Mapping Eurasia in an Open World: How the Insularity of Russia’s Geopolitical and Civilizational Approaches Limits Its Foreign Policies

Peter J. Katzenstein and Nicole Weygandt

Russia’s Eurasian view of the world brings together anti-Western and state-centric elements. Placed at the center of its own geopolitical sphere of influence and civilizational milieu, Russia’s worldview is self-contained and insular. What Russian policy slights is the global context in which its primacy over a heterogeneous Eurasia is embedded and which, when disregarded, can impose serious costs. This paper traces the broad contours of Russia’s geopolitical and civilizational Eurasianism, linking it to earlier scholarship on regions and civilization. We also explore selected aspects of Russia’s foreign security (Crimea and Ukraine) and economic (energy) policies as well as the constraints they encounter in an increasingly global world that envelops Russia and Eurasia in a larger context.

After one of her many talks with President Putin at the height of the Crimean crisis, Chancellor Merkel reportedly told President Obama that the Russian president lives “in another world.” We argue here that Putin’s world is Eurasian and is shared by much of the Russian public and elite. Other states and polities view the world in different terms. China’s tianxia, Europe’s normative power and America’s neoliberalism offer different cognitive maps, more or less well aligned with the territory of twenty-first-century world politics. Explicating the geopolitical and civilizational aspects of Eurasianism helps shed light on contemporary Russia’s foreign policies.

Russia’s Eurasianism forms a large umbrella construct that encompasses different types of Russian identities and multiple foreign policy schools of thought. Iver Neumann, for example, distinguishes between Westernizers, Eurasianists, and Slavophiles; Andrew Kuchins and Igor Zevelev between pro-Western liberals, great power balancers, and nationalists; Andrew Buck between reformers, nationalist-communists, and centrists; Anne Clunan between national restorationists, neocommunists, slavophiles, statists, and Westernists; Ayşe Zarakol between pro-Western international institutionalists, moderate liberals and conservatives, and ultra-nationalists; and Ted Hopf between liberals, conservatives, and centrists. As an umbrella term Eurasianism provides interpretive elasticity that accommodates civilizational, geopolitical, nationalist, religious, anti-globalist, anti-Western and other ideas. None of these are determinative of the foreign policy choices of Putin’s Russia. Taken together all of them help shape practices that fit Eurasia as Russia’s plausible “catchall vision” and bring into clear focus a broad range of foreign policies.

The dominant Russian conceptualization of geopolitics and civilization as self-contained components of Russia’s Eurasianism does not fit the porosity of Eurasia and its

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openness to a broader global context. This discrepancy is not specific to Russia. The election of Donald Trump, Britain’s Brexit vote, and a rising tide of rightwing populism throughout Europe reveal similar strains in other geopolitical and civilizational settings. The nationalist and autarkic excesses of the first half of the twentieth century ended in global war. The United States subsequently rebuilt and led a new, liberalizing order after 1945. Its geographic scope broadened during successive decades, as did the socio-economic depth with which it helped remake many polities, especially after the end of the Cold War. Liberalizing processes found many supporters throughout the world. At the same time, opposition and resistance to unwanted intrusions never ceased in many parts of the global South. Eventually, the challenges to the power of ruling coalitions and the distributional struggles among different social segments led to surprising political change even in the core of that liberal order, the United States and Britain. The map with which American, English, and European nationalists seek to navigate the world differs in its fundamentals neither from Russia’s Eurasian map nor those of early-twentieth-century states seeking national and civilizational greatness and finding, eventually, only carnage.

Using old maps in new terrains can court disaster. Half a century of liberalizing policies have left a deep imprint on world politics. Even for semi-authoritarian Russia this century of liberalizing policies have left a deep imprint and poile.15 And in Turkey it can mean either pro- or anti-Westernism.14 The plasticity of the term is politically useful.15 Inside Russia, for example, in the early 1990s Eurasianism was able to gather support from diverse quarters: former communists, unabashed imperialists, Russian nationalists concerned about the near abroad, and all who opposed taking the states of Western Europe and the United States as models for Russian reforms.16

That makes moat-digging and bridge-building a favored Eurasian sport, for example on the location, significance, and political agency of Northern and Southern Central Asia.17 In Putin’s words, Russia is located at the very “center of Eurasia,18 reaffirming its great power status.19 And since “Russia can only survive and develop within the existing borders if it stays a great power,20 the definition of Eurasianism is vitally important to our understanding of Russia. Eurasia is neither synonymous with Euro-Asia and other terminological and conceptual variants nor is it simply shorthand for the territory once covered by the Soviet Union.21 In a large literature some scholars distinguish between normative, ideological, geo-economic,22 and pragmatic, neo- and intercivilizational Eurasianism.23 Although the list of different variants of Eurasianism is considerably longer,24 it shows a consistent difference between Eurasia’s essentialist, monological and conflictual elements on the one hand and its constructivist, dialogical, and cooperative ones on the other.25 Typically, Eurasia is perceived as a self-contained, closed entity autonomously pursuing its foreign policy objectives. Yet clear binaries are the product of abstractions that have never existed in history. In terms of geopolitics and civilization Russia always confronted choices more interesting and complex than acting the part of Europe’s backyard or Asia’s front row.26

Geopolitical Eurasianism

Russia’s annexation of the Crimea and its support of secessionist forces in Eastern Ukraine mark a return of geopolitics, a term mired in confusion.27 Geopolitics is not a mere shorthand for power politics. Instead geo-political theorizing has focused on factors such as topography, climate, technology, and especially on how the configuration of land and sea power shapes interactions among states and empires. Over the last century and a half geopolitics evolved gradually from a natural to a social science within the discipline of international relations, with classical realism as a half-way house between the two.28

Under Soviet rule the conceptual language of geopolitics was deeply tainted by its association with Nazism.29 But after 1991, a Russian tradition of materialist geopolitical and regional thinking reasserted itself as an integral part of today’s interest in Eurasianism.30 The first cohort of Eurasianists consisted of expatriates who had fled Russia after the October Revolution.31 They insisted that Russia needed to unlearn the West. In contrast to Europe, geography was Russia’s destiny. Territorial expansion was the most natural expression of its identity. Geography, geopolitics, political economy, and culture all pointed to a structural unity captured by the conceptual...
vocabulary of Eurasianism. A pioneer of the discipline of structural geography, Peter Savitsky developed the concept of topogenesis (or “place development”) through which he sought to prove scientifically the link between territory and culture. The steppe unites Eurasia from East to West. Revealing its continental essence, it sets Russia apart from the maritime mission of Europe and the United States: “Geopolitics is therefore inherent in Eurasianism; geography is a scientific means of restoring political power.”

In line with continental European thinkers such as Ratzel and Kjellén, in the late nineteenth century American Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan and his British contemporary, the geographer Sir Halford Mackinder, developed theories of geopolitics. For Mahan, insular states like Britain, or “continentally insular” states, like the United States, had an ineradicable advantage over even the most powerful land states such as Russia. Mackinder disagreed. Instead of the indefinite primacy of insular states like Britain and the United States, he pointed to the eventual emergence of a globally dominant empire located in the Eurasian “Heartland,” an imprecisely demarcated region occupied by Russia. Although Mackinder’s thinking evolved over time, he continued to fit rapidly-evolving developments in world politics into a global configuration of land and sea. Neither theorist took a determinist view on the role of geography in world politics; both included other factors such as national character (Mahan) and technology (Mackinder). Mahan and Mackinder disagreed on how geography shapes world politics. But they agreed both on the importance of geographic location for giving states particular advantages and disadvantages and on its lack of determinist effects.

Contemporary Russian Eurasianists have been deeply influenced by this tradition, including by writers with suspect Nazi pedigrees, such as Carl Schmitt and Karl Haushofer. They locate Russia geographically not along the European periphery but at the center of the Eurasian landmass. This assigns Russia distinctive roles as both mediator between East and West and a source of authentic and new solutions to the world’s problems. In the 1990s Eurasianism became the platform for a broadly-based, red-brown, Left-Right opposition to Russian liberals, with Vladimir Zhirinovsky, leader of the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDPR), and Gennady Zyuganov, leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), as prime examples.

Many of the Eurasian geopolitical ideas they expressed in their books and speeches were shaped by and resonated with those advanced by the tireless efforts of geopolitical theorist Aleksandr Dugin, the most published and publicized of all contemporary Russian Eurasianists. Dugin is a complex person with a colorful biography that mixes activism with scholarship. His geopolitical writings draw on the German Conservative Revolution after World War I and offer an idiosyncratic mix of nationalist, neo-fascist, European Far Right, mystic, racist, and postmodern elements. As a public intellectual, Dugin has had an important effect on the thinking of the political class and enjoyed access to Russia’s military and political leadership. For Dugin the distinction between “Heartland” and “World Island,” between authoritarian land-based and democratic sea-based empires is the central axis around which world politics has been organized in the past and forever will revolve. Eurasia is the continental land mass and essential platform for Russia to play its predetermined, unavoidably anti-Western role, among others as the central supplier of Eurasian energy. In many of his writings and public speeches Dugin adheres to a determinist version of geopolitical analysis that views Eurasia as self-contained space and assumes that power, purpose, and policy can be “read off the map.”

