti.

This consolidation of democracy will affect the nature and amount of instability that states experience and decisions they make on militarization. In Guyana, for instance, the successors to Forbes Burnham ended the country's militarization. They also took steps to democratize their rule by lifting press controls, ending the harassment of critics, and restoring electoral democracy. The immediate result was that in the October 1992 elections, Hugh Desmond Hoyte and the People National Congress (PNC) lost power to Cheddie Jagan and the People's Progressive Party-Civic (Brana-Shute 1993). Hoyte had been president only since 1985, but PNC rule dated back to 1964.

Other electoral changes in the early 1990s may well influence the nature and amount of instability in the near future: the February 1990 election of Violeta Chamorro in Nicaragua; the December 1991 election of Patrick Manning in Trinidad and Tobago; the August 1992 election of Hubert Ingraham in the Bahamas, in which Lynden Pinding was removed after twenty-five years in power; and the March 1994 elections in Antigua-Barbuda, in which Lester Bird succeeded his father, eighty-four-year-old Vere Bird, Sr. All these election results should augur well for future stability. At the least, most of these changes should infuse the respective political systems with a new political confidence that could facilitate the kind of political authority and legitimacy that promote stability. But electoral democracy is not the sole basis for stability. There is also an economic dimension, and a stark reality is that many Caribbean


countries experienced a relative economic decline during the 1980s. Part of the problem has been the high debt burden that most countries are carrying, as will be discussed further.

In light of all these considerations, what kind of security agenda might accompany the Caribbean into the next century? My discussion is intended to be suggestive rather than extensive or definitive.

**Agenda Items**

Although it is impossible to foresee all the security issues that will confront the region in the near or medium term, the factors just mentioned suggest some fairly obvious ones. Given the size and the geographic, military, and economic characteristics and limitations of Caribbean countries, vulnerability will continue to be an overarching concern. Other core concerns may well be drugs, instability, and the environment.17

*Drugs / Drug* issues are likely to be at the top of the agenda. Four main problem areas can be singled out: production, consumption and abuse, trafficking, and money laundering. These dimensions have security consequences that include corruption, arms trafficking, and an adverse effect on tourism, the economic mainstay of several Caribbean countries. Just a few highlights of narcotics operations suggest how drugs will come to dominate the security agenda: in the 1980s, marijuana reportedly contributed between one and two billion dollars to Jamaica's foreign exchange earnings, more than the country's combined earnings from bauxite, sugar, and tourism. In Trinidad and Tobago, hospital admissions of cocaine and marijuana addicts tripled from 376 in 1983 to 1,041 in 1989. A 1990 inquiry uncovered a scheme in which the Antigua and Barbuda Defense Force was used by the Colombian Medellín cartel as a front for buying Israeli weapons. In March 1991, 311 banking licenses were revoked in Montserrat following investigations into money laundering there. In May 1992, joint army-police operations in eastern Guyana discovered and destroyed 800,000 pounds of marijuana, and in July 1992, police in Trinidad and Tobago seized 26.5 kilos of cocaine, following transshipment from Venezuela. In September 1992, a Barbadian national was caught trying to board a flight out of Guyana to the United States with twenty pounds of cocaine worth more than twelve million dollars; and the following January, police in St. Vincent and the Grenadines seized more than a ton of cocaine in a raid just outside the capital city of Kingstown. In June 1994, Trinidad and Tobago experienced the country's biggest cocaine

17. A fourth possible agenda item is migration, which has implications for both instability and environment.
seizure ever: 226 kilos of cocaine worth eighteen million dollars, captured near Monos Island, off the northern coast.

Thus it can be seen that drug operations are increasing in scope in almost every country in the region. Belize, Jamaica, the Bahamas, and Suriname are no longer the only countries critically affected. To paraphrase Guyanese poet Martin Carter, “All are involved, all are consumed.” Haiti, for example, is being used by Colombian traffickers as a base and transit point. Its convenient location, numerous uncontrolled airstrips, and corruption among law-enforcement officials make Haiti a desirable locus of operations. The scope of the problem in the Dominican Republic is reflected in the following facts: in 1993 the National Anti-Drug Directorate and the navy seized 1,073 kilograms of cocaine, 305 kilograms of marijuana, and 1,444 grams of crack; they also confiscated 183 vessels, 222 motorcycles, and 164 firearms in 812 counternarcotics operations in which 5,635 people were arrested.

