

though the proper title (admittedly cumbersome) would be "Councils, People's Militias, Extremist Parties, and Free Corps Units in Germany and German-Austria, with Some Consideration of Similar Phenomena in Prague and Budapest."

For the German-speaking lands the research is based on all the major archival collections; for Hungary and Czechoslovakia it is based mainly on secondary sources in Western languages. Conclusions are drawn sharply and frequently, and even if there are no great surprises, it is still shattering to read from the pen of a foremost historian that in 1918–19 democratization was a real possibility but it failed mainly because of the miscalculations and inferiority complex of German Social Democracy. The fall of 1918 saw genuine mass movements in Central Europe, not for socialist experiments or for a permanent revolution, Professor Carsten says, but for peace, the creation of soldiers' and workers' councils, parliamentary government, and democratization. Although these mass movements had similar origins and motivation, the results differed fundamentally in Austria, where there was temporary success, and in Germany, where democracy failed almost immediately. In Austria the old army disbanded at the end of the war, demobilization went smoothly, a people's militia was set up rapidly, and the civil service was reorganized under democratic leadership. The councils in Austria soon fell under the sway of the Social Democrats, while the far Left never became truly dangerous. In Germany the opposite was true. The army did not disband, the High Command was allowed to continue in the mistaken assumption that it alone could demobilize the soldiers, and the people's army was small, not quite reliable, and soon suppressed by the generals. The old bureaucrats were kept in office; the councils were aggressive and dictatorial, but they soon split and lost all power; and the far Left was a real danger but was exterminated by the Free Corps, which made no distinction between putschists and loyal Social Democrats. The end result was the same in both countries: the rise of right-wing forces. But Social Democratic determination in Germany could have saved the whole of Central Europe. The fault lay also with German and Austrian history and with the conservatism of the peasants. All this, and more, is presented by Professor Carsten through a skillful balancing of topical and narrative treatments.

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LOCARNO DIPLOMACY: GERMANY AND THE WEST: 1925–1929. By
Jon Jacobson. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972. xii, 420 pp. \$13.00.

This is an important book. Concerned with the little-explored period 1925–29, it offers a judicious and profound analysis based on British, German, and American archives, and an impressive array of printed sources and historical literature. It is really the first time that post-Locarno diplomacy has been so exhaustively presented, although, as the subtitle indicates, the author confines himself to German-French-British relations rather than attempting to cover all of Europe. Jacobson does draw the reader's attention to the most important Russian, Italian, and East European aspects of international politics, but treats them marginally. German-Russian secret military cooperation is barely mentioned, and the name of Seeckt seldom appears. True, Jacobson makes one important contribution by showing that the Locarno Triplice was hardly ever used against the Soviet Union, a point which is at complete variance with the standard "Marxist" interpretations. Franco-Italian and British-

Italian relations, important for the understanding of Danubian and Balkan problems and also French policy in this area, are virtually left out. To say all this is not to criticize the author's approach but merely to note the limitations of this study from the point of view of diplomatic historians of Eastern Europe. At the same time Jacobson's book is of great value for them, because it brings new dimensions to our understanding of the diplomacy of the great Western powers. It also raises certain important questions to which I shall turn at the end of this review.

The Locarno period has changed labels in historical accounts. In traditional presentations, to mention only G. M. Gathorne-Hardy's book, it appeared under the heading "period of fulfillment." Later, some post-World War II historians felt that it should rather be called the period of illusions. French and German historians attempting scholarly cooperation in the name of a United Europe agreed to see in it an era of missed opportunities. A certain aura of illusions fostered by speeches made in Geneva and elsewhere undoubtedly existed during the period, but were the makers of Locarno diplomacy taken in by it themselves? Were Stresemann, Briand, and Austen Chamberlain, the joint recipients of the Nobel Peace Prize, idealists and "good Europeans"?

Jacobson's chief contribution lies in presenting and discussing the hard-boiled politics behind the façade of the Locarno diplomacy. He shows convincingly that peace meant different things for Paris, London, and Berlin. He makes a telling point about the persistence of different and virtually irreconcilable German, French, and British goals, and rightly emphasizes that far from being an arbiter, Britain to a large extent abandoned the settlement of continental affairs to France and Germany. The author devotes a good deal of attention to the interaction between foreign and domestic policies in the three countries. His presentation of Briand's policy, in the absence of French archival sources, may raise more questions and controversy than in the case of Britain and Germany. The author seems to be aware of it, and several times advances hypotheses rather than offering definitive interpretations.