The foreign policy strategies that Dugin deduces from his set of binary distinctions are of the sphere of influence kind, 1930s- and 1940s-style. Moscow-Berlin, Moscow-Tokyo, and Moscow-Tehran are the axes around which a Russian-centered Eurasia should operate. Russia faces formidable tasks in world politics. Lacking a cordon sanitaire separating it from Europe, Russia must keep a watchful eye on Turkey to its west, China in the east, and coerce or convince India in the south to grant Russia direct access to the Indian Ocean. However far-fetched, abstruse, and dangerous Dugin’s theories may be, they always arrive at a conclusion that makes them eminently plausible to many Russians: Europe and Asia are destined to converge in a Eurasia that is dominated by Russia. Standing for the principle of state sovereignty and engaged in a mission of global significance, Russia promises a multi-polar and anti-global alternative to a world dominated by Atlanticism and the United States. Centered around Russia, Eurasian geopolitics for Dugin, thus is self-contained and determines the contours of Russian foreign policy and world politics.

Civilizational Eurasianism

Russia’s civilizational Eurasianism likewise has a long history. By the eighteenth century Russia was squarely Western and European in both its self-understanding and experience. Over many centuries it had encountered and fought the Oriental Other in the form of the Mongolian Empire, Turkic Asia, and the Ottoman Empire. Kiren Chaudhry calls this a “nested orientalism . . . a hierarchy in which West Europeans Orientalized the Russians, who, in turn, Orientalized the Turks.” In the words of Filippo Costa Buranelli, “Central Asia meant disorder, marauding, oppression. Russia meant salvation, civilization, morality.” Russia’s territorial expansion, into Central Asia as well as planned and unplanned migrations across often nebulous borders, made the Asiatic other a problematic part of the Russian, and later Soviet, self. For example,
celebrating the twenty-fifth anniversary of her reign, in 1787 Empress Catherine II organized a six-month, lavish tour to visit Crimea, which she had annexed and pacified in 1783. Invited to join her on this trip, Europe’s diplomatic elite marveled at the exoticism of Orientalized Asia—a mixture of Asia, China, ancient Europe, and even paradise.46

In Russia, as elsewhere, civilizations are typically viewed as unitary cultural complexes, organized hierarchically around uncontested core values that yield unambiguous criteria for judging good conduct. Invented in Europe in the eighteenth century, the concept of civilization was enshrined in the nineteenth century as one standard of civilization. That standard was grounded in race, ethnic affiliation, religion, and a firm belief in the superiority of European civilization over all others. The distinction between civilized and uncivilized peoples is not specific to the European past. The unitary argument is widely used also by non-Europeans. Everywhere and at all times, it is widely believed, barbarians have knocked on the doors of civilizations.47

Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations, translated into 39 languages, restates the old, unitary thesis for our times.48 For Huntington, civilizations are coherent, consensual, invariant, equipped with a state-like capacity to act, and operating in an international system. In his view, civilizations balance power rather than human practices. Neglecting all the evidence of a restless, pluralist, and at times seething West, Huntington’s analysis sees the West as a civilizationally reactive status quo power that reluctantly engages the upsurge of revisionist non-Western civilizations. Rather than focusing exclusively on actors such as states, polities, or empires that are embedded in civilizational complexes, in Huntington’s analysis civilizations themselves become actors. His clash of civilizations thus looks remarkably like a clash of large states or empires. The voices proclaiming the dawn of Asia’s civilizational primacy may shift from yesterday’s Japan, to today’s China and Russia, and to tomorrow’s India. But these Huntingtonian voices are growing louder. Like “Orientalism,” “Occidentialism” characterizes East and West in the singular.

Much like the Russian revolution and the rise of Eurasianism in the 1920s, the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 acted as a trauma that gave rise to new versions of Eurasianism.49 Both traumas elicited a strong anti-Western response. In the 1920s Eurasianist thinkers reacted against Western Socialism, in the 1990s against Western Neo-liberalism. Drawing on Savitsky, Trubetsky, Danilevsky, Tsybumsky, and many other writers, Lev Gumilëv has defined civilizational Eurasianism in contemporary Russia.50 Gumilëv is a revered and widely-read figure. His complex, at times contradictory, and occasionally abstruse writings have become dogma, immune to criticism. His books are bestsellers and required reading well beyond academia. His idiosyncratic vocabulary—including terms such as ethnos, superethnos, ethnosphere, ethnogenesis, passionarity—is used without any questioning in history, ethnology, and civilizational textbooks. His writings have made ethnic and racial features, group mentalities and invariant forms of biosocial organization legitimate topics in teaching and research that are well known to Russia’s leading politicians.51

Gumilëv’s Eurasianism is grounded in non-hierarchical, fraternal relations between Russians and Steppe peoples sharing deep linguistic and cultural affinities.52 In contrast to conventional Russian nationalism and older versions of Eurasianism, the “yoke” imposed by the Mongol conquest is for him no more than a historical myth. Gumilëv’s biologically- and ecologically-rooted, essentialist, anti-semitic, and naturalistic theory of ethnicity placed the origins of ethnic groups in creative moments of eruption and their evolution in long-term, cyclical change. His theory stipulated the existence of inter- and intra-group complementarities in hierarchical orders. Civilizations, like Eurasianism, are superethnic forms of association and the largest communities of fate that humans inhabit. Eurasianism is fundamentally at odds with Europe, the West, and all forms and articulations of liberal cosmopolitanism or universalism. Russia’s primordial nationalism thus is fused with Eurasia’s. It evolves isolated from a more encompassing global context whose existence Gumilëv, like Huntington, denies. In a fusion of nationalism and internationalism after 1990, Eurasia’s multicultural harmony and shared historical destiny thus is a successor to the traditional Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. At stake here is not the often-dubious truth-content of Gumilëv’s elaborate theory, but its acceptance as unchallenged dogma in Russia. Eurasian civilization plays a special role as the only viable global model that integrates different peoples and principles and thus generates a plurality of civilizational views and discourses.53 In short, informed by a voluminous intellectual and public civilizational discourse, Russia “is coming to self-identify in increasingly civilizational terms.”54

These civilizational terms give rise to a pursuit of milieu goals, a corollary of great power status and spheres of influence. More than half a century ago Arnold Wolfers55 drew a distinction between possession and milieu goals, between direct, territorial control and indirect, transnational influence. According to the Eurasianist founding myth, ever since Kievan Rus adopted Christianity in 988, the center of Russia’s world (Russkiy mir), and of its 180 million Russian speakers, is also the core of its religious and secular soft power.56 Culture, mass media, common language, the Orthodox Church, and business networks all provide instruments of influence.57 As Putin has repeatedly stated, challenging the unity of the Russian world, as in Ukraine, is not ephemeral to Russia’s soft power but nothing less than a frontal assault on the core values and strategic interests of not just the Russian state but of the Russian world.58
Geopolitical and civilizational versions of Neo-Eurasianism reinforce one another. Dugin’s geopolitical theory, for example, stipulates the existence of four closed civilizational zones—American, Afro-European, Asian-Pacific, and Eurasian—leaving the issue of where to locate Islam curiously unaddressed and unresolved. Dugin often relies on a “spiritual-racist” terminology to describe civilizational differences. Aryanism and neo-paganism pervade his work. He is intellectually indebted to racial German theorists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and to the slogans of the European New Right.59 Conversely, Gumilëv’s civilizational formulation is grounded in a naturalistic and scientific rather than cultural and relativist biopolitics. It incorporates biological and environmental factors, conceptualized not in terms of race but energy circulation and ecology. Gumilëv thus grounds his theory of the formation and evolution of ethnic groups and their superethnic, exclusionary, civilizational complexes in the natural, geographical world.

As summarized in Table 1, geopolitical and civilizational versions of Eurasianism offer a differentiated conceptual vocabulary widely shared in Russia for describing the contours of the Russian world.

**Russia’s Foreign Security and Economic Policies: Eurasianism as Rationale and Limit**

The plasticity of Eurasia’s geopolitical and civilizational meanings offers Russia welcome latitude in fashioning and justifying its security and economic policies. That flexibility notwithstanding, the worldview of Eurasia as a relatively compact and self-contained geopolitical and civilizational space does not align with some important facts. Although Russia has achieved a degree of success in pursuing its objectives, its self-contained and inward-looking Eurasian worldview fails to recognize adequately the porosity of regional and national systems in a globalized world. Putin’s moves in Eurasia and elsewhere are therefore often constrained, at times seriously, on both security and economic questions. Yet Russian policies and practices are not cast in stone; they could be changed through learning, specifically learning from a more distant Eurasian past.

