Hungary’s radical right 2.0

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In the digital age, the Internet is an important factor in the emergence and success of political parties and social movements. Despite growing evidence that extremists of all stripes use the virtual world for their purposes, research on this topic still lacks a wide array of empirical data, case studies, and theoretical background. In particular, Facebook, as the most important social networking site, is a new tool for political parties and movements to mobilize followers. The article explores how the extreme-right party Jobbik uses this tool more successfully than other Hungarian parties or Western European extreme-right parties. Comparing the growth in followers highlights this success, and a look at how it generates likes helps to explain it. The article argues that Jobbik uses Facebook in a sophisticated way and suggests that this “likable” attitude helps to attract young and first-time voters.

Keywords: mobilization; radical right; Hungary; social media; Jobbik

Introduction

In recent years, Hungary has witnessed the success of the radical right on various levels. In the political sphere, the radical-right party Jobbik emerged as the second largest party in parliament in the 2014 parliamentary elections. This is remarkable considering that the party was founded only in 2003 and entered parliament for the first time in 2010. Some of its main political goals have been implemented by the governing coalition of Fidesz-Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt (KDNP). It is the most successful radical-right party in Hungary since 1945. This article argues that Jobbik’s unprecedented success is helped by its skillful use of the mobilization potential of Facebook, the leading social networking site in Hungary. It is therefore useful to analyze its use by radical-right political parties and social movements – especially because a “likable” attitude can help to attract young and first-time voters.

After shedding light on the predecessors of Jobbik in Hungary and the terminology, the paper briefly presents the findings of current research on the use of Web 2.0 by social movements in general and Hungary’s radical-right movements in particular. As a measure of Jobbik’s success online, the development of its Facebook fanbase is then compared with those of Magyar Szocialista Párt (MSZP), the main left-wing opposition party, and Fidesz, the right-wing ruling party, as well as the French extreme-right party National Front and the German extreme-right Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschland (NPD). To put these findings into perspective, those numbers are juxtaposed with the number of

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Internet users in the respective countries and the number of voters at the last corresponding elections. The posting behavior of these parties is then scrutinized in order to get a better idea of how online mobilizing might be successful in the case of Jobbik and if it would be appropriate to speak of a Radical Right 2.0 in Hungary.

**Predecessors of Jobbik and terminology**

The current radical right does not exist in a vacuum. Of the radical-right parties that existed before Jobbik in Hungary, the only one to have electoral success after 1989 was MIÉP, led by István Csurka. MIÉP, one of the more extreme far-right parties in Europe (Mudde 2007), was represented in the Hungarian parliament from 1998 to 2002.

Before the Communist era, Hungary was briefly governed by the fascist Arrow Cross party (Nyilaskeresztes Párt) after Nazi Germany’s intervention in 1944. Antisemitic and extremely brutal (Friedlander and Kenan 2010), the Arrow Cross helped the Nazis to organize the extermination of Hungarian Jews in the period from October 1944 until February 1945 (Friedlander and Kenan 2010).

Both these previous radical-right parties had direct or indirect influence on Jobbik. The founders of Jobbik claimed to be inspired by MIÉP (Kovács and Koltay 2003). The Arrow Cross party is not officially cited as an influence, but Jobbik’s use of its symbols, such as the Arpád stripes, is a clear reminder of the Hungarian fascist era (Pandula 2011; Ungváry 2011). Thus, Jobbik’s action and ideology tend to be – at least indirectly – inspired by MIÉP and the Arrow Cross. The constant reference to the past is particularly crucial for radical-right parties in general since national history is usually a key element of their ideology (Minkenberg 1998, 2010; Mudde 2007). However – as this article tries to show – the contemporary far right is more sophisticated in the use of media and technology and thus more interesting for young and first-time voters than other contemporary radical-right parties, which might suggest why it has been more successful than some Hungarian predecessors.