The book is well and clearly organized. The nine parts—making of Locarno, appeasement before and after Locarno, decline of the spirit of Locarno, freedom for the Rhineland, compensation for the allies, final reparation settlement, "the final liquidation of the war," first Hague conference, and conclusion—follow logically and smoothly. It is surely no mean achievement to make even the very detailed accounts of unexciting legal and financial problems lucid and interesting. Excellent introductory and summing-up paragraphs provide guideposts for the reader. From the first chapter, which gives a balanced and fair analysis of Locarno, to a thoughtful conclusion, which makes sure that the reader, having followed complex diplomatic maneuvers throughout the book, has not missed the main trends, Jacobson's study is eminently readable and sound.

Since this review is addressed mainly to East European specialists, let me now return to the East European angle I mentioned at the beginning. In his conclusion, Jacobson makes a very good point by showing that France was largely left alone by Britain and the United States to negotiate a final settlement with Germany. He implies that greater firmness or softness toward Germany could have been applied only with the full backing of the Anglo-Saxon powers. This was certainly the way Briand saw it, and he strove for cooperation with Britain, perhaps not fully realizing that Locarno meant a lesser and not a greater British involvement on the Continent. True to a great power's outlook that partners are to be sought only among other great powers, Paris tended to relegate its lesser allies in Eastern Europe to a position

of relative unimportance. France did not abandon them, but from Locarno on the erroneous view of divisibility of peace prevailed, though disguised by the formula that peace in the West meant stabilization in the East. In 1928 the French tried to weaken their alliance with Poland, and they made efforts to defer to Italy to the detriment of the Little Entente. Although from a strictly French point of view the premature evacuation of the Rhineland may not have been very important, its consequences for the French Eastern alliance system were profound. Finally Locarno itself, which seemingly opened to Germany the chances of a full comeback, and consequently produced annoyances when Allied concessions did not come more rapidly and unconditionally, contributed in the long run to the Anschluss, Munich, and September 1939. Briand was no dreamer, but in a sense all he did was to fight a rear-guard action and exchange concessions for limited advantages for France and France alone. But this aspect of the story, which touches closely on the current work of this reviewer, has to be told elsewhere. Jacobson's excellent book will greatly facilitate the task.

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GERMAN-POLISH RELATIONS, 1918-1933. By *Harald von Riekhoff*. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971. xiv, 421 pp. \$15.00.

Few episodes of the long, often tempestuous history of German-Polish relations have drawn as much attention as the fifteen-year period from the end of World War I to the formal establishment of the Third Reich. Since Polish as well as non-Polish scholars have written extensively on this topic or specific aspects of it, Mr. Riekhoff's work can hardly be considered an original contribution on a neglected subject. Rather, he has combined the substantial body of secondary studies and published primary sources with new unpublished materials from the German Foreign Ministry files and, to a lesser extent, from the Polish archives, in order to produce a definitive study of German-Polish relations in the Weimar years. If sheer quantity of factual detail is the criterion of scholarly success, the author has reason to rejoice. Indeed, the book's chief strength is its wealth of consistent, conscientious documentation and its substantial body of information. In this regard, the detailed tables in the appendix merit special mention. Furthermore, the author skillfully relates foreign affairs to domestic developments in each country, thereby revealing the intimate connection between international relations and internal political considerations. Every issue of German-Polish relations became the subject of heated political discussion within the two polities, and assumed particular importance in such questions as the fate of the so-called optants and economic agreements. Riekhoff also displays a solid sense of the general international setting for his story, and frequently points out the role played by German-Polish affairs in Soviet, British, and French diplomatic calculations.

These merits notwithstanding, the book has several flaws. Its meticulous attention to detail and mass of information often overwhelm the reader to the point where he loses sight of the major themes central to the author's thesis of how both states needed, yet could not develop, viable, harmonious working relations. The overabundance of factual data also affects the author's style, which is ponderous and occasionally difficult to follow. Moreover, despite its broad base, the book tends to be uneven in its treatment of specific problems. The most notable example is