1

Inventions/Reinventions

Race Studies, Modernity, and the Middle Ages

[T]he extent to which contemporary discourses, consciously or not, are affected by pre-modern paradigms is, at times, surprising.

Khaled Abou El Fadl, *And God Knows the Soldiers* (18)

In 1218, Jews in England were forced by law to wear badges on their chests, to set them apart from the rest of the English population. This is the earliest historical example of a country's execution of the medieval Church's demand, in Canon 68 of the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215, that Jews and Muslims be set apart from Christians by a difference in dress. In 1222, 1253, and 1275, English rulings elaborated on this badge for the Jewish minority – who had to wear it (men and women at first, then children over the age of seven) – its size, its color, and how it was to be displayed on the chest in an adequately prominent fashion. In 1290, after a century of laws that eroded the economic, religious, occupational, social, and personal status of English Jews, Jewish communities were finally driven out of England *en masse*, marking the first permanent expulsion in Europe.

Periodic extermination of Jews was also a repeating phenomenon in medieval Europe. In the so-called Popular and First Crusades, Jewish communities were massacred in the Rhineland, in Mainz, Cologne, Speyer, Worms, Regensburg, and several other cities. The Second Crusade saw more Jew-killing, and the so-called Shepherds’ Crusade of 1220 witnessed the genocidal decimation of Jewish communities in France. In England, a trail of blood followed the coronation of the famed hero of the Third Crusade, Richard Lionheart, in 1189, when Jews were slaughtered at Westminster, London, Lynn, Norwich, Stamford, Bury St. Edmunds, and York, as English chronicles attest.

Scientific, medical, and theological treatises also argued that the bodies of Jews differed in nature from the bodies of Western Europeans who were Christian: Jewish bodies gave off a special fetid stench (the infamous *foetor judaicus*), and Jewish men bled uncontrollably from their nether parts, either annually, during Holy Week, or monthly, like menstruating women. Some authors held that Jewish bodies also came with horns and a tail, and for centuries popular belief circulated through the countries of the Latin West that Jews
constitutionally needed to imbibe the blood of Christians, especially children, whom they periodically mutilated and tortured to death, especially little boys.³

Cultural practices across a range of registers also disclose historical thinking that pronounces decisively on the ethical, ontological, and moral value of black and white. The thirteenth-century encyclopedia of Bartholomeus Anglicus, De Proprietatibus Rerum (On the Properties of Things), offers a theory of climate in which cold lands produce white folk and hot lands produce black: white is, we are told, a visual marker of inner courage, while the men of Africa, possessing black faces, short bodies, and crisp hair, are “cowards of heart” and “guileful.”⁴

A carved tympanum on the north portal of the west façade of the Cathedral of Notre Dame in Rouen (c. 1260) depicts the malevolent executioner of the sainted John the Baptist as an African phenotype (Figure 1), while an illustration in six scenes of Cantiga 186 of Las Cantigas de Santa Maria, commissioned by Alfonso X of Spain between 1252 and 1284, performs juridical vengeance on a black-faced Moor who is found in bed with his mistress; both are condemned to the flames, but the fair lady is miraculously saved by the Virgin Mary herself (Figure 2). Black is damned, white is saved. Black, of course, is the color of devils and demons, a color that sometimes extends to bodies demonically possessed, as demonstrated by an illustration from a Canterbury psalter, c. 1200 (Figure 3). In literature, malevolent black devilish Saracen enemies – sometimes of gigantic size – abound, especially in the chanson de geste and romance, genres that tap directly into the political imaginary, as some have argued.⁵

White is also the color of superior class and noble bloodlines. In the fourteenth-century Cursor Mundi, when four Saracens who are “blac and bla als led” (“black and blue-black as lead”) meet King David and are given three rods blessed by Moses to kiss, they transform from black to white upon kissing the rods, thus taking on, we are told, the hue of those of noble blood: “Als milk thair hide bicom sa quite/And o fre blode thai had the hew” (“Their skin became as white as milk/And they had the hue of noble blood” [Morris ll. 8072, 8120–1]). Elite human beings of the fourteenth century have a hue, and it is white. The few examples I cite here from medieval England, Germany, France, and Spain – examples from state and canon law, chronicles and historical documents, illuminations, encyclopedias, architecture, devotional texts, rumor and hearsay, and recreational literature – form only a miniscule cross-section of the cultural evidence across the countries of Western Europe.

Yet, in spite of all this – state experiments in tagging and herding people, and ruling on their bodies with the violence of law; exterminations of humans under repeating conditions, and disparagement of their bodies as repugnant, disabled, or monstrous; in spite of a system of knowledge and value that turns on a visual regime harvesting its truths from polarities of skin color, and moralizing on the superiority and inferiority of color and somatic difference – canonical race theory has found it difficult to see the European Middle Ages as the time of race, as racial time. Conditions such as these typically constitute race theory’s standard identifiers of race and racism, so it’s logical to ask: How is such obliviousness possible?

Canonical race theory understands “racial formation” (Omi and Winant 55) to occur only in modern time. Racial formation has been twinned with conditions of labor and capital in modernity such as plantation slavery and the slave trade, the rise of capitalism or bourgeois hegemony, or modern political formations such as the state and its apparatuses (we think of

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108381710.002 Published online by Cambridge University Press
David Theo Goldberg’s magisterial *The Racial State*, nations and nationalism (Étienne Balibar’s chapters in *Race, Nation, Class*), liberal politics (Uday Mehta), new discourses of class and social war (Foucault of the 1975–6 Collège de France lectures), colonialism and imperialism (the work of many of us in postcolonial studies), and globalism and transnational networks (Thomas Holt on race in the global economy).  

---

Figure 1. African executioner of John the Baptist, Cathedral of Notre Dame, Rouen: tympanum, north portal, west façade, c. 1260.
Reproduced with permission from the Menil Foundation, Houston; Hickey and Robertson, Houston; and Harvard University’s Image of the Black Project.
In the descriptions of modernity as racial time, a privileged status has been accorded to the Enlightenment and its spawn of racial technologies describing body and nature through pseudoscientific discourses pivoting on biology as the ground of essence, reference, and

Figure 2. Illustration from Cantiga 186, Las Cantigas de Santa Maria, commissioned by Alfonso X of Spain. Escorial, Real Monasterio, Biblioteca, second half of the thirteenth century. Reproduced with permission from the Menil Foundation, Houston; Hickey and Robertson, Houston; and Harvard University's Image of the Black Project.

In the descriptions of modernity as racial time, a privileged status has been accorded to the Enlightenment and its spawn of racial technologies describing body and nature through pseudoscientific discourses pivoting on biology as the ground of essence, reference, and
definition. So tenacious has been scientific racism’s account of race, with its entrenchment of high modernist racism as the template of all racisms, that it is still routinely understood, in everyday life and much of scholarship, that properly racial logic and behavior must invoke biology and the body as their referent, even if the immediate recourse is, say, to theories of climate or environment as the ground by which human difference is specified and evaluated.

In principle, race theory – whose brilliant practitioners are among the academy’s most formative and influential thinkers – understands, of course, that race has no singular or stable referent: that race is a structural relationship for the articulation and management of human differences, rather than a substantive content. Ann Stoler, a particularly incisive scholar of race, voices the common understanding of all when she affirms that “the concept of race

Figure 3. Healing of the Gadarene demoniacs. Psalter, folio 3v (detail), from Canterbury, c. 1200. Reproduced with permission from the Bibliothèque Nationale de France.
is an ‘empty vacuum’ – an image both conveying [the] ‘chameleonic’ quality [of race] and [its] ability to ingest other ways of distinguishing social categories” (“Racial Histories” 191).

In principle, then, race studies after the mid-twentieth century, and particularly in the past three and a half decades, encourages a view of race as a blank that is contingently filled under an infinitely flexible range of historical pressures and occasions. The motility of race, as Stoler puts it, means that racial discourses are always both “new and renewed” through historical time (we think of the Jewish badge in premodernity and modernity), always “well-worn” and “innovative” (such as the type and scale of “final solutions” like expulsion and genocide), and “draw on the past” as they “harness themselves to new visions and projects.”

The ability of racial logic to stalk and merge with other hierarchical systems – such as class, gender, or sexuality – also means that race can function as class (so that whiteness is the color of medieval nobility), as “ethnicity” and religion (Tutsis and Hutus in Rwanda, “ethnic cleansing” in Bosnia), or as sexuality (seen in the suggestion raised at the height of AIDS hysteria in the 1980s that gay people should be rounded up and cordoned off, in the style of Japanese American internment camps in World War II). Indeed, the “transformational grammar” of race through time means that the current masks of race are now overwhelmingly cultural, as witnessed since September 11, 2001. Definitions of race in practice today at airport security checkpoints, in the news media, and in public political discourse flaunt ethnoracial categories decided on the basis of religious identity (“Muslims” being grouped as a de facto race), national or geopolitical origin (“Middle Easterners”), or membership in a linguistic community (Arabic-speakers standing in for Arabs).

But if our current moment of flexible definitions – a moment in which cultural race and racisms, and religious race, jostle alongside race-understood-as-somatic/biological determinations – uncannily renews key medieval instrumentalizations in the ordering of human relations, race theory’s examination of the past nonetheless stops at the door of modern time. A blind spot inhabits the otherwise extraordinary panorama of critical descriptions of race: a cognitive lag that makes theory unable to step back any further than the Renaissance, that makes it natural to consider the Middle Ages as somehow outside real time.

Like many a theoretical discourse, race theory is predicated on an unexamined narrative of temporality in the West: a grand récit that reifies modernity as telos and origin, and that, once installed, entrenches the delivery of a paradigmatic chronology of racial time through mechanisms of intellectual replication pervasive in the Western academy, and circulated globally. This global circulation project is not without its detractors, but the replication of its paradigmatic chronology is extraordinarily persistent, for reasons I outline below.

Race Theory and Its Fictions: Modernity as the Time of Race, an Old Story of Telos and Origin

In the grand récit of Western temporality, modernity is positioned simultaneously as a spectacular conclusion and a beginning: a teleological culmination that emerges from the ooze of a murkily long chronology by means of a temporal rupture – a big bang, if we like – that issues in a new historical instant. The material reality and expressive vocabulary of rupture is vouched for by symbolic phenomena of a highly dramatic kind – a Scientific Revolution, discoveries of race, the formation of nations, etc. – which signal the arrival of modern time. Medieval time, on the wrong side of rupture, is thus shunted aside as the detritus of a
pre-Symbolic era falling outside the signifying systems issued by modernity, and reduced to
the role of a historical trace undergirding the recitation of modernity’s arrival.

Thus fictionalized as a politically unintelligible time, because it lacks the signifying
apparatus expressive of, and witnessing, modernity, medieval time is then absolved of the
errors and atrocities of the modern, while its own errors and atrocities are shunted aside as
essentially nonsignificative, without modern meaning, because occurring outside the condi-
tions structuring intelligible discourse on, and participation in, modernity and its cultures.
The replication of this template of temporality – one of the most durably stable intellectual
replications in the West – is the basis for the replication of race theory’s exclusions.

For the West, modernity is an account of self-origin – how the West became the unique,
vigorous, self-identical, and exceptional entity that it is, bearing a legacy – and burden – of
superiority. Modernity is arrival: the Scientific Revolution, represented by a procession of
founding fathers of conceptual and experimental science (Galileo, Descartes, Bacon, Locke,
Newton) and the triumph of technology – the printing press ushering in mass culture,
heavy artillery ushering in modern warfare.

Or arrival is attested by the Industrial Revolution, witnessing extraordinary per capita
and total output economic growth of the Schumpeterian, over the Smithian, kind. Since
origin is haunted in the post-Biblical West by the story of a fall from grace, modernity is
also necessarily the time when new troubles arrive, the most enduring of which are race and
racisms, colonization, and the rise of imperial powers. Regrettable as such phenomena are,
their exclusive arrival in modern time (variably located) nonetheless sets off modern time
as unique, special: confirming modernity as a time apart, newly minted, in human history.

The dominance of a linear model of temporality deeply invested in marking rupture and
radical discontinuity thus eschews alternate views: a view of history, for instance, as a field
of dynamic oscillations between ruptures and reinscriptions, or historical time as a matrix in
which overlapping repetitions-with-change can occur, or an understanding that historical
events may result from the action of multiple temporalities that are enfolded and coextant
within a particular historical moment. The dominant model of a simple, linear temporality
has geospatial and macrohistorical consequences. Since the prime movers and markers of
modernity are exclusively or overwhelmingly discovered in the West, the non-West has
long been saddled with the tag of being premodern: inserted within a developmental
narrative whose trajectory positions the rest of the world as always catching up.

Some sociological historians and historians of science, working against the grain, have
attempted to disrupt the narrative of scientific, economic, and demographic transformation
separating modern from premodern time in the West, and the West from the rest. Revisiting
the old repertoire of questions, they have argued for the legitimacy of complex,
nonlinear temporalities: temporalities in which multiple modernities have recurred in
different vectors of the world moving at different rates of speed within macrohistorical
time. One position is articulated by Jack Goldstone’s thick description of human history as
punctuated by scientific and technological “efflorescences” that, coupled with labor special-
ization and intensive market orientation, have driven both Schumpeterian and Smithian
growth and change in various societies and various eras, thus muddying the monomythic
simplicity of a radical break favoring the West in modernity’s singular arrival.