**State of the art and aim of the article**

Research on the radical right in Hungary has been rather prolific in recent years. Research on Jobbik especially has flourished. In analyzing the electoral success of Jobbik, political scientist András Bíró Nagy and others focused primarily on the radicalization of the political process and identified three main components of Jobbik’s campaign: hostility to minorities, a left-wing economic agenda, and cultural conservatism (Bíró Nagy and Róøa 2011; Bíró Nagy, Boros, and Varga 2012; Bíró Nagy, Boros, and Vasali 2013). Mihai Varga has argued that the reasons for Jobbik’s success in 2010 lie in its focus on the economy (2014). Karácsony and Róøa (2011) focused on the Roma issue during the 2010 elections as a motivation for Jobbik’s voters. Csingár (2013) discussed whether or not Jobbik should be labeled extreme right. Other research aims to determine the ideological background of Jobbik. Akcali and Korkut (2012) explained the use of Turanism as a metanarrative that Jobbik incorporates into its sociopolitical concepts. Pytles (2013) worked on politicized historical narratives of the radical right in Slovakia and Hungary and their historical legacies, mythologized reinterpretations, and application to contemporary politics. An appreciation of the importance of the Internet for understanding Jobbik and Hungary’s radical right has also triggered necessary insights in this area (Bakó, Tóth, and Jeskö 2012). Bartlett et al. have specifically researched the Facebook fans of Jobbik (2012a).
This article builds on that foundation and aims to illustrate the Hungarian radical right’s comparative success in using Facebook. To begin, the development of Jobbik’s Facebook fanbase is examined compared with those of the French National Front, the German NPD, the Hungarian MSZP, and the Hungarian Fidesz. The National Front is one of the most electorally successful radical-right parties in Western Europe in the last 30 years. The NPD is, in contrast, one of the least successful. MSZP is the main left-wing opposition party in Hungary. Fidesz is, since 2010, the governing party in Hungary (in coalition with the KDNP). It sits on the borderline between radical right and right-wing conservative (Mudde 2007, 55). The first two of these four parties were chosen as examples of established far-right parties from other countries. MSZP was chosen as the main opposition party besides Jobbik and Fidesz as the governing party and Jobbik’s main ideological competitor in Hungary. In the second step, the number of Facebook fans is briefly compared with the number of Internet users and voters to stress Jobbik’s success. A third step analyzes the posting behavior of these parties in order to better understand how likes were generated. The main point of the article is that for its social media sophistication, Jobbik might better be likened to the new social movements of the digital age or to tech-savvy parties such as the German left-wing Piratenpartei (even though it is no longer successful) than to the traditional radical right or even traditional parties.

Jobbik’s use of social media in comparative perspective

Web 2.0 has changed life fundamentally for many people in the twenty-first century. Gradually through smart phones and higher bandwidth, the use of Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Instagram, YouTube, and so forth have become part of everyday life. At the same time, the digital revolution has changed the way social movements and political actors behave. In the last several years, the Arab Spring, the 2009 rebellion in Iran, the Indignados movement starting in Spain, Occupy, and so on are examples of this new kind of tweeted and social-mediated movement (Castells 2012).

Social movements in the digital age

Manuel Castells argues that networked social movements in the digital age represent a new form of social movement, as interactive communications have facilitated more active involvement and a turn away from hierarchy (2012, 15). In the example of Tunisia, Castells claims that the unfettered communication on social media simultaneous with the occupation of urban space created a new hybrid public space, which was key to the Tunisian revolution and of similar events in other countries (2012, 29). He cites three crucial factors: an active group of jobless academics who led the rebellion, a highly developed culture of cyber activism, and widespread use of the Internet (2012, 29). For Castells, horizontal mass communication networks represent the nucleus of what he calls “network society” in which the new social movements of the twenty-first century develop (Castells 2012, 220). Thus, we live in a “self-constructed network society based on perpetual connectivity” (Castells 2012, 231). To sum up, social media leads to a new quality of social movements through faster, stronger, less hierarchical, and less guidable networks.

