

revolutionary ideas, and the transformation of society. But Maslin also warned, from the Soviet Marxist point of view, of the errors in Pisarev's elitism and his positivistic and mechanistic approach to science and society.

Tsybenko's book has little to contribute to the serious study of Pisarev and his time. The best guide to Pisarev remains his collected works and the magisterial study of Armand Coquery on Russian nihilism.

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PIONEERS FOR PROFIT: FOREIGN ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND RUSSIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1885-1913. By *John P. McKay*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1970. xiii, 442 pp. \$11.50.

At the beginning of this century the prominent Belgian banker and director of the Société des Wagons-lits, Jules Nagelmackers, had contracted to provide dining and sleeping services for the Trans-Siberian Railroad. Payment for part of the bill was long overdue, but when in 1903 Nagelmackers presented his contract personally to Count Witte, as related by John P. McKay, "Witte asked to see the contract, read it, and then 'carefully taking it between thumb and forefinger, tore it to pieces and threw it in the wastebasket without adding a word of explication or justification.' Nagelmackers left St. Petersburg that evening in a hopeless rage, 'vowing never again to return to this country of savages'" (p. 278). This little scene dramatizes a very important point that McKay makes in his study of foreign enterprise in Imperial Russia during the last three decades of the old regime. The Russian economy was not being placed "under the control of the henchmen of Rothschild and Bleichröder," as Lenin taunted Witte (p. 274). There was never an imperialistic "imbalance of power in the foreigner's favor." Tsarist Russia, as Witte said, was not China (p. 277); the government was too strong to capitulate to foreign enterprise. It kept the whip hand. Diplomatic pressures were not decisive, nor was the foreign businessman permitted to ensconce himself in an insulated enclave from which he could drain the country dry. Why then was he attracted to a seemingly inhospitable land where the classic imperialist "wedge" was so obstructed? Profits, according to McKay, could be made by the foreigner coming into partnership with Russian capital and a *modus vivendi* with the tsarist government, arrangements mutually profitable for all concerned. The foreigner profited by selling his superior technology, which Russia could not duplicate. Advanced technology was worth money, and it saved money in lower production costs. Russian as well as European capital sought investment in such profitable ventures; and Russian businessmen, with their connections and knowledge of local affairs, could help the foreign entrepreneur establish himself in Russia. For Russian officialdom, on the lower levels, here was a new and lucrative source for bribes. For the Minister of Finance, it was a way to industrialize Russia through the importation of foreign capital and technology. McKay departs from previous scholars in attaching more importance to this aspect of the tsarist government's modernization efforts than its other more direct attempts to develop and control industry. He also suggests that the massive and rapid growth of foreign enterprise and technology during the reign of Nicholas II, particularly in the south, helped to "infuse a missing dynamism and growth outlook in Russia" (p. 383). On balance, he sees foreign enterprise in Russia as productive pioneering rather than plunder, more useful than harmful for the country.

One great virtue of McKay's study is that he supports his arguments with extensive materials, hitherto little used, from the archives of banks and industrial firms in France and Belgium. He has also used publications of the tsarist government, as well as the contemporary technological and business press of Europe and Russia. His materials have enabled him to study the operations of some two hundred foreign firms in Russia. McKay has not covered all foreign business activity in Russia—the Americans and English are notable exclusions. He does not deal with the big subject of the foreign petroleum industry, reserving it for a future separate study. His method of presentation is to combine general problems, drawing upon all of his cases, with more detailed studies of specific firms. Thus, his early chapters discuss investment, entrepreneurship, promotion, management, technology, labor recruitment, and relations with the state, while the last chapters are devoted to studying a few big foreign enterprises.

McKay has made an original contribution. He has argued tellingly against some conventionally held interpretations. He has provided a mine of new facts, and has described clearly for the first time how the foreign entrepreneur operated in Russia during the last years of tsarism. The book is clearly written and well organized. It must take its place as an essential monograph for the study of the economic history of Russia during the first industrialization drive, 1885–1913.

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PO TU STORONU BARRIKAD: IZ ISTORII BOR'BY MOSKOVSKOI BURZHUAZII S REVOLIUTSIEI. By *V. Ia. Laverychev*. Moscow: "Mysl'," 1967. 286 pp. 1.05 rubles.

RUSSKAIA BURZHUAZIIA I TSARIZM V GODY PERVOI MIROVOI VOINY (1914–1917). By *V. S. Diakin*. Leningrad: "Nauka," 1967. 363 pp. 1.70 rubles.

Laverychev concentrates on the political evolution of the small but economically powerful group of liberal Moscow magnates, led by P. P. Riabushinsky and A. I. Konovalov, who formed the core of the Progressist Party. Speaking through the newspaper *Utro Rossii*, this group, though it remained numerically small, exercised increasing influence in opposition politics during the half decade prior to the Bolshevik Revolution. In attempting to thwart the growing revolutionary labor movement and expand their own influence in state economic policy-making, the Moscow Progressists promoted the idea of a single, united bourgeois opposition party, and much of the monograph is devoted to this theme. The author credits them with an important role in organizing the Fourth Duma's Progressive Bloc and in creating the wide network of war-industry committees. The single-party idea neared fruition with the tacit 1915–16 alliance between Progressists, Left Octobrists, and Kadets, who sacrificed the most radical (and most objectionable to the Moscow capitalists) planks of their program in the name of wartime nationalism. But this liberal coalition—timid and indecisive at critical junctures—failed to make use of existing organizations to realize its goals. Most serious was its failure to organize the workers successfully through the war-industries committees.

Laverychev finds that pro-Bolshevik sympathies were strong enough among the workers to frustrate the organizational efforts of the bourgeoisie. This traditional contention may well be accurate, but Laverychev fails to support it with ade-