Since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian security policy has been highly innovative in the development of “new,” “hybrid,” “compound,” or “frozen” wars that are deployed less as an instrument of gaining battlefield victories in territorial disputes and more as a means of ensuring Russia’s continued political leverage in situations it regards as being of vital interest. These wars operate below the threshold of NATO mobilization. Putin’s reforms during his first presidency (2000–2008) gave the Russian state capacities and resources to use new and old forms of war in combination, for example in Georgia in 2008 and in Crimea and eastern Ukraine since 2014. While not resulting in definitive victories for Russia, these conflicts reveal weakness in U.S. and European military responses and allow Russia to reinforce its claims of multipolarity.60

The war with and inside Ukraine reflects both “fierce symbolic power struggles” with NATO and “frozen conflicts” in other breakaway ethnic regions in Eurasia, including in Moldova’s Transnistria region, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia in Georgia, and Nagorno Karabakh in Azerbaijan. Crimea’s annexation had high symbolic overtones

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that supported geopolitical Eurasianism; and Russia deployed in eastern Ukraine all the instruments of its coercive diplomacy—supporting separatist ethnic movements, covert military action, bribes, information warfare, humanitarian aid, and energy trade—that it had developed in prior Eurasian conflicts. In these conflicts, Russia is taking a long-term perspective on destabilization. It is based on the premise that, marshalling its formidable resources, Russia will be patient in the pursuit of an objective that is of vital importance to Russia but not to the EU or the United States.

Russia’s Eurasian sphere of influence, however, is not self-contained, and its interventions are not costless. Crimea’s occupation and annexation openly violated agreements constitutive of the European peace and security order. Russia broke at least four legal obligations to recognize Ukraine as a sovereign, independent state within its existing borders, as codified in: the Commonwealth of Independent States (1991); the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (1992); the 1994 Budapest Memorandum; and the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation of 1997. This egregious breach of international law engendered a strong reaction not only from the United States but, to Putin’s evident surprise, also from the EU and, in particular, from Germany. Furthermore, the unilateral, military nature of his action also violated a widely-accepted European and UN norm of peaceful multilateralism. It robbed Russia’s policy of support even though it was bloodless and evidently supported by a majority of the Crimean population. In spite of political upheaval in Europe, the leaders of Germany, France, Britain, Italy, and Spain—along with the outgoing Obama administration—have continued to reaffirm their commitment to sanctions even as late as November 2016. Great power status and spheres of influence politics no longer work as they did before World War II. International law and the ingrained practice of multilateralism penetrate spheres of influence. Disregarding this fact brings with it serious political costs, and may demand changes to Russia’s worldview and resulting policies.

Russia is likewise encountering limitations to its policies in the energy sphere. Although Russia does use its energy sector to advance its Eurasianist goals, it finds itself hampered by incomplete control over key actors and international markets. Contrary to the statist vision of realists, oil markets do not pit state against state but are complex transnational networks in which states and corporations, often with mixed ownership, interact. Gazprom is a case in point. It is part of a transnational energy system linking states and non-state actors. Both in its current form and its predecessor institutions, Gazprom has long-established international relationships, for example with Germany and its energy corporations, manifested in long-term sales contracts.

Sub-state cooperation and trust (and its breakdown) has been influential for Russia’s relations with transit states. Ninety percent of Russia’s gas was shipped through the Druzhba (“Friendship”) Pipeline, which crossed Ukraine and provided badly needed transit fees. “All of this delivered unto Europe and Eurasia a kind of pipeline brotherhood . . . Although governments played important, recurrent roles, it was the firms that drove change.” There were only a handful of firms in this market and over time the essential story linking them, first to the Soviet gas ministry and subsequently to Gazprom, was a story of the development of trust. In 2014 Russian policy was based in large part on the assumption that these corporate relations—combined with heavy dependence on Russian gas supplies—would make it impossible for EU governments to follow the United States’ lead and challenge Russia’s Ukraine policy through financial sanctions. That assumption proved to be wrong.

Russia’s ability to leverage its energy trade for political purposes has also been hampered by global energy price movements outside of its control. Price weakness has been driven by a range of international factors, including a glut in liquefied natural gas markets, actual or expected demand reductions in Europe and China, the scale and resilience of unconventional oil and gas production in the United States, improved interconnections in pipeline networks following the Ukrainian gas crises of 2006 and 2009, failures by OPEC to significantly reduce oil production, and the expectation of added Iranian oil supplies following its nuclear deal with the United States. While prices will surely rise (and fall) in response to changing market conditions, Russia and other producers will suffer if the price recovery is slow or stops well short of the $90–100 per barrel range. In October 2016, Russia was forced to amend its national budget to reflect a deficit of 3.7 percent of GDP. In order to cover this deficit, Russia has sold stakes in oil producers Bashneft and Rosneft and has been depleting its reserve fund, which had shrunk from $91.7 billion in September 2014 to $15 billion by the end of 2016. The combination of fiscal fragility and a reduction of Europe’s dependence on Russian gas represent a potential weakening of Russia’s ability to shape its regional milieu through its energy corporations or to enforce its sphere of influence more directly.

A Eurasian map depicts itself as a self-contained geo-economic bloc and a homogenous, inward-directed civilizational space. This view resembles that of public intellectuals and scholars who analyze the dynamics of what they consider to be the economics of regional blocs and the politics of putatively homogenous and unified civilizations. Contradicting these views, Eurasia is marked instead by porosity to its extra-regional context and openness to global civilizational currents. Both porosity and openness limit Russia’s ability to achieve its objective of great power status. International survey data, for example, indicate the limits that Russia encounters in its pursuit of milieu goals. In one survey...
that relies on 50 different indicators, as assessed by a panel of experts, Russia ranked twenty-ninth out of 30 countries in 2014. And in the Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, conducted in 27 countries between 2007 and 2012, the number of people who viewed Russia favorably increased in only 3 countries while it decreased in 17. As Russia is discovering, regions are no longer self-contained blocs as they were in the heyday of great power spheres of influence politics; and civilizations are no longer clearly-demarcated transnational milieus. Both are instead sites of engagement and arenas of exchange that Russia can disregard only by paying considerable political costs. Expanding its influence in a fractured and volatile Middle East will make Russia the focus of new hatred and animosity.

Recent failures of Russia’s international security and economic policies have imposed real costs and may provide the impetus for a process of complex learning and adaptation of the Eurasian worldview. As Peter Haas notes, decision-makers—and other policy experts—frequently fail to recognize limitations to their understanding of complex issues. Crises and uncertainty may be necessary to open policy-makers to new ideas about cause and effect as well as new conceptualizations of state interests. Learning occurs when states deliberately adjust their goals or behaviors based on new information or experiences. Simple learning occurs when states adjust their strategies while preserving their worldview, whereas complex learning reshapes a worldview fundamentally. Rather than changing ends and means, learning might also involve a reappraisal of the appropriate setting for the use of policy tools. Learning is also more likely in response to failures and policy shifts resulting from learning may require “shifts in the locus of authority over policy.” The resulting new ideas are not necessarily “better” or “more appropriate”; but they can provide new filters that modify actors’ existing worldviews. Those modifications, in turn, can produce policy responses ranging from incremental innovation to transformational invention. The lessons of Russia’s Ukraine policy and its energy diplomacy are that spheres of influence and milieu goals are challenged by a world order that is more open and interdependent than is recognized in the current iteration of the Eurasian worldview.

Those lessons resonate with important aspects of Eurasia’s past that attest to the importance of porosity and openness and that could help shape some of Russia’s future policies. Eurasia emerged from exchanges made possible by the carnage and cosmopolitanism of the vast Mongol empire. In victory, the Mongols consolidated the Turkic-speaking tribes, dealt a harsh blow to Arab dominance of the Muslim world while spreading Mughal rule to Northern India, penetrating much of China, creating the institution of the Dalai Lama in Tibetan Buddhism, and helping spread Islam in many important oasis towns dotting old and new trade and pilgrimage routes across Eurasia. The empire was not divided by religious, linguistic, or tribal barriers. Dispersed centers of rule brought an unknown cosmopolitanism to all walks of life. Stephen Kotkin has identified Mongolia as “a model of empire as exchange,” created by and reflected in human practices that have come to shape Eurasian geopolitics and civilizations. This simple fact makes unnecessary and misguided the search for authentic historical Eurasian or Russian origins. Instead it is an invitation to connect Putin’s world to the Atlantic, Sinic, Islamic, and other worlds that constitute contemporary world politics. Geopolitical and civilizational Eurasianism shares with these other worlds two attributes. Its distinctiveness grounds Russia’s claim to be a great power; and its openness and porousness makes that claim conditional on the recognition by other actors, thus imposing serious constraints on Russian policies based on a different Eurasian worldview.

**Eurasianism in an Open World**

Geopolitical and civilizational versions of Eurasianism entail Russia’s insistence on a Eurasian geo-political sphere of influence and the legitimacy of Russia’s strong impact on Eurasia’s civilizational milieu. For Russian foreign policy, contemporary world politics are marked by persistent competition between diverse states, regions, and civilizations, rather than by convergence on a pattern defined by the West. Competition demands collective leadership that represents the world’s diversity rather than U.S. hegemony. Occupying a pivotal geo-political place in Eurasia and as a civilizational state enjoying great power status, Russia thus contributes to the world’s collective leadership.