Right-wing movements online

Castells has exclusively left-wing, progressive social movements in mind. Yet, in Hungary, the radical right most effectively uses the Internet in general and social media in particular.
Spreading their message through the virtual world is crucial for (right-wing) extremist groups, and researchers early on anticipated the Internet’s use by extremists. One of the first studies in this area was conducted by the Anti-Defamation League, which examined the use of bulletin boards by extremists in the United States (Hoffman 1996). As the online sphere developed so did the research in this field. Burris et al. used hyperlink analysis to explore white supremacist websites in the United States (2000). Elsewhere, Luca Tateo examined the online structure of the Italian radical right through network analysis (2005). Recently, this relatively new field of study has flourished. Most notably, Manuela Caiani and her colleagues have contributed astute works comparing extreme-right online networks in the United States, Italy, Spain, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom (Caiani, Porta, and Wagemann 2012; Caiani and Parenti 2013). How radical-right parties interact through social media, for example, on Twitter (Conway et al. 2013), and who is following them for which reasons on Facebook (Bartlett et al. 2012b) are also more and more part of scientific studies by political scientists, sociologists, or ethnologists.

**Research on Hungary’s radical right 2.0**

With regard to Hungary, studies by Bakó et al. on the radical right online network and from Bartlett et al. on Jobbik’s Facebook friends provide important new revelations. Bakó et al. identified around 300 websites that form the Hungarian radical online network through hyperlink analysis, starting their analysis from www.jobbik.hu, www.barikad.hu, and www.kuruc.info (2012, 87). Within this network, they recognized four sub-networks: (1) news, media, and history sites, (2) music and music band sites, (3) web shops, and (4) political parties and associations (2012, 88). Furthermore, Bakó et al. stressed the massive increase in the size of the online network from 2002 until 2011 (2012, 96).

Bartlett et al.’s study focused on the demographic background and the beliefs of Jobbik’s Facebook fans, using data from a survey of 2263 of them during July and August 2011. Bartlett et al. point out:

> The Jobbik party has been particularly effective at mobilizing young Hungarians, by using online communication and messages to amplify its message, recruit new members and organize. [...] This mélange of virtual and real world political activity is the way millions of people – especially young people – relate to politics in the twenty-first century. (Bartlett et al. 2012a, 13)

When the resulting report was released in January 2012, Jobbik had 37,682 Facebook fans (Bartlett et al. 2012a, 14). The researchers found that they were predominantly male (71%) and under 30 (64%) (2012, 14, 31). A plurality (36%) lived close to Hungary’s capital, Budapest, but nearly as many (34%) lived in rural areas (2012, 32).

**The development of Jobbik’s Facebook fanbase in comparison**

In May 2011, Jobbik’s Facebook fans numbered 27,048, which means that their number had risen 39% by January 2012. Then, by May 2013, they had tripled, to 92,681, and practically tripled again by May 2014, to 276,679, which is an exponential growth. Theoretically, at that rate, they would reach 1 million in 2015. Jobbik’s Facebook support grew at a far faster pace between May 2013 and May 2014 than that of the French National Front, the German NPD, and the Hungarian parties MSZP and Fidesz (see Table 1).

Notably, in May 2013, the National Front had slightly more followers than Jobbik. After May, the trend changed and Jobbik became far more attractive on Facebook than the National Front (as well as obviously MSZP and NPD). Only since May 2014 has the
growth rate of Jobbik’s Facebook followers stagnated and the National Front made up some
ground. This spurt and slowdown (for both Jobbik and MSZP) coincides with the run-up to
and aftermath of Hungary’s most recent parliamentary elections, in April 2014. The abrupt
spike in Fidesz followers in October and December 2013 represents its highest growth rate
during the study period. After December 2013, the party was constantly ahead of MSZP but
constantly behind Jobbik. The most important finding is that Jobbik is not only more
successful than the other Hungarian parties but also highly successful compared with
other European radical-right parties, taking into account the technological opportunities
and the different population of these countries.

This finding is more clearly visible in Table 2, which compares the number of Facebook
fans with the number of Internet users, the ratio of fans to Internet users, and the number of
voters. Jobbik has the highest number of followers and the best Internet user–Facebook fan
ratio despite the fact that the total number of votes it gathered at the latest election (see foot-
notes from Table 2) was overall the second smallest. In order to understand this striking
development better, the next section focuses on how and why those followers are generated
by the different ways the parties use Facebook.

