

TERRORISM, DRUGS, AND VIOLENCE IN LATIN AMERICA

Jennifer S. Holmes
University of Texas at Dallas

- NIGHTWATCH: THE POLITICS OF PROTEST IN THE ANDES.* By Orin Starn. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1999. Pp. 329. \$49.95 cloth, \$17.95 paper.)
- MONKEY'S PAW: NEW CHRONICLES FROM PERU.* By Robin Kirk. (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1997. Pp. 215. \$45.00 cloth, \$15.95 paper.)
- SENDERO LUMINOSO IN CONTEXT: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY.* By John Bennett. (Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow, 1998. Pp. 229. \$60.00 cloth.)
- THE SHINING PATH.* By Gustavo Gorriti. Translated by Robin Kirk. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999. Pp. 290. \$60.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.)
- URBAN POVERTY, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, AND THE STATE: LIMA, 1970–1990.* By Henry Dietz. (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998. Pp. 307. \$50.00 cloth, \$22.95 paper.)
- STATE BUILDING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN COLOMBIA, 1986–1994.* By Harvey Kline. (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1999. Pp. 240. \$34.95 cloth.)
- COLOMBIA: THE POLITICS OF REFORMING THE STATE.* Edited by Eduardo Posada-Carbó. (New York: St. Martin's, 1998. Pp. 286. \$65.00 cloth.)
- VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA, 1990–2000: WAGING WAR AND NEGOTIATING PEACE.* Edited by Charles Bergquist, Ricardo Peñaranda, and Gonzalo Sánchez. (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 2001. Pp. 300. \$60.00 cloth, \$21.95 paper.)

Violence, ineffective government, and impunity are unfortunately common problems in Latin America. Both Peru and Colombia have faced economic crises, rampant violence, and weak governments. Peru experienced the peak of violence in 1989 and a subsequent decline in recent years. Since 1980 Peru has returned to democracy, struggled with violence, and survived President Alberto Fujimori's *autogolpe* and the subsequent corruption of his regime. Currently, Peru is recovering. Colombia, however, remains mired in a morass of drug-related guerrilla, state, and paramilitary violence that continues to escalate. The eight books to be reviewed here shed light on the

specific situations in Peru and Colombia, but they also offer general lessons about democracy, violence, and state responses to violence.

Democracy

What happens to the quality of democracy and political participation in countries facing violence with or without or inefficient government? How do citizens react? Conversely, is there something about Peruvian and Colombian democracy that encouraged violent protest? Three books examine the broader issues of democracy in the context of violence.

In *Urban Poverty, Political Participation, and the State: Lima, 1970–1990*, Henry Dietz covers two decades of Peruvian social, political, and economic change with a focus on political participation. He concentrates on the formal and informal participation of Lima's low-income working class. Dietz describes how poor Limeños were simply trying to guarantee their own survival, increase local control, and gain some sense of certainty during these twenty years. Building on four surveys conducted in 1970, 1982, 1985, and 1990 and bolstering them with ethnographic studies, surveys, and observation, Dietz analyzes the participation of the poor and how it has shaped the larger society. He also examines how patterns of participation are affected by regime change. He considers four factors—macro-level economic conditions, poverty, the state, and the relations between the state and society—at the three levels of the city, the district, and the neighborhood to comprehend participation. Working with these factors and within them different levels, Dietz creates a multilevel model of individual political participation. To elaborate on his model, he discusses the macroeconomic problems, such as poverty, both before democracy and under democracy.

Dietz covers Lima and six selected neighborhoods in *Urban Poverty*. He also provides a quantitative analysis of changes in modes of participation over the 1970s and 1980s. He examines participation in a theoretical framework in which he views democracy as a public good and political and economic preference dimensions that influence an individual's decisions about participating over time. Informal participation is especially informative because it reveals what the poor consider to be rational actions. Dietz finds that when economic conditions worsen and state policies are perceived as ineffectual, the poor will focus more on local activities as opposed to political efforts aimed at the state. He also concludes that new neighborhoods and those experiencing extreme economic pressures exhibit high levels of involvement in informal political participation.