Against the putative uniqueness of the Industrial Revolution, we have Robert Hartwell’s
data showing that the tonnage of coal burnt annually for iron production in eleventh-
century northern China was already “roughly equivalent to 70% of the total amount of coal

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108381710.002 Published online by Cambridge University Press
annually used by all metal workers in Great Britain at the beginning of the eighteenth century” (“Cycle” 122). Demographic patterns deemed characteristic of modernity have also appeared in premodernity. Goldstone observes that urban populations in twelfth- and thirteenth-century Europe – a period of extraordinary growth – amounted to 10 percent of the total population, a ratio not exceeded until the nineteenth century (347).

The work of Eric Jones and Robert Hartwell on the extensively developed water power, iron and steel industries, and shipping of Song China; that of Billy So on China’s mass-market industrial production of export ceramics; and that of Richard Britnell and Bruce Campbell, Joel Mokyr, D. S. L. Cardwell, Lynn White, and Goldstone himself on the economic and demographic growth, technology, urbanization, and commercialization of twelfth- and thirteenth-century Europe (Goldstone 380–9) furnish material for counter-narratives contesting the fiction of sudden, unique arrival, and the discourse of Western exceptionalism. Some historians of science and sociology accordingly prefer to speak of scientific revolutions across time, rather than the Scientific Revolution – a single, unique instance, in a single unique modernity (Hart, Civilizations chapter 2; “Explanandum”) – and of industrial revolutions, rather than the Industrial Revolution.

Even were we to ignore the demographic, economic, and industrial materialities painstakingly tracked by these historians, the representation of medieval time as wholly foreign to, and unmarked by, modernity intuitively runs counter to the modes of understanding in contemporary theory undergirding the study of culture today. Studies of culture, literature, history, and art that have been open to late twentieth- and twenty-first-century developments in academic theory across the disciplines will not find unfamiliar the notion that the past is never completely past, but inhabits the present and haunts modernity and contemporary time in ways that estrange our present from itself.

Modernity and the present can thus be grasped as the habitat of multiple temporalities that braid together a complex and plural “now” that is internally self-divided and contaminated by premodern time. In public life, the evocation of Crusades and jihad by Jihadi and Salafi ideologues and by the Western political right after 9/11 is one example of the past in the present, marking an internal cleavage in modern time through which premodern time speaks itself as an active presence.

Dipesh Chakrabarty’s meditation on how an earlier time reinscribes itself in later periods (always with difference, never in exactly the same way) is useful here:

humans from any other period . . . are always in some sense our contemporaries: that would have to be the condition under which we can even begin to treat them as intelligible to us . . . the writing of medieval history for Europe depends on this assumed contemporaneity of the medieval [with our present], or . . . the non-contemporaneity of the present with itself.

(109)

If we grant that the present can be nonidentical to itself in this way, we should also grant the corollary: that the past can also be nonidentical to itself, inhabited too by that which was out of its time – marked by modernities that estrange medieval time in ways that render medieval practices legible in modern terms.

If we allow our field of vision to hatch open these moments in premodernity that seem to signal the activity of varied modernities in deep time (Goldstone’s “efflorescences”), our expanded vision will yield windows on the past that allow for a reconfigured
understanding of earlier time. Indeed, hatching open such moments in premodernity is what feminists and queer studies scholars have, in a sense, been doing for decades in staking out their European Middle Ages – identifying the instances in which a different consciousness and practice erupt and effloresce – even as their earliest archeologies suffered slings and arrows hurled in the name of anachronism and presentism. The “contemporaneity of the medieval” with our time, and the nonidentity of medieval time with itself, thus grants a pivot from which the recloning of old narratives can be resisted.

Nonetheless, at present the discussion of premodern race continues to be handicapped by the invocation of axioms that reproduce a familiar story in which mature forms of race and racisms, arriving in modern political time, are heralded by a shadowplay of inauthentic rehearsals characterizing the prepolitical, premodern past. For discussions of race, the terms and conditions set by this narrative of bifurcated polarities vested in modernity-as-origin have meant that the tenacity, duration, and malleability of race, racial practices, and racial institutions have failed to be adequately understood or recognized. With centuries elided, the long history of race-ing has been foreshortened, truncated to an abridged narrative.

But why would we want a long history of race? Like other theoretical-political endeavors that have addressed the past – feminism comes readily to mind as a predecessor moment; queer studies is another – the project of revising our understanding by inserting premodernity into conversations on race is closely dogged by accusations of presentism, anachronism, reification, and the like. Why call something race, when many old terms – “ethnocentrism,” “xenophobia,” “premodern discriminations,” “prejudice,” “chauvinism,” even “fear of otherness and difference” – have been used comfortably for so long to characterize the genocides, brutalizations, executions, and mass expulsions of the medieval period?

The short answer is that the use of the term race continues to bear witness to important strategic, epistemological, and political commitments not adequately served by the invocation of categories of greater generality (such as otherness or difference) or greater benignity in our understanding of human culture and society. Not to use the term race would be to sustain the reproduction of a certain kind of past, while keeping the door shut to tools, analyses, and resources that can name the past differently. Studies of “otherness” and “difference” in the Middle Ages – which are now increasingly frequent – must then continue to dance around words they dare not use; concepts, tools, and resources that are closed off; and meanings that only exist as lacunae.

Or, to put it another way: the refusal of race destigmatizes the impacts and consequences of certain laws, acts, practices, and institutions in the medieval period, so that we cannot name them for what they are, and makes it impossible to bear adequate witness to the full meaning of the manifestations and phenomena they install. The unavailability of race thus often colludes in relegating such manifestations to an epiphenomenal status, enabling omissions that have, among other things, facilitated the entrenchment and reproduction of a certain kind of foundational historiography in the academy and beyond.

To cite one example: How often do standard (“mainstream”) histories of England discuss as constitutive to the formation of English identity, or to the nation of England, the mass expulsion of Jews in 1290; the marking of the Jewish population with badges for three quarters of a century; decimations of Jewish communities by mob violence; statutory laws ruling over where Jews were allowed to live; monitory apparatuses like the Jewish Exchequer and the network of registries created by England to track the behavior and lives
of Jews; or popular lies and rumors like the cultural fiction of ritual murder, which facilitated the legal execution of Jews by the state? That the lives of English Jews were constitutive, not incidental, to the formation of England’s history and collective identity—that the built landscape of England itself, with its cathedrals, abbeys, fortifications, homes, and cities, was dependent on English Jews—is not a story often heard in foundational historiography.\(^{14}\) Scholars who are invested in the archeology of a past in which alternate voices, lives, and histories are heard, beyond those canonically established as central by foundationalist studies, are thus not well served by evading the category of race and its trenchant vocabularies and tools of analysis.\(^{15}\)

For race theorists, the study of racial emergence in the longue durée is also one means to understand if the configurations of power productive of race in modernity are, in fact, genuinely novel. Key propensities in history can be identified by examining premodernity: the modes of apparent necessity, configurations of power, and conditions of crisis that witness the harnessing of powerful dominant discourses—such as science or religion—to make fundamental distinctions among humans in processes to which we give the name of race.

A reissuing of the medieval past in ways that admit the ongoing interplay of that past with the present can therefore only recalibrate the urgencies of the present with greater precision. An important consideration in investigating the invention of race in medieval Europe (an invention that is always a reinvention) is also to grasp the ways in which homo europaeus—the European subject—emerges in part through racial grids produced from the twelfth through fifteenth centuries, and the significance of that emergence for understanding the unstable entity we call “the West” and its self-authorizing missions.\(^{16}\)

**Premodernists Write Back: Historicizing Alternate Pasts, Rethinking Race in Deep Time**

Scholars who have considered race in premodernity have by and large understood race as arguments over nature—how human groups are identified through biological or somatic features deemed to be their durable or intrinsic characteristics, features which are then selectively moralized and interpreted to extrapolate continuities between the bodies, behaviors, and mentalities of the members of the group thus collectively identified. Premodernists subscribing to a view of race as contentions over nature have accordingly focused primary attention on bodies in examining the record of images, artifacts, and texts: investigating the meanings of skin color, phenotypes, blood purity and bloodlines, genealogy, physiognomy, heritability, and the impact of environment (including, in the medieval period, macrobian zones, astrology, and humoral theory) in shaping human bodies and human natures, with differential values being attached to groups thus differentially identified.

For antiquity, major studies by Frank Snowden, Benjamin Isaac, and David Goldenberg are among those that consider body-centered phenomena as indicators of race—and in particular, for Snowden and Goldenberg, blackness as a paramount marker of race.\(^{17}\) Among medievalists, noted studies by Robert Bartlett, Peter Biller, Steven Epstein, David Nirenberg, and contributors to a 2001 issue of the *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* edited by Thomas Hahn also suggest that medievalists too have understood race as a
body-centered phenomenon: defined by skin color, physiognomy, blood, genealogy, inheritance, etc.

Not all medievalists who have considered race believe the concept has purchase for the medieval period. Bartlett, for whom race pivots on biology, not culture, offers this caveat in his volume of 1993: “while the language of race – gens, natio, ‘blood,’ ‘stock,’ etc. – is biological, its medieval reality was almost entirely cultural” (Making of Europe 197). Bartlett’s subscription to the preeminence of biology in race matters wavers, however, when he grants that medieval practices which assume Jewish religious identity to be coterminous with ontological and essential nature can be considered racial (at least by other medievalists):

Many scholars see in the later Middle Ages a tendency for racial discrimination to become sharper and racial boundaries to be more shrilly asserted. The hardening of anti-Jewish feeling between the eleventh and the fifteenth centuries is recognized by all who work on the subject and they disagree only on their dating of the crucial change for the worse. (Making of Europe 236)

Bartlett’s later work (in 2001) continues his emphasis on biology, and attends to blood and descent groups in deciding race. For instance, because “environmental influence” is behind the thinking of Bartholomeus Anglicus and Albertus Magnus in their sorting of human kinds based on climatological determinism, Bartlett believes that their linking of skin color, physiognomy, and phenotype to dispositions of group character is not a racial dispensation, but an environmental one (“Medieval and Modern Concepts of Race and Ethnicity” 46–7). In his most recent work of 2009, “Illustrating Ethnicity in the Middle Ages,” Bartlett eschews race altogether in favor of “ethnicity.”

Peter Biller’s studies – among the most impressive and arresting work on medieval race today – focus on the evidence of medieval scientific texts, and on intellectual-pedagogical discourses circulating in medieval universities, in entrenching and diffusing theories of race. Steven Epstein, for whom “race/color” is a compound term (Purity Lost 9), scrutinizes the mixing of kinds in the eastern Mediterranean, and concludes that “back in the Middle Ages, color prejudice existed, at times even with few or no people of color to deprecate” (Purity Lost 13). In fact, the “literal valuing of people crossed beyond simple color symbol-ism or even prejudice into a way of thinking that closely resembled modern forms of racism, in a vocabulary suited to the times” (Purity Lost 201).

David Nirenberg’s interest in body-centered medieval race, based on evidence in Spain, has shifted in recent years: from earlier attention (in 2002) to Spanish historical events at the close of the Middle Ages that feature an obsession with blood purity, genealogical descent, and body-centered essential natures (“Mass Conversion and Genealogical Mentalities,” “Conversion, Sex, and Segregation”) to his more recent (2009) agnostic stance on medieval race, whether named explicitly as race or not (“Race and the Middle Ages,” “Was There Race Before Modernity?”).

Observing that “All racisms are attempts to ground discriminations, whether social, economic, or religious, in biology and reproduction. All claim a congruence of ‘cultural’ categories with ‘natural’ ones” (“Race” 74; “Before Modernity?” 235), Nirenberg concludes, “I am not making . . . claim[s] that race did exist in the Middle Ages, or that medieval people were racist. Such statements would be reductive and misleading, obscuring more than they reveal” (“Race” 74), and adds: “Nor do I aspire to anything so provincial as a proof that late medieval discriminations were racial” (“Before Modernity?” 239).
Nirenberg’s ambivalence (he simultaneously resists the notion that modernity is the sole context of race and inveighs against modernists who claim that race and racism are exclusively modern phenomena) may owe something to his conviction that “any history of race will be at best provocative and limited; at worst a reproduction of racial logic itself, in the form of a genealogy of ideas” (“Before Modernity?” 262).

Most contributors to Hahn’s issue – in particular Verkerk, J. J. Cohen, Lomperis, and Hahn himself (Kinoshita prefers “alterity” as her category of choice) – perform supple readings of literature and visual images within paradigms of body-centered race, focusing primarily on blackness and color as well as the exotic-foreign. In the same issue, William Jordan’s response (“Why Race?”) expresses a number of reservations, recommends attention to Jews rather than to color in medieval race, and offers the view that race paradigms may not be useful for the medieval period, especially when imaginative literature is mined for examples (much of the issue consists of literary readings).

Some premodernists have insisted that there must be prior linguistic evidence of the word “race” in European vocabularies before racial phenomena and racializing practices can exist, advocating priority for whether medieval peoples themselves saw themselves as belonging to races and practicing racisms. Insistence of this kind may underpin classicist Denise Buell’s scrupulous attentiveness to the meaning of the word genos in the early centuries of the Common Era, when strategies of Christian universalism rhetorically posit Christians as a new people, a kind of race (Why This New Race, “Early Christian Universalism”).18 As a reminder that a gap can exist between a practice and the linguistic utterance that names it, Steven Epstein’s discovery of “a way of thinking that closely resembled modern forms of racism, in a vocabulary suited to the times” (Purity Lost 201) suggests that “unfamiliar vocabularies and languages” (Purity Lost 13) do not in themselves indicate the absence of a phenomenon.