**Posting behavior on Facebook**

To analyze the posting behavior on Facebook, all posts between 1 June 2013 and 1 June
2014 that had more than 1000 likes were categorized. The first date roughly corresponds
to the start of data collection and the second marks the end of one year and roughly the end
of the European Parliament election season. Table 3 provides an overview of which party

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**Table 1. Development of Facebook fans of selected parties between May 2013 and July 2014.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>16.05</th>
<th>16.07</th>
<th>05.10</th>
<th>10.12</th>
<th>24.02</th>
<th>25.03</th>
<th>11.05</th>
<th>10.07</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jobbik</td>
<td>92,681</td>
<td>114,565</td>
<td>130,909</td>
<td>156,637</td>
<td>205,860</td>
<td>247,390</td>
<td>276,679</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSZP</td>
<td>38,299</td>
<td>58,637</td>
<td>65,166</td>
<td>70,060</td>
<td>94,095</td>
<td>120,272</td>
<td>124,745</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fidesz</td>
<td>34,412</td>
<td>35,937</td>
<td>54,089</td>
<td>90,646</td>
<td>127,885</td>
<td>153,200</td>
<td>176,518</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FN</td>
<td>100,289</td>
<td>103,814</td>
<td>107,993</td>
<td>118,591</td>
<td>125,852</td>
<td>132,761</td>
<td>151,587</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPD</td>
<td>34,368</td>
<td>34,000</td>
<td>46,399</td>
<td>53,532</td>
<td>60,110</td>
<td>65,888</td>
<td>81,879</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Table 2. Comparison of the Facebook performance of selected parties.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Jobbik</th>
<th>MSZP</th>
<th>Fidesz</th>
<th>FN</th>
<th>NPD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internet users end of June 2014</td>
<td>7,388,776</td>
<td>7,388,776</td>
<td>7,388,776</td>
<td>55,221,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of likes July 2014</td>
<td>279,967</td>
<td>124,470</td>
<td>182,624</td>
<td>173,028</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio Internet users – likes</td>
<td>0.0379</td>
<td>0.0168</td>
<td>0.0247</td>
<td>0.0031</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral results 2013–2014</td>
<td>1,020,476b</td>
<td>1,290,806c</td>
<td>2,264,780d</td>
<td>4,712,461e</td>
<td>560,828f</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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aIn the respective countries Hungary, France, and Germany, according to http://www.internetworldstats.com/
stats4.htm.

bHungarian parliamentary elections 2014 (http://www.valasztas.hu/en/ogyv2014/416/416_0_index.html), list
votes.
cHungarian parliamentary elections 2014 (http://www.valasztas.hu/en/ogyv2014/416/416_0_index.html), list
votes. MSZP had formed an electoral coalition with four other parties.
dHungarian parliamentary elections 2014 (http://www.valasztas.hu/en/ogyv2014/416_0_index.html), list
votes. Fidesz had formed an electoral coalition with one other party.
28path%29/ER2014/FE.html).

fGerman parliamentary elections 2013, second votes (http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/de/bundestagswahlen/
BTW_BUND_13/ergebnisse/bundesergebnisse/index.html).
Table 3. Comparison of the Facebook performance of selected parties.

<table>
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<th>Fidesz</th>
<th>FN</th>
<th>NPD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Posts</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Videos</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pictures</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graphics, charts, diagrams</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likes on average</td>
<td>3402</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>3962</td>
<td>2906</td>
<td>2469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shares on average</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>822</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>758</td>
<td>675</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

posts were successful. Then, posting behavior of the parties is described generally to get an overall picture and conclusively the posting behavior of Fidesz, MSZP, and Jobbik is compared looking at their respective successful posts from the national holiday on 15 March 2014.