In general, Dietz examines how the poor participated in Peruvian politics and the evolution of their participation. He also analyzes what factors influenced participation in order to understand the arenas, modes, and options of participation. He combines in-depth knowledge of Peru with an exhaustive awareness of relevant theory, deftly blending them throughout

Urban Poverty. Dietz tests and builds on the theories of Albert Hirschman, Sydney Verba, and Norman Nie, among others. Dietz succeeds in producing a rich analysis of both informal and formal participation. Even so, the book will leave readers wishing for another round of study of 1992 and beyond to examine the autogolpe in 1992 and the eventual fall of the Fujimori regime.

Orin Starn's *Nightwatch: The Politics of Protest in the Andes* grew out of fieldwork experiences spanning a decade. Drawing on his many visits to Peru, which ranged from the small village of Tunnel Six to Lima, Starn offers an in-depth account of one particular form of political participation: the *rondas campesinas* in Peru. He focuses on the rondas in the north of Peru—not the movement of the same name in the south and central parts of the country organized by the military to fight the insurgencies. Starn chronicles the ronda movement in the north from its origins in peasant crime patrols to its evolution toward providing a grassroots alternative to the corrupt and inept Peruvian justice system. He finishes by discussing the decline of the movement. This masterful work is captivating and honest, filled with engaging anecdotes yet analytically informed by classic and recent theoretical works. Starn draws on countless interviews with ronda participants, villagers, and leaders. He conducted village ethnography in Tunnel Six in 1986 and 1987, went back for multi-locale fieldwork in 1990 and 1991, and returned to Lima in 1997.

A main focus of *Nightwatch* is the formation of the rondas. Starn zeroes in on two dimensions: theft and encouragement from the government. When Starn arrived in Tunnel Six, he found that almost eight hundred animals had been stolen in the village between 1980 and 1983, more than six per family. For poor families trying to survive the economic contraction between 1975 and 1990, losing six animals over a period of three years could well threaten their survival. Starn also found evidence that the government was involved in starting these northern rondas in various ways: from creating a feeling of identity and inclusion among the villagers under the government of General Juan Velasco Alvarado, to having the lieutenant governor, subprefect, policeman, or schoolteacher organize nightly rounds. This history is interesting considering that by the 1990s, many in the rondas considered the town bureaucrats and government officials to be enemies of the movements.

Starn also covers the expansion of the ronda movement in *Nightwatch*. The nascent movement borrowed methods of discipline, punishment, and procedures from the haciendas and the military patrols. Despite the historical bitterness of the villagers toward haciendas and the military, at the height of the movement, the rondas were the villages' best bets for security, survival, and accountability from the government. The rondas functioned in the interests of their own community, not that of the landlord or a distant bureaucrat or politician. In the case of Tunnel Six, within a few years of

founding the *ronda*, only a dozen or so animals disappeared or were stolen. Although some *ronda* discipline was strict and corporal, it emphasized reintegrating the accused into the community as a reformed individual. Later, as crime declined, the *rondas* evolved into providing an alternative to the official justice system. Rallied by their success in drastically reducing crime, the *rondas* shifted to solving disputes among villagers. *Ronda* assemblies allowed the villages to settle their conflicts without resorting to contact with the police, judges, lawyers, and bureaucrats who often were corrupt in administering justice and dismissive of villagers' concerns. This new role played by *rondas* created conflict with the traditional justice system.

Starn also examines the role of women, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and leaders in the *rondas*. In the early days, women's committees were organized to make sure that the men woke up to participate in the nightly rounds, despite the lack of precedent from women's movements. As soon as village women saw the benefits of the *rondas* in reducing theft of animals, they became enthusiastic supporters. The *rondas* also became an option for women who were abused by their husbands.

The *rondas* matured in a time when the numbers of NGOs were rapidly increasing. Sometimes the NGOs collaborated with the *rondas* but sometimes attempted to bypass them. In some instances, NGOs actually weakened previously robust movements. Yet NGOs were essential in freeing many *ronda* leaders from jail.