A few premodernists, following examples in critical race theory, have chosen to emphasize cultural and social determinants in racing – including a political hermeneutics of religion – while not eschewing overlapping multiple discourses in racial formation. Unlike many who stress nature-based determinants in racing, and race as body-centered phenomena, premodernists emphasizing sociocultural determinants do not assume that race or racism require human distinctions to be posited as permanent, stable, innate, fixed, or immutable.19

Critical race theory itself, of course, has for decades attentively scrutinized culturalist forms of racing – in which culture functions, we might say, as a kind of superstructure that is relatively disarticulated from its base, nature – without assuming that racial distinctions must be grasped as permanent or stable for racial categorizations to occur. Ann Stoler’s 1997 study of the colonial Dutch East Indies is a salient and oft-quoted example:

Race could never be a matter of physiology alone. Cultural competency in Dutch customs, a sense of ‘belonging’ in a Dutch cultural milieu . . . disaffiliation with things Javanese . . . domestic arrangements, parenting styles, and moral environment . . . were crucial to defining . . . who was to be considered European. (“Racial Histories” 197)

With the appearance of studies (like Gauri Viswanathan’s influential Outside the Fold) which point suggestively to how racial and religious identities might form interlocking and mutually constitutive categories,20 the examination of religion-based race has gained
increased legitimacy among premodernists (see, especially, Buell; Heng [Empire of Magic, chapters 2 and 4; "Invention . . . 1" and "Invention . . . 2"; “Reinventing Race”]; Lampert, “Rrace”; Ziegler 198).

In the attempt to suggest how we might rethink the past, I should therefore begin with a modest, stripped-down working hypothesis: that “race” is one of the primary names we have — a name we retain for the strategic, epistemological, and political commitments it recognizes — attached to a repeating tendency, of the gravest import, to demarcate human beings through differences among humans that are selectively essentialized as absolute and fundamental, in order to distribute positions and powers differentially to human groups. Race-making thus operates as specific historical occasions in which strategic essentialisms are posited and assigned through a variety of practices and pressures, so as to construct a hierarchy of peoples for differential treatment. My understanding, thus, is that race is a structural relationship for the articulation and management of human differences, rather than a substantive content.

Since the differences selected for essentialism will vary in the longue durée — perhaps battering on bodies, physiognomy, and somatic attributes in one location; perhaps on social practices, religion, and culture in another; and perhaps on a multiplicity of interlocking discourses elsewhere — I will devote the rest of this introductory chapter to outlining architectures that support the instantiation of race in the medieval period, and to specifying key particularities — distinctive features — of medieval race, working where possible through actual examples. The use of concrete, particularized examples — a small spectrum which is not intended to be exhaustive, nor to duplicate the chapters that follow — will help to indicate how we might identify the varied locations and concretions of race in the Middle Ages, and sketch ways to consider medieval race without recourse to totalizing suppositions.

In addressing the nested discourses formative of race, it is important to note that religion — the paramount source of authority in the Middle Ages — can function both socioculturally and biopolitically: subjecting peoples of a detested faith, for instance, to a political theology that can biologize, define, and essentialize an entire community as fundamentally and absolutely different in an interknotted cluster of ways. Nature and the sociocultural should not thus be seen as bifurcated spheres in medieval race-formation: they often crisscross in the practices, institutions, fictions, and laws of a political — and a biopolitical — theology operationalized on the bodies and lives of individuals and groups.

Religious Race, Medieval Race: Jews as a Benchmark Example

Medievalists who study Jews will be familiar with my first example of how race emerges as an outcome of clustered forces and technologies. The infamous occasion described in this section issues from thirteenth-century England and is recorded and discussed in three contemporaneous Latin chronicles and an Anglo-Norman ballad, and has a tenacious afterlife for six-and-a-half centuries afterward. It is cited, elaborated, and transformed in drama and ballads, statuary and shrines, preaching and pilgrimage, books of private devotional prayer, miracle tales, etc., until the twentieth century, when a tourist pamphlet of 1911 invites (paid) viewing of the site at which the original atrocity allegedly occurred. The most influential historical account is by the thirteenth-century
chronicler of St. Alban’s, Matthew Paris, and the finest aesthetic treatment in the Middle Ages is afforded by Chaucer, in the *Prioress’s Tale of The Canterbury Tales,* 21

On July 31, 1255, in the city of Lincoln, an eight-year-old boy named Hugh, the son of a widow, Beatrice, fell into a cesspool attached to the house of a member of the Jewish community. There, “the body putrefied for some twenty-six days and rose to the surface to dismay Jews who had assembled from all over England to celebrate a marriage in an important family. They surreptitiously dropped the body in a well away from their houses where it was discovered on 29 August” (Langmuir, “Knight’s Tale” 461). 22

The panicked behavior of the Jews who were gathered in Lincoln for the marriage of Belaset, daughter of Benedict fil’ Moses, poignantly expresses the sense of danger and fragility that characterized the quotidian existence of a minority community used to periodic violence from the majority population among which the minority community lived, and by which it was surrounded. Here, Jewish panic also issued from a frightened recognition of threat from a medieval technology of power against Jews, a *techne* that scholarship today calls the “ritual murder libel.”

In the standard plot of the libel, Jews were said to seize Christian boys of tender years, on the cusp of childhood, in order to torture, mutilate, and slaughter them in deliberate reenactments of the killing of Christ, for whose deicide Jews were held responsible. By 1255, ritual murder stories were well sedimented in English culture as a popular fantasy of Christian child martyrdom, a fantasy which had proliferating material results, since they installed a series of shrines for the Christian martyred that became public devotional sites around which feelings of Christian community could gather, pool, and intensify, bringing fame and pilgrims to the towns and cities in which the shrines were located. 23

First invoked at Norwich in 1144, then Gloucester in 1168; Bury St. Edmunds in 1181; Bristol in 1183 or 1260; Winchester in 1192, 1225, 1232, and 1244; London in the 1260s and 1276; and Northampton in 1279, ritual murder libel – to be distinguished from its near-relative in anti-Semitic fiction, the blood libel, and its first cousin, host desecration libel – was the technology of power exercised against the hapless Jews of Lincoln in 1255. 24 Consequently, on October 4, 1255, by order of Henry III of England, ninety-one Jews were imprisoned and one person executed for the “martyrdom” of Hugh. On November 22, eighteen more Jews were executed, “drawn through the streets of London before daybreak and hung on specially constructed gallows” (Langmuir, “Knight’s Tale” 477–8). 25 Nineteen Jews were officially executed – murdered – by the state through acts of juridical rationality wielding a discourse of power compiled by communal consent over the generations against a minority target.

When state executions of group victims – unfortunates who were condemned by community fictions allowed to exercise juridical violence through law – occurred in the modern period, such official practices have been understood by race studies to constitute de facto acts of race: institutional crimes of a sanctioned, legal kind committed by the state against members of an internal population identified by their recognized membership within a targeted group. In the twentieth century, the phenomenon of legalized state violence occurred most notoriously, of course, under the regime of apartheid in South Africa. Today, Turkey’s systematic targeting of its minority Kurdish population for persecution and abuse offers an example of twenty-first-century-style apartheid and state racism.
In the United States, an example of state violence against a minority race might be Franklin Roosevelt’s Executive Order 9066, an order that created ten internment camps across seven states on the North American continent for the incarceration of 111,000 Japanese Americans during World War II, on the presumption that Japanese Americans constituted a community of internal aliens who would betray their country, the United States of America, to the enemy nation of Japan in wartime by virtue of their race.26

Were we to consider thirteenth-century enforcements of state power, which recognized Jews as an undifferentiated population collectively personifying difference and threat, alongside other state enforcements of homologous kinds that occurred in modern time, our aggregated perspective would likely yield an understanding that the legal murder of nineteen Jews in 1255 in England, on the basis of a community belief in Jewish guilt and malignity, constituted a racial act committed by the state against an internal minority population that had, over time, become racialized in the European West.

Jews were pivotal to England’s commercializing economy of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and constituted an immigrant community identifiable by virtue of religious and sociocultural practices, language, dress, and, occasionally, physical appearance (caricatures of Jewish phenotypes and biomarkers survive in English manuscript marginalia and visual art: see, for example, Figure 4).

Monitored by the state through an array of administrative apparatuses, and ruled upon by statutes, ordinances, and decrees, they were required to document their economic activity at special registries that tracked Jewish assets across a network of cities. No business could be lawfully transacted except at these registries, which came to determine where Jews could live and practice a livelihood. Jews needed official permission and licenses to establish or to change residence, and by 1275, the Statutum de Judeismo (Statute of Jewry) dictated that they could not live in any city without a registry by which they could be scrutinized, and they could not have Christians living in their midst – a thirteenth-century experiment in de facto segregation.

Subjected to a range of fiscal extortions and special, extraordinary taxations (tallages) which milked them to the edge of penury, Jews were barred from marriage with Christians, from holding public office, from eating with Christians or lingering in Christian homes, and even from praying too loudly in synagogues. They were required to wear large, identifying badges on their outer garments (Figure 5) and denied the
freedoms of walking publicly in city streets during Holy Week and of emigration, as a community, without permission.

A special subset of government known as the Exchequer of the Jews was created to monitor and regulate their lives, residences, activities, and livelihoods. The constraints on their lives are too numerous to list; some would resonate eerily with the treatment of minority populations in other countries, and other eras, linking into relationship moments of medieval and modern time.

Robert Stacey observes that England’s example was “archetypical” of how Jews were treated throughout the countries of medieval Western Europe (“Twelfth Century” 340), differing mainly by virtue of the earliness, inventiveness, and intensity of English actions (Skinner 2). But the vast scholarship on Jews in medieval Europe specifies in excruciating detail more than state actions. Across a miscellany of archives, scholarship has tracked how Jews were systematically defined and set apart via biomarkers such as the possession of horns, a male menstrual flux or the generationally inherited New Testament curse of visceral-hemorrhoidal bleeding, an identifying stink (the infamous foetor judaicus), facial and somatic phenotypes (the facies judaica, “Jewish face”), and charges of bestiality, blasphemy, diabolism, deicide, vampirism, and cannibalism laid at their door through a hermeneutics of theology exercised by religious and laity alike across a wide range of learned and popular contexts.

Instructive as legal, formal instruments of state control are as examples of ethnroracial practices, it is the extralegal and informal rehearsals of power that grant special traction and insight into medieval modalities of racial formation. For instance: The popular enthusiasm

Figure 5. English Jew wearing the Jewish badge on his chest in the form of the tablets of the Old Testament. BL Cotton MS Nero, D2, fol.180, thirteenth century. Reproduced with permission from the British Library, UK.
for community fictions of Jewish violence — stories of ritual murder and host desecration, blood libels; fictions that are designed to authorize and arrange for community violence to Jews — guides us to an important understanding that, for medieval Jews, it is equally the ritualized iteration of group practices that triumphantly enacts racial formation in the medieval period. Community fictions and community consent, periodically refreshed, augur performances that are ritually productive of race.

In England, then, the Jewish badge, expulsion order, legislative enforcements, surveillance and segregation, ritualized iterations of homicidal fables, and the legal execution of Jews are constitutive acts in the consolidation of a community of Christian English—otherwise internally fragmented and ranged along numerous divides—against a minority population that has, on these historical occasions and through these institutions and practices, entered into race.

Architectures of Racial Formation: Church and State, Law, Learning, Governmentality, Thirteenth to Fifteenth Centuries

I argued in my earlier book, Empire of Magic, that the medieval period of the long thirteenth century witnessed a motility in which seemingly opposed forces—universalizing measures set in motion by the Latin Church, in tandem with a partitioning, fractionalizing drive that powered nascent territorial nationalisms—furnished an array of instrumentalities for intensified collective identity-formation (68–73). In the drive for universality, the Church expanded modes of governmentality through exponential elaborations of canon law, circulating new orders of mendicant friars and inquisitions to root out heterodoxy, and systemically sought unity across internal divisions in the Latin West through uniform practices, institutions, sacraments, codes, rituals, and doctrines.29

Concomitantly, the West’s romance with empire that, from the end of the eleventh century, had seen overseas colonies (“Outremer”) established in the Near East for 200 years through the mass military incursions known as the Crusades, saw extraterritorial ambitions ramify from military expansionism to para- and extramilitary endeavors.30 Long before the territorial loss of the last crusader colony, Acre, in 1291, Dominicans and Franciscans had begun to diffuse worldwide a “soft power” vision of Latin Christianity from Maghrebi Africa to Mongol Eurasia, India to China, insinuating Christendom’s reach through missions, conversionary preaching, chapter houses, churches, and foreign-language schools for proselytes.31

Universalist ambitions are articulated in letters and embassies from popes and monarchs, ethnographic accounts and field reports, reconnaissance and diplomatic missions, offers of military and political alliances, and conversionary enterprises, the surviving evidence of which has become the miscellaneous records of Europe’s presence in the world.32 One (extreme) strain of universalist ambition is given voice by the English historian Matthew Paris, who conveys a high-ranking English churchman’s vision for Christian world domination when he vivaciously reports the Bishop of Winchester as saying, on the question of Mongols and Muslims, that England should leave the dogs to devour one another, so that they may all be consumed and perish; when Christians proceed against those who remain, they will slay the enemies of Christ and cleanse the face of the earth, so that the entire world will be subject to one Catholic church (Luard, Matthaei Parisiensis III: 489).
Scholars also point to congruent ambitions in this time such as the reordering of knowledge/power, as universities and scholasticism systematized learning and the reproduction of knowledge, encyclopedias retaxonomized the world, and compilations of *summae* sought to aggregate and systematize the totality of human understanding. More recently, scholars such as Peter Biller and Joseph Ziegler have emphasized how Greek and Arabic texts of science, medicine, and natural history – interpreted, modified, and circulated through university lectures and curricula after the energetic translation movements of the twelfth century – assembled a crucible of knowledge through which scientific, environmental, humoral, and physiognomic theories of race were delivered from antiquity to the Middle Ages.\(^{33}\)

