¹ See Cranston, Ross, How Law Works - The Machinery and Impact of Civil Justice (Oxford University Press, 2006), p.36 Google Scholar.

² An alternative target could be to achieve “adequate” access to justice: see Rhode, Deborah L., Access to Justice (Oxford University Press, 2004), p.20 Google Scholar.

³ The main representative schools here include the legal realists and the critical legal scholars: Cappelletti, Mauro, “Access To Justice As A Theoretical Approach To Law And A Practical Programme For Reform” (1992) 109 South African Law Journal 22 at 23–25 Google Scholar.

⁴ Mauro Cappelletti, ibid, at 25.

⁵ Mauro Cappelletti, supra note 3 at 25.

⁶ Michael Andersen, “Access to Justice and Legal Process: Making Legal Institutions Responsive to Poor People in LDCs”, Institute of Development Studies, Law, Democracy and Development Series, Working Paper 178, February 2003, p. 16.

⁷ E.g. Singapore has been regarded by the World Bank as a developed and high income economy. Online:http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0„contentMDK:20 421402~menuPK:64133156~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html. The recent United Nations Human Development Report 2005 categorised Singapore as high-income and high human development (0.907 HDI in 2003, 25th position). Online: http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2005/pdf/HDR05_complete.pdf.

⁸ The score was 0.796 HDI in 2003 and she was placed in 61st position. Online: http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2005/pdf/HDR05_complete.pdf.

⁹ See Economic Planning Unit, Prime Minister's Department, Federal Government Administrative Centre, Malaysia, “Malaysia: 30 Years of Poverty Reduction, Growth and Racial Harmony”, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2004, pp. 1 and 4; Lucas, Robert EB and Verry, Donald W., “Growth and income distribution in Malaysia” (1996) 135(5) International Labour Review 553 at 556 Google Scholar (covering the period from 1970 to 1990 only).

¹⁰ See Yaqin, Anwarul, Law and Society in Malaysia (International Law Book Series, 1996) at p. 195 Google Scholar; the reduction of income disparities between rural and urban areas remains a concern in the Ninth Malaysia Plan 2006-2010; see also “Malaysia plans $54 bn projects for rural poor”. Online: http://www.tradearabia.com/tanews/newsdetails_snINTBIZ_article102066.html (14 March 2006).

¹¹ See Ninth Malaysia Plan 2006-2010, chapter 16 (“Achieving Growth With Distribution”). Online: http://www.epu.jpm.my.

¹² See Li, Ho Ai, “Poverty: Generation Next”, The Straits Times (27 May 2006)Google Scholar. In terms of relative poverty, 11% (or 340,000 persons) of the resident population per capita had household incomes of less than half the median of $500 per month in 1997; the comparative figure in Hong Kong was 14% in 1996: see “Household Income Growth and Distribution 1990-1997”, occasional paper, Singapore Department of Statistics, 1998 at para. 25.

¹³ The Gini coefficient, as a measure of income inequality, increased slightly for resident households from 0.436 in 1990 to 0.444 in 1997: see “Household Income Growth and Distribution 1990-1997”, occasional paper, Singapore Department of Statistics, 1998 at para. 20; the recent General Household Survey conducted by the Department of Statistics indicated that the Gini coefficient has continued to rise from 0.490 in 2000 to 0.522 in 2005: see Low, Aaron, “Household Incomes up, Bottom Third's Wages Down”, The Straits Times (29 June 2006)Google Scholar; see also Mitton, Roger, ‘For Richer or Poorer”, Asiaweek, Vol. 26 (44) (10 November 2000)Google Scholar; Lim, Lydia, “Power Struggles in the Heartland”, The Straits Times (27 May 2006)Google Scholar.

¹⁴ Anwarul Yaqin, supra note 10 at p. 194.

¹⁵ See Michael Anderson, supra note 6 at p. 3.

¹⁶ See generally, Chan, Gary and Tan, Eugene, “Introduction to the Singapore Legal System” in Phang, Andrew (ed), Basic Principles of Singapore Business Law (Thomson, 2004) at pp. 3–51 (particularly paras. 1.4 to 1.57)Google Scholar.

¹⁷ See Harding, Andrew and Carter, Connie, “The Singapore Model of Law and Development: Cutting Through the Complexity” in Hatchard, John and Perry-Kessaris, Amanda (eds.), Law and Development: Facing Complexity in the 21^st Century (Cavendish Publishing Limited, 2003) at pp. 193–194 Google Scholar; Tan, Eugene, “‘We’ and ‘I’: Communitarian Legalism in Singapore” (2002) 4(1) The Australian Journal of Asian Law 1 Google Scholar (on the conservative approach of the Singapore judiciary towards the adjudication of fundamental constitutional rights of individuals).

¹⁸ A detailed study of the practical implementation efforts of the Singapore judiciary to enhance access to justice is outside the constraints of this paper. The interested reader may wish to refer to, for example, Blochlinger, Karen, “ Primus Inter Pares: Is the Singapore Judiciary First Among Equals?” (2000) 9(3) Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal 591 Google Scholar; Magnus, Richard, “The Confluence of Law and Policy in Leveraging Technology: Singapore Judiciary's Experience” (2004) 12 William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 661 Google Scholar; Yuan, Lim Lan & Leng, Liew Thiam, Court Mediation in Singapore (FT Law & Tax Asia Pacific, 1997)Google Scholar.

¹⁹ E.g. Worthington, Ross, “Between Hermes and Themis: An Empirical Study of the Contemporary Judiciary in Singapore” (2001) 18(4) Journal of Law and Society 490 CrossRefGoogle Scholar (note that the assumptions and conclusions made in the article have been rejected by the High Court in the recent case of Attorney-General v. Chee Soon Juan [2006] SGHC 54 at para. 50); with respect to the present emphasis on efficiency and speed in the Singapore judiciary, one senior lawyer was quoted as stating that “[j]ustice delayed may be justice denied. But justice hurried is justice buried. You can't expect cuisine quality under fast food conditions”, in “Singapore Lawyers - Up close with ‘a most naughty profession’”, The Straits Times (13 February 2006).

²⁰ See Roger Tan, “The Role of Public Interest Litigation In Promoting Good Governance in Malaysia and Singapore”. Online: http://www.malaysianbar.org.my.

