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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 November 2020
This article examines the strategies employed by multinational banks to mitigate political risk following the onset of revolution in their host countries during the early twentieth century. It does so by exploring the activities of multinational banks in China during the Revolution of 1911 and its aftermath. This article first describes the measures that multinational banks took to maintain China's credit on foreign bond markets after the outbreak of revolution. It then examines how these bankers curtailed political instability by first withdrawing financial support from both the Qing government and the revolutionaries and then providing financial assistance to the new Chinese Republican government.
This article is based on part of my doctoral dissertation, which was funded by grants from the Arts and Humanities Research Council of the United Kingdom, the German Academic Exchange Service, the British Council, the China Scholarship Council, and the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation. I received further financial aid from St Catharine's College and the Faculty of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies at University of Cambridge and through a postdoctoral fellowship and KAKENHI grant (Grant Number 17F17310) from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. For their very useful comments on previous drafts of the article, I am grateful to Youssef Cassis, Koji Hirata, Elisabeth Kaske, Tetsuji Okazaki, Debin Ma, Micah Muscolino, Tomoko Shiroyama, Hans van de Ven, and the editors and two anonymous reviewers of Business History Review.
1 DAB, “Geschäfts-Bericht für das Jahr 1911,” 12 June 1912, Geschäftsberichte, Historical Archive of Deutsche Bank, Frankfurt am Main, (hereafter HADB). In this article, all translations from German and Chinese are my own.
2 For an overview of foreign banking in late Qing China, see King, Frank H. H., “Extra-Regional Banks and Investment in China,” in International Banking 1870–1914, ed. Cameron, Rondo and Bovykin, V. I. (Oxford, 1991), 371–405Google Scholar; for contemporary overviews, see Takeshirō, Kodera, “Shindai niokeru zaishi gaikoku ginkō,” in Tōa shakai keizai kenkyū, ed. Ichirō, Tamura (Kyoto, 1942), 301–42Google Scholar; and Dōbunkai, Tōa, comp., Shina keizai zensho: Dai roku shō, 4th ed. (Tokyo, 1909), 811–14, 980–1000Google Scholar. On the first wave of modern multinational banking, see Jones, Geoffrey, “Banks as Multinationals,” in Banks as Multinationals, ed. Jones, Geoffrey (London, 1990), 1–13Google Scholar.
3 The first foreign bank entered China in 1845. See Moazzin, Ghassan, “Sino-Foreign Business Networks: Foreign and Chinese Banks in the Chinese Banking Sector, 1890–1911,” Modern Asian Studies 54, no. 3 (2020): 972CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
4 See, for example, Kobrak, Christopher and Hansen, Per H., European Business, Dictatorship, and Political Risk, 1920–1945 (New York, 2004)Google Scholar; Kobrak, Christopher and Wüstenhagen, Jana, “International Investment and Nazi Politics: The Cloaking of German Assets Abroad, 1936–1945,” Business History 48, no. 3 (2006): 399–427CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Jones, Geoffrey and Lubinski, Christina, “Managing Political Risk in Global Business: Beiersdorf 1914–1990,” Enterprise & Society 13, no. 1 (2012): 85–119Google Scholar; and Yacob, Shakila, “Rising of the Phoenix: Mitigating Political Risk through Knowledge Management—Behn, Meyer & Co., 1840–1959,” Enterprise & Society 19, no. 4 (2018): 946–78CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
5 An exception that deals with political risk management by multinational banks but also does not discuss specific financial measures is Smith, Andrew, “A LBV Perspective on Political Risk Management in a Multinational Bank during the First World War,” Multinational Business Review 24, no. 1 (2016): 25–46CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Frans-Paul van der Putten, in his study of political risk in China, also discusses the impact of political risk on Dutch banks in one of his case studies; however, he does not see political risk as having had a significant impact on these banks’ business before the late 1930s and does not mention any active measures they took to deal with such risk. Putten, Van der, Corporate Behaviour and Political Risk: Dutch Companies in China, 1903–1941 (Leiden, 2001)Google Scholar.
6 For broad studies of multinational banking, see for instance, Jones, Geoffrey, Banking and Empire in Iran (Cambridge, U.K., 1986)Google Scholar; Jones, ed., Banks as Multinationals (London, 1990); Jones, British Multinational Banking: 1830–1990 (Oxford, 1995); Frank H. H King, The History of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, vol. 2, The Hongkong Bank in the Period of Imperialism and War, 1895–1918: Wayfoong, the Focus of Wealth (Cambridge, U.K., 1988).