At the same time, we have shown, important aspects of Russia’s foreign security (Crimea and Ukraine) and economic (energy) policies encounter serious constraints in an increasingly global world that envelops Russia and Eurasia in a larger context. The insularity of Russia’s Eurasianism imposes significant costs and may require future redefinition in the meaning of Eurasianism that would take account of the influences that emanate from its global context.

Russia’s Eurasian geopolitical worldview is not unique. It is, or should be, quite familiar to American observers. Indirectly, geopolitical Eurasianism has shaped American foreign policy since the late nineteenth century. Drawing on both Mahan’s and Mackinder’s theories, a Yale professor of Dutch origin, Nicholas Spykman, introduced the concept of the “Rimland” that stretched along the rim of the Eurasian landmass, from Western Europe, across the Middle East to India, China, and Japan. Neither purely land nor purely maritime powers, Rimland states were the amphibious center of the world. George Kennan, as one of the main architects of American foreign policy during the early stages of the Cold War, was greatly influenced by...
Spykman’s theory; and so were John Foster Dulles, Henry Kissinger, and Zbigniew Brzezinski.98

Geopolitical theories—along with the shortcomings of oversimplification—have, as in Russia, also found new support in the current world order. The fall of the Berlin wall, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the attacks of 9/11 have prompted some Americans to revive geopolitical theory.89 Robert Kaplan, for example, is a noted public intellectual whose work is widely and favorably reviewed. In an article that previewed an ambitious book, he argues that “of all the unsavory truths . . . the bluntest, most uncomfortable, and most deterministic of all is geography . . . Such determinism is easy to hate but hard to dismiss.”90 More recently, Kaplan91 has repeated this geopolitical argument opening a new book with a similar argument: “Europe is landscape; East Asia is seascape . . . the sea acts as a barrier to aggression, at least to the degree that dry land does not.”92 Kaplan’s geopolitics is one manifestation of a cast of mind that seeks to understand a complex world with misleading simplifications. Different strands of American conservatism, for example, are also prone to essentialist arguments about America as the incarnation of universal values, of the most perfect democracy, or of God’s chosen country.

Geopolitical theory is surely correct in pointing to the importance of geography for world politics.93 But geography is not destiny. Peter Zeihan,94 for example, starts his analysis with geography, specifically the combination of easy water transport within and difficult transport beyond a country and then adds the importance of technology, specifically deepwater navigation and industrialization, to analyze the accidental nature of power. Similarly, Kees Van Der Pijl95 has developed an ambitiously comprehensive historical-materialist framework for a nuanced analysis of the historical processes and practices of land- and sea-based empires in world history that sidesteps the temptation to assume that geography is self-contained or lends itself to determinist explanations. As Leslie Hepple96 reminds us, we should avoid the “naturalistic fallacy”: an excessively direct linking of ‘permanent geographical factors’ with policy . . . with little discussion of the social and political assumptions and models that are always involved in social constructions such as geopolitics.” The material context of land and sea power is relevant for our understanding of world politics; its significance in any specific case, however, is a different matter.”97 “The issue is not whether geography can play some role, but why it should be the primary explanatory approach, as a reference to geopolitics suggests”98. One of geopolitical theory’s most distinguished proponents, Harvey Starr, argues that we should not see the geographical context of politics as enduring, immutable, and deterministic. Indeed, the closure of Eurasia to the broader international and global context is a chimera, as Dugin himself appears to acknowledge at times.99 Instead, that context is marked by dynamism and many political possibilities. Human interventions alter the meaning of space, of location, and of distance and thus of time-space, cost-space, and social-space.100

Much like Russia’s geopolitical Eurasianism, its civilizational variant, with its self-contained nature and deterministic qualities, finds adherents abroad. Civilizational Eurasianism resonates also in France. Like Russian, French is an international language. Like Russia, France used to have a sphere of influence in Africa long after the end of imperialism. Like Russia, France practices an ambitious public diplomacy in defense of French language, values, and interests. And like Russia, France provides fertile soil for civilizational thinking. Important aspects of Eurasianism’s geopolitical and civilizational lineage are therefore not specifically Russian. And just as America and France hold fast to their worldviews, so does Russia—revealed, for example, in its energy diplomacy and doctrine of sovereign democracy.

But Eurasian, French, and other civilizations are not self-contained. Rather, they are placed in a broader context, a universal system of knowledge and practices that may undermine or reinforce civilizational unity. Islam, for example, does not cohere around values of religious fundamentalism. Instead, just like Russia, China, and America, Islam experiences conflicts over contested truths reflecting its internal pluralism and external context. Islam is instructive because it illustrates a territorially loosely integrated and decentralized civilizational complex rather than a civilizational state, like China or Russia, struggling to contain its diversity. The founder of modern Islamic studies in the United States, Marshall Hodgson, has argued persuasively that Islam belongs to neither East nor West.101 As a truly global civilization, Islam is a bridge between both.

In this paper we have highlighted both the relevance and limitations of the self-contained Eurasian worldview that informs the pursuit of great power status and a favorable international milieu by contemporary Russia. In fact, Russian language does not differentiate between geopolitical and civilizational Eurasianism. Both are expressed as evraziiskii. This terminological vacuum makes Eurasia a plastic concept that resonates deeply inside Russia.102 Without making talk “cheap,” political actors can adapt Eurasian discourse readily to shifting contexts.

Outside Russia, processes of exchange and interaction have made civilizational and geopolitical interactions similarly plastic. In contemporary world politics porous borders cannot easily be sealed against outside influence. The relative closure and openness of geopolitical and civilizational spaces is thus a matter of degree. Always an object of political struggle, it varies across time and space. The participants in that struggle are convinced that at the end of their steep climb they will find, at the
top of the mountain, a plateau that is secure, be it open or closed. But all political struggle is Sysiphian labor; it is unending. And so is the search for the proper and feasible balance between openness and closure. Analyses that convert political struggles over social processes into fixed categories—such as maritime and land power or East and West—aim to discover laws that the contingencies of politics and history have a habit of upending.

Russia’s Eurasian worldview rests on deep historical foundations. Yet memories of a grand past are not a recipe for meeting tomorrow’s challenges. Like Britain, France, Turkey, and other centers of once-vast empires, in the twenty-first century Russia will have to come to terms with the fact that its self-assessment as a great power, deeply encrusted in habits of thought, emotions, and practices at home, conflicts sharply with the assessment of politically-relevant others abroad. These others recognize Russia as an important rather than a great power, despite its vast land mass, rich energy resources, and formidable arsenal of nuclear weapons. Geopolitically and civilizationally, Russia and Eurasia, like other polities, regions, and civilizations, are part of an encompassing global context. Realigning map to territory so as to navigate successfully a turbulent regional and civilizational world in the twenty-first century is a prerequisite—not only for Russia but also for all other great and would-be great powers and polities.

Notes
1 Baker 2014; Paterson 2014.
2 Greenspan 2013.
3 This formulation skirts a thorny level of analysis problem: does policy reflect the preferences of Putin and his core support group or that of Russia? See Nathans 2016. In international relations theory there exists an unresolved analytical ambiguity between state and ruler as the basic unit of analysis; see Krasner 1999. Not seeking to resolve this conundrum, we explicate the politics and policies of Putin’s Russia in light of the geopolitical and civilizational categories that constitute Eurasianism.
5 Neumann 1995.
6 Kuchins and Zevelev 2012.
8 Clunan 2009, 62.
9 Zarakol 2011, 221–22.
11 Laruelle 2012, 1.
13 Although the following discussion emphasizes the international implications of Eurasianism, there exist also important domestic civilizational and geopolitical aspects of Eurasianism centering on state and national identities; Podberezsky 1999, 43–44.
14 Kotkin 2007, 495–97.
15 Papava 2013.
17 F. Starr 2013.
18 Kotkin 2007, 495.
20 Tsygankov 2006, 1089.
21 Not only do Russia’s most recent Arctic claims differ from those of the Soviet Union (as evidenced by its 2001 petition to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf to extend its claims), but its efforts to influence former Soviet territories vary greatly in intensity. Public opinion also does not see the Soviet Union as central to Russia’s status: only 8 percent of respondents in a recent survey considered control over the former Soviet territories to be among the most important factors for Russia achieving great power status; refer to WCIOM 2014a.
22 Makarychev 2015.
23 Rangsimaporn 2006.
26 Russia is a similarly complex concept. Morozov underlines its ambiguous identity and conflicted standing in world politics by calling it a subaltern empire; Morozov 2015. Like Turkey and Japan, Russia is self-conscious in placing itself between East and West, acting both as a bridge and a gatekeeper; see Zarakol 2011, 9. The concept of the “Russian world” matches an objective material reality, a legacy of the Soviet Union in communication, transportation, energy infrastructure, and organizational and political routines as discussed in Hopf 2016, 361 manuscript. It also creates family-like connections to “compatriots” living abroad and focuses on shared language and destiny, encompassing not only ethnic or linguistic Russians but all those who identify with the fate of Russia. It leaves ambiguous whether it refers to Russia’s relations with Ukraine and Belarus, its near abroad, interactions with its diasporas, or creation of a newly branded messianic project. The Russian world is thus both smaller and larger than Eurasia Laruelle 2016; 2015a, 6, 12, 18.
27 Mead 2014.
28 Grygiel 2006, 5–18.
29 Erickson 2013.
32 Savitsky et al. 1996.
33 Laruelle 2012, 34.
34 Guzzini 2012b, 18–44.
35 Chaudet, Parmentier, and Pélopidas, 2009, 39–63. The State Duma set up a permanent Committee on Geopolitical Affairs—the only one of this kind in the world; Calder 2012, 20.
Although Dugin is perhaps Russia’s most visible geopolitical theorist, his is not the only variant of this form of Eurasianism, and disagreements exist, including debates about the importance of race and religion; Laqueur 2015.