Starn also studies the leadership in *rondas*. Just as presidents were elected after the return to democracy, so were *ronda* leaders. Leadership positions were costly to maintain, however, financially and in terms of reputation. As the role of *rondas* expanded into settling disputes, the costs of leadership increased because not everyone won his or her case in the assemblies. Starn also discusses efforts to create *ronda* federations at the regional and national levels. He found that the original aim of reducing theft encouraged a local bond but that similar bonds at the regional and national level were difficult to form and maintain. By examining these issues in *Nightwatch*, he provides a valuable in-depth account of the *ronda* movement.

As the steep decline in theft made nightly rounds unnecessary and as the court system was reformed, it eventually became easier for villages to access and be served by the official apparatus. This trend made it riskier for the *ronda* assemblies to settle conflicts. In response, the *rondas* turned to organizing public works. This mission was not as clear or productive, however, because many organizations avoided the *rondas*, and resources sometimes corrupted the leadership. Despite the decline of the *rondas*, Starn concludes that they succeeded in reducing crime, resolving conflicts, and forcing the government to pay attention to peasants. Overall, *Nightwatch* is an extensive and impressive study of the *rondas* of the north.

In *Colombia: The Politics of Reforming the State*, edited by Eduardo Posada-Carbó, the contributors focus on attempts to reform the Colombian state

and the persistent problems that make effective reform elusive. This volume emerged from a conference entitled "The Colombian Process of Reform: A New Role for the State," held at the Institute of Latin American Studies in London in April 1995. The list of contributors is a who's who in Colombian politics, including former President Belisario Betancur, presidential advisors, ministers, and academics.

In this volume, Marco Palacios addresses postcolonial New Granada, focusing on attempts to centralize power in the context of regional conflict. The result was a decentralized legacy and a state suffering from a lack of legitimacy. Palacios continues his analysis into the nineteenth century, when efforts to procure a centralized modern state were frustrated. He concludes that all the constitutional reforms "have resulted out of agreements from above, to solve conflicts within the elite" (p. 41). In Palacios's view of these cases, the majority in Colombia was still treated as a minority and the fundamental problems of a lack of legitimacy remain.

Gary Hoskin's contribution focuses on the resilient Colombian two-party system and on party organization. Rather than blaming the parties for failing to modernize the system to reflect appropriately the changes in a modernizing society, Hoskin shows how the parties have been extremely successful at adapting to changing environments. He develops a typology of five major stages of party organization. Regarding the second stage of the aborted transition to mass-based parties, Hoskin demonstrates that the parties were stronger than the Colombian state. In the end, he remains optimistic that Colombian parties will emerge out of the current stage restructured into more accountable, participatory, and transparent organizations.

Manuel José Cepeda's essay analyzes the Constitution of 1991. Cepeda characterizes the new constitution as centered around the ideal of participatory democracy and a strengthened judiciary. The idea was to strengthen the state by empowering the people. Although Cepeda believes that not enough time has passed to judge the constitution fully, he thinks that the state has been strengthened as a result. Some innovations like the Tutela have successfully redistributed some power and granted the average Colombian effective and prompt access to the court system.¹ The Constitutional Court has provided a venue for implementing the new constitution.

Contributor Gustavo Bell Lemus focuses on the move toward decentralization in this reform as part of participatory democracy. A former governor of the department of Atlántico and now vice president of Colombia, he argues that decentralization is doomed to fail unless the old clientelistic practices are eliminated and the political parties are modernized.

Alvaro Tirado Mejía addresses *violentología*, the study of La Violencia.

1. The *acción de tutela* is an innovation introduced in the Constitution of 1991 that gives citizens access to the court system when they believe public officials have violated or failed to protect their rights.

He reviews various approaches, including economic and social interpretations and institutional studies (especially of the judiciary). He finds that violence has regional characteristics related to patterns of population settlement. Tirado Mejía also blames the lack of effective state and judicial systems in Colombia.