7 Studies by Wilfried Feldenkirchen and Kurt Jacobsen do not solely focus on the topic of revolution but discuss the impact of the Russian October Revolution on multinational enterprises. Feldenkirchen, “Siemens in Eastern Europe: From the End of World War I to the End of World War II,” in Kobrak and Hansen, European Business, 122–48; Jacobsen, “The Great Northern Telegraph Company and Dictatorship,” in Kobrak and Hansen, European Business, 174–93.
8 Osterhammel, Jürgen, The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century (Princeton, 2014), chap. 10Google Scholar.
9 Malik, Hassan, Bankers and Bolsheviks: International Finance and the Russian Revolution (Princeton, 2018), 204Google Scholar. I am grateful to Youssef Cassis for pointing me toward this work.
10 For examples of this large body of literature on the Chinese Revolution of 1911 see: Esherick, Joseph, Reform and Revolution in China: The 1911 Revolution in Hunan and Hubei (Berkeley, 1976)Google Scholar; Zheng, Xiaowei, The Politics of Rights and the 1911 Revolution in China (Stanford, 2018)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Kaiyuan, Zhang, “Xinhai geming yanjiu de huigu yu qianzhan,” Wenshi zhishi, no. 9 (2001): 4–10Google Scholar. A recent exception that studies the revolution's financial side is van de Ven, Hans, Breaking with the Past: The Maritime Customs Service and the Global Origins of Modernity in China (New York, 2014), 162–71Google Scholar.
11 See, for example, Barth, Boris, Die Hochfinanz und die Imperialismen: Banken und Außenpolitik vor 1914 (Stuttgart, 1995), 386–401Google Scholar; Edwards, E. W., British Diplomacy and Finance in China: 1895–1914 (Oxford, 1987), 158–75Google Scholar; Hirata, Koji, “Britain's Men on the Spot in China: John Jordan, Yuan Shikai, and the Reorganization Loan, 1912–1914,” Modern Asian Studies 47, no. 3 (2013): 895–934Google Scholar; and Liangcai, Xia, “Guoji yinhangtuan he xinhai geming,” Jindaishi yanjiu, no. 1 (1982): 188–215Google Scholar.
12 King, History of the HSBC, 2:472–504. In his brief description, King overemphasizes the role of the HSBC in maintaining China's credit and only comments on the reaction of the London bond market at the end of 1911 (pp. 475–76).
13 For a recent general review of the Chinese business history literature, see Bian, Morris L., “Interpreting Enterprise, State, and Society: A Critical Review of the Literature in Modern Chinese Business History, 1978–2008,” Frontiers of History in China 6, no. 3 (2011): 423–62CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For literature that deals with the management of political risk in China after 1914, see, for example, Van der Putten, Corporate Behaviour; Osterhammel, Jürgen, “Imperialism in Transition: British Business and the Chinese Authorities, 1931–37,” China Quarterly, no. 98 (1984): 260–86CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Shai, Aron, The Fate of British and French Firms in China, 1949–54: Imperialism Imprisoned (Basingstoke, 1996)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Horesh, Niv, Shanghai's Bund and Beyond: British Banks, Banknote Issuance, and Monetary Policy in China, 1842–1937 (New Haven, 2014), chap. 5Google Scholar; Moazzin, Ghassan, “From Globalization to Liquidation: The Deutsch-Asiatische Bank and the First World War in China,” Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review 4, no. 2 (2015): 601–29CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Smith, “LBV Perspective.” Smith's study, however, mainly focuses on the maintaining of legitimacy in home markets. An exception that discusses the management of political risk by a multinational company in China before 1914 is Cochran, Sherman, Big Business in China: Sino-Foreign Rivalry in the Cigarette Industry, 1890–1930 (Cambridge, MA, 1980), chap. 2Google Scholar. This focus on the post-1914 period is also present in the business history literature on political risk more generally. On this, see Jones, Geoffrey and Comunale, Rachael, “Business, Governments and Political Risk in South Asia and Latin America since 1970,” Australian Economic History Review 58, no. 3 (2018): 233–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
14 On the historical background of the revolution, see Michael Gasster, “The Republican Revolutionary Movement,” in The Cambridge History of China, vol. 11, Late Ch'ing, 1800–1911, Part 2, ed. John K. Fairbank and Kwang-ching Liu (Cambridge, U.K., 1976), 463–534; and Mary Clabough Wright, ed., China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900–1913 (New Haven, 1968).