This orientalization was carried on by Ottomans, who orientalized Arabs. Orientalism, however, did not simply allow Russia to raise itself in a hierarchy, but also allowed it to differentiate itself from the European cultures that dominated its court; Laqueur 2015.

Costa Buranelli 2014, 829.

This historical record differs sharply from Putin’s generic references to the memories of Russia’s forefathers with which he justified publicly the annexation of Crimea in May 2014 as discussed in MacFarquhar 2014a,b. 2015. It has no more than a tenuous relation to the restoration of Russia’s history, spirituality, and statehood to which Putin referred on the first anniversary of the annexation in March 2015; see Herszenhorn 2015.

Pocock 2005.

Huntington 1996.

Astrov and Morozova 2012.

Bassin, Glebov, and Laruelle 2015; Bassin 2016.

Laruelle 2012, 10–11, 50–82. Other Eurasianists, like Aleksandr Panarin, also espouse a cultural determinism that sees Russia as the model for a multicivilizational world, and that regards religion as the exclusive basis for all cultures and civilizations; ibid., 11–12, 83–106.


Badmaev 2015, 31.


Petro 2015, 4–7.

Bogomolov and Lytvynenko 2012; Sherr 2013; Pelněns 2010.

For public opinion data recording Russians’ relative unfamiliarity with the term “Russian world” see WCIOM 2014b.


Tsygankov 2014.
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Trump and the Populist Authoritarian Parties: The Silent Revolution in Reverse

Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris

Growing up taking survival for granted makes people more open to new ideas and more tolerant of outgroups. Insecurity has the opposite effect, stimulating an Authoritarian Reflex in which people close ranks behind strong leaders, with strong in-group solidarity, rejection of outsiders, and rigid conformity to group norms. The 35 years of exceptional security experienced by developed democracies after WWII brought pervasive cultural changes, including the rise of Green parties and the spread of democracy. During the past 35 years, economic growth continued, but virtually all of the gains went to those at the top; the less-educated experienced declining existential security, fueling support for Populist Authoritarian phenomena such as Brexit, France’s National Front and Trump’s takeover of the Republican party. This raises two questions: (1) “What motivates people to support Populist Authoritarian movements?” And (2) “Why is the populist authoritarian vote so much higher now than it was several decades ago in high-income countries?” The two questions have different answers. Support for populist authoritarian parties is motivated by a backlash against cultural change. From the start, younger Postmaterialist birth cohorts supported environmentalist parties, while older, less secure cohorts supported authoritarian xenophobic parties, in an enduring intergenerational value clash. But for the past three decades, strong period effects have been working to increase support for xenophobic parties: economic gains have gone almost entirely to those at the top, while a large share of the population experienced declining real income and job security, along with a large influx of immigrants and refugees. Cultural backlash explains why given individuals support Populist Authoritarian movements. Declining existential security explains why support for these movements is greater now than it was thirty years ago.

Over forty years ago, The Silent Revolution thesis argued that when people grow up taking survival for granted it makes them more open to new ideas and more tolerant of outgroups (with insecurity having the reverse effect). Consequently, the unprecedentedly high level of existential security that emerged in developed democracies after World War II was giving rise to an intergenerational shift toward Postmaterialist values, bringing greater emphasis on freedom of expression, environmental protection, gender equality, and tolerance of gays, handicapped people, and foreigners.1

Insecurity has the opposite effect. For most of its existence, humanity lived just above the starvation level, and under extreme scarcity, xenophobia becomes realistic: when a tribe’s territory produces just enough food to sustain it, and another tribe moves in, it can be a struggle in which one tribe or the other survives. Insecurity encourages an authoritarian xenophobic reaction in which people close ranks behind strong leaders, with strong in-group solidarity, rejection of outsiders, and rigid conformity to group norms. Conversely, the high levels of existential security that emerged after World War II gave more room for free choice and openness to outsiders.

During the postwar era, the people of developed countries experienced peace, unprecedented prosperity, and the emergence of advanced welfare states, making survival more secure than ever before. Postwar birth cohorts grew up taking survival for granted, bringing an intergenerational shift toward Postmaterialist values.2 Survival is such a central goal that when it is threatened, it dominates people’s life strategy. Conversely, when it can be taken for granted, it opens the way for new norms concerning everything from economic behavior to sexual orientation and the spread of democratic institutions. Compared with previously prevailing values, which emphasized economic and physical security above all,

A permanent link to supplementary materials provided by the authors precedes the references section.

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Postmaterialists are less conformist, more open to new ideas, less authoritarian, and more tolerant of outgroups. But these values depend on high levels of economic and physical security. They did not emerge in low-income countries, and were most prevalent among the younger and more secure strata of high-income countries. Security shaped these values in two ways: (1) through an intergenerational shift toward Postmaterialism based on birth cohort effects: younger cohorts that had grown up under secure conditions, gradually replaced older ones who had been shaped by two World Wars and the Great Depression; and (2) through period effects: people respond to current conditions as well as to their formative experiences, with economic downturns making all birth cohorts less Postmaterialist, and rising prosperity having the opposite effect.3

The 35 years of rapid economic growth and expanding opportunities that developed democracies experienced following WWII brought pervasive cultural changes contributing to the rise of Green parties and the spread of democracy. But during the most recent 35 years, while these countries still had significant economic growth, virtually all of the gains went to those at the top; the less-educated experienced declining real income and a sharply declining relative position that fueled support for populist authoritarian parties.

Postmaterialism eventually became its own grave-digger. From the start, the emergence of pervasive cultural changes provoked a reaction among older and less secure strata who felt threatened by the erosion of familiar traditional values. A Materialist reaction against these changes led to the emergence of xenophobic populist authoritarian parties such as France’s National Front. This brought declining social class voting, undermining the working-class-oriented Left parties that had implemented redistributive policies for most of the twentieth century. Moreover, the new non-economic issues introduced by Postmaterialists overshadowed the classic Left-Right economic issues, drawing attention away from mining the working-class-oriented Left parties that had implemented redistributive policies for most of the twentieth century. Consequently, though recruited from the more secure strata that traditionally supported conservative parties, they have gravitated toward parties of the Left, supporting political and cultural change.

From the start, this triggered a cultural backlash among older and less-secure people who were disoriented by the erosion of familiar values. Twenty years ago, Inglehart described how this was stimulating support for xenophobic populist parties, presenting a picture that is strikingly similar to what we see today:

The Materialist/Postmaterialist dimension has become the basis of a major new axis of political polarization in Western Europe, leading to the rise of the Green party in West Germany . . . During the 1980s, environmentalist parties emerged in West Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and Switzerland. In the 1990s they made breakthroughs in Sweden and France, and are beginning to show significant levels of support in Great Britain. In every case, support for these parties comes from a disproportionately Postmaterialist constituency. As Figure 1 demonstrates, as we move from the Materialist to the Postmaterialist end of the continuum, the percentage intending to vote for the environmentalist party in their country rises steeply . . . Pure Postmaterialists are five to twelve times as likely to vote for environmentalist parties as are pure Materialists.

West Germany was the scene of the first breakthrough by an environmentalist party in a major industrial nation. In 1983 the Greens were sufficiently strong to surmount Germany’s 5 per cent hurdle and enter the West German parliament . . . But more recently, the Greens have been pitted against a Republikaner party characterized by cultural conservatism and xenophobia. In the 1994 national elections, the Greens won 7 percent of the vote. The Republikaner, on the other hand, were stigmatized as the heirs of the Nazis and won only two percent of the vote, which was insufficient to win parliamentary representation. Nevertheless, xenophobic forces have already had a substantial impact on German politics, motivating the established parties to shift their policy positions in order to coopt the Republikaner electorate. These efforts included an amendment to the German constitution: to cut down the influx of foreigners, the clause guaranteeing free right of political asylum was eliminated in

Cultural Backlash and the Rise of Xenophobic Populist Authoritarian Parties

The intergenerational shift toward post-materialist values generated support for movements advocating peace, environmental protection, human rights, democratization, and gender equality. These developments first manifested themselves in the politics of affluent societies around 1968, when the postwar generation became old enough to have political impact, launching an era of student protest.3 This cultural shift has been transforming post-industrial societies, as younger cohorts replace older ones in the population. The Silent Revolution predicted that as Postmaterialists became more numerous they would bring new issues into politics and declining social class conflict. Postmaterialists are concentrated among the more secure and better-educated strata, but they are relatively favorable to social change. Consequently, though recruited from the more secure strata that traditionally supported conservative parties, they have gravitated toward parties of the Left, supporting political and cultural change.