In this period, Jobbik had 142 such posts. It generated on average 3402 likes and 870 shares. Among them were 67 videos, most quite short and containing television interviews, speeches, or campaign advertisements. Forty-four were graphics, charts, or diagrams depicting campaign advertisements, quotations of politicians, or – quite regularly – greetings and thank you messages to followers. Those graphs were rather sophisticated in style and design and very diverse. For example, the “thank you” message for 170,000 followers contained this number in the Hungarian colors created out of thumbs up icons. The 145,000-follower thank you message combined this number with the 145th birthday of Miklós Horthy, the Hungarian head of state in the interwar period and an important reference for right-wing Hungarians. Jobbik’s Facebook page is rather creative. Pictures were posted 27 times. Four times, the new cover of the Facebook page got more than 1000 likes. The five most important categories of posts were interviews, speeches, electoral campaign ads, depictions from events, and “thank you” messages (among those were 17 celebrating new numbers of followers). The posting behavior was highly self-referential and fitted to a young, tech-savvy audience. Written posts, quotations, graphics, and videos (the videos lasted mostly less than one minute) were always short and easy to decipher. Frequently, Jobbik asked followers to share its posts.

The Hungarian socialist party, MSZP, was decidedly less successful. Its 112 posts generated on average 1986 likes and 822 shares. However, those figures have to be interpreted cautiously because the party formed an electoral coalition with four other parties that shared their posts in time of working together. Before the first mentions of this coalition in mid-July, the posts with more than 1000 likes averaged 1700 likes and in the time after the national elections, the posts averaged 1872 likes. The MSZP posted videos 23 times (on average longer than those of Jobbik), one-third as many as Jobbik. Those videos were mostly campaign advertisements. Correspondingly, most of the 49 posted graphics, tables, and figures contained campaign advertisements, often negative ads about Fidesz and Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. However, the 23 posts including pictures were mostly about party events. Additionally, four times, a new cover image was liked and 12 times, an article from the party’s website was shared and well received, a top-down approach that Jobbik never used successfully. Most of the content was campaign or negative-campaigning related (53 times). Their own events were promoted regularly and messages to the audience were posted repeatedly, though speeches and interviews were rare. Overall, the posts seemed less sophisticated in substance and style, perhaps because MSZP voters are proportionally older and thus the posting behavior is directed to another audience.
Fidesz’s posting behavior was even less sophisticated, which is paradoxical since at first glance one might think that Fidesz has been more successful than Jobbik: its most-liked posts have on average more than 3962 likes, and it has such posts practically as often as Jobbik. However, these most popular posts were shared on average only 463 times. Around 40 times, Fidesz posts with more than 1000 likes got fewer than 100 shares. For Jobbik, that happened four times and for MSZP, 13 times. Jobbik and MSZP had a similar share of well-liked posts over the month, whereas Fidesz had only six before 26 September. Before 2014, the average number of likes of those posts was 2100; thereafter, it grew to almost 5000. These developments surprise even more because Fidesz had only seven video posts, and the party frequently posted official government news or quotations and images of Orbán that were quite similar stylistically, neither very surprising nor diverse, with a repetitive design that resembled an old-school campaign poster – nothing you would expect on Facebook. Unlike Jobbik and MSZP, Fidesz did not post substantial messages, sometimes only an image of a huge crowd with the slogan “Only Fidesz.” It is quite remarkable for such a posting to get more than 4000 likes (which happened at least four times). Furthermore, “boring” stuff such as the list of the EP election candidates received more than 3000 likes and a picture of the new Fidesz-KDNP faction in the newly elected Hungarian parliament received more than 5000 likes. Fifty-eight posts with pictures and 54 posts with graphics containing mostly quotations were successful. In addition, at least 16 times, official announcements from the government were shared. The high number of likes could be partly due to the fact that they might have been shared as well by the government and on ministers’ Facebook pages. The development and the sheer number of likes seem suspicious – especially when bearing in mind the market for like manipulation. The growth rate of the likes from other parties included in this research appears to have grown organically, whereas Fidesz’ like development has to be treated with caution in this period. Even more so because the party’s posting behavior was less interactive than Jobbik’s or MSZP’s. Even though Facebook’s news feed algorithm changes, likable posts such as thank you messages are generally more visible in the news feed and get more likes for this reason, and the more likes a certain post gets, the more visible it is on other time lines. Interactive communication in the most basic sense like posting messages to Facebook fans or urging them to share certain posts were less frequent in Fidesz postings. Overall, Fidesz took the most top-down approach to communication on Facebook, with Jobbik using the most bottom-up style.