15 Deutsch-Asiatische Bank to Mitglied des Aufsichtsrates der Deutsch-Asiatischen Bank, 30 Nov. 1911, K07/010/I/01, HADB. Conversion of taels into pounds sterling throughout the article have been made using the average Shanghai Tael-Pound exchange rate for the respective year provided in Markus A. Denzel, Jürgen Schneider, and Oskar Schwarzer, Währungen der Welt IV: Asiatische und australische Devisenkurse im 19. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart, 1992), 154.
16 Quote from Foreign Office and Board of Trade (hereafter FOBT), Report for the Year 1911 on the Foreign Trade of China (London, 1912), 8. See also FOBT, Report for the Year 1911 on the Trade of Shanghai (London, 1912), 7; FOBT, Report for the Year 1911 on the Trade of Tientsin (London, 1912), 4; FOBT, Report for the Year 1911 on the Trade of Hankow (London, 1912), 3.
17 On the interdependence between foreign and Chinese banks, see Moazzin, “Sino-Foreign Business Networks.”
18 FOBT, Report for the Year 1911 on the Foreign Trade of China, 8. See also FOBT, Report for the Year 1911 on the Trade of Shanghai, 4.
19 Deutsch-Asiatische Bank to Mitglied des Aufsichtsrates der Deutsch-Asiatischen Bank, 30 Nov. 1911, K07/010/I/01, HADB.
20 Deutsch-Asiatische Bank to Mitglied des Aufsichtsrats der Deutsch-Asiatischen Bank, 9 Jan. 1912, K07/010/I/01, HADB. On the importance of intra-Asian trade, see Kaoru, Sugihara, Ajia-kan bōeki no keisei to kōzō (Kyoto, 1996)Google Scholar.
21 FOBT, Report for the Year 1911 on the Trade of Shanghai, 4; FBOT, Report for the Year 1911 on the Trade of Hankow, 10.
22 Deutsch-Asiatische Bank to Mitglied des Aufsichtsrats der Deutsch-Asiatischen Bank, 9 Jan. 1912, K07/010/I/01, HADB.
23 FOBT, Report for the Year 1911 on the Trade of Shanghai, 4.
24 FOBT, Report for the Year 1911 on the Foreign Trade of China, 8.
25 “The Revolution and Trade,” North-China Herald, 25 Nov. 1911.
26 On foreign borrowing as a reaction to fiscal crisis, see Peng Zeyi, Shijiu shiji houbanqi de zhongguo caizheng yu jingji (Beijing, 2010), 104–33. On the early phase of Chinese foreign borrowing, see Takeshi, Hamashita, Chūgoku kindai keizaishi kenkyū: Shinmatsu kaikan zaisei to kaikōjō shijōken (Tokyo, 1989), 68–74Google Scholar.
27 Frank H. H. King, The History of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, vol. 1, The Hongkong Bank in Late Imperial China 1864–1902: On an Even Keel (Cambridge, U.K., 1987), 535–62; Van de Ven, Breaking with the Past, 136–44.
28 Ghassan Moazzin, “Networks of Capital: German Bankers and the Financial Internationalisation of China (1885–1919)” (PhD diss., University of Cambridge, 2017), 159–61.
29 See the overview of China's outstanding debt in Ernst Heinemann, Georg Tischert, John Weber and Th. Stegemann, Saling's Börsen-Jahrbuch für 1912/1913 (Berlin, 1912), 212–18. For only slightly different numbers, see H. T. Montague Bell and H. G. W. Woodhead, The China Year Book, 1912 (London, 1912), 298–301. While Chinese bonds could be freely traded within Europe, this assessment is made according to the bonds’ place of issue. According to Xu Yisheng, Britain and Germany were also China's greatest creditors overall for the period between the Sino-Japanese War and the Revolution of 1911. See Xu, Zhongguo jindai waizhaishi tongji ziliao 1853–1927 (Beijing, 1962), 92. For details of individual public loans during this period, see Wilhelm Kuhlmann, China's Foreign Debt 1865–1982 (Hannover, 1983).