The Church’s bid for overarching authority and uniformity importantly furnished medieval societies with an array of models on how to consolidate unity, power, and collective identity across internal differences. A church with universalist ambitions in effect sought to function like a state, a state without borders: exercising control through a spectrum of supervisory apparatuses, laws, institutions, and symbols; homogenizing belief and coalescing communities of affect around uniform ritual practices; deploying mobile agents-at-large to police conformity within the Latin West and to gather information, extend diplomacy, and propagate doctrine without; and calling forth crusading armies from the countries of Europe at intervals for deployment in the ongoing competition with Islam for territorial, political, and cultural supremacy in the international arena.\(^{34}\)

Functioning like a state without borders, a Church with universalist ambitions paradoxically also saw a swirl of contrapuntal forces in motion in the historical moment: a concomitant fractionalizing of collective identity in the form of emergent medieval-style nations characterized by intensive state formation and imagined local unities, as territorial nationalisms coalesced within Christendom.\(^{35}\)

Nascent nationalisms also harnessed, and were powered by, expanded formal mechanisms such as law and informal mechanisms such as rituals, symbols, rumors, pilgrimage shrines, and affective communities mobilized by telling and retelling key stories of cultural power. In their mutual resort to overlapping resources, we can see how the interests of church and nation interlocked in logical relationship. Canon laws established by the Church to extend governmentality across territorial boundaries, such as Fourth Lateran’s Canon 68 requiring Jews to be publicly marked, also enabled the legal manipulation of Jewish populations within territorial boundaries: so that, in England, a distinctively English communal character was able to emerge through its posited difference from, and opposition to, the Jewish minority within England’s borders.\(^{36}\)

Canon 68 thus in effect instantiates racial regime, and racial governance, in the Latin West through the force of law. It also bears witness to the rise of a political Christianity in the West that installs what Balibar calls “an interior frontier” within national borders, reinforced by affective cultures of fear and hate mobilized through stories of race like the ritual murder lie (“Racism and Nationalism” 42). The coalescence of England’s identity as a national body united across disparate (but always Christian and European) peoples thus pivoted on the politico-legal emergence of a visible and undifferentiated Jewish minority *into race*, under forms of racial governance supported by political Christianity, and sustained through the mobilization of affective communities enlisted by stories of race.
This is not to claim, of course – absurdly – that race-making throughout the medieval period is in any way uniform, homogenous, constant, stable, or free of contradiction or local differences across the countries of Europe in all localities, regions, and contexts through some three or four centuries of historical time. Neither is it to concede, in reverse, that local differences – variation in local practices and contexts – must always render it impossible to think translocally in the medieval period. The effort to think across the translocal does not require any supposition of the universal, static, unitary, or unvarying character of medieval race.

Indeed, in *Invention of Race* I point to particular moments and instances of how race is made, to indicate the exemplary, dynamic, and resourceful character of race-making under conditions of possibility, not to extract repetitions without difference. In this chapter, I point to homogenizing drives that universalize Christendom, and to fractionalizing drives that fragment Christendom into territorial nationalisms – such drives always manifesting themselves nonidentically and unevenly, in different places and at different times – to sketch the dynamic field of forces within which miscellaneous particularized instances of race-making can occur under varied local conditions. The remaining chapters of this book then take up skeins in the warp and weave of this matrix to outline some possibilities for further scholarly investigation.

The field of forces within which race-making occurs is also one of the operative grids through which *homo europaeus* cumulatively emerges over time. A modular feature disclosed by medieval elaborations is that *race is a response to ambiguity*, especially the ambiguity of identity: for among the “new visions and projects” to which the utility of race answers in this time are the specification of an authorized range of meanings for Latin Christian, European identity; the careful disarticulation of that identity-in-flux from its founding genealogies such as Judaism; and the securing of new moorings – including imperial moorings, launched by crusade and war, diplomacy, missions, and propagandizing – that answer to the ambitions and exigencies of the historical moment.

**Cartographic Race: The Freakish, Deformed, and Disabled, or a Racial Map of the World in the Middle Ages**

In the project of European identity, one of the most spectacular cultural creations of the medieval period – the *mappamundi*, or world map – hits its stride in the thirteenth century and after as a medium that visually unfolds an imagined universe of space-time which pictures the world in extraordinary ways that reflect on, and concretize, locations of race. A thirteenth-century *mappamundi* such as the richly detailed Hereford map, with its more than 500 pictures, 420 towns, 15 Biblical events, 5 scenes from classical mythology, 33 plants and animals, and 32 peoples of the earth puts on display the “cosmological, ethnographic, geographical, historical, theological and zoological state of the world” (Westrem, *Hereford Map* xx; Edson 142) by marking differences of place through the insertion of distinctive objects, narratives, and peoples that it locates into place as stakeholders for the meaning of a site.

For the territories of Europe, place is visualized on the Hereford by architectural features such as fortifications and cathedrals – the built environment of civilized urban centers – and
bordered by natural features such as rivers (*Figure* 6). Outside Europe, however, geography is often dissected as ethnography, with places being identified as the habitat of human groups made distinct by the attribution of traits to them that are notable by virtue of their difference from normativity in the Latin West. Race is what the rest of the world has: Made

*Figure* 6. Western Europe with its cathedrals and fortifications, Hereford world map, Hereford Cathedral, thirteenth century. Reproduced with permission from the Dean and Chapter of Hereford and the Hereford Mappa Mundi Trust, UK.
visible and projected on a map through a human landscape, it indexes each vector of the world according to its relative distance from Europe in human, as well as spatial, terms. Rendered cartographically, the project of European identity, in surveying the world, sees Europe as the civilized territory of urban life – a web of cities – while global races swarm in other vectors of the world.

In its most grotesque and spectacular forms, cartographic race equates with the monstrous races of semihumans located by the Hereford and other mappaemundi in Asia and Africa, and especially the coastline of southern Africa, which in the Hereford arresting teems with human monsters of many kinds (Figure 7). The depiction of pygmies, giants, hermaphrodites, troglodytes, cynocephali, sciapods, and other part-human, misshapen, deformed, and disabled peoples inherited from classical tradition harnesses the inheritance of the past to a medieval survey and anatomization of the world that reflects on the meaning and borders of European self-identity and civilization.

Scholars such as Scott Westrem (“Against Gog and Magog”) and Andrew Gow have found a close association between one particular monstrous race in mappaemundi – the unclean race of cannibals that was supposedly enclosed by Alexander the Great behind a barrier of mountains – and medieval Jews, also defined as unclean and monstrous by virtue of the blood libel. The eschatological tradition that the enclosed unclean descendants of Cain would break forth in the last days of the world to war on Christendom – supported by the tangible presence of those enclosed creatures visibly marked on mappaemundi – is thus doubly overwritten as a racial script that congeals the same external and internal racial target of accusation and fear.

Therefore, though much has been written about a uniquely different, medieval – which is to say, authentically unmodern – sense of the marvelous that celebrated “wondrous diversity” through prolific depictions of freaks and monsters in literature, art, and cartography, the insistence that medieval absorption with freakery and monstrosity is exuberantly different from modern absorption should not suggest to us that medieval pleasure should be seen as pleasure of a simply and wholly innocent kind.

Cartographic and imaginary race issued a grid through which European culture perceived and understood the global races and alien nations of the world. The “Monstrous Races tradition,” as Debra Strickland puts it, “provided the ideological infrastructure” for ruminating on and understanding “other types of ‘monsters,’ namely Ethiopians, Jews, Muslims, and Mongols” (42).

Gregory Guzman details how a race of Mongols, issuing from Central Asia, was understood by authors in the Latin West, including Matthew Paris, through a conceptual grid of the monstrous cannibal races of the world and their geographic locations. Equated with cannibalistic monsters cartographically found in northwest Asia are in fact a variety of historical races: Jews (in Mandeville’s Travels), Mongols (in the Chronica Majora of Matthew Paris), and Turks (in the Hereford mappamundi [Westrem, Hereford Map 137, Map section 4]).

Finally, if there is a symbolic evocation on the Hereford of the relationship between race and chaos, it would be located in the largest single edifice on the map: an imposing Tower of Babel, key image in the Biblical narrative of the fabulous origin of proliferating human diversity, and a menacing reminder of incommensurate and unassimilable human difference – an edifice in the East that looms in immensity above the castles and cathedrals of Western Europe.
But what of humans within Europe who share the most fundamental basis of identity in the Latin West: the European peoples of the Latin rite who are not monstrous aliens,
nor Jews, Muslims, Mongols, Africans, pagans, heretics, schismatics, nor Greek or Eastern Christians, but neighbors living in proximity and bound by a common Latin Christian faith?

Studies of conquest and colonization in the countries of the “Celtic fringe” — a term ironized by medievalists, and which witnesses the unequal periphery-center relations that bound Wales, Scotland, and Ireland to the metropolitan hub of England — have pointed to English depictions of Celtic barbarity and subhumanness that were standard ideological tropes in England’s self-justification for its enterprise of occupying its neighbors.

Reflecting on Wales, Jeffrey Jerome Cohen sums up England’s colonial strategy: “An indigenous people are represented as primitive, subhuman, incomprehensible in order to render the taking of their lands unproblematic” (“Hybrids” 87). Though scholars differ on the legacy and intentions of English conquest, few disagree, given the documentary record, that the indigenous colonized were indeed portrayed by England as primitive and even subhuman.

Do such portrayals constitute race-making? A microhistorical example offered by Michael Goodich suggests that in the context of lived relations on the ground, a shared faith can sometimes bridge large enmities. Goodich shows how, in 1290, “when Wales was experiencing the baleful effects of forced colonization and Anglicization” by neighboring England, the attempted execution of a Welsh rebel named William Cragh, who miraculously survived death by hanging — a miracle he and others attributed to St. Thomas of Hereford (d. 1282) — resulted in conciliation between Welsh colonized and English colonizers. Pilgrimage to the English saint’s shrine by the subsequently pardoned Welsh ex-rebel, in the company of the local English lord and the lord’s wife and household, sealed “public recognition of a shared religious faith which could overcome political differences” (21).

“The religious cult,” Goodich concludes, “transcended ... ethnic loyalties” (12), evincing “the power of the faith ... to bring warring groups together ... Despite the destruction inflicted on Swansea and South Wales shortly before” by the English (21). Such Christian amity did not extend to those who were not coreligionists: St. Thomas himself, while bishop of Hereford, had supported the expulsion of Jews from England and confiscation of Jewish property “because they are ‘enemies of God and rebels against the faith’” (Goodich 21).39

If microhistory suggests that enmity between colonized and colonizers can sometimes be disengaged by a common religion and a shared religious ritual such as pilgrimage, micro-literary example also attests to divisions not bridged by a common profession of the Latin Rite. Studies point to how Blind Hary’s nationalistic work of the 1470s, The Wallace, ferociously insists that essential differences of blood fundamentally separate English colonizers from native Scots resisters despite commonality of faith. R. James Goldstein stresses The Wallace’s use of “blood as an indicator of both class and race” (237), while Richard J. Moll shows how blood functions less as a genetic or genealogical category in The Wallace than as the binding glue of “true Scots” — defined as those who are loyal to the nationalist cause of Scotland’s independence, whatever their socioeconomic, personal, or group status (whether highlanders or lowlanders, etc.).40

Among neighbors in Latin Christendom, Ireland presents a resonant example of how even commonalities of faith can be adroitly manipulated to subserve colonial interests. English invasion and occupation of Ireland required a theological hermeneutic that
insinuated difference of a fundamental kind between the Christianity of the colonized (rendered as inferior, defective, and deviant) and the Christianity of their Anglo-Norman colonizers (assumed as superior and normative).

No less than the magisterial Bernard of Clairvaux in his *Vita Sancti Malachiae* declared the Irish to be “uncivilized in their ways, godless in religion, barbarous in their law, obstinate as regards instruction, foul in their lives: *Christians in name, pagans in fact*” (qtd. in Bartlett, *Gerald of Wales* 169, emphasis added). Given that the Irish members of Latin Christendom were pagans *in fact*, Pope Adrian IV, writing to Henry II of England in 1155, could authorize the English monarch to occupy Ireland — a land that had converted to Christianity a century and a half before England itself — “with a view to enlarging the boundaries of the church . . . and for the increase of the Christian religion” (Muldoon, *Identity* 73).41

Exposition of a fundamental Irish difference in Christianity is accompanied by the elaboration of Irish socioeconomic difference and Irish cultural differences: Layer upon layer of negative judgments are nested in such a way as to discover a vast civilizational gulf between Ireland and England on a vertical axis of evolutionary development. Ireland’s economic practices of transhumance signified backwardness, evidence that the Irish “have not progressed at all from the primitive habits of pastoral living,” as Gerald of Wales, the gifted chronicler and ethnographer who accompanied his Anglo-Norman masters from England to Ireland derisively put it in his *Topographia Hiberniae* (O’Meara 101; Brewer 5: 151).42 Labor in Ireland is transformed into a condition of lack — moralized as willful laziness and self-indulgence — and assigned to the character of an entire people: “[T]he soil of Ireland would be fertile if it did not lack the industry of the dedicated farmer; but the country has an uncivilized and barbarous people . . . lacking in laws and discipline, lazy in agriculture” (William of Newburgh, qtd. by R. R. Davies 124).43

The Irish people are . . . a people getting their living from animals alone and living like animals; a people who have not abandoned the first mode of living — the pastoral life. For when the order of mankind progressed from the woods to the fields and from the fields to towns and gatherings of citizens, this people spurned the labors of farming.