Evidence also points to Cuban involvement in narcotics operations, although the full extent is unknown. The Cuban government itself has acknowledged the existence of serious problems. In April 1992, Cuba joined with Venezuela to form the Joint Commission on Drug Trafficking and Abuse and participated in establishing of the Latin American Inter-Parliamentary Group for the Prevention of Drug Abuse. Cuba and Venezuela also signed counternarcotics agreements with Jamaica and Guyana in 1993. It should also be noted that Caribbean countries are vulnerable to more than the intrusions of drug barons. These countries’ sovereign independence is often violated by the United States in its attempts to confront its own drug problems. This is especially true for the microstates in the region. Thus drug problems undermine the safety and governability of the states involved while exacerbating other problems (Blom-Cooper 1990; Maingot 1988; MacDonald 1988b; Sanders 1990; Griffith 1993c, 1994, 1995).

Caribbean leaders are well aware of the gravity of the drug problems. Manuel Esquivel, Prime Minister of Belize, once declared drugs a greater threat to his country’s security than the territorial claims by Guatemala. The final report of the West Indian Commission, formed in 1989 to help chart a course for the English-speaking Caribbean, warned: “Nothing poses greater threats to civil society in CARICOM countries than the drug problem; and nothing exemplifies the powerless of regional governments more” (West Indian Commission 1992, 343). Moreover, the situation is worsening throughout the Americas and beyond (see Griffith 1993–1994). In March 1994, the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD) held its fifteenth regular session in Mar del Plata, Argentina, and lamented: “Despite all the efforts undertaken to date at the national and regional level, the problems related to the production, processing, trafficking, and the use of narcotic drugs and psychotropic sub-

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stances have not only persisted but spread dangerously." Security specialists will therefore be obliged to examine the reasons for this spread and recommend realistic countermeasures to deal with these operations and the problems they precipitate.

Instability / Earlier discussion suggested that pockets of internal instability will remain part of the regional political landscape into the next century. The specter lurks in Suriname, but critical focus may shift to Cuba and Haiti.

The collapse of communism worldwide has aggravated the economic crisis within Cuba and increased political disenchantment with Castro’s rule (Pérez-Lópe 1991; Basdeo 1992; Schulz 1993). Clear indications highlight an acute socioeconomic crisis in Cuba: contraction of the economy, with exports shrinking from 8.1 billion dollars in 1989 to 2.2 billion in 1992; a decline in gross national product ranging from 34 to 51 percent during the same period; a decline in milk production of 45 percent; high costs of oil and wheat imports; reduced importation of fertilizers, chemicals, herbicides, and animal feed, resulting in reductions in food programs; uncontrollable power outages; abandonment of many capital (and showpiece) projects, including the Cienfuegos oil refinery and the Punta Gorda nickel plant; and the replacement of tractors and combines with oxen in agricultural operations (Basdeo 1992; Schulz 1993).

But as Clifford Griffin has indicated in a perspective shared by other Cuba watchers, the expectation of public disruption leading to Fidel Castro’s imminent political demise represents “the triumph of wishful thinking over detached analysis” (Griffin 1992, 25). According to many Cuba specialists, mass uprising is improbable for many reasons: an extensive and efficient security apparatus; the absence of meaningful opportunities to articulate and organize opposition; harsh treatment of dissidents; the absence of institutional sanctuaries like the Catholic Church; and the absence of charismatic dissident leaders. A variety of other factors suggest the unlikelihood of a revolution from above (see Shultz 1993, esp. 97–106). Moreover, U.S. policy toward Cuba, which was designed to end communism and secure Castro’s demise, is actually bolstering the regime in many respects. As Jorge Domínguez said, “The United States has been a staunch enemy of Fidel Castro, but with an enemy like this one, he may not need friends” (Domínguez 1993, 107).

More probable are serious political undercurrents arising from the economic contingencies that Castro has helped create. Such a develop-

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19. These very factors explain why the freedom riots of 5 August 1994 failed to pose any serious threat to Castro’s regime.
ment portends some degree of instability. It seems reasonable to believe arguments about Castro's survival, at least in the short term. But more important is this question: what will become of Cuba once Castro passes from the scene? Especially if his passage from power is accompanied by violence, the crisis following Castro's departure will involve not just changes in leadership styles but systemic and institutional adaptations that will surely cause internal instability. An important task will be mitigating the impact of these major changes on the "new" Cuban society.

In the case of Haiti, the ongoing saga dramatizes the reality that "Haiti might be small and impoverished, but its politics are invariably complex and intractable" (Maingot 1994, 2). Its complexity and intractability are all the greater because the Haitian matrix includes elements outside the country's territorial and political territory, among them U.S. domestic politics and foreign policy, the OAS, and the United Nations. As Ken Boodhoo has shown, Haiti presents a multidimensional dilemma for Haitians remaining in their home country, those scattered in the diaspora, and those living in the international community (Boodhoo 1994).20

September 1994 witnessed a multilateral humanitarian intervention that led the following month to Jean-Bertrand Aristide's restoration to power. But this action—a first in the hemisphere—has not stopped the twists and turns of the Haitian political roller coaster. Given the acute shortage of economic and political assets, the critical tasks of building economic as well as political democracy may well generate a cycle involving high expectations, frustration, and aggression. Even if Haiti does not continue to dominate the evening news, political and economic undercurrents are likely to create varying degrees of instability.