Jesús Duarte looks at clientelism and decentralization in the context of educational reform. The Constitution of 1991 mandated nine years of education for Colombians, and President Ernesto Samper attempted to meet this requirement. Duarte analyzes the historical problem of education in Colombia, the Samper reform proposals, the historical weakness of the state in regard to education, and politicization of the educational administration. He delineates how almost all aspects of managing public teachers and the support staff depend on clientelism. This kind of clientelism results in high turnover among the directors and senior staff members of educational institutions. Duarte concludes that two problems need to be addressed if the Colombian educational system is to be reformed successfully: the weakness of the education ministry and the clientelistic nature of public education.

Alan Gilbert reviews the housing policy under Presidents César Gaviria and Samper. Instead of following the traditional approach of building houses for the poor, the state opted for a less direct role in which it reformed housing, land, and financial sectors to encourage the market to solve the housing problem. Finally, Gilbert assesses various approaches to increasing housing options for the poor in a country like Colombia, concluding that it is better to subsidize the provision of infrastructure and services rather than providing housing directly.

Jorge Ramírez analyzes the economic reforms known as *la apertura*. He discusses the gradual opening of the economy and the end of import-substitution industrialization under Gaviria. The Colombian economy is unique in that it grew even during “the lost decade” of the 1980s. But despite a proud tradition of sound fiscal management, Colombia faces the challenges of drug trafficking and its impact on the economy. In general, Ramírez believes the reforms to be successful and resilient.

Armando Montenegro focuses on the modest level of state intervention in Colombia under the Gaviria administration. He examines the administration’s goal of deregulating the economy while creating new institutions to regulate the new free markets. Montenegro also scrutinizes the strengthening of traditional state roles, as in security, the judiciary, and services for the poor. Somewhat pessimistically, he acknowledges that the weaker the government, the less likely neoliberal reforms are to succeed. He hopes that in the end, regulation will not become just another political tool but part of a modern and efficient economic system.

Contributor Rudolf Hommes discusses the Colombian budget institutions, especially the central bank, the Banco de la República. Despite the decentralizing reforms of 1991, the main thrust of building financial insti-

tutions in Colombia has been to give the central government autonomous power to craft fiscal policy. The Central Bank operates independently, and the fiscal policies have created stability and moderate growth. Hommes worries nonetheless that after implementing these decentralizing reforms, the government will have to apply tighter fiscal restraint to achieve price and exchange-rate stability.

All these contributions to *Colombia: The Politics of Reforming the State* discuss in one way or another the difficulties of reforming the Colombian state into an efficient state that can guarantee security, human rights, and the rule of law. Many of the essays in this volume focus on the persistent problem of clientelism. In addition, many make the connection between strengthening the state and worsening clientelism because some politicians were then able to take advantage of expanded state power. Without eliminating the tradition of clientelism in the political system, the reforms of the early 1990s as well as present and future reforms will be jeopardized.

Peruvian Violence

Three of the books under review address violence in Peru. Robin Kirk tells gripping stories about the violence, the violent, and the Peruvian state. Gustavo Gorriti delves into the history, development, and strategy of Sendero Luminoso, placing it in the context of a new democracy. John Bennett has compiled a useful annotated bibliography on Sendero, organized thematically to introduce readers to the published literature up to 1995.

An independent journalist, Robin Kirk first visited Peru in 1983. In 1986 she lived in the village of Tunnel Six and later in Lima. Her novel, *Monkey's Paw: New Chronicles from Peru*, is a rich compilation of personal interviews, Peruvian history, personal narrative, and contemporary Peruvian reality. Kirk combines ancient myth with contemporary stories to create seven chronicles.