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1993, in a decision supported by a two-thirds majority of the German parliament.

The rise of the Green Party in Germany has also had a major impact, for the Greens are much more than an ecological party. They seek to build a basically different kind of society from the prevailing industrial model... They have actively supported a wide range of Postmodern causes, from unilateral disarmament to women’s emancipation, gay and lesbian rights, rights for the physically handicapped and citizenship rights for non-German immigrants.6

The Greens and the Republikaner are located at opposite poles of a New Politics dimension, as figure 2 indicates. The Republikaner do not call themselves the Anti-Environment Party; nor do the Greens call themselves the Pro-Immigrant Party. But they adopt opposite policies on relevant issues. The older parties are arrayed on the traditional Left-Right axis established in an era when political cleavages were dominated by social class conflict. On this axis (the horizontal dimension of figure 2) are the Party of Democratic Socialism (the ex-communists) on the extreme Left, followed by the Social Democrats and the Free Democrats, with the Christian Democrats on the Right. Though most people think of the Greens as located on the Left, they represent a new dimension. Traditionally, the Left parties were based on a working-class constituency, and advocated redistribution of income. In striking contrast, the Postmaterialist Left appeals primarily to a middle-class constituency and is only faintly interested in the classic program of the Left. But Postmaterialists are intensely favorable to pervasive cultural changes—which frequently repel the Left’s traditional working-class constituency.7

The vertical axis on figure 2 reflects the polarization between Postmaterialist and authoritarian populist values. At one pole, we find openness to ethnic diversity and gender equality; and at the opposite pole we find an emphasis on authoritarian and xenophobic values.

As figure 3 demonstrates, across five advanced industrial societies 70 percent of the pure Materialists supported a policy of reverse affirmative action—holding that “When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to [one’s own nationality] over immigrants.” Among the pure Postmaterialist type, only 25 percent are in favor of giving preference to native-born citizens. Similarly, in response to a question about whether they would like to have immigrants or foreign workers as neighbors, Materialists were six times as likely as the Postmaterialists to say they would not want foreigners as neighbors.

A New Politics axis has also emerged in many other countries such as Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, The Netherlands, France, Austria—and recently, despite its two-party system, the United States, where it stimulated major revolts within each of the two major parties in 2016, with Trump, backed by older, less-secure voters, capturing the Republican presidential nomination and Sanders, backed by younger, well-educated voters, mounting a strong challenge for the Democratic nomination.

Why Is Populist Authoritarianism So Much More Powerful Now Than It Was 30 Years Ago?

The backlash against Postmaterialism that motivates populist authoritarian parties is not new—it has been present from the start. What is new is the fact that, while these parties were once a fringe phenomenon, today they threaten to take over the governments of major countries.
The rise of populist authoritarian parties raises two key questions: (1) “What motivates people to support xenophobic populist movements?” And (2) “Why is the populist vote so much higher now than it was several decades ago?” Surprising as it may seem, the two questions have different answers.

Support for populist authoritarian parties is motivated by a backlash against the cultural changes linked with the rise of Postmaterialist and Self-expression values, far more than by economic factors. The proximate cause of the populist vote is anxiety that pervasive cultural changes and an influx of foreigners are eroding the cultural norms one knew since childhood. The main common theme of populist authoritarian parties on both sides of the Atlantic is a reaction against immigration and cultural change.

Economic factors such as income and unemployment rates are surprisingly weak predictors of the populist vote. Thus, exit polls from the U.S. 2016 presidential election, show that those most concerned with economic problems disproportionately voted for Clinton, while those who considered immigration the most crucial problem voted disproportionately for Trump.

For Trump.10 considered immigration the most crucial problem voted disproportionately for Clinton, while those who considered economic problems the most crucial problem voted disproportionately for Trump, although unemployment rates are higher among the young. And, although women tend to have lower-paying jobs, men are much likelier than women to support populist authoritarian parties.

Today, as 30 years ago, support for xenophobic populist authoritarian parties comes mainly from older, more Materialistic voters. But thirty years ago, the Republikaner and the National Front were relatively small. In September 2016, support for the Alliance for Germany (a successor to the Republikaner) had risen to 16 percent, making it Germany’s third-strongest party. At the same time, surveys indicated that the National Front’s leader was leading the field of candidates for the presidency of France.11 Other things being equal, one would expect that, as younger, more Postmaterialist birth cohorts replaced older ones in the population, support for these parties would dwindle. But when dealing with intergenerational change, one must take period effects and life-cycle effects into account, as well as birth-cohort effects. Let us examine how this works.

One of the largest cohort analyses ever performed traced the shift from Materialist to Postmaterialist values among the publics of six West European countries, analyzing surveys carried out in almost every year from 1970 to 2008, interviewing several hundred thousand respondents. Figure 4 shows a simplified model of the results. From the start, younger birth cohorts were substantially more Postmaterialist than older ones, and they remained so. Cohort analysis revealed that after almost forty years, given birth cohorts were still about as Postmaterialist as they were at the start. They had not become more Materialist as they aged: there was no evidence of life-cycle effects. Consequently, intergenerational population replacement brought a massive long-term shift from Materialist to Postmaterialist values. But strong period effects, reflecting current economic conditions, were also evident. From 1970 to 1980, the population as a whole became more Materialist in response to a major recession—but with subsequent economic recovery the proportion of Postmaterialists recovered. At every time point, the younger cohorts were more Postmaterialist (and more likely to support Green parties) than the older ones (who were more likely to support xenophobic parties). But at any time point, current socioeconomic conditions could make the population as a whole more (or less) Materialist—and more (or less) likely to support xenophobic parties.

We do not have the massive database that would be needed to carry out a cohort analysis of the vote for xenophobic populist parties similar to this analysis of Materialist/Postmaterialist values, so our conclusions can only be tentative, but it is clear that strong forces have been working to increase support for xenophobic parties.

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Figure 3
Support for giving preference to one’s own nationality over immigrants, when jobs are scarce (United States, Britain, France, West Germany, and Sweden)

This seems to reflect the fact that in recent decades, a large share of the population of high-income countries has experienced declining real income, declining job security, and rising income inequality, bringing growing insecurity. In addition, rich countries have experienced a large influx of immigrants and refugees.

Both survey data and historical evidence indicate that xenophobia increases in times of insecurity. Under the relatively secure conditions of 1928, the German electorate viewed the Nazis as a lunatic fringe party, giving them less than 3 percent of the vote in national elections. But with the onset of the Great Depression, the Nazis won 44 percent of the vote in 1933, becoming the strongest party in the Reichstag. During the Depression several other countries, from Spain to Japan, fell under Fascist governments.

Similarly, in 2005 the Danish public was remarkably tolerant when the publication of cartoons depicting Mohammed led to the burning of Danish consulates and angry demands that Muslim values take precedence over free speech. At the height of the cartoon crisis in 2005–2006, there was no backlash. But after the Great Recession of 2007–2009, there was. In 2004, before the crisis erupted, the overtly anti-Muslim Danish People’s Party won 7 percent of the vote; in 2014, it won 27 percent, becoming Denmark’s largest party. In both years, cultural backlash rather than economic deprivation was the strongest predictor of the vote for the Danish People’s Party—but rising economic insecurity made people increasingly likely to vote for them.

In high-income countries, younger, Postmaterialist voters are least likely to support xenophobic parties at any given time, but the population as a whole has become increasingly likely to do so. Cultural backlash largely explains why specific people vote for xenophobic parties—but declining economic and physical security helps explain why these parties are much stronger today than they were 30 years ago.

Decades of declining real income and rising inequality have produced a long-term period effect conducive to the populist vote. Thus, although the proximate cause of the populist vote is cultural backlash, its high present level reflects the declining economic security and rising economic inequality that many writers have emphasized.

The fact that birth-cohort effects can coexist with period effects is not intuitively obvious and tends to be overlooked, but it explains the seeming paradox that economic factors do not explain why given individuals vote for populist parties—but do largely explain why the populist vote is much stronger now than in the past.

**Its Own Grave-Digger: The Shift from Class-Based Politics to Values Politics**

For most of the twentieth century, working class voters in developed countries generally supported Left-oriented parties, while middle- and upper-class voters supported Right-oriented parties. Governments of the left tend to bring redistribution and income equality, largely through their influence on the size of the welfare state. Parties of the class-based Left successfully fought for greater economic equality.

As the century continued, however, postwar generations emerged with a Postmaterialist outlook, bringing declining emphasis on economic redistribution and growing emphasis on non-economic issues. This, plus large immigration flows from low-income countries with different cultures and religions, stimulated a reaction in which much of the working class moved to the right, in defense of traditional values.

