Tryptophan depletion in addictive behaviours

We read with interest the article by Cox et al1 and the insightful editorial by Nutt2 and applaud both the research staff and the patients involved in this important study in view of the ethical issues and challenges in their work. They provide supportive evidence that low serotonin activity can increase dopaminergic responses to cocaine in humans, suggesting a possible mechanism specific to ‘a low-serotonin state’ in causing addictive behaviours. Although illuminating, the results of the study should be interpreted with caution.

First, Cox et al use acute tryptophan depletion producing a reduction in plasma tryptophan, assumed to represent low levels of serotonin in the brain. The primary neuropharmacological effect of cocaine is to block the uptake of monoamines released into synapses, thereby increasing synaptic monoamine availability. It has been shown that cocaine can increase extracellular levels of serotonin in the nucleus accumbens of rats.3 Notably, in Cox et al’s study, plasma concentrations of tryptophan did not significantly differ between cocaine and placebo, which appears to be an unexpected finding. This should be left open to discussion. Second, the interplay between serotonin and cocaine may be altered after repeated cocaine administration,4 a common manifestation in ‘real-world’ cocaine users. In this context, a study using an acute tryptophan depletion method plus repeated cocaine administration for patients with or without cocaine dependence, although ethically challenging, may obviously be of great clinical significance. Third, using repeated measures ANOVAs, it was assumed that the effects of cocaine did not carry over across conditions. Thus, it would have been clearer if the intervals between each condition were defined.

In addition to the issues raised by Nutt,5 as to the differences in response to various drugs of addiction, we would like to suggest that future research in the field of addiction focuses on using the tryptophan depletion test. For example, we now know that in pathological gamblers, dopamine release in ventral striatum correlates with excitement levels during the Iowa Gambling Task.6 The study by Cox et al6 showed that low serotonin activity augmented, rather than diminished, dopamine release in response to cocaine.

In summary, Cox et al’s study7 is a valuable contribution to the field of addiction, and we anticipate further studies examining the relationship between experimental reductions in serotonin activity and endogenous dopamine release in various addictive behaviours under control of the relevant stimuli.

5 Linnet J, Moller A, Peterson E, Gjedde A, Doudet D. Dopamine release in ventral striatum during Iowa Gambling Task performance is associated with increased excitement levels in pathological gambling. Addiction 2011; 106: 383–90.

Authors’ reply: Liang & Ho raise a number of interesting points. First, participants were tested following cocaine ingestion while in a low serotonin v. control state. Investigating the effects of repeated cocaine use in these states, we agree, would be interesting. Second, cocaine ingestion did not alter plasma tryptophan levels. We consider this a strength. Although acute cocaine administration increases extracellular serotonin levels, this need not be associated with decreased tryptophan levels in the periphery. In comparison, tryptophan levels fell as expected after the acute tryptophan depletion procedure, changes that are indicative of decreased availability of the serotonin precursor in brain. Third, Liang & Ho cite recent work indicating that greater striatal dopamine release in pathological gamblers correlates with higher subjective excitement and poorer performance during the Iowa Gambling Task.1,2 Our own study raises the possibility that individuals exhibiting the largest dopamine responses might have lower serotonergic tone. Although Campbell-Meiklejohn et al’s elegant study suggests that low serotonin increases sensitivity to punishment when healthy participants perform an unfamiliar task, other work indicates that serotonin induces the opposite effect in response to highly salient rewards.4 Moreover, numerous impulsivity subcomponents have been proposed, and serotonin’s contribution to them seems to vary. Fourth, the minimum time between cocaine test sessions was 2 days, well beyond the drug’s plasma half-life of 40–60 min. Average time between test sessions 1 and 2 was 30 days (s.d. = 19), and 36 days (s.d. = 46)
between sessions 2 and 3. These sessions were randomised and counterbalanced, and no order effects were observed.

Finally, as Liang & Ho note, Professor Nutt commented on the two main effects of acute tryptophan depletion. That is, acute tryptophan depletion increased the dopamine response when patients took cocaine, and decreased it when the drug was absent. These opposite effects in the presence of absence of drug might contribute to a core feature of substance misuse: i.e. increased incentive motivational states when drugs and highly desirable drug cues are present, and decreases when such stimuli are absent.5


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Encephalitis and schizophrenia: a matter of words

The two recent articles1,2 on the psychiatric manifestations of antibody-mediated encephalitis are important reminders that a well-informed differential diagnosis has far reaching implications for providing optimal patient care. It is indeed instructive to note that a marked recovery is possible with immunosuppressant therapy. Additionally, the need for close liaison with plasma exchange facilities, gynaecologists, neurologists and immunologists represents a novel departure for many practitioners, we presume. We did, however, have some concerns with the title of the Lennox et al editorial.1 Describing the encephalitis as a treatable cause of schizophrenia jarred a little. First, we were concerned that the editorial title could give the impression that other causes of schizophrenia are not treatable. This brings to mind another excellent editorial, by Williams et al.3 They proposed that we should use the term ‘neuroleptic resistance’ as opposed to treatment resistance when discussing clozapine therapy to avoid therapeutic nihilism. Second, is what is being described schizophrenia or a schizophrenia-like illness? The ICD-104 states that ‘schizophrenia should not be diagnosed in the presence of overt brain disease.’ As neuroimaging progresses, this stipulation might no longer be tenable. Is it preferable to refer to this type of presentation as a psychosis? However, these are minor quibbles and we will certainly view initial psychotic presentations differently as a consequence of these two important contributions to the psychiatric literature.


Authors’ reply: We suggest that the evidence shows that although antipsychotics are effective in alleviating some, although often not all, of the symptoms of schizophrenia, there is no evidence that they treat the underlying disorder. The editorial was highlighting the fact that the clinical syndrome of patients with psychosis and N-methyl-D-aspartate receptor antibodies is the same as those with schizophrenia, such that most patients with this new disorder have previously received diagnoses of schizophrenia. However, as O’Laughlin et al state, having an identifiable cause invalidates the diagnosis of schizophrenia according to ICD. We agree that a syndrome of psychoses is a better diagnostic construct. This situation is not unique to psychiatry. In epilepsies, despite the rapid advance in discovery of aetiological factors, the diagnosis remains based on the clinical presentation of the seizures.

Declaration of interest

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Loss of autism in DSM-5

I wish to comment on the phrase in the editorial by Tyrer & Craddock that in DSM-5 the changes are largely cosmetic.1 This is probably correct for most of DSM-5 but not for autism, where a new, narrow definition of autism is proposed. The broader autism phenotype is accepted by professionals in this area of study. A new study has shown that only 60% of patients meet criteria for DSM-IV autism when they are assessed using the criteria of DSM-5 autism.2 A second error in this area in relation to DSM-5 is that an aspect of autism has been split off into a new category called social communication disorder. ICD-11 has not made this error. These changes in DSM-5 in relation to autism are radical and will lead to patients losing their diagnosis and services.


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