(Gerald of Wales, qtd. by Bartlett [Gerald] 176)44

Even in the Middle Ages, we notice, *modernity* — symbolized by England as a poster child of agricultural cultivation; trade and commerce; urbanization; enlightened laws, usage, and custom; centralized state authority; and even the circulation of coin — is posited against a *premodernity* located in Ireland and rendered as a prior moment of human development that England had long since left behind.

Caricatured as a primitive land — an undeveloped global south lying to the west of England — Ireland was accordingly positioned as a project in need of evolutionary improvement and instruction, in order to force the “savage Irish” (“irrois savages” [Lydon, *Lordship* 283]) to emerge one day from their barbaric cocoon into a state of enlightened civilization — an agenda, Robert Bartlett observes, that “would not be out of place in nineteenth-century anthropological thought” (Gerald 176).45

The logic of evolutionary progress by which colonizers justify their extraterritoriality and craft their right to colonial rule — so much in evidence in later centuries in Africa, India, Southeast Asia, the West and East Indies, the Americas, and elsewhere — is pronouncedly a racial logic, and exercises “the language of colonial racism” (Bhabha 86). Racial logic of the
The evolutionary kind seems to promise (or even mandate) progress, yet racial logic’s ostensible goal of a subject population’s achievement of a civilizational maturity which will guarantee their equality with their colonial masters is never attained, but merely floats as a vaunted possibility on an ever-receding horizon.

The not-yet of racial evolutionary logic then becomes perpetual deferment, a “not yet forever” (Ghosh and Chakrabarty 148, 152). Thus we find four centuries later that England’s authors – Spenser’s *A View of the Present State of Ireland* is especially eloquent – are still derisively lamenting the premodern, backward, savage, uncivilized Irish.46

“So,” R. R. Davies wonders, “what was it . . . about the Irish which persuaded Edmund Spenser that they would never be able to reach that happy state [of English civility]?” (128). The clustering of virulent discourses on the Irish brings into focus processes of racialization that have little to do with skin color, physiognomy, phenotype, genealogy, blood lineage, macrobian zones, or climatology, but point instead to how flexible and resourceful strategies of race-making could be.

The Irish, after all, were Europeans and had converted to Latin Christianity much earlier than their colonizers, and Irish monasticism had famously helped to preserve the cultural record of the Latin West after the dissolution of the Western Roman Empire. Yet “[t]o be *merus Hibernicus* (‘pure Irish’) meant that one could never be the equal of an Englishman, whether one born in England or in Ireland” (Lydon, *Lordship* 288). Indeed, the Remonstrance of the Irish Princes, written in 1317 and addressed to Pope John XXII, describes how English laymen and clergy alike “assert . . . that it is no more sin to kill an Irishman than a dog or any other brute” (qtd. by Lydon, *Lordship* 289, “Nation and Race” 109).47

The absence of physiognomic distinction that could enable Christian European groups to be visually distinguished from one another dictated a reliance on other regimes of visual inspection. Pointing to cultural cues to supply visual proofs of deep differences between Irish and English, Gerald of Wales, for one, makes much of the “flowing hair and beards” of the Irish, whose clothing is “made up in a barbarous fashion,” and whose warriors “go naked and unarmed into battle” (O’Meara 102, 101; Brewer 5: 153, 5: 151).

But the treacherous slipperiness of cultural markers, which can easily go astray and cue incorrectly, must be arrested, finally, by the force of law. Prohibitions of the infamous 1366 Statutes of Kilkenny – focusing on both Irish and English populations resident in Ireland – specially target those who, in their outward appearance, their manners, and their mores, enact the uneasy mixing of kinds: Anglo-Irish colonial settlers who have gone native and resemble the native population of Ireland.

Miscegenation – cultural, linguistic, sexual, and marital – is explicitly named in the opening statement of the 1366 legislation as the urgent animating imperative for issuing the Statutes. Enumerating the kinds of mixing that must not occur, the Statutes exhibit a particular distress at nativizing colonials who personify the unnerving difficulty of telling apart colonizers from colonized. The Statutes demand that every Anglo-Irish colonial settler “use the *English* custom, fashion, mode of riding and apparel” (Berry 434–5, emphasis added) because “many English . . . forsaking the English language, fashion, mode of riding, laws and usages, live and govern themselves according to the manners, fashion, and language of the Irish enemies; and also have made divers marriages and alliances between themselves and the Irish enemies” (Berry 430–1).

The Statutes of Kilkenny are rightly identified by scholars as *racial law* – legislating “a racial moment,” as Kathy Biddick puts it (“Cut” 453), in “the language of racism,” as James

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108381710.002 Published online by Cambridge University Press
Lydon puts it (“Nation and Race” 106). Yet, issuing centuries after initial colonization, this edict merely ratifies rather than enacts race-making ab origo: “[t]he famously discriminatory 1366 Statutes of Kilkenny . . . merely codify a policy long pursued” (Hoffman 7).

Equally haunting is a story told by Gerald of Wales in his *Topographia Hibernia*, an anecdote that drives home both the horrors of miscegenation and the fate of the benighted Irish. Couched as a vignette about an old couple, a man and a woman of Ossory who are outwardly wolves but inwardly human, the story catches the eye of many because of its capacity for poignancy and shock, and for its evocation of the touching devotion of the aged couple and the pathos of their plight. An abbot’s curse has caused a human pair to live seven years as wolves; if they survive, the couple is released and replaced by another pair of humans who assume the burden of the curse for the next seven years, and so on, pair by pair, forever.

Narrated in detail and at far greater length than Gerald’s cursory accounts of Irish women copulating with goats or Irish men inseminating cows, this allegory of species miscegenation unfolds vividly in our mind’s eye as the old male wolf pleads with a priest to bless the female wolf— who is very ill and near death— with last rites and the Host. When the priest performs the rites but withholds communion, the old wolf, to prove that she is human and thus deserving of the Host, uses his paw to peel off the top half of her wolf form, from head down to the navel, shockingly disclosing an old woman beneath.

A woman’s body thus proves the humanity of the wolf-couple— sexual difference emerging in the instant of confirming humanity, and issuing as the very ground of confirmation. The human voice alone, emerging from the jaws of a male wolf, has not been adequate to confirm humanness. A woman’s face, breasts, and navel are necessary— her navel also presenting proof of human predecessors before her. After she has “devoutly received the sacrament,” the skin is folded back again over the woman’s humanness, and the two wolves, sharing the priest’s fire all night long, depart in the morning, merely the latest pair to endure an unendurable destiny (O’Meara 75, 74, 70–2; Brewer 5: 101–3).

Like the people of Ireland who must bear the burden of imposed subhumanity in perpetuity while striving for admission to full humanity and civilization, the Irish were-wolves of Gerald’s story are subhuman in perpetuity and live on the margins of the civilized world, as they ask for the most fundamental gifts of Christian humanity: sacraments and rites. Even if this individual pair survive their seven years of submergence into animalkind, these humans-who-are-wolves continue to be collectively cursed, doomed to subhumanity and outcast status forever. The story’s haunting ambience is delivered with wonderful little touches, like the lively presentation of the priest’s terrified incredulity, the human speech that startlingly emanates from the male wolf’s maw, and the old wolf’s desperation as he makes his plea for the dying female.

Finally, though the narrative concludes that “the wolf showed himself . . . to be a man rather than a beast” (72), we are left not with an image of the reassuringly human, nor one of the palpably animal, but with an impression of a profoundly tragic intermixture, and a relentless continuity without end. Through this strange presentation of a story that appeals at the level of affect and intuition, we absorb an allegory of colonial logic rendered as the fearful intermixing of kinds.

Irish appear like savage beasts on the outside, but may really be human under the skin. Their humanity, however, cannot be extricated from their animal nature, and even if some appear Christian, as witnessed by a touching faith in the highest of sacramental rites, the
taking of the Host (a faith that confirms the power of those rites over all creation, universally), the Irish – as represented by these unfortunates of Ossory – are in the end tragic beings, mixing dual natures, at best doomed to pity, and forever denied access to full human and civilized status.49

The compassion elicited from us by this story and the poignancy that hovers over its narrative arc suggest alternative ways to read even colonial documents, if we attend to the queer residues that exceed the requirements of plot and trajectory. Like the Irish werewolves, Gerald’s text also appears at times to possess dual natures – evincing glimpses, here and there, of a tentative sympathy or wonder that abuts queerly against the more usual vitriol which the text aims at the Irish.

This story of tragic wolf-humans is not the only moment when the empire seems to write back in the interstices of the text or from the textual unconscious. In the annals of colonial documents where anticolonial discourse, oddly secreted in fissures, unexpectedly speaks, Gerald’s pithy report of the brief exchange between himself and the Irish Archbishop of Cashel (“a learned and discreet man,” says the text) can scarcely be bettered. To Gerald the narrator’s complacently superior remark deprecating Irish Christianity for lacking martyrs, given that “no one had ever in that kingdom won the crown of martyrdom in defence of the church of God” before, the Archbishop wryly responds:

“It is true” he said, “that although our people are very barbarous, uncivilized, and savage, nevertheless they have always paid great honor and reverence to churchmen, and they have never put out their hands against the saints of God. But now a people has come to the kingdom which knows how, and is accustomed, to make martyrs. From now on Ireland will have its martyrs, just as other countries.”

(O’Meara 115–16; Brewer 5: 178–9)

The sly civility of this Irish ecclesiastic – adverting to English atrocity to come, and a brave response by Irish resisters, all in the dulcet tones of the colonized but slippery and undefeated subject – belies the very barbarity the Archbishop so readily concedes as the identifying characteristic of his people. Gerald the narrator and Anglo-Norman enthusiast – so often described by scholars as obtuse, humorless, and tone-deaf – deadpans: “the archbishop gave a reply which cleverly got home – although it did not rebut my point” (O’Meara 115; Brewer 5: 178).50

In recent years, scholars have increasingly argued that “the experience of the English in Ireland ... shaped the initial response of the English to the inhabitants of North America” (Muldoon, Identity 92):

justifications contained in the charters that English monarchs granted to colonizers [in North America], echoed the language of the papal documents associated with Henry II’s entry into Ireland ... to the eyes of English colonizers, the Indians with their long flowing hair, deerskin robes, and seminomadic way of life appeared to be living at the same stage of development as the Irish.

(92–3)51

Beyond America, Robert Bartlett muses, “the prejudices the English acquired in the course of their colonial experience in Ireland were exported by them and brought to bear on their colonial experience throughout the world” – one result of which, he adds, has been the crafting of “an ideological weapon that has not yet lost its cutting edge” (Gerald 177).
Colonial racism of the medieval kind, it would seem, found rich afterlives in the colonial racisms of the postmedieval centuries, as subsequent English empires spread their umbra across the world.

**Politics of the Epidermis: Color Differences in the Medieval Sensorium of Race**

I have postponed the discussion of color as an index of race to nearly the end of this chapter, partly because color as the paramount signifier of race – the privileged site of race – is too commonly invoked as the deciding factor adjudicating whether racial attitudes and phenomena existed in premodernity, and my preference has been to emphasize multiple, rather than singular, locations of race. But the desire to redistribute attention away from the-epidermal-as-race is also prompted by a recognition that color has a specific resilience in the Middle Ages that overdetermines its coding in some contexts of medieval thinking about difference in which color is called into service.

This is not at all to cast doubt that a hierarchical politics of color, centering with precision on the polarity of black and white, existed and is in evidence across the multitude of texts and artifacts, sacred and secular, that descends to us. It is rather to suggest that color is exercised over a range of genres – sermons, letters, romances, chronicles, sculpture, painting, encyclopedias, maps – as a special resource with the ability, under specific hermeneutic conditions, to switch between alternate valencies afforded by religious epistemology, in order that it might answer satisfactorily to variable demands.

For instance: Color as a marker of difference answers with precise responsiveness to the demands of the central conceptual paradoxes on which medieval theological Christianity thrives, and on which it is constituted. Color can be deployed conventionally in Christian texts to signal the polar difference between sacred and demonic – as I duly noted at the beginning of this chapter. But color can also be flexibly deployed to underscore the recuperability and pivotal centrality of sin, sinfulness, and the sinner in the salvational narrative of redemption that is the cornerstone of Christian thinking.

Indeed, the importance of sin – whose color is black – in salvational theology often leads, in medieval modes of religious expression, to what David Wallace wittily calls “competitive abjection” between sinners self-proclaimed. Since the condition of being more-sinful-than-thou, and thus more-abject-than-thou, signals the potentiating likelihood of being more-saved-than-thou, and ascending to greater heights of ultimate grace – so much does God love the worst sinners, who are the most abject of all – possessing blackness, at least in theory and in imagination, is not always a bad thing. Thus it is possible for the great Bernard of Clairvaux, in his Sermon 25 on the Song of Songs, only half-playfully to refer to Jesus, who among humans has the greatest access to the highest grace (his self-sacrifice being the ultimate abjection), as “obviously black” and “black but beautiful” (Walsh 56).