In the first tale, "Heroes," Kirk focuses on the rondas campesinas, detailing the friction between ronda leaders and the official authorities, the precarious role of women in the rondas, and the limitations on the rondas' ability to impose solutions leading to reliance on persuasion and broad community support. In the second chronicle, "Blackout," she discusses the late 1980s, when the Peruvian economy was plummeting and Sendero Luminoso was intensifying its campaign in Lima. In "Recorded in Stone," Kirk builds on her interviews with female Sendero militants to discuss how Peruvian women became an important part of the guerrilla movement. Kirk recounts compellingly the story of Sendero and the government's responses. She also details the case of María Elena Moyano, the vice mayor of Villa El Salvador who was assassinated by Sendero. In "Señoras" Kirk covers the 1990 elections in which Fujimori was elected. Having lived through his "Fujishock," Kirk provides a telling and compassionate account of the dif-

difficulties of living in Peru at that time. In "Monkey's Paw," Kirk follows the experiences of the Castillo family in order to discuss state violence. Son Ernesto Castillo disappeared. But unlike the typical disappeared person, he came from a middle-class family who had some contacts with the government. Kirk chronicles their efforts to find out what happened to their son and their attempts to protect their daughter from a similar fate. Kirk tells the tale within the context of international and local human rights groups and amnesty laws. Her final tale, "Home," narrates the plight of internal refugees in Peru, caught in the conflicts among the civil defense committees, Sendero, and the army. Kirk follows them fleeing to Lima and returning to the countryside. She tells the story of those who attempted to rebuild their lives in the city and in the towns. Together, the seven chronicles constitute an eloquent telling of life in Peru.

John Bennett's *Sendero Luminoso in Context: An Annotated Bibliography* provides brief yet descriptive annotations of works on the Sendero movement, arranged by topic. Bennett places the movement in a broad context of Peruvian history, society, and culture. This annotated bibliography adds to two earlier works: *Violencia política en Peru, 1980–1988* (published by DESCO in 1989), which detailed the Peruvian media's coverage of the Sendero; and Peter Stern's *Shining Path Guerrilla Movement, 1980–1993*, which focused more on the scholarly literature but also covered foreign and domestic media. Bennett's bibliography is organized into twenty-one substantive sections. The topics vary widely, covering the revolutionary period, social conditions, various presidencies, leftist groups, the drug trade, and many other topics. Within the sections, entries are described concisely and organized alphabetically by author. Bennett also provides a helpful index.

Gustavo Gorriti's, *The Shining Path* was originally published in Spanish in 1990. It remains essential reading for understanding Sendero Luminoso. A respected Peruvian investigative journalist, Gorriti wrote regularly for *Caretas* during this period. Many of the documents on which Gorriti based his book have been donated to Princeton University and are now available to researchers. The book was masterfully translated by Robin Kirk.

Gorriti focuses on the Shining Path during the transition to democracy and into the early 1980s. He discusses in depth the ideology of the movement but also chronicles the evolution of the state response to Sendero. Beginning with the democratically inclined José María de la Jara, the first minister of the interior, Gorriti skillfully lays out the government's difficulties in meeting the guerrillas' challenge. As if narrating a well-written tragedy, Gorriti leads readers through tales of missing files on guerrilla movements that the military had kept, to corruption in the ministries, and to the difficulties of controlling the police and military and encouraging effective action. He also describes the strategy that Sendero developed, following its growth as a movement and the evolution of its activity. He skillfully portrays the guerrillas' dedication in a chapter entitled "The Quota." The quota

refers to the belief that every Senderista was committed to dying for the cause and would not hesitate to kill anyone in the way of achieving the movement's Maoist goals. Gorritti also details the development of the state response, including the use of specialized police units, the Sinchis, states of emergency, and the military. Throughout *The Shining Path*, Gorritti skillfully relates the story of Sendero members, victims, and targets, weaving together a coherent description of the movement that challenged the survival of Peru as a nation.

The Colombian Violence in Context and Proposed Solutions

The final two books under review together provide masterful overviews of the conflict in Colombia and examine possible solutions. Both works will engage readers who have the sophisticated background knowledge necessary to appreciate the complexity of the Colombian crisis. Harvey Kline focuses on the time period from 1986 to 1994, while Eduardo Posada-Carbó's edited volume covers all of the 1990s.