30 Heinemann et al., Saling's Börsen-Jahrbuch, 212–18; Investor's Manual Monthly (Dec. issues, 1905–1910). The only exception at times was the 7 percent loan floated in London in 1894, which, unlike the other loans, was denominated in silver.
31 “Money Market,” Times (London), 14 Oct. 1911.
32 Front page, Berliner Börsen-Zeitung (Abend-Ausgabe), 16 Oct. 1911.
33 “The Chinese Government and the Rebellion,” Times (London), 27 Oct. 1911. See also “Die Revolution in China,” Berliner Tageblatt, 18 Oct. 1911; and “The Manchu Dynasty and the Chinese Revolution,” Economist, 21 Oct. 1911.
34 “Die chinesischen Wirren,” Berliner Börsen-Zeitung (Abend-Ausgabe), 25 Oct. 1911.
35 Front page, Berliner Börsen-Zeitung (Abend-Ausgabe), 30 Oct. 1911.
36 “Money Markets,” Economist, 21 Oct. 1911.
37 For an overview of these loans, see Kuhlmann, China's Foreign Debt.
38 On the importance of the underwriters’ reputation on European bond markets, see Marc Flandreau and Juan H. Flores, “Bonds and Brands: Foundations of Sovereign Debt Markets, 1820–1830,” Journal of Economic History 69, no. 3 (2009): 646–84.
39 King, History of the HSBC, 2:482–84. King makes this argument not in specific reference to the situation right after the outbreak of the Revolution of 1911 when political instability threatened China's credit but about the HSBC bankers and their loan business and opposition to “ill-advised borrowing” in general. Thus, he also mentions that China would wish to tap foreign capital markets after a loan agreement was reached as a reason for the HSBC bankers to oppose such “ill-advised borrowing” and preserve China's credit.
40 Charles Addis to F. Campbell, 2 Dec. 1911, FO 405/205, 324, The National Archives, Kew, U.K. (hereafter TNA).
41 King, History of the HSBC, 2:474–75. King explains that the funds held in the Shanghai branches of the banks could not be used for payments in the absence of instructions from the Chinese government. However, there is evidence that, for a time, money held in London to the credit of the Chinese government, possibly having already been transferred for that purpose before the revolution, was used for loan payments for the Shanghai-Hangzhou-Ningbo and Shanghai-Nanjing railway loans. See J. N. Jordan to Edward Grey, 16 Nov. 1911, FO 405/205, 335–36, TNA.
42 Franz Urbig to A. M. Townsend, 27 Oct. 1911, FO 405/205, 177, TNA.
43 “Minutes of Meeting of the French, British, German & American Groups at the Offices of the Banque de l'Indo-Chine, Paris, on the 8th November, 1911,” S2592, HADB.
44 On the development of the consortium, see King, History of the HSBC, 2:406–15, 434–45. An old but still useful account is Frederick V. Field, American Participation in the China Consortiums (Chicago, 1931), chaps. 2–4.
45 “Minutes of Meeting of the French, British, German & American Groups at the Offices of the Banque de l'Indo-Chine, Paris, on the 8th November, 1911,” S2592, HADB.
46 Charles Addis to F. Campbell, 2 Dec. 1911, FO 405/205, 324, TNA
47 “Chinese Imperial Government 6% Gold Loan of 1895, £3,000,000 (Notice),” 21 Dec. 1911, FO 371/1098, 351, TNA. Also see King, History of the HSBC, 2:475.
48 “Consortium für Asiatische Geschäfte, Protokoll der Sitzung vom 27. December 1911,”; DAB to Deutsche Bank, 28 Dec.1911, both in S2592, HADB. On the Nationalbank für Deutschland and the 1895 loan, see Maximillian Müller-Jabusch, Fünfzig Jahre Deutsch-Asiatische Bank : 1890–1939 (Berlin, 1940), 72–73; Berliner Actionair, Jahrbuch der Berliner Börse 1897–1898: Ein Nachschlagebuch für Banquiers und Capitalisten (Berlin, 1897), 56.