In general, the numbers of likes for the Hungarian parties’ posts are remarkably high in comparison. The German NPD had only 28 posts that collected more than 1000 likes and the Front National merely 10. NPD’s posts were liked on average 2469 times and shared 675 times, whereas the posts of the Front National were liked 2906 times and shared 785 times. Combined, they posted only two videos (one each) that were successful and mostly graphics, pictures, and images, predominantly containing electoral ads. All in all, Jobbik’s posts were the most successful (not counting Fidesz’s suspiciously high number of likes), since they were more diverse, the most stylistically sophisticated, and less top-down oriented.

**Different styles of posting on 15 March 2014**

Hungary commemorates the revolution of 1848, one of the three most important national holidays, each year on 15 March. On that day in 2014, MSZP, Jobbik, and Fidesz had Facebook posts that were liked by more than 1000 people. In order to highlight more specifically the parties’ different posting styles, these posts are examined in the following section.
Jobbik posted two sets of pictures: first from the event “A Magyar név megint szép lesz – a Jobbik fővárosi megemlékezése” (The Hungarian name will be great again – Jobbik capital commemoration), which took place in the afternoon in Budapest, and the second from the event “A magyarság minden nehézséget nilel, mert ez a sorsa” (The Hungarians will survive every difficulty because that is their destiny) held two hours later. Jobbik posted albums with respectively 12 and 13 pictures including photos of the speakers and the musical company – a choir and a rock band – and pictures of the audience. Each single picture was liked, shared, and commented on several times – the likes and shares usually went into the hundreds. Fidesz also posted an album about the renewed Kossuth square titled “Megijult a nemzet főtere” (The nation’s main square has been renewed). Those 18 pictures were as well liked, shared, and commented upon. The big difference in style and substance was clear: one party celebrates and depicts its own event and its followers, while the other shows off what it has done while in government. The Jobbik pictures are joyful, playful, and spontaneous, with kids and balloons, for example, Fidesz’s images are beautiful but empty and almost clinical, like a brochure. There are no people or symbols of party affiliation. Apart from this album, Fidesz posted a graphic with a picture of Orbán holding a speech and a quotation supposedly from that speech to the effect that Hungary is on the threshold of a new era and when Hungary steps in, there will be work for everyone, and life will be hard but dignified and fair. This image depicts Orbán statesmanlike, thoughtful, and solemn. The background (trees without leaves) is drained of color, and overall, its grays and browns, and Orban’s frown make a sad and depressing impression. MSZP’s one well-liked post that day was its new cover image, a collage from 10 images of party events depicting the audiences. In the right lower corner is a red banderole with the slogan “2014 – year of governmental change.” Overall, the cover is colorful but dominated by red. It seems uninspired: the pictures do not relate to one another and predominantly show, for example, an audience sitting in chairs or hands signing papers. The biggest and dominating image is on the right and shows Attila Mesterházy, the party’s leader, looking dynamic, probably while giving a speech. Jobbik’s albums received the most likes – 8246 and 7815 – while Fidesz’s album received 6697 likes, Fidesz’s graphic 5242 likes, and MSZP’s cover image 2563. The analysis above helps to explain those numbers: Jobbik is conscious of their followers (both on- and offline) and integrates them through posting images of them. Many comments on the pictures describe the feelings of those who attended the event. In this way, Jobbik creates hybrid public spaces. Fidesz – as a government party – legitimately rules over the public (spaces) and shows it with pictures and the graphic. However, it does not implicitly invite its audience to share their feelings – to interact (even if they do). The posting behavior is top-down, as if to say, “Look what we’ve done. We celebrate it – with or without you.” In contrast, Jobbik’s pictures give the impression that it would rather say, “Look at how we celebrate, have fun, and share emotions together” and is thus more bottom-up oriented. The fact that the photographer was in the middle of the events adds to this impression. MSZP offers a potpourri that is neither one thing nor the other. The cover tries to convey dynamism and optimism but does not look convincing. Its event was obviously not very successful (on Facebook). In contrast to Fidesz, MSZP tries to integrate its audience (but not the party logo or name) but exclusively as spectators and not as participants. That is one big difference among Jobbik, Fidesz, and MSZP: Jobbik understands itself as a movement and behaves as such, whereas Fidesz and MSZP convey a more traditional approach to party communication policy, which may ultimately explain why they are less successful on Facebook than Jobbik.
Conclusion and discussion