In *State Building and Conflict Resolution in Colombia, 1986–1994*, Kline reviews the attempts to resolve the many Colombian conflicts. The main problem with this book is its title. Its specific time period may imply to the general reader that the lessons learned in these periods are not relevant for the current day and beyond. On the contrary, Kline's book is essential to understanding the complexities of achieving peace and the constraints on fulfilling that goal in Colombia today. He provides a thoughtful historical analysis and then details the efforts to negotiate with the paramilitaries, the guerrillas, and the narcotraffickers in Colombia. Kline also acknowledges the human rights violations inflicted by the Colombian government. He focuses mainly on the presidencies of Virgilio Barco Vargas (1986–1990) and César Gaviria Trujillo (1990–1994).

Presidents Barco and Gaviria both tried to solve the conflict peacefully, a change from the previous 150 years of Colombian history. Kline begins his study with a discussion of state building. In Colombia, it is difficult to discuss state building when the power of the narcos, the guerrillas, and the paramilitaries make the state irrelevant in many parts of the country. To analyze the peace efforts in this context of weakness, Kline examines the human rights situation, the role of the police, and the Colombian court system, recognizing fully that nongovernmental groups may have taken over some roles not performed by the government. In an era when many on-lookers misrepresent the situation in Colombia as one of crisp lines drawn between "good guys" and "bad guys," Kline stresses how the lines separating guerrillas, paramilitaries, and drug groups are ambiguous and fluid. To this end, he constructs a precise overview of the Colombian state and the emergence of all three groups. Kline also looks at the role of the military, from its involvement in internal security, to the expansion of its role into

drug operations, to its support or nonsupport of the peace processes. Kline portrays a situation in which the state was weak, the politically motivated guerrillas had a robust ideology, economically motivated drug dealers were flush with money, and the sometimes legal paramilitaries felt justified in committing violence because of the state's weakness.

President Barco's negotiations, according to some estimates, resolved 95 percent of the guerrilla violence at the time. Kline believes that the Barco government was successful in negotiating the end of the M-19 because that group was not as ideologically committed to Marxism as the other groups and because of the group's weakness after the incident at the Palacio de Justicia.² Despite Barco's success with the M-19, the attempts at securing cease-fires with the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and the Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL) failed. Thus Barco's success with the M-19 did not significantly strengthen the state because of the failure to reach an agreement with all the guerrilla groups. Kline discovers a general pattern, in which the government succeeds with small groups but fails with large ones, a pattern that began with Barco and continued through Gaviria's years in office.

In regard to the drug issue, Barco tried both a military response and a more conciliatory response. In the end, he failed to secure a settlement with the narcos, and in a context of public unwillingness to settle with groups that had ruthlessly pursued economic rather than political ends. Instead, the government focused on capturing or killing top drug lords like Pablo Escobar. But the drug lords augmented their power vis-à-vis the state as drug corruption spread. The inability of the Colombian state to control its own territory is exemplified in the case of the paramilitaries. At the beginning of the Barco administration, the government was unaware of the severity of the vigilantism. But once it became more aware, the Barco administration subscribed to a belief that if the guerrillas were eliminated, the paramilitaries would fade away. As the paramilitaries evolved and became implicated in drug money and involved with the military, violations of human rights increased and the government became even weaker.

Nor could Gaviria capitalize on the opportunities to settle the conflict with the main guerrilla groups during and after the Constitutional Assembly. Instead, he found success with three minor groups. Gaviria also began asking for total war against the paramilitaries and the narcos. In the end, he plea-bargained with the narcos but failed to stop drug terrorism, although it subsided after the death of Escobar. The negotiating policies were hampered by a lack of support, inconsistency, and weak military performance. Kline recounts how Gaviria had some success in resolving conflict with the paramilitaries. Kline then explains the problems of definition:

2. The M-19 seized the Palacio de Justicia in 1985, an act that resulted in the deaths of one hundred persons, including eleven supreme court justices.

according to the Colombian military, a self-help group was one armed by the military and a paramilitary group was armed by someone else. Kline shows how the negotiations were hamstrung by ties to drug dealers and to the military.