49 “Consortium für Asiatische Geschäfte, Protokoll der Sitzung vom 19. Februar 1912,” S2592, HADB. On the Konsortium für Asiatische Geschäfte and its composition, see Müller-Jabusch, Fünfzig Jahre Deutsch-Asiatische Bank, 31–32, 52–53.
50 Quote from Peking Syndicate to Foreign Office, 19 Dec. 1911, FO 405/205, 417, TNA; “Memorandum communicated to Wai-wu Pu,” 4 Jan. 1912, FO 405/208, 123, TNA. In the case of the Peking Syndicate, the sum for the payment of the interest coupons was included in a loan to the Imperial Chinese Railways.
51 HSBC (Beijing) to Addis, 5 Dec. 1911, FO 405/205, 347, TNA.
52 HSBC (Beijing) to Addis, 5 Dec. 1911, FO 405/205, 347, TNA; DAB to Deutsche Bank, 4 Jan. 1912, S2592, HADB. On the Chinese Maritime Customs Service, see Van de Ven, Breaking with the Past.
53 Van de Ven, Breaking with the Past, 162–63.
54 Waiwubu to Liu Yulin, 21 Nov. 1911, FO 405/205, 281, TNA.
55 DAB (Shanghai) to DAB (Berlin), 28 Nov. 1911, S2592, HADB.
56 Franz Urbig to Charles Addis, 30 Dec. 1911, FO 405/208, 22, TNA.
57 DAB to Deutsche Bank, 4 Jan. 1912, HADB.
58 Van de Ven, Breaking with the Past, 167.
59 Charles Addis to Langley, 1 Feb. 1912, FO 405/208, 163, TNA. For the telegram from Aglen, see Inspector-General of Customs, Peking to HSBC (London), 31 Jan. 1912, FO 405/208, 163, TNA; and “Chinese Customs Revenues. Early Resumption of Loan Service Payments,” Times (London), 2 Feb. 1912.
60 “Chinese Customs Revenue. Recent Improvement Maintained,” Times (London), 5 Feb. 1912; “Chinese Loan Service. Payments Expected Shortly,” Times (London), 7 Feb. 1912.
61 DAB to Deutsche Bank, 2 Mar. 1912, S2592, HADB.
62 “Aufnahme-Consortium für Chinesische Anleihen,” 30 Dec. 1911, S2606, HADB.
63 Disconto-Gesellschaft to Deutsche Bank, 16 Oct. 1911, S2606, HADB.
64 Quote from Disconto-Gesellschaft to Deutsche-Bank, 17 Oct. 1911; Disconto-Gesellschaft to Deutsche Bank, 20 Oct. 1911, both in S2606, HADB.
65 For the sales, see the relevant tables in file S2606, HADB.
66 Disconto-Gesellschaft to Deutsche Bank, 4 Dec. 1912, S2606, HADB.
67 The three railway loans are the Tianjin-Pukou Railway Loan (1908), the Tianjin-Pukou Railway Supplementary Loan (1910), and the Huguang Railway Loan. Because of their later issuing, the latter two loans are only included in the calculation after February and October 1911, respectively, for Britain and after January and November 1911, respectively, for Germany.
68 The British consols used are 2.5 percent British Consols Redeemable, 1923. The German sovereign bonds used are Deutsche Reichs-Anleihe (1890), 3 percent.
69 Goetzmann, William N., Ukhov, Andrey D., and Zhu, Ning, “China and the World Financial Markets 1870–1939: Modern Lessons from Historical Globalization,” Economic History Review 60, no. 2 (2007): 267–312Google Scholar.
70 HSBC (Beijing) to HSBC (London), 24 Oct. 1911, FO 405/205, 170, TNA.
71 A. M. Townsend to F. Campbell, 25 Oct. 1911, FO 405/205, 169–70, TNA.
72 “Consortium für Asiatische Geschäfte, Protokoll der Sitzung vom 28. Oktober 1911,” S2592, HADB.
73 “Minutes of Meeting of the French, British, German & American Groups at the Offices of the Banque de l'Indo-Chine, Paris, on the 8th November, 1911,” HADB.
74 Sun Zhongshan [Sun Yat-sen], “Tonggao geguo shu,” Oct./Nov. 1911, in Sun Zhongshan quanji (hereafter SZSQJ), ed. Guangdong sheng shehui kexue yuan lishi yanjiushi et al., 11 vols. (Beijing, 1981–1986), 1:545; Waiwubu to Foreign Ministers, 9 Jan. 1912, 02-24-008-02-061, Archives of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Taipei, http://archives.sinica.edu.tw.