The classic economic issues did not disappear. But their relative prominence declined to such an extent that non-economic issues became more prominent than economic ones in Western political parties’ campaign platforms. Figure 5 shows how the issues emphasized in thirteen Western democracies evolved from 1950 to 2010. Economic issues were almost always more prominent than non-economic ones from 1950 to about 1983, when non-economic issues became more prominent. Since then, non-economic issues have dominated the stage.

Moreover, the rise of Postmaterialist issues tended to neutralize class-based political polarization. The social basis of support for the left has increasingly come from the middle class, while a substantial share of the working class shifted to the right. As figure 6 demonstrates, social-class voting declined markedly from 1950 to 1992. If 75 per cent of the working class voted for the Left while only 25 per cent of the middle class did so, one would obtain a class-voting index of 50. This is about where the Swedish electorate was located in 1948—but by 1990, Sweden’s index had fallen to 26. By the 1990s, social-class voting in

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Note: Percentage of Materialists minus percentage of Postmaterialists in six West European countries, 1971–2009.

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**Figure 4**

*Model cohort analysis*

![Graph](image)
most democracies was less than half as strong as it had been a generation earlier. In the United States, it had fallen almost to zero. Income became a much weaker indicator of the public’s political preferences than cultural issues: by wide margins, those who opposed abortion and same-sex marriage supported Republican Presidential candidates over Democrats. The 2016 U.S. presidential elections actually showed a negative social-class voting index, with white working-class voters being more likely to vote for Trump than for Clinton. The electorate had shifted from class-based polarization toward value-based polarization, unraveling a coalition that once brought economic redistribution.

Declining Real Income and Rising Inequality in High-Income Countries

During the past 40 years, the real income and existential security of the less-educated half of the population of high-income societies has been declining. More recently, artificial intelligence has been undermining the economic position of the more-educated strata, with computers replacing the jobs of the college educated and those with graduate degrees. It once seemed likely that the knowledge society would bring rising living standards for those with advanced skills and higher education but as figure 7 shows, from 1991 to 2014, real incomes in the United States stagnated across the entire educational spectrum.

The highly educated still make substantially higher salaries than the less educated, but since 1991, the real incomes of not only the less-educated, but even those of college graduates and people with post-graduate educations have stagnated. The problem is not lack of economic growth—U.S. GDP increased substantially. So where did the money go? To the elite of the elite, such as the CEOs of the country’s largest corporations. During a period in which the real incomes of highly-educated professionals including doctors, lawyers, professors, engineers, and scientists were flat, the real incomes of CEOs rose sharply. In 1965, CEO pay at the 350 largest U.S. companies was 20 times that of the average worker; in 1989, it was 58 times as high; and in 2012 CEOs earned 354 times as much as the average worker.20 This vastly increased disparity doesn’t reflect improved CEO performance: economic growth was higher in the 1960s than it is today.

Economic inequality declined in advanced industrial societies for most of the twentieth century, but since about 1970 it has been rising steeply, as Piketty has demonstrated.21 In 1915, the richest 1 percent of Americans earned about 18 percent of the national income. From the 1930s to the 1970s, their share fell below 10 percent—but by 2007, it had risen to 24 percent. The U.S. case is far from unique: all but one of the OECD countries for which data are available experienced rising income inequality (before taxes and transfers) from 1980 to 2009.22

Economic inequality is ultimately a political question, as the Swedish case demonstrates. Though it had considerably higher levels of inequality than the U.S. in the early twentieth century, by the 1920s Sweden had attained lower levels and has retained them to the present. In the United States, the top decile got almost half of the total income in 2010, while in Sweden it got only 28 percent. The advanced welfare-state culture...
Piketty holds that rising inequality is the normal state—significantly higher levels of income inequality than other developed capitalist societies. The dramatic change that occurred when former communist countries abandoned their state-run economies is further evidence that income inequality reflects a country’s political system: the collapse of communism brought even larger increases in income inequality than those in the West.23

Piketty holds that rising inequality is the normal state of affairs, which was temporarily offset by exogenous shocks (the two World Wars and the Great Depression). But historical evidence doesn’t support this claim. Inequality began falling in many capitalist countries before World War I, and major welfare state legislation was adopted well after World War II. Moreover, Sweden established one of the world’s most advanced welfare states without participating in either World War.

Economic equality or inequality ultimately depends on the balance of political power between owners and workers, which varies at different stages of economic development. The transition from agrarian society to industrial society created a demand for large numbers of industrial workers. Though initially exploited, when they became organized in labor unions and working-class-oriented political parties, they were able to elect governments that redistributed income, regulated finance and industry, and established extensive welfare states that brought growing income equality throughout most of the twentieth century. Since about 1970, organized labor has dwindled to a small minority of the work force, weakening its political influence. Government redistribution and regulation of the economy were cut back during the Reagan-Thatcher era; and the rise of the knowledge society tends to establish a winner-takes-all economy in which the rewards go mainly to those at the very top.

As Milanovic demonstrates, the world as a whole is getting richer, but it is doing so on a very uneven trajectory that he describes as an “elephant curve.”24 Most of the world’s population made large gains in real income from 1988 to 2008. The largest gains were made by the 40 percent living in China, India, Thailand, Vietnam, and Indonesia, where real incomes increased by 80 percent. In sharp contrast, the decile living in the high-income societies of Western Europe, the United States, Canada, and Australia started from a much higher base, but made no gains. But the greatest absolute gains by far were made by the very rich in high-income countries, who started out with very high incomes and made massive gains, sharply increasing inequality.

The contrasting performance of China-India-Indonesia-Thailand-Vietnam versus that of the high-income countries reflects the fact that the two groups of countries are at different phases of modernization. Most of the people in the former group are making the transition from agricultural society to industrial society, in which the average person’s bargaining power is inherently greater than in service economies. The people in high-income countries have made the transition from industrial society to service economies, where jobs are highly differentiated according to educational levels, giving the less-educated little or no bargaining power. This tendency becomes increasingly strong as these societies move into artificial intelligence society, where almost everyone’s job can be automated, leaving them at the mercy of those at the top.

**Pay No Attention to That Man Behind the Curtain**

Conservatives argue that rising inequality really doesn’t matter. As long as the economy as a whole is growing, everyone will get richer, and we should pay no attention to rising inequality.

But everyone isn’t getting richer. For decades, the real income of the developed world’s working class has been stagnant and the material basis of what counts as an acceptable standard of living has been rising. In the nineteenth century, having enough to eat counted as a chicken in every pot; and a car in every garage” was an ambitious goal. Today, automobiles and television sets are part of the minimal standard of living in high-income countries, but the working class has increasingly precarious job prospects and an awareness of the vast economic gains made by those
above them—and feel that they are shut out from the benefits of growth. In 2000, 33 percent of the U.S. public described themselves as “working class;” by 2015, that figure had risen to 48 percent.25

Conservative economists used to argue that even very steep taxes on the top earners wouldn’t raise enough money to change things substantially. That is no longer true. Inequality has risen so rapidly that by 2007, the top one percent took home 24 percent of the U.S. total income and in 2011 the top one percent of households controlled 40 percent of the nation’s wealth.26 In 2014, Wall Street paid out in bonuses roughly twice as much as the total earnings of all Americans who work full time at the federal minimum wage.27 And in 2015, 25 hedge fund managers were paid more than all the kindergarten teachers in the United States.28

For centuries, it seemed to be a law of nature that modernization brought rising life expectancy. But since 2000 the life expectancy of middle-aged non-Hispanic whites in the U.S. has been falling.29 The decline is concentrated among those with less than a college education, and is largely attributable to drug abuse, alcohol abuse, and suicide. This is a sign of severe malaise; the only comparable phenomenon in modern times was the sharp decline in male life expectancy linked with the collapse of the Soviet Union. In service-sector economies, economic growth no longer raises everyone’s standard of living.

Political Mobilization Shapes the Rise and Fall of Inequality

Inequality reflects the balance of political power between elites and mass, which is shaped by modernization. Early industrialization brought ruthless exploitation of workers, low wages, long working days, and suppression of unions. But eventually, industrialization narrowed the gap between elites and masses by redressing the balance of political skills. Urbanization brought people into closer proximity; workers were concentrated in factories facilitating communication among them, and the spread of mass literacy put them in touch with national politics, enabling workers to organize for effective action. In the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, unions won the right to organize, enabling workers to bargain collectively. The expansion of the franchise gave workers the vote, and left-oriented political parties mobilized them. These newly mobilized voters eventually elected governments that implemented redistributive policies such as progressive taxation, social insurance, and extensive welfare states, causing inequality to decline for most of the twentieth century.

High-income societies are now entering the stage of Artificial Intelligence Society. This brings substantial economic gains but inherently tends to produce a winner-takes-all economy in which the gains go almost entirely to the top. Artificial Intelligence makes it possible for computers to replace even highly-educated professionals. Left solely to market forces, secure well-paid jobs will continue to disappear even for the highly educated. In Artificial Intelligence Society, the key economic conflict is no longer between a working class and a middle class, but between the top one percent and the remaining 99 percent.