Should this signal to us that color discourse in the twelfth century of St. Bernard is so unstable that the value of a color such as black can be made to tip over readily into its opposite? Or should we find ourselves cued, instead, to understand that paradoxical play with color is only possible when a signifying field has stabilized to the point that enables such play, and to the degree that allows paradox to be performed? If the contemplation of color polarities affords intellectual pleasures of wit and paradox for the great theological
minds of the Middle Ages, similar and different kinds of pleasure, consolation, and reassurance are discernible in other modalities of contemplation.

For instance, statuary in thirteenth-century Magdeburg in Germany and regions under the influence of Magdeburg depicting a black African St. Maurice, martyr of the Theban legions under a persecutory Rome (Figure 8), has long elicited the interest of art historians,

Figure 8. Statue of the Black St. Maurice of Magdeburg. Magdeburg Cathedral, Germany, 1220–1250. Reproduced with permission from the Menil Foundation, Houston; Hickey and Robertson, Houston; and Harvard University’s Image of the Black Project.
who have reached for explanations as to why a black African saint should be venerated in certain sites of the German empire despite a virulent discourse on blackness and the ubiquity of a white St. Maurice elsewhere in Europe, especially in England and France. These explanations have variously invoked the politics of the German empire under Frederick II, the machinations of archbishops responsible for commissioning architecture in which the Black St. Maurice appears, and the freedom of thirteenth-century German artisans to invent and fantasize as they wished, while such artistic freedoms were denied to craftsmen in places such as France because of the rapid entrenchment of rigid artistic models and traditions.53

By and large, however, considerations of German exceptionalism in the politics of color have not yet engaged with the circuits of pleasure – the consolation, identification, play, and reassurance – that can be apotropaically tapped with the acceptance and welcome, publicly and in contexts of privacy and intimacy, of imaginative representations like that of Maurice: beautiful and comforting renditions of what might otherwise be deemed frightening or malign in other historical contexts.54

Private, intimate acceptance and welcome of an otherness signaled by color may be easier to imagine sympathetically when a discourse on color intersects with fantasies of sexuality and gender, even if such acceptance and welcome appear more opaque in religious devotion.

In one of his letters to his wife Heloise, Peter Abelard comments on the blackness of the Ethiopian bride of Canticles in a fairly conventional exposition of the meaning of color (with black standing for disfigurement, shame, and adversity), but suddenly swerves off on a provocative tangent to contemplate the pleasures afforded by color in sexed and bodied form, especially when enjoyed and relished in privacy: “it often happens that the flesh of black women is all the softer to touch . . . and for this reason the pleasure they give is greater and more suitable for private than for public enjoyment, and their husbands take them into a bedroom to enjoy them rather than parade them before the world” (Radice 140).55

Here, there are fewer obstacles to understanding why black is beautiful under the circumstances, even in a historical context of color virulence. Nothing in the trajectory of forbidden desire outlined by Peter Abelard is novel to any who have read postmedieval literatures of empire or slavery, or have followed the modern-day saga of Strom Thurmond or the historical saga of Thomas Jefferson with any attentiveness.

Vacillations in the field of color would thus suggest the availability of medieval color discourse to strategies of meaningful play, especially in the rarefied symbolic realms of religious subtlety and religious theology, and in the sphere of the fantasmatic: play that otherwise leaves undisturbed hierarchical alignments of color and race. Having said that, I have also argued that a critical shift in our attention to color is timely, to make visible what has been invisible in the field of the specular: the ascension of whiteness to supremacy as a category of identity in the definition of the Christian European subject.56

For it would be true to say that race makes an appearance in the Middle Ages not only through fantasmatic blackness, Jews, Saracens, Mongols, Africans, Indians, Chinese, tribal islanders, “Gypsies,” indigenes in the Americas, and the collections of freakish and deformed humans pressing upon the edges of the civilized world, but is also to be found at the center of things, in the creation of that strange creature who is nowhere yet everywhere in cultural discourse: the white Christian European in medieval time. Seven hundred years after the Hereford, Duchy of Cornwall, and Psalter maps of the world had located monstrous races in southern Africa, there would indeed be a race of human
monsters practicing monstrosity in the name of apartheid in South Africa, and the color of that monstrous race, as it turns out, was not black.

Notes

1 For the text of Canon 68, see Schroeder 584. For summaries of English rulings, see Roth (History) 95–6. On the badge in Europe, see Grayzel 68–9. The literature on medieval English Jews is vast. Adler, Richardson, Roth (History), and Mundill provide standard points of entry. England was the first to expel its Jewish population; in 1496, Portugal was the last (France expelled and readmitted Jews several times in the Middle Ages, and only permanently in 1394).


3 Trachtenberg surveys several traditions, including Jewish possession of horns, a tail (44–52), and a goat’s beard (46). Biller examines how a male menses or hemorrhoidal flow is established in thirteenth-century University of Paris theological quodlibets (“Christian or ‘Scientific?’” and “A ‘Scientific’ View”); Ziegler (187) tracks the flux in texts of physiognomy; see Marcus on the relationship of the “bloody flux” to Passion Friday (“Images” 250). Johnson offers the fullest account of how Christian political theology accrues in stages the fiction of the bloody flow. Biller (“Proto-Racial Thought” 177) offers Caesarius of Heisterbach and Berthold of Regensburg (“ein stinkender Jude”) on the smell of Jews, and Matthew Paris on the Jewish face (“facies Judaica”); see also Marcus on Caesarius’ depiction of the “evil odour” (“Images” 255). For Jewish phenotypes and somatic features in medieval art, see Mellinkoff I: 127–9 and Strickland 95–155. Blood libels insist that Jews need Christian blood, especially for Passover rites, which is one reason for the ritual murder of Christian children (the flux efficiently overdetermines this: Blood is also needed because Jewish men are supposed to bleed congenitally). See note 28 for fuller documentation.

4 See Seymour et al. 2: 752–3, 763. Ranulph Higden’s Polychronicon has a similar formulation (Babington and Lumby 1: 50–3); ethnographic polarities based on phenotype, biomarkers, and color are also posited by texts on physiognomy. Biller (“Proto-Racial Thought”) surveys the more influential medieval encyclopedias and medical texts describing how color and biomarkers reveal the moral, psychological, and intellectual character of human groups.

5 See Devisse 72–9 for conventions depicting the Baptist’s executioner and Christ’s torturers as black Africans. Figure 1 is from Devisse 74; Figure 2 from 92; Figure 3 from 71. On romance, see, e.g., Heng, Empire of Magic; Metlitzki, chapter 6. On chansons de geste, see, e.g., Daniel, Heroes and Saracens; de Weever.

6 My discussion of why race has been located exclusively in modernity merely points to a blind spot in academic culture. Needless to say, it does not detract from the value of, and my admiration for, the work of these and other authors on modern race. I also apologize for naming representative exemplars here: The scholarship on race is vast, and rather than devote this chapter to summarizing more than half a century’s work in race theory and critical race studies, I offer exemplars whose studies include extensive bibliographies that can be consulted as starting points.

7 Kwame Anthony Appiah’s 1990 “Race,” opposing biology, in high modernist racism, to theology in preracial premodernity, is still widely cited in (especially undergraduate) courses on race. A keynote by Balibar (“Election/Selection”) for a 2003 University of California Humanities Research Institute conference, “tRaces: Race, Deconstruction, Critical Theory,” shows how little has changed in race theory, despite deconstruction, when it maintains that “the biological” is to racism what “the theological” is to “pre-Modern discriminations,” thus continuing race studies’ habit of separate and cordoned-off polar oppositions (Balibar, “Election/Selection” 2).
THE INVENTION OF RACE IN THE EUROPEAN MIDDLE AGES

8 I owe the impetus for the following arguments on temporalities, premodernity, and modernity to Stoler’s marvelous reading of origins in her “Racial Histories.” Quotations are from p. 191.
9 Stoler, Race and the Education of Desire 73; Goldberg, Racist Culture, “masks,” p. 6ff.; see also Goldberg’s important formulations on cultural race, “ethnorace,” and the “ethnoracial” (70–8).
10 For a trenchant critique of Western exceptionalism and grand narratives of scientific transformation, see Hart (“Explanandum,” Civilizations, Algebra). See especially Biagioli, Terrall, Galison, and Stump on the Scientific Revolution and Goldstone on the Industrial Revolution and multiple economic and demographic modernities. Also useful is the symposium on “Eurocentrism, Sino-centrism and World History” in Science and History. In the past three or four decades, euro-medievalists have also critiqued the modern/premodern divide, most recently under the rubric of “periodization.” For an influential early example, see Jauss. Haskin’s 1927 volume on the “renaissance” of the twelfth century may perhaps also be seen as a precursor moment. Among other important issues, euromedievalist critiques have focused attention on literary history (Summit and Wallace), “neo-medievalism” in political writing (Lampert[-Weissig], “Race, Periodicity, and the (Neo-) Middle Ages”; Holsinger), stories of reading and queer relationalities (Dinshaw), epistemologies of feudalism and sovereignty (Kathleen Davis), and the politics of knowledge and disciplinary formations (Biddick, Typological).
11 For other comparisons between eleventh-century Song China and eighteenth-century Europe, see Hartwell’s “Revolution” 155. Much scholarly work decentering the West has, of course, been inspired by Joseph Needham’s magisterial studies on the history of science, and in particular on Chinese science and technology. Rondo Cameron, Eric Jones, and Jan de Vries dismiss an Industrial Revolution in the West or qualitative distinctions between modern and premodern growth (Goldstone 327). For David Levine and Alexander Woodside (Goldstone 331), Michael Mann and Alan McFarlane (Goldstone 347), “modern” growth began in the early or high Middle Ages. Janet Abu-Lughod’s Before European Hegemony also remains invaluable.
12 I elaborate the politics of temporality more fully in “Holy War Redux.” For the strategic value of studying the deep past in postcolonial and global studies in the academy today, see my “Reinventing Race.”
13 Medievalists, however, have long been interested in questions of race. Earlier scholarship conjured with “the Celtic races,” “Germanic stock,” “Indo-Europeans,” “the Anglo-Saxon race,” inter alia, as more than contingently heuristic categories, and discussed relationships between ethnicity, lineage, tribe, natio, gens, blood, linguistic affiliations, ties to territory, etc. For an example of more recent thinking on Anglo-Saxons, race, and ethnogenesis, see Harris. Twenty-first-century scholarship on medieval race has tended increasingly to focus on non-Christians or non-Europeans such as Muslims, on blackness and fantasmatic Africans in literature and art, and on Jews. For examples of recent euromedievalist work, see Hahn’s special issue of the Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies on race and ethnicity (discussed presently), Lynn Ramey (Black Legacies), and Cord Whitaker’s special issue of postmedieval entitled “Making Race Matter in the Middle Ages.” Studies of “otherness” and “difference” are also on the rise, and may or may not invoke race/ethnicity in discussing “internal foreigners” such as Hungarians (e.g., Hoffman, Sager), “the Celtic fringe” (e.g., Lydon [“Nation and Race,” Lordship], Lilley, Knight, Moll, Muldoon [Irish Frontier]), or preconversion pagan eastern Europe, or Spain (e.g., Mariscal, Kagay, Hoffman, Nirenberg). Importantly, medievalists have shown that studying the Middle Ages reconfigures our understanding of key contemporary concepts such as gender, sexuality, national formations, and even literacy. Race should prove little exception.
14 Foundational historiography’s exclusions make Colin Richmond wonder why the Oxford don H. E. Salter’s Medieval Oxford “ignored [the Jews]”; why “less than three pages” mention Jews in Michael Prestwich’s magisterial 567-page volume on Edward I, a volume that amply considers Edward’s treatment of the Welsh and Scots; and why James Holt’s Magna Carta dismisses “the anti-Jewish clauses 10 and 11 as ‘superficial’” (222). Concluding that “non-Jewish historians ignored
the Jews” (214), Richmond wonders if medieval Jews upset the myth of an English England: “The history of the Jews in England enables us to see that [an English England] is myth . . . Is this not why the Jewish history of England is not taught in schools – because it is a type of anti-history as perceived by those who finally determine national curricula?” (221). Kathy Lavezzo’s Accommodated few discusses the debt of England’s architecture to medieval English Jewry. English historiography, of course, is by no means unique: Menocal astutely remarks, e.g., of medieval Spain: “Spaniard is implicitly defined in racial and religious terms. The Cid is a Spaniard, but Ibn Hazm and Maimonides are not; they are an Arab and Jew respectively” (284 n.17).

15 In contrast to foundational historiography, there exists a large and rapidly growing body of scholarship on medieval English Jews that furnishes ample material for counternarratives and alternative histories of England. Studies range from Anglo-Saxon England’s conceptual understanding of Jews and Judaism before the eleventh-century post-Conquest arrival of Jews (e.g., Scheil, and Zacher’s edited volume) to careful analysis of records of taxation and tallages, registries of debt and financial transactions, trials and imprisonment records, civic and municipal documents, laws and statutes (e.g., Stacey, “Parliamentary Negotiation”; Rokéah; Roth, Oxford; Dobson, York; Lipman; Hillaby, “Testimony from the Margin”), the political implications of manuscript and codicological artifacts (Bale, The Jew in the Medieval Book), and the economic and political bases of expulsion (e.g., Mundill; Abrahams; Menache, “Faith, Myth, and Politics”), among many kinds of archival scrutiny. Literary interpretation of how Jews are portrayed in medieval literature – an endeavor not irrelevant to historiography – is also a large, riveting, and expanding field, and can be bibliographically rendered by subject, genre, author, and topoi.