²¹ E.g. Lim Cho Hock v. Government of the State of Perak [1980] 2 MLJ 148 Google Scholar; Tan Sri Othman Saat v. Mohamed bin Ismail [1982] 2 MLJ 177 Google Scholar.

²² [1988] 2 MLJ 12 (see, however, the powerful dissenting judgments of Seah S. CJ and Abdoolcader S. CJ); compare the Singapore position in Chan Hiang Leng Colin v. Minister for Information and the Arts [1996] 1 SLR 609 Google Scholar (which appears to endorse more liberal locus standi rules in the context of a challenge against a ministerial order based on constitutional provisions which seek to protect the right to profess, practice and propagate religion). See also the recent Malaysian decision of Majlis Peguam Malaysia v. Raja Segaran a/l Krishnan [2005] 1 MLJ 15 Google Scholar in which locus standi was established.

²³ Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Alam Sekitar v. Kajing Tubek [1997] 3 MLJ 23 Google Scholar.

²⁴ See SP Gupta v. President of India (1982) SC 149 at 189 (Bhagwati, J.)Google Scholar; Bandhu Mukti Morcha v. Union of India AIR 1984 SC 802 at 814 (Bhagwati, J.)Google Scholar.

²⁵ See e.g. Craig, PP and Deshpande, SL, “Rights, Autonomy and Process: Public Interest Litigation in India” (1989) 9 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 356 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Susman, Susan D., “Distant Voices In The Courts of India: Transformation of Standing in Public Interest Litigation” (1994) 13 Wisconsin International Law Journal 57 Google Scholar.

²⁶ See e.g. Galanter, Mark and Krishnan, Jayanth K, ““Bread for the Poor”: Access to Justice and the Rights of the Needy in India” (2003–2004) 55 Hastings Law Journal 789 Google Scholar (critiquing the “judicially orchestrated public interest litigation” and the Lok Adalats or “peoples' courts” in India); Cassels, Jamie, “Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in India: Attempting the Impossible?” (1989) 37 American Journal of Comparative Law 495 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Dam, Shubhanker, “ Vineet Narain v. Union of India: “A court of law and not of justice” - is the Indian Supreme Court beyond the Indian Constitution” [2005] Public Law 239 Google Scholar.

²⁷ [1995] 1 SLR 77.

²⁸ [1995] 1 SLR 77 at 84 (emphasis added).

²⁹ [2001] 3 SLR 400 at 403.

³⁰ [1990] 3 MLJ 481. For related proceedings, see Lorraine Esme Osman v. Attorney-General of Malaysia [1986] 2 MLJ 288 Google Scholar (the validity of Order 66 of the Rules of the High Court 1980 on obtaining evidence in Malaysia for foreign courts in criminal proceedings and examinations carried out pursuant to the Order); Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd v. Lorrain Esme Osman [1986] 1 MLJ 426 Google Scholar (substituted service of writ); Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd v. Lorrain Esme Osman [1987] 2 MLJ 633 Google Scholar (dismissal of application for striking out of action and/or stay of Malaysian proceedings and the issue of the applicable substantive law).

³¹ LY Lim and TL Liew, supra note 18 at p. 21 (emphasis added).

³² “Anchoring Justice’, Subordinate Courts”, 12^th Workplan 2003/2004 (emphasis added).

³³ The Chief Justice said that “[m]ore than ever, it is important for the Subordinate Courts to entrench the rule of law, enhance access to justice and deepen public trust and confidence in its work”: see Keynote Address by the Honourable the Chief Justice Chan Sek Keong, “Justice @ The Subordinate Courts: The New Phases of Justice”, 15^th Subordinate Courts Workplan 2006/2007 (18 May 2006).

³⁴ This statement details the mission, objectives, goals, justice models and values of the subordinate judiciary. The full text of the Singapore Subordinate Courts' Justice Statement is found online: http://www.subcourts.gov.sg.

³⁵ The Star (9 February 2002).

³⁶ Charles L. Black Jr., “Further Reflections on the Constitutional Justice of Livelihood”, Address Before the Columbia University Law School, 20 March 1986, in 86 Columbia Law Review 1103 at 1115 (1986).

³⁷ Mauro Cappelletti, supra note 3 at p. 36.

³⁸ [1998] 3 MLJ 289.

³⁹ It reads: “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty save in accordance with the law”.

⁴⁰ In this case, section 59A of the Malaysian Immigration Act 1963, which provides in wide terms that “(1) There shall be no judicial review in any court of any act done or any decision made by the Minister or the Director General, or in the case of an East Malaysian State, the State Authority, under this Act except in regard to a question relating to compliance with any procedural requirement of this Act or the regulations governing that act or decision.”

⁴¹ For an endorsement of the independent ground of substantive fairness in judicial review, see Sudha CK G. Pillay, “The Emerging Doctrine of Substantive Fairness - A Permissible Challenge To The Exercise of Administrative Discretion?” [2001] 3 MLJ i.

⁴² [1997] 2 All ER 779.

⁴³ AIR 1987 SC 386 at 388 (per Bhagwati C.J.), interpreting an earlier Indian decision in Minerva Mills Ltd v. Union of India [1981] 1 SCR. 206; see also Kesavananda Bharati v The State of Kerala AIR (1973) SC 1461. India has a written constitution.

⁴⁴ [2002] 3 MLJ 72.

⁴⁵ See Phang Chin Hock@ Ah Tee v. PP [1980] 1 MLJ 70 Google Scholar; Loh Kooi Choon v. Government of Malaysia [1977] 2 MLJ 187 Google Scholar.

⁴⁶ Section 59A of the Malaysian Immigration Act 1963.

⁴⁷ See S. Kulasingam v. Commissioner of Lands, Federal Territory [1982] 1 MLJ 204 Google Scholar; Government of Malaysia v. Selangor Pilot Association [1977] 1 MLJ 133 Google Scholar.

⁴⁸ [1988] SLR 132 (Wee Chong Jin CJ, LP Thean and Chan Sek Keong JJ.).

⁴⁹ Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Services [1985] AC 374.

⁵⁰ Cap. 143, ss. 8 and 10. The objective test has also been applied in Malaysia: see Mohamad Ezam bin Mohd Noor v. Ketua Polis Negara [2002] 4 MLJ 449 Google Scholar (on the decision of police officers to arrest and detain under section 73 of the ISA).