75 Charles Addis to Franz Urbig, 7 Dec. 1911, FO 405/205, 359, TNA.
76 Franz Urbig to Max Warburg, 9 Dec. 1911, R17.799, 53, Political Archives of the German Foreign Office, Berlin (hereafter PAAA).
77 Charles Addis to Franz Urbig, 7 Dec. 1911, FO 405/205, 359, TNA.
78 HSBC (Hong Kong) to HSBC (London), 11 Dec. 1911, FO 405/205, 375, TNA.
79 W. M. Koch to Takahashi Korekiyo, 22 Dec. 1911, Prewar Diplomatic Records, 1-7-1-11-004, B04010802700, Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, Tokyo, https://www.jacar.go.jp/. On Panmure Gordon & Co. and China, see King, History of the HSBC, 1:545; King, History of the HSBC, 2:269.
80 Ijūin Hikokichi to Uchida Kōsai, 17 Dec. 1911, in Yuan Shikai quanji (hereafter YSKQJ), ed. Luo Baoshan and Liu Lusheng, 36 vols. (Zhengzhou, 2013), 19:165.
81 Yuan Shikai to Zhao Erxun, 29 Dec. 1911, YSKQJ, 19:219.
82 Marie-Claire Bergère, Sun Yat-sen, trans. Janet Lloyd (Stanford, 1998), 207–9.
83 King, History of the HSBC, 2:477.
84 “Yu ximeng de tanhua,” 23 Nov. 1911, SZSQJ, 1:563.
85 Sun to Chen Jiongming, Provincial Assembly of Guangdong and the Guangdong Railway Company, 26 Jan. 1912, SZSQJ, 2:41–42. Sun's government was only ever able to borrow small and insignificant amounts from foreign sources. See Xu, Tongji ziliao, 96–100.
86 On the effect of withholding financial support on the agreement, though from a diplomatic perspective, see also Edwards, Finance and Diplomacy, 159–60.
87 Young, Ernest P., The Presidency of Yuan Shih-k'ai: Liberalism and Dictatorship in Early Republican China (Ann Arbor, 1977), 123Google Scholar.
88 HSBC (Beijing) to HSBC (London), 24 Oct. 1911, FO 405/205, 170, TNA; HSBC (Beijing) to HSBC (London), 3 Nov. 1911, FO 405/205, 218, TNA; Straight to J. P. Morgan, n.d., attachment to Franz Urbig to Zimmermann, 21 Nov. 1911, R17.798, 194–95, PAAA; “Auszug aus dem Protokoll No. 122 der Sitzung des Geschäftsausschusses der Deutsch-Asiatischen Bank vom 8. Dezember 1911,” S2592, HADB.
89 Front page and “Politische Nachrichten” (III. Beilage), Berliner Börsen-Zeitung (Abend-Ausgabe), 13 Feb. 1912; “The First President of China,” Times (London), 11 Mar. 1912.
90 Xiong Xiling to Tang Shaoyi, Mar. 1912, in Xiong Xiling ji, 8 vols., comp. Zhou Qiuguang (Changsha, 2008), 2:572–75.
91 HSBC (Beijing) to HSBC (London), 15 Feb. 1912, FO 405/208, 241–42, TNA; HSBC (Beijing) to HSBC (London), 24 Feb. 1912, FO 405/208, 262, TNA.
92 Yuan to Four Groups, 9 Mar. 1912, YSKQJ, 19:626.
93 HSBC (Beijing) to HSBC (London), 1 Mar. 1912, FO 405/208, 291, TNA.
94 HSBC (Beijing) to HSBC (London), 15 Feb. 1912, FO 405/208, 241-242, TNA; “Consortium für Asiatische Geschäfte, Protokoll der Sitzung vom 19. Februar 1912”; “Inter-Bank Conference: Minutes of Meeting at the office of the British and Chinese Corporation, Limited, London, on the 12th March, 1912,” both in S2592, HADB.
95 HSBC (Beijing) to HSBC (London), 15 Feb. 1912, FO 405/208, 241-242, TNA; “Consortium für Asiatische Geschäfte, Protokoll der Sitzung vom 19. Februar 1912”; Deutsche Bank to Jacob S. H. Stern, 19 Feb. 1912, both in S2592, HADB.