16 Though the focus of this book is the medieval West, this focus in no way suggests that the rest of the world – in premodernity or after – is free of fault in race matters, or innocent in its treatment of minorities and others. This clarification seems necessary to repeat, and is made in response to those who have expressed concern with projects that appear to “blame the West, and not the rest.”

17 Snowden, for example, has argued at length that antiquity is a time “before color prejudice.” The work of the few named here constitutes examples of studies on antiquity that have appeared in recent years, and that with growing frequency conjure with categories of ethnicity and race. Also important is the work of Martin Bernal’s Black Athena, despite controversies of scholarship (see Lefkowitz and Rogers; Bernal, Black Athena Writes Back) and Jonathan Hall (though Hall’s category of choice is “ethnicity”). The wonderful term “deep time” is Dimock’s (3).

18 The Introduction in Eliav-Feldon et al. discusses examples of those who believe that the key determinant to whether we can discuss race and racisms in the Middle Ages is what medieval peoples thought about their own identity and behavior. The insistence that the word “race” must first exist in European languages prior to racial phenomena and practices has also led to disagreements over where the term first appears. De Miramon, arguing against common belief that Iberia is where the word “race” first issues, finds late-fifteenth-century French poems to be the earliest provenance. He also finds that the sorting of kinds performed by the word closely relates race to nobility and noble blood.

19 See e.g., Buell; Heng (Empire of Magic, chapters 2 and 4; “Invention of Race . . . ?” and “Invention of Race . . . ?2”, “Reinventing Race”); Lampert “Race”; Ziegler.

20 See also Chakrabarty, in Ghosh and Chakrabarty 165, on “homologies between racism and [religious] communalism.” Fredrickson wavers on whether premodern race exists and whether religion can constitute racial discourses. He outlines conditions through which anti-Judaism becomes anti-Semitism and anti-Semitism becomes racism (19), which seems to allow for the possibility of premodern race, given the fulfillment of his conditions. But Fredrickson also confusingly concludes that only “the racial antisemitism of the modern era” (23) constitutes racism in “full flower” (47) since the “supernaturalist racism” (46) of the “late medieval and early modern periods” was “primarily religious rather than naturalistic or scientific” (46) and “racism had to be emancipated from Christian universalism” first (47).
21 The three contemporaneous Latin chronicles recording the incident are: Matthew Paris’s *Chronica
Majora* (Luard, *Mathaei Parisiensis* 5: 516–19, 546, 552); the annals of Burton-on-Trent (Luard,
*Annales monastici* 1: 340–8); and Waverley annals (Luard, *Annales monastici* 2: 346–8). For the
Anglo-Norman ballad, see Michel 1–16 and Dahood, “Anglo-Norman ‘Hugo de Lincolnia’.”
Hillaby, “Ritual-Child-Murder” (107 n.90) lists sources for the 1911 pamphlet. Chapter 2 closely
examines the Anglo-Norman ballad and Chaucer’s *Priest’s Tale*.

22 See David Carpenter’s two-part study for the reconstruction of events. The records vary in
incidental details, as is common with medieval texts – e.g., Matthew Paris puts the child at eight
(“acto annos,” [Luard, *Mathaei Parisiensis* 5: 516]), while the Burton annals call him “a tiny boy of
nine years” (“puerum parvulum ix. annorum” [Luard, *Annales monastici* 1: 340]) – but not in their
narrative trajectory or plot purposefulness.

23 Invented in England, the accusation spread to France, then Germany, Spain, and Italy (Hillaby,
“Ritual-Child-Murder” 98–102). Seven English shrines were raised to boy martyrs murdered by
Jews, three of which – at Norwich, Bury, and Lincoln – survived to the Reformation. Four had
already appeared by the middle of the thirteenth century (Langmuir, “Knight’s Tale” 463). Hugh’s
“was the most popular of all the English pilgrimage sites . . . after that of [Thomas] Becket at
Canterbury” (Hillaby, “Ritual-Child-Murder” 96), drawing “extraordinary nationwide interest”
(Hillaby, “Ritual-Child-Murder” 7).

24 *Encyclopaedia Judaica* 4: 1122, 6: 748; Langmuir, “Knight’s Tale” 462–3; Stacey, “From Ritual
Crucifixion to Host Desecration” 25; Adler 185–6; and Hillaby (“Ritual-Child-Murder”). Hillaby
(“Ritual-Child-Murder”) discusses the boy martyrs William of Norwich, Harold of Gloucester,
Robert of Bury, Stephen of Winchester, and Hugh of Lincoln. Stacey (“Ritual Crucifixion”) treats
Adam of Bristol, and Langmuir (“Thomas of Monmouth”) William of Norwich. See also
McCulloh on the early years of the accusation.

25 Executions also occurred in Northampton in 1279: “The chronicle of Bury St. Edmunds describes
how ‘a boy was crucified by the Jews on the Day of the Adoration of the Holy Cross (Good
Friday), but was not quite killed. Notwithstanding, numbers of the Jews were torn to pieces by
horses in London and hung, immediately after Easter, under this pretext’” (Hillaby, “Ritual-
Child-Murder” 94). See Chapter 2 for a comparative examination of four tales, written before and
after the Expulsion, grouped around the theme of Hugh of Lincoln and/or Jewish child murder.

26 Away from the mainland, the state of Hawaii had its own internment camps at Sand Island and
Honouliuli. As we have noted, AIDS hysteria in 1980s America saw suggestions that gay
communities should also be rounded up and cordoned off from the population, in an updated
version of internment-quarantine. In addition to tagging and herding Jews, a suggestion was also
mooted in medieval England to intern Jews on an island. In 2016, the presidential candidate
Donald Trump’s proposal of a database for surveillance of all 3.3 million Muslims in the United
States astonishingly recalled medieval England’s surveillance of Jews through the bureaucratic
database created by the special branch of government known as the Jewish Exchequer. Racial
homologies across deep time thus seem to accrue around internments and surveillance, actual and
anticipated, and perhaps offer ways of “seeing [the medieval] as contemporary with the present,” a
perspective in which the medieval continues to exist as “an ever-present possibility that haunts the
practices of the modern” (Chakrabarty 110).

27 Spain’s persecutions of Jews, because of their scale and lateness, are better known to modernists
and race theorists than England’s, though Stacey and others note that Spain’s unique history – of a
polyglot, hybridized social matrix, intermingling Arabs, Berbers, Jews, Visigoths, Basques, and a
slew of other communities in mixed languages and cultures, leavened by occupation and warfare
from the eighth to the fifteenth centuries – means that Spain is less paradigmatic of the rest of
Europe. Stacey enumerates several ways in which England’s Jews paralleled Jewish populations
elsewhere in Ashkenazi Europe (“Twelfth-Century” 340–2). Edwards sums up the views of many:
“it is not possible to separate England from the mainland of Western Europe in the period
The scholarship is enormous; the few studies listed here offer some points of entry. Trachtenberg, as noted above, surveys several traditions, including the tarring of Jews with infernal diabolism (11–31), bestiality (187), and sorcery (57–87). See also Bonfil’s broad survey on Jews and the devil. Note 3 surveys the literature on a male menses or hemorrhoidal flow, the smell of Jews, the Jewish face, and Jewish phenotypes and somatic features in medieval art.

On Jewish carnality, see Anna Sapir Abulafia (“Bodies,” “Carnality”). Blood libels insist that Jews need Christian blood (see note 3 above), and cannibalism may join Jewish vampirism (Langmuir Antisemitism 263–81): In 1235, thirty-four Jews at Fulda were killed for the deaths of boys for blood-use (264), while in 1247 German Jews were accused of eating “the heart of a murdered child while solemnizing Passover” (265). The plot of host desecration says Jews steal consecrated hosts to re-perform their deicide of Christ (see Rubin, “Desecration,” “Eucharist,” and Gentle Tales), who may materialize as a beautiful child in the host itself (Sinanoglu).


My quick sketch of an overarching architecture cannot, of course, do justice to the complexities and shifting dynamics of what I’ve called the long thirteenth century, and serves merely to isolate some factors that figure in race-formation. Since history has jagged edges, some have detected an epistemic shift that begins earlier: Moore’s study of intolerance – the development of “a persecuting society” – ends with the thirteenth century as the culminating point (Formation). In the thirteenth century’s intensification of surveillance and persecution, especially of Jews, Jeremy Cohen (Friars) assigns a primary role to the mendicant orders. On Innocent III’s Jewish policies, see Tolan, “Of Milk and Blood.” For the narrowing of attitudes and changes in law with vicious consequences for alternative sexualities see Boswell; Mark Jordan tracks the invention of sodomy in this time. The Fourth Lateran Council’s massive expansion of canon law in 1215 – more than thrice the decrees of Lateran I, and more than double those of any council of the previous century – meant that canon law, as one scholar put it, “cover[ed] most areas of life” (Tentler 117), strengthened church dominance, and “entailed a level of power which insinuated itself into the heart of secular life” (Tambling 38).

Muldoon’s survey of Vatican registers (Popes, Lawyers, and Infidels) discerns marked shifts of several kinds. In the late eleventh century, in 1076, two decades before the crusades, a letter from Pope Gregory VII to a Muslim ruler in North Africa expatiates with apparent generosity on shared commonalities between Muslim and Christian monotheisms: “we who believe in and profess the one God, although we do so in different ways, daily praise and worship Him Who is the creator and ruler of this world” (Muldoon, Popes 39). By the late thirteenth century, however, the “blurring of distinctions between various non-Christians seems part of a general process of reducing the world to two classes of people, those within the Church and those outside of it” (Muldoon, Popes 52).

“In the thirteenth century ‘the overall strategy of Christendom underwent modification’: the battle now was not only military but doctrinal” (Burns 1387). Muldoon (Popes) traces the efforts of some sixteen popes in the thirteenth century and half a dozen in the fourteenth to extend the purview of
the papacy and Latin Christianity to North Africa, Eurasia, eastern Europe, India, and China through a range of initiatives, from conversionist preaching to papal fiefs, from papal treaties to economic threat. This is not to say, of course, that the hope of expanding Christendom’s borders and purview through crusade and military adventure ended: Crusading history shows how, even after the last major gathering of international forces foundered at Nicopolis in 1396, the practice and ideology of crusading did not die (Atiya, Nicopolis). On late-medieval crusading, see Atiya, Later Middle Ages.

31 “As early as 1235 the master-general [of the Dominican friars], writing from Milan to all the order, called for men ‘prepared to learn Arabic, Hebrew, Greek, or some other outlandish language’ for programs of conversion (Burns 1402). An early fourteenth-century polemical tract by Pierre Dubois envisages training women in foreign languages, theology, and medicine for missionary work: “Pierre Dubois accorded girls an equal place with boys in the schools which he proposed should be founded for the education of a generation which should convert the East . . . Like the boys the girls were to be highly educated in the languages which they would need . . . trained in medical skills . . . especially in those skills needed to deal with women’s ills, so that they might then proceed to their conversion . . . the girls were also to be trained in theology, since they would need to be able to instruct the women in the tenets of the Christian faith” (Purcell 61). See also David Abulafia (“Monarchs and Minorities” 236).

Abulafia finds that whereas in 1293 the Dominican Raymond Llull “had been trying to persuade Pope Celestine V to encourage missions to the Muslims, Mongols, and other nations beyond the Latin frontiers,” after 1293 Llull took to organizing conversionist preaching in mosques and synagogues within Christendom instead (“Monarchs and Minorities” 242). Abulafia examines the argument that the destruction of Muslim communities inside Europe—Lucera in southern Italy in 1300 and Spanish Minorca in 1287—and the 1289 expulsion of Jews from Anjou and Maine meant that where mass conversions were impracticable, deportation or enslavement were resorted to instead.

32 “In the 1260s Roger Bacon hungrily eyed the multitudes of Muslims, Mongols, Buddhists, and pagans ripe for conversion . . . Thirteenth-century crusading popes like Honorius III, Gregory IX, and Innocent IV encouraged conversion of Muslims by persuasion [and] from time to time the program tended to focus on a promising princely candidate” (Burns 1391). Innocent IV (1243–54), canonist initiator of embassies to the Mongols, developed the theoretical basis for papal interventions worldwide: “the pope’s responsibility for the souls of all men, Christian and non-Christian alike, justified papal intervention in the functioning of infidel societies” (Muldoon, Popes 9) and “authorized him to send missionaries into their lands to instruct the nonbelievers in the proper way of worshiping God. Should an infidel ruler block the entry of peaceful Christian missionaries, the pope could order him to admit them or face an invasion by Christian armies” (Muldoon, Popes 11). Innocent’s carefully argued conceptual frame for international relations did not, however, allow for reciprocity and “the right of infidels to send peaceful missionaries into Christian lands” because “The Muslim faith could not be treated as the equal of the Christian faith, and so its missionaries could not be treated as Christian missionaries ought to be, ‘because they are in error and we are on the righteous path’” (Muldoon, Popes 14). The pope could also judge infidels who violated natural law (the worship of idols constituted one such violation).

In Europe itself, Innocent IV and his predecessor Gregory IX (1227–41) ordered the public burning of the Talmud. Nicholas IV (1288–92) renewed ties with Christians living in North Africa and Ethiopia; Boniface VIII (1294–1303) granted two islands off Tunis to Roger Doria, the Sicilian admiral who captured them, as a papal fief in 1295 (Muldoon, Popes 54–5). Though papal vassals had held papal fiefs for centuries, “In accepting and legitimizing Doria’s African conquests, Boniface was extending beyond Europe the traditional papal policy with regard to newly conquered or converted regions” (Muldoon, Popes 55). Extensive studies exist on the international relations, embassies, ethnographic accounts, field reports, papal and missionary letters, diplomatic
missons, and explorations of this period. For a selection, see Dawson; de Rachewiltz (Papal Envoys); Fernández-Armesto; Moule; Muldoon (Popes); Setton.