⁵¹ [1988] SLR 132 at 155.

⁵² [1988] SLR 132 at 156.

⁵³ Acts No. 1 & 2 of 1989. The new section 8 B(2) of the I.S.A. provides that “[t]here shall be no judicial review in any court of any act done or decision made by the President or the Minister under the provisions of this Act save in regard to any question relating to compliance with any procedural requirement in this Act governing such act or decision”; section 8B (1) confirmed that the subjective test encapsulated in the old case of Lee Mau Seng v. Minister for Home Affairs [1969-71] SLR 508 shall, henceforth, be the applicable test.

⁵⁴ [1990] 2 MLJ 129.

⁵⁵ Cheng Vincent v. Minister of Home Affairs [1990] SLR 190 at 202.

⁵⁶ That is, Form 16D notice under the Malaysian National Land Code 1965.

⁵⁷ Section 72 reads:

“Notwithstanding any law, an order of a court cannot be granted –

(a) which stays, restrains or affects the powers of the Corporation, Oversight Committee, Special Administrator or Independent Advisor under this Act;

(b) which stays, restrains or affects any action taken, or proposed to be taken, by the Corporation, Oversight Committee, Special Administrator or Independent Advisor under this Act;

(c) which compels the Corporation, Oversight Committee, Special Administrator or Independent Adviser to do or perform any act, and any such order, if granted, shall be void and unenforceable and shall not be the subject of any process of execution whether for the purpose of compelling obedience of the order or otherwise.” The term “Corporation” above means Danaharta (s. 2).

⁵⁸ It has been referred as a “God-provision” which “allows Danaharta to do anything it likes, no matter how illegal, unfair or malicious it is”: see Nik Nazmi Nik Ahmad, Fahri Azzat Amer Hamzah and Edmund Bon, “The God-provision”. Online: http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/content/view/1357/27 (18 May 2005).

⁵⁹ For example, the special administrators: see section 39 of the Danaharta Act and the case of Wong Koon Seng v. Rahman Hydraulic Tin Bhd [2003] 1 MLJ 98 (High Court, Kuala Lumpur).

⁶⁰ See Wong Koon Seng v. Rahman Hydraulic Tin Bhd [2003] 1 MLJ 98 Google Scholar.

⁶¹ [2003] 3 MLJ 1.

⁶² Article 8(1) reads: “All persons are equal before the law and entitled to the equal protection of the law”.

⁶³ Article 160(2) reads: “Law includes written law, the common law in so far as it is in operation in the Federation or any part thereof, and any custom or usage having the force of law in the Federation or any part thereof”.

⁶⁴ [2003] 3 MLJ 1 at 15.

⁶⁵ [1988] AC 539 at 591 (House of Lords). The “rule of law” in Pierson was that a sentence lawfully passed should not be increased retrospectively.

⁶⁶ [1981] 1 MLJ 64.

⁶⁷ As to the debate whether the concept of natural justice is both procedural and substantive or merely procedural, see Harding, Andrew, “Natural Justice And The Constitution” (1981) 23 Malaya Law Review 226 Google Scholar; and Iyer, TKK, “Article 9(1) And “Fundamental Principles of Natural Justice” In The Constitution of Singapore” (1981) 23 Malaya Law Review 213 Google Scholar.

⁶⁸ [1994] QB 198.

⁶⁹ [1997] 2 All ER 779.

⁷⁰ See R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Leech [1994] QB 198 at 212.

⁷¹ Note, however, R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115 at 131 (Lord Hoffman) (“In the absence of express language or necessary implication to the contrary, the courts therefore presume that even the most general words were intended to be subject to the basic rights of the individual. In this way the courts of the United Kingdom, though acknowledging the sovereignty of Parliament, apply principles of constitutionality little different from those which exist in countries where the power of the legislature is expressly limited by a constitutional document.”)

⁷² See Allan, TRS, “Constitutional Rights and Common Law” (1991) 11 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 453 CrossRefGoogle Scholar (that rights at common law have a ‘constitutional’ dimension in the UK context and cited at 455 Lord Diplock's statement in Attorney General v. Times Newspapers [1974] AC 273 at 310 as supporting a fundamental right of access to justice to the courts).

⁷³ Article 3 of the Supreme Court Fees (Amendment) Order 1996.

⁷⁴ The former exemptions and remissions were subsequently reinstated. See English, Rosalind, “Wrongfooting the Lord Chancellor: Access to Justice in the High Court” (1998) 61 Modern Law Review 245 at 253 Google Scholar.

⁷⁵ In the very recent House of Lords' decision of Watkins v. Home Office [2006] UKHL 17 at paras. 24, 58 and 59, the constitutional right of access to the court, in particular the right to obtain confidential legal correspondence, was endorsed (in the context of a claim under the tort of misfeasance in public office).

⁷⁶ Ex parte Leech [1994] QB at 198.

⁷⁷ Ex parte Witham [1997] 2 All ER 779; Watkins v. Home Office [2006] UKHL 17 at para. 59 (Lord Rodger of Earlsferry).

⁷⁸ See Raymond v. Honey [1983] 1 AC 1 at 13.

⁷⁹ [2003] 3 MLJ 1 at 19.

⁸⁰ [2004] 2 MLJ at 257.

⁸¹ [2004] 2 MLJ 257 at para. 17; applied in Harmenderpall Singh a/l Jagara Singh v. Public Prosecutor [2005] 2 MLJ at 542.

⁸² [2004] 2 MLJ 257 at para. 17.

⁸³ [2004] 2 MLJ 257 at para. 14. See also the recent decision of Abdul Hamid Mohamad F.C.J. ]rifin Zakaria F.C.J. concurring) in Majlis Perbandaran Ampang Jaya v. Steven Phoa Cheng Loon [2006] 2 MLJ 389 at paras. 39-50Google Scholar, in particular para. 42 on the approach of the Malaysian courts under section 3 of the Civil Law Act 1956 in first ascertaining the written law in force in Malaysia when faced with the issue of determining whether a particular common law principle (in this case, a tort law principle) applies.

⁸⁴ [1981] 1 All ER 289.

⁸⁵ [2004] 2 MLJ 257 at para. 26.

⁸⁶ [2004] 2 MLJ 257 at para. 26.

