different implications. Ferdinand Christian Baur, however, would beg to differ from both of them. According to him, dogma is necessarily historical; in fact, it is its own history. We cannot understand Christian ideas unless we contextualise them within their historical flow and development, as emerging from controversies and from the internal tensions inherent in major theological systems. History of dogma cannot therefore be the mere enumeration of the opinions of fathers and heretics, but the insight gathered from individual sources must be organised in such a way that they shed light on the story as a whole. Baur’s *Lehrbuch der christlichen Dogmengeschichte*, first published in 1847 and here translated into English for the first time, is the classical expression of this fundamental assumption. 170 years after its first publication it therefore still merits not just historical but theological interest, even though the underlying scholarship is inevitably outdated. The work must impress in the first instance as the compressed synthesis of an incredibly extensive as well as innovative scholarly oeuvre spanning practically all periods of Christian history beginning with the New Testament. Apart from the breath-taking command of the widest possible range of theological works, the English reader is most likely to be struck by Baur’s unashamed adoption of the philosophical tools of German idealism, and especially the philosophy of G. W. F. Hegel, in the service of historical theology. Yet Baur’s historical understanding of dogma required a philosophical foundation, and he believed that Hegel’s thought offered the most attractive one available, even though he did not accept it without considerable qualifications.

Peter Hodgson and Robert Brown have rendered scholarship a huge service by translating Baur’s often convoluted and difficult German faithfully but elegantly. The resulting text is therefore as accurate as it is accessible. Hodgson has prefaced the translated text with a masterful introduction providing much-needed context and background for Baur’s understanding of theology, history and philosophy. In particular, it is unlikely that any reader will easily find a more competent sketch of Baur’s complex relationship with Hegel’s philosophy than the one provided here.

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doi:10.1017/S0036930615000587


Hume’s *Dialogues concerning Natural Religion* (1779) focus on beliefs about God, Gordon Graham begins by reminding us. *The Natural History of Religion* (1757)
explores the place of religion in human life. For decades, Wittgenstein’s later philosophy has been drafted to clarify religious beliefs, so Graham maintains, thinking of the ‘Swansea Wittgensteinians’ (Rush Rhees, D. Z. Phillips, Peter Winch). Accordingly, in chapters 3 and 4, he debunks language games, forms of life, systems of reference and the rest of the worn-out late Wittgensteinian jargon which he finds in their books. In chapter 5 he discusses philosophers who regard Wittgenstein’s philosophy as itself ‘religious’ (Philip R. Shields, James C. Edwards, Norman Malcolm). Rejecting all this, Graham turns to what Wittgenstein might offer positively, first endorsing the view that Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is ‘therapeutic’ (chapter 6): we have to look at what religion is like, without preconceptions in favour of a belief system. Then, in his admiration for William James’ Gifford Lectures and his contempt for The Golden Bough, J. G. Frazer’s even more famous book (back then), Wittgenstein’s account of religion highlights ritual and practices rather than beliefs (chapter 7). Again in debate with Hume, now attacking his analogy of the world as a ‘great theatre’ and ourselves as mere spectators, Graham argues (in chapter 8) that religion is properly seen as ‘essentially practical rather than speculative’, ‘a way of being in the world, rather than a system of thought about the world’ (p. 151, his italics). Finally, the post-Wittgensteinian ‘anti-intellectualism about religion’ (p. 197) which he is developing takes Graham close (in chapter 9) to Thomas Reid’s insistence on practical ethics rather than moral theory (1788). Even more to the point, a couple of pages from the end, he sums up his thesis in a wonderful quotation from the young Aberdeen divine, Henry Scougal’s now forgotten classic The Life of God in the Soul of Man (1677): ‘true religion’ is not to be found in ‘understanding orthodox notions and opinions’, not even in ‘external duties [like] the relief of the poor’, let alone in ‘rapturous heats and ecstatic devotion’ – ‘true religion is . . . a real participation of the divine nature’ (p. 199).

This outline does little justice to a splendid book. As founding editor of the Journal of Scottish Philosophy Graham obviously has a perspective that previous readers of Wittgenstein lack. The language-game jargon, as he rightly says, is found now (if at all) only in first-year philosophy of religion historical surveys. On the other hand, if he were to get to Gregynog for the annual conferences he would find much lively debate in Wittgenstein’s wake, often led by Scandinavian scholars. Rhees, the progenitor of the Swansea school, turns out, in posthumously published papers, to have been extremely unhappy about Wittgenstein’s talk of language as a game; and, while personally Rhees was deeply attracted to the old-style Latin Mass, he found Catholic beliefs unintelligible. In papers such as his Marett lecture, Phillips was perhaps not so far from Graham’s position as might seem. Wittgenstein and Hume have been read in mutually illuminating ways by
philosophers with no interest in religion, which might strengthen Graham’s case. How much of Hume was ever read by Wittgenstein we are unlikely now to find out: the Tractatus is dedicated to the memory of David Hume Pinsent, his best friend at Cambridge, killed in 1918, descended from Hume’s elder brother, as the family proudly remembered – the two friends must surely have peeked into the philosopher’s works in their college library.

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doi:10.1017/S0036930615000642


Resulting from a 2006 conference sponsored by the Dr William’s Centre for Dissenting Studies in London, Dissenting Praise begins to fill a lacuna in hymnological studies, discussing the music of dissenting churches and the influence of that music on English-language hymnody. It is a thought-provoking collection of essays which explores hymnody from a wide range of academic angles, aggregating the work of literary scholars, historians and musicologists. The first three chapters feature textual analysis of the hymns, and the next four are more historical discussions. Musicological and Welsh topics are then considered in the final two chapters. While some essays, such those by Ken R. Manley and Nicholas Temperley, are quite accessible and would be suitable for a broad audience, the chapters by Elizabeth Clarke and Françoise Deconinck-Brossard assume more specialist knowledge and expertise.

Temperley’s is the strongest chapter, despite his writing suggesting a bias against Calvin and his followers. He contradicts the fact that Calvin had a deep appreciation for the emotional power of music (pp. 203, 205–6), and that ‘high Calvinist doctrine’ (p. 206) had long promoted new psalm tunes (i.e. Common Tunes) and harmonised homophonic and polyphonic settings of existing psalm tunes in England, Scotland and on the Continent (i.e. Ravenscroft Psalter, 1635 Scottish Psalter, etc.). Nevertheless, his point is well made that congregational singing became progressively more complex so that it resembled a performance. Whether readers are interested in select chapters or the entire volume, they would be well served by beginning with Temperley’s chapter, as his provides much-needed background and terminology for the other chapters.

Other essays which deserve mention include those of David M. Thompson and E. Wyn James. Thompson’s essay evaluates Josiah Conder’s contribution