33 Biller ("Christian or ‘Scientific’,?" “A ‘Scientific’ View of Jews,” “Black Women,” “Proto-Racial Thought”) emphasizes the power of medieval scientific discourses in shaping medieval racisms; Ziegler, who also considers scientific texts, finds religion and theology to be larger forces in race-formation (198).

34 The status of Muslims in medieval race – Muslims being the primary contestants of Western interests in the international arena in commercial, military, and political spheres, as well as formidable religious opponents on whom the Latin West depended for critical translations and interpretations of knowledge and culture – deserves more attention than can be encompassed here. I treat Muslims in Chapter 3 and in the sections of Chapter 6 devoted to Marco Polo and Mandeville’s Travels.

35 On medieval-style nations (not eighteenth-century nation-states), see, e.g., Forde, Johnson, and Murray; Bjorn, Grant, and Stringer; Turville-Petre; Heng, Empire of Magic chapters 2 and 4; and Lavezzo, Imagining. Judith Ferster made the astute remark, in one audience discussion of my argument here, that if one were to track the expulsions of Jews country-by-country across medieval Europe, one would likely be able to establish how early or how late a country underwent nation formation, and thus gather a map of comparative medieval nationalisms. Stacey (“Medieval English State”) relates the treatment of Jews to the growth of the English state. Or, as Dobson asks, “is it altogether a coincidence . . . that the Jews were expelled en masse from England at the very point of time which witnessed . . . le génèse de l’état moderne?” ("Jewish Women” 167).

36 Dress is instrumental to both universalizing and partitioning drives in this period. Within Europe, Canon 68 facilitates a partitioning drive by instructing religious and lay rulers to mark off their internal Jewish and Muslim minorities from the Christian majority by a difference of dress. Outside Europe, converts to Christianity were instructed not to alter their dress, so that a Christian minority living within a non-Christian majority would not be visibly marked off. Thus Pope Nicholas IV (1288–92) instructed the newly converted Nicholas, Mongol son of the Ilkhan Arghun and a convert to whom the Pope had given his own name, “to refrain from insisting that . . . converts make significant changes in the external style of their lives, and pointed especially to changes in dress as something to avoid . . . The pope’s suggestion was to emphasize that one could be both a Christian and a Tartar” (Muldoon, Popes 67).

37 Though the formulation here may seem novel, it builds on the insights of others. Moore, for instance, argues that “the persecution of Jews, and the growth not only of anti-Judaism but of anti-Semitism, were quite central to the developments which taken together I choose to describe, without the faintest tincture of originality, as the birth of Europe” (“Anti-Semitism” 53). On the role played by Muslims and Islam in the creation of “Europe” and homo europaeus, see, e.g., Mastnak.

38 For Figure 6, see Westrem, Hereford Map, Map section 10. Section 1 has northeast Asia’s monstrous humans; section 5 the one-legged Monoculi of India; section 6 the web-footed Tigolopes of West Asia; sections 8 and 11 (Figure 7) the bestial and deformed races of southern Africa (also seen in Harvey 48). The Duchy of Cornwall map fragment also shows human monsters in Africa; even the tiny Psalter map – nine centimeters across – expends precious space depicting monstrous humans on the south African coast: see Delano-Smith and Kain 39, and Edson’s Plates II and VI.

39 However, Goodich reports that “there is also evidence that during his lifetime Thomas of Hereford did not always act as an impartial figure” toward the Welsh. Thomas “didn’t speak Welsh,” and after Thomas’ death, canonization records show that “most of those wounded soldiers aided through invocation of the saint were Englishmen fighting against the Welsh” (20–1). Goodich’s microhistory may perhaps be most usefully seen in its immediate context as an important parallel, among warring Christians, to interreligious hostilities wherein an individual
churchman, castellan, pope, or German emperor prevents the massacre of Jews or the looting of Jewish property, though such rescues may not have been aggregated with sufficient frequency and dispersion to form a pattern of widespread incidence over the centuries.

The Wallace may perhaps be seen as offering an example of medieval “racialism,” a species of race-making by the victimized that enables the victimized to define and racialize themselves positively against powerful oppressors wielding negative racial discourses against them (i.e., “racism” in the familiar sense). See Chapter 7 on the Romani, another example. Critical race studies distinguishes between such racial self-descriptions by the marginalized or oppressed and othering descriptions exercised by powerful and metropolitan forces (see, e.g., Goldberg, Racist Culture 72; Appiah, “Racisms” 5).

Richard Hoffman also argues at length that the Scots in the late Middle Ages and early Renaissance theorized fundamental divisions among their own peoples – divisions that amount to de facto race-making – between highlanders and lowlanders. Hoffman cites John of Fordun in 1387 and John Major in 1521 as examples: “Late fourteenth and early fifteenth century Lowland literature pictured the Highlander as an outlandish character, at once a figure of fun and of menace . . . Highlanders hated and persecuted English-speaking Lowlanders no less than they did the real English” (8). Hoffman analyzes these internal divisions as de facto constructions of race and class. His description of internal race-making in Scotland thus seems to resonate with Foucault’s description of the genesis of race in Europe in class war (located, for Foucault, in modernity – not in the medieval period).

Irish variation in liturgical practice, degrees of consanguinity in marriage, calendrical marking of the liturgical year, etc., became grist for the mill of theorizing the Irish as “pagans in fact,” even if, as Muldoon observes, “the existence of a distinctive Irish liturgy and of various adapt[ations] to the local culture was not unique in the early Middle Ages . . . until the twelfth century there was wide variation in liturgical practice within the Christian Church” (Identity 70). Translations of Gerald of Wales’s Topographia Hiberniae (Topography of Ireland) are by O’Meara; the original Latin is from J. S. Brewer’s edition of Gerald’s works (Giraldi Cambrensis Opera).

The Bretons were similarly moralized: “in William of Poitiers’ words, ‘they do not engage in the cultivation of fields or of good morals,’ as if corn-growing and clean living went together” (Davies 125). “In Wales,” remarks David Walker, “conquest introduced a note of racial hatred which has marked historical writing on both sides of the border” (65). In Ireland, “[o]fficial records consistently employed the phrase ‘wild Irish,’ using the adjective ‘wild’ to mean uncivilised, and sometimes using ‘savage’ in the same way . . . Even in the fifteenth century the term ‘wild’ was still applied to Gaelic Irish . . . the Commons in the English parliament of 1422 petitioned the king that all wilde Irisshmen should be excluded from the realm” (Lydon, Lordship 284). Beyond the work of historians, literary scholars such as Patricia Ingham and Michelle Warren have also scrutinized England’s relations with its neighbors in detailed analysis of literary texts and founding myths.

“Gerald’s work, especially on Ireland, was profoundly important . . . because it became an almost canonical text of English views of the Irish for the better part of five centuries” (Davies 116).

“Ultimately, as almost all observers agreed, the disqualification par excellence . . . was . . . fundamentally of economic attitude. [The Irish] simply lack the spirit of economic enterprise and wealth creation and accumulation” (Davies 126). Gerald of Wales snorts, “they think . . . the greatest wealth is to enjoy liberty” (qtd. by Davies 126–7). Davies notes that while “ease-loving, economically unambitious societies” such as Ireland and Scotland “had their virtues – notably a fierce love of liberty, an independence of spirit, a self-denying frugality, and a remarkable etiquette of hospitality,” the fact that “there was no well-calibrated set of social distinctions and no recognized hierarchy of landed competence” and thus no “emergence of a truly economically differentiated ruling class,” and “capital accumulation [was] ignored and even despised,” indicated to the English a lack of civilized values (127–8).
Writing in 1577 on Irish inability to move beyond “barbaric rudeness” and stasis, “Sir William Gerrard held that the Irish of his day ‘lived as the Irish lived in all respects before the conquest,’ some 400 years earlier” (Davies 136). Conveniently, by Spenser’s time, the steadfast Latin Christianity of the Irish could now serve as a damnable religious difference: As “Papistes,” the Irish were now “Atheists or infidels” (Works 10: 136). In contrast to the insistence that Ireland was incapable of change, historians today point to material transformation in the colonized “Celtic fringe”: “By the end of the twelfth century [there were] forty new burghs . . . in Scotland; by 1300 . . . some 225 towns in Ireland and some 85 in Wales. The same pattern applies broadly to mints and monetization . . . By the thirteenth century coins were minted in sixteen centres in Scotland . . . and . . . up to six centres in Ireland” (Davies 137–8). Davies finds that “Ireland in the century or so after 1170 underwent ‘a radical social and economic revolution’” (139). As importantly, Lilley points out that the very idea “that the Welsh and Irish lacked urban life before the Anglo-Normans imposed their statutes upon them and ‘perseveringly civilized’ them is, of course, a nonsense. It is now well known that both Ireland and Wales were urbanized before the arrival of the Anglo-Normans . . . [yet] despite the presence and existence of important ‘Hiberno-Norse’ towns in Ireland (such as Dublin and Waterford), many of which were thriving in the mid-twelfth century, William of Malmesbury nevertheless talked of ‘rustic Irishmen’ in contrast with ‘the English and French’” (25).

The Remonstrance also points out that far from helping to civilize the Irish, the English “have striven with all their might . . . to wipe our nation out entirely and utterly to extirpate it” (qtd. in Muldoon, Identity 41).

Catherine Karkov importantly reminds us that in early Irish literature, the sovereignty of Ireland is often personified as an old woman: “the old, dying female werewolf can also be understood as a personification of Ireland and her passing from the old to the new order” (99).

Karkov, who shows how the wolf is an apposite symbol of Ireland, reads Gerald’s story as a colonial narrative that is later answered by an Irish “postcolonial” text, the Dialogue [or Tales] of the Ancients. Like Caroline Bynum before her, Karkov (98) reads the wolf-human métissage as a species of disguise (Bynum opposes such “disguise” to twelfth-century writing in which metamorphosis or metempsychosis genuinely appears); unlike Bynum, however, who “ignores the political content of the episode” (95), Karkov is interested in how Gerald’s text documents the Irish for English colonial purposes: “no matter how inhuman they might appear, the Irish had to be redeemable, because redemption was part of the justification for the Conquest. The Irish had to be made to seem simultaneously attractive and repulsive, a duality . . . that the werewolf is particularly suited to convey, because it is simultaneously human and monster” (98).

Bartlett, for example, characterizes Gerald as vain, boastful, “prone to pomposity and, like most vain people, humourless. He took himself very seriously, and had no sense of proportion” (Gerald 211).

“The charters that Queen Elizabeth I and King James I (1603–25) issued to prospective colonizers employed language clearly drawn from the papal legal tradition developed in a series of documents beginning with Adrian IV’s Laudabiliter and extending to Alexander VI’s Inter caetera in 1493. These charters required the colonizers to be responsible for the Christianization and civilizing of the inhabitants of North America, just as Laudabiliter had obligated the English to reform the condition of the church in Ireland and to bring the Irish to the civilized way of life” (Muldoon, Identity 93). Lilley, who argues against “medieval historians” asserting that “the colonialism of the Middle Ages is quite different’ from that of ‘modern’ colonialism,” emphasizes that “Anglo-Norman ‘thering’ of subject populations . . . was little different from the European othering of peoples in Africa, Asia and the Americas in later centuries” (“Imagined Geographies” 23). For an argument of how Christendom’s experience with Jews and Muslims shaped Europe’s response to indigenous peoples in the Americas, see Jonathan Boyarin.
For nuanced readings on St. Bernard’s postulate of Christ as a black man, see Hahn 20 and Epstein, *Purity Lost* 19–21.

Jean Devisse (149–205) suggests imperial and ecclesiastical politics to explain Magdeburg’s black St. Maurice (*Figure 8* is on p. 163); Gude Suckale-Redlefsen offers the explanation of artistic models and artistic freedoms. See Chapter 4 for Paul Kaplan’s arguments (“Black Africans,” “Introduction”).

I consider Africans, blackness, and color – exemplary black knights such as the Dutch Moriaen, virtuous black African queens, black Saracen giants and babies, and the Black St. Maurice of Magdeburg, *inter alia* – in Chapter 4.

Biller (“Black Women”) thoughtfully surveys the long trail of scientific texts from antiquity – translated, annotated, interpreted, modified, and taught in university lectures and curricula – though which black women arrive in the Middle Ages as sexually superior objects of desire. The *Quaestiones super De animalibus*, “ventilated in 1258” by Albertus Magnus, sums it up thus: “For black women are hotter [a reference to humoral theory], and most of all dusky women, who are the sweetest to have sex with, so lechers say, and because the mouth of their vulva is temperate and gently embraces the penis... *quia nigrae sunt calidiores, et maxime fuscae, quae sunt dulcissimae ad supponendum, ut dicunt leccatores, et quia temperatum habent os vulvae, quod suaviter amplectitur virgam*” (486). For a survey of fourteenth through mid-sixteenth century portrayals of sex with black women, see Groebner.

The ascension of whiteness is intriguingly complexified by medieval slavery, as well as by gender and sexuality. Constable (275) and Epstein (*Speaking of Slavery* 185–90) both find, for instance, higher prices paid for white slaves in Mediterranean Europe in the thirteenth century and after, and that the majority of slaves were female. I discuss medieval slavery in Chapter 3, and the ascension of whiteness to supremacy as a category of European identity in Chapter 4.