As elaborated in this article, Jobbik shares some similarities to the new hybrid forms of social movements that developed in the digital age: its use of Facebook is less hierarchical than the other parties’ and is highly effective. Manuel Castells emphasizes three paramount conditions for those new movements, all of which apply to Hungary: an active group of jobless academics, a highly developed culture of cyber activism, and the rather widespread use of the Internet. The radical right in Hungary and especially Jobbik’s grasp of the influence of the Internet and social media on digital natives, and its use of these tools, help explain its success. In this regard, this article might serve as a starting point to debate if Hungary’s far right is a special case and whether Jobbik may function as a role model for other parties. Jobbik uses social media such as Facebook in a decidedly effective and interactive way, which explains its huge audience on these platforms – not only by Hungarian but also by European standards. One reason for that success might lie in the fact that Jobbik is heavily in touch, especially on Twitter, with consultants who deal on a daily basis with the intricacies of Facebook’s news feed algorithm. Therefore, an analysis over time with the development of the news feed algorithm (as far as it is known to the public) might be fruitful. Another possible explanation might be the fact that Jobbik’s Facebook followers themselves are more accustomed to using Facebook and understand its functioning better and therefore often share Jobbik’s posts. In the future, it might be interesting to compare more specifically the liking behavior of opposition vs. government parties, since the risks or benefits associated with liking a certain party might differ on that ground. There is ground to speak of a Radical Right 2.0 in Hungary, because the present article shows that on Facebook, Jobbik is very successful, knows its audience, and understands how to mobilize people. Young and first-time voters might find their way to Jobbik due to its “likable” communication policy – therein lies the danger.

Notes

1. Jobboldali Ifjúsági Közösség: Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom – right-wing youth association: Movement for a Better Hungary. The word “Jobb” in Hungarian has two meanings, the adjective for “better” and the direction “right;” the comparative Jobbik therefore means both “better” and “more to the right.”

2. The coalition of Fidesz (Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége-Magyar Polgári Szövetség: Alliance of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Alliance) and KDNP (Kereszténydemokrata Néppárt-Christian Democratic People’s Party) has governed since 2010 with a two-thirds majority.

3. Given the limited extent of Twitter use in Hungary, it was omitted from this analysis.


5. Jobbik is considered by the author as a formation at the junction of party and social movement due to its close ties to subcultural groups; therefore, social movement theories are helpful to interpret Jobbik.

6. The term “radical right” is much disputed (Mudde 2007). This article follows the approach of Michael Minkenberg, who understands the radical right as an ideological family that covers organizations, groups, political parties, and subcultures. Minkenberg argues that “the radical right can be defined as a radically exclusionist political force, which, more than other political currents and movements, employs rigid historical references in the imagination of the community it claims to fight for.” (Minkenberg 2010,17)


8. On the importance of Árpád stripes, Hungarian historian Krisztián Ungváry has noted, “The historical Árpád flag is a historical flag of Hungary. However, it was in far-reaching use only until the late 14th century. But the Arrow Cross Party revived this banner again in 1938. Behind this move was the rejection of Western cultural heritage, since the Árpáds were the only autochthonous Hungarian royal family in Hungarian history. The Árpád flag was for many a symbol of...
terror when the Arrow Cross Party declared it the state flag on October 15, 1944” (Ungváry 2011, 289, originally in German, translation by this author).

9. However, this assessment is increasingly disputed in light of Fidesz’s handling of the refugee crisis.

10. Manuela Caiani and Linda Parenti developed a tool for measuring the degree of Internet openness of a given country, which they labeled “technological opportunity.” Data on internet penetration can be found at: http://www.internetworldstats.com for the years 2008–2010 (Caiani and Parenti 2013, 32).

11. Subsequent similar posts were only integrated once.

References