Kline also discusses constitutional and judicial reforms in *State Building* in order to examine the idea that a more open and democratic state would undermine the causes of guerrilla conflict. He considers the idea that strengthening the judicial system would discourage the violence of the drug dealers and paramilitaries. Specifically, Kline examines the effectiveness of the 1991 constitutional reform and other reforms undertaken by Barco and Gaviria.

In the end, Kline assesses the effectiveness of the policies of these two presidents. Did their policies affect the level of crime and violence in Colombia? Barco had success with the M-19, Gaviria with the drug terrorism of the Medellín group and some paramilitary groups. But despite these successes, the violence did not significantly decrease. Kline elaborates on historical reasons explaining why the Colombian state could function well in certain situations of conflict resolution but fail in others. He focuses on three. First, Kline believes that the historical structure of the Colombian state and previous political decisions complicated peace making. He points to the traditional weakness of the state, the traditions of violence, and the historically intense religious conflict. Second, Kline thinks that too much drug money has flooded Colombia, infiltrating the paramilitaries, filling the coffers of the guerrillas, and forcing the government to devote more and more of its budget to police and military functions instead of social programs. Third, the modernization of Colombian society put new stresses on a political system that never had been particularly effective. In conclusion, Kline finds that a modern state has never existed in Colombia. He is somewhat optimistic nonetheless that the reforms of the Constitution of 1991 may yet create a political party system capable of producing much needed social reform.

Violence in Colombia, 1990–2000: Waging War and Negotiating Peace is a comprehensive collection that will provide readers with an understanding of the current crisis in Colombia. Edited by Charles Bergquist, Ricardo Peñaranda, and Gonzalo Sánchez, it is a sequel to an earlier volume published by Scholarly Resources in 1992.³ All but two of the essays were written by Colombian scholars. The volume also contains several helpful features: a glossary, a chronology, a section on documents, and an appendix with comparative homicide data.

Contributor Gonzalo Sánchez assesses how the violence in Colombia has changed in the 1990s, highlighting how complex a problem it has become, one with international aspects. He provides an overview that in-

3. Published by Scholarly Resources in 1992.

cludes the history of violence and the different actors participating in it. Sánchez concludes that the problem is greater than just a conflict between guerrillas and the Colombian government because it lays bare the limitations of the country's current form of democracy. He calls for a fundamental reorganization of Colombian democracy in order to construct a new national consensus that can solve long-festered political and social problems.

Contributor Rodrigo Uprimny Yepes compares Colombia with Bolivia in arguing that violence is not simply a reflection of poverty, social fragmentation, or the drug trade. He views it instead as resulting from a lack of collective action. Yepes finds a depoliticization and failure of social movements under the Frente Nacional governments (1958–1974) that favored a violent form of political action in Colombia, in contrast to a preference for collective action in Bolivia. Yepes cites three reasons why the Colombian state is stable but weak: the decentralized clientelism of the party system, the social homogeneity of the elite, and the “mechanisms of aggregating the interests of the dominant economic agents in which the State . . . plays an independent and autonomous role” (p. 42). In his view, Colombian democracy has been a very closed system, closer to an aristocracy than a true democracy. He perceives Colombian violence resulting from a lack of popular influence due to a lack of collective action. In response, violence increases social fragmentation, which results in more violence. Yepes calls for greater democratic participation to confront the violence.

Ana María Bejarano scrutinizes the Constitution of 1991. She believes that the new constitution expressed the hopes of many Colombians, thus addressing dissatisfaction with the political system dominated by the two political parties. The new constitution also incorporates participatory reforms, such as fiscal and administrative decentralization, representation for ethnic and religious minorities, and improved citizen control over the state. Bejarano finds nevertheless that the Colombian state remains weak despite the reforms due to having excluded the large guerrilla groups, paramilitaries, and the military from the Constituent Assembly.

Mauricio Reina analyzes the effects of drug trafficking on the economy, arguing that the inflow of income from the drug trade harms it. Although drug money has helped some regional economies, enriched a small sector of society, and contributed to consumption and investment flows, it has hurt the Colombian economy on balance. According to Reina, drug money has led to appreciation of the peso, which harmed legal exports. In addition, income from the drug trade is typically reinvested in ways that do not stimulate the rest of the economy positively, and it has distorted the national markets. The violence, corruption, and disruption associated with the drug trade have also discouraged foreign capital investment in Colombia.

