

antiballistic missile active defenses? How effective are Soviet "war survival" measures—and how effective do the Soviet leaders consider them to be? And how—if at all—does this affect their foreign policies? This book argues one case, a case grounded in the assumption that Soviet policy and policymakers are dedicated to world domination, and that their operative policies are determined by this objective. Soviet policy aims appear simple and clear; too simple and too clear, and based too heavily on pronouncements which may serve various purposes. To cite but one example: "Soviet leaders today are the only ones who speak of gaining 'victory' in a nuclear war. *It follows from this [sic] that, in the Soviet view, a war-survival capability is an important 'strategic factor' . . .*" (p. 23). The author draws this and other similar conclusions, notwithstanding his admission (p. 18) that "it is, of course, not possible to assess how well USSR Civil Defense would perform in the event of a war," and despite many admitted and recognized deficiencies—unknowns such as the fact that "no large-scale evacuation exercises for entire cities have been held so far" (p. 17), and that "there are some indications of popular skepticism in the Soviet Union regarding the effectiveness of civil defense measures."

War Survival in Soviet Strategy makes a useful—if flawed—contribution to a subject which indeed deserves attention.

RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF
Washington, D.C.

THE SOVIET NAVY TODAY. By *Captain John E. Moore, R.N.* Introduction by *John Erickson*. New York: Stein and Day, 1976. 255 pp. Photographs. \$15.95.

Captain Moore, editor of *Jane's Fighting Ships*, has in this volume produced a poor man's *Jane's* (the larger tome having an astronomical cost for the individual reader). As such, it is an invaluable reference work, ranging from the latest 16,000-ton "Delta II" class ballistic missile submarines and 40,000-ton "Kuril" class aircraft carriers (which the Russians call "antisubmarine cruisers" in order to transit the Dardanelles legally) down to East German harbor tugs, Mi-4 Hound general purpose helicopters, and the 12,000-man Soviet Naval Infantry. The book is divided by ship types, each section introduced by a short historical narrative and each ship class replete with vital statistics, a silhouette, and one representative photograph. The photographic reproductions, incidentally, are of the usual superior Western quality.

But since statistics alone do not tell a story, Moore does, using the historical development of the post-World War II navy as his vehicle. His story line—in an initial chapter which serves as a scenario—is simply that the Soviet Union started from virtually nothing—Stalin's dream of a balanced fleet and the many devastated shipyards—and has since inexorably created a superb, quantitatively superior fleet that demonstrated its global capabilities in the Okean II maneuvers of April 1975, the latter event emphasized in John Erickson's introduction. Moore even goes so far as to suggest resemblances between Russia's thrust abroad for bases and nineteenth-century British imperialism; further, he regards the increasing number of long-range Soviet naval cruises as the measure of a new offensive navy. But he wrongly minimizes the geographical limitations. Constanta, Varna, or Sakhalin are no more "forward bases" than are San Diego, Dutch Harbor, or Guantánamo Bay (p. 20); and the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean anchorages and installations are hardly the major base facilities of, say, a Pearl Harbor, Subic Bay, or Holy Loch. Indeed, as Erickson says (p. 9), the Russians have erred most heavily in not establishing "an effective understanding of and relationship between naval capability and the pursuit of Russia's proper maritime interests or 'mission.'"

But Moore counterbalances his own quantitative overstatement (which also prevails in *Jane's*) with a discussion of Russia's serious qualitative handicaps (which this reviewer regards as the key factors): lack of experience in global naval operations, poor relations between the navy and the political commissars, a largely conscript enlisted force and the resultant rapid turnover and perpetual inexperience in non-commissioned ratings, the latter's overspecialization, unified aviation training, exceedingly low enlisted pay, cramped and Spartan shipboard conditions, lack of personal initiative, and a mediocre standard of ship maintenance. All these factors lead the author to conclude that "the final impression is that the Soviet Navy might well be hard-pushed to sustain a long-term conventional war" (p. 48). It is even possible to question whether the Soviet sailor has enough of what Erickson calls "*morskaya kultura*—the seaman's innate skill and orderliness, ship shape in every sense." This reviewer is convinced that the Russians would never dare risk fighting a naval war to find out.

CLARK G. REYNOLDS

U.S. Merchant Marine Academy

INVENTION AND INNOVATION UNDER SOVIET LAW: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS. By *Manfred Wilhelm Balz*. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, D. C. Heath, 1975. xii, 187 pp. \$15.00.

Germany's prominent specialist in Soviet patent law has written an exhaustive and thoughtful study of Soviet methods of encouraging invention within a socialist framework, giving special attention to developments since Soviet adherence to the Paris Convention for the protection of industrial property in 1964 and revision of Soviet law in 1973. His conclusions are that Soviet patent law compares favorably with Western laws, that Soviet law provides the inventor (frequently a wage earner in large enterprise) coveted personal recognition often denied Western inventors, whose inventions are bought up to be suppressed; that comparisons must focus on more than legal texts because differences in capitalist and Soviet invention systems rest largely on contrasting economic systems.

Soviet law is expected to attract increasing Western attention as joint ventures are introduced. Today Western firms simply sell technology for a lump sum; in the future, they may want to monitor the use that Soviet enterprises make of the technology, especially if the joint venture exports the technology in finished products to third countries. The author suggests preparing carefully conceived protective clauses to avoid such competition.

Dr. Balz also theorizes on relative social advantages in Soviet and Western patent systems. He questions the wisdom of reliance in the West on the market to arbitrate developmental policies. Soviet patent law, favoring Certificates of Authorship without monopoly control over exploitation, permits manipulation of invention to achieve planned economic and social goals. To Dr. Balz, this feature of Soviet law may and perhaps should have increasing appeal to states suffering from the impact of diminishing resources.

From a legal viewpoint, this study is admirably written; from a sociological viewpoint, the broader social ramifications of patent law are left unexplored.

JOHN N. HAZARD

Columbia University (Emeritus)