⁸⁷ [2004] 2 MLJ 257 at para. 26.

⁸⁸ E.g. Ahmad Yani bin Ismail v. Inspector General of Police [2005] 4 MLJ at 636 (Malaysian High Court)Google Scholar.

⁸⁹ See Nik Nazmi Nik Ahmad, Fahri Azzat Amer Hamzah and Edmund Bon, supra note 58 (“By affirming the constitutionality of section 72 of the Danaharta Act, the Judiciary also affirmed its impotence.”)

⁹⁰ Mohideen Abdul Kader, “Access to Justice”. Online: http://www.malaysiabar.org.my (16 November 2005). 9912 Ibid.

⁹² Naidu, Jayanthi, “The Rise and Rise of Administrative Finality” [2004] 2 MLJ lxxii Google Scholar.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ The amendments to Article 121 in 1988 were prompted by the Malaysian decision in Public Prosecutor v Dato’ Yap Peng [1987] 2 MLJ at 311. The court in that case held that section 418A of the Criminal Procedure Code, which empowered the Public Prosecutor to issue a certificate requiring the Subordinate Courts to remove or transfer a pending criminal case to the High Court, was unconstitutional as it amounted to an interference with “judicial power” under the old Article 121(1) of the Federal Constitution.

⁹⁵ See The Queen v. Liyanage (1967) AC 259; (1966) 1 All ER 650; Hinds v. The Queen [1977] AC 195; Kok Wah Kuan v. Pengarah Penjara Kajang, Selangor Darul Ehsan [2004] 5 MLJ 193 at para. 52.

⁹⁶ Harding, Andrew, Law, Government and the Constitution in Malaysia (Malayan Law Journal Sdn Bhd, 1996) at 136 Google Scholar.

⁹⁷ [2003] 3 MLJ 1 at 22.

⁹⁸ [2004] 2 MLJ 257 at para. 31.

⁹⁹ E.g. Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice SR Tendolkar AIR 1958 SC 538; Charanjit Lal v. Union of India AIR 1951 SC 41; State of WB v. Anwar Ali AIR 1952 SC 75.

¹⁰⁰ E.g. Datuk Haji Harun bin Hj Idris v. Public Prosecutor [1977] 2 MLJ 155 Google Scholar; Abdul Ghani bin Ali@ Ahmad & Ors v. Public Prosecutor [2001] 3 MLJ 561 (Federal Court of Malaysia)Google Scholar.

¹⁰¹ [2004] 2 MLJ 257 at para. 59.

¹⁰² AIR 1981 SC 2138.

¹⁰³ [2004] 2 MLJ 257 at para. 54.

¹⁰⁴ See Franky Construction Sdn Bhd v. MEC Industrial Park Sdn Bhd [2002] 6 MLJ 212 (High Court, Kuantan)Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁵ [2004] 2 MLJ 257 at para. 57.

¹⁰⁶ See also Tan Sri Dato Tajuddin Ramli v. Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd [2002] 5 MLJ 720 Google Scholar on the constitutionality of section 72 with respect to Article 5(1) and 13(1) of the Federal Constitution. The Malaysian High Court observed that the Danaharta Act is a “social legislation” necessitated by the Asian economic crisis and “expressly legislated for the singular purpose of saving the economy from collapse.” Further, section 72 was “an essential provision necessary for the achievement of its expressed objective” and that the provision served to counter the tendency of the litigants in present-day Malaysia to press for injunctive reliefs.

¹⁰⁷ Jayanthi Naidu, supra note 92.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ The problem of delays could, subject to costs reasons, be resolved by setting up special courts to deal expeditiously with issues arising from the implementation of the Danaharta Act; see for example, the special debt recovery tribunals pursuant to the Indian Recovery of Debt Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act 1993, though it is recognised that the objectives of the respective legislation are not entirely the same.

¹¹¹ See Jayanthi Naidu, supra note 92; see also Gopal Sri Ram JCA in Kekatong [2003] 3 MLJ 1 at 22.

¹¹² The learned judge also ruled that Malaysian case precedents concerning the constitutionality of section 29 of the Government Proceedings Act and section 54(d) of the Specific Relief Act which provide for protection from injunctive relief, were “directed at permanent injunctions and not temporary injunctions”; hence, those cases were not directly relevant to the present case.

¹¹³ Danamodal, for instance, envisaged that it has a limited life span of five years and aimed to exit once it has satisfied the objectives of recapitalisation or if its exit will enhance the prospects of achieving its objectives. See “Danamodal Nasional Berhad - the Malaysian Approach to bank recapitalisation, revitalisation and restructuring”. Online: http://www.bnm.gov.my/images/en/danamodal/approach.pdf.

¹¹⁴ For instance, whether the work of Danaharta was material to the revitalisation of the economy and the alternatives available which do not adversely affect access to justice.

¹¹⁵ These measures, if adopted, will help to alleviate the concerns of the Malaysian Court of Appeal in Kekatong that the bar against injunctions in section 72 applies in all circumstances, “including circumstances in which the [Danaharta] Act may not apply”.

¹¹⁶ See e.g. Puhlhofer v. Hillingdon London Borough Council [1986] AC 484 (House of Lords) (the courts are slow to interfere with the housing authority's administration of the UK Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977) for purposes of deciding on the provision of accommodation for homeless persons).

¹¹⁷ [1981] 1 MLJ 64; Haw Tua Tau v. Public Prosecutor [1981] 2 MLJ 49 at 51; and Nguyen Tuong Van v. PP [2005] 1 SLR 103.

¹¹⁸ See Li-Ann, Thio, “‘Pragmatism and Realism Do Not Mean Abdication”: A Critical and Empirical Inquiry Into Singapore's Engagement With International Human Rights Law”, (2004) 8 SYBIL 41 at 56 Google Scholar.

¹¹⁹ Harding, Andrew, “The “Westminster Model' Constitution Overseas: Transplantation, Adaptation and Development in Commonwealth States” (2004) 4(2) Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 143 at 164 Google Scholar.

¹²⁰ See generally, Ramraj, Victor V., “‘Comparative Constitutional Law in Singapore”, (2002) 6 Singapore Journal of International and Comparative Law 302 Google Scholar.