What appear to be problems of political security often have economic underpinnings. Conversely, economic security issues can go beyond latent economic consequences to precipitate political and military problems. One economic issue that will continue to threaten the economic security (and thus potentially the political and military security) of Caribbean countries is the debt burden. The 1991 edition of World Economic Data listed 9 billion (U.S.) dollars in foreign debt for Cuba, with Haiti's being

20. President Aristide's outrage at the Clinton administration's lack of concerted action to aid his restoration led him to charge that Clinton's policy on Haiti was racist. See "Aristide Condemns Clinton's Haiti Policy as Racist," The New York Times, 22 Apr. 1994, pp. A-1, A-6. This statement, buttressed by U.S. Congressional pressure and intense lobbying by groups like TransAfrica Foundation (whose head, Randall Robinson, conducted a twenty-seven-day hunger strike) produced some change in the Clinton administration's position. The administration stopped returning fleeing Haitians and announced a new policy to conduct asylum hearings at sea. See Gwen Ifill, "Clinton Grants Haitian Exiles Hearings at Sea," The New York Times, 8 May 1994, pp. L-1, L-14. Clinton also named William Gray III (a former Democratic Representative and now president of the United Negro College Fund) as his new special adviser on Haiti. Curiously enough, eight days after the new policy was announced, 618 fleeing Haitians were returned to Haiti without a hearing. See Douglas Jehl, "U.S. Sending Back Haitian Refugees," The New York Times, 17 May 1994, pp. A-1, A-7.
775 million. The Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) reported in March 1994 that the 5.5 million people of the English-speaking Caribbean alone carried a debt in 1992 totaling 9.5 billion dollars: Jamaica led with 3.6 billion; Trinidad and Tobago had 2.1 billion; and Guyana had 1.8 billion. Among the independent Anglophone countries, St. Kitts–Nevis had the smallest debt at 37 million dollars. Most of the Anglophone Caribbean debt is owed to bilateral official creditors and to multilateral agencies like the IMF, the World Bank, and the IADB.

Servicing the debts is a major headache because debt ratios are steep. For instance, according to the CDB, in 1992 the ratio of Trinidad and Tobago’s debt service to exports was 30 percent. Guyana’s finance minister told the parliament in his 1992 budget speech, “Scheduled external debt service payments by the public sector range from 50 to 70 percent of merchandise exports in 1991–1993, and are projected to be above one-third of exports in the rest of the decade” (Guyana Parliament 1992, 44).

Fortunately, some Caribbean countries have secured relief from debtors through debt forgiveness and other measures. In 1990, for example, Canada forgave 182 million dollars (Canadian) in debt owed by English-speaking Caribbean countries, and some countries in the region have begun to receive debt relief under the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative (EAI) announced in June 1991 by President George Bush. Nevertheless, coping strategies adopted by Caribbean countries, whether voluntarily or because of IMF or other mandates, could generate social and political discontent. These strategies are often linked to larger efforts to adjust economies structurally and include tax increases, withdrawal of subsidies, privatization, wage freezes, and staff reductions.

Two sets of implications need to be noted here. First, some of these measures—and therefore the overall economic performances of the countries in question and their debt-reduction capacities—will be further affected by some of the mediating factors noted above, such as relative inattention to the Caribbean and consequences of megablocs. Second, in pursuing some of the coping strategies, many governments risk jeopardizing their nations’ stability because of potentially negative reactions by labor, business, and other sectors. Some analysts worry that severe economic pressures threaten not only political stability but the maintenance of democracy in the region (see, for example, Huber 1993, especially 80–87).

Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, Nicaragua, Panama, Barbados, Venezuela, and Jamaica all experienced strikes, riots, demonstrations, vandalism, and arson when austerity measures were introduced in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In Trinidad and Tobago, 31 were killed and 393 wounded in a July 1990 coup attempt with strong economic undercurrents. In Venezuela 300 were killed in spring 1990, and two attempted coups threatened to revisit military rule for the first time in thirty years (Ryan 1991;
It is important to note, however, that discontent in these countries was fueled by factors in addition to austerity measures.

Environment / Anthony Bryan remarked recently, “Not too long ago dismissed as the hobby horse of fringe groups, the environment has shot to the forefront of the international security agenda” (Bryan 1992, 129). This observation is as true for the Caribbean as it is for most other regions. Size, demographic, and economic factors combine to force Caribbean countries to pay increasing attention to the implications of several ecological and environmental issues.