Currently, the rich are able to shape policies that increase the concentration of wealth. Martin Gilens presents evidence that the U.S. government responds so faithfully to the preferences of the most affluent ten percent of the country’s citizens that “under most circumstances, the preferences of the vast majority of Americans appear to have essentially no impact on which policies the government does or doesn’t adopt.”30

The safety net that once protected the American public is unraveling, as politicians and corporations cut back on health care, income security and retirement pensions.31 In the United States, financial institutions employ about 2.5 lobbyists for every representative in Congress, largely to dissuade them from regulating banks more closely.32 The fact that Congress has been so hesitant to regulate banks, even after inadequate regulation of the financial sector led to a Great Recession that cost millions of people their jobs and homes, suggests that this investment is paying off.

Joseph Stiglitz argues convincingly that a tiny minority of extremely rich individuals has attained tremendous political influence in the United States, which they are using to shape policies that systematically increase the concentration of wealth, undermining economic growth, and diminishing investment in education, research, and infrastructure.33 Hacker and Pierson argue that winner-take-all politics in the United States is based on an alliance between big business and conservative politicians that has cut taxes for the rich from 75 percent in 1970 to less than 35 percent in 2004 and has sharply reduced regulation of the economy and financial markets.34 This is indeed the proximate cause. But the ability of U.S. politicians to adopt one-sidedly pro-business policies was enhanced by the weakening of organized labor, globalization, and the trend toward a winner-takes-all economy. Fifty years ago, capitalists and conservative politicians were probably just as greedy and as clever as they are today—but they were restrained by an alliance of strong labor unions and left-oriented political parties that was able to offset the power of the rich, and establish redistributive policies. Modernization has eroded this political alignment, and inequality is rising in virtually all highly-developed countries.

Growth without Good Jobs

In 1860, the majority of the U.S. workforce was employed in agriculture. By 2014, jobs in the agricultural sector had virtually disappeared but this didn’t bring widespread unemployment and poverty because of
a massive rise in industrial employment. But by 2010, automation and outsourcing had reduced the ranks of industrial workers to 10 percent of the workforce. The loss of industrial jobs was offset by a dramatic rise in service-sector jobs, which now employs most of the U.S. workforce (refer to figure 8).

The service sector includes a high-technology sector, consisting of everyone employed in the information, finance and insurance, and professional, scientific, and technical-services categories. It is often assumed that the high-tech sector will produce large numbers of high-paying jobs. But—surprising as it may seem—employment in this area is not increasing. As Figure 8 shows, the high-tech sector’s share of total employment in the United States has been constant since statistics became available about three decades ago. As figure A-2 in the online appendix indicates, this is also true of Canada, Germany, France, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Unlike the transition from agricultural to industrial society, the rise of the knowledge society is not generating large numbers of secure well-paid jobs.

Initially, only unskilled workers lost their jobs to automation, but today even highly-skilled occupations are being automated. Artificial intelligence is replacing lawyers who used to do legal research, resulting in growing unemployment and a 30 percent drop in law school enrollment from 2010 to 2015. Expert systems are being developed that can do medical diagnoses more accurately and faster than physicians. The print journalism profession has been virtually annihilated and tenure-track jobs in higher education are disappearing, making it a much less attractive career. And increasingly, computer programs themselves are being written by computers—which is one reason why the number of jobs in the high-technology sector is not growing.

Even highly-educated workers are no longer moving ahead, with gains from the large increases in gross domestic product going almost entirely to a thin stratum of financiers, entrepreneurs, and managers at the very top. As artificial intelligence replaces people, unregulated market forces tend to produce a situation in which a tiny minority controls the economy, while the majority have precarious jobs, serving them as gardeners, waiters, nannies, and hairdressers—a future foreshadowed by the social structure of Silicon Valley today.

The Knowledge Society inherently has a winner-takes-all economy. In manufacturing material objects, industrial societies have niches for a wide range of products—from small cars that cost very little to produce, to mid-size cars, to large cars, to extremely expensive luxury cars. Lower quality products were competitive on price. But in the Knowledge Economy, the cost of reproduction is close to zero: once you have produced Microsoft software, it costs almost nothing to produce and distribute additional copies—which means that there is no reason to buy anything but the top product.

In this winner-takes-all economy, Bill Gates became a billionaire before he was 40, and Mark Zuckerberg became a billionaire before he was 30. The rewards to those at the top are immense—but increasingly, they are limited to those at the very top.

In 2012, the gap between the richest one percent and the remaining 99 percent in the United States was the widest it has been since the 1920s.36 In the long run, growing economic inequality is likely to bring a resurgence of mass support for government intervention—but for now, this is held in check by emotionally-hot cultural issues such as immigration and same-sex marriage, that enable conservative politicians to draw the support of low-income voters.

Political stability and economic health require a return to the redistributive policies that were in place for most of the twentieth century. A punitive attitude toward the top one percent would be counter-productive—it includes some of the country’s most valuable people. But moving toward a more progressive income tax is perfectly reasonable. In 1950–1970, the U.S. top 1 percent paid a much higher share of their income in taxes than they do today. This did not strangle economic growth—we had higher growth-rates than we have now. Two of the richest Americans, Warren Buffet and Bill Gates, advocate higher taxes for the very rich. They also argue that the inheritance tax is a relatively painless way to raise funding that is badly needed for increased investment in education, medical care, research and development, and infrastructure. But powerful conservative interests have moved the United States in the opposite direction, sharply reducing the inheritance tax.
The groundswell of support for populists ultimately reflects economic insecurity, but its immediate cause is a backlash against rapid cultural changes. Trump promised to make America great again—meaning that he would make America go back to being like it used to be. This is one reason why older voters are much likelier than younger voters to support populist parties. But Trump’s policies of deregulating the financial sector and reducing taxes on the very rich are the opposite of what is needed by the people left behind; these policies will make America great for billionaires who pay no income tax.

Hochschild argues that the paradox of low-income Americans voting against their own economic interests by supporting conservative Republicans reflects a powerful emotional reaction. 37 It is not just that right-wing politicians are duping them by directing their anger to cultural issues, away from possible solutions to their status as a permanent underclass. Less-educated white Americans feel that they have become “strangers in their own land.” They see themselves as victims of affirmative action and betrayed by “line-cutters”—African-Americans, immigrants, refugees, and women—who jump ahead of them in the queue for the American Dream. They resent liberal intellectuals who tell them to feel sorry for the line-cutters, and dismiss them as bigots when they don’t. Unlike most politicians, Donald Trump provides emotional support when he openly expresses racist and xenophobic feelings.

We may be witnessing a shift in political cleavages comparable to that of the 1930s, which saw the rise of Fascism, on one hand, and the emergence of the New Deal and its West European parallels on the other hand. The reaction against rapid cultural change and immigration has brought a surge of support for xenophobic populist parties among the less-secure strata. But rising inequality has also produced an insurgency on the Left by politicians like Bernie Sanders and intellectuals like Joseph Stiglitz and Thomas Piketty who stress the need for redistributive policies. Thus far this movement has been supported mainly by younger and more-educated voters. Cultural politics continues to dominate electoral behavior—but demands for political realignment are emerging.

Increasingly, high-income societies have winner-takes-all economies that tend to establish societies dominated by a small minority, while the overwhelming majority have precarious jobs. If left to market forces, this tendency is likely to prevail. But government offers a countervailing force that can reallocate resources to benefit society as a whole. In recent decades government has done the opposite, but for much of the twentieth-century, working-class-oriented parties elected governments that brought declining inequality. Though this class-based coalition has disintegrated, a huge majority of the population now has an incentive to elect governments committed to reallocation. If a large share of the 99 percent becomes aware of this, it can create a new winning coalition. There are signs that this is happening.

In surveys carried out from 1989 to 2014, respondents around the world were asked whether their views came closer to the statement “Incomes should be made more equal” or that “Income differences should be larger to provide incentives for individual effort.” In the earliest polls, majorities in four-fifths of the 65 countries surveyed believed that greater incentives for individual effort were needed. But over the next 25 years, publics in 80 percent of the countries surveyed, including the United States, became more favorable to reducing inequality. 38 So far, emotionally-charged cultural issues cutting across economic lines have hindered the emergence of a new coalition. But both the rise of populist movements and the growing concern for inequality reflect widespread dissatisfaction with existing political alignments. In the long run, a coalition based on the 99 percent is likely to emerge.

Artificial Intelligence Society is making greater resources available, but government intervention will be required to reallocate a significant portion of these resources into creating meaningful jobs in infrastructure, environmental protection, health care, education (from pre-school to post-graduate levels), research and development, care of the elderly, and the arts and humanities—in order to improve the quality of life for society as a whole, rather than blindly maximizing GDP. Developing effective programs to attain this goal will be a crucial task for social scientists and policy-makers during the next 20 years.

Notes
2 Subsequent research demonstrated that Postmaterialist values are part of a still-broader shift from survival values to self-expression values. For simplicity, “Postmaterialist” as used here refers to this broader cultural shift.
7 Norris 2005.
8 Ivarsflaten 2008.
9 Sides and Citrin 2007.
10 Election 2016.
11 Inglehart and Norris 2016.
14 For a detailed discussion of this cohort analysis, see Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 99–107.
References