¹²¹ For example, there is arguably an implied constitutional right to vote in Singapore, though this is not explicitly enumerated in the constitutional texts: see Li-Ann, Thio, “Recent Constitutional Developments: Of Shadows and Whips, Race, Rifts and Rights, Terror and Tudungs, Women and Wrongs” [2002] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 328 at 343 Google Scholar.

¹²² See Chapter II, 1966 Constitutional Commission Report, reproduced in Appendix D in Tan, Kevin and Li-Ann, Thio (eds.), Constitutional Law in Singapore and Malaysia (Butterworths, 1997) at 3 p. 1022 Google Scholar.

¹²³ Cap. 7A, 1994 Rev. Ed. Section 3 reads: “(1) The common law of England (including the principles and rules of equity), so far as it was part of the law of Singapore immediately before the commencement of this Act, shall continue to be part of the law of Singapore.

(2)The common law shall continue to be in force in Singapore, as provided in subsection (1), so far as it is applicable to the circumstances of Singapore and its inhabitants and subject to such modifications as those circumstances may require.”

For a comprehensive discussion of the statute, see generally Phang, Andrew, “Cementing the Foundations: The Singapore Application of English Law Act 1993” (1994) 28 University of British Columbia Law Review 205 Google Scholar.

¹²⁴ Supra note 83.

¹²⁵ It reads: “The judicial power of Singapore shall be vested in a Supreme Court and in such subordinate courts as may be provided by any written law for the time being in force”.

¹²⁶ See e.g. the Singapore Court of Appeal's statement in Jabar bin Kadermastan v. Public Prosecutor [1995] 1 SLR 617 at 631 (“Any law which provides for the deprivation of a person's life or personal liberty, is valid and binding so long as it is validly passed by parliament. The court is not concerned with whether it is also fair, just and reasonable as well.”)

¹²⁷ Cap. 1, 2002 Rev. Ed.

¹²⁸ See Constitutional Reference No 1 of 1995 [1995] 2 SLR 201.

¹²⁹ E.g. Nappalli Peter Williams v. Institute of Technical Education [1999] 2 SLR 569; Chan Hiang Leng Colin v. Minister for Information and the Arts [1996] 1 SLR 609. This emphasis on communitarianism and state-centrism are also in sync with Singapore (Lee Kuan Yew) and Malaysian (Mahathir Mohamed) political leaders' advocacy of Asian Values.

¹³⁰ Thio Li-Ann, supra note 118, at 43 (that human rights in Singapore is “ultimately informed by state objectives and national development goals prioritising economic growth and social order”); Tan, Eugene, “Law and Values in Governance: The Singapore Way” (2000) 30(1) HKLJ 91 Google Scholar (on the dichotomous approach in Singapore towards commercial laws and individual rights respectively).

¹³¹ The following quote from the Singapore Minister for Foreign Affairs is instructive, particularly in the context of fundamental rights for the poor:

…poverty makes a mockery of all civil liberties. Poverty is an obscene violation of the most basic of individual rights. Only those who have forgotten the pangs of hunger will think of consoling the hungry by telling them that they should be free before they can eat. Our experience is that economic growth is the necessary foundation of any system that claims to advance human dignity, and that order and stability are essential for development.

See Wong Kan Seng, “The Real World of Human Rights”, Statement at the World Conference on Human Rights (Vienna, 16 June 1993).

¹³² Harding, Andrew, “The Economic Crisis and Law Reform in South East Asia”, in Bhopal, Mhinder and Hitchcock, Michael (eds.), ASEAN Business in Crisis (Frank Cass: London, Portland, 2002) at pp. 49–58 Google Scholar.

¹³³ The Honourable the Chief Justice Chan Sek Keong: see “Welcome Reference for the Chief Justice - Response by the Honourable the Chief Justice Chan Sek Keong”. Online: http://www.supcourt.gov.sg (22 April 2006).

¹³⁴ See “Welcome Reference for the Chief Justice - Response by the Honourable the Chief Justice Chan Sek Keong”. Online: http://www.supcourt.gov.sg (22 April 2006) at paras. 11-13.

¹³⁵ Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that - “All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”

¹³⁶ Article 8 – “Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.”

Art 10 –”Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him”.

¹³⁷ Merdeka University Bhd v. Government of Malaysia [1981] 2 MLJ at 356 Google Scholar.

¹³⁸ The Act established the National Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (Suruhanjaya Hak Asasi Manusia Malaysia) which is a national human rights institution to investigate human rights complaints or to review domestic law in line with international human rights instruments and standards. Singapore does not have such an institution.

¹³⁹ [2002] 4 MLJ at 449.

¹⁴⁰ E.g. Article 25 on the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family.

¹⁴¹ E.g. Article 11 on the right to an adequate standard of living as well as freedom from hunger.

¹⁴² The Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary in the Lawasia Region (as amended at Manila, 28 August 1997). Online: http://www.lawasia.asn.au/uploads/images/BeijingStatement.pdf.

¹⁴³ PP v. Nguyen Tuong Van [2004] 2 SLR 328 at 359; see also Lim, CL, ‘Public International Law Before the Singapore and Malaysian Courts’, (2004) 8 SYBIL 243 at 248 Google Scholar.

¹⁴⁴ This is not entirely clear but the Malaysian position is presumably the same as Singapore following the decision of Mohamad Ezam bin Mohd Noor v. Ketua Police Negara [2002] 4 MLJ at 449 (on UNDHR)Google Scholar.

¹⁴⁵ One exception is Sagong bin Tasi v. Kerajaan Negeri Selangor [2002] 2 MLJ at 591 Google Scholar, wherein the Malaysian High Court was persuaded by the statement in the Australian decision of Mabo v. Queensland (1991–1992) 175 CLR 1 Google Scholar that “international law” is a “legitimate and important influence on the development of the common law”. The High Court then referred to the “worldwide recognition” of aboriginal rights and ruled that the orang asli in Sagong bin Tasi had a proprietary interest in their customary and ancestral lands; see also PP v. Nguyen Tuong Van [2004] 2 SLR 328 Google Scholar and Nguyen Tuong Van v. PP [2005] 1 SLR 103 Google Scholar (which appears to endorse the position that Singapore is bound by Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations as a rule of customary international law). For the latter case, see Lim, CL, “The Constitution and the Reception of Customary International Law: Nguyen Tuong Van V. Public Prosecutor ” [2005] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 218 Google Scholar; Li-Ann, Thio, “The Death Penalty as Cruel and Inhuman Punishment Before the Singapore High Court? Customary Human Rights Norms, Constitutional Formalism and the Supremacy of Domestic Law in Public Prosecutor v. Nguyen Tuong Vari ” (2004) 4(2) Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 1 Google Scholar.