These issues include greater demands on coastal zone management, the fragility of water resources and the risk of contamination, toxic dumping, rain-forest depletion, waste management, population pressures due to space limitations (except in Guyana and Belize), hurricanes, earthquakes, and other natural disasters, and the predicted rise in sea levels due to global warming. Higher sea levels would threaten many islands in the Caribbean Sea as well as mainland Guyana. Four-fifths of Guyana’s population and much of its agriculture are concentrated along the country’s northeastern coast, which is below sea level and is constantly menaced by the Atlantic Ocean (CARICOM 1989; Hamilton 1992; West Indian Commission 1992, 218–19).

Some of these factors threaten the desirable quality of life generally and the economic security of many countries as well, especially in terms of tourism, industry, and agriculture. In the English-speaking Caribbean, for example, agriculture is vital to the economy. Yet in many places, less than one-fifth of all land is suitable for farming. Consequently, attempts are being made to maximize production through extensive use of fertilizers and pesticides. Although this approach has resulted in increased production, it has also injured the health of consumers and the stability of ecosystems.

Caribbean leaders are conscious of these dangers and the need for collective action. Their awareness was demonstrated by well-prepared participation in the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development held in June 1992 in Brazil. Most Caribbean states also signed the Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Convention on Biodiversity. Some are in the forefront of conservation efforts in the hemisphere. Belize, for instance, has a program involving 122,000 acres of tropical forest. Guyana’s Iwokrama project is even larger, with 900,000 acres of tropical Amazonian rain forest dedicated to improving conservation and demonstrating sustainable management techniques (West Indian Commission 1992).22

The West Indian Commission addressed the seriousness of the environment issue in prophetic terms: “There is, perhaps, no greater damage that we face as we look into the twenty-first century than the implications of the crisis of environment and development. It is no comfort that it is a global crisis. Our capacities, the absence of resilience in our economies, the overall vulnerability of our condition: all make it imperative that we come together in the face of these threats. They concern specifically the question of what kind of Caribbean we leave for future generations—those already with us and others to come” (West Indian Commission 1992, 229).

Those skeptical of the gravity of actual and potential environmental threats may have been shocked at the stridency of collective condemnation by Caribbean governments in 1992 of the plan to ship plutonium through the region. The one-ton plutonium cargo was initially to be transported from France to Japan by air but was prevented by U.S. objections. Of the four possible sea routes, the most cost-efficient involved crossing the Atlantic Ocean, passing through the Mona Passage between the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico, crossing the Caribbean Sea to the Panama Canal for transit into the Pacific Ocean, and thence to Japan.

Given the nature of plutonium and the damage it can render, Caribbean concerns about the consequences of sabotage of the plutonium convoy or an accident were justifiable. A silvery-white radioactive element made from uranium, plutonium is used to fuel nuclear reactors (the purpose of the 1992 shipment to Japan), to serve as a fissionable material in nuclear weapons, and to produce radioactive isotopes for medicine and industry. One of the deadliest substances known to mankind, plutonium lasts for more than twenty-four thousand years in the environment. One-thirty-thousandth of an ounce is said to be enough to cause cancer if inhaled. Caribbean leaders and analysts therefore worried that any contamination of the Caribbean Sea, deliberate or accidental, would endanger human and marine habitation in the region and permanently injure the quality of life in the area (Chin 1992; Perkovich 1993). Concern has also been expressed over shipment of spent nuclear fuel from Japanese nuclear reactors through the Panama Canal and across the Caribbean Sea. According to Greenpeace, at least five such shipments were made between October 1992 and May 1993.23

CONCLUSION

All three agenda items—drugs, instability, and the environment—have backward and forward linkages as well as domestic, regional, and

international interconnections. For example, drug production and trafficking are partly driven in some places by poor economic conditions, which are caused in part by austerity measures introduced to deal with huge debts. And partly because of their limited economic and other resources, states are obliged to undertake collective countermeasures to curb narcotics operations. Moreover, drug-driven corruption and crime can undermine the political stability of states.

It seems obvious that the Caribbean security agenda for the rest of the 1990s and beyond will be complex and challenging. Although complexity and challenge are not strangers to the region, new domestic, regional, and international realities are presenting different kinds of challenges for the next century— theoretical ones for scholars and practical ones for political leaders. Gone are the days when one could afford to try to interpret the world fully before attempting to change it. Now part of the challenge involves having to guide change while interpreting events and outcomes. How well Caribbeanists help interpret change and contribute to it in the region during the rest of this critical decade will be left for the verdict of scholars in the next decade and beyond.

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