96 Deutsche Bank to Jacob S. H. Stern, 19 Feb. 1912, S2592, HADB.
97 Moazzin, “Networks of Capital,” chap. 4.
98 HSBC (London) to DAB (Berlin), 25 Apr. 1912, S2592, HADB.
99 DAB (Berlin) to Addis, Simon and Warburg & Co., 18 Apr. 1912, K07/010/I/01, HADB.
100 “Inter-Bank Conference: Minutes of Meeting at the office of the British and Chinese Corporation, Limited, London, on the 12th March, 1912,” S2592, HADB.
101 Charles Addis to Langley, 1 Mar. 1912, FO 405/208, 291, TNA.
102 DAB (Berlin) to Addis, 1 July 1912, FO 405/209, 9, TNA.
103 “Inter-Bank Conference: Minutes of Meeting at the office of the British and Chinese Corporation, Limited, London, on the 12th March, 1912,” S2592, HADB.
104 “Konsortium für Asiatische Geschäfte,” 24 May 1912, S2592, HADB.
105 On the negotiations, see Barth, Imperialismen, 388–402; King, History of the HSBC, 2:488–505; and Hirata, “Britain's Men,” 908–16. Russian and Japanese participation in the issuing of the loan was of relatively little financial significance, as “the whole of the Japanese share and a considerable part of the Russian were actually issued in the financial centers of western Europe.” Remer, C. F., Foreign Investments in China (New York, 1933), 127Google Scholar. However, in the case of Japan it foreshadowed a growing involvement in Chinese finance during the following years. On this involvement, see Schiltz, Michael, The Money Doctors from Japan: Finance, Imperialism, and the Building of the Yen Bloc, 1895–1937 (Cambridge, MA, 2012), 121–54CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
106 “Chinese Government Five Per Cent Reorganization Gold Loan Agreement” (26 Apr. 1913), in Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China, 1894–1919, 2 vols., comp. and ed. John Van Antwerp MacMurray (Oxford, 1921), 2:1007–21; “Inter-Bank Conference: Minutes of the Four Groups held at the Office of the British and Chinese Corporation, Limited, London, on the 14th and 15th May, 1912,” K07/002II-12, HADB.
107 “The Chinese Loan,” Times (London), 22 May 1913.
108 Hirata, “Britain's Men,” 925–28.
109 DAB, “Geschäfts-Bericht für das Jahr 1913,” 29 May 1914, Geschäftsberichte, HADB.
110 FOBT, Report for the Year 1913 on the Trade of Tientsin (London, 1914), 3.
111 Gareth Austin, Carlos Dávila, and Geoffrey Jones have recently pointed out the importance of studying the “alternative business history of emerging markets” in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. They identify “turbulence,” including political instability, as a main challenge faced by businesses operating in these three regions. See Austin, , Dávila, , and Jones, , “The Alternative Business History: Business in Emerging Markets,” Business History Review 91, no. 3 (2017): 537–69CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
112 See, for example, Geoffrey Jones and Marcelo Bucheli, “The Octopus and the Generals: The United Fruit Company in Guatemala” (Harvard Business School Case 805-146, Boston, May 2005, rev. July 2016); Bucheli, Marcelo and Salvaj, Erica, “Reputation and Political Legitimacy: ITT in Chile, 1927–1972,” Business History Review 87, no. 4 (2013): 729–56Google Scholar.
113 This literature has focused mainly on the evaluation of customers by commercial banks in Europe. See Pohle, Monika, “Risk, Information and Noise: Risk Perception and Risk Management of French and German Banks during the Nineteenth Century,” Financial History Review 2, no. 1 (1995): 25–39CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Newton, Lucy, “Trust and Virtue in English Banking: The Assessment of Borrowers by Bank Managements at the Turn of the Nineteenth Century,” Financial History Review 7, no. 2 (2000): 177–99CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For some more recent scholarship on risk management of banks in Europe and North America (however, also not on political risk), see Schönhärl, Korinna, ed., Decision Taking, Confidence and Risk Management in Banks from Early Modernity to the 20th Century (London, 2017)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
114 On Yuan's downfall, see Hirata, “Britain's Men,” 928–29; and Young, Presidency, chap. 8.