¹⁴⁶ [1981] 2 MLJ at 49.

¹⁴⁷ CC 6/90.

¹⁴⁸ Tay, Simon, “The Singapore Legal System and International Law” in Tan, Kevin (ed.), The Singapore Legal System (Singapore University Press, 1999) at p. 482 Google Scholar.

¹⁴⁹ See e.g. Golder v. United Kingdom [1975] ECHR 1.

¹⁵⁰ See Report of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human Rights, UN World Conference on Human Rights, Bangkok, 1993 [Bangkok Declaration]. This “Asian” view is, however, not an absolute one and does not preclude the Singapore and Malaysian courts from endorsing foreign court decisions from the West even on matters relating to fundamental human rights: see e.g. PP v. Nguyen Tuong Van [2004] 2 SLR 328 at 360 (citing a US decision that hanging did not violate the constitutional protection against cruel and unusual punishments) and Nguyen Tuong Van v. PP [2005] 1 SLR 103 Google Scholar.

¹⁵¹ See e.g. Kok Wah Kuan v. Pengarah Penjara Kajang, Selangor Darul Ehsan [2004] 5 MLJ 193 at paras. 96-100Google Scholar which rejected the applicability of Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights cited in the Privy Council case of Director of PP of Jamaica v. Mollison [2003] 2 W.L.R. 1160; see also JB Jeyaratnam v. Lee Kuan Yew [1993] 1 SLR 185.

¹⁵² [1995] 1 SLR 617.

¹⁵³ [1994] QB 198 at 210. See also R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Anderson [1984] 1 QB 778.

¹⁵⁴ See Denning, MR in Pett v. Greyhound Racing Association Ltd (No. 1) [1969] 1 Q.B. 125 at 132 Google Scholar.

¹⁵⁵ Heong, Stanley Yeo Meng, “Unrepresented Defendants in the Subordinate Criminal Courts of Singapore (1979-1980)” (1981) 23 Malaya Law Review 41 Google Scholar.

¹⁵⁶ Factors and possibilities which have not been taken into consideration in the study include (1) some of the accused did not engage lawyers because they regarded the evidence against them to be very strong; (2) unrepresented defendants might be more likely to have previous conviction records than represented defendants; and (3) defendants who can afford legal counsel come from better socio-economic and educational backgrounds than those who are unrepresented: see Stanley Yeo, Ibid, at 44.

¹⁵⁷ The study treats non-custodial sentences as less severe than custodial sentences: Stanley Yeo, supra note 155 at 48.

¹⁵⁸ See Toh Han Li, “Facing the court, lawyerless”, The Straits Times (24 May 2006).

¹⁵⁹ [1993] 2 SLR 388.

¹⁶⁰ See Webster, J in R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Tarrant [1984] 1 All ER 799 Google Scholar; R v. Board of Visitors of HMPrison, The Maze, ex parte Hone [1988] AC 379 Google Scholar.

¹⁶¹ [1992] SLR 388 at 406. In this regard, the Singapore Small Claims Tribunals Act (s 23), for example, does not permit legal representation so as to ensure the litigants' costs are affordable.

¹⁶² Section 35 of the Malaysian Legal Profession Act.

¹⁶³ For a discussion on the meaning of “court of justice” in section 29, see Lin, Tan Yock, The Law of Advocates and Solicitors in Singapore and Malaysia (Butterworths, 1998) at pp. 119–122 Google Scholar.

¹⁶⁴ [1971] 2 MLJ 127.

¹⁶⁵ ]1971] 2 MLJ 127 at 130.

¹⁶⁶ See also Article 12 of the Singapore Constitution.

¹⁶⁷ [1983] 1 MLJ 175.

¹⁶⁸ [2003] 2 MLJ 337.

¹⁶⁹ On the facts of the case, the appellant was not denied legal representation, but representation by an officer of the Malaysian Trade Union Congress.

¹⁷⁰ (1863) 143 ER 414 at 420 (cited by Gopal Sri Ram JCA in Marathaei).

¹⁷¹ See generally, Kevin Tan and Thio Li-Ann, supra note 122 at pp. 557-580.

¹⁷² See Hashim bin Saud v. Yahaya bin Hashim [1977] 2 MLJ 116 at 118 Google Scholar; Ooi Ah Phua v. Officer in Charge Kedah/Perlis [1975] 2 MLJ 198 Google Scholar.

¹⁷³ Lee Mau Seng v. Minister for Home Affairs, Singapore [1971] 2 MLJ 137 Google Scholar.

¹⁷⁴ [1994] 2 SLR 18.

¹⁷⁵ In section 36 of the Singapore Criminal Procedure Code, the period stated is 48 hours for persons arrested without warrant and detained in police custody. The corresponding period in section 24 of the Malaysian Criminal Procedure Code (Act 593) is 24 hours; however, section 117 of the Malaysian CPC provides that the Magistrates may authorize the detention of the accused in such custody as the Magistrate thinks fit for a term “not exceeding fifteen days in the whole” where it appears that the investigation cannot be completed within the period of twenty-four hours as stipulated in section 28 and there are “grounds for believing that the accusation or information is well founded”.

¹⁷⁶ Cap. 68, 1985 Rev. Ed. Yong CJ in Jasbir Singh stated that section 122(6) statement, which provides for a written notification to be served on persons charged with an offence, does not compel the accused to make self-incriminating statements. For a critique, see Rajah, KS SC, ‘The Constitutional Right of Access to Counsel’, Law Gazette, August 2002 (4)Google Scholar.

¹⁷⁷ Philip Jeyaretnam SC, President of the Law Society of Singapore's speech at the Opening of the Legal Year 2006. Online: http://www.lawsociety.org.sg (7 January 2006) at para. 6.