Luis Alberto Restrepo reviews the human rights situation. Using a concept of human rights that emerged from the time of the French Revolution, he analyzes human rights in Colombia. Restrepo passionately chastises

the human rights groups and the international community for failing to focus on the violations committed by the guerrilla groups instead of highlighting government groups. He absolves no groups of responsibility for their violence, however, whether they be the paramilitaries, the government, or the guerrillas.⁴

Fernando Cubides examines the paramilitaries. He finds that such groups justify their existence as a response to the guerrillas and believes that they will go away when the guerrillas do. Cubides follows the evolution of these groups from the time when they were legal until 1989, when the 1968 law that allowed their formation was abolished. But they did not disappear after 1989. Many groups formed alliances, and some worked as part of the defense ministry's CONVIVIR (Cooperativas para la Vigilancia y la Seguridad Privada) until it too was abolished in 1999. Cubides also analyzes the economic aspects of the paramilitary movement. He finds that proclamations to quash paramilitary violence are not credible, given that the government lacks the resources, support, and right conditions to make that happen.

Contributor Donny Meertens takes an innovative look at gender relations in the context of Colombian violence. She compares the violence toward women during La Violencia to that of today. Meertens also analyzes how today's violence affects men and women in different ways. For example, men are more likely to be killed, but women are more likely to be displaced. She also considers gender differences among war refugees.

Miguel Angel Urrego examines social and popular movements. In particular, he examines the consequences of a strategy of the Left to justify armed struggle for groups seeking political reform. Because of this strategy, Urrego argues, the legal Left in Colombia has paid a high price in assassinations. He also looks at the neoliberal reforms on the legal Left and concludes, "The social movement is situated between a hardening of the Right, a debilitation of the Left, and a strengthening of the armed forces, all of which have contributed to a situation of escalating violence" and the weakening of social movements (p. 177). Urrego finds that although the neoliberal reforms have unified these movements, such reforms may also threaten them because much of the current peace process proposes peace in exchange for their permanent implementation.

Coeditor Ricardo Peñaranda provides an overview of the Colombian literature on violence of the 1990s. This essay is particularly useful for those unaware of the work of Colombian scholars. He also stresses the multiple forms of violence and the interdependence of different kinds of violence. Peñaranda finds that scholarship has significantly improved in the

4. It should be noted that in 2001, Human Rights Watch released a special report documenting the abuses of FARC. See Human Rights Watch, "Colombia: Rebel Abuses Worsening," July 2001, available online at www.hwr.org/press/2001/07/farc-0709.htm.

1990s in contributing more data, achieving a better understanding of the failure of the state and its relationship to the violence, and advancing the public debate. In the conclusion, Charles Bergquist compares the Colombian crisis at the end of the nineteenth century with the contemporary crisis. He proposes a negotiated settlement based on real reform that is supported by a strong majority of Colombians.

Conclusion

In addition to providing comprehensive analyses of Colombian and Peruvian violence, these works outline some general themes about violence and democracy. As Martha Crenshaw has instructed in *Terrorism in Context*, the study of terrorism must be broadly contextualized, with proper attention paid to the political, social, and economic aspects.⁵ Numerous authors stress the changing identities of the guerrillas, paramilitaries, and drug traffickers and the ambiguous divisions among them. These books thus prevent oversimplification of the actors. A common theme throughout these works is the focus on violence in a discussion of the quality of democracy. Strengthening participatory democracy, encouraging collective action, and finding new forms of participation like informal participation and rondas are all cited as potential solutions to the problems of violence, impunity, and ineffective government. Other works in this set focus on obstacles to reform, especially clientelism and drug money. Overall, these eight books highlight the need to examine violence within a broad perspective that also considers the quality of democracy.

5. Martha Crenshaw, *Terrorism in Context* (University Park: Pennsylvania State Press, 1995).