¹⁷⁸ See Vijayan, KC, “Navy sergeant in drug case had no access to lawyer for a month Counsel not allowed during probe; law group wonders if constitutional rights were denied”, The Straits Times (15 March, 2006)Google Scholar and the response from the Ministry of Defence, “Sergeant Not Repeatedly Denied Access to Lawyer”, The Straits Times (20 March 2006)Google Scholar; see also “Editorial”, Pro Bono (newsletter of the Association of Criminal Lawyers, Vol. 2 No. 1, February 2006).

¹⁷⁹ Suruhanjaya Hak Asasi Manusia Malaysia Report, “Forum on the Right to an Expeditious and Fair Trial” (7-8 April 2005) at p. 11.

¹⁸⁰ See Abdul Ghani Harron v. Ketua Polis Negara [2001] 2 MLJ 689.

¹⁸¹ See Amer Hamzah Arshad, “Rights of Accused Persons: Are Safeguards Being Reduced?”. Online: http://www.malaysianbar.org.my/content/view/1577/27/ (2004).

¹⁸² See PP v. Choo Chuan Wang [1992] 3 CLJ (Rep.) 329 in which the court held that the right to a fair hearing within a reasonable time in criminal cases is part of the right to life and liberty in Article 5 of the Federal Constitution.

¹⁸³ Mohamed Ali Abdullah v. Public Prosecutor [1980] 2 MLJ 201 Google Scholar.

¹⁸⁴ PP v. Mazlan bin Maidun [1993] 1 SLR 512; contra the Privy Council decision of Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago v. Whiteman [1991] 2 WLR 1200; see also Hor, Michael, “The Right to Counsel - The Right To Be Informed”, (1993) 5 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 141 Google Scholar.

¹⁸⁵ Sun Hongyu v. PP [2005] 2 SLR 750 at 760.

¹⁸⁶ [2002] 4 MLJ 449.

¹⁸⁷ Article 149 reads: “If an Act of Parliament recites that action has been taken or threatened by a substantial body of persons, whether inside of outside the Federation -

[(a) to (e) …

(f) which is prejudicial to public order in, or the security of, the Federation or any part thereof, any provision of that law designed to stop or prevent that action is valid notwithstanding that it is inconsistent with any of the provisions of Article 5, 9, 10 or 13, or would apart from this Article be outside the legislative power of Parliament …”]

¹⁸⁸ The Minister for Labour Mr Lim Yew Hock, in moving the Legal Aid and Advice Bill in 1956, said:

Where inadequate facilities exist for a citizen of limited means to seek redress through the Courts for a wrong which has been done to him, or to obtain legal aid for his defence when he is committed for trial, then justice becomes a rationed commodity not freely available to all. (see Parliamentary Debates Reports, Sitting Date 6 June 1956, Col. 1957).

¹⁸⁹ See Yeo, Adrian, “Access to Justice: A Case for Contingency Fees in Singapore” (2004) 16 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 76 at 141 Google Scholar.

¹⁹⁰ Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Sitting Date 13 March 2003, Vol. 76, Cols. 698-701; and Parliamentary Debates, Sitting Date 18 October 2005, Col. 1653.

¹⁹¹ See Philip Jeyaretnam SC, supra note 177, at para. 5 (in which the President of the Law Society intimated that a “public-private partnership” would better meet the needs of the less welloff). The Council had urged the setting up of a pro bono scheme for young lawyers to address unmet legal needs in society (see Philip Jeyaretnam, “The Future of the Law Society”. Online: http://www.lawgazette.com.sg/2006-4/Default.htm (April 2006).)

¹⁹² The Legal Aid Bureau in Singapore provides only civil legal aid. The Criminal Legal Aid Scheme (CLAS), under the auspices of the Singapore Society, provides for the poor and needy in non-capital charges. CLAS applications are based on the type of offence as well as a means test: see “Criminal Legal Aid Scheme”. Online: http://www.lawsociety.org.sg/html/CLAS/CLAS.html.

¹⁹³ The Malaysian state-funded Legal Aid Bureau is set up pursuant to the Malaysia Legal Aid Act 1971 and Legal Aid and Advice Regulations 1970. For a brief discussion of the history and the initial years after its establishment, see Abu Bakar Bin Awang, “Access to Justice: Legal Assistance to the Poor in Malaysia” [1979] 1 MLJ xlix.

¹⁹⁴ Compare with India in which public interest litigation has established the right to legal aid: see e.g. Sheela Barse v. Union of India AIR 1983 SC 378.

¹⁹⁵ For example, a Singapore Judge has suggested increasing the disposal income figure under the means test: see “In Conversation: An Interview with the Honourable Judicial Commissioner Lai Siu Chiu” (1992) 13 Singapore Law Review 1 at 21 Google Scholar.

¹⁹⁶ See e.g. section 5(2) and (3) of the Singapore Legal Aid and Advice Act (Cap. 160) (1996 Rev. Ed.); regulation 5 of the Legal Aid and Advice Regulations; and Malaysia Legal Aid and Advice Act 1971, Third Schedule.

¹⁹⁷ See Dietrich v. The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292 at 323 (Brennan, J.); 330 (Deane J)Google Scholar.

¹⁹⁸ In the United States, a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to counsel where his or her personal liberty is at stake: see Gideon v. Wainwright 372 US 335 (1963); compare the Australian position in Dietrich v. The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292 which does not recognise a right of access to counsel for an accused at public expense but the court has the power to stay the criminal proceedings if access to counsel is essential to a fair trial.

¹⁹⁹ See rule 96(a) of the Malaysian Rules of the Federal Court 1995 and 66(a) of the Malaysian Rules of the Court of Appeal 1994; rule 11(a) of the Singapore Supreme Court (Criminal Appeals) Rules, 1997 Rev. Ed.

²⁰⁰ Samatta, Barnabas A., “Access to the Courts for the Poor”, (2003) 15(2) Commonwealth Judicial Journal (Journal of the Commonwealth Magistrates' and Judges' Association) 29 at 30 Google Scholar; see also Doresamy v. Public Services Commission [1971] 2 MLJ 127 (in the context of the right to legal representation).

²⁰¹ See Dietrich v. The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292 (accused persons charged with a serious offence should in most cases be represented).

²⁰² Rule 96(b) of the Malaysian Rules of the Federal Court 1995 and rule 66(b) of the Malaysian Rules of the Court of Appeal 1994.

²⁰³ Rule 11(b) of the Singapore Supreme Court (Criminal Appeals) Rules, 1997 Rev. Ed.

²⁰⁴ (1980) 2 EHRR 305. See also Steel & Morris v. United Kingdom Application no. 64816/01, 15 February 2005. See generally, Shipman, Shirley, “ Steel & Morris v. United Kingdom: legal aid in the European Court of Human Rights” (2006) 25 Civil Justice Quarterly 5 Google Scholar.

²⁰⁵ See Ross Cranston, supra note 1 at p. 37.

²⁰⁶ 452 US 18 (1981). For a critique of the limited protection afforded to civil litigants in Lassiter, see Bruce Boyer, “Justice, Access to the Courts, and the Right to Free Counsel for Indigent Parents: The Continuing Scourge of Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham” (2005) 36 Loyola University of Chicago Law Journal 363.

²⁰⁷ Section 8(3) Legal Aid and Advice Act, 1996 Rev. Ed. Tan has interpreted the provision to mean that the Director may assess the behaviour of the applicant in relation to the proceedings: Tan Yock Lin, supra note 163, para 174. See also s. 17(3) of the Malaysian Legal Aid and Advice Act 1971.

²⁰⁸ K. E. Hilborne, “The Quality of Legal Aid in Singapore” [1969] 2 MLJ xlii at xliv.

²⁰⁹ See Ying, Yeo Hwee, “Provision of Legal Aid in Singapore” in Tan, Kevin (ed.), The Singapore Legal System (Singapore University Press, 1999) at p. 464 (at footnote 29)Google Scholar.

²¹⁰ Section 12(3) of the Malaysian Legal Aid and Advice Act.

²¹¹ See the UK Vexatious Actions Act, 1896 (59 & 60 Vict. c. 51) and Re Boaler [1915] 1 KB 21; Section 42 of the UK Supreme Court Act 1981.

²¹³ Section 74(2) of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap. 322, 1999 Rev. Ed.).

²¹³ Rules 31 and 32 of the Malaysian Rules of the Court of Appeal.

²¹⁴ See rule 32(5) of the Malaysian Rules of the Court of Appeal 1994.

²¹⁵ This agreement consists of the payment of a lawyer's fees contingent upon the outcome of the litigation.

²¹⁶ Section 3 of the Civil Law Act 1956.

²¹⁷ Section 3 of the Application of English Law Act.

²¹⁸ Thomas, Philip, “Contingency Fees: A Case Study for Malaysia” (1981) Anglo-American Law Review 37 at 45 Google Scholar.

²¹⁹ Section 107 (1)(b) of the Singapore Legal Profession Act; r. 37(b) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules (Cap. 161, R. 1, 2000 Rev. Ed.) (“An advocate and solicitor shall not enter into any negotiation with a client - (a) for an interest in the subject matter of litigation; or (b) except to the extent permitted by any scale of costs which may be applicable, for remuneration proportionate to the amount which may be recovered by the client in the proceedings”).

²²⁰ Section 112 of the Legal Profession Act, 1976.

²²¹ Re Chan Chow Wang (1982-3) SLR 413.

²²² See Landsman, Stephan, “The History of Contingency and the Contingency of History” (1998) 47 DePaul Law Review 261 Google Scholar; CJ, Russell in Ladd v. London Road Car Co (1990) 110 Law Times 80 Google Scholar.

²²³ See Lim Lie Hoa v. Ong Jane Rebecca [1997] 2 SLR 320.

²²⁴ Wallersteiner v. Moir (No. 2) [1975] 1 QB 373.

²²⁵ Access to Justice Act 1999.

²²⁶ With respect to Australia, see the recent decision of the High Court of Australia in Campbells Cash and Carry Pty Limited v Fostif Pty Limited; Australian Liquor Marketers Pty Limited v Berney [2006] HCA 41 in the context of litigation funding. In Campbells, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ cited at para. 65 Mason P's statement that the “law now looks favourably on funding arrangements that offer access to justice so long as any tendency to abuse of process is controlled” and that “public policy now recognises that it is desirable, in order to facilitate access to justice, that third parties should provide assistance designed to ensure that those who are involved in litigation have the benefit of legal representation"; Kirby J at paras. 144 and 145 reinforced the notion of access to justice as a “fundamental human right” (cf Callinan and Heydon JJ at para. 265). See also Lee Aitken, “Litigation Lending” After Fostif: An Advance in Consumer Protection, or a Licence to “Bottomfeeders”?” (2006) 28 Sydney Law Review 171 Google Scholar; Smart AJ in Volpes v Permanent Custodians Limited [2005] NSWSC 827; Gore v Justice Corp Pty Ltd [2002] FCA 354.

²²⁷ [1998] 3 All ER 65.

²²⁸ [1998] 3 All ER 65 at para. 18.

²²⁹ [1998] 3 All ER 65 at para. 32.

²³⁰ [2000] 1 All ER 608.

²³¹ The Court stated that contingency fee agreements are in breach of the prohibition in r. 8(1) of the UK Solicitors' Practices Rules 1990.

²³² See R (Factortame Ltd) v. Secretary of State for Transport (No. 8) [2003] QB 381 at 400.

²³³ [2000] 1 All ER 608 at 623.

²³⁴ For arguments on proposed legislative reforms in Singapore, see Chan, Gary, “Re-examining Public Policy - a Case for Conditional Fees in Singapore” (2004) 33(2) Common Law World Review 130 Google Scholar; and Yeo, Adrian, “Access to Justice: A Case for Contingency Fees in Singapore” (2004) 16 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 76 Google Scholar.

²³⁵ See the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in McIntyre Estate v. Ontario [2002] OJ No. 3417, 10 September, 2002 (at para. 85) which had urged the Ontario government to enact legislation to permit contingency fees.

²³⁶ Public policy concerns include the unprofessional conduct of lawyers and higher legal fees: see Low Hop Bing, “Contingent Fee - Expedient Access to Justice” [1982] 2 MLJ iv; at the time of publication of his article, the learned judge was serving as President, Sessions Court in Ipoh, Malaysia. Cf Yong CJ's views in “In Conversation: An Interview With the Honourable Chief Justice Mr Yong Pung How” [1991] Singapore Law Review 1 at 23-24 (adopting a cautious approach to the introduction